WNU SI 2011

Standardization of Reactor Designs and International safety framework

Oxford, 05 August 2011

An Industry view
Bernard Fourest

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Content
• Part I: The needs for International standardization of nuclear reactor designs • Part II: Harmonization initiatives in the international safety framework • Part III: The WNA/CORDEL Initiative

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Part I: The needs for International standardization of nuclear reactor designs

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Some Historical aspects(1/3)
The fifties: Hope of a worldwide market for civil nuclear technology and wide international cooperations.
• Atom for peace conference: Eisenhower open US nuclear technology to the world • Establishment of IAEA • Euratom treaty: one of the first pilar of what would became the European Union

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Some Historical aspects(2/3)
The sixties and seventies: Nationalism prevails
 Several countries develop their own technology (Canada, UK, France, USSR…),  And/or customize US LWR technology to escape US vendors licenses (Germany, Japan, Korea, France…)  Development of country specific industry design and manufacturing codes (ASME, JSME, KEPIC, ANRIC…),  Regulators develop their own safety requirements and licensing processes
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Some Historical aspects(3/3)
• Apart from the NSSS, each utility wanted its nuclear power plant to be built on its own standard (custom-made) : • The result: all Nuclear Power Plants were different, no standardization • One main exception in France where EDF built 58 PWRs of the same design in 3 batches (900Wwe, 1300Mwe, 1450Mwe) this being recognized as a key element of the competitiveness of the french nuclear program • Lesson learnt by the world nuclear industry:

Standardization is a necessary condition for new nuclear plants to be built economicaly

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The 2000: Main additional context changes
Past: • Investment by state-owned utilities in regulated markets • Investment by national players • Custom-made reactors: almost every reactor was different Present: • Investment by privateowned utilities in highly competitive markets • Emergence of multinational utilities choosing among a small number of international designs • Standardization is required to facilitate new build !!!

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International standardization of reactor designs
 International standardization means that each vendor’s design can be built by a vendor, and ordered by a utility, in every country without obligatory adaptation to specific national regulations International standardization will help competitiveness needed to deliver large-scale worldwide new build bring benefits for safety

Standardization as a benefit for safety
 Fleets of standardized designs offer a broad basis for construction and operation experience feedback
 Design improvements could be implemented across the fleet  Risk of a design shortcoming affecting the whole fleet (large scale shutdown) is small due to high probability of early detection of design flaws

Standardized advanced plants will bring additional safety layers in all stages: design, construction, operation and decommissioning

Standardization as a benefit for the industry and regulators
Standardization will
• reduce strain on resources • reduce investment risks, time and cost in licensing and construction • foster joint supplier oversight • enable project neutral manufacturing of components for standardized designs • improve transparency of regulatory practices • gain public confidence

• facilitate establishment of nuclear power programmes in emerging countries in safest and efficient manner

www.world-nuclear.org/reference/reports.html

Paper “Benefits Gained through International Harmonization of Nuclear Safety Standards for Reactor Designs” available on

OECD IEA-NEA Nuclear Technology Roadmap (June 2010) – conclusions
Among actions for governments:

To the extent possible, facilitate the construction of standardised designs for nuclear power plants worldwide by harmonising regulatory design requirements. In particular, countries introducing new nuclear programmes should avoid imposing unique requirements.
Milestones: Common requirements should be established from 2020.

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Existing regulatory/legal situation
 Each NPP is licensed by an independent regulatory body within
  specific national licensing process, which vary from country to country specific national safety requirements, which vary considerably in details

A design approval in one country is legaly irrelevant for others

This is an obstacle to deployment of standardized designs across a range of countries

Harmonization of regulatory regimes
• Absolutely necessary for standardization! • Differences are even more difficult to justify in public eyes (why should regulation in one country be “safer” than in others....) • However, combination and “piling up” of the strictest requirements to be avoided

• IAEA Safety Standards - a good initial model for harmonisation
• Newcomer countries should start right away with regulations based on international consensus
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What challenges have to be kept in mind
• Sovereignty of each country’s regulator has to be respected
• Regulators are bound by law to apply their national safety requirements and licensing procedures • Regulators need to build up knowledge of the design

Part II: Harmonization initiatives in the international safety framework

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International Safety Framework

Global
Convention on Nuclear Safety IAEA - Safety Standards

European
EU Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Establishing a Community Framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations

Other Directives will follow...

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Who is Who? in international harmonization of safety standards

Global
Intergov’tal Institutions IAEA

European
EC (DG ENER) European Council - EURATOM ENSREG WENRA ENEF

OECD/NEA

Regulatory

MDEP

Industry

WNA-CORDEL WANO

FORATOM-ENISS EUR

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IAEA Safety Standards Hierarchy

Safety Fundamentals

Safety Requirements Global Reference Point for a High Level of Nuclear Safety
19 19 Slide from the IAEA presentation at the WNU Harmonization Forum, Manchester, September 2009

Safety Guides

A Foundation built on Principles for Safety and Security
Principle 1: Responsibility for Safety Principle 2: Role of Government Principle 3: Leadership and Management for safety Principle 4: Justification of facilities and activities Principle 5: Optimization of protection Principle 6: Limitation of risk to individuals Principle 7: Protection of present and future generations Principle 8: Prevention of accidents Principle 9: Emergency preparedness and response Principle 10: Protective actions to reduce existing of unregulated radiation risk

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IAEA Safety Standards Revision 2006-2015

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Current Structure of IAEA Safety Standards

IAEA Safety Review Services
Operational Safety  OSART – Operational Safety Review Team  SEDO – Safety Evaluation of Fuel Cycle Facilities During Operation  SCART – Safety Culture Assessment Review Team Research Reactors  INSARR – Integrated Safety Assessment of Research Reactors Engineering and Technical Safety  Safety Assessment Services – Engineering/Safety Assessment Review Services Regulatory Framework and Activities  IRRS – Integrated Regulatory Review Service

OECD - Nuclear Energy Agency
• OECD-NEA has two nuclear safety-related committees:
– Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI)
• Mission is to assist member countries in maintaining and further developing the scientific and technical knowledge base required to assess the safety of nuclear reactors and fuel cycle facilities. Committee is made up of senior scientists and engineers, and representatives from regulatory authorities.

– Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA)
• Mission is to guide the NEA programme concerning the regulation, licensing and inspection of nuclear installations with regard to safety. CNRA is made up of senior representatives from regulatory bodies.

• CNRA’s Working Group on the Regulation of New Reactors (WGRNR) examines the regulatory issues of the siting, licensing and regulatory oversight of generation III+ and generation IV nuclear reactors. • WGRNR is developing:
– – –
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Construction Experience Database Regulation of Nuclear sites Selection and Preparation Licensing Structure of Regulatory staff and Regulatory Licensing Process

• The WGRNR also coordinates activities of the CNRA and MDEP

Multinational Design Evaluation Programme (MDEP)
 10 regulators who are/will be undertaking review of new NPP
designs: Canada, China, Finland, France, Japan, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, UK, US and IAEA in observers  Fully operable since 2008 • Aims of MDEP:
–enhance cooperation between regulators –establish reference regulatory practices –achieve convergence of codes, standards, and –safety goals in the long-term

 However: no harmonization of safety requirements, no commonly valid design acceptance
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Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA)
• WENRA is Association of Heads of Nuclear Regulatory Authorities of 17 countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. Plus 5 Observers: Austria, Ireland, Luxemburg, Norway and Poland; in 2009 Russian, Ukraine and Armenia were invited)

• Main objective is to find a common approach to nuclear safety and radiation protection within EU (Nations recognize IAEA Safety Standards, the
Convention on Nuclear Safety, etc. but, different organizations & different regulatory regimes)

• And to give EU an independent means of examining applicant countries’ nuclear safety & regulation (Nuclear safety in EU enlargement
criteria)

• WENRA’s Reactor Harmonisation Working Group (RHWG) was established to harmonize safety approaches & continuously improve nuclear safety for NPPs
– Reference Levels FOR EXISTING NPPs were established. All 17 countries have been benchmarked against 18 safety issues – and National Action Plans being implemented. – Definition of safety objectives for “new reactors”

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European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG)
• ENSREG - independent authoritative expert body composed of senior officials from national regulatory or nuclear safety authorities from all 27 Member States in the EU.
• ENSREG had a key role in the development of the EU Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community Framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations • 3 working groups:
 Nuclear Safety  Openness and Transparency  Radioactive Waste Management and Decommissioning

• ENSREG has key role in future development of harmonised safety requirements for new NPPs in the EU

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European Nuclear Energy Forum European Nuclear Energy Forum (ENEF)
ENEF is a unique forum, free of taboos, for an open dialogue Competitiveness between key decision makers and stakeholders:
• • 27 EU MS governments, European Institutions incl. the European Opportunities Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, the nuclear industry, the electricity consumers Civil society ENSREG and Sustainable Nuclear Energy Risks Technology Platform Financial institutions (EBRD, EIB)
Nuclear Legal Roadmap Financing Smart grids Safety harmonisation Waste disposal Training and education Non Proliferation
Bratislava - Prague

• •

WG Risk aims to further improve nuclear safety aspects on the basis of the Safety Directive, which provides for Transparency high level harmonisation of nuclear safety in the EU
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Consultative Process Inform.&Communicatio n Special events

European Utility Requirements (EUR)
• a utility network
– to share experience in plant specification, design evaluation, licensing … – to build common specifications for the European Gen 3 LWR NPPs

• a common bridge with the external stakeholders: vendors, partners outside Europe:
EPRI, Asian utilities..., the regulators, international organisations: IAEA, OECD, EU, WENRA...

• A range of Gen 3 LWR projects:
– PWRs and BWRs, "evolutionary" and passive safety features

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European Utility Requirements (EUR)
• It has been used as technical specification for the call for bids in Finland, Bulgaria, South Africa, Turkey as well as in other countries worldwide. • It has also been used by the NPP vendors willing to be present in Europe, as a guide for designing their new products. • Main objective of utilities: the design rules must be harmonised, stabilised & predictable, high operational performance, simplification, short construction • These requirements cover not only safety but also balance of plant, grid connection… • EUR drives design towards standardisation
– The same design is usable by different utilities in different countries without specific re-development – Licensing and safety studies costs can be shared
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The EUR Document volume 1 volume 2 volume 3 volume 4

generic main policies nuclear island & objectives requirements

Applications of EUR to specific projects

generic conventional island requirements

The EUR Document contents and status
• Volume 1 presents the main utility objectives and summaries the main requirements. • Volume 2 is a set of generic nuclear island requirements. The contents cover most of what a Plant Owner has to specify for the assessment, licensing, design, supply, construction, tests and operation of a future LWR power plant. • Volume 3 includes evaluations of the selected LWR designs that are felt feasible for the European market. There is a subset of volume 3 per project, produced with contribution of the corresponding vendor. • Volume 4 is a set of generic requirements for the power generation plant organised by chapters that deal with the specific systems.
revision A: 03/1994 revision B: 11/1995 revision C: 04/2001 BWR 90: 06/1999 EPR rev A: 12/1999 EP1000: 12/1999 ABWR: 12/2001 SWR 1000: 02/2002 AP1000: 06/2006 AES92: 06/2006 EPR rev B: 06/2009 revision A: 11/1996 revision B: 03/2000 revision C: 10/2007

FORATOM’s ENISS-Initiative
European Nuclear Installations Safety Standards Initiative represents nuclear licensees across Europe
– ENISS is acting as a stakeholder in the regulatory issue process in Europe and has fruitful interactions with WENRA to improve its Reference Levels – ENISS is strengthening its activities in the IAEA revision work – ENISS is developing a constructive interaction with the EU institutions and initiatives dealing with regulatory issues

in the areas of:
o o o o
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Nuclear Safety Waste Management Decommissioning Radiation Protection

FORATOM’s ENISS-Initiative
ENISS – Membership
• • • • • • • • • Belgium (Tractebel, Electrabel) Finland (Fortum, TVO) Germany (EON, RWE) Italy (SOGIN/ENEL) Spain (UNESA) The Netherlands (EPZ) France (EdF, AREVA NC) Sweden (EON-Se, Vattenfall AB) Switzerland (Swiss Nuclear) • Czech Republic (CEZ) • Hungary ( Paks NPP) • Slovakia (Slovenske Elektrarne, JAVYS*) • Romania (Nuclearelectra) • Bulgaria (Kozloduy NPP) • United Kingdom (BE) • Slovenia (Krško NPP) • Lithuania (Ignalina NPP*)

All ENISS Members represent licensees
*involved only in waste & decommissioning activities

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Part III: The WNA/CORDEL initiative

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The CORDEL Working Group
WNA’s Cooperation in Reactor Design Evaluation and Licensing (CORDEL) Group

• Founded in January 2007
•Membership:
–all major vendors: AECL, AREVA NP, GE-Hitachi, Hitachi-GE, MHI,
Toshiba, Westinghouse...

–utilities interested in new build: CEZ, EDF, ENDESA,

Energoatom, E.ON,, Exelon, KHNP, NOK/Resun, OPG, Rosenergoatom, RWE, FEPC (TEPCo), TVO, Vattenfall, Visagino AE,...

–service companies: EXCEL Services Corp., Rolls-Royce, AMEC, CH2M
Hill,...

–observers from int’l organisations: FORATOM/ENISS, EUR, EPRI,
ISO, IAEA DNE, WANO, NEI…
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http://www.worldnuclear.org/uploadedFiles/org/referenc e/pdf/CORDELreport2010.pdf

January 2010

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Boundaries of standardization within NPP
• Not every detail in a nuclear plant can be standardized: a certain degree of adaptation, dictated by site-specific conditions and other local factors, would be necessary. • But sufficient detail of standardization to enable:
a) the operator to prepare specifications for the procurement of equipment; and b) the regulatory body to determine the adequacy of a facility's safety.

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Design approval as part of the overall regulatory process
policy decision on nuclear energy in the country

creation of legal framework

decision in principle and justification of a particular NPP project

new NPP licensing process
design site licensee

construction and operating licence
surveillance, inspections and assessments during operation

licence on decommissioning, dismantling and site clearance

Main Conclusions of CORDEL Report
CORDEL proposes 3 Phases to achieve international standardization of reactor designs:
1. Sharing design reviews and assessments 2. Validating and accepting design approvals 3. Issuing international design certification

Urgent need for international harmonization of » national licensing processes » and safety requirements Standardized designs will » help deliver nuclear new build on a large scale » enhance nuclear safety

Phase 1: Share design assessments/reviews

Regulator A

Regulator B

design review

share elements of design review, i.e.calculations, modelling of event sequences, etc.

design review

design approval by regulator A

design approval by regulator B

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Phase 1: Share design reviews/assessments
• During safety reviews, regulators could make use of:
– – Assessment work done by their peers, e.g. by reusing calculations or modelling of event sequences Assessments done by industry (EUR, US URD)

• Regulators may join efforts in reviewing the same design by creating a collaborative network • This would reduce the strain on regulators’ resources • This would in no way infringe the right and the duty of regulators to take the final decision to issue a licence • CORDEL encourages MDEP progress towards shared assessment work

Phase 2: Validate & accept design approvals
Not “automatic” but through a “validation”. Examples: transport casks for waste, aviation industry’s Type Certification

Regulator A

Regulator B

design review

validation

design approval by regulator A

design approval by regulator B

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Phase 2: Validation and acceptance of design approvals (2)
Example: Italy‘s new Act on Energy Companies, Act no. 99 of 23 July 2009, Art. 25, 2 i):
[Government is empowered to issue] a provision that licences relating to technical requirements and specifications for reactor designs which have been licenced in the past 10 years by the competent authorities in member states of OECD-NEA, or in states linked to Italy by bilateral agreements ... in the nuclear sector, will be considered to be valid in Italy after approval by the Nuclear Safety Agency

Phase 3: International Design Certification
• Multinational Design Certification/Approval – issued by a team of all concerned regulators or by an international organisation
• Multinational certification is owned by the vendor and is valid for entire design life • Operator is “intelligent customer”, but vendor is responsible for the detailed design knowledge

• Network of vendors, operators and regulators is required to address post-certification design changes and to maintain the lifetime validity of Multinational Design Certification

Phase 3: International Design Certification
Team of Regulators: A, B, C (or, later, International Organisation)
Joint design review

multinational design Approval / Certification

Country A
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Country B

Country C

Phase 3: International Design Certification
Team of Regulators: A, B, C (or, later, International Organisation)
Joint design review

... a long term goal
multinational design Approval / Certification

Country A
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Country B

Country C

Alignment of licensing processes
• Licensing processes and documents should be aligned so that the design approval of one country would fit into the licensing sequence of another country • Best solution: separate design approval (e.g.design certificate) • Legal implications of design approval: period of validity, binding character, “ownership”, etc. • Examples:
• US: Design Certification

• UK: Generic Design Assessment (GDA)
• France: ASN monitoring of compliance on design safety, parallel to construction
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Role of all stakeholders
• Industry: – operators and vendors: Owners’ Groups, information exchange, implementation of design improvements, Design Authorities, experience feedback, codes and standards, training – Role of WNA Cordel within industry and liaison with regulators (MDEP) • Regulators: – National regulators can already achieve greater convergence and facilitate mutual acceptance of design reviews – Enhanced role of MDEP in promoting harmonization and mutual acceptance • Governments: – Some changes in national legislation may be required to facilitate standardization – Longer term goal – creation of legal framework for international certification • International organizations: – IAEA and OECD-NEA, EU institutions - to take a proactive part in standardization and harmonization

CORDEL – commitment from industry
13 April 2010, 11 Leading Nuclear Companies CEOs published a letter of support for CORDEL:
• • • • • • • • • • • • John Ritch, DG, WNA Anne Lauvergeon,CEO, Areva Hugh MacDiarmid, CEO, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Henri Proglio, CEO, Electricité de France Wulf H Bernotat, CEO, Eon Christopher Crane, President , Exelon Jack Fuller, CEO, GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Masaharu Hanyu, President, Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy Akira Sawa,Director, Nuclear Systems, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ichiro Takekuro, Chief Nuclear Officer, Tokyo Electric Power Co Yashuharu Igarashi, CEO, Power Systems Toshiba Aris Candris, CEO, Westinghouse

CORDEL – commitment from industry
13 April 2010, 11 Leading Nuclear Companies CEOs published a letter of support for CORDEL:
Recipients: • Yukiya Amano, DG, IAEA • André-Claude Lacoste, Chairman, Multinational Design Evaluation Program (MDEP) • Luis Echávarri, DG, Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD • Andrej Stritar, Chairman, European Nuclear Safety Regulator Group cc: Laurent Stricker, Chairman, World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO)

CORDEL’s near-term activities
 The group encourages international cooperation in design reviews, mutual acceptance of design approvals and (in the long term) international certification of designs
 Cooperation with MDEP and other relevant regulatory initiatives

 Participation in IAEA safety standard revision process
 Promotion of harmonization of standards and codes
(complementary to the MDEP work, compile existing comparisons of codes and conduct additional comparisons of mechanical, electrical, civil, fire protection etc. codes with the view of producing industry reference document)

 Design Change Management – develop institutional mechanisms in the industry which would enable compliance with standardization throughout standard fleet’s lifetime
 Develop model licensing regime and focus on support to emerging markets
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CORDEL in IAEA Safety Standards Revision
 Observer status in the IAEA NUSSC since early 2008.  Involvement in drafting process of the IAEA Safety Standards.

 Main safety standards:  Safety requirements on NPP Design NS-R-1;  Safety Classification Guide;  Guides on licensing processes; regulatory infrastructure;  Construction and Commissioning guides,  Guides related to safety assessments of NPP designs...
 WNA through CORDEL members can identify industry experts on specific issues and send them to technical meetings enriching standards with industry experience from a very early stage

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Codes and Standards Task Force
• A MDEP working group with national standard organisations launched a comparison between different industrial mechanical codes (ASME, JSME, KEPIC, RCCM…) • CORDEL proposes a pilot project going a step further:  Selection in relation with SDOs of few topics of major interest for the industry,  Where convergence could be reached or equivalence could be demonstrated,  Sponsoring independant experts to do the work,  Results to be approved by SDOs,  And agreed by the regulators.

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Design Change Management Task Force
 How to maintain standardization after the plant’s licensing stage?

 DCM TF Objective: to develop and promote institutional mechanisms in the industry which would enable compliance with standardization throughout standard fleet’s lifetime
 Many existing mechanisms are being examined and could be further improved:  Owner’s Groups  Responsibility of vendors and utilities – “Design Authority / Entity” concept  WANO role  Regulators role

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Licensing and Permitting Task Force
 A joint initiative with the Nuclear Law and Contracting WG  Objective :  to provide a unified industry position in the dialogue on new licensing arrangements;  to establish new structural arrangements for licensing and permitting of NPPs with requirements for safety and efficiency of new build, particularly in emerging markets.  Communicate with all stakeholders - regulators , IAEA, OECD-NEA

 With this aim, the Task Force set up a WNA Membership Survey, which will seek to identify
 The current licensing, permitting processes and nuclear laws in various countries and how they impact scheduling, procurement, financing, risk assessment...

 In order to propose to emerging countries the process fitting the best their needs.

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Conclusions
• Industry has learnt from past experience that standardization is a necessary (but not always sufficient) condition for new nuclear plant competitiveness and for nuclear to take its share in world energy needs. • Regulators have to agreed to further rapid progress in safety requirements harmonisation. • This last point being all the more important after Fukushima. • Various International organisations have to better coordinate their efforts towards harmonized safety regimes • Aerospace industry needed 30 years to get internationaly recognized aircraft certification. • Nuclear industry cannot wait for such a long time.

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