Helton, Donald

From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject: Helton, Donald Friday, April 29, 2011 4:37 PM Wong, See-Meng Marksberry, Don; Coyne, Kevin SFP Risk Assessment Thoughts

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With regard to the weekend tasker you've been given from the RST, here are my knee-jerk thoughts (as we discussed earlier): 4 'yForcriticality concerns, which would require specialized conditions to even be relevant, I personally would not attempt to inform these with an ad hoc risk tool. I would defer to the deterministic look taken by Kent Wood earlier in the event response (during the first two weeks; I'm not sure if more was done later or not)1(' know of that exercise, but not of its outcome, so I unfortunately can't be of further help 'there. • With respect to time to uncover and heatup fuel, these I assume will only play in to your assessment via non-recovery probabilities and times for operator action in quantifying HEPs. Given the quick-turnaround and the uncertainties, I personally wouldn't spend much time trying to estimate these times on the fly (using things like the RT. computational aids that were set up to deal with LOOP events from a very different initial conditionlather, I'd select a time based on past RST site abandonment assessments (e.g., > 24 hoursnd re-visit this assumption if the assessment turns out to be sensitive to this. Otherwise, I think the uncertainties and differences in initial water level and water temperature are going to make things difficult in such a quick assignment. If the assessment turns out to be sensitive to this assumption, or we just want to refine kvlater regardless, then we can investigate doina 15_an actual treatment using other information source namely the post 9/11 security assessments)2 ,•, /T.Doing so would require binning of initial water leveinnitial damage state, and leak rates, because the ~timing can be very different due to these factors3/3t • }/Please remember that the extent of condition and the mitigative actions currently being employed are different for the various units. Thus, there is not a generic model that represents both Unit 4 and Unit 3. In particular, worrying about loss of SFP injection via the fire truck/purification line mitigative action isn't relevant if all of the makeup is being provided by the pumper truck/crane arm. Similarly, if the mitigative 6ýction doesn't rely on offsite power, remember to not penalize it for a LOOP.T01,When considering what initiators to treat, keep in mind that those that lead to a potential loss of pool integrity (e.g., seismic) will be more limiting than those that require boiloff of all the water. Even so, the time to drain the pool can be significant (especially in the case where you are starting from a full pool). You will not have the type of structural boundary conditions you need to account for this. That is even more reasonyt not attempt to be very precise on this aspect in the context of this quick-turn-around V assignment., * The strength of the risk model in this case (if there is one) is the potential ability to inform relative importance amongst mitigative strategies. I would suggest leaving this in the context of a Level 1-like treatment (i.e., end state is avoiding significant heatup) rather than trying to make any prognostications of radionuclide release frequency/magnitude, given the quick-turn-around. Even more so than usual, it is the relative rather than absolute contribution to risk that the model can inform.

Best, Don



Don .Helton Division of Risk Analysis NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Physical address: 21 Church Street, CSB4-C9, Rockville, MD 20850 Postal address: US NRC / MS CSB4-C7M / Washington, DC 20555 Ph: 301 251-7594