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THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS CITY MAYOR [G.R. No. 138810. September 29, 2004] FACTS: On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, “provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210. Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines. ISSUE : may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction? HELD: No. xxx The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies. xxx Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system – the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions – allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators. xxx But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the State’s deregulation policy over the CATV industry. LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC.
The sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision were public in nature and ownership thereof belonged to the City of Marikina or the Republic of the Philippines following the 1991 White Plains Association decision. alleys and sidewalks in a residential subdivision are for public use and beyond the commerce of man. clearing. 99-331-MK. including infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of their residents and which are financed by their own funds. Like all LGUs. Respondents. City Mayor Bayani F. City Engineer of Marikina. namely. 59. Assistant City Engineer of Marikina. respondents allegedly violated the constitutional proscription against the use of public funds for private purposes4 as well as Sections 335 and 336 of RA 71605 and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Invoking this Court’s 1991 decision in White Plains Association v. 1993 3 like other infrastructure projects relating to roads. a taxpayer’s suit for certiorari. repair and maintenance of the existing sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. widening. the City of Marikina is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes set forth in the Local Government Code (RA 7160).R. injunction and damages. No.8 With this power. 148357 June 30. he instituted this petition. On June 14. the appellate court sustained the ruling of the trial court and held that Ordinance No. the petition was dismissed. LGUs may prescribe reasonable regulations to protect the lives. prohibition. On December 22. petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. streets and sidewalks previously undertaken by the city. health. the trial court denied petitioner’s application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction.V. and to disburse public funds. City Treasurer of Marikina. In undertaking the project. Albon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina. ENGR. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision but it was denied. Hence. Petitioner. appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities. 1993 was well within the LGU’s powers. Assistant City Engineer Anaki Maderal and City Treasurer Natividad Cabalquinto. the trial court rendered its decision6 dismissing the petition. 2006 ANIANO A. and NATIVIDAD CABALQUINTO. Soliven. the improvement and widening of the sidewalks pursuant to Ordinance No. It is expressly vested with police powers delegated to LGUs under the general welfare clause of RA 7160. He alleged that the sidewalks were private property because Marikina Greenheights Subdivision was owned by V. 1993. One of the "whereas clauses" of PD 121612 (which amended PD 95713) declares that open spaces. 59. ALBON. 1999. of the City of Marikina for the grading. repair and improvement of the sidewalks of a privately-owned subdivision? This is the issue presented for the Court’s resolution in this petition for review on certiorari1 which assails the December 22. It was docketed as SCA Case No. mandates subdivision owners to set aside open spaces which shall be devoted exclusively for the use of the general public. clear and repair the existing sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. 1999. was a valid enactment. Thereafter. Undaunted. 9 Cities and municipalities also have the power to exercise such powers and discharge such functions and responsibilities as may be necessary. the City of Marikina undertook a public works project to widen. On November 15. petitioner Aniano A. vs. Inc. ENGR. In May 1999. 59. 2000 decision 2 and May 30. Legaspi. 56767. the city government could not use public resources on them.R. 1999. 2000. On these grounds. It ruled that the City of Marikina was authorized to carry out the contested undertaking pursuant to its inherent police power. s.7 the roads and sidewalks inside the Marikina Greenheights Subdivision were deemed public property. ANAKI MADERAL. prohibition and injunction with damages against respondents (who were at that time officials of Marikina). Petitioner claimed that it was unconstitutional and unlawful for respondents to use government equipment and property. May a local government unit (LGU) validly use public funds to undertake the widening. In conjunction herewith. 68-94 which prohibited courts from issuing a TRO or injunction in any case. therefore. On June 22. 11 There is no question about the public nature and use of the sidewalks in the Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. s. City Mayor of Marikina. . and property of their constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective territorial jurisdictions. dispute or controversy involving an infrastructure project of the government. ALFONSO ESPIRITO.G.14 roads. 2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. as amended by PD 1216. Petitioner further alleged that there was no appropriation for the project. s.10 These infrastructure facilities include municipal or city roads and bridges and similar facilities. City Engineer Alfonso Espirito. Fernando. BAYANI F. Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the trial court’s decision but it was denied. PD 957. It was undertaken by the city government pursuant to Ordinance No. Thus. FERNANDO. SP No. Branch 73. The trial court reasoned that the questioned undertaking was covered by PD 1818 and Supreme Court Circular No.
repair and improvement of road lots and open spaces of the subdivision prior to their donation to the concerned LGU. The law speaks of infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of the residents of the LGU and "which are funded out of municipal funds. . However. The ruling in the 1991 White Plains Association decision relied on by both the trial and appellate courts was modified by this Court in 1998 in White Plains Association v. RA 7160 contemplates that only the construction."32 It particularly refers to "municipal roads and bridges" and "similar facilities. provide that it is the registered owner or developer of a subdivision who has the responsibility for the maintenance.29 In Young v.V. Court of Appeals." in its correct and ordinary usage.20 this Court held in its 1998 decision that subdivision streets belonged to the owner until donated to the government or until expropriated upon payment of just compensation. Section 335 of RA 7160 is clear and specific that no public money or property shall be appropriated or applied for private purposes. has retained ownership of the open spaces and sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision or has donated them to the City of Marikina and (2) whether the public has full and unimpeded access to. The Court ruled that as long as the private owner retained title and ownership of the subdivision. Whether V. Similarly significant is the character of the direct object of the expenditure. improvement. a privately-owned subdivision. No. SO ORDERED. 59. Inc. what is true for subdivision roads or streets applies to subdivision sidewalks as well.R. an appropriation made by Congress for that purpose was null and void. he was under the obligation to reimburse to the city government the expenses incurred in land-filling the streets. 1993. that is. Inc. The Court held that where the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged to a private person. No. has retained ownership of the open spaces and sidewalks or has already donated them to the City of Marikina.28 In Pascual. (2) G.Thus.R."33 Applying the rules of ejusdem generis. 12813118 decided in 1998. alleys and planting strips. the use of LGU funds for the widening and improvement of privately-owned sidewalks is unlawful as it directly contravenes Section 335 of RA 7160.R. 9552217 decided in 1991 and (3) G.24 Thus. Soliven. and use of. The Marikina City Regional Trial Court is directed to decide the case with dispatch. the implementing rules of PD 957. the roads and sidewalks of the subdivision.23 lots allotted by subdivision developers as road lots include roads. Soliven. s.21 The part of the street set aside for the use of pedestrians is known as a sidewalk. the question of ownership of the open spaces (including the sidewalks) in Marikina Greenheights Subdivision is material to the determination of the validity of the challenged appropriation and disbursement made by the City of Marikina. the validity of RA 920 ("An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works") which appropriated P85. under subdivision laws. are factual matters. No. This is in consonance with the fundamental principle in local fiscal administration that local government funds and monies shall be spent solely for public purposes. repair. sidewalks.19 Citing Young v. This Court has already resolved three interrelated White Plains Association cases:15 (1) G. extension and improvement of feeder roads within a privately-owned subdivision was questioned. repair and maintenance of infrastructure facilities owned by the LGU may be bankrolled with local government funds.V. the phrase "similar facilities" refers to or includes infrastructure facilities like sidewalks owned by the LGU. Moreover.30 the City of Manila undertook the filling of low-lying streets of the Antipolo Subdivision. 31 Therefore. and whether the public has full and unimpeded access to the roads and sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. as amended by PD 1216. includes not only the roadway used for carriages and vehicular traffic generally but also the portion used for pedestrian travel. 5568516resolved in 1985. 25 In Pascual v. Clearly. Thus. the trial and appellate courts were correct in upholding the validity of Ordinance No. Secretary of Public Works. There is a need for the prior resolution of these issues before the validity of the challenged appropriation and expenditure can be determined. City of Manila.22 Moreover. and thus the public welfare. this case is hereby ordered REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City for the reception of evidence to determine (1) whether V. The owner or developer shall be deemed relieved of the responsibility of maintaining the road lots and open space only upon securing a certificate of completion and executing a deed of donation of these road lots and open spaces to the LGU.26 the Court laid down the test of validity of a public expenditure: it is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community.000 for the construction. 27 Incidental advantage to the public or to the State resulting from the promotion of private interests and the prosperity of private enterprises or business does not justify their aid by the use of public money. WHEREFORE. It was enacted in the exercise of the City of Marikina’s police powers to regulate the use of sidewalks. Ownership of the sidewalks in a private subdivision belongs to the subdivision owner/developer until it is either transferred to the government by way of donation or acquired by the government through expropriation. The word "street. may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. This conclusion finds further support from the language of Section 17 of RA 7160 which mandates LGUs to efficiently and effectively provide basic services and facilities. the sidewalks. City of Manila. both the trial and appellate courts erred when they invoked our 1991 decision in White Plains Association and automatically applied it in this case.
and the rest they rented out to nine other families. let alone. Roberto J. ABALOS. Series of 1997. vs. City of Mandaluyong. ADOPTED on this 2nd day of October 1997 at the City of Mandaluyong. Jose Fernandez Street. a step towards the implementation of social justice and urban land reform in this City. The resolution reads as follows: RESOLUTION NO. Barangay Mauway. CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY. the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. S-1997 4 1 2 RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING HON. 552. 552. whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the order issued in their favor on February 19. Delos Santos Acting Sanggunian Secretary Attested: Approved: Sgd. Hon. Abalos Presiding Officer . to provide modest and decent dwelling. Half of their land they used as their residence. Barangay Mauway.R. JOSE FERNANDEZ STREET. Jose Fernandez Street. as it is hereby authorizing. 1997. ABALOS to institute expropriation proceedings to achieve the noble purpose of the City Government of Mandaluyong. among other things. NOW. Allegedly. Mayor BENJAMIN S.G. We affirm the CA. to institute expropriation proceedings against the above-named registered owner of that parcel of land situated along Dr. to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos. No. the expropriation of said land would certainly benefit public interest. 2011 SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY. 156684 April 6. 2002 and resolution promulgated on January 17. OWNED BY MR. to authorize. WHEREAS. Francisco City Councilor & Acting City Mayor Sgd. (f)or the purpose of developing it to a low-cost housing project for the less privileged but deserving constituents of this City. On October 2. RESOLVED. CITY OF MANDALUYONG. 2003. Adventor R. Thereby. ABALOS TO TAKE THE NECESSARY LEGAL STEPS FOR THE EXPROPRIATION OF A PARCEL OF LAND SITUATED ALONG DR. COURT OF APPEALS. the City Council deems it necessary to authorize Hon. 552. Mayor BENJAMIN S. this piece of land have been occupied for about ten (10) years by many financially hard-up families which the City Government of Mandaluyong desires. owned and registered in the name of MR. upon motion duly seconded. in session assembled. WHEREAS. WHEREAS. to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants. under the present situation. BENJAMIN S. the land was their only property and only source of income. Respondents. The petitioners appeal the adverse decision promulgated on October 18. City of Mandaluyong. Petitioners. WHEREAS. Mandaluyong City. THEREFORE. BARANGAY MAUWAY. as it hereby RESOLVES. the said families have already negotiated to acquire this land but was refused by the above-named owner in total disregard to the City Government’s effort of providing land for the landless. Benjamin S. adopted by the City of Mandaluyong (City) authorizing its then City Mayor to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the parcel of land registered in the names of the petitioners. Branch 214. Sr. 2002 by the Regional Trial Court. the CA upheld Resolution No. Series of 1997. in 3 Mandaluyong City (RTC).044 square meters situated between Nueve de Febrero Street and Fernandez Street in Barangay Mauway. the City Council of Mandaluyong. Antecedents The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1. Sgd. there is a parcel of land situated along Dr. ANTONIO YUSAY WHEREAS. ANTONIO YUSAY.
the City had yet to commit acts of encroachment. Can the validity of Resolution No. and . 552 due to its being unconstitutional. and without force and effect. Certiorari does not lie to assail the issuance of a resolution by the Sanggunian Panglungsod The special civil action for certiorari is governed by Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 The petitioners moved for reconsideration. nor any plain. praying for the annulment of Resolution No. and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC. 552. 552 would already pave the way for the City to deprive the petitioners and their heirs of their only property. or usurpation. 552 was but the initial step in the City’s exercise of its power of eminent domain granted under Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The City countered that Resolution No. In its decision promulgated on October 18. Series of 1997 of the City of Mandaluyong null and void. for it was enough that their views had been consulted and that they had been given the full opportunity to voice their protest. opining that certiorari did not lie against a legislative act of the City Government. although necessary at times. posing the following issues. the suit of the petitioners was premature. – When any tribunal. and that notwithstanding the issuance of Resolution No. albeit upon different grounds. that the special civil action of prohibition did not also lie under the circumstances considering that the act of passing the resolution was not a judicial. The CA disposed as follows: WHEREFORE.Notwithstanding that the enactment of Resolution No. 552 because the petitioners had not been invited to the subsequent hearings on the resolution to enable them to ventilate their opposition. because the special civil action of certiorari was only available to assail judicial or quasi-judicial acts done without or in excess of jurisdiction. improper. confiscatory. speedy. the RTC. namely: 1. 2001 decision by the RTC was not justified because Resolution No. 1. we sustain. Aggrieved. that there was no due process in the passage of Resolution No. but the CA denied their motion. they appeal to the Court. or had yet to act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or in excess of jurisdiction. that to rule otherwise would be to give every affected resident effective veto powers in law-making by a local government unit. and find that certiorari and prohibition were not available to the petitioners under the circumstances. The RTC held that the petition was not premature because the passage of Resolution No. board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction. is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. premises considered. the petitioners became alarmed. was not indispensable and merely aided in law-making. 552 was a mere authorization given to the City Mayor to initiate the legal steps towards expropriation. the Court considers it necessary to first determine whether or not the action for certiorari and prohibition commenced by the petitioners in the RTC was a proper recourse of the petitioners. the questioned order of the Regional Trial Court. and that the purpose for the expropriation was not for public use and the expropriation would not benefit the greater number of inhabitants. On January 31. 552 was null and void. or quasi-judicial. whose Section 1 provides: Section 1. However. No costs. and that a public hearing. Thus. the RTC ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. 552 be assailed even before its implementation? 2. Thus. the result announced by the CA. on February 19. which included making a definite offer to purchase the property of the petitioners. 15-MD. or ministerial act. or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 2002. 2002. and declare that the RTC gravely erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition. and there is no appeal. or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. that notice to the petitioners (Spouses Yusay) of the succeeding hearings conducted by the City was not a part of due process. Petition for certiorari. excess. acting upon the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. hence. the CA concluded that the reversal of the January 31. SO ORDERED. which declared Resolution No. Branch 214. however. Ruling We deny the petition for review. 2002 in SCA Case No. Must a citizen await the takeover and possession of his property by the local government before he can go to court to nullify an unjust expropriation? Before resolving these issues. 552. 2001. set aside its decision and declared that Resolution No. 552 deserved to be accorded the benefit of the presumption of regularity and validity absent any sufficient showing to the contrary. the City appealed to the CA. Mandaluyong City dated February 19.
board. or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless. viz: Section 19. based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. exercise the power of eminent domain for public use. and through and by means of which it accomplishes its purpose and exercises its peculiar powers. "is used to describe generally those modes of action which appertain to the judiciary as a department of organized government. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control and restraints. however. board or officer. That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner. In this regard. Republic Act No. upon payment of just compensation. the Sangguniang Panglungsod in no way abused its discretion. V. a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court. The first is upon a specific matter of a temporary nature while the latter is a law that is 11 permanent in character. and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. according 9 to Bouvier. Indeed. That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided. further." In this case. also lays down the parameters for its exercise. but a legislative and policy-making body declaring its sentiment or opinion. and (c) There is no appeal or any plain. through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance. Moreover. the petitioner must allege and establish the concurrence of the following requisites. The first requisite is that the respondent tribunal. imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations." Bouvier continues. No rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a resolution. 552 that merely expresses the sentiment of the Sangguniang Panglungsod is not sufficient for the purpose of 12 initiating an expropriation proceeding. namely: (a) The writ is directed against a tribunal.M. Judicial function. or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless. therefore. Eminent Domain. exercise the power of eminent domain for public use. it is well to differentiate between a resolution and an ordinance. not adopt a resolution. (b) Such tribunal. To demonstrate the absence of abuse of discretion. and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 552. pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided. in Municipality of Parañaque v. which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain. not an ordinance. therefore. In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion through the resolution. xxx For certiorari to prosper. or purpose. or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. it also means the capacity to act in a specific way which appertains to the judicial power. for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding. Realty Corporation. alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal. and such offer was not accepted: Provided. board. That. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may. 7160 (The Local Government Code) required the City to pass an ordinance. board. which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs. least of all gravely. through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance. or purpose. a case in which the Municipality of Parañaque based its complaint for expropriation on a resolution. which is nothing but an embodiment of what the lawmaking body has to say in the light of attendant circumstances. other public entities and public utilities. upon payment of just compensation. however. board. is the exercise of the judicial faculty or office. or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. board. A resolution like Resolution No. speedy. or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Nor did the Sangguniang Panglungsod abuse its discretion in adopting Resolution No.adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. certiorari did not lie against the Sangguniang Panglungsod. or officer thereby acts without 8 jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Section 19 of The Local Government Code clearly provides. That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid 7 . and does not correct just any error or mistake committed by a court. It provides as follows: "Section 19. or officer must be exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. which was not a part of the Judiciary settling an actual controversy involving legally demandable and enforceable rights when it adopted Resolution No. or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions unless such court. 552. 6 It is further emphasized that a petition for certiorari seeks solely to correct defects in jurisdiction. the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court. pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided. "The term. 10 as one of the powers of government." Based on the foregoing. Section 19 of RA 7160. the Court ruled so: The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government. finally. A local government unit may. for its expression of sentiment or opinion was a constitutionally protected right.
In contrast. which had provided that a mere resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. petitioner did not raise this point before this Court. this allegation does not cure the inherent defect of petitioner’s Complaint for expropriation filed on September 23. or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation. 4. explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose. appropriates the land of an individual without his consent. 2. there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. and is guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously. petitioner argues that its Sangguniang Bayan passed an ordinance on October 11. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code. but not for a resolution. for their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use. for greater public purposes." (Emphasis supplied) Thus. petitioner merely alleged the existence of such an ordinance. 93-35. Accordingly. the question submitted before the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. or unjust. the previous Local Government Code. unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. "No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. Additionally.and definite offer has been previously made to the owner. 3. An ordinance is a law. but it did not present any certified true copy thereof. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character. however. as required under Section 9 Article III of the Constitution and other pertinent laws. the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. and only in passing. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true. to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. absurd. and ratified all the acts of its mayor regarding the subject expropriation. Whether those allegations are true or not is beside the point. We are not convinced by petitioner’s insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. in behalf of the LGU. the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people. finally. but a resolution is temporary in nature. "[l]egislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Court of Appeals to show that a resolution may suffice to support the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1. Thus. Indeed. it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. it was mentioned by private respondent. may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint?" . than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. In the first place. It is hornbook doctrine that: " x x x in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action. based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.a third reading is necessary for an ordinance. RA 7160. If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution. 1993. and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. In any event. the law is applied according to its express terms. purpose or welfare. That. There is payment of just compensation. the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court. In the case at bar. since the law requiring an ordinance is not at all impossible." In the instant case. there is no reason to depart from this rule. Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. When the legislature interferes with that right and. but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. further. This case. 1994 which reiterated its Resolution No. That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided. But Congress did not. Series of 1993. This argument is bereft of merit. the two are enacted differently -. the manifest change in the legislative language – from "resolution" under BP 337 to "ordinance" under RA 7160 – demands a strict construction. but said offer was not accepted. Moreover. In fact. In the second place. is not in point because the applicable law at that time was BP 337." xxx In its Brief filed before Respondent Court. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated. and such offer was not accepted: Provided. the present Local Government Code which was already in force when the Complaint for expropriation was filed. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive. Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance.
provided always that due provision is made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owner. the power of judicial review becomes limited in scope. considering that only a resolution expressing the desire of the Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners’ property was issued. As of then.The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint for expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. and there is no appeal or any other plain. the Court of Appeals committed no reversible 13 error in affirming the trial court’s Decision which dismissed the expropriation suit. the term excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court. corporation. or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of 16 law. officer. however. the petitioners as the owners 23 could not also be deprived of their property under the power of eminent domain. board. SP No. Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminent domain. — When the proceedings of any tribunal. Consequently. board. but only expressing its collective sentiment or opinion. WHEREFORE. and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction. the remedy of prohibition was not called for. it was premature for the petitioners to mount any judicial challenge. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action. speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the tribunal or 19 inferior court. Until then. On the other hand. The writ of prohibition is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction. 2002 in CA-G. corporation. by such adoption. Petition for prohibition. there being no appeal or other plain. or person. Only when the landowners are not given their just compensation for the taking of their property or when there has been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may the remedy of prohibition become available. for the power of eminent domain could be exercised by the City only through the filing of a verified complaint in the proper court. SO ORDERED 22 18 . was not exercising judicial. and the courts will be left to determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the affected landowners. 2. has exercised its or his power in an arbitrary or despotic manner. and the interest of the affected landowner is thus made subordinate to the power of the State. no expropriation proceeding could be said to exist. or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. the petitioner must first demonstrate that the tribunal. Here. whether exercising judicial. quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This bar against prohibition comes from the nature of the power of eminent domain as necessitating the taking of private land intended for public 21 use. 1avvphi1 The rule and relevant jurisprudence indicate that prohibition was not available to the petitioners as a remedy against the adoption of Resolution No. speedy. alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein. 70618. For grave abuse of discretion to be a ground for prohibition. officer or person. quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. xxx The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration 14 of justice. whether exercising judicial. by reason of passion or personal hostility. or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis supplied) In view of the absence of the proper expropriation ordinance authorizing and providing for the expropriation. which must be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion. Costs to be paid by the petitioners. Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such verified complaint. or with grave abuse of 15 discretion. 552. The petitioner must further allege in the petition and establish facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate. or officer has jurisdiction over a case but has transcended 17 such jurisdiction or acted without any authority. Verily. a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court. we affirm the decision promulgated on October 18. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. board. which states: Section 2. the petition for certiorari filed in the RTC was dismissible for lack of cause of action. Prohibition does not lie against expropriation The special civil action for prohibition is governed also by Section 2 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. A remedy is plain. there can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate possession of the land under expropriation proceedings may be 20 taken.R. for the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
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