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(with illustrative extracts from the commentaries

)

JAMES R. BALLANTYNE

Sacred Texts Hindu

The Sánkhya Aphorisms of Kapila
with illustrative extracts from the commentaries

translated by James R. Ballantyne third edition edited by Fitzedward Hall
[London, Trübner & Co.]

[1885]
{reduced to HTML and edited by Christopher M. Weimer, January 2003}

note to the hypertext transcription

Title Page Advertisement Preface Book I Book II Book III Book IV Book V Book VI

Sacred-Texts Hindu Index

The Sánkhya Aphorisms of Kapila
notes to the hypertext transcription

In the original text, the Sanskrit of all of the aphorisms was supplied, and that of many of the commentaries was shown in the notes. All of this was eliminated, and the footnotes remaining were in many cases edited to circumvent direct reference to the Sanskrit that was removed. Where reference to the deleted Sanskrit was deemed unavoidable, it was replaced with the ### symbol. There are internal references to other parts of the text throughout, and all of these have been linked to allow for ease of navigation. In addition, every aphorism is preceded by a red asterisk link (i.e.: *), which is a self-referential anchor. This acts as a temporary bookmark, and by clicking on this anchor before following other links, you will be able to use your browser's back button to return directly to the aphorism that you were reading (and not to the beginning of the file) after following internal links. There are several places in the text where it was necessary to add matching brakets, quotation marks, and other punctuation that are missing in the original; these changes are not marked or otherwise noted. The same is true of the diacritical marks in some of the Indian words and names. Also, there was a list of corrections and additions printed at the end of the book. These have all been incorporated into this rescension where they emend the English. Some have been changed without further notice, and others have been added as additional footnotes. Added footnotes are referenced by asterisk instead of number, but all commentary (excepting that enclosed in braces, i.e.: { }, and the minor emendations mentioned above) was the work of the translator or the original editor.

Index

Sacred-Texts Hindu Index Next

THE

SÁNKHYA APHORISMS
OF

KAPILA,
WITH

Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries.

TRANSLATED BY

JAMES R. BALLANTYNE, LL. D.,
LATE PRINCIPAL OF THE BENARES COLLEGE.

THIRD EDITION.

LONDON: TRÜBNER & CO., LUDGATE HILL. 1885.

for publication. Ballantyne's translation in as many different copies of it. is an amended reprint of three volumes. afforded by accessible productions of that character. I should have placed at his disposal the materials towards improvement of his second edition.2 which subsequently p. contains nothing of the Sanskrit original but the Aphorisms. vi . the volumes mentioned at the beginning of this Advertisement. THE present work. The Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya. That Dr. are exhibited word for word. The variants. p. have been drawn from the works. My oldest MS. All these1 were. have been embodied p.Sacred-Texts Hindu Index Previous Next p. The residue. an immense number of improved readings have been taken from another source.1 published in India. I was unaware. till some years after he had made over the abridgment of them to Professor Cowell. in whatever form. in the following pages. The Sánkhya Aphorisms. of which only one has yet been printed. all the corrections obtainable from the abridgment have been turned to account. of the Aphorisms. about to be specified:3 I. While. Ballantyne had any thought of reissuing. but are not indicated. and such of them as did not meet his approval were crossed through. and similarly making independent suggestions in my third copy. v in the ensuing sheets. i ADVERTISEMENT. Revelant particulars I have given elsewhere. many more than a thousand. on various occasions. The renderings proposed in the footnotes are. entering suggestions. now given. Ballantyne. are here made available. in all the known commentaries on them. Three several times I carefully read Dr. iv appeared.2 Otherwise. in the second copy. for the most part. of it was transcribed in 1654. at the cost of no slight drudgery. which have already become very scarce. which. An abridged form of those volumes.1 as successively introduced. submitted to Dr. both in its Sanskrit portion and in its English. without reference to those which had been entered in the first. from among those which have recently occurred to me as eligible. by Vijnána Bhikshu.

which cannot be valued too highly. which I possess is complete. The Laghhu-sánkhya-sútra-v•itti.. 550 Copies:— Price 12 . Aug. III. but the other is defective by the three first Books. Aph. The Sánkhya-pravachana-sútra-v•itti-sára. 28. G. formerly the property of Dr. which breaks off in the midst of the comment on Book II. Printed for the use of the Benares College.. III. one which I procured to be copied. 1852. only one of two MSS.. Ballantyne. The other. Nearly all my longer annotations." "The Aphorisms of the Sánkhya Philosophy. P. P. The Kápila-sánkhya-pravachana-sútra-v•itti. Sup't. and some of the shorter.. MARLESFORD. with Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries. W. were scrutinized. by the learned Professor Cowell. W. in places. N.II. SUFFOLK. both undated.] Printed for the use of the Benares College. with Illustrative Extracts from the Commentary. In Sanskrit and English. 15. besides a MS. 1884. IV. F. by Vedánti Mahádeva. Neither of them has a date. Next Footnotes p. Books II. is. (1st Edition. Of this I have consulted. by Kapila. One of them is entire. in several instances. by order of Govt. copied in 1818. by Nagesa. Of this I have two MSS. I. they would. without date. freely intetpolated from No. in 1855. while in the rough. Allahabad: Printed at the Presbyterian Mission Press. & IV. iii 1 Their titles here follow: "The Aphorisms of the Sánkhya Philosophy of Kapila. again. but for whose searching criticisms. [Book I. H. by order of Govt. from an old MS. by Aniruddha. Rev. N. L. HAY. Here. have been far less accurate than they now are.

-VI. Though not fully published till 1856. he has." &c. which takes up 63 pages out of the total of 175. P . with Illustrative Extracts from the Commentary by Vijnána-Bhikshu. Ballantyne had a copy of it. iv Vedánti Mahádeva mainly supplies it at the outset. rest on readings of the original preferable to those which had been accepted. however. But this is a misrepresentation. 1 Many of them. were read by Dr. N.. p. well nigh exclusively. Ballantyne. 1856. as by his own acknowledgment.. v 1 Nor has attention been topically directed to sundry blemishes of idiom which have been removed. towards the end. Translated by James R. The proof-sheets of only 32 pages of the whole. 374. from the beginning. Benares. and Dr.' . will not be traced. Ballantyne.D. by the substitution of 'unless' for 'without. See. HAY. by Professor Cowell. 288. G. My advice was unheeded." "The Aphorisms of the Sánkhya Philosophy. for example. 381. his text. A few arbitrarily chosen words apart. p. its preface alone excepted. Books V. L. 550 Copies:—Price 12 annas. but with no mention of the fact. pp. Printed for the use of the Benares College. very largely. which might easily have been avoided. issued in 1862 and 1865. as regards Book I. Superintendent. & VI. and. the rest. by Kapila. more or less gross.. 1854. Principal of the Govt. HAY. (1st Edition.) Allahabad: Printed at the Presbyterian Mission Press. whom I have repeatedly seen in the very act. The expository matter in that Book is derived. here and there. by order of Govt. Greatly to his disservice. LL.' of 'presently' for 'just. especially in Books II. my edition of the Sánkkya-pravachana-bháshya. Aniruddha. L. as. it having been furnished by one of Dr. Rev. W. Rev.' and of 'between the two' for 'between both. after Book I. Ballantyne's pandits. Sanskrit and English. Some share of it. 357. 390. is borrowed from it throughout. for specimens. he would not be induced even to look at them. was in print as early as 1853. It faring the same with my typographical corrections. of preparing his elucidations.) Allahabad: Printed at the Presbyterian Mission Press. G. 373." 2 Occupying Fasciculi 32 and 81 of the New Series of the Bibliotheca Indica. with Extracts from Vijnána Bhiks[h]u's Commentary.annas. that he should profit by the copious emendations which I had amassed and digested from better manuscripts than those to which I at first had access. College. reproduced errors. Sup't. The title of the abridged form runs: "The Sánkhya Aphorisms of Kapila. from other commentators than Vijnána.' of 'in time' for 'through time. 197..

2 "At the time of his departure from India. it was lent. and never found its way back to me. or my Preface to the Sánkhya-sára. p. vi 1 I once had a second copy of this very rare work. in 1860. 3 For details respecting these commentaries and their authors." in the Bibliotheca Indica. bearing no date. 81. Dr. Like many of my manuscript treasures. No. see my Contribution towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems." "Notice. of his revised translation of the Sánkhya Aphorisms. but most venerable in appearance. Ballantyne left with me the MS. New Series. .

by the briefest possible suggestions. brought out in successive portions. For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms. as to aid. of other learned Bráhmans. J. is not chargeable upon them as a fault. These pages.Sacred-Texts Hindu Index Previous Next PREFACE. 5th January. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve. the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible. now submitted to the criticism of the pandits who read English. They invite discussion. Next . further. with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. the obscurity which must needs attach to them. are to be regarded as proof-sheets awaiting correction. the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East. A class of pandits in the Benares Sanskrit College having been induced to learn English. B. and. Without a commentary. in the eyes of the uninstructed. they being designed. this being their end. through them. the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. THE great body of Hindu Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms. R. 1852. shall be submitted to the criticism of these men. To this end they are admirably adapted. BENARES COLLEGE. not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school. and. as regards that of the West.

[the particle atha being regarded as an auspicious one]. the complete cessation of pain [which is] of three kinds is the complete end of man. Aph. Well. desirous of raising the world [from the Slough of Despond in which he found it sunk]. which is of three kinds. 1 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA. the great sage. is a cause of people's betaking themselves to the means [adapted to the attainment of the fruit]. [viz. The word 'well' serves as a benediction.Sacred-Texts Hindu Index Previous Next p.. perceiving that the knowledge of the excellence of any fruit. (1) due to one's self (ádhyátmika). Salutation to the illustrious sage. Kapila! b. 2 a. . b. a. 1. declares [as follows] the excellence of the fruit [which he would urge our striving to obtain]: The subject proposed. wealth. BOOK I. he means to say that it is the chief end of man.. Kapila.* Well. merit.—is the complete end of man. (2) due to products of the elements (ádhibhautika). p. among the four human aims. through the desire [which this excites] for the fruit. and (3) due to supernatural causes (ádhidaivika).—viz. By saying that the complete cessation of pain.

... we see its restoration.pleasure. the springing up again of pain in general.' in the shape of the drugs.. seeing that this may be asked] he declares [as follows]: A question whether the end may not be attained by ordinary means.e.* The effectuation of this [complete cessation of pain] is not [to be expected] by means of the visible [such as wealth. 'The visible. c. when there are easy remedies for bodily pains. The state of the matter is this: not by the expedients above-mentioned is there such a removal of pain. beautiful women and delicate food.. and remedies for mental pains. c. it must be still more hard to get one to betake himself to the doctrinal system [which treats of the knowledge in question]? Therefore [i. and when [on the other hand].]. grant that future pain is not debarred by drugs. &c. let it be that the above-mentionend cessation [of all the three kinds of pain] is the complete end of man.. The end is not to be attained by ordinary means.)].]. what reason is there for betaking one's self to a doctrinal system which is the cause of a knowledge of the truth. &c.] the restoration [of the misery and evil. c. &c. the knowledge of truth [as a complete remedy] is to be desired. &c.. the effectuation of the complete cessation of pain.e.] after [its temporary] cessation. for. Therefore. drugs.. that no pain arises thereafter. 2. viz. still. when. this or that pain has been destroyed. because the three are transitory.].. and herbs of mighty p. as is enjoined in the institutes of polity. d. by this or that expedient. &c. But then. in the shape of the knowledge of the difference between Nature and Soul. 4 a. and liberation (see Sáhitya-darpa•a. 3 power. 'The effectuation of this. b. viz.. and spells. § 2)]. and remedies for pains due to supernatural causes. [employed to remove . gems [such as possess marvellous prophylactic properties]. But then. b. whereas liberation is not transitory: such is the state of the case. and remedies for pains due to products of the elements. the residing in impregnable localities. Why is it not [to be thus effected]? Because. since it is hard to get one to grapple with that very difficult knowledge of truth which can be perfected only by the toil of many successive births. we see other pains springing up. c. though it be not easy [§ 1. e. above-mentioned [§ 1. viz. &c. viz. Aph. &c.. after the cessation (the cessation of pain is understood)... for we see [on the loss of wealth. &c. [from whichever of its three sources (§ 1.' i. p.

5 again and again obviating it [as often as it presents itself]. liberation from pain. the cessation of hunger. &c.* This [method of palliatives (§ 3)] is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidence. viz. in every respect.. and thus there is the soul's desire. just as one should eat.e.. &c. and because. [i. who are acquainted with authoritative treatises]. 5. When pain shall arise [let us suppose one to argue] then it is to be obviated. since physicians are not perfect [in their art]. would not be advisable]. there would be an impossibility as regards [ensuring] the perfect fitness [of the agents employed]. the cessation of pain. &c.* [Let us consider the doubt] that the soul's desire [the cessation of pain. For there are not physicians. 6 Aph. so that there is not [under such circumstances]. a. may result] from exertions for the obviation [of pain]. He mentions another proof [of his assertion]: p. 4.* Also [an inferior method ought not to be adopted] because of the . Moreover. This negation negatived. by p. still. This doubt he states [as follows]: The question whether the end may not be attained by the recurrent use of ordinary means. because it is not everywhere possible [to employ it at all].. when corporeal pain has departed. when there is hunger. there may still be that which is mental. b. even if this were possible.. Aph. For these reasons.e. &c. In regard to this [doubt] he states the recognized decision: p. and [to rely on physicians. such a soul's aim [as that which contents itself with temporary palliatives] is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidence. in every place and at all times. even if there were the possibility. with their drugs. there may be the cessation of future pain. also..—for pain cannot with certainty be got rid of by means of physicians..present pain]. &c.—i. 3.. even if these were [always at hand]. and thus there is the soul's desire of the eater. 7 Aph. as is the case with the obviation of daily hunger a.

that the bondage is essential. [with the utter exclusion of pain]. What have we to do with your 'knowledge of truth. c.Scriptural evidence in favour of this view. if that were the case. it is incapable of destruction. But then [it may be suggested]. There is no difference in the applicability of liberation. [it follows that] Bondage is the junction of pain. if it come under the latter head.e. we understand you to mean from bondage. in the Scriptural or legal injunction of means for liberation: such is what must be supplied. by being eternal. p.. and that it is adventitious. no fitness. which is the means thereof [i. then there would be no rule. Aph. of Liberation]. For. and how the liberation takes place. it will perish of itself. is transcendent as a remover of all pains. transitory thing]. i. a.]: Liberation must be possible.)]. in the first place. Now. Moreover. since Liberation (moksha). [supposing it were either (see § 19. therefore. b. exclusively. One ought not to endeavour after the removal of this or that pain by these and those expedients [§ 1. That is to say. on either of the suppositions. with the view of demonstrating [the real nature of] Bondage and Liberation. 6. Since Liberation has been stated [§ 1] to result from the complete cessation of pain. in the text: 'There is nothing beyond the gaining of Soul. one ought to endeavour only after the knowledge of truth. [to complete . 8 An objection met. b. And is that bondage essential? Or is it adventitious? In the former case.]. because the Scripture tells its preeminence above all [other objects of endeavour].' b. a.. [like any other adventitious and. the objections to Bondage's being essential [§ 5. 9 a. else the means would not have been enjoined. he declares.' then? To this he replies [as follows]: p. Aph. 7.e. and this is not essential in man.* And there is no difference between the two.* There would be no rule in the enjoining of means for the liberation of one bound essentially. b. we can tell both how the bondage takes place. preeminence of Liberation [as proved] by the text [of Scripture declaratory] of its preeminence above all else. when you say liberation.

though something be enjoined. [and. To this he replies [as follows]: p. 10 Scripture would be nugatory. Scripture being assumed. 11 An impracticable injunction is no rule. as in all the others of the six systems. a. b. There can be no fitness. Aph. Because. or changeable. or impure.the aphorism]. [would be chargeable against the Scripture. to be an exact measure of truth]. 9. betokened by impracticableness. endures as long as the thing itself. unauthoritativness. which is eseential to it. the Scripture which enjoins the means for its attainment is a false authority. that. if pain were essential to humanity]. or propriety. a. since Scripture is an unquestionable authority. where something impossible is enjoined: though it be enjoined. if pain were inevitable.* There is no rule. then its liberation could not take place even through hundreds of successive births.)].* Since an essential nature is imperishable. to explain our meaning [by an illustration]. why the injunction is given]. b. 8. inasmuch as it is impracticable [in its injunctions.e. in an injunction with a view to an impossible fruit. (§ 7. it would follow [on the supposition that pain is essential to humanity]. or ordered [to be effected] by means . And it has been declared in the Divine Song [the Í•wara-gítá. let it be an injunction [to use means for the attainment of an unattainable object]. here. And this is out of the question. what have we to do with that?' Therefore he declares [as follows]: p. we may be excused from asking or answering the question. it is no injunction.' c. fire cannot be liberated from its heat. But then [some one may say]. since that which is essential exists as long as the substance exists. a. Aph. since Liberation is impossible. i. [Since some one may be disposed to say] 'Grant that there is no fitness [in the Scriptural and legal injunctions.]: 'If the soul were essentially foul. That is to say: since the essential nature of anything is imperishable. on the mere strength of Scripture.. seeing that.

[something essential may be not irremovable. So. too. .* Since both perceptibleness and [subsequent] non-perceptibleness may belong to some power [which is indestructible]. or of a seed. Therefore. because. Here he comes upon a doubt: A doubt whether the essential be not removable. as. with reference to the doubt just raised]: Aph. but only the semblance of an injunction. but not removed. But then [the doubter is supposed to argue]. &c. there are merely the manifestation and [afterwards] the hiding of the whiteness. a. a. of appearing white and of germinating (see § 10. the essential whiteness of white cloth is removed by dyeing. and the essential power of germination in a seed is removed by p. because it stands to reason. or of the power of germination. 10. and by the will of the Yogí. in these two p. such is the meaning [of the aphorism. even though it were essential. there may be [without any impropriety] the enjoinment of the means thereof. to which he proceeds to reply]. according to the analogy of the white cloth and the seed. for example. the whiteness of the dyed cloth and the germinating power of the roasted seed can again be brought out by the processes of the bleacher. a.. which is indestructible [§ 8]. Decision that an essential property may be hidden. b. that not even the Veda can make one see sense in an absurdity: such is the meaning. it is possible that there should be the removal of the bondage of the soul. b. 11. it is not something impracticable that is enjoined. that is to say.. &c. then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].* If [some one says] as in the case of white cloth.that are impracticable. in the case of the roasted seed]. He declares [the real state of the case. In regard even to the two examples above-mentioned [§ 10]. [when one is directed to render some indestructible* power imperceptible]. [in the case of the dyed cloth]. if [any one argues thus]. Well. Why [do we say this]? Because. but not the removal of the whiteness. namely.)]. people do not give an injunction for [the positive destruction of]** something essential. 13 instances of the perceptibleness and non-perceptibleness of a power [the powers. the destruction even of what is essential [in spite of what is stated under § 7] is seen. Aph. this is no injunction at all. [the possessor of supernatural powers. 12 fire. &c.

if that which is the fact in regard to another could occasion the bondage of one quite different. bring all into bondage. because [if that were the case.* Not from connexion with time [does bondage befall the soul]. because this.* Nor [does bondage arise] from connexion with place. 12. 14 Time. place] is connected with all men.. a. if any]. Why? 'For the same reason. 14.. [and must. The bondage of man is not caused by time. is [eternally] associated with all. The soul is not kept in bondage by its being conditioned... Aph. Aph. for that stated in the preceding aphorism. since it [viz. but] the body. bondage might befall even the liberated [which is impossible]. bondage would [in that case] befall the liberated.* Nor [does the bondage of the soul arise] from its being conditioned [by its standing among circumstances that clog it by limiting it]. whether liberated p. because time. for the same reason. for the same [reason] a.b. Aph.: p. That is to say: bondage does not arise from connexion with place. By 'condition' we mean the being in the shape of a sort of association. and is eternal. because. because that is the property of the body [and not of the soul]. viz. is at all times associated with all men. &c. which applies to all. Time. viz. Having thus disproved the notion that bondage is essential [to man]. wishing to disprove also the notion that it is the result of some [adherent] cause. all-pervading and eternal. because that is the fact in regard to [not the soul. cannot be the cause of the bondage of a part. which applies to everything. be rejects the [various supposable] causes.e. 13. therefore. either.' i.] there could be no such separation as that of the liberated and unliberated. a. Place. The bondage [of the soul] does not arise from that. . that. that is to say. 15 or not liberated. cannot be the cause. also. [and not with those alone who are in bondage].

e. if. whether enjoined or forbidden. But then [some one may say].. b.. but not the soul]. then bondage might befall even the liberated. through a property of another. the mental organ]: so.e. a. The word iti here shows that it [i. And. the assertion conveyed in the aphorism] is a reason.* Because this soul is [unassociated with any conditions or circumstances that could serve as its bonds.3 [if the case were as you imagine]. c. and. the bondage of one quite distinct could take place. since the soul is unassociated.* Nor [does the bondage of soul arise] from any work. not the property of the soul [but of the mind]. because [works are] the property of another [viz.] even in such cases as the universal dissolutions [of the phenomenal universe. 16 The soul is absolute. with allusion to this.b. the mind]. let this conditioned state belong to the soul.. and because it [the bondage] would be eternal. . 'and because it would be eternal.' i. 17 a.e. belong [not to the soul. it belongs only to the body to be conditioned. this objection does not apply. belongs not to something else than the soul. then let the bondage. [through some acts of some one else]. he declares: p. that. too. That is to say: moreover. On this point [to prevent mistakes]. in the shape of connexion with pain. if we hold that bondage may arise from the acts of the associate2 [viz. p. 16. but] to the mind alone. since it is an established point that pain is an A doubt whether the bondage. if that be the case. it is] absolute. But then [some one may say]. the bondage of the soul does not arise from any work. because works are the property of another. in accordance with the principle that it have the same locus as the works [to which it is due]. including the mental organ. in the shape of connexion with pain. The fruit of works belongs not to the soul.. Aph. the construction with the preceding aphorism being this. 15. i. would occur [where it does not.. also. he states another reason. Aph. because bondage. But then [some one might say].

also. since Nature can be the cause of bondage. 20 b.e. is a dependent thing. If the reading [in the aphorism] be nibandhaná1 [in the 1st case. a. also. p. If bondage.. he declares [as follows]: Why it is to the soul that the bondage must belong. but of soul. [then I say] 'no. [when soul is altogether disconnected from the phenomenal].e. 18 of the mind. it must be remembered. I say 'no. then bondage would occur even in such cases as the universal dissolution. if it [Nature] were to occasion bondage. And this [pain that belongs to the soul] is in the shape merely of a reflexion of the pain [that attaches to its attendant organism]. i. Therefore. only as depending on . then the construction will be as follows: 'If [you say that] the bondage is caused by Nature. that men are held. a property of the mind. as its cause. there could be no such different experience as one man's experiencing pain. Therefore. connexion with pain] assumed of the soul. why is bondage [i. then there could not be diverse experience. and not in the 5th].* If it were the property of any other. there could be no such thing as diverse experience. a. and another man's not: [for. p. also? With reference to this doubt. c. is dependent on the conjunction which is to be mentioned in the next aphorism. 19 b. But then [some one may say].' because that.' &c. because. to be numerically different]. as its cause. let bondage result from Nature. also. it is not in point of mind.. 18. He rejects also the notion that Nature (prak•iti) is directly the cause of bondage: Nature is not the immediate cause of the soul's bondage.affection p. Nature.e.. Aph. by Kapila.' [because] that. also. Aph. If you say so. it must be admitted that pain is connected with the soul.* If [you say that the soul's bondage arises] from Nature. so that there is no undue result [deducible from our theory]. i. 17. in the shape of connexion with pain. even without that [conjunction which is next to be mentioned]. were the property of another. and this reflexion is of its own attendant [organism] only.

just through that [connexion with Nature] does bondage take place. of pain] with that [viz.] nor adventitious [§ 11. through this very sort of conjunction [it follows that] the bondage is reflexional. he says 'which is ever. [the opinion that there is] an absolutely real conjunction [of the soul] with pain. That is to say: as the connexion of colour with essentially pure crystal does not take place without the conjunction of the China-rose [the hue of which. as colour is produced by heating [in the case of a jar of black clay. 21 What really is the relation of its bondage to the soul.1 without the conjunction thereof. the soul. of Nature] is there the connexion of that [i. moreover. [water being held to be essentially cold. and neither essential [§ 5. 19. after the fire of the brick-kiln has been extinguished.' &c..e. any connexion with that. the bondage is merely reflexional. ['not without']. For.. [§ 19]. viz. could not take place without the . while engaged on this point. which becomes red in the baking]. without the conjunction of Nature. on the removal thereof]. Therefore. any connexion with bondage.. Hence.. on the conjunction to be mentioned in the next aphorism]. b. ever essentially pure. in the very middle [of his criticisms on erroneous notions in regard to the matter. just so the connexion of pain with the soul.* [But] not without the conjunction thereof [i. Aph. i. if bondage were produced by the conjunction [of the soul] with Nature. d. &c.e. but. either essentially or adventitiously]. In order that there may not be such an error as thot of the Vai•eshikas... then. seems to belong to the crystal]. b. [as the red colour remains in the jar.something else [i. i. he makes use of the indirect expression with a double negative. a. e..]. ceases. In order to suggest the fact that the bondage [of the soul] is reflexional [and not inherent in it. there is not. like the heat of water due to the conjunction of fire. and to seem hot only while the heat continues in conjunction with it].e. just like that.] which is ever essentially a pure and free intelligence. He establishes his own tenet. seen athwart the crystal. as bondage ceases. 22 c. whereas the red colour occasioned in a crystal vase by a China-rose. for there are more to come]: p. while it occurs not without the China-rose.. p. on the disjunction [of the soul] from Nature.e. it would continue even after disjunction therefrom. to the soul. b.

§ 20.] certain causes of [the soul's] bondage. and the perpetual liberatedness means the being ever dissociated from real pain: that is to say. pain. too. because that which is not a reality is not adapted to binding.]. since their 'Ignorance' is not a real thing. the connexion with pain in the shape of a reflexion is not a real bondage. the perpetual purity means the being ever devoid of merit and demerit. it is not fit to bind. that is to say. antecedently to the statement. 20. b. But. in consequence of the proximity of something [as a China-rose] p. that is to say. preferred by others: p. in the Saura.* f. which had been rejected. 19].' &c.. And now enough as to that point. [does the soul's bondage arise]. c. Aph.. of the received cause]. And so the maker of the aphorism means. a.* Not from Ignorance. because. 23 that lends its colour.conjunction of some accidental associate. Neither. that the cause of its bondage is just a particular conjunction [§ 19. as follows 'As the pure crystal is regarded. d. [any more than a red colour can arise spontaneously in the crystal which is essentially pure]. d.' e. as causes of the bondage. too. [any more than the reflexion of the China-rose is a real stain in the crystal]. by people. cannot arise spontaneously. the perpetual intelligence means the consisting of uninterrupted thought. in § 19. then he declares [as follows]: .)]. Now he rejects [§ 18. because. if 'Ignorance' be a reality [as some assert]. 24 The Vedántic tenet on this point disputed.' as is the opinion of those who assert non-duality [or the existence of no reality save one (see Vedánta-sára. in like manner the supreme soul [is regarded as being affected by pain]. the binding of any one with a rope merely dreamt of was never witnessed. does [the soul's] union with bondage result directly from 'Ignorance. [§ 12. In that [aphorism. c. This has been declared. The word 'too' is used with reference to the previously mentioned 'Time. as red. &c. g. b.

then there is a duality. a.' for the reason to be assigned in the next aphorism]. asserting non-duality. 21. without conceding a duality. p.* If it ['Ignorance'] be [asserted. b. it is not unreal. hold that there is neither a duality through there being something of the same kind [with soul].* And [if you assume 'Ignorance' to be a reality. That is to say: and. and this the Vedántís cannot intend to establish]. Aph. which you asserters of non-duality cannot contemplate allowing]. through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul. a. without stultifying himself. [by you who profess to follow the Vedánta]. because we experience its effects. p. then] there would be a duality. but it is in the shape of something at once real and unreal. regarding 'Ignorance.' [and so you stultify yourself]. 26 The Vedántí must not allege tha 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal. § 21)]. [like Plato's •ν κα• ¼• •ν: (see Vedánta-sára. 25 Aph. Aph. by you. The meaning is: if [the Vedántí says that] 'Ignorance' is not real.—and.The Vedántí cannot evade the objection. to be] a reality. 22. through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul. He states another objection: The Vedántí cannot evade the objection. and coordinate with Soul: if [therefore] it be not soul. a.* If [the Vedántí alleges. then there is an abandonment of the [Vedántíc] tenet. because these followers of the Vedánta. which a follower of the Vedánta cannot allow]. .—else there would be a duality through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul. then you abandon your own implied dogma* [see Nyáya Aphorisms I. moreover. That is to say: if 'Ignorance' is real and without a beginning. if you agree that 'Ignorance' is a reality.. 23.' that] it is in the shape of both these opposites. [then we shall say 'no. nor through there being something of a different kind. § 31] of the unreality of Ignorance. then it is eternal.

as they are agreed that fire is to be met with on the culinary hearth?]: such is the import. we hold that there is such a thing. as regards your opinion. unknown though it be [to people in general]. as 'Ignorance' which is at once real and unreal. That is to say: it is not right to say that 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal.' &c. [for. I. because this is established by proofs. § 35)].e. I. which differs at once from the real and the unreal [see p. although they may not comply with all the technical requisitions of Gotama's scheme of argumentative exposition (see Nyáya Aphorisms. in the case of a dispute. p. it is neccssary that there should be an example of the thing [i. 25. by disallowing the categories of the Nyáya]: . 28 A question whether the Vedántí is bound to avoid selfcontradiction. Therefore. Aph. who arrange them under sixteen]. and. § 1]. 'We are not asserters of a definite set of categories [like the Vai•eshikas. which are satisfactory to us.. where is there anything in regard to which both parties are agreed that it is at once real and unreal. § 21]. Aph. 28 Vedánta-sára.' because no such thing is known [as is at once real and unreal. § 25).] a.* [To the suggestion that 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal we say] 'no. and the Naiyáyikas. Again he ponders a doubt: p.. who arrange all things under six heads. (see Nyáya Aphorisms. He confutes [this pretence of evading the objection. I.* [Possibly the Vedántí may remonstrate] 'We are not asserters of any Six Categories. like the Vai•eshikas and others. By the expression [in the aphorism] 'and others' are meant the Naiyáyikas.. c.There is no such thing as a thing at once real and unreal. such is not to be found.' a. 27 For. a case in which all parties are agreed that the property in dispute is really present].' [Scriptural or otherwise. b. 24. or [if you prefer it]. because any such thing as is at once real and unreal is not known. for the Naiyáyika is an asserter of sixteen categories [see Nyáya Aphorisms.. b. The reason of this he states in the words 'because no such thing.

we might as well accept also the selfcontradictory assertions of children and the like: such is the meaning. Aph. because there is a local separation. it is impossible for disciples to p. a thing at once real and unreal. A thing cannot act where it is not. however. between the external and the internal there is not the relation of influenced and influencer. in the shape of a continued stream. else we come to the level of children. 26. and madmen. 27. contrary to all fitness: otherwise. is not caused by any influence of objects from all eternity. replaced by its facsimile the next instant.* [The bondage] thereof moreover. and the like. Let there be [accepted] no system of categories [such as that of the Vai•eshika. 31 The heretical theory of a succession of momentary objects from all eternity. still. as well as in yours.. This he objects to. In the opinion of these [persons whose theory we are at present objecting to]. or sixteen]. which is inconsistent. 29 admit. a.* Also [in my opinion. b. rejected. each being. has had no commencement.' i. apparently]. Aph.The self-contradictory is altogether inadmissible. 'Thereof. either. there is no acceptance of the inconsistent. and that by the influence2 of these the bondage of the soul [is occasioned]. is it possible that the bondage [of the soul] has been occasioned: such is the meaning. He states the reason of this [impossibility]: p.* Even although this be not compulsory [that the categories be six. [as follows]: p. 30 a. § 25]. Certain heretics [deniers of the authority of the Vedas] assert that there exist external objects of momentary duration [individuaily. as there is between him that stays at Srughna and him that stays at Pá•aliputra. merely on Your Worship's assertion. 28. An eternal influence of objects. b. since being and not-being are contradictory. an influence of objects the effect of which. as causing the soul's bondage. so that the uninterrupted series of productions becomes something equivalent to continuous duration]. a.e. the . Aph.—not by this. of the soul.

[the free soul. such as that of madder and the cloth [to which it gives its colour]. goes to the place of the object. being just as likely to come across objects as any other]: such is the meaning.* [It is impossible that the soul's bondage should arise] from an influence received in the same place [where the object is. according to Your Worship. the free soul would be equally liable to bondage. p. &c. Aph. Here he ponders a doubt: .] b. because. or Patna] are two several places far apart. or that of flowers and the flower-basket [to which they impart their odour.' Why? Because there would be no distinction between the two. as regards an external object. just as the senses. we must supply as follows: 'It is impossible that the bondage should arise from an influence received in one and the same place with the object.. residing entirely within the body. is connected [with the matter of the present aphorism]. because bondage would [in that case] befall the liberated soul. 'The influence of objects [on the soul] may be asserted. the soul bound and the soul free. inasmuch as the soul. Srughna and Pá•aliputra [Palibothra. a. 32 c. and that which is thus within cannot stand in the relation of the influenced and the influencer. But then [these heretics may reply]. [the bond and the free]. because there is a contact with the object. Because the affection which we call 'influence' (vásaná) is seen only when there is conjunction. By the word 'also' the absence or conjunction [between the soul and objects (see § 10)]. in that case].soul is circumscibed. according to us. Why? Because they are separated in regard to place. according to this hypothesis. To complete the sense. 29. also. there would be no distinction between the two.' Therefore he declares [as follows]: On the heretical view. which he himself holds. 33 b. d. like two persons the one of whom remains in Srughna and the other in Pá•aliputra: such is the meaning. p.

yet the reception of the influence may result merely from the force of the unseen. also.) momentarily perish and are replaced. occasioned by the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] belonging to an agent [say. there is positively no such relation [between the soul at one time and its successor at another] as that of deserver and bestower [or transmitter of its merits or demerits]. 32. the agent and the patient are distinct. [then he will find his reply by looking forward]. [i. Aph. not only that objects (see § 26. The heretic's attempted defence. 34 Each back must bear its own burden. because it is impossible that there should be an influence of objects [§ 27] taking effect on a patient [say. a. which. in thy opinion. the soul that is liberated alike from merit and demerit being able to encounter. [as follows]: p. with impunity. and do not belong to the same time [believing. But then [the heretic. Since.Aph. the soul of to-day]. since the two do not belong to one and the same time. Aph. a. is of a like description].* They cannot stand in the relation of deserver and bestower. be imputed. then he will find his answer in the next aphorism]. is a numerically different individual]: such is the meaning. granting that they [the free soul and the bound] are alike in respect of their coming into contact with objects. as thou heretically dost. 31. b. then we look forward]. admitting the principle that p. from the merit and demerit of this or that soul. on the hypothesis in question. b.. or may not. the soul of yesterday.* If [the heretic suggests that] the case is like that of the ceremonies in regard to a son. b. a. [i.* If [the heretic.. [the heretic may argue]: 'But then. when they become conjoined with them in one and the same locality.e. the object that would enchain one differently circumstanced]': if [this be urged. of merit and demerit. but that the duration of souls. wishing to save his theory suggests that a difference between the two cases (see § 29) does exist] in virtue of the unseen. That is to say. This he disputes. 35 the merit or demerit of an act . 30.e. He ponders a doubt: Whether merit may.

b. also.belongs entirely to the agent. so as to be a fit subject for the duties that pertain to the time subsequent to birth [such as the investiture with the sacred thread. a. III. 'for.e. let this bondage have nothing determinate for its cause. in like manner there may be an influence of objects on the experiencer [say. on thy theory.' i. [on your own theory: it is not a thing that you can assert as a fact]... &c. on the strength of [the argument here next stated.... and there is the injunction [of Manu. 37 c.' [which view of matters is propounded in the next aphorism]: . which [no doubt] belongs to the father [who performs the ceremonies. Aph. by showing that the illustration is not a fact: This will not help the heretic's argument. 36 the son. p. with regard to the ceremonies in question. b. such as that [ceremony (see Colebrooke's 'Hindu Law. according to my theory. if the ceremonies in anticipation of his conception had been omitted]: and thus your illustration is not a real one. [like everything else] is momentary. or nothing at all for its cause.. in that case.' Vol. the soul of to-day]. v. since bondage. 104) celebrated] in anticipation of conception. 33. &c. there is no one permanent soul which could be consecrated by the ceremonies in anticipation of conception. p. II. viz. And.] for. by [means of the performance of]1 the ceremonies in anticipation of conception. on that theory. 26). the benefit of p. for which the young Bráhman would not be a fit subject. to propitiatc the gods]. He refutes this. 'In that case. too.e. there is not one [self-identical] soul. because.' i. the soul of yesterday]: such is the meaning [of the heretic]. Some other heretic may encounter us. (Ch. also. which could be consecrated [by the ceremonies in question]. as the son is benefited by ceremonies in regard to a son. your illustration is not a fact. seeing that it is possible that the benefit to the son should arise from the 'unseen' [merit] deposited in the son by means of the ceremony regarding the son: for it is an implied tenet [of my school]. through the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] that belongs even to a different subject [say. which proceeds on the same grounds]. may urge that]. that it [the soul] is permanent [in its self-identity].] 'But then. could not take place. continuing from the [time of] conception to birth.* [Your illustration proves nothing.

] this [reason. [things are not momentary in their duration]. (2) Because it exists. 'what I saw. b.e. 'since there is no such thing as a permanent result' [§ 34]. is to be admitted]. and so require no cause. for the absurdity of this is proved by recognition. viz. p. because the absurdity of its being momentary follows from the opposite argument [to that under § 34. And thus the point relied on is.Whether bondage may not be momentary. p.. is permanent. 'existence'] does not extend unduly1 [as you may object. that same do I touch. bondage] have no cause at all.] as a jar. a. or the like.]. [to complete the aphorism]... This [in fact] is precisely what is asserted in the expression. Aph.] because this is contradicted by Scripture . is like the subject in dispute.. 34. 'Of bondage': this must be supplied.' [an argument which may be stated as follows]. [in being momentary]. viz. &c. 38 c. And [continues the heretic. &c. because that. He objects [to this heretical view]: The fact of recognition proves that things are not momentary.] as the apex of the lamp-flame. that it [i. or the like. 36. (2) Because it exists. Aph. That is to say: nothing is momentary.]: (1) Bondage. And so this is the application [of the argument.] to the case of a jar. also [in my opinion]. a. or the like.* No.* And [things are not momentary. (3) [Everything that exists is momentary. 39 (3) [Everything that exists is permanent. also. taken from such facts of recognition as.: (1) Bondage. d. 35.* Since there is no such thing as a permanent result [on the heretical view]. is momentary. viz. Aph. b. the momentariness [of bondage.

And you must not say that there is no such thing as that [relation of cause and effect]. [and who. is contradicted by such texts as this. 40 Aph. thou quite errest in regard to momentariness. because the general principle. if the momentary duration. &c. That is to say: nothing is momentary. because this momentary churacter does not [in fact] belong to the apex of the lampflame. Moreover.)]. there would be no such thing as the efforts of him who desires an effect. as simultaneously coming into [their supposed momentary] existence. and reasoning.. that the relation of cause and effect exists. was antecedently existing. That is to say: the general principle of the momentariness [of all things] is denied. &c. Let us ask. Moreover. p. consisting of effects and causes. sets in operation the causes adapted to its production]. from not taking account of the minute and numerous instants [really included in a duration which seems to thee momentary]: such is the import. The heretic's illustration is not a truth. (§ 34. does the relation of product and [material] cause exist between the earth and the jar.. 41 The causal relation is not between things that arise simultaneously. viz. O ingenuous one.' and by such Scriptural and other arguments as this. '[All] this. or as successive? Not the first.. because it is proved to be a reality by the fact that. that the whole world. Aph. because there is nothing to lead to such an inference. a. and the like.a.. b. then there can be no such thing as the relation of cause and effect. b. viz. otherwise. [of things] be asserted. dost ground thy generalization. and . there could be no relation of cause and effect. therefore. he declares [as follows]: If things were momentary. heretic. in the case of the earth and the jar. 37. With reference to this. in that instance. a. 38. p.] because his instance is not a fact. the instance [on which thou.* And [we reject the argument of this heretic.* It is not between two things coming simultaneously into existence. is momentary. 'How should what exists proceed from the non-existent?' That things are momentary is contradicted by Scripture and reasoning.

'moreover. the] substantial cause. further. The relation of cause and effect is. however formally different from.] its p. operating with earth. departs. for the product. which is contrary to the nature of the causal relation just defined]. the product.] are momentary in their duration.. we must say.. the product no longer exists: and these two [conditions. &c. because.e. the two being mutually exclusive.' i. is not competent to arise. With reference to this same [topic. the consequent. therefore. and survive it]. when the antecedent departs the consequent is unfit [to arise.2 that.'4 The two suggesters of the relation of cause and effect. i. [on the theory objected to]. according to you. because. but] 'let the . because. he mentions another [the converse] objection [to the theory of the momentary duration of things]: The coexistence of substance and product is impossible. that. [and cannot. [the heretic may say. because.. a. as indispensable to the causal relation between the two. while the product exists. at the time when the antecedent. because.e.3 belong to opposite times. Aph.because we should not [in that case] find the man. the substance and the product]. inasmuch as they are antecedent and consequent. viz. in product and p. the two [viz. i. a product is cognized only by its inhering in [and being substantially identical with.3 a.* Because.1 are (1) concomitancy of affirmatives. that is to say. who wants a jar... Nelther is it the last. if things be momentary.e.. because the two keep always asunder. when the substance no longer exists. Aph.* Moreover. the other [the consequent] is incompatible. b. therefore. [and is incapable. does not come into existence until its substance has perished. 39. at the time when the antecedent exists. is 'unfit. the substance thereof exists. But then. do not let the coexistence of substance and product be insisted upon. since things [in your opinion. 40. of surviving it]. on your theory] cannot be. coexist. 43 substance. 42 substantial cause. To complete [the aphorism]. there can be no such relation as that of cause and effect. inconsistent with the theory of the momentary duration of things. [with a view to the jar's subsequent production]. the consequent cannot coexist with it. not [on the theory of the momentary duration of things can there be such a relation as that of cause and effect]. while the one [the antecedent] exists. b. the cause. in regard to which he declares [as follows]: A product cannot survive its substantial cause. and (2) this concomitancy of negatives.

then a mere void offers itself. a.* Not Thought alone exists.* If there were merely antecedence. except Thought. p. as distinguished from an instrumental cause]. 42. Aph. But then [these heretics may rejoin].' Part I. 45 Therefore it has no cause. then there would be no determination [of a substantial or material cause. neither does Bondage. are proved to exist. by intuition. because external objects. 'From the example of intuitive perception in dreams [see Butler's 'Analogy. just as the things of a dream [have no real existence]. because antecedence constitutes no distinction between it and the instrumental causes. And it could not be determined that this was the substance [of this or that product].. Ch. 43. since.' He rejects the opinion of these [heretics]: We have the evidence of Intuition for the External. That is to say: the reality is not Thought alone. in respect merely of its antecedence. Why? .]. the other does not exist. 44 as it belongs to the instrumental cause. we find this [your supposed evidence of objective reality] to exist. p. that there is a distinction between instrumental and substantial causes. Other heretics say: 'Since nothing [really] exists..nature of a cause belong to the substantial cause. Aph. for. b.' To this he replies: Antecedence to the product does not distinguish the Matter from the Instrument. The question whether anything exists besides Thought. the whole world is agreed: such is the meaning. on the granting of nothing more than its antecedence [to the product]. p. because there is the intuition of the external. nor it is absolutely false.e. [i. Aph. 46 a. a. if the one does not exist. I. even in the absence of objects!' To this he replies: The denial of the external amounts to Nihilism. as well as for the Internal. That is to say: if external things do not exist. 41. nothing exists at all]. b. just as Thought is. also. there is a void. [as we need scarcely remind you].* Then.

'because to perish is the habit of things. a. if the intuition of the external did not establish the objective.' i. who can be bound by what? This [question] is what we rest upon. 47 truth]. in the midst [of any beginning and ending]. .Because. that 'the jar has passed away. [and such an assertion is idle. Aph. also. [for] just as. Therefore. then thought does not exist. too. or the like.' because to perish is the very nature of things: but nothing continues. if it ceased to perish]: such is the meaning. 48 exists.] because things that are not made up of parts. if the external does not exist. would not establish [the existence of] thought. is in the condition of having passed away. because it p. 44. that even products perish. just because a void is all:' with such a proposal [as recorded in the next aphorism] does [some one who may claim the title of] the very crest-gem of the heretics rise up in opposition: The heretic goes the length of asserting sheer Nihilism. as is a dream. cannot perish. 'Then let the reality be a mere void.. [But] what need of many words? It is not the fact. as the indiscerptible is indestructible. Bondage. unintelligent persons. by the cognition that 'the jar is old' [we mean that it has passed from the condition of new to that of old].—is phenomenal. this is 'a mere counter-assertion. 45. since there is no cause of the destruction of such things. Since everything that exists perishes.' i. [so that nothing could continue. and. after quitting its own nature.e. then the intuition of thought. b. and not real. 'Of unintelligent persons. [or the only p.' it is settled only that the jar. therefore. therefore. &c. a mere idle counter-assertion that a thing must needs be perishable.. by such a cognition as this. The void alone [says this prince of heretics. so. has merely a momentary existence. and that which is perishable is false.* The reality is a void: what is perishes. a. The reason assigned for the perishableness of whatever exists is. He rejects [this heretical view] Aph. or the fact that nothing exists at all] is the reality. b.* This is a mere counter-assertion of Nihilism denied. for it is intuition that proves the objective: and. b. the searching for the cause of Bondage is unfitting. because to perish is the habit of things.e. as of all things the beginnings and endings are merely nonentities. of blockheads..

[(see § 33) in respect of which the liberation or beatification would be possible. the theory that external things are momentary [§ 26. 46. and also the means thereof [since there can be no further means required for the removal of anything.]. [which is. or as presenting the means for the cessation of pain. i. at least. viz. b. and as the theory that nothing exists besides Thought [§ 41. 50 The soul's aim is not annihilition Aph. . b. because the [whole] world agrees. This view. if it be settled that the thing positively does not exist]. &c. the intuition of the external.]. or even predicable]. is not a good one. b. that the aim of the soul consists in the joys.. because it has the same fortune as. 49 Aph. viz. [as stated in § 42]. apply equally here [in the case of Nihilism]: such is the import. the fact of recognition.' this too. viz. that shall abide in it. He states another objection [to the heretical view]: Nihilism is open to the same objections as both the Momentary and the Ideal theories. The reason for the rejection of the theory that things are momentary in their duration. &c.. that there is a permanent soul. moreover [§ 44]. 'Let the void [of mere nonentity] be the soul's aim. is open to similar reasons for rejection as. whether as consisting in the cessation of pain.* In neither way [whether as a means. can hardly be: so he declares [as follows]: p. p. and the reason for the rejection of the theory that nothing exists besides Thought. when there is absolutely nothing]. [as stated in § 35].' [says the heretic. Moreover. 47. because it has the same fortune as both the views [which were confuted just before]. a. a. or as an end. as little consistent with Nihilism as it is with the momentary duration of things].c. as for the opinion which is accepted by these [heretics]. &c.. e. because [they hold. since herein consist at once the cessation of pain [which cannot continue. that is to say. And this cannot be. 'Let the mere void [of absolute nonentity] be the soul's aim [and summum bonum].. while] you do not hold. this [nihilistic theory is not a right one]..* Moreover.] is this [annihilation] the soul's aim.

'Of the size p.e. for instance. in the books of Scripture and of law. if the soul were admitted to be. since it would come under the same conditions as jars. in the case of the soul. or the like. i. remaining over and above those [proposed by unbelievers. [and. moreover. are to be set aside: It is by no movement that the soul gets into bondage. c. and] already rejected. 48. [or in other words without motion] a. 'Bondage' [required to complete the aphorism] is understood from the topic [of discussion].. does not result from any sort of motion. [because] all-pervading.* [We cannot admit that the soul is other than all-pervading. incapable of changing its place]. is the text. &c. 50. p. 52 of the thumb is the soul. . b. which is inactive. we hear of its going and coming into this world and the other world. that the soul's bondage. i. But then [the objector may say]. motion is impossible. as you allege. Were the soul limited. Now [certain] other things. entertained. there would be a contradiction to our tenet [of its imperishableness]. by [imperfectly instructed] believers. it might be perishable.* Not from any kind of motion [such as its entrance into a body. That is to say: and. Aph. the inner spirit.' and the like:1 [but] this conjecture he repels: Aph. 51 Aph. That is to say: because this is impossible.. The meaning is. also. b. 49. a.b. because] by its being limited. 'Since. of its entrance into a body. therefore. let soul be [not allpervading. a. limited. but] merely limited [in its extent]: and to this effect. like a jar. also. does the soul's bondage result]. He states a reason for this: What is all-pervading does not change place. as causes of [the soul's] bondage.* Because this is impossible for what is inactive. in the shape.

and in like manner is the soul. from such maxims3 as this. He now justifies the text [see § 49.] referring to the motion [of the soul. as the declaration that 'It is eternal. § 4. because this [merit or demerit (see § 16.2 b. i.). 54 and it is wilful Nature that] in the three worlds. b. moreover] does not arise from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] resulting therefrom: The bondage of the soul is no result of any merit or demerit.* b. l. is [applicable. permanent.'2 the text3 regarding its motion is to be explained as having reference to a movement pertaining [not to the soul. but] to an attendant. [in this case] the jar may be removed. but not the space.e. 51.* The text regarding the motion [of the soul].1 as in the case of the Ether [or Space. then. 52. which is like the sky. or the like. reaps these': such is the import.)] is no property of the . but of an accessory]: p. Soul moves not. Since there are such proofs of the soul's unlimitedness. Now he declares that the bondage. a. 53 Aph. this would be contrary to our settled principle. circumscribed [in dimension].. a.e. Part I. that 'Nature does the works the fruits of which are blissful or baneful.4 and because we may conclude that the motion [erroneously supposed to belong to the soul (49. in being made up of parts. a. omnipresent. That is to say: the bondage of the soul does not arise directly from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] occasioned p.]. It has already been denied [§ 16] that the bondage [of the soul] is occasioned by works] in the shape either of enjoined or of forbidden actions. b. [does the bondage of the soul result from the merit or demerit arising] from works. moreover. though we talk of the space enclosed in a jar. and [hence] in being perishable. [incapable of being moved]'. p.. 55 by works. moreover. 'As the Ether [or space] included in a jar.] belongs to Nature [see Vedánta Aphorisms. [that the soul is imperishable]. by showing that the motion is not really of the soul. which moves not. any more than Space.1 Why? Because this is no property thereof. when the jar is removed. &c.* Nor. Aph. only] because of the junction of an attendant. as moving with the jar].. since it would resemble a jar. because these belong not thereto. for there is the text.

then. b. The expression 'and so much for that point' means. this would be contradictory to such texts as. p.soul. &c.].e.] is the first. a. That is to say: if the case were otherwise. b. if the bondage of the soul arose from any one or other of those [supposed causes already treated of. then it [the bondage of the soul might extend unduly. 56 b. if bondage and its cause were under other conditions [than we have declared them to be]. 54. stands thus: since [all] other [theories] are overthrown by the declaratory aphorisms. alone. 57 that the investigation of the cause of the bondage [of the soul] here closes. it is ascertained that the immediate cause of the bondage [of the soul] is just the conjunction . 'There would be no fitness in the enjoining' [see § 7]. equally. What need of so much [prolixity]? He states a general objection why the bondage of soul cannot result from any one or other [of these causes]. b. bondage might cling even to the emancipated. beginning with its essence [see § 6.. and without the [three] qualities [is the soul]:'2 such is the meaning. Aph. the merit [or demerit] even of another. a.' i. even to the emancipated]. 53. p. then there might be an undue extension. intelligent. The case. inasmuch as it is contrary to Scripture.' whereupon he declares [as follows]: Else. that the bondage of the soul arises from any of causes alleged by the heretics. 'Let it be that the bondage resulting from the 'unseen. b. should attach to a different person. a. And. bondage would befall even the emancipated. [for the same reasons as those stated under § 16.] among which its essential character [§ 6. and ending with its [supposed] works [see § 16].*4 If the case were otherwise [than as I say]. But then [some one may say].]. c.] is contrary to such texts as the one that declares it [the soul] to be without qualities: and so much for that point.* And this [opinion. 'Witness. all the heretical notions of the soul's relation to bondage. [that any one of these should be the cause]: A single text of Scripture upsets. Aph..

Aph. nondiscrimination. a. The true cause of bondage. Having thus declared the cause of that [bondage] p. 58 [in this respect. he disposes of it [as follows]: How the true cause of bondage affects not the emancipated. is removed by light alone. take place [in the case of the emancipated]. the removal of the non-discrimination [between Nature and soul]. p.. in such cases as 'shell-silver' [i. the conjunction of Nature and of the soul. d. the dark. moreover. 56.2 a.* Moreover.' i. incur.of Nature and of the soul. the conjunction thereof does not. through the want of a discrimination [between Nature and soul] in the emancipated. he declares the means of getting rid of it:] Non-discrimination is removable by discrimination alone. between the emancipated and the unemancipated]. nor is there a parity. The necessary means. Aph.e. or the like: such is the meaning: just as darkness. does not take place again 'through non-discrimination. But then.e. this conjunction. through non-discrimination.. in other words. just like darkness. . and not by works. [some one may say]. by this alone is 'its removal. viz..' i. c. [and by no other means].]: such is the import. Aph. to be effected. [who do discriminate. 59 which is to be got rid of. a. this conjunction of Nature and of the soul [§ 54. b. the immediacy of discrimination.. and who thus avoid the conjunction which others. [under the circumstances stated at § 54.' i. 55.e. or adventitiously caused by Time or something else [§ 5. a pearl-oyster-shell mistaken for silver]. whether it be essential. established throughout the world. 'The conjunction thereof. must occasion the bondage even of the emancipated. failing to discriminate.]. in that case.* Bondage arises from the error [of not discriminating between Nature and soul].]. Having pondered this doubt.* The removal of it is to be effected by the necessary means. 56. And thus the emancipated and the bound are not on a level..e. c. and thus fall into bondage]: such is the meaning.

]:' p.' &c. it is based on the non-discrimination [from soul] of that cause to which there is none antecedent [viz. the effects of the body.' To this he replies: The discrimination of Nature.' &c. by parity of reasoning.. p. 'no. cease.. if merely the non-discrimination of Nature and soul be. The state of the case is this: as. is a thing unalterable].' and so on. you tell us. even while there remained the conceit of [one's possessing] a body.' &c. for example. the cause of bondage. 62 well.. itself. an effect. when the soul has been discriminated from the body. through the conjunction [of the two. it is impossible that there should remain a conceit of [the soul's being any of] the products thereof [i. Aph.e. 61 b. Nature]. 60 to the institutes of law. while the soul. unless there . [without postulating a primal Nature which is to assume the shape of an 'understanding. and this is contrary to Scripture. so. a. [which is the substantial cause of its own properties]. [as something other than soul. &c. By reason of the non-discrimination of Nature from the soul. on the cessation of the non-discrimination of Nature. involves all discrimination.* c.' because.' and the like. p. as other than soul.] does occur. if any one says this. 'But then [some one may say]. and to sound reasoning.. of Nature]. on the cessation of that [from which it results]. can be accounted for on the ground simply of an 'understanding. since the non-discrimination of an effect [and the 'understanding' is an effect or product of Nature. such as the 'understanding. consequent on the want of discrimination]. &c. and if merely the discrimination of the two be the cause of liberation. 'What proof is there that there is a conceit [entertained by people in general. [which. on the other hand. in its character of unalterableness. then there would be liberation. of course.] is. [and will. which have the character of being modifications [of primal Nature. what nondiscrimination of other things there is.] of a Nature [or primal principle] different from the conceit of an 'understanding. such as. this necessarily ceases. from the departure of the cause. with the cessation of its cause]. when the non-discrimination of the understanding. 57. But then [some one may say]. because. such as the non-discrimination of the understanding [as something other than the soul]. I reply.* Since the non-discrimination of other things [from soul] results from the non-discrimination of Nature [from soul]. are products of this supposed first principle]? For all the various conceits [that the soul falls into]. has been discriminated from Nature.. it is impossible but that it should be discriminated from the colour and other [properties].. 'I am ignorant.b. the cessation of this will take place. when soul.

melted down. or the oak?' being a frivolous question]. when there is a creation. reciprocally. viz.] in respect of the cause. or of one's identity with.. and its freedom [at another].. the old puzzle. viz. again. Now. that must be the predetermining agency: for we see this in ordinary life. if it be supposed that we thus lay ourselves open to the charge of a regressus ad infinitum. like seed and sprout. or the gold. in ordinary life. &c..' because no products. the acorn. or in the case of the self-continuance1 thereof. that the conceit of [the ownership of] the grain. 'The . of which the 'understanding' is held to be a product].. 'Having died. can be created anew. though another like it may be produced from the materials]. by the removal of these [i. and its continuing so to confound itself is. is [the primary cause of the soul's bondage.. For [to explain.were such a thing as Nature. and its discrimination [at one time]. produced p. it is inadmissible to say that men's conceit of [the identity of themselves with their] 'understanding. [And. there is the removal of those. &c. But then [some one may say]. [any more than a gold-bracelet. that it is 'ever essentially a pure and free intelligence.' when they have perished. formed of that gold. f. the corresponding products or effects of the field and of the gold. or if it be supposed thut we are chargeable with reasoning in a circle. of that error of confounding one's self with Nature]. and nothing else. e.] any effects. on our own principles. it is clear that it is a conceit of [ownership. that the field. we reply. or other things. when we hold that the soul's confounding itself with Nature is the cause of p.. d. be asked what was the 'predetermining agency' in regard to it. we could not account for such conceits as the following. results from the conceit of [the ownership of] the field. 63 by a field. and that the bracelets. from the conceit of [the ownership of] gold.e. the removal of the logically antecedent conceits.] we see.. &c. because [these two are alike] without antecedent. then this is in contradiction to the assertion [in § 19].' &c. are one's property: and so the soul will cease to confound itself with the 'understanding. while it is to be expected that there should be some predetermining agency to establish a conceit of [ownership in.' and it is in contradiction to such texts as this.. the conceit of [the ownership of] the bracelets.. whatever we may assign as the first cause. because 'understanding' and the rest [as you will not deny] are effects. let me be a denizen of Paradise. 'which was first. and not of hell. Moreover.' in the case of the conceit of [the identity of the soul with] Nature. having died. The soul's confounding itself with Nature is logically antecedent to its confounding itself with anything else. and.. is one's property]. and its non-discriminatian [at another]. seeing that. the removal of the conceits that the grain. if we admit the soul's bondage [at one time]. we may. [i. and our theories are bound to conform [deferentially] to experience. [of which it is needless to ask which is the first. that] there is no occasion to look for any other 'predetermining agency.' when it ceases to confound itself with Nature. can be reproduced. [i. e. and is] not preceded by anything.e. 64 its continuing so to confound itself. such as the 'understanding. the cause why it confounds itself. &c. and.

But then.) would insinuate]: such is the state of the case.* Moreover. i. nor is it an effecter [of any work]. [as the objector (under § 57. or Inference. nor is it bound. f. which. 65 The bondage of the soul is merely verbal. since it [the bondage] resides in the mind. can remove the evil. [and not in the soul]. with no false imputation. The truth must be directly discerned.. liberated. is merely verbal. or by argument [establishing that they are so]. but not a reality. a discriminative knowledge [of Soul. going the length of immediate cognition? To this he replies: Whether Testimony. as regards the soul. Aph. that neither is there destruction [of the soul]. a. no more than 'argument. along with 'argument'] 'testimony. as distinguished from Non-soul]. a. in the Scripture and the Law. 66 b. By 'argument' we mean thinking. which was never bound]. nor production [of it].' [or verbal authority. all this. which can be removed by nothing short of direct intuitive perception of the real state of the case]. Aph. Why. That is to say: since bondage. all reside only in the mind [and not in the soul]. or of Inference. indeed.e.] is not to be removed by argument. Hence there is no contradiction to what had been said before. as regards the soul.' or inference.absolute truth is this. nor is it desirous of liberation. it [the non-discrimination of Soul from Nature.. as that of a person perplexed about the points of the compass [is not to be removed] without immediate cognition. let them be set aside by hearing [that they are merely verbal]. like the redness of the China-rose itself.* It is merely verbal. [seeing that that cannot desire or obtain liberation. like the redness of [pellucid] crystal [when a China-rose is near it].'3 This [charge of inconsistency] he repels: p. might not avail to dissipate the soul's bondage. without Perception. . 58. be merely verbal. and not a reality1 [this socalled bondage of the soul]. as the cause of liberation. if bondage. because is is merely a reflexion. p. &c. it is vox et praeterea nihil. and not merely accepted on the ground of Testimony.. The word 'moreover' is intended to aggregate [or take in. is there enjoined. nor is it. 59. &c.

or he may believe the testimony of a friend. or instruments of knowledge. tell us. 67 b.: But then. without directly perceiving. are not to be removed by merely hearing.. but still nothing will remove his erroneous perception of yellowness in the chalk. that 'The removal of it is to be effected by the necessary means.. a man with the jaundice perceives white objects as if they were yellow. This being the topic.' that knowledge. &c. That is to say: non-discrimination is not excluded. the next thing to be set forth is the 'discrimination' [here referred to]. by argument. Or it [Aph. 69 Nature]. he enounces the aphorism [§ 59]: 'Moreover.p.. then. He may infer that the piece of chalk which he looks at is really white. in the shape of discrimination [between soul and Nature]. to which immediate perception 'testimony. 59] may be explained as follows. just as the contrariety in regard to the [proper] direction. by the assertion [in Aph. set forth the fact that Liberation results from the immediate discrimination [of Soul from p. just as is the case with one who is bewildered in regard to [his] direction.? Or is it something peculiar? A reply to this being looked for.' or 'inference. by inferring. as that of fire [when not directly perceptible. without immediate cognition.' &c. i. without [his] directly perceiving [how the points of the compass really lie. unless there be discrimination as an immediate perception. therefore that 'instrument of right knowledge' (pramá•a) which establishes the existence of these [two imperceptible realities] is [first] to be set forth: The evidence for things imperceptible. because the only thing to remove an immediate error is an immediate individual perception [of the truth. [seeing that] it is declared. Aph. e. of the soul though [granted to be] merely verbal. that it is white. though merely verbal [as resulting from misdirection]. liberation can result from the discrimination of the one from the other. in the case of1 a person who is mistaken as to the points of the compass [and hence as to his own bearings]. in the first place. 56]. cannot supersede]. it is not to be removed by argument. but the necessity of which these media. is not removed by testimony. or by testimony. or by inference. viz. That is to say: the bondage. except a direct perception of whiteness. without immediate cognition. Having thus. d. is not cut off.' may conduce. . is the remover of non-discrimination [in regard to the matter in question]. since only if Soul and Nature exist.* The knowledge of things imperceptible is by means of Inference. viz.] is by means of smoke.e. &c. For example. is that knowledge of a like nature with the hearing p. c. 68 [of Testimony]. 60. &c.

Moreover.1 Weight. viz.a. e.2 In this [Sánkhya] system..e. Lightness. preparatorily to the argument that will be [afterwards] stated: p. a... severally]. Self-consciousness (ahankára). but yet is] not established by 'Inference. that is to say. [but which (see Nyáya Aphorisms. as [the knowledge that there is] fire [in such and such a locality.' i.' i. 72 the Vai•eshika system have.] of Organs (indriya). c. 'Goodness. &c.. where we cannot directly p. Disjunction.* Nature (prak•iti) is the state of equipoise of Goodness (sattwa) Passion (rajas).' &c. because [the 'Qualities' of p.] as the chief thing. § 5) is. the Gross Elements (sthúla-bhúta). 71 Aph. it is to be understood that that which is [true. He [next] exbibits the order of creation of those things among which Nature is the first. But. and both sets [external and internal.. &c. from Self-consciousness.). while] these have the qualities of Conjunction.' &c.e. 61. the fruit lodged in the soul. And thus 'Nature' is the triad of 'Qualities' (gu•a). 'The state of equipoise' of the [three] things called 'Goodness.' is estalished by Revelation. [though spoken of as the three Qualities]. 88 of this Book]. b. The twenty-five Realities enumerated... and the relation of cause and effect [among these. more correctly. I. the state of not being [developed into] an effect [in which one or other of them predominates]. [Then there is] Soul (purusha).' occasioned by smoke. themselves. are not 'Qualities' (gu•a) in the Vai•eshika sense of the word. the five Subtile Elements (tan-mátra). These things.] is brought about by the 'recognition of a Sign. no qualities (see Ka•áda's 16th Aph. &c. of things not cognizable by the senses. 'the recognition of a Sign']. is their being neither less nor more [one than another]. from Mind. and Darkness (tamas): from Nature [proceeds] Mind (mahat). Force. and. since 'Inference' is the chief [among the instruments of knowledge].3 b. 'the knowledge.3 because they are subservient to . Such is the class of twenty-five.g. and in Scripture.. but Revelation is not disregarded [in the Sánkhya system. distinct from the products [to which this triad gives rise]: such is the complete meaning. 'Inference' only is laid down [in the aphorism. the word 'Quality' (gu•a) is employed [as the name of the three things in question]. That is to say: 'of things imperceptible. as will be seen from Aph. in this [the Sánkhya] System. Nature and the Soul. is brought about by means of that instrument of right knowledge [which may be called] 'Inference' (anumána). 70 perceive it. from the Subtile Elements.

therefore. in [several] aphorisms.' &c. the 'Gross Elements. The two sets of 'Organs. the Soul. d. is the product. 73 'Subtile Elements' and (2) the two sets of 'Organs. Of this [Nature] the principle called 'the great one' (mahat). [and] thereby [i. (1) the p. or those which have not reached the absolute limit [of simplification. viz. or of the atomic].' so much is supplied. 60].* [The knowledge of the existence] of the five 'Subtile Elements' is [by inference. Of this there are two products. Taste. . declares the order of the inferring [of the existence of these principles. 62.' a.' But 'Soul' is something distinct from either product or cause. as stated in Gotama's 5th Aphorism. and so of the others]: (2) Because they are gross. for Perception must precede Inference. Touch. by Perception.' through their division into the external and the internal. 'Mind. &c. [to complete the aphorism.] which have distinct qualities. [the στοιχει•α στοιχε•ων of Empedocles].. viz.' are proved to exist. besides these there is nothing.' p. by inference.' and which bind. Colour. And so the application [of the process of inference to the case] is as follows: (1) The Gross Elements. and because they form the cords [which the word gu•a also signifies]. 'Self-consciousness' is a conceit [of separate personality]. the aggregate of things..] are the 'Subtile Elements' inferred. Such is the class of twenty-five.' The 'Subtile Elements' are [those of] Sound. as a [cow. or Atoms. and Smell. 74 Aph. [the earthy element having the distinctive quality of Odour. hold a secondary rank in the scale of being]. from Aph... or other] brute-beast. That is to say. the one from the other]: The existence of the 'Subtile Elements' is inferred from that of the 'Gross.Soul [and. b. 'The knowledge. He [next].. Earth. which consist of the three [so-called] 'Qualities. are of eleven kinds. from that Perception.5 c. The products of the 'Subtile Elements' are the five 'Gross Elements. (buddhi).] from the 'Gross Elements. the principle of Understanding.e. consist of things [Subtile Elements.

whatever is not made out of Self-consciousness] is not thus [i.e. webs. b. or. are made up of Self-consciousness.. 61)]. you may remember. [which.' mentioned in Aph.e.] of the emancipated soul's experiencing [either good or ill]. on one's beatification. is not a product of Self-consciousness]. a. [the gross web being formed of the less gross threads.] from the external and internal p. 75 [organs]. But then. if it be. and from these ['Subtile Elements. . is not a product of it].e. if it be thus [i.' or 'Mind.' or 'Intellect.. as the Sánkhyas declare. By inference from [the existence of] the external and internal organs.] recognizes that 'This is that same jar [which. 76 And this [the objector may go on to say. there is an end of only those modifications of his internal organ [or 'Intellect'] which could be causes [as the jar no longer can be.(3) [And everything that is gross is formed of something less gross. the jar made by him would disappear.' the first product of Nature' (see Aph.] as jars. p.' d. while Self-consciousness depends on Understanding. The application [of the process of inference to the case] is in the following [somewhat circular] manner: (1) The Subtile Elements and the Organs are made up of things consisting of Selfconsciousness: (2) Because they are products of Self-consciousness: (3) Whatever is not so [i.. then [some may object. 62]. and so of the others]. that all objects. 63. but not an end of the modifications of intellect in general. [In reply to this we say. in other words. not being made up thereof. Aph. c.* [The knowledge of the existence] of Selfconsciousness is [by inference. since it would be the case that the Self-consciousness of the potter is the material of the jar. as the Soul. on the beatification of the potter. was fabricated by our deceased acquaintance]. whose internal organ [or 'Understanding'] then surceases. and from [that of] these 'Subtile Elements. more subtile.. because. nor [an end] of intellect altogether: [so that we might spare ourselves the trouble of further argument. &c. because another man [after the beatification of the potter.] is not the case.' there is the knowledge of [the existence of such a principle as] Self-consciousness. that]. such as jars. And thence that of Selfconsciousness.] it is not thus.

without conceding any necessity for the surcease of his pottery. ergo sum.. for example. the surcease of the 'intellect' of the beatified potter. [the existence of which is recognized] under the character of the cause of this [product. as the Soul.e. which is a product. the sum of all life.. vi. having first determined anything under a concept [i. Here the following reasoning is to be understood: Every one. in his Principles of Human knowledge. 77 not the Self-consciousness of the potter. or a possible action of one kind or other].' and so forth: so much is quite settled. after that makes the judgment. [which is not made out of this or of anything antecedent]. viz. [who may lose their Selfconsciousness. (2) Because it is a thing which is a product of judgment [proceeding in the Cartesian order of cogito. 78 (3) Whatever is not so [i. is not a product of mental assurance]. under such a form of thought as is expressed by a general term. [hence] called 'the great one' (mahat). never loses his Self-consciousness. a.]. or mental assurance]. of the process of inference to the case. That is to say: by inference from [the existence of] 'that.. &c. b. whatever is not made out of judgment.. or a human body. &c. Hira•yagarbha (see Vedánta•ara. for the sake of argument..' viz. [and there is no . Or [as Berkeley suggests.. and] p. 64. that this which presents itself is a jar. and p. is not thus [i. the great 'inner organ' (anta•kara•a). And so the application [again rather circular.so far as concerns the objection grounded on the assumption that the intellect of the potter surceases. And thence that of Intellect. on his beatification: but we may go further. 'This is I. there comes the knowledge of 'Intellect' (buddhi). c.* [The knowledge of the existence] of Intellect is [by inference. whereas the Deity. Aph. Ch.] from that [Self-consciousness.] is as follows: (1) The thing called Self-consciousness is made out of the things that consist of the moods of judgment [or mind]. § 63]. let the Self-consciousness of the Deity be the cause why jars and the like [continue to exist]. while aught living continues]. and admit.' or 'This ought to be done by me.e. Self-consciousness. This alternative theory of the case may be stated as follows]: e. § 62). Self-consciousness].e.

having.* [The knowledge of the existence] of Nature is [by inference. And the appropriate refutation [of any objection]. or] partakes of the quality of 'Goodness. And thence that of Nature. 65. is [the principle]. which is a function of Self-consciousness].' and she who is separated [and perhaps forgotten. and Dulness. except so far. For an agreeable woman gives pleasure to her husband.' d. and Dulness.] occasions indifference. it is assumed. being in any p. Now. or Dulness. 80 (3) [Every product that has the affections of. a. and in such wise. or that occasions. b. and Dulness: (2) Because. [those of] Pleasure. partakes of the quality of 'Foulness.] from that ['Intellect. Pain. whilst it is a product [and must. Pain. &c.dispute that the fact is as here stated]. as lovely women. [and this is sufficient. .' which is a product. have arisen from something consisting of that which itself now consists of]. therefore.. in the present instance. the principle [of Intellect. is produced from something which has these affections. and. for simplicity. takes its rise in something which consists of these].' viz. Pain. and the subsequent occasional judgment. By inference from [the existence of] 'that. termed]. Aph. therefore. 'the Great one. according to the Sánkhya.' the indiscreet one gives pain to him. 79 product. and so partakes of the quality of Darkness. it consists of Pleasure. there comes the knowledge of [the existence of] Nature. [nothing. since the relation of cause and effect subsists between the two functions [the occasional conception.' § 64]. therefore.] because it follows. The application [of the process of inference to the case] is as follows: (1) Intellect. merely that the relation of cause and effect exists between the two substrata to which the [two sets of] functions belong. to look for some cause of the thing called 'Self-consciousness' [which manifests itself in the various judgments just referred to]. as it preexisted in the cause of that product]. Pain. as [its] cause. the affections whereof are Pleasure. and. as a matter of course. that the occurrence of a function of the effect must result from the occurrence of a function of the cause. Pleasure. [and] p. c. [is known to be mainly made up of. in this case.

. he establishes the eternity of Nature (prak•iti): Argument for the eternity of Nature. for this reason it is understood that soul exists: such is the remainder. (3) [And every combination. as existing between Nature and its various products]: Aph. or a seat. or the like. and its several component parts render no mutual service].2 Mind. But the application [of the argument. c.3 .' i. has.e. in a different way. Now he states how. these resulting from the conjunction of their constituent parts].. b. the [mundane] experiences and the [eventual] Liberation of some other than itself: p. viz. 67. Since whatever has this quality. e. a.that it is fitting that the qualities of the effect should be [in every case. p. Now.] in conformity with the qualities of the cause. Nature the 'Great one. which is not made up of parts]. as its fruit [or end].* [The existence] of Soul [is inferred] from the fact that the combination [of the principles of Nature into their various effects] is for the sake of another [than unintelligent Nature. 81 [in the four preceding aphorisms. is as follows]: (1) The thing in question. [is for another's use. which is void of the relation of cause and effect that has been mentioned. or any of its similarly unintelligent products]. is for the sake of some other. The argument for the existence of Soul. in this particular case. Aph.* Since the root has no root. which is the cause [of all products. as Nature. conjunction. 'Combination. and so on [unlike soul. [required to complete the aphorism].' with the rest [of the aggregate of the unintelligent]. 82 (2) Because it is a combination [or compages]. the root [of all] is rootless. in order to establish that it is the cause of all [products]. 66. not for its own.] as a couch. we have [the evidence of] inference for [the existence of] Soul.

would require another cause. § 21]. a. was produced from the great Spirit. make up the twenty-five realities recognized in the Sánkhya.2 a. in respect of Nature. again. and so on without end]. in Scripture. He states the argument [just mentioned] in regard to this. [which. [if we were to suppose another cause. is 'rootless..—another cause of Nature. at last. the cause which is the root [of all products]. and another [cause] of that one. at some one. which. for this [word prak•iti. there is no other cause of Nature. i.] is the cause of Mind. Aph. presents p. [as follows]: p. too.a.' i. viz. But then [some Vedántí may object according to this view of matters]. This may be thus stated: As there is mention. b. the same side is taken by us both. Aph. 83 a regressus in infinitum. uncaused. 69. 68.. That is to say. the position that there are just twenty-five realities is not made out. so. the 'root. a halt. or conclusion. void of root. or Nature. has no cause. Nature (pradhána). [and of both Soul and Nature.—there must be. is merely to debate the regressus in infinitum. b. at some one point. of the production of Nature.e. is the argument for the uncreated existence]. Since there would be the fault of regressus in infinitum. the cause of the twenty-three principles.e. when we speak of the root of things. is there of that of Ignorance. which has five divisions. if there were a succession of causes. in addition to2 the 'Indiscrete' [or primal Nature]. Since 'the root' (múla).e.* Even if there be a succession. because there would be p. somewhere or other. In the discussion of the Primal Agent [Nature]. there is a halt at some one point. the asserter [of the Sánkhya doctrine] and the opponent [Vedántí].' i. in such texts as this.] is nothing more than a sign to denote the cause which is the root: such is the meaning..3 another unintelligent principle.. for.: 'This Ignorance.'* . Therefore. by parity of reasoning.* Alike. 85 itself. 84 The employment of the term Primal Agency. with soul and the root itself. and so it is merely a name [that we give to the point in question. Having pondered this doubt. which [according to you. that at which we stop is the Primal Agency (pra-k•iti). eternal thing.' viz. under the the name of 'Nature']. usually and conveniently rendered by the term Nature. named 'Ignorance' [see Vedánta-sára. he declares [as follows]: Nature and Soul alike uncreated.] 'has no root.

it is with Nature only that a figurative production. he states [as follows]: a. 'Of action [or the Primal Agency]. as figurative. c. that reflect in the manner that has been set forth [in our exposition of the process of reflexion which leads to the discriminating of Soul from Nature]: such is the import. &c. whence is it that reflexion. But then. and more probable. else we should have no root at all]. has been declared. in respect of one of these [and not the literal production of both. at [a knowledge of the saving truth in regard to] Nature.' Hence there is no increase to the [list of the twenty-five] Realities. are dull. By the mediocre they [are brought into doubt. 88 arguments which are not true: [see the section on Fallacies in the Tarkasangraha]. or.* There is no rule [or necessity. Aph. i. Of these. beginning.. He now. by means of arguments which really prove the reverse [of what these people employ them to prove]. interpretation p.] the characteristic of which is conjunction is mentioned. and knowledge [or Soul]. in other words. A production [such as that metaphorical one here spoken of. of both Soul and Nature: such is the meaning. to be [not a separate entity.' and so on. for there is mention p.Hence it must needs be that a figurative production is intended to be asserted. . Or [according to another. in an aphorism of the Yoga.. defines 'the Great one' and 'Self-consciousness'. that the argument is the same in support of both. there being [as has been shown.] a mode of arriving. of the origin of Ignorance. through their distinction into those who. in reflecting. in the shape of a manifestation through conjunction with Soul. does not take place in the case of all [men]? In regard to this point. 87 of the aphorism. For those privileged [to enguge in the inquiry] are of three descriptions. as there is no mention. Soul. through two aphorisms. mediocre. And. because those who are privileged [to engage in the inquiry] are of three descriptions. in Scripture.e. and best.] are made to appear as if there were equally strong arguments on the other side. &c. But there is no rule that all must needs reflect in the manner so set forth: such is the literal meaning. 70. to be styled ignorance]. or by p. in the shape of discrimination [between Soul and Nature]. b. and. b. because it is only the best kind of people that are fully amenable to reason. by means of the sophisms that have been uttered by the Bauddhas. &c. which consists of false knowledge. is congruous. by inference. that all should arrive at the truth]. of the two. in a passage of the Kaurma [Purá•a]. And Ignorance.. But it is only the best of those privileged. [in the shape of a twenty-sixth principle.] the meaning is this. it is not from eternity. All do not profit by the saving truth. by the dull the [Sánkhya] arguments are frustrated [and altogether set aside]. but] 'an affection of the mind. 86 of [such] a figurative origination of Soul and Nature.

it therefore follows that the others [among the phenomena of mundane existence. Nature].e. to the [gross] Elements. 89 is 'intellect' (buddhi). that called 'the Great one' (mahat): such is the meaning.' i. That of which this is the function p. Aph.. save Mind. because its function is 'thinking' (manana). 73. b. and so he declares [as follows]: p. such as the 'Subtile elements' (see § 61)]: By 'the Great one' is meant Mind. By 'thinking' is here meant 'judging' (ni•chaya).e. and to be familiar with the other principles.' 'I do this. 90 Aph..2 the eleven 'Organs' (indriya).* To the others it belongs to be products All products. is that which is subsequent: that is to say. in every case of cognition.' the function of which is a conceit [that 'I exist.' and. the fact of being products thereof belongs to the others. and the other thing']. you relinquish your dogma. [i.] a. and that is the first product. b. 'Mind' [is so called]. thereof. 'To be products thereof. the formless Objective]. if it be thus [some one may say].[the reader being presumed to remember that Nature consists of the three 'Qualities' in equipoise. which is called 'the Great one. that. a. Since 'Self-consciousness' is that whose function is a conceit [which brings out the Ego. the five 'Subtile elements. a.] are effects of this [Selfconsciousness]. to be products of Self-consciousness: that is to say.* 'Self-consciousness' is that which is subsequent [to Mind. that Nature . the matter of which cognition would. 'Mind' (manas).' is Mind. 'Self-consciousness' is the next after 'the Great one' [§ 71]. The relation of Selfconsciousness to Mind. of Self-consciousness]. But then.* The first product [of the Primal Agent. have lain dormant in the bosom of Nature. 'Self-consciousness. result from Self-consciousness. Aph. also. 71. else. the products of the Subtile elements. 72. mediately.

[mediately. &c. must be 'devoid.is the cause of the whole world.] through combinatians of two atoms. the nature of a cause must belong. is the Cause of 'Self-consciousness' and the rest. mediately. only [mediately.] through 'the Great one' and the rest. Therefore he declares [as follows]: p. But then [some one may say]. which of them is [really] the cause of the creation's commencing? In regard to this. Soul. 'Moreover. still. [viz.* While both [Soul and Nature] are antecedent [to all products].' or lack the nature of a cause.' viz.e. mediately. cause [of all products]. moreover. from the fact of its not being modified [into anything else. 76. also. both Nature and Soul are eternal. let Atoms alone be causes. as clay is modified into a jar].]. Soul and Nature. That is to say: 'while both. immediately the 'Great one' (§ 71)] the first [cause.* Moreover. 74. Nature. 93 Aph. mediately.' i. since the one [viz.. 92 Aph. 'the first. is.' i. the Nature. Why Nature is the sole cause.e. . he says: p... though not the immediate causes. to the other of the two. and so on: such is the meaning. the Atoms are the cause of a jar. Nature].e. a. Soul. 75. he declares [as follows]: p. as. or the like. b. in the theory of the Vai•eshikas. 'it is applicable. 91 Aph. [the causes. as is the case with the Atoms... are preexistent to every product. b..* What is limited cannot be the substance of all [things]. But then.] is devoid [of this character of being a cause]...] is the cause of Mind. a.' viz. Nature. since. viz.. since there is no dispute [that these are causal]. the cause of all other products. 'since the one. not in the character of the immediate cause. of jars. In reply to this. it is applicable [only] to the other of the two.' i.e. through that [i.

is to be trusted]. To this he replies: Ex nihilo nihil fit. An argument. a jar which antecedently did not exist is seen to come into existence. 'the invariable antecedent being denominated a cause.] he. i. a. Scripture declares in favour of the theory. 78. 'From Nature the world arises. Aph. a cause. [i. Therefore it would [on the theory suggested. b. in such terms as.] be necessary to mention separate causes of [all] things severally.e. in the first instance. p. in his 6th lecture.e.. [and.* A thing is not made out of nothing. Scripture. If an entity were to arise out of a nonentity. Therefore Nature alone is the cause.. and it is simpler to assume a single cause. then.e. also. That is to say: it is not possible that out of nothing. out of a nonentity. from Nature]. 95 . be unreal: what harm is that to us? [If any ask this. therefore. hence. Such is the meaning. since the character of a cause is visible in its product. then. no one falls back upon authority]. But then [some one may say].* And [the proposition that Nature is the cause of all is proved] from the text of Scripture.' &c. too. Let the world. b. Brown. the world. 94 b. since this is an invariable antecedent.' if Dr. that the origin [of the world] is therefrom. an entity should arise. has been set forth [in § 76. i. moreover. a. as yarn cannot be the [material] cause of a jar. antecedent non-existence be the cause [of each product]. till argument fails him. That which is limited cannot be the substance of all [things]. Aph. He alleges Scripture in support of this: Why the theory of a plastic Nature is preferable to that of Atoms. would be unreal: such is the meaning. a thing should be made. declares that Nature is the cause of the world. declares [as follows]: p. Let. 77.a.. for.

in the case in question. [like the cause with which it is united. let a nonentity be the [substantial] cause of the world. if any one ever really had such.] it being an entity might be opposed. that this is not silver. e. In regard to this. Reasons why the world is not to be supposed unreal.e.* If it [the substantial cause. still the world will not [necessarily. in the case in question [that of the world regarded as a reality]. 80.Aph. b.' by which [cognition. the world would be a nonentity. and because it is not the [false] result of depraved causes..] since.' i.. [but] if [the cause be] a nonentity.] be unreal.* It [the world] is not unreal. since it is a nonentity. When there is the notion. some one's cognition of a [white] conch-shell as yellow. at all times.. a. But then [some one may suggest]. by reason of its being a nonentity. [leading to a belief in what ought not to be believed]. If an entity were the substantial cause [of the world]. because of the union [of the product] with the reality [which is its subatratum]. 96 c. But. [by parity of reasoning]. nothing. [that the product would be an entity]. then how could it possibly be the case [that the product would be real]. Therefore the world is not an unreality. i. its being silver is contradicted by the [subsequent and more correct] cognition. in the relation of identity]? The product of something is something. [like its supposed cause]. then this would be the case. [that it would be real]? . p. But. a. how could this be the case.e.. he declares [as follows]: Aph. in regard to a shell [of a pearl-oyster. if a nonentity [were the substantial cause]. [that of the world regarded as a reality]. by reason of the world's being [on that supposition. cognize the world as a reality.] be an entity. which sometimes glitters like silver]. [But. then. 'because of union therewith. since [it is a maxim that] the qualities of the cause present themselves in the product. 'this would be the case. that it is silver.g.] necessarily a non-entity. [which depraves his eye-sight]. there is not such [temporary or occasional] depravation [of the senses]. it would be the case that the product was real. And it is held that that is false which is the result of a depraved cause. no one ever has the cognition. 79. because all. therefore. and that of nothing. 'This world is not in the shape of an entity. e. because there is no fact contradictory [to its reality]. through such a fault as the jaundice.' i. then. from its union [or identity] therewith.

yet we never see merit or demerit in the character of the substantial cause [of any product]: and our theories ought to show deference to our experience. is 'the accomplishment thereof. moreover.* No. the chief end of man does not consist in this.* The accomplishment thereof [i. a product.p. For this reason. what occasion is there for [our troubling ourselves about] Nature? To this he replies: Aph. . Granting that 'the uneeen' [merit or demerit arising from actions] may be an instrumental cause.' i.' i. [just] because it is [the result of] acts. 99 [soul] is still liable to repetition of births.e. of Salvation is not to be obtained by ritual observances Liberation] is not moreover. because the [thus far] liberated p. 82. because.] from discerning the distinction between Nature and the Soul. 'because one is liable to repetition of births. But then [a follower of the Mímá•sá may say]. since this consists of what is accomplished through acts.3 and § 83. the accomplishment of Liberation. by reason of the fact that it [the supposed Liberation. through Scriptural rites: the chief end of man does not consist in this [which is gained through such means].] the liability to repetition of births. a. 81.] was accomplished by means.e. 'Scriptural means.' such as sacrifices. 97 b. 'Nature' is to be accepted. and not eternal]. there is [still left impending over the ritualist.e. because Liberation arises [see § 56. [and is therefore.. But then [some one may say]. let works alone be the cause of the world. Not thereby. since [it would appear that] nonentity can take no shape but that of nonentity. p. What need have we of the hypothesis of 'Nature'? To this he replies: Action cannot serve as a substratum... a.] is not eternal. for works are not adapted to be the substantial cause [of any product]. [which is gained through ritual observances]. Aph. since Liberation can be attained by undertaking the things directed by the Veda. 98 b.1 inasmuch as this [its supposed Liberation. [are so called]. because they are heard from [the mouth of the instructor in] Scripture. [in bringing about the mundane condition of the agent].

e. of him who has attained to discrimination.' &c. there will be no repetition of births.* There is Scripture for it. a. rather. 84. since the acts involve a variety of pains. If Liberation were to be effected by acts.' i. b. p. 83. by affusion of water.* [Liberation cannot arise from acts]. To this he replies: p. that the act is productive of things desirable.b. the fact that the act is productive of pain is not the motive [to the performance of sacrifice]. e. that he who has attained to discrimination.e. Liberation itself [on the principle that every effect includes the qualities of its cause. in consequence of his knowledge of the distinction. a. And. in accordance with this.g. He shows what does constitute the chief end of man: In regard to the attainment of the chief end of man. to one who is distressed by chilliness the affusion or water does not bring liberation from his chilliness. 'He does not return again. 'By means of acts [of sacrifice] they may partake of immortality.. then. not to liberation from it. 100 b. has no repetition of births.* From pain [occasioned. but. that. the text. because whether the end be something . the Scripture concurs with the Sánkhya.. But then [some one may say]. [such as sacrifices]. Aph. and not liberation from pain]. Pain can lead only to pain. there is the text. but the [real] reason is this. from the fact that it must eventually end: for. and it would be a grief. 'In regard to these.. 85. there is a text declaring. in regard to Nature and Soul. to victims in sacrifice] must come pain [to the sacrificer. He states an objection to the opposite view: Aph. [additional] chilliness. in regard to these [i. viz.'4 &c. as there is not relief from chilliness.] would include a variety of pains. 101 Aph. Nature and Soul].

the annihilation. whose Liberation we. 103 Aph. or undesirable.] must be perishable. and Liberation comes through knowledge. I repeat. and who may thereby secure a temporary sojourn in Paradise.e. .] is absolute:3 there is no parity [between his case and that of him who relies on works. his bonds having absolutely perished. To this he replies: p.] through the knowledge of the distinction between Nature and Soul. [which. as is imagined. by parity of reasoning. b. were both on an equality. [between the two cases. still. mundane life may return. The text which declares that works done without desire are instruments of Liberation has reference to knowledge. a. [on the part of the virtuous sacrificer]. again. of Nondiscrimination: and how is it possible that there should again be a return of the mundane state. The right means effect Liberation once for all. supposing that Liberation may take place [as you Sánkhyas contend.]. the fruit of his saving knowledge. Grant that pain is not what is [intended] to be accomplished by works done without desire.' who. still. it [i. when the destruction of Non-discrimination is absolute? Thus there is no [such] similarity. [and we admit that the motive of the sacrifice is not the giving pain to the victim].1] is Non-discrimination [between Nature and Soul]. and you Sánkhyas. some one may say]. I grant. [we. because it is a production. though there is a difference [as you contend. permanent Liberation cannot be]: there must still again be pain. since. b. look upon as being. so that these [works] are instruments of Liberation p. [But then. by the objector. desirable. may be gained by such means].* Of him who is essentially liberated. By the removal thereof there is the destruction. only to return again to earth]. a. in much the same predicament]. 102 mediately: [but you will recollect that the present inquiry regards the immediate cause]. in his very essence. as well as any other means]. from the perishableness [of the Liberation effected by this means.The character of the end contemplated makes no difference in regard to the transitoriness of what is effected by works. this makes no difference with repect to the fact of the Liberation's being produced by acts.] between [an act done to secure] something enjoyable and an act done without reference to enjoyment. is free. 86. whose Liberation you Sánkhyas look upon as transitory. for it [the Liberation supposed to have been attained through works. therefore. [which. under § 85. there is the destruction of bondage. [and. The bond [see § 56. not eternal. but transitory].. Of him 'who is essentially liberated. this makes no difference in regard to its being the result of acts.

or] evidence is an affection of the Intellect. the ascertainment [or right comprehension] of such a thing. are spoken of as 'evidence. not previously known. &c. [the definition of its several species falling to beconsidered hereafter]: such is the meaning. It has been asserted [in § 61. in the other p. 'Not lodged. nor in one or other of them. &c. You are to understand. and Doubt. &c. of Intellect. in the shape of an affection [of that the affections of which are mirrored by the Soul]. (pramá•a)]. a. that.] are [to receive the name of] proof (pramá•a). of any given 'right notion']. [i. or reality. 106 case.' [which excludes doubt]. or whatever we may choose to call that from which 'right notion' results.' then both of these aforesaid [the affection of the Intellect. Error. is that.] the expressions 'not previously known' [which excludes things remembered].' is spoken of as located in the Soul [see § 87. then the [proof. productive thereof [i.e. 105 b.] either way. 'what is.b. then it [the proof. What is meant by evidence. such conjunction giving rise to sense-perception]. and 'reality' [which excludes mistakes and fancies]. e. in the first case. p. the 'right notion' is spoken of as] located in the Intellect..' it is only as being mediately [the sources of right knowledge].] that there is a class of twenty-five [things which are realities]. or of only one or other of the two. when the organ of vision. if both the Soul's cognition and the affections of the Intellect are spoken of as [cases of] 'right notion.' i. not deposited in 'one rightly cognizing' (pramát•i). whether this be an affection 'of both. except by p.. if 'right notion. In regard to this [topic of knowledge and the sources of knowledge]. or] evidence.] is just the conjunction of an organ [with its appropriate object. a. [as others hold.e. therefore he displays this. and. in short. is what we mean by proof.' i. in their order.]. The 'determination. that we employ [when speaking of the result of evidence.. [i. since these cannot be ascertained [or made out to be true].e. he shows what he means by proof]: Aph. 104 proof.. or evidence.. It is with a view to the exclusion of Memory. c.* The determination of something not [previously] lodged in both [the Soul and the Intellect]. or evidence.' i. What is.e.. (pramá•a): such is the definition of evidence in general.. productive' of this 'right notion' is [what we term proof. 87. and 'discrimination. . and the conjunction of an organ with its appropriate object. and. But. in the highest degree. If [on the other hand. and also of Soul [as some hold that it is]. in the highest degree.e. is 'right notion'.. is 'right notion' (pramá).

and the others [such as 'Conjecture. if there be the three kinds of proof established. and Scriptural authority in its various shapes [of legal institute. How many [kinds of] proofs [then. which are reckoned.' that is to say. 'everything [that is really true] can be established [by means of them]. in like manner.' &c. and 'testimony' (•abda).* Proof is of three kinds:1 there is no establishment of more. Manu.' And 'Comparison. And. there is no establishment of more..' &c. let 'comparison' [which is reckoned. c. 'the recognition of signs' (anumána). v. are the [three kinds of] proofs. and 'Non-perception' (anupalabdhi) and the like are included under Perception. [as well as these three]. are included under Inference and Testimony. xii. [for the non-perception of an absent jar on a particular spot of ground is nothing else than the perception of that spot of ground without a jar on it]. . where he says [see the Institutes. having already (§ 87) given the general definition]: Perception defined. 'because.* Perception (pratyakska) is that discernment which.].' no addition to the proofs can be fairly made out. in [the matter of] the discriminating of Nature and Soul: he therefore says. and the like. viz. For the same reason. Aph. if these be established.' and 'Tradition' (aitihya). But then [some one may incline to say]. if those [three] be established.. also be instruments of right knowledge. He [next] states the definitions of the varieties [of proof. has laid down only a triad of proofs. since. Aph. [these] three [sources of right knowledge] must be well understood. 88. in the Nyáya. a. d. portrays the form thereof. Inference. b. 108 &c. being in3 conjunction [with the thing perceived]. 105]: 'By that man who seeks a distinct knowledge of his duty. then all [that is true] can be established [by one or other of these three proofs]. p. also. because of the cumbrousness [that sins against the philosophical maxim. that we are not to assume more than is necessary to account for the case]: such is the meaning. 'perception' p. in the Mímá•sá].d. 107 (pratyaksha). 89. a specifically distinct source of knowledge].. because. Ch. Perception. 'Proof is of three kinds.] are there? To this he replies: There are three kinds of evidence.

since the mind of the Yogí.4 a. [because there is no intention to include them]. 110 The definition not to be blamed. future. there is no failure to include the perceptions of these. or such intervening things as interrupt ordinary perception]. that it does not apply to the perceptions of adepts in the Yoga].' [literally. what 'discernment. shall be the thing to be defined. b. as follows. also. 'Being in conjunction.. still there is no fault [in our definition. and the adepts of the Yoga do not perceive through the external [organs of sense]. also]. of that [mystical mind] which has attained exaltation. it does not fail to extend [to this.)] is the evidence [called] Perception: such is the meaning. 90. [does this]. by adepts in the Yoga. Or. But then. i.* Or. because that of the adepts in the Yoga is not an external perception. he corrects it by [stating. p. assumes the form of the thing with which it is in conjunction [as water assumes the form of the vessel into which it is poured]. 'no form of the thing.e. Therefore there is no fault [in our definition].* It is not a fault [in the definition. that [affection of the Intellect (see Yoga Aphorisms.] this [definition of Perception (§ 89)] does not extend [as we conceive it ought. that this [supernatural sort of perception] is not what he intends to define: p. in conjunction' [with the mind of him who perceives it.a. b. 91. and presume it is intended. although this reply is as much as the objector has any right to expect.' or affection of the Intellect. of things past. [But. 109 'portrays the form thereof.' i.e. here. though it should not apply to the perceptions of the mystic. That is to say: it is only sense-perception that is to be here defined... with causal things. I. to do. because there is.' p. while absent]: having pondered this doubt. § 89].] to the perception. because of the conjunction. 111 Aph. b. in the exaltation gained from the habitude produced by .] 'existing in conjunction. or concealed [by stone walls. Aph.] the fact. a. be it so that the perception of the Yogí.] he states the real justification [of the definition in question]: But the definition does apply to the perceptions of the mystic. [some one may say. § 5 and § 8. there is no fault [in the definition].

(§ 89). not in conjunction [with the senses]. &c.' what we mean to speak of [in our definition of Perception. before taking the shape of effects. since these are from everlasting. does come into conjunction with things [as existent] in their causes. [which declare his existence]?' he states a dilemma which excludes [this]: .' p. a. the expression employed is. that the definition does not apply to the perceptions of the 'Lord. To this he replies: That any 'Lord' exists is not proved. But. its conjunction [with the mind of the mystic.] is merely the being of the [same] kind with what is produced by conjunction [of a sense-organ with its object. or the clairvoyant. because.* [This objection to the definition of Perception has no force]. on the implication1 that there is a 'Lord. though they were not to come from the same source]. b.' c. Having pondered the doubt.' but not the expression. in their causes. when again resolved into their causes]. b. it is to be understood. That there is no fault [in the definition of Perception]. But then.. hence. likewise. And this demurring to there being any 'Lord' is merely in accordance with3 the arrogant dictum of [certain] partisans [who hold an opinion not recognized by the majority]. because there is no proof that there is a Lord. because it is not proved that there is a Lord (í•wara). 'How should the Lord not be proved [to exist] by the Scripture and the Law. 'because it is not proved that there is a Lord.concentration. hold that even what is past. still essentially exists. who assert that effects exist [from eternity. and. and that. alluded to by the objector [in § 89. 113 c.]. is supplied [from § 90]. [whether or not with the things as developed into products perceptible by the external senses]. Aph. they cannot p. b.] is possible. for we. and the perceptions of the 'Lord' may be of the same kind with such perceptions. [some one may say. Therefore. Here the word rendered 'causal' (lína) denotes the things. 92. 112 result from [emergent] conjunction. d.] still this [definition] does not extend to the Lord's perceptions. Objection. 'because there is no Lord. in these same causes.

] is intended. He explains this very point: The force of the dilemma.' Aph. tell us. b.? Or is he in bondage through these? p. 116 Vish•u. That is to say: accordingly as the case may be. Since. which [as compulsory motives. [of this world]. to exhibit. of the familiarly known3 Brahmá. Aph.* [Because. &c. some text [among those in which the term 'Lord' occurs. by enabling him to take a part in extolling] the eternity. i. &c. &c. a.. declaratory. either the one or the other. 93. •iva. as what is to be known. of creatorship. The 'Lord' whom you imagine. or other non-eternal 'Lord. and some other text. he would have no desires. because [whoever exists must be either free or bound.] unequal to the creation. he can be neither the one nor the other. the liberated Soul.' [as Soul is held to be]. if he were bound.' since these. 95. of free and bound. to incite [to still deeper contemplation]. what becomes of the Scripturetexts which declare the 'Lord?' To this he replies: p. or homages to the recognized3 [deities of the Hindu pantheon]. he would be under delusion.* [And. 94. [it may be asked.. b.] would instigate him to create.e. 114 Since he is not.] either way. he would be inefficient. and. if he were free. is intended] to extol [and to purify the mind of the contemplator.A dilemma. it is not proved that there is a 'Lord:' such is the meaning. he must be [on either alternative.] if such be the case. &c. preceded by resolution [to create. is he free from troubles. for example. and]. &c.* [The Scriptural texts which make mention of the 'Lord' are either glorifications of the liberated Soul. to exclude proof that there is any 'Lord..' Aph. 115 The import of the texts which speak of the 'Lord. . a.. absolute Soul in general. cannot be. But then.'] exists. as the 'Lord. p. further.4 a. in the shape of a glorification [of Soul].] it is not proved that he [the 'Lord. merely in virtue of junction [with Nature].

Soul] is the governor of Nature. or [its] governorship. &c. for. [and it is] an agent. even if it were thus [as alleged under § 95].] would apply. [the lodestone. (see § 61. is attracted by iron merely by proximity. b. the fact that it [viz. that there are..' d. merely through approximation [to Nature]. b.. like the lode stone. also. is merely from [its] proximity [to Nature]. [some one may say].] it is held that the Soul's governorship.] stands void of volition. [really]. have immortality. &c. i. inasmuch as it is void of volition. as is the case with the gem. in every combination.]. or to govern]. [in some one of the Purá•as1]: 'As the iron acts. [and.' b. for. Soul's] creativeness.] and non-agency. c. It is not an agent. [not from its resolving to act thereon]. Aph. Thus it is. To this he replies: p. in the Soul.. 118 c. was through a resolve [to create. we speak of government in reference only to modifications [preceded and determined] by resolutions [that so and so shall take place]. And in this alone consists [what we speak of as] its acting as creator towards that which is superadded to it: such is the meaning p. is immortal... If it were alleged that [its. acts not by resolve. though the combination itself is not so]. so. And thus it is declared.)]. what is heard in Scripture. But [it is not so. both agency [seemingly. &c. without resolving [either to act or to be acted on]. then this objection [brought forward under § 95. in a secondary sense. 117 Soul. 'as is the case with the [lodestone] gem. or the like. in the world. just so this world is created by a deity who is mere Existence. of Soul over Nature] is from [its] proximity thereto. [seeing that the Soul.' [or Mind. &c. by the mere conjunction of the primal Soul.* The governorship [thereof. But then. a.] by us [Sánkhyas. &c. Nature is changed into the principle [called] the 'Great one. in so far. would not be the case. As the gem. merely through their approximation [to Nature]: so he declares [as follows]: . in regard to iron].though possessed of the conceit [of individuality]. the lodestone. in the shape of creatorship. but through proximity. liable to perish].. 96. whilst the gem [the lodestone. animal souls overrule. [viz. In respect of worldly products.e.

of course. to draw the iron. To this he replies: p. overrule. souls in which the intellects [of individuals] reflect themselves [see § 99.' through the doubt of a blind tradition. embodied souls do not energize.. § 67)]. in the case. i. 97.. of particular productions.. 'since Hira•yagarbha [i. [is authorative evidence]. of things individual [as contradistinguished from that of all things in the lump.] and others [viz. Vish•u and •iva]. the declaration of the texts or sense of the Vedas. i. [the apparent agency] of animal souls [is solely through proximity]. But then.e. [some one may say].* The declaration of the texts or sense [of the Veda. since he knows the truth. while the conviction is entertained.—as the magnet may be said. by Brahmá. is an overruler in a secondary sense [only of the term. cannot be entertained for an instant].]. seeing that these [animal souls] are none other than the motionless Thought. but not through any effort. also. is a secondary sense.. that. of what is true.e. he says: p. a. if there were no eternal and omniscient 'Lord.* In the case of individual products. 119 In like manner. 121 . actually and literally. the iron draws the magnet]. Brahmá. 120 How the Vedas need not the 'Lord' to authenticate them. merely through proximity. Aph. for example]. also. 'The agency is solely through proximity:' so much is supplied [from § 96]. Aph.] overruler? In reference to this.e. a.' b.p. 98. if Soul. &c. [a possibility which. To complete [the aphorism. by its simple proximity [to Nature (§ 96)]. that. we must say]. b.—animal souls.—the creation. are knowers of what is certain. The meaning is this. a. the Vedas would cease to be an authority.. But then. c. is evidence [altogether indisputable]. [in the absence of an intelligently effective guardianship].—who is the primary [or actual. where these are the speakers. (see Vedánta-sára.

99. and through the perception thereof [it being that the mind has possession of any general principle]. But a conclusion (anumiti) is knowledge of the soul. [and so acquires magnetism by magnetic induction].* The internal organ. c. [as it does fancy.. through the knowledge of the constant accompaniment: by 'connexion' (pratibandha) here being meant 'constant attendedness' (vyápti).1 through its being enlightened thereby [i. having discussed the evidence that consists in direct perception.. 'just as the iron. by Soul]. as the attracting iron. He [next] defines testimony (•abda): p. of the constant accompanier. The internal organ.g. b. i.g.] Soul. b. [whilst an Inference. or understanding (see § 87. through its fancying itself to be Soul.e. of fire with smoke].] by reason of its being enlightened by the Soul.e. that Nature affects Soul. [in respect of the magnet]. as is the iron. 122 Inference defined..e. is the overruler. draws [the magnet]. is inference.)] c. [which is none other than] the knowledge of the connected.It is in the shape of the internal organ. Aph. a.. Aph.. i. though inactive. so far forth as it is an instrument in the establishment of knowledge deducible from it. 123 . a. the understanding.* The knowledge of the connected [e. through its happening to reflect itself in [and contemplate itself in.] is [a kind of] evidence consisting in a [mental] modification. is the overruler.] states the definition of inference (anumána): p.' that is to say. 100. through perception of the connexion [e. fire]. He [now. in consequence of [its] mere proximity. is an affection of the internal organ. That is to say: inference [or conviction of a general truth.

been here declared: such is the meaning. b. having apprehended a constant accompaniment. a. viz. has been here made]. by a proof which is one kind of inference.. 125 for example. And [while this belongs to the understanding. Among these [several kinds of proof]. . [the one from the p. is established. Nature and Soul are here to be established discriminatively: The existence of Soul and Nature argued from analogy. instrument of knowledge.. not cognizable by the senses.. a. that an act implies an instrument]. b. of the kinds of evidence. evidence. he [now] describes that one by which.* The establishment of both [Nature and Soul] is by analogy. by taking into consideration such instruments as axes. b.* Since the establishment of [the existence of] both [soul and non-soul] is by means of evidence. a. [e. [where.e. 102. p. or internal organ (see § 100. 103.* Testimony [such as is entitled to the name of evidence. i.] which the residence of any property in the subject derives from a knowledge of its being constantly accompanied [by something which it may therefore betoken]. It is only by means of evidence that both Soul and non-soul are established as being distinct. especially. &c. for instance. a quite heterogeneous. 101. [Analogy (sámányato d•ish•a) is that kind of evidence which is employed in the case] where. Aph. when we have had recourse to [as the means of determining this constant accompaniment. we repeat. Aph. [which is called. imperceptible. the decaration thereof [i. by the force [as an argument.)] the result is that [knowledge] in the Soul. is a declaration by one worthy [to be believed].. generically of a perceptible kind.] 'knowledge by hearing' (•abda-bodha). Here 'fitness' means 'suitableness. He [next] volunteers to tell us what is the use of his setting forth [the various divisions of] evidence: Why the kinds of Evidence have been here set forth.Valid testimony defined. Aph.' and so the evidence which is called 'Testimony' is the knowledge arising from a suitable declaration: such is the meaning. 124 other]: therefore has this. as when. under such circumstances. viz.g. which are of earthy and other kinds.] what is..] anything of a different kind.e..

But.] ceases. something of a different kind therefrom. under § 66. in regard to houses.. [which is a combination of various parts combined for the benefit of the tenant]. [and the result of her action is the bondage of the Soul].)] is formed out of the things [called] Pleasure. To this he replies: p. Experience [whether of pain or pleasure. Nature and Soul. &c.. or the like. By 'Thought' [we mean] soul. as stated before. and it is by this [species of inference].] continues [no further than] till the discernment of the difference [between Nature and Soul]. and is thereby known to have been formed out of gold. [has the characteristic properties p. a. ends with the discernment of] Thought.* Experience [whether of pain or pleasure. and. [the instrument named] Sense. Pain. viz.] the argument from analogy for [the existence of] Nature is as follows: the Great Principle [viz... In this instance.] Nature and Soul are proved [to exist]: such is the meaning. b. [as regards tht argument from analogy.e. [viz. &c. hence. from Nature. for instance. Aph. as being a compound thing. in proof of the existence] of Soul. no such thing as thorough emancipation. having gathered. because. so. is established [or inferred to exist]. or the like]. [see Tarka-sangraha. Understanding (see § 61.] does not at all times occur: such is the state of the case.. eternal Nature [eternal. and Delusion. is inferred [by analogy. as regards the absence of any beginning. 104. on the discerning thereof. that both. As 'antecedent non-existence. that they exist for the sake of [organized] bodies. c. and Delusion. such is what we mean by Analogy. so that experience [whether of pain or pleasure. [or Soul. [i. Of these [viz. and exertion is habitual to her. it has the characters of Pleasure. since Nature is eternal. formed of gold. § 92]. [it is. because it is something that acts as a combination. as contradistinguished from Nature]. surceases [when the thing antecedently non-existent begins to be]. as a house. to the following effect]: Nature is for the sake of another. [to the aggregate of which three in equipoise (see § 61) the name of Nature is given].. there should constantly be experience [whether of pleasure or of pain].] as something other than Nature. just as a bracelet. for example. Soul. 127 When it is that experience ceases. or the like. c. d. whilst it is [undeniably. But then [some one may say]. or the like.' though devoid of a beginning.].viz. Pain. [which.] a production.. the fact established on senseperception. 126 of the gold. is not designed for itself]: such is the meaning. .

i. that conceit takes place. 129 b. since it is from nondiscrimination that it is derived. can experience neither pain nor pleasure]. 105. b. but. also.* Or. the master. Aph. and to one who was not the agent. As it belongs to the cook to prepare the food. p.. To suppose that Soul acts and experiences is an error. [to give a better account of the matter than that given in § 105].] he states [as follows]: Soul is really neither agent nor experiencer. that this takes place. that it is the agent that experiences the fruit. nor experience]. i. [in regard to the doubt started under § 104. him on whose principles it may be valid].)] is reflected in it. so is the case here. a. if Nature be agent. referred to in § 106. in Soul. .] that another is the experiencer of [the results of] the acts done by one different. The opposite of this [wrong view. then it must follow [which seems unreasonable. Having stated an exoteric principle [which may serve. 128 Aph. b.* And. 106. from the fact that the Great Principle [the actual agent (see § 97. 107. in practice.. there is [seen to be] neither [agency. and Soul experiencer. To this he replies: The fruit of the action is not always the agent's. a.e.* The experience of the fruit may belong even to another than the agent.]: Aph. to silence. [whereas the actual agent is Nature. as in the case of food. p. since it is from non-discrimination. he [next] declares his own doctrine. the fruit of the cook's actions]. to enjoy the fruit [thereof. because it is from the failure to discriminate between Nature and Soul. b.' that is to say..b. the notion that the agent [soul being mistaken for an agent. by the argumentum ad hominem. [But some one say].e. being unintelligent. &c. 'Or. &c. which. The soul is neither an agent nor a patient.] has the fruit [of the act is a wrong notion]. viz. there arises the conceit of its being an agent. when the truth is told..

from distraction of mind. &c.e. through the want of conjunction [between the sense and what would otherwise be its object]. through the proximity. through there being. What may prevent perception. 131 an atom [is not perceived]. nor is a very small sound. 130 Aph. the unhappy. Having discussed [the topic of] evidence. the collyrium located in the eye [is not perceived by the eye itself].* Her imperceptibleness arises from [her] subtility.] an appliance of the sense [to the thing].] of an agent nor that of a patient.] in consequence of extreme proximity. of the sense [with the object]. he [now] states the distribution of the subject-matter of evidence: p. Aph.. &c. b.] comes the imperceptibleness of Nature? In regard to this.' i. neither the condition [as regards soul. under certain circumstances. [A thing may be] not an object [perceived]. What is perceptible. for which of the possible reasons just enumerated. under others. and also [at another time. or on the opposite side of.' and to exemplify the causes that may prevent the conjunction. An object [is a perceived object]. when overpowered by the sound of a drum. that] it is in consequence of great distance. a want of [conjunction of the sense with the thing]. 109. 'When the truth is told' [and discerned]. in consequence of the obstruction. 108. between the thing and the sense. How [or. a.. by means of evidence. we may remark. p. or other [agitated person].] not an object. in consequence of great distance.e. may be imperceptible. 'there is neither.. when. or [on the other hand. And [this] want of conjunction [may result] from the junction's being prevented by great distance. b. i. Nature and Soul are perceived [in their entire distinctness. c. through the want of the sense.. one from the other]. a thing placed in [the inside of. that a bird [flying very high up] in the sky is not perceived. or conjunction. [To explain the '&c.a. does not perceive the thing that is at his side [or under his very nose]. [then again. he declares: The subtility of Nature.e.] a wall [is not perceived]. . i. required in order to perception. and so on.* [A thing may be] an object [perceptible]. through its subtilty..

that it has atoms as its cause. Aph. but] all-pervasive.] is [the existence of] Nature determined? To this he replies: Nature inferred from the existence of productions. How. so the knowledge of Nature comes from the beholding of products which have the three Qualities. 133 A doubt thrown on the existence of Nature. a. by the contradiction of dissentients. perhaps. that it has Nature as its cause...] say that the world has Brahma as its cause.] because her existence is gathered from the beholding of productions. not [as a Naiyáyika might. [which are agglomerations]. here prefer understanding the term. imperceptibleness is from subtilty. p. By subtilty is meant the fact of being difficult to investigate. &c.e. [it may be asked. Nature's. then you will find an answer in the next aphorism]. then. but our seniors [the transmitters of the Sánkhya doctrine]. because of the contradiction of asserters [of other views. Nature [as asserted by the Sánkhyas..) and the existence of which implies a cause. 132 b.e. a.] the consisting of atoms. if a product existed antecedently to its production [as that product]. in which these constituents exist from eternity].' i. . b. [(see § 62.] is not established. 111.* [Nature exists. 'Because of the the contradiction of asserters [of the Vedánta or Nyáya]. As the knowledge of [there being such things as] atoms comes from the beholding of jars. [to set forth the objection of these counter-asserters]. 'Her. Aph.a. for Nature is [not atomic. the existence of Nature. So he sets forth a doubt [which might naturally found itself] thereon: p. Some [the Vedántís. a.* If [you throw out the doubt that] it [viz. in the opinion of the Sánkhyas.] is not established. But then.] would be proved to exist as the [necessary] substratum thereof. it is not established. b. others [the Naiyáyikas]. to which the name of Nature is given. 110..' i. then an eternal Nature [such as you Sánkhyas contend for.

pain. 135 Nature the only hypothesis consistent with what appears. . [such as Atoms. since1 each [doctrine] is established in the opinion of each. pain. a. then there would be a contradiction to the fact of being an aggregate of pleasure. c. how is it that this [cause] is Nature. 113. Well. but it is denied. which is recognizable in the world. The drift here is as follows: If the character of cause [of all things around us] belonged to Atoms.. we hold. Aph.]. which did not exist in the cause. Goodness. that the effect does exist [antecedently to its production.since you will declare that a cause is inferred only as the [invariable] accompanier of an effect. 134 Mutual denials settle nothing. viz. can exist in the effect. then [look you. 112. a.* Still. too: so how could it be established? If the one side is established by there being inevitably attendant the recognition of the constant accompanier. &c. by us asserters [of the Vedánta. b. &c. and pleasure. well. If one side were disproved merely by the dissent of the opponent.] we should have a contradiction to the threefold [aspect which things really exhibit]. Aph.* Because [if we were to infer any other cause than Nature. b. then. also: therefore [my] inference from effect [to cause] is not to be denied [in this peremptory fashion].. and Darkness: there would be a contradiction to these: such is the meaning. and delusion. are no properties of Atoms]. let [the inference of] cause from effect be granted.] there is dissent against the other side. on the recognition of that which is constantly accompanied [by it]. for instance]? To this he replies: p. a [mere unsupported] denial is not [decisive]. it is the same with my [side]. Quality is threefold [see § 61. a. or the like. [because nothing.].] if [this doubt be thrown out]: such is the meaning [of the aphorism]. and nothing else. Passion. [the opponent may say]. He states [his] doctrine [on this point]: p.

there is no production of what existed not [antecedently]: . as a man's horn.c. we see that everything is not possible. This he insists upon [as follows]: p.* Because of the rule. 137 Else. even the production is impossible: such is the meaning. Aph. That is to say: because. 'always. or of what did not exist: p. 136 What never existed will never exist.. a. Aph. 115. 114. every [effect] might be produced. b. He states an argument why an effect must be some [previously existent] entity: A product cannot be of nothing. everywhere and always. 'everywhere. like the horn of a man. He now repels the doubt as to whether the production of an effect is that of what existed [antecedently]. b.e. anywhere. a. he declares. also. [the presence of the cause being. the presence of the effect. And only when both are extant is there.' i.* The production of what is no entity. is not an entity. anything might occur at any time. in every place.' i. 116. in the world. Otherwise. from the presence of the cause. Of that which. Aph.e.. that there must be some material [of which the product may consist]..* Because everything is not possible everywhere and always [which might be the case] if materials could be dispensed with]. And so the import is. superfluous]. on the supposition. i. that everything is not produced. at all times.e. a. does not take place. For the following reason. that that effect alone which [antecedently] exists is [at any time] produced.

makes the product which is 'possible' [to be made out of it]. in Scripture.e. if this be urged: such is the meaning. potentially. A doubt whether that which is can be said to become. if it be thus [that every effect exists antecedently to its production]. Aph. . because the employment of [the term] 'arising' [or the fact of being produced] has reference solely to what did not exist [previously]. since the effect [every effect. and [this] competency is nothing else than the product's condition as that of what has not yet come to pass: therefore. moreover.* And because it [the product. by hypothesis. production is not of what [previously] existed not: such is the meaning. previously to production. Because the being the material [of any future product] is nothing else than the fact of [being it. He ponders a doubt:. potentially. it is not of any nonentity that the production takes p. b. 117. Aph. 139 a. there is no difference between the cause and its effect. i. antecedently. and. b.] must be eternal [without beginning].] in the shape of an entity. 138 place. a.* Because it is that which is competent [to the making of anything] that makes what is possible. since 'that which is competent. [as a product of it].* If [it be alleged that] there is no possibility of that's becoming which already is [then the answer will be found in the next aphorism]. that. 118.. p. the adjunction of arising. was possibility]: such is the meaning. a. in their causes.Effects preexist. [but of an entity. Aph. since it is thereby settled that a product is an entity. of] having the competency to be the product. 119.. whose esse.] is [nothing else than] the cause. in the case of a product which is [already. [in the shape of the product]. He states another argument: The product is nothing else than the cause. the cause. That is to say: but then. there is no possibility of [or room for] the adjunction of becoming.' viz. It is declared.

the employment and the non-employment of the [term] 'the production of an effect' are dependent on manifestation.' the view stated [in § 119] is not the right one: such is the meaning.* Destruction [of anything] is the resolution [of the thing spoken of as destroyed. of husked rice.. Aph. is the pot brought into manifestness. a. not spoken of as produced]. He declares the doctrine [in regard to this point]: Aph. therefore. which resided in the midst of the stone. [whereas]. by the operation of the sculptor. of milk. &c.] into the cause [from which it was produced]. that of oil. 140 so. dependent on the manifestation of the effect: that is to say. or not]. from the cow. &c.* No. by threshing. . for] the employment and the non-employment [of the term 'production'] are occasioned by the manifestation [and the non-manifestation of what is spoken of as produced. But if [the employment of the term] 'production' is occasioned by [the fact of] manifestation. p. 121. but [the employment of the term 'production' is] not in consequence of that's becoming an entity which was not an entity. the employment of [the term] 'production' is in consequence of the manifestation [of what is spoken of as produced]. As the whiteness of white cloth [which has become] dirty is brought manifestly out by means of washing.b. 141 e. [do not argue that what is cannot become. d. p. by what is occasioned [the employment of the term] destruction?1 To this he replies: What is meant by destruction. And manifestation [is no fiction of ours. [and no longer appears as a pot]. and the non-employment of [the term] 'production' is in consequence of there being no manifestation [of that which is. for example. by milking. 'No. for it] is seen. 120. by pressure. Therefore. Production is only manifestation. c. from rice in the husk. it becomes hidden. from sesamum-seeds. by the operation of the potter. of the statue. and so of the opposite. b. on the blow of a mallet.

then [all] effects [during this constant manifestation] ought constantly to be perceived. and thus we have a regressus in infinitum. still there is no fault. 144 b. from eternity. of a jar into its cause [i. Aph.e. a resurrection [or παλιγγενεσ•α] of it might be seen. So is it with all entities. for there is no starting-point. if there were [only] a resolution [of a product into that from which it arose]. then there would be the absence of [all] products. [manifestation may generate manifestation. Pray [some one may ask].3 as is the case with seed and plant. one to another. For example.a. He states another argument: Aph. The resolution. 143 on the principle that an effect consists of neither more nor less than its cause]. therefore. therefore.. as sources. but it is seen by those who can discriminate. [in the absence of all manifestation. and of this another. if it be not real. when thread is destroyed. To this he replies: How manifestation may occur without being an entity. and this is not seen: well [we reply]. and thread [spun again from the fruit of the cotton-plant]. reciprocally]. 122. 142 b. Be it so. must be something real.' and the kind of action [or behaviour] belonging to anything [which is termed its destruction]. that there are thousands of manifestations. c. [at all events. [which people may suppose to have served. fruit. Manifestation. and this [successively] changes into the shape of flower.4 p. into the particles of clay which constituted the jar]. it is changed into the shape of earth [as when burned to ashes]. and. a. as is the case with seed and plant. from eternity to eternity].* Because they seek each other reciprocally. p. is [this] manifestation [that you speak of under § 120] something real. by the blow of a mallet. and] there must be [in order to give rise to it. [seeing that a manifestation can be the result of nothing else than a manifestation. or something not real? If it be something real [and which. to this are due both [the employment of] the term 'destruction.] another manifestation of it.* Or. our theory of 'manifestation' is as] blameless as [your . p. 123. and the earth is changed into the shape of a cottontree. [But some one may say]. it is not seen by blockheads. never anywhere ceases to be].

and no more]. are such common operations as knowing. pray.. &c. in consequence of the distinction of souls. mergent. He [now] states the community of properties [that exists] among the products of Nature. since 'production' itself consists of production. is capable of being retorted]. a. dependent. and bodies. c. or is it not? If it is produced.. mutable. distinguished by the acts of leaving [one form]. having a separate body]. [every man. 'Uneternal..' i.' a. not present everywhere. if you say. the production of [all possible] effects. [in order to save an hypothesis with which what you see is irreconcilable]? To this he replies: .. it [i..e. is production produced. 'Mutable. &c.e. Pray [let us ask]. move [and are mutable. 146 b. what need of supposing an ulterior manifestation [of manifestation]? The view which you hold on this point is ours. if realities be the twenty-five [which the Sánkhyas enumerate (see § 61).' i. [But. probably.' i. 145 thus every objection stated or hinted under § 121.e.The objections to the theory of manifestation retorted. mutually: The characters common to all products. enjoying. then production never is at all. in due time. [and. multitudinous. uneternal.* [A product of Nature is] caused. or because it is eternal? If because it is unreal. having a cause. 124. is this because it is unreal. then of this [production of production] there must be production.e. 'Not all-pervading. some one may say]. pray. what need of supposing an ulterior production [of production]? then. under § 121. destructible. not all-pervading. takes another].e. 'Multitudinous. 'Dependent. 'Mergent. [as you allege that it is]. c. all times. e. and assuming [another form].' i.] is resolved into that from which it originated. [I ask. It [the soul.' that is to say.] If it be not produced.] on its cause. Again. &c..] because it is eternal. 'Caused.e. [and p. [which you will scarcely pretend is the case].' i. so that it would never be perceived.] leaves the body it has assumed. theory of] 'production.. as is notorious]. you accordingly giving up what you see. Again. so that there is a regressus in infinitum.e. if [production is not something produced.. in like manner. b.g. also. then there would be at. then.' [i.. absolutely nothing.. [such as you allege against our theory. every product. Aph. p.] since 'manifestation' itself consists of manifestation.

to the objection in question]. and of the effects [viz.' i. By the expression '&c. quite evidently.* Of both [Nature and her products] the fact that they consist of the three Qualities [§ 61. [see § 66]. four 'Qualities' of the Nyáya. because we do not explicitly enumerate them]. [is the common property]. [such as Knowledge]. He [next] states the mutual differences of character among the three Qualities which [see § 61] are the [constituent] parts of Nature: .Aph.' truly. mediately. p. products of Nature. the qualities. &c. nothing different.. Consisting of the three qualities. 125.e. or [to put it in another point of view. 'in reality. of the cause [viz. there is their establishment [as realities. 'Of both. 'Or because they are hinted by [the term] Nature. &c. are. Aph. and that they are irrational. they are implied]..* There is the establishment of these [twentyThe qualities of the Nyáya are implied in the term Nature. like our own three Qualities.] —' there is the establishment of these. a. Such is the meaning: b. a. &c.—since the character of these [twenty-four] fits the ordinary qualities. just because they are hinted by [the term] Nature.. 148 The characters common to Nature and her products. [such in the meaning of the compound term with which the aphorism commences]. by reason that [these] qualities are. The word 'or' shows that there is another alternative [reply. But the omission to mention them [explicitly] is not by reason of their not being at all. Either from their being nothing different from the twenty-four principles. He [next] mentions the points in which Nature and [her] products agree: p. for there is no difference between product and cause.] through their being implied just in those [twenty-four principles which are explicitly specified in the Sánkhya].... are established [as realities]. in reality. c.' i. &c. b.e. either by reason that these ordinary qualities [as contradistinguished from the three Qualities of the Sánkhya]. in the aphorism.]. 126. [in which.. which you fancy that we do not recognize.' is meant [their] being intended for another.' that is to say. 147 a. and being irrational. [which you fancy are neglected in our enumeration of things.] because they are hinted by [the term] Nature. all natural products]. Nature].

. and being reciprocally present. [one in another]. producing one another. through the characters of Lightness.. He states the proof of this: Proof that Mind &c. 'Through Lightness and other habits. or the like. severally. Aph. a. for the sake of Soul. 'Unpleasantness. and Darkness. viz. viz.' i. 127. b.* Through Lightness and other habits the Qualities mutually agree and differ. a.' i. as is the case with a jar. 128. 'lightness' (laghutwa)] is the prominent thing...] is meant Passion (rajas). are products. 129. At the time of telling their differences.' is meant Darkness (tamas). or the like. 'light. &c. the Qualities differ.' i. because . 'Pleasantness.' And this consists in their mutually predominating [one over another.] 'caused. what things are light. Mind and the p. 150 shape of the term laghu. which is light [i. stupefaction. Their agreement is through what is hinted by the expression 'and other.' i. but] is one where the abstract [the nature of light things. are products. &c.. the only two uncaused entities].e.' is meant Goodness (sattwa). Goodness. a. Aph. Passion.' &c. 'Lassitude. 151 rest are products.* The Qualities [§ 62] differ in character mutually by pleasantness. from time to time]. Pain. 149 '&c... b. It is by these habits that the Qualities.' is not one intended to call attention to the concrete. Restlessness. which is urgent and restless. Aph. [required to complete the aphorism].e. lassitude. Mind and the rest are products.' [in reference to this.In what the three Qualities differ. differ: such is the remainder.e. That is to say: like a jar. it is declared that the 'Great one' [or Mind]. the Qualities present themselves]. and Heaviness.* Since they are other than both [Soul and Nature. The meaning is as follows: the enunciation [in the p..e.. unpleasantness.] and illuminating. viz. in § 124.. By [the expressions. [in which forms.e. as well as differ.. By the expression '&c. not heavy. By the expression p. Pleasure. he tells in what respects they agree: In what respects the Qualities agree. By the expression '&c. which is heavy and enveloping. consorting together.

He states another reason: A second proof. 132.* Because of [their] measure.* And. It is by the power of its cause. He states the same thing.] powerless. e.. because they well [follow and] correspond with Nature. [as a chain restrains an elephant. i. are unlimited]. c. that the product can do aught]. He states another argument: A third proof. [Mind and the rest are products].they are something other than the two which [alone] are eternal. because it is through the power [of the cause alone.. He [next] states [in support of the same assertion. 152 is a maxim. because they are limited in measure. b. 153 from the consideration as to what becomes of Mind and the others. Nature and Soul. That is to say: [Mind and the rest are products]. finally. a. is intended to notify the completion of the set of [positive] reasons [why Mind and the others should be regarded as products]. [which it will not be alleged that they do]. they would at all times produce their products. a.] the argument from negatives. b. Nature and Soul. [which is a limited one]. a. 131.. that a product energizes. Otherwise. [i. Aph. b. Aph.* Because they conform [to Nature]. viz. the argument drawn p. that what is in the effect was derived from the cause and implies the cause]. produce their products in subservience to Nature. b.. so that Mind and the rest. [whereas the only two that are uncaused. [in the next aphorism]: A fourth proof. 130. since it is their habit to energize. And the word iti.e. viz. because the Qualities of Nature [§ 61] are seen in all things: [and it p. when they are not products]: . in this place. being [except through the strength of Nature. Aph. only by the force of the iron which it is made of].

Aph. from the rising of the moon. a. that the sea is swollen [into full tide. other than that of material and product. 'On the quitting thereof.' i.* The cause is inferred from the effect. b. a. he declares [as follows]: p. Aph. which you would make out to exist between Nature and Mind. where the nature [or p. because it accompanies it. there is Nature.] why should it be under the character of a product. than product or non-product [§ 133].* On the quitting thereof [quitting the condition of product]. towards her son who was produced from her bosom on the occasion of the celebrated Churning of the Ocean. that] Mind and the rest may exist quite independently of the pair of alternatives [just mentioned]. If Mind and the rest were 'other than these two. [But perhaps some one may say. or Soul. e. Converse proof of the same.e. merely in virtue of their not occurring apart from it. or Soul.Aph.' i. 134. when Mind and the rest quit the condition of product. In regard to this.. 135..e. such is the pair or alternatives.] exists. in the shape of nonentity. 154 Mind and the rest would not be at all. as [is the case with] the inference.. that Mind and the rest are a sign of [there being such a principle as] Nature? They may be [more properly said to be] a sign.' i. besides soul and Nature].* If they were other than these two they would be void. [some one may say. 155 essence] of the cause is not seen in the effect. [in the case of Nature and her products]. [seeing that there is nothing self-existent. [into one or other of which the product must needs have resolved itself]. 133. rising. with maternal affection. To this he replies: What kind of causes can be inferred from their effects. b. indeed. if neither product nor non-product. a. they would be in the shape of what is 'void. [these two alone being non-products]. That [other relation. Though the swelling of the tide does not occur apart . Mind and the rest [of necessity] enter into Nature. Well now. Product and non-product.

Aph. the cause could not have been inferred from the effect]. a. 'It is resolved..] we infer that into which it is resolvable. as we see the clay which is the cause of a jar. must be resolvable into something else. And that the 'Great principle.' From that [resolvable effect]. the cause is inferred from the effect.] is. he remarks [as follows]: p. in which are the three Qualities.e.' in the shape of ascertainment [or distinct intellection]. though we infer the effect from the cause. must be the root of all. But then. and nothing else.' i. [Nature. a. there would be a regressus in infinitum. moon-rise. in Mind and the rest. yet here the cause.e. in the present case. then. Therefore [i. viz.* The indiscrete. b. in Mind and the rest.* There is no denying that it [Nature. Is the cause of this [world] a product. the same being [with equal propriety to be assumed to be] the case with its cause.from the rising of the moon. is discrete [or limited] and perishable. or not a product? If it were a product. Aph. [in other words. [some one may say]. and. since we see. be the cause of the world: what need of Nature? To this he replies: p. the 'Great one' [or Mind]. because of its effects. since 'effect' has been termed linga]. the characters of Nature. because. in which are the three Qualities. b. If effects be from any root [to which there is nothing . its 'cause. the 'Great principle' [or Mind]. 'Because it accompanies it. 156 How Mind must have an antecedent. must be inferred] from its [discrete and resolvable] effect... being perishable. e. 137. then let that principle itself. 157 Why Nature. consequently. [Mind].' such is the import of [the term] linga.] if it be thus. 136. since Mind. Nature must be inferred. actually present in the jar]. Nature herself actually present. still something quite different may be the cause [of all things]: what need of [this] Nature [of yours]? In regard to this. [here rendered] 'effect. But. we see the properties of Nature. [But it may still be objected. [i. is not seen in the effect. [which will be in vain attributed to any other source]. [which constitute Nature]. tide.' here analogously termed lingin.. is established by direct observation.

according to the Mímá•sá creed...* Soul is something else than the body. 139.e.] that Nature is. i.] Soul positively cannot be. 'Because of its effects.. [though what kind of thing is matter of dispute].' b. as [whether it be] multitudinous. 138.antecedent]. simply. &c.* [The relation of cause and effect is] not [alleged as] the means of establishing [the existence of Soul]. There is no denying 'that it is. because. or] theory. that Nature is. in every [philosophical system. of some kind]. Be it so.' there is no dispute about there being such a kind of thing. [let us grant. It is not from any effect that Soul is inferred. a. or sole. just as.—which shall be held to involve] 'merit. all-pervading. for the dispute is [not as to its being. seeing that] it has no products. 'I will mention another means of establishing it.e. or not all-pervading. but] as to its peculiarity [of being].: what need of imagining anything else? To this he replies: Materialism scouted.] Souls are nothing else than the body. and so forth. 'Not the means of establishing' that [viz.' i. and its organs. 158 Aph.' that is to say. then this is that [to which we give the name of Nature]. &c. there is no dispute as to [there being something to which may be applied the term] 'merit' (dharma). In regard to this. [since everybody who does not talk stark nonsense must admit a Soul. Soul cannot be thus demonstrated to exist. yet [the opponent may contend. There is no dispute about 'there being such a kind of thing. e. or good works. for [if the existence of causes is to be inferred from their products. the existence of soul]. the relation of cause and effect is not the means of establishing it. This intends. as to there being Soul. b.' p. he remarks [as follows]: p. according to the Nyáya. Aph.' i. for the difference of opinion has regard to the particular kind of [thing. or self. because of the effects of Nature.. [But some one may say. . as is the case with [the disputed term] 'merit.—such as sacrifices. 159 c.

] combinedness is the state of the soft and the hard. also. c. If it were intended for something else that is discerptible.] is for the sake of some other. there would be a regressus ad infinitum. 141. Because there is. b. By the expression '&c. [not discerptible]. Aph.]. i.* [And Soul is something else than the body.] because of [its] superintedence [over Nature]. &c. He elucidates this same point: Soul presents no indication of being material. And this exists occultly in Nature. as well as the rest. because there is [in Soul. viz. discerptible. Aph. or [to express it otherwise. He states another argument: p. because the other characters of Nature..' &c.' is meant. the 'Great one. [The meaning of the aphorism is] plain.] the reverse of the three Qualities.' &c. otherwise.* Because that which is combined [and is. a. discerptibleness would not prove discoverable in the products thereof.e. in Soul. b. a.. And combinedness [involving (see § 67) discerptibleness. because. therefore.. 161 Another proof that Soul is not material.* And [Soul is not material. That which is discerptible is intended for something else that is indiscerptible. 160 consists in the Qualities' making some product by their state of mutual commixture. are not seen [in soul].] p. &c. 140. [which distinguishes matter from spirit]. 'the reverse of the three Qualities. b. 142.a. . because they are not seen [in it]. Aph. He propounds an argument in support of this: The discerptible is subservient to the indiscerptible.

which. is Liberation wanted. It is Nature that is experienced. a. it seems. the experiencer]? To this be replies: For Soul. [and thus makes it seem as if it experienced (see § 58. b.a. b. and that is Soul. self-manifesting.* Since light does not pertain to the unintelligent. light. [the departure of which from it would leave nothing behind]. Although Soul. a. p. is the essence of the Soul. He states another argument: Another proof.] because2 the exertions are with a view to isolation [from all qualities.)].)]. Efforts are engaged in for the sake of Liberation. Aph. and Nature is unintelligent: such is the meaning. [and not constitutive (see § 58. a. [whereas.] is made. 144. a. because of the fact that the reflexion of the Intellect befalls it. because the three Qualities are its very essence. it is eternal]. from its being unchangeably the same.* [And Soul is not material. still the assertion [in the aphorism. and because it would thus prove to be not eternal. The very essence of Nature cannot depart from it [so as to leave it in the state of absolute. Pray. . the experiencer is Soul.* [It is for Soul. Of what nature is this [Soul]? To this he replies: p. manifests whatever else is The nature of the Soul. or of Nature. a condition to which Soul is competent. Aph. in the shape of Mind. is this [for the benefit] of the Soul. 163 Aph. is not [really] an experiencer. 145. is. [which must pertain to something or other. but Nature is not]. solitary isolation contemplated]. For a superintendent is an intelligent being. The isolation (kaivalya) of that alone is possible of which the qualities are reflexional. 143. and not for Nature. not Nature. in reality. b.] because of [its] being the experiencer. 162 [since Nature.

but it is not. He declares that there is a contradiction to Scripture in this. or susceptibilities. would be confuted. And there is Scripture [in support of this view.. also. then there would need to be another light for it.] is confuted [by the Scriptural declaration of the contrary]. there would be no Liberation. b. Intelligence. b. a. it would be [as we hold everything to be. or. essentially. that is associated with attributes.. the absolutely simple being the only unalterable]. p. It is a settled point. therefore. were unintelligent [as the Naiyáyikas hold it to be.* There is no denial [to be allowed] of what is established by Scripture. because the [supposed] evidence of intuition for this [i.e. If soul were associated with attributes.e.* It [Soul. and. To this he replies: Soul has no quality Aph.'1 &c. 147.. for example. 165 a.manifest].] let Soul be unintelligent [in its substance]. in the view which he is contending against]: Aph. essentially. [its attributes. Scripture is higher evidence than supposed intuition. and. of light. knowledge being. always keeping it liable to be affected by something or other. The text. if there were any annexation of qualities [to Soul: and the notion of confuting Scripture is not to be entertained for a moment]. that the unintelligent is not light. . regarded not as its essence or substratum. but as one of its qualities]. as the simple theory. in substance. 'For this Soul is uncompanioned. [it is not self-manifesting]. a. 164 attribute. Thereby it manifests all things. [But the Naiyáyika may urge. the two following texts from the B•ihadára•yaka Upanishad2]: 'Wherewith shall one distinguish that wherewith one distinguishes all this [world]?' 'Wherewith shall one take cognizance of the cognizer?' c.] liable to alteration. but have Intelligence as its p. 146.] has not Intelligence as its attribute. by them. because it is without quality. let Soul itself consist. [i. If Soul. for the existence or qualities in the Soul.

e. void of blemish:' 'Being one [only]. Argument against the soul's being unintelligent.. then. he says [as follows]: There is a multiplicity of souls. 166 the case [may be inferred] from the phenomenon. &c. . soul's.e. multiplicity attaches [seemingly.] there being a difference in its investments. by reason of jars.' By the '&c. Aph. as is the case with Space. a knower. 167 are many. then.b. i. when one is born. and so. that.' that is to say. death. are included. death to another. a. 150. 148. the opinion of the others. all must be born. &c... a multiplicity of souls [is to be inferred]. changeless.] dreaming is included. it is divided [into a seeming multitude] by Nature (•akti). 'Birth.—[and yet]. But the literal meaning [of the aphorism] is this. [birth to one. b.e. If soul were one only. in deep sleep. a.* [If soul were unintelligent.. i. b. If soul were unintelligent.. [to which there does not belong multiplicity]. &c. from their being appointed..e..* From the several allotment of birth. of the Vedántís]: Aph. 'For Soul is eternal. i. He ponders.. 'From the several allotment' of these. &c. As Space is one. souls p. &c. again.' In regard to this. &c. [viz. Illusion (máyá). a.] in profound [and dreamless] sleep. Aph. But that this is not p. and so on].' [in the aphorism. &c. that the fact.] it would not be witness [of its own comfort.' By the expression '&c. &c.' growth. [in the soul]. The Vedántís say that 'soul is one only'. &c.] to the one [Soul]. omnipresent. because the Scripture itself confutes the [supposed] intuitive perception thereof. but not through its own essence. 149.* [The Vedántís say. [which mark out the spaces that they occupy]. moreover. the [supposed] intuitive perception of qualities. 'A multiplicity of souls. that 'I slept pleasanty..] being devoid of qualities. established by Scripture.. The view of the Vedánta on this point. in consequence of the difference of adjuncts. of its [i. as a doubt. [as] jars.. cannot be denied.. it would not be a witness.

when a jar is destroyed. in consequence of the destruction of one thing. as an illustration.e. for Conjunction is not pervasion. for that reason. is not different. because this [if it were evidence of a thing's being destroyed. &c. [i. we are not to speak as if there were the destruction of something else.] are not contradictory. He states [what may serve for] the removal of doubt [as to the point in question]: Refutation of the Vedánta on this point. it would be nonsense to speak of Bondage as affecting one portion of a monad. [according to the Vedántís]. who is not.. Thomas. presenting itself. in all its multiplicity. 'The investment is different. when we are considering the case of Yajnadatta.' [there are diverse bodies of John. it is [familiarly] said. a. [of which the Vedántí may seek to avail himself.&c.] belong [simultaneously] to one. p. by taking the Sánkhya view.* The investment is different. that [Soul] to which this investment [of body.. since Bondage and Liberation do not [and cannot. and Liberation as affecting another portion. [without beginning or end. of the limitation occasioned by any particular human body]. but not that to which this belongs. 'that to which this belongs.. since Soul is eternal. 'the jar's space is destroyed' [for then there no longer exists a space marked out by the jar]. 'The soul has perished. 169 e. but p.] also on the hypothesis that there are many souls.] belongs..] there is no imputation of contradictory conditions to [a Soul p. What may be [proved] by this? To this he replies: Aph. on the hypothesis of there being but one Soul.3 [the destruction of Devadatta.e.]. also. [And it must be true:] otherwise. And. [whereas.] would present itself where it ought not. 168 then it is true.e. indeed. b. that there is really no perishing of Soul. on the other hand. as both parties agree]. Aph. is so far true. [and the absurd consequences of such an opinion will be seen]. without being in conjunction with the stem]. But the conjunction and [simultaneous] nonconjunction of the sky [or space] with smoke. since there is a difference of corporeal limitation. [now consider]. 151. .' [This. as a monkey may be in conjunction with a branch of a tree. [i. 170 supposed to be] everywhere present as one [infinitely extended monad].. the [fact that the Vedánta makes an] imputation of in consistent conditions is quite evident. to be assumed to be dead]: and.3—so.g. &c.* Thus. as a fact. 152. on the hypothesis that Soul is one. [but is one only]: such is the meaning. it is merely a way of talking [to say].' i. how could there be the appointment of birth and death? b. on the destruction thereof.

a. 'Thus,' i.e., [if you regard the matter rightly,] according to the manner here set forth, there is no 'imputation,' or attribution, 'of incompatible conditions,' Bondage, Liberation, &c., to a soul 'existing everywhere,' throughout all, as one, [i.e., as a monad]. b. [But, the Vedántí may contend,] we see the condition of another attributed even to one quite different; as, e.g., Nature's character as an agent [is attributed] to Soul, which is another [than Nature]. To this he replies:

The Sánkhya is free from the charge of absurdity to which the Vedánta is open.

Aph. 153.* Even though there be [imputed to Soul] the possession of the condition of another, this [i.e., that it really possesses such,] is not established by the imputation; because it [Soul,] is one [absolutely simple, unqualified entity].
Imputation is not proof.

a. [The notion] that Soul is an agent is a mistake; because, that Soul is not an agent is true, and the imputation [of agency to Soul] is not true, and the combination of the true and the untrue is not real. Neither birth nor p. 171 death or the like is compatible with Soul; because it is uncompanioned, [i.e., unattended either by qualities or by actions]. b. [But the Vedántí may say:] and thus there will be an opposition to the Scripture. For, according to that, 'Brahma is one without a second:'2 'There is nothing here diverse; death after death does he [deluded man,] obtain, who here sees, as it were, a multiplicity.'3 To this he replies:

Scripture, speaking of Soul as one, is speaking of it generically.

Aph. 154.* There is no opposition to the Scriptures [declaratory] of the non-duality [of Soul]; because the reference [in such texts,] is to the genus, [or to Soul in general].

a. But there is no opposition [in our Sánkhya view of the matter,] to the Scriptures [which speak] of the Oneness of Soul; because those [Scriptural texts] refer to the genus. p. 172 By genus we mean sameness, the fact of being of the same nature: and it is to this alone that the texts about the non-duality [of Soul] have reference. It is not the indivisibleness [of Soul,—meaning, by its indivisibleness, the impossibility that there should be more souls than one,—that is meant in such texts]; because there is no motive [for viewing Soul as thus indivisible]: such is the meaning.

b. But then, [the Vedántí may rejoin,] Bondage and Liberation are just as incompatible in any single soul, on the theory of him who asserts that souls are many, [and that each is at once bound and free]. To this he replies:
p. 173

Aph. 155.* Of him [i.e., of that soul,] by whom the cause of Bondage is known, there is that condition [of isolation, or entire liberation], by the perception [of the fact, that Nature and soul are distinct, and that he, really, was not bound, even when he seemed to be so].3
The compatibility of Bondage and Freedom.

a. By whom is known 'the cause of bondage,' viz., the non-perception that Nature and soul are distinct, of him, 'by the perception' [of it], i.e., by cognizing the distinction, there is 'that condition,' viz., the condition of isolation, [the condition (see § 144) after which the soul aspires. The soul in Bondage which is no real bondage may be typified by Don Quixote, hanging, in the dark, from the ledge of a supposed enormous precipice, and holding on for life, as he thought, from not knowing that his toes were within six inches of the ground].
p. 174

b. [Well, rejoins the Vedántí,] Bondage [as you justly observe,] is dependent on nonperception [of the truth], and is not real. It is a maxim, that non-perception is removed by perception; and, on this showing, we recognize as correct the theory that soul is one, but not that of soul's being multitudinous. To this he replies:

He jeers at the Vedántí

Aph. 156.* No: because the blind do not see, can those who have their eyesight not perceive?

a. What! because a blind man does not see, does also one who has his eyesight not perceive? There are many arguments [in support of the view] of those who assert that souls are many, [though you do not see them]: such is the meaning.' b. He declares, for the following reason, also, that souls are many:
p. 175

Scripture proof that Souls are many.

Aph. 157.* Vámadeva, as well as others, has been liberated, [if we are to believe the Scriptures; therefore] non-duality is not [asserted, in the same Scriptures, in the

Vedántic sense]. a. In the Purá•as, &c., we hear, Vámadeva has been liberated,' '•uka has been liberated,' and so on. If Soul were one, since the liberation of all would take place, on the liberation of one, the Scriptural mention of a diversity [of separate and successive liberations] would be self-contradictory. b. [But the Vedántí may rejoin:] on the theory that Souls are many, since the world has been from eternity, and from time to time some one or other is liberated, so, by degrees, all having been liberated, there would be a universal void. But, on the theory that Soul is one, Liberation is merely the departure of an adjunct, [which, the Vedántí flatters himself, does not involve the inconsistency which he objects to the Sánkhya], To this he replies:
p. 176

Aph. 158.* Though it [the world,] has been from eternity, since, up to this day, there has not been [an entire emptying of the world], the future, also, [may be inferentially expected to be] thus [as it has been heretofore].
As it has been, so will it be.

a. Though the world has been from eternity, since, up to this day, we have not seen it become a void, there is no proof [in support] of the view that there will be Liberation [of all Souls, so as to leave a void]. b. He states another solution [of the difficulty]:

The stream of mundane things will flow on for ever.

Aph. 159.* As now [things are, so], everywhere [will they continue to go on: hence there will be] no absolute cutting short [of the course of mundane things].

a. Since souls are [in number,] without end, though Liberation successively take place, there will not be [as a necessary consequence,] a cutting short of the world. As

now, so everywhere,—i.e., in time to come, also,—there p. 177 will be Liberation, but not, therefore, an absolute cutting short [of the world]; since of this the on-flowing is eternal. b. On the theory, also, that Liberation is the departure of an adjunct [§ 157. b.], we should find a universal void; so that the doubt2 is alike, [in its application to either view]. Just as there might be an end of all things, on the successive liberation of many souls, so, since all adjuncts would cease, when [the fruit of] works [this fruit being in the shape of Soul's association with body, as its adjunct,] came to an end, the world would become void, [on the Vedánta theory, as well as on the Sánkhya]. c. Now, [if the Vedántí says,] there will not be a void, because adjuncts are [in number,] endless, then it is the same, on the theory that Souls are many. And thus [it has been declared]:4 'For this very reason, indeed, though those who are knowing [in regard to the fact that Nature p. 178 and Soul are different], are continually being liberated, there will not be a void, inasmuch as there is no end of multitudes of souls in the universe.' d. Pray, [some one may ask,] is Soul [essentially] bound? Or free? If [essentially] bound, then, since its essence cannot depart, there is no Liberation; for, if it [the essence,] departed, then it [Soul,] would [cease, with the cessation of its essence, and] not be eternal. If [on the other hand, you reply that it is essentially] free, then meditation and the like [which you prescribe for the attainment of liberation,] are unmeaning. To this he replies:
p. 179

Soul is ever free, though it may seem bound in all sorts of ways.

Aph. 160.* It [Soul,] is altogether free [but seemingly] multiform [or different, in appearance, from a free thing, through a delusive semblance of being bound].3

a. It is not bound; nor is it liberated; but it is ever free, [see § 19]. But the destruction of ignorance [as to its actual freedom,] is effected by meditation, &c., [which are, therefore, not unmeaning, as alleged in § 159. d.]. b. It has been declared that Soul is a witness.2 Since it is a witness [some one may object], even when it has attained to discriminating [between Nature and Soul], there p. 180 is no Liberation; [Soul, on this showing, being not an absolutely simple entity, but something combined with the character of a spectator or witness]. To this he replies:

* And. alike]. Soul's indifference. [Some one may say.* It [Soul.'] implies that the exposition of the Nature of Soul is completed. a. from the proximity of Intellect. it be not an agent]? To this he replies: p. from which Soul is really distinct]. Aph. always devoid of the Bondage called Pain [see §§ 1 and 19].* [Soul's fancy of] being an agent is. The word iti [rendered 'finally. through How Soul. Through its connexion therewith. it [Soul. 'Constant freedom:' that is to say.5 a. [which quit it. Soul is.] b.] is a witness. as you say. [which (see § 61) is a modification of Nature. positively. [if. [Well. 162. some one may ask]. which is not an agent. 182 Aph.How Soul is a spectator. 161. because Pain and the rest are modifcations of Understanding. By 'indifference' is meant non-agency. finally. a. [these products of Nature (see § 61)]. Aph. How is this.1 from the proximity of Intellect. the influence [of Nature]. [the nature of Soul is] indifference [to Pain and Pleasure.] is a witness. when discrimination [between Nature and Soul] has taken place? b. 164. 163. And where is [its] connexion with sense-organs. the fact of] Soul's being an agent is declared in Scripture. on liberation]. A sense-organ is an organ of sense. through its connexion with sense-organs. . at all times of what nature is Soul? To this he replies: p. 181 The real condition of Soul. is yet spoken of as such.* [The nature of Soul is] constant freedom. Aph.

' i. where it is said. that on the [topics or] subject-matter [of the Sánkhya system]. b.a. Next Footnotes p.e. 12 * Instead of 'indestructible' read 'impracticable. [e. in the Veda: 'Soul is to be known.' Dr.. [Its] 'being an agent. 183 c. Near the end of a.) of which Intellect (see § 61) is a modification]. for the First Book. in this Commentary1 on the illustrious Kapila's Aphorisms declaratory of the Sánkhya. is 'from the proximity of Intellect. Soul's fancy of being an agent. and that definition. Ballantyne's maimed expression I find nowhere but in the Serampore edition of Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya. in the next page but one. p. g. [(see § 19. in all probability.' For the synonymous atiprasakti .' ** Remove the brackets enclosing the words 'the positive destruction of. atiprasanga is rendered 'undue result. it does not come again'4]. So much. it is to be discriminated from Nature: thus it does not come again.. The repetition of the expression 'from the proximity of Intellect' is meant to show that we have reached the conclusion: for thus do we see [practised] in the Scriptures. END OF BOOK I. who here had to do with atiprasakti. 16 3 Professor Wilson's Dictionary erroneously gives 'uninterrupted continuance' as one of the definitions of atiprasanga. p.' 'through the influence' of Nature. suggested 'eternal' to the translator.

p.' p. See. 53.and atiprasanga. Ed.' &c. for which see p. of this Book. see Aph. and also elsewhere. 23 * 'That is to say. 25 * Read. infra.' 'straining a rule. instead of 'your own implied dogma. in Prof. p. Ed. notion. 38 . for a more correct rendering. Colebrooke..' Ed. from past actions.. As technicalities. they generally signify 'illegitimately extended application' of a canon. a term which Dr. Benfey's SanskritEnglish Dictionary: 'An impression remaining unconsciously in the mind. the Rational Refutation. 1. with the comment on it. 20 1 This is the lection preferred by Aniruddha and his followers. 63. 151. p. It is well defined. 29 2 Vásaná. or the like. and. on various occasions. &c. 21 1 The Sanskrit word thus rendered was inadvertently omitted in the first edition. etc. Ed. and the comment on Aph.' 'the dogma which you accept. p.' 'room for misconstruction. 17 2 Upádhi. producing pleasure or pain. p. 53. p. respectively. Ed.' &c.. represents one or other of these terms by 'wrest. 36 1 The brackets are of my inserting. by the resulting merit or demerit. Ballantyne has rendered variously. Vijnána here supplies the comment. p. p. Ed. in divers passages of the present work.

p. Ed. in the Sanskrit. Ed. the translator has given it many meanings. in wider acceptations. unaccompanied by the major term. at p. translated 'successive' in Aph. Ed. Ed. below.' &c. 42 3 For vyabhichára. 3 'Text' and 'maxim' are here meant to represent •ruti and sm•iti. Both are held to have originated from a superhuman . p. see Book VI.' 'failure. a. As a logical technicality. 119. In this work and others. at p.. 52 1 •wetá•watara Upanishad.. 24. the second. the term vyabhichára. p. ii.' &c. 13. 15 and 63. Ed. often. 'memorial law. by 'contradiction. 2 Bhagavad-gítá.' the Vedas. it denotes the presentation of the reason. see 1. 53 1 Upádhi.' or a code of such law. 43 1 I have inserted the words 'in product and substance. Aph. For another version.' Ed. taken in their more limited senses. 38.' &c. For other English equivalents of this term. and also any composition of a man reputed to be inspired.' 'unoperativeness. supra. Ed. or middle term. the word used in the original. 38. for the same terms.' 'impossibility.. occurring in the singlar number. as the Mánava. in various contexts. 'investment' and 'adjunct. p.1 Vyabhichára is the expression here paraphrased. 2 The original dual of 'concomitancy of affirmatives' and 'concomitancy of negatives' is anwayavyatirekau. Ed. supra. and so has Colebrooke. 'books of Scripture and of law. 41. * 'That is to say. 4 Here again occurs. p..' Ed. iii. 3 'Antecedent and consequent' renders kramika.' 'derogation. who renders it. see the Rational Refutation. The first is 'revealed law. Elsewhere the translator has. &c.

& c. Ed. 58 2 These words. 11. vol. in which additions. and my alteration of the numbering of the Aphorisms throughout the remainder of Book I. no place here. 54 2 For another rendering. Ballantyne. when he republished the Sánkhya Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca Indica. were pointed out. compressions. 64 . by me. supra. pp. My copy of that work was lent. 61 * For another rendering {of the text from § 56 b through § 57 b}.. p. 1-183. vi. and Dr.] p. as having. 61. a bad reading of the 24th Aphorism of Book III. Ed. p. with the sentence of comment attached to them. ii. Ballantyne. omitted them. 56 2 •wetá•watara Upanishad. this interpolation was taken from the Serampore edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya. interpolations. Ed. in 1851. p. but only the former is regarded as preserving the very words of revelation. and should have made the former explanatory of the latter. p. the Sanskrit portion of what corrpesonds to pp. 57. [* Almost certainly. Ballantyne should have taken 'unseen' and 'works' as in apposition.source. Ed.. 4 Aniruddha transposes Aphorisms 53 and 54. 12. and scholia of his own devising. 55 1 Dr.. who prepared. see the Rational Refutation. 4 The anacoluthism observable in the translation follows that of the original. p. for Dr. Ed. from a text here and there somewhat different. to Pandit Híránanda Chaube. 13. see my translation of the Rational Refutation. and other alterations lawlessly made by him. Hence the brackets now inserted.. were introduced with regrettable frequency. &c. p. Ed.. with reference to which see the Indische Studien. p.

on which see 2. pp. see the Rational Refutation.. 189. 3 For 'is employed. . 90. those of] contact and separation. 67 1 Here I have had to make several insertions and other alterations. and darkness]. pp. gravity. v..' Ed.1 To render vásaná. [of the soul] is not to be removed by merely hearing. at p. the bondage. and also have the properties of levity. Ballantyne had: 'That is to say. &c. vol.. 5 For a different translation. a. Ed. p. 25. from the Vivekachú•áma•i. &c. not a reality. for they [themselves] possess [qualities. Ed. Ed. I cannot now say how tenably. 32. 61.] p..' see the Bháshá-parichchheda. Ed.' Ed. viz. 72 1 Balavattwa. p. for which I find the variant chalatwa. in the case. 10. goodness.. 71 3 For a translation of a slightly different text. 'mobility..' &c. They are quoted and translated in the Rational Refutation. or inferring. 29. p. 44. 'is applied to these (teshu). read. without perceiving. not specific qualities. Ed. mobility. Albrecht Weber's Indische Studien. which is credulously affiliated on •ankara Áchárya. &c. 43. 2 Read: 'Goodness and the rest are substances. where they are professedly taken.' Vai•eshiká gu•ah is equivalent to the vi•esha-gu•áh in the original of Book V. st. 3 Am•itabindu Upanishad. supra. &c. See Dr.' &c. ii. 43.' &c. note 2. 65 1 Aniruddha has: 'But it is merely verbal. of Gau•apáda's Má••úkyopanishatkáriká. Dr. For the 'specific qualities. &c. Ed. p. 190. passion. p. Ed. see the Rational Refutation. just as the contrariety in regard to the proper direction.. [namely.. [* The verses in question also occur as ii..

81 2 Here indicated by the adjective avyakta.' See Aph. in respect of Nature.] is rootless. that is here referred to Ed. v.p. from Aniruddha.' Ed. 84 2 Read 'in connexion with.' &c..: 'He meets a Vedántic objection. of the Vish•u-purá•a. 90 2 Paragraph a is taken. quoted and translated below. the root [or radical principle.' The side-note was formerly correspondent to a. at p. Ed.' Ed. Ed. p. . which I consulted in India I found the strange reading: 'The root of roots.' the principle [termed] the Great one. 97 3 It is the bracketed Aph.' Ed. since it has no root. 58 supra. p. * 'This Ignorance.' In several MSS.' Ed. 99 1 Literally. 'liable to return to mundane existence. p. p. viz. in the Sánkhya. is rootless. Ballantyne's revised translation. Ed. 56. p. 'the indiscrete. instead of 'Mind. p. The rendering now replaced runs: 'Alike [is the opinion] of both [of us].. with slight alterations at the beginning and at the end. 82 3 This seems to mean: 'There being no root to a root. The original of this is i. in b.. suggested by a remark of Vijnána. 136 of this Book.' This is very like saying that A = A. 3 Literally. 85 2 This is Dr. 4.

again rendered. Náge•a. seems to be the most elegible. p. Ed. on comparison of the various commentaries. adopted the genuine reading.4 Compare the Chhándogya Upanishad. might have run somewhat as follows: 'Of him who is. 115. productive thereof is proof. if the aphorist had been atheistic]. 112 3 Rather. 113 1 Rather. on republishing the Sánkhya Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca Indica. instead of 'being in. xv. of three kinds. p. 58.' &c.e. Ed. Ballantyne.' vide infra.' &c. but Vijnána. p. p.' &c.' &c. and Vedánti Mahádeva end the eightyseventh Aphorism with these two words. in himself. The aphorist would not be confounded with those who denied what he waited to see evidenced. 'And this [mere] taking exception to a Lord is expressly owing to. Ed. instead of that given above. to have altered his translation. Because of the non-existence of a Lord. otherwise [i. p. viii. but in no MS. The attitude which he assumed is that of suspense of judgment on the point of theism. indeed. then goes on to say: 'For. p. it would have been explicitly declared. 110 4 For the term ati•aya. note 4. supra. 1 This is the Aphorism bracketed at p. 102 3 Dr. as against the positiveness of the professed atheist.' Ed. Hence: 'That which is in the highest degree. Vijnána. 103 which. Ed. by 'exaltation. Ed. Such is the interpretation which. p. He ought. 108 3 Aniruddha has 'determined by. which I find. 106 1 So reads Aniruddha.. liberated all extinction of bondage is final. in the Serampore edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya. in conformity with the unadulterated text. in the next page. p..' Ed. 'the view being accepted' (abhyupagame): . here followed. at the same time.. however.

p. here quoted. p. that is to say.' 'lord. the Yogí.. and such a one. are impredicable of one absolutely liberated. has acquired transcendent faculties. Dr. &c.] p.' Hence the expression. 'possessor of supernatural powers. by what is destruction occasioned?' Aniruddha.. Such is the meaning of the word [ná•a]. Ed. 143 3 Translating the Sánkhya Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca Indica. Ed. p. for ati•aya.' Ed. Ballantyne. 142 it expresses. and [such is] the particular action [which] p. 4 'From the blow of a mallet [results] the resolution of a jar into its material cause: by this the destruction [of it] is occasioned.— translated. adopting the lection anvesha•á. by way of eulogy. Ed. p. 141 1 'If production is occasioned by manifestation. 118 1 The translator's authority for this attribution has not been discovered. and the like. 4. 214.p. either to a soul as it were liberated. since thus.' Ed. being inert and impassive. agentship. 'a power. Resolution. 'as it were liberated. 'mighty one. that. 'transcendent faculties. 4 Aniruddha's exposition of this Aphorism is as follows: p.' which rendered an unwarranted reading. 121 1 Aniruddha prefixes to 'the internal organ' the synonymous 'the Great One. 134 1 I have corrected the translator's 'But. For a more correct translation of it.of the Yoga-vásis•ha. 3.' Also see. through devotion.'—Book IV. inconsiderately rendered: 'You are to understand. [* The quotation in question is xvi. cannot be intended by í•wara. now replaced by one correlative to the end of the preceding Aphorism.' is applied. . p. Ed. siddha. 115 3 In both places.' This is from Aniruddha. Aph. or to a person who. the term í•wara. Ed. 24. 116 According to this. see the Rational Refutation.. above.

Ed. 16. 172 2 Chhándogya Upanishad. 165 1 B•ihadára•yaka Upanishad.. Vijnána. p. unity.. thus undertood. 4. 16.. only in the eyes of the mistaken man who is influenced by the notorious cause of bondage. iv. 163 2 II. The two sentences quoted are continuous. a condition the reverse of the one before referred to. Ed. p. as they often do. 172 3 All the commentators but Aniruddha read ###. Ed. p.successively. in definition of it. however. and they differ widely from him.. 14. the synonymons anusara•a. is the essential condition of souls multeity. or •atapatha-bráhma•a. xiv. Ed. 51. p. Náge•a's explanation of it is as follows: ### p. iv. 17. or •atapatha-bráhma•a. or in other words. note 3. 11. 1.' Vijnána explains anvesha•á by anudhávana. Aph. 167 3 Vide supra.' &c. Ed. and that is inconclusive. must be assumed to proceed from a Vedántic disputant against the Sánkhya. p. who is unable to discriminate... 16. The Aphorism. 5. that. 53. 168 3 Vide supra. 173 The substance of this is. Ed. in their elucidations of the Aphorism. 7. Ed. and Vedánti Mahádeva has. vi. But the word ### does not occur there. p.. 3. 3 Ka•ha Upanishad.' instead of 'There is a continual following of one after the other. . &c. xiv. 162 2 This lection is that of Aniruddha alone. 1. 4. and Vedánti Mahádeva necessitate 'and because. Instead of ###. p. p. p. Náge•a. the correct reading is ###.

The original is found. § 148. 181 of those alluded to in Aph. Also see the commentaries on the Sánkhya-káriká. however.Whether as read by Aniruddha. is Soul. p. For what is very similar to the second. of a variety of renderings. 'Clear of both conditions [i. 19. . and § 144. that of being bound and that of being freed. Colebrooke's 'thus' is unrepresented in the Sankrit as I find it. and p. Ed. see the conclusion of the Chhándogya Upanishad. 160. p. at all times. by one text. 178 3 This reading I find nowhere.. They are preceded.' 'question.. or as read by others. . p. p. it is susceptible.' According to most interpreters. which is eternally free].. 183 The words ### {?} are obviously a gloss. with reference to the previous context. p. as a quotation.. . but. a. 182 1 The translator inadvertently omitted the words 'through. in Váchaspati Mi•ra's Tattwa-kaumudí. 180 5 Vijnána says that this Aphorism and that next following specify notes of Soul which establish that its essential condition is neither p.e. vol. Ed. The source of the first has not been discovered. on the other hand. at p. 162. a. Cowell's edition). supra. or unchanging fixedness. &c. and are followed by another. Ed. i. 2 of the Sánkhya-káriká . 2 Vide supra. 4 The source of the stanza here translated I have not ascertained.' &c. the preceding Aphorism has reference to the question whether it be only after Soul is p. Ed. p. . of essential condition (ekarúpatwa) is predicable of it. Ed. I take it.' rather signifies 'difficulty raised. Ed. 179 liberated. that simplicity. 165. and I have punctuated accordingly. 4 These words are taken from Colebrooke: see his Miscellaneous Essays (Prof. instead of it. here rendered 'doubt.. st. § 54. or.' Ed. p. 177 2 Anuyoga. near the beginning of the comment on st. 56. 249.

see p. 429.[* For emendations of sundry matters. Ed. note 4. though many passages in the preceding pages are from other commentaries. 1 Aniruddha's is intended. .

the eternal. is] for the emancipation of what is [really.* Of Nature [the agency. were to create without a motive. Therefore. which is unintelligent. The expression 'the being a maker' is borrowed from the last aphorism of the preceding Book. There. we remark. in the first place. very diffusely. thirsting no more.]. in the Second Book. which is [really] a shadow [Book I. belonging to the Soul. Now. which is.Sacred-Texts Hindu Index Previous Next p. &c.] for the sake of removing pain . he. too.' c. Nature makes the world for the sake of removing the pain. § 58]. of Emancipation. the nature of the products of Nature is to be declared fully.1 b. free from the bonds of pain. 1. he states the motive for the creation of the world: p. or the being a maker.. 184 BOOK II. 185 Aph. The motive for creation. all the three [things mentioned in these verses] require to be known. or [to explain it otherwise. though not apparently. how the creation is formed out of the Primal Principle. that. in its very nature. if Nature. he will tell. we should find even the emancipated one bound. and the Primal Agent [Nature]. a. and soul.] emancipated. according to [the verses]. is emancipated. that. with a view to the very clear discrimination of Soul from these. or else for [the removal of] itself.. with advertence to the consideration. a. in order to prove that it is not the Soul that undergoes the alterations [observable in the course of things]. 'Whoso rightly knows its changes. The subject-matter [of the Institute] has been set forth [in Book I. And here. with reference to the character.

Aph. Book II]: therefore. there would not be creation again and again. 3. as well as Emancipation. Even then dispassion is not established through the mere hearing. . and direct cognition does not take place suddenly. He tells the reason why dispassion does not take place through creation once for all: Force of the foregoing reason. and.* Because this [Emancipation] is [only] of him that is void of passion. yet Emancipation alone is mentioned. a.' that is to say. c. Although experience [of good and ill]. Aph. Emancipation does not take place through creation once for all. &c. sickness. therefore. only after many births do dispassion and Emancipation take place at any time of any one at all: such is the meaning. but it is [the lot only] of him that has been extremely tormented many times by the various pain of birth. if creation were for the sake of Emancipation. but only] through the merit of acts done in many births. because of the forcibleness of the impressions4 from eternity. p. [or successive lives]. also. and there is an abundance of obstacles to Concentration [see Yoga Aphorisms. inasmuch as it is the principal one. but through direct cognition. 187 arisen through the knowledge of the distinctness of Nature and Soul: such is the meaning. But then. death. then. in which the distinctness of Nature from Soul is enounced. b. 188 have existed from eternity. for the sake of removing the actually real pain [which consists] of itself.] comes [not to all alike. 2. since Emancipation might take place through creation once for all. is a motive for creation. a. [successive creation goes on] because Emancipation actually occurs in the case only of him in whom complete dispassion has p. or [on the other hand. to which he replies:3 Successive creation why. Even the hearing [of Scripture.* It is not effected by the mere hearing.. but [the required direct cognition takes place] through the completion of Concentration.] it is 'for the sake of itself. because of the forcibleness of false impressions that p.[connected] by means of but a shadowy link. 186 b.

And so the Yoga aphorism [Book II. [The reality . it has not [absolutely] ceased to be. Therefore. 4. viz.] belongs. to Nature. But then. inasmuch as they produce impressions and exhibit acts.. by the text. creates? To this he replies: Nature.] without end: such is the meaning. And. severally. in respect of him that has done the work. is real.. a. is on a level with a dream? To this he replies: The reality of Nature's creativeness.b.' viz. As householders have.. b. since Nature's character of creator is decided to be real. creates. severally. 'From that or this Soul proceeded the Ether. not Soul. many dependants.* And. Goodness. He states another reason for the continuous flow of creation: Another reason for continuous creation. children.'2 &c. many who are dependent upon them..] which acquaints us with the subject [in which the creative character inheres]. moreover. only a fictitious [or figurative] attribution of creativeness to Soul. in the Scriptures. so. for products are real... § 61. &c. how is it laid down that Nature's creativeness. [Book I. because it is common to others besides him. 6. it follows that it is fictitiously attributed to Soul. § 22] says: 'Though it have ceased p. Aph.] have to emancipate innumerable Souls. But then why is it asserted that Nature alone creates. there is.* Or as people have. it is proved that Soul. also. Aph. since we are told [in Scripture. the Qualities. Aph. by that evidence [see Book I. 189 to be. a. the onflow of creation takes place for the emancipation of other Souls. severally. p.* Since it is proved from the products. according to the distinctions of wife. § 110.. if it be thus. when.' b. 190 a.. &c. That is to say: because the real creative character of Nature is established just 'from the products. really. moreover. for Souls are [in number. 5.] that creation. however many Souls may have been emancipated. b. also. since it [the character of creator. really.

what was said [at § 5]. who says: 'I think p. should be modified into Mind. who are not knowing. The word chetana here means 'one knowing. by its own nature. but to others. also. the distribution. there belongs to Soul no . and.' These existing products being admitted. in myself. through the conjunction of earth. b. though associated with what is so.* The rule is with reference to one knowing. just as it is by Locke.]. because it is fitting. for a modification of wood. whatever proves the existence of the cause proves. both pleasure and pain (artha). bound [inasmuch as it consists of bonds]. Aph.' meaning. 191 God has given me assurance enough as to the existence of things without me. its creative character. that. that. the Sánkhya argues that they must have a cause.' because the derivation is from chit. a. As one and the same thorn is not a cause of pain to him who..' i.] b.' one aware. which is one great concernment of my present state. being 'one knowing. is escaped by 'one knowing. so that it does not energize with reference to the emancipated Soul [§ 6. she must energize with reference to the emancipated Soul. but actually is so in respect of others. is seen: to which he replies: p. I can produce. resembling earth..* Even though there be conjunction [of Soul] with the other [viz. also. by their different application. of Nature. 'to be conscious'. 193 Soul not creative. it actually is a cause of pain: such is p. 7. the creative character is only fictitiously attributed. on the alternative [see § 1] that Nature works for herself. so Nature. also. the self-emancipation is possible. 8. Soul. 192 the 'rule. at the same time. escapes from that same. Nature]. &c. Hence. this [power of giving rise to products] does not exist in it immediately. as this cause means neither more nor less than something creative.. which is. Aph. also. one who has accomplished the matter: to him it does not consist of pain. by the conjunction of Nature. But then [suggests some one]. in respect of Soul. &c. But then [it may be said]. a. b.. &c. aware of it. just like the burning action of iron. To this he replies: Who escape nature. since...e. this is not proper.of eternal things is established here. just as escape from a thorn. &c. Even though there be conjunction with Nature.

Book I.] of Mind.. p. b. otherwise. b. directly. 'Creation' is supplied from the preceding aphorism.' i. § 22]: such is the meaning. or the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle [Yoga Aphorisms... being through the fire conjoined with it: such is the meaning. 9. 'like the burning action of iron:' as iron does not possess. by the conjunction of the China-rose. because.e. But.. [in the former]. 'immediately. Now he states the principal occasional cause of creation: Creation when. [or of the material world]. [in the latter case. there is 'concentration. or dispassion. because of their being3 simultaneously present or absent. it might be held that the colour of the crystal was changed.* When there is passion.' i. it is admitted that there is an alteration of both. in the example just mentioned. the abiding [of Soul] in its own nature [see Yoga Aphorisms. After this he begins to state the manner of creation: p. a. [is the creation] of the five elements. It has already been stated [§ 1] that the fruit of creation is emancipation. Aph. there is creation. Aph. When there is passion. 195 Order of creation. that Passion is the cause of creation. and.e. and] creation. emancipation. And so the import is. An illustration of this is. in short. there is cumbrousness in postulating the modification of both. 194 b.* In the order [see § 12..creativeness. directly. &c. He mentions a distinction [between these successively creative energies and the primal one]: . there is concentration. 10. but this is only fictitiously attributed to it. § 32]. a burning Power. Book I. a. b. for this is proved by sense-evidence: but. since the case is accounted for by the modification of one only. when there is dispassion. in the instance under doubt.

a. for the sake of the emancipation of Soul. He mentions other properties. By the expression '&c.' i.' [in the aphorism. is its p. the things mentioned [in § 10] as 'in the order of Mind. inasmuch as they are perishable. also. § 71)].e. of Mind. But they are set forth as identical..' b. 'Intellect' is a synonym of 'the Great Principle' [or Mind (see Book I. the 'origination.. 197 peculiar modification: such is the meaning.' i.. since. of the Great Principle: .' called [also] ascertainment. the creativeness. is not for the sake of themselves. through their nature and their habits.Nature's products not for themselves. being the source of the Ether.* [Relative] Space and Time [arise] from the Ether. &c.* Intellect is judgment.] is meant 'from the apprehending of this or that limiting object. 'Of these.. &c. a. since the creativeness is 'for the sake of Soul. really.e. that this Intellect is 'Great. in their order. and because it is of great power.' because it pervades all effects other than itself. through the conjunction of this or that limiting object: such is the meaning. (see § 1)] are not susceptible of emancipation: such is the meaning. 11.e.. b. they [unlike Nature.* Since creation is for the sake of Soul the origination of these [products of Nature] is not for their own sake. b.': Mind or Intellect defined. and 'judgment. sorts of qualities of Nature: therefore it is consistent that Space and Time should be all-pervading. &c. 196 Relative time and space whence. Aph. Aph. a. Now he exhibits. because a property and that of which it is the property are indivisible..1 And it is to be understood. But the Space and Time which are limited arise from the Ether. are. He declares the creation of limited space and time: p. Aph. The Space and Time which are eternal [and absolute].' i. 12. 13.

and want of Supernatural Power: such is the meaning. if it be thus. Aph.. Aph. The meaning is. [without admixture of Passion and Darkness]. the Great Principle [or intellect]. 199 Self-consciousness.] becomes reversed through tincture. Dispassion. in the portions of intellect lodged in men. also becomes 'reversed' [see § 14. &c.. Only when a thing has been determined by intellect [i. &c. He mentions the product of Self-consciousness. &c. 198 b. are formed out of intellect.e. do the making of an Ego and the making of a Meum take place. by an act of judgment (see § 13. he defines its product.Products of intellect. a. Selfconsciousness: p. be accounted for? To this he replies: Opposite products of intellect. which has arrived in order: . cattle. the thing [called] the internal* instrument (anta•-kara•a): and this. and Supernatural Power. vile. 15. a. i. Ignorance.2 a. of personality]. That same 'Great one.] is a product of superlative Purity. inasmuch as a property and that of which it is the property are indivisible. because intellect alone [and not self-consciousness. moreover. p. a. through being tinged with Passion and Darkness. Knowledge..' i. b. how can the prevalence of demerit. are products of it. a.* Merit. But then. Non-dispassion. in order to acquaint us that this is its peculiar modification.e. 14.e. as a potter [makes a pot].. Having characterized the Great Principle. 16.'1 [viz. that Merit. is spoken of as 'a conceit. not formed of self-consciousness (ahankára). with the properties of Demerit. 'Self-consciousness' is what makes the Ego.. b.. Aph.]..* The Great one [intellect.)].* Self-consciousness is a conceit.

And hence. taste. Aph. a. viz. from the Dark Self-consciousness.. hearing. the anus.' called also Intellect and Mind. and. proceeds from modified Self-consciousness. those called the organs of sight. with the p. the organs of understanding are five.. the vocal organ. Aph. Aph. 'another. touch.] is the eleven [organs]..e. b. 200 five Subtile Elements. 18.'—which is not to be confounded with 'the Great one. 201 Of the Organs. [or the 'internal organ.' viz.e. He refutes the opinion that the Organs are formed of the Elements: . and the generative organ. it is to be reckoned that the ten organs are from the Passionate Selfconsciousness. is the eleventh organ: such is the meaning. Sound. consists of Purity.' i. Among these.—alone. the completer of the eleven. b. 19.' i.* The product of it [viz. too. and the Subtile Elements. is 'the eleventh. b. moreover. &c. The organs of action are five. the hands. viz..' i.* Along with the organs of action and the organs of understanding another is the eleventh. pure: such is the meaning.] among the set consisting of sixteen [§ 17]. and the five Subtile Elements.e. therefore it is produced from Self-consciousness 'modified. The 'eleventh.. the feet. 17. Along with these ten. consisting of [the principle of] Purity. He exhibits the eleven organs: p. he mentions a distinction: The Mind whence. The meaning is.. that the eleven organs. Mind. Mind. and smell..Product of Selfconsciousness. a. viz. are the product of Self-consciousness..* The eleventh. a.. of Selfconsciousness.

'2 &c. is usually spoken of as being resolved into its originator. Some say that the Mind. decays. 22. e. 20. a. and because we are certified of their destruction by the fact that.g. a.* [None of the organs is eternal.]: p. because [although a thing. b. He repels this: p. for the Scripture says.: such is the meaning.] is merely the set of eye-balls. when it ceases to be a jar. is not its originator. 204 . That Scripture which there is about absorption into deities is not 'of an originator. it does not refer to an originator. the mind.Aph. [&c. and because we see their destruction. in the conditions of being aged.' b. also.. like the sight and the rest. [and such is the absorption into a deity from whom the Mind absorbed did not originally emanate]. the ground.. Pondering a doubt.' that is to say.] are not formed of the Elements. yet] we see the absorption of a drop of water into what. the mind. b. a jar.* They [the organs. The Nyáya view rejected. included among the organs. &c. 'From this are produced the vital air. have a beginning. as some hold the Mind to be. because there is Scripture for [their] being formed of Self-consciousness.* The Scripture regarding absorption into deities is not [declaratory] of an originator. he says: p. into earth. All these organs. a. He rebuts the atheistical opinion that the sense [for example. and all the organs.. 203 Aph.] because we have Scripture for their beginning to be. 21. is eternal. without exception.. No organ eternal. &c. 202 A text explained.. viz. Supply 'the organs. viz. Aph. nevertheless.

a. [Sight. He rebuts the opinion that one single Sense.. there is not a singleness of organ: such is the meaning. Aph. because the powers are. in the condition of identity [with the eye-ball]: such is the meaning.* Moreover. but only in the opinion of mistaken persons does the Sense exist 'in its site.' b. b. 23.] in the eye-ball. Every Sense is supersensuous. the other ten are kinds of powers: p. But then [it may be said]. 205 a. there is something unphilosophical in supposing various kinds of organs to arise from one single Self-consciousness. Even by the admission that a diversity of powers belongs to one single organ.g. 25. To this he replies: Theoretical considerations cannot upset facts. a.* A theoretical discordance is not [of any weight. b. The correct reading is: '[The sense is something supersensuous. p. He tells us that. organs. This is simple. there is not a oneness [of the organs]. of the single leading organ. therefore. the Mind. a difference being established if a difference of powers be [conceded].* The Sense is supersensuous. 206 .' e. to confound it with] the site.] in the case of what is matter of ocular evidence. Aph. assuredly. [is a mistake]. and not perceptible. performs various offices: All the organs are not one organ. through diversity of powers. 24.The Sense not to be confounded with its site. the diversity of organs is established. [it being the notion] of mistaken persons [that the Sense exists] in [identity with] its site. Aph.

a lover.* The Mind identifies itself with both a. Aph. through association with one indifferent. through the force of association. 26. Of his own accord. He mentions the object of the organs of intellection and of action: What the organs deal with. something other. 207 b. —being...* By reason of the varieties of transformation of [which] the Qualities [are susceptible]. As one single man supports a variety of characters. p. the meaning being. a. 208 . The 'dirt' of the tastes of food. &c. by its being [thereby] distinguished by the modification of seeing. from its becoming one with the organ of vision. through what service.—so the Mind. because of the adaptability of the Qualities. a. also. means ordure.Diversified operation of Mind. b. &c. these are termed Organs (indriya). indifferent. through association with the organ of vision. is partly transformed].* Of both [sets of organs the object is that list of things]. to varieties of transformation. That is to say: the Mind identifies itself with the organs of intellection and of action. 28. and. or any other.. b. Of what Soul (indra). through association with his beloved. and ending with the dirt of Taste. he explains the meaning of the expression 'identifies itself with both:' Aph. 'of the Qualities. Aph.. How this happens.' &c. through association with some other.] according to circumstances. becomes various. or the like.. the Mind. there is a diversity [of their product. both these things he tells us: p. The argument in support of this is. beginning with Colour. [into which the food. &c.. &c. consisting of the quality Taste. 27. or any other. Goodness.

The Organs and their possessors.e. &c. in the shape of Breath. For. the instrumentality belongs to the Organs. and the like. 31. of vision. That is to say: the five. The aspect of Intellect is attention1. though quiescent. 29. merely through the proximity called 'Conjunction. because of their circulating as the air does. b. The opinion is not ours. &c. decision and doubt. 209 Aph..* The being the seer. so the Soul.' i. 210 that the modifications of the organs take place successively only. these [animal spirits] are the joint or common 'modification. a common aspect of the three: A character common to the three.. Breath. even without himself energizing. viz. through all the organs. p. a. 30. b. Now he mentions the special modifications of the triad of internal organs: Difference in the internal organs. a. a. &c. conceit [of personality]. &c.* Of the three [internal organs] there is a diversity among themselves. as it is that of the Vai•eshikas. He mentions. becomes a warrior through his instrument. of the [three internal] instruments. of the Mind. his army. Aph. and a judger. a speaker. by directing this by orders simply. without exerting any effort]. becomes a seer.. 'of the instruments. of the triad of internal instruments. are the modifications. b.' or kinds of altered form. in common.* The five airs. also. So he says: . Aph.' because it moves these... p. of Self-consciousness. and not simultaneously. as the lodestone [does the iron. as a king. belongs to the Soul. which are familiarly known as 'airs'..

33. he. is abiding in itself. [viz. Aph. The 'and' implies that this is the reason [of what was asserted in the preceding . That is to say: during the state of repose of these modifications. at other times. § 62] b.* The modifications [of the understanding. which are to be shown to be the cause of the world. Aph. §§ 2. a.] not painful. p.Sense-impressions. 212 b. Aph.. the gem. That the modifications are of five sorts is declared by Patanjali's aphorism. This is simple. of mundane influences]. and 46]. are [some of them. in isolation. not excusively successive.* And as [by] a flower... it [Soul. it [the Soul]. 32. the reflexion of these having ceased. 34. with a view to showing how they are the cause of the world.. 211 a.] abides in itself. also. And to this effect there is a triad of Aphorisms of the Yoga. 3. and] which are of five kinds. Book I. He acquaints [us] with the nature of Soul: Soul's relation thereto. 35. as it were. &c. its tincture4 ceasing.* The modifications of the organs take place successively and simultaneously. Lumping the modifications of the understanding. He explains this by an illustration: This illustrated.4 p.* On the cessation thereof [viz. a. b.] painful and [others. Book I. exhibits [them]: The ideas which constitute the world. [though seemingly not so]. Aph. [see Yoga Aphorisms.. in the first place. a. being.

external and internal combined.* Organ is of thirteen sorts. the understanding of its own accord wakes up. apparently.aphorism]. through division of the subordinates. 36. just so. on the removal thereof.e. becomes colourless. b. [the Soul not really possessing either merit or demerit]. in like manner [is the Soul apparently tinged by the adjunction of the Qualities]. by reason of a flower of the Hibiscus. But then [it may be asked]. § 13.. for the sake of the master. that. Book II. by whose effort does the aggregate of the organs come into operation. And it is seen. and awaits no other effort.' i. As the cow. 37. b. the energizing of the Organs is just in consequence of the development of the deserts of the soul: [see Yoga Aphorisms. abiding in its own state. that. and. a. just as Nature energizes 'for the sake of Soul. becomes red. the Organs energize quite spontaneously: such is the meaning. b. a. Aph. 214 out of profound sleep. not abiding in its own state.. as the gem [is tinged. And the desert belongs entirely to the investment. He mentions an instance of a thing's spontaneously energizing for the sake of another: An illustration. b. Aph. As the gem called rock-crystal. how many Organs there are.] by a flower. for the sake of Soul from the development of desert. for the sake of the calf. Soul. since Soul is motionless.* The Organs also arise.* As the cow for the calf. With reference to the question. quite spontaneously secretes milk. and since it is denied3 that there is any Lord [or Demiurgus]? To this he replies: p. . 38. The meaning is. he says: The number of the Organs.]. the meaning being.' so 'the Organs also arise. p. Aph. 213 What moves the Organs to operate.

meaning to imply that it is one with the internal organ. although the blow itself. called understanding. he says: Preeminent efficiency of Mind illustrated.' with a reference to the fact. so [here. is the principal efficient in the cutting. through [their] distinction into individuals. is an efficient.] alone is the principal instrument in furnishing its object [of emancipation] to Soul. He says 'sorts. The quality of the [principal] organ. in the shape of being most efficient on behalf of soul. a. are more than one. The triad of internal organs. He does not here say that Selfconsciousness is secondarily efficient. 39. and the ten external organs.] of the single organ. because the organs [or functions.* Because the quality of being most efficient is conjoined with the organs. there is an infinity. 215 b. and the instrumentality of the others is secondary. p.* c. just as. since it is this that puts an end to our non-possession of the result. 40. also]: such is the meaning.* Among the two [the external and the internal organs]. But then. among troops of dependants. moreover. as in the case of an axe. because of its close proximity to the quality of being the principal efficient. in the [other derivative] organs. of these. in this case what is [meant by] secondariness?1 [Why are they said to be instrumental at all?] In regard to this he says: Efficiency of the Organs whence. exists. the meaning being. He says 'through division of the subordinates. Aph. combined. also. Therefore it is made out that an organ is of thirteen kinds: such is the connexion with the preceding aphorism: p. yet the axe. the principal is Mind.' As. . Aph. derivatively. 'As in the case of an axe.a. that it is understanding which is the principal organ. 216 b. are thirteen. Specifying the precise state of the case in regard to the condition of secondary and principal. in the world.' in order to declare that. the understanding. since understanding [it seems.

] is the depository of all self-continuant impressions. Aph. and not the Sight. in three aphorisms. or because there is no result apart from it. simply.] pervades p. Here the word 'Mind' does not mean the third internal organ. or immediate and direct. its modification in the shape of meditation. For the modification of thought called 'meditation' is the noblest of all the modifications [incident to Soul. 42. 217 chief. the reasons why Intellect [or understanding] is the principal: A reason why Understanding is the principal. else it could not happen that things formerly seen.' i. b. is the immediate cause. too. Aph. That is to say: and because we infer its preeminence. 'Among the two. &c. Understanding alone is the depository of all self-continuant impressions..e. &c. a. a. 'Mind. or pure Thought.] because there is no wandering away. 218 all the organs.* So. because it is that which furnishes Soul with its end. Aph. and heard. Another reason. among troops of dependants.* And because we infer this [its preeminence] by reason of its meditating. or state of emancipation. just as. p. as being the depository thereof. are his subordinates: such is the meaning. in short. understanding. 'by reason of its meditating. would be remembered by the blind.. or the Mind. e. efficient in Soul's emancipation. and deaf.'] c.' viz. a. the external and the internal..) but Intellect.. a. 41.. &c. some one single person is the prime minister of the king. whose blessedness. Another reason. and the others. and the Understanding itself which. 43. &c. governors of towns. or 'the Great One.. 219 same root as chintá1].' i.e..* [And Intellect is the principal. or Self-conconsciousness. because it [the understanding.a. named Thought [chitta. is 'the principal. it is to have no modification at all]. is nobler than the organs whose .' i. He tells. further. is. from the p. [(§ 30. That is to say: because it [understanding.

] of secondary and principal is relative.' i. a. 'the energizing. of this [or that] Soul. 46. or principal. because of [its] having been purchased by this [or that] . That is to say: meditation cannot belong to Soul essentially. Intellect. the condition.. To this he replies: Meditation not essential to Soul. 220 apparent contradiction to the view propounded at § 39]? To this he replies: An organ may be. &c.* The condition [as regards Soul's instruments. 45. In the operations of the Sight. suppose that the modification 'meditation' belongs only to the Soul. just as in the world. that. is principal [or precedent]. In respect to the difference of function.. alone. all operation.] that it is the Mind that takes the nature of both [sets of organs.e. and. But then. b. and. the Mind is principal. a. But then. a.. is the instrument? With reference to this. he says: p. because of the difference of function. if thus the preeminence belongs to understanding alone.* It cannot be of its own nature. [suggests some one]. Self-consciousness. in the operation or Self-consciousness. in p. because of the immobility [of Soul. that. or secondary. of the instruments [of Soul] is relative.modifications are other than this: such is the meaning. whereas 'meditation' is an effort]. and not another Intellect. how was it said before [at § 26. 221 Every one reaps as he has sowed. The meaning is. b. Aph.* The energizing [of this or that Intellect] is for the sake of this [or that Soul]. viz. what is the cause of this arrangement. b. Aph. this [or that] Intellect. because of [its] having been purchased by the works [or deserts] of this [or that Soul]. relatively. as secondary. 44. principal. of the instrument is for the sake of this [or that] Soul. But then. in the operation of the Mind. Aph.

So much for [this abstract of] the Second Book. the preeminence belongs to Intellect. it is called the act of Soul. p. the acts of his servants]. among the rulers of towns. in the commentary. Although the action of all the instruments is the same. belongs to the prime minister. Therefore.. the operation of that [axe. or the like]. The import is. e. Although there is no act in Soul. because it is immovable. has been purchased by the act. END OF BOOK II. just like the victories.* Admitting that they [the various instruments of Soul. of buying.] b. As. b. The meaning is. that therefrom is the distributive allotment of instruments [inquired about under § 45. 223 [viz. 47. c. b. since it is the means of Soul's experience. because of Soul's being the owner [of the results of acts.. all] equally act. just as in the world.Soul's works [or deserts]. just as in the world. Intellect alone is celebrated as 'the Great One. &c. of a king [which are.. Next Footnotes . still the preeminence belongs to Intellect alone: just as in the world. and the rest. even although there be no difference so far as regards their being [all alike workers] for the sake of the king. In order to make clear the chiefship of Intellect. really.' The repetition p. 'just as in the world. in the world. Summing up. in all the Institutes. on the Products of Nature. [as follows]: Aph. in being for the sake of Soul.'] implies the completion of the Book. by whatever man. because it is just as the preeminence. such as cleaving. as the king is of the results of the actions of his troops]. composed by the venerable Vijnána Áchárya. just as in the world. a. on Kapila's Declaration of the Sánkhya. or the like. he sums up. is only for the sake of that man [who purchased it]: such is the meaning. in the world [or in ordinary affairs]. whatever axe. just as in the world.g. 222 still.

'. p. p. . Emancipation. &c. 45. p. 7879. is to render anwayavyatirekau. for a different rendering. Vide supra.. Ed. Ed... instead of 'we remark . Ed. Ed. 186 3 For another rendering of the original of a.. 197 1 See. 3 'Simultaneously. note 2.' The verses quoted are from the Mahábhárata. 184 1 Here add. p. and occur in Chap.' Ed. 211. 45. p. 187 4 Vásaná.e..' &c. 194 2 Vide infra. 1. and c. 198 2 I. ii. 62. 189 2 Taittiríya Upanishad. 29. But read: 'From this. Ed. and read. 199 1 For another version. b. p. &c...' &c.. p. Ed.. see my translation of the Rational Refutation. from this same self. p. xii. 43. in the Section entitled Moksha-dharma. note 6. p.p.. 'influence. p. p. . note 2. &c. . . ccxvi. &c.' 'there is the declaration that. 'in the Moksha-dharma. see the Rational Refutation. p. on which vide supra. p. the Rational Refutation.. Ed. Ed.

46. supra. p. p. Ed. from chit and chint. 15. 3.' Dr. Ed. 4 Literally the same words are found in the Yoga Aphorisms. 211 2 Namely: 'Evidence. as in Aph. called manas. 6 'Concentration (yoga) is the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle. &c. Ballantyne's translation is here quoted. 203 2 Mu••aka Upanishad. Ed. p. Ed. 'what is the character of these [i. read.. Also see the Rational Refutation. rendered 'ascertainment' and 'judgment' at pp.' 'Then [i. Ed.e. supra. chimera. Vide supra. p. p. Ed.] p. 216 1 The two words are.. 212 it [the Soul.. p.e.. at p. and manas really make one whole. ii. 156 and 196. § 5. ahankára. which are cognate. respectively. misprision.* 'An internal' is better.. 3 'Demurred to' is preferable. Book I. in the wider sense of that term.] is in the same form as the modifications [of the internal organ].' 'At other times [than that of Concentration] it [the Soul. p.' &c. memory.. at the time of Concentration.] abides in the form of the spectator [without a spectacle].. organs]? Ed.' Ed.. p. 215 1 Instead of 'in this case.e. Ed. that buddhi.' The implication is. 'influence'. 112. . unconsciousness. 215 * Instead of 'it is one with the internal organ. 198.' read 'the internal organ is really one. 4 I. 209 1 Adkyavasáya. i.

.

in the degrees of greater. in the gross Elements only. because these. fierceness.. therefrom. are manifest to the concentrated.' i. of the dyad of bodies: The Body whence. in the shape of the calm. the great Elements: such is the meaning. simply. viz. the going into various wombs. not in the Subtile. and less. . the gross product of Nature. or the like. after that. &c. In the next place. dulness.* Therefrom.. the Subtile Elements.. Aph. the fact of consisting of pleasure. called 'the five somethings. a. and.e. is manifested. he states the origination. with a view to perfect freedom from passion. is to be described. but to no others]. [this description being given] with a view to that less perfect degree of dispassionateness which is the cause of one's engaging upon the means of knowledge. b. 2.Sacred-Texts Hindu Index Previous Next p. of the Body. after that... '[Which] has no difference. &c. a. 1.. the great elements and the dyad of bodies. since they have but the one form of the calm. all the means of knowledge are to be told: so the Third [Book] commences: The elements whence. For. the origin of the twentythree Principles. &c. having stated. in the shape of calmness. [practitioners of meditation. in the shape of the calm. viz. the gross. by composing the preceding Book. So then. 225 of 'the diversified. Aph. 224 BOOK III.' [so called] from their possessing a difference..' from this [set of five] is the origination p. and the like. and.* The origination of the diversified [world of sense] is from that which has no difference. that in which there exists not a distinction. and the rest. viz.

e.. 4.' i.* And.. also. Aph. 3.. p. for it is impossible that. Aph. of all Souls whatever.' i. 227 b. 'Therefrom. do the going and coming of Soul take place.e. being conditioned by the twenty-three Principles. and it does not continue after that. a. a. Aph. 'Thereof.a. . b.e. possessed of such differences. The meaning is. He states. in the shape of the twenty-three Principles... 'from the seed. &c. from the Subtile one. i. 226 there is the origination of the pair of Bodies.e. Mundane existence whence. as its cause. seemingly. the Gross [Body] and the Subtile: such is the meaning. which have no differences. mundane existence.. the limit of mundane existence. p. b. Mundane existence till when. there is the energizing of these. of itself.. even till there is discrimination [of Soul from its seeming investments].] 'energizing. which does not discriminate. is inevitable. 228 other. a. or not Lord. only by means of that investment migrates from Body to Body. with a view to experiencing the fruits of previous works.e. of that which.* From the seed thereof is mundane existence. that that very [Soul]. of the Body. is 'mundane existence. Now he proves that mundane existence could not be accounted for otherwise than on the ground of the twenty-three Principles. that. there should be a going. till there is discrimination. For Soul. from the twenty-three Principles. is immovable: such is the meaning. He states the reason of this: The reason of this.* Because of [the necessity of] the other's experiencing.' i. 5.e. &c.' i. in virtue of [its] all-pervadingness. void of the differences of being Lord. should experience the fruit of its own [reputed] acts.. [though.' i. The meaning is: because of the necessity that the p.

the Subtile Body.e. at the commencement of the creation [or annus magnus]. Aph. cold and heat.* It [Soul. Gross and Subtile..e. The Gross one arises from father and mother.' i. &c. belongs to that Subtile Body alone whose origin was 'antecedent.' i.e.' i. during the time of mundane existence. Which of the bodies is the cause of Soul's bondage. in a body of earth: such is the meaning. because all are p.: such is the meaning. the dyad of Bodies: The Gross and the Subtile Bodies distinguished. the Subtile Body... 230 agreed that there is neither pleasure nor pain. not to the other. 7. the Gross Body. He states. Why? Because the fruition of what is called pleasure and pain belongs only to 'the one.. a.. 229 Aph.e..e.: such is the meaning. a. &c. from the pairs.' i.] is now quite free from both.b. He next proceeds to describe. p. He decides [the question]. pleasure and pain..' i.. does not arise from a father and mother.. is 'not so.. b.. .] with Soul takes place.e. to have pleasure and pain as its effect [reflected in Soul]. 8. b.* The Gross [Body] usually arises from father and mother. &c.' i.e. 'Now.' i. but not to 'the other. because it arises from creation. &c.' i. 6. the other one is not so. for the most part. that. Soul is quite free 'from both.* To that which arose antecedently it belongs to be that whose result is this. the conjunction of the pairs [pleasure and pain. viz. fruition [really] is not: Soul's bondage only seeming.e. a. because it is to the one that there belongs fruition. through disguise by which one of the Bodies. 'To be that whose result is this. e. for there is mention also of a Gross Body not born of a womb: and 'the other.' i. separately.. 'usually. during the time of mundane existence. even while there is a Body. Aph.

there becomes a division of it into individuals. how can there be diverse experiences accordingly as Souls are [numerically] distinct.—as. in the shape of an aggregate. The Subtile Body. Aph.* There is distinction of individuals.' meaning. 232 b.] if the Subtile Body be one. and Understanding. through its being container and contained.] mingled. 9. are the Subtile Body.. since the Subtile one alone. The seventeen are the eleven organs. the five Subtile Elements. there was but one Subtile Body. 11. further. is twofold. But [one may ask.) named] Hira•yagarbha. as one. the aggregate of many trees. a. at the beginning of a creation. 231 b. p. a. in the shape of the Subtile Body of son.. § 62. is [what ought to be denoted by the term] Body. daughter. 'through diversity of desert.3 p. [one from another]? To this he replies: How there come to be individuals. through actions.* From its being applied to it. 10. at present. [as the forest. and that. Aph. [viz. are the Subtile Body. is but one]: such is the meaning.b. partitively. Here the seventeen. which are causes of the experiences of other animal souls. But then. through diversity of desert. a plurality. it is applied to the . of the one Subtile Body of a father. to the Subtile one]. subsequently. there is. Self-consciousness is included under Understanding. [presently mentioned.* The seventeen. saying. moreover. at the beginmng of the creation [or annus magnus]. on this showing. He tells the nature of the Subtile Body just mentioned: The Subtile Body how constituted. is but one.—a plurality. still. how is the term Body applied to the Gross one? To this he replies: Aph. &c. from its being the site of fruition. He tells the cause of this. partitively. in the shape of individuals. &c. in the shape of that investment [of Soul (see Vedánta-sára. Although.

But then. a. That is to say: the Subtile Body does not stand independently. are seen only under the circumstances of association [of the luminiferous imponderable] with earthy subtances. since it is limited substance. as the Air.—serving as a tabernacle for the Subtile Body? With reference to this. without that [Gross Body]. it is settled that the Subtile Body takes another body.. because of [its] association with masses. it does not abide independently. All lights. He determines the magnitude of the Subtile Body: Size of the Subtile Body.* No. since. But then [it may be said]. Though it be limited. as a shadow. be the site: it is purposeless to suppose [its] attachment to anything else. Body. 'without that. which is the tabernacle of the abiding thereof. to serve as its tabernacle: such is the import. it is inferred to be associated with a mass: such is the meaning. just like a shadow and a picture.. 12. does not stand without a support. let the Ether [or Space]. for there is a Scripture for its acting. Aph. 'It. 14. or as a picture. b. the sun and the rest.' i. what proof is there of another body. but not absolutely an atom. Aph. a. or the like. of the Subtile Body. even though it be limited. a.' which is Light: therefore it must be associated with the Elements. without a support.' the Subtile Body. in order to go p. and the Subtile Body p. 234 consists of 'Purity. without association. for. To this he replies: For it must have a material support. 233 to another world. Wherefore? 'For there is Scripture for its .Why the Gross Body is called a Body. a. limited.* It is of atomic magnitude. just like the sun. is 'of atomic magnitude. Aph.* Not independently [can the Subtile Body exist]. because it is declared to have parts. without [its] being attached [to anything]. it consists of light. And so. just like the sun.' i. b. 13.e. having abandoned a Gross Body.—other than the one consisting of the six sheaths. he says: The Subtile Body dependent on the Gross Body.e.

When a thing is all-prevading. Aph. [action being motion]. 237 Aph. because they are filled with homogeneous particles. For what purpose is the mundane existence.* And because there is Scripture for its being formed of food. b. The Subtile Body has been discussed in respect of all its peculiarities. through contact with food. Aph. That is to say: it. so the Subtile Bodies transmigrate for the sake of Soul. cannot be all-pervading. 16. are not formed of the Elements. . He states another argument for its being limited: Another proof of this. viz. Although Mind. 235 b. the migrating from one body to another [Gross] body. &c. it would be eternal. 17. a. also: The Gross Body whence. a. &c.. it cannot act.. 'because there is Scripture for its moving.* The mundane existence of is for the sake of Soul. But the proper reading is. p. just like a king's cooks.' i. That is to say: as the cooks of a king frequent the kitchens for the sake of the king. if it were all-pervading. for. That is to say: the Body is a modification of the five elements mingled. He now likewise discusses the Gross Body.' p. because there is Scripture about its acting. still it is to be understood that they are spoken of as formed of food... 15. a.* The Body consists of the five elements. [as the light of a lamp is supplied by contact with the oil].e. which are unintelligent? With reference to this. of Subtile p. he says: Why the Subtile Body migrates. because there is a Scripture for its being partially formed of food. 236 Bodies.acting. b. the Subtile Body.

b. The import is. because it is not found in them severally.b. that the body is of Earth only.. § 13.* Some say it consists of four elements.] there would not be the death. imply the body's being non-intelligent.—but is adventitious. 20. For death. Another opinion. He mentions another opinion: Another opinion. Aph. of one or other element: [see the Rosicrucian doctrine in the Tarka-sangraha..* Others say that it consists of one element. profound sleep. . a. He states another refutation [of the notion that Intellect is a property of the Body]: A further argument. of anything. Or 'of one element' means. 21. if it were. 19.* And [if the Body had intellect natural to it. &c. &c. the profound sleep. a. 18. would not take p. intelligent. a. and the other elements are merely supporters. a. That is to say: and. 238 b.. &c. intellect is not natural to the Body. because the essential nature of a thing remains as long as the thing remains.* Intellect is not natural [a natural result of organization]. 'of anything. there would not be the death.— which consiste of the Elements. and this. This [is alleged] with the import that the Ether does not originate [anything]. He tells us what is proved by the fact that the Body consists of the Elements: Intellect not the result of organization.. by its own nature. &c]. 239 place. p. Aph. Aph.' of all things. Aph. That is to say: since we do not find intellect in the separated Elements. if the Body had intellect natural to it.

&c. [Soul's chief end]. 23. which means their transmigrations into Gross Bodies. 'because it is not found in them severally. it is not the case that it is seen in each. comes] salvation. but. that] this might arise. through birth. as an intoxicating power. have no intoxicating power. and that] it is like the power of something intoxicating. in the illustration [of something intoxicating resulting from mixture]. it is not established. viz.b.* From knowledge [acquired during mundane existence.] that the Subtile Bodies transmigrate for the sake of Soul. by what operation. resides in the mixed substance. 240 Therefore. It was stated [§ 16. Pondering a doubt. 241 Purpose of the Subtile Body's taking a gross one. Bondage whence. though not residing in the substances severally. That is to say: by the transmigration of the Subtile Body. 24. on conjunction.* Bondage [which may be viewed as one of the ends which Soul could arrive at only through the Subtile . what aims of Soul are accomplished: p. but. that there is. b. if we had seen. it being established. something conducive to the result]. we reply. Aph. it is not so. in each [element. If it had been seen in each [constituent].' he repels it: Aph. that there is intelligence. so may Intellect. there takes place the direct operation of discrimination [between Soul and Non-soul]. a subtile tendency to intoxicate. he tells. in two aphorisms. 22. in the thing illustrated. separately. it is settled only that.* If [you say that Intellect results from organization. Aph. But then. by the Institutes. if any one say this. also. An illustrative objection disposed of. in the shape of emancipation. as to the assertion [in § 20]. in the elements separately: such is the meaning.. be. dependent on the birth of the Subtile Bodies. by any proof whatsoever. [the ingredients of which.. its appearance in the compound might have had place. p. there will be a manifestation of the [latent] power of intoxicating. [and] thence. in the case in question. In regard to this. a. Soul's [chief] End. in a subtile [or undeveloped] state. at the time when these combine. in each ingredient. a.

g.* The emancipation of Soul does not depend on both [knowledge and works. e. there is neither association [of anything else with it. knowledge. or alternativeness. Of these. 242 Knowledge has neither cooperator nor substitute. of good works.. since there is no illusoriness in this object of Worship. But. the non-illusoriness is not complete.] nor alternativeness. 26. .] illusory and not illusory.g. have been mentioned.* Since this [viz.* Even of that other it is not complete. divine] Soul. [some one may say. because imaginary things. In respect of there being neither association nor alternativeness.. [resulting] from knowledge and misconception [respectively]. Through the transmigration of the subtile body. in the first place.] is from Misconception. Even of 'that other. To this he replies: p. consisting of pleasure and pain: such is the meaning.. b. in the shape of bondage. 25. Aph. Liberation and Bondage. he explains Liberation [arising] from knowledge: p. all-constitutive. a. 243 Man's conception of the All is faulty. or the like]. from misconception. which are. 27. a. also.] there may be association..] is the precise cause [of liberation]. of knowledge of the truth with that knowledge which is termed Worship of [the One. in liberating Soul. severally. a. there is that [less worthy] end of soul. in its stead]. Aph. of the [just-mentioned] object of worship. This illustrated. [e. a. [together. he states an illustration: Aph.' i. good works. as [any end that one aims at is not obtained] from dreams and from the waking state.e. or alternatively. even if it be so.Body.

enter into [our conception of, and overlie, and disguise,] the object of worship, the [One, all-constitutive] Soul: such is the meaning. b. He states in what part [of it] is the illusoriness of the [object of] Worship, [just referred to]:

Where the fault applies.

Aph. 28.* Moreover, it is in what is fancied that it is thus [illusory].

a. That is to say: 'moreover, it is thus,' i.e., moreover, there is illusoriness, in that portion of the thing meditated which [portion of it] is fancied by the Mind, [while it does not exist in reality]; for, the object of worship having been declared in such texts as, 'All this, indeed, is Brahma,'3 the illusoriness belongs entirely to that portion [of the impure conception of 'the All' which presents itself, to the undiscriminating, under the aspect] of the world.
p. 243

b. Then what profit is there in Worship? With reference to this, he declares [as follows]:

The fruit of Worship.

Aph. 29.* From the achievement of [the worship termed] meditation there is, to the pure [Soul], all

[power]; like Nature. a. Through the effecting of the worship which is termed meditation, there becomes, to the 'pure,' i.e., the sinless, Soul, all power; as belongs to Nature: such is the meaning. That is to say: as Nature creates, sustains, and destroys, so also the Purity of the understanding of the worshipper, by instigating Nature, creates, &c. [But this is not Liberation, or Soul's chief end.] b. It has been settled that Knowledge alone is the means of Liberation. Now he mentions the means of Knowledge:
p. 245

Removal of obstacles to knowledge.

Aph. 30.* Meditation is [the cause of] the removal of Desire.

a. That is to say: Meditation is the cause of the removal of that affection of the mind by objects, which is a hinderer of knowledge. b. With advertence to the fact that knowledge arises from the effectuation of Meditation, and not from merely commencing upon it, he characterizes the effectuation of Meditation:

Meditation at what point perfected.

Aph. 31.* It [Meditation,] is perfected by the repelling of the modifications [of the Mind, which ought to be abstracted from all thoughts of anything].

a. He mentions also the means of Meditation:

Practices conducive to meditation.
p. 246

Aph. 32.* This [Meditation,] is perfected by Restraint, Postures, and one's Duties.

a. That is to say: Meditation results from the triad, which shall be mentioned, viz., Restraint, &c. b. By means of a triad of aphorisms he characterizes, in order, Restraint, &c.:

Restraint of the breath.

Aph. 33.* Restraint [of the breath] is by means of expulsion and retention.3

a. That it is 'of the breath' is gathered from the notoriousness [of its being so]. b. He characterizes Postures, which come next in order:

Postures.

Aph. 34.* Steady and [promoting]* ease is a [suitable] Posture.

a. That is to say: that is a Posture which, being steady, is a cause of pleasure; such as the crossing of the arms.
p. 247

b. He characterizes one's Duty:

One's duty.

Aph. 35.* One's Duty is the performance of the actions prescribed for one's religious order.

a. Simple.

Knowledge by Concentrantion how attained.

Aph. 36.* Through Dispassion and Practice.

a. Simply through mere Practice, in the shape of Meditation, accompanied by Dispassion, Knowledge, with its instrument, Concentration, takes place in the case of those who are most competent [to engage in the matter]: such is the meaning. Thus has liberation through knowledge been expounded. b. After this, the cause of Bondage, viz., Misconception, declared in [the assertion,] 'Bondage is from Misconception,' [§ 24], is to be expounded. Here he first states the nature of Misconception:
p. 248

Misconception defined.

Aph. 37.* The kinds of Misconception are five.

a. That is to say: the subdivisions of Misconception, which is the cause of Bondage, are Ignorance, Egoism, Desire, Aversion, and Fear of Dissolution; the five mentioned in the Yoga, [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book II., § 32].

b. Having stated the nature of Misconception, he states also the nature of its cause, viz., Disability:

The varieties of Disability.

Aph. 38.* But Disability is of twenty-eight sorts.5

a. Simple; [as explained in the Yoga].
p. 249

b. In a couple of aphorisms he mentions [those] two. Acquiescence and Perfection, on the prevention of which come two sorts of Disability of the Understanding:

Acquiescence.

Aph. 39.* Acquiescence is of nine sorts.

a. He will, himself, explain how it is of nine sorts.

Perfections.

Aph. 40.* Perfection is of eight sorts.

a. This, also, he will, himself, explain. b. Of the aforesaid, viz., Misconception, Disability, Acquiescence, and Perfection, since there may be a desire to know the particulars, there is, in order, a quaternion of aphorisms:
p. 250

Their subdivisions.

Aph. 41.* The subdivisions [of Misconception] are as [declared] aforetime.

a. The subdivisions of Misconception, which, in a general way, have been stated as five, are to be understood to be particularized 'as aforetime,' i.e., just as they have been declared by preceding teachers: they are not explained here, for fear of prolixity: such is the meaning.

Why? 'Without abandonment of . Misconception]. of Disability. from anything. through its divisions. 43.... e. &c. Disability]. [which are its subdivisions. because what does arise therefrom. how is it said that Perfection consists only of 'Reasoning. as regards their particularities. Aph. are to be understood. 251 a. &c.' seeing that it is determined. from austerities. that the eight Perfections.. 45. which are twenty-eight. &c.] Perfection [is eightfold]. That is to say: Perfection is of eight kinds. result from recitations. Reasoning.. 'has been explained in a memorial verse.. The enumeration defended.g. [the capacity of assuming] atomic bulk. 42. This aphorism. in all the Institutes. 'Reasoning..* Through Reasoning. [viz. a. also.? To this he replies: Aph.e. 514].. from Austerity.' e. Acquiescence divided. This aphorism is explained by a memorial verse [No.' i..* So of the other [viz. Perfection divided. p. 'From any other. different from the pentad.' viz. also.' [No. Aph.* Acquiescence is ninefold. Aph..' i. 502]. meditation. a. the divisions 'of the other. &c. 252 b..e. But then. there is no real Perfection. &c.' p. &c. That is to say: 'so. through the divisions of 'the internal and the rest.. a.. &c..* Not from any other [than what we have just stated does real Perfection arise. viz. is] without abandonment of something else. viz. just as aforetime [§ 41]. g.Of this further. 44. austerity.

533]. a. .' the included divisions. He mentions. 47. Aph. This is explained in a memorial verse. That is to say: 'aloft. since it is no antagonist to mundane existence. till there be discrimination [between Soul and Nature]. Now the individuated creation.] abounds in [the quality of] Purity. Supply.. also. 254 b. a.e. 48. i. of which 'the subdivisions.something else. of Misconception: therefore [that Perception]. for its [Soul's.] sake is creation. is for the sake of Soul: This creation. also.* Aloft. Aph. further. is set forth diffusely: The creation viewed in its parts. is only a semblance of a Perfection. the creation has chiefly [the Quality of] Purity. &c. &c. p. are the demons. p.' i.' [§ 10].* From Brahmá down to a post. He states that the aforesaid subdivided creation. 253 b. in three aphorisms: The celestial world. [No. it [the creation.e.' above the world of mortals. because that Perfection [which you choose to call such] takes place positively without abandonment of something else. 46. and not a real Perfection: such is the meaning. 'There is distinction of individuals through diversity of desert. Aph. such is that creation. which was mentioned concisely in the assertion. for Soul's sake. a.* [The creation is that] of which the subdivisions are the demons. the division of the subdivided creation..

' that is to say. he says: Why Nature operates diversely.. if the creation aloft is abundant in Purity [the element of joy]. Aph.* By reason of diversity of desert is Nature's [diverse] behaviour. i. in the shape of diversity of operation. But then. creations diverse in having. it [the creation. in the world of mortals. for what reason are there. there are. 50.e. . a. An illustration of the diversity is [offered in the example].] abounds in Passion. it [the creation.' that is to say. what need is there of Liberation? To this he replies: Aph. of service. 'Beneath. p. 49. a.* Even there there is return [to miserable states of existence]: it is to be shunned. 51. b. 52. as asserted. for the sake of his master. Why Heaven is to be shunned. through the aptitude arising from the habit3 of being a dependant. since Soul's object is really thereby effected. Aph. p. of him who is a slave from the embryo-state upwards.* Beneath. a.] abounds in Darkness. 'like a born-slave. Just by reason of diverse desert is the behaviour of Nature. various sorts of behaviour. purity and the rest? With reference to this. Aph. affluently. under the world of mortals.* In the midst. like a born-slave.The infernal world. so [does Nature serve soul in various ways]. [from which the inhabitants of Heaven enjoy no immunity]. 'In the midst. by reason of the successive subjections to birth.' That is to say: as. from one single Nature. 256 b. But then. 255 The world of mortals.

either. because of her being devoted to another. then. the absorption into the cause.a.. therefore. i. 54.* Alike [belongs to all] the sorrow produced by decay and death. b. when indifference towards Mind. as in the case of one who has dived. the cause is not by anyone caused to act. for it is declared: 'Through Dispassion there is absorption into Nature. there is a rising again. as in the case of one who has dived. What need of more? The end is not effected by absorption into the cause. 258 impossible that one's Faults should be consumed. as he tells us: Absorption into Nature ineffectual. yet this is fitting. &c. the end is not gained. But then. by reason of the non-destruction of habits. Moreover: Transitoriness of heavenly bliss.e. b. [at the commencement of a new annus magnus]. Being independent. is the 'sorrow produced by decay and death'. Common to all alike. beginning with Brahmá and ending with a stock. p.. it [heaven. 53. because it is p.: such is the meaning. in the condition of Lords. why does she [Nature. 257 Aph.* Though she be not constrained to act. those that are aloft and those beneath. . In the absence of knowledge of the distinction [between Soul and Nature].1 &c.* Not by absorption into the cause is there accomplishment of the end. then absorption into Nature takes place.' Even through this. 'because there is a rising again. has resulted from worship of Nature. a. because. Aph.' As a man who has dived under water rises again. exactly so do Souls which have been absorbed into Nature reappear.] is to be shunned: such is the meaning. in consequence of the reappearance of Passion. without a familiarity with the distinction [between Soul and Nature]. a. moreover. 55.] make that grief-occasioning resurrection of her own worshipper? To this he replies: Aph.

It is quite agreed. it is impossible to deny2 a Lord. nevertheless. Aph. yet guided by an end. But then.* The existence of such a Lord is a settled point. he who had been absorbed into Nature. that there is an emergent Lord.e. 259 a.' viz. b..] for he becomes omniscient and omnipotent [in a subsequent creation]. Though Nature is 'not constrained to act.] is altogether about an eternal Lord: such is the meaning.. p. are not constrainers of Nature. The meaning is that he who is absorbed in her is again raised up. the First Spirit. and the like. in a subsequent creation becomes 'omniscient and omnipotent. so that there is nothing detracted from her independence. For 'he. To this he replies. 260 a. And Soul's end. 57. by Nature. for the ground of dispute [between Sánkhyas and the rest. yet 'this is fitting. was absorbed into the Cause. Aph. which was mentioned only indicatorily in the first aphorism of the Second Book: p. p.* [He who is absorbed into Nature must rise again.' it is proper that he who is absorbed in her should rise again. in a previous creation.' not instigated. he who. a. Why? 'Because of her being devoted to another. but occasions for the energizing of her whose very being is to energize. 56. b. b. by all. for the sake of Soul's end. He expounds diffusely the motive for Nature's creating. a proof that Soul rises from absorption into Nature: The gain of absorption into Nature. if that be so. because she seeks Soul's end. In what sense there is a Lord. which consists in knowledge of the distinction [between Nature and Soul]. not subject to the will of another.Nature free to act. [which.' the Lord. 261 . the Sánkhyas seem to do]. further. He mentions.' i.

c. or would energize the wrong way. without reference to men's efforts. 59. p.. in the shape of one season's now departing and another's coming on: let the behaviour of Nature.—for she is not the experiencer. the spontaneous action of Nature is proved from what is seen. should be. for we see that a cart. changes into the form of Mind. 262 b. as is the case with milk. operates only by reason of the efforts of another. The action of Time. a. a creator.' [Book II.* Or as is the case with the acts [or on-goings] —for we see them—of Time.. although she be unintelligent. To this he replies: Nature's spontaneous action illustrated. so Nature. a. takes place quite spontaneously. Aph. and because cows are intelligent. also.. § 37]. because there the question was only of the operation of instruments. a senseless Nature would never energize. But then. it is quite impossible that Nature. 'As the cow for the calf. spontaneously. be thus. for example. Aph. By means of the exhibition of another illustration. though it be spontaneous. yet Nature acts. 58. &c. Or as is the case with the acts [or on-goings. &c. 263 b. But. &c.* Nature's creating is for the sake of another.] of Time.* Though she be unintelligent. quite of itself changes into the form of curd. because of there being [in her case. or the like. he mentions the cause of the thing asserted as aforesaid: Another illustration. —like a cart's carrying saffron [for the sake of its master]. 60. being unintelligent. for the supposition conforms to observed facts: such is the meaning.] no such communing as. even without the efforts of any other. still. Nature's disinterestedness. p. a. That is to say: as milk. This is not rendered tautological by this aphorism.Aph. 'This is my means of .

which have been from eternity. at that rate. the labour of the cook ceases: such is the meaning. through attraction by Deserts. Here the word 'or' is for connecting [this aphorism with the preceding one]. moreover. Aph. in the following section. naturally. a. 63. b. as. therefore. the energizing of Nature is necessary and rightly distributed: such is the meaning.3 b. 61. when the cooking has been performed. To this he replies: . a. like a servant. he tells us. When Soul's aim has been accomplished. since Nature's creating ceases through the production of discriminative knowledge in the case of a single Soul. 264 Or through the influence of Desert. by means of indifference to all else.* From discriminative knowledge there is a cessation of Nature's creating.2 the appointed and necessary service of the master is engaged in. p. Nature's creating ceases. Liberation takes place through Nature's quite spontaneously ceasing to act: p. 265 Nature desists when the end is gained. a.* From her own nature she acts. But. when the cooking is completed. not from thought. Since Desert has been from eternity. just from habit. on the completion of that other's purpose. That is to say: as. Aph. Aph. It being thus settled. as is the case with a cook. 62. just so does Nature energize from habit alone. &c. in the case of an excellent servant.' To this he replies: Nature acts from habit.producing experience. through discriminative knowledge of Soul. then. and not with a view to his own enjoyment.* Or from attraction by Deserts.4 that. that Nature is creative for the sake of another. we should find all liberated.

and not the other. b.. though.* Another remains like another. 65.] of either. a.' i.. but does create in respect of that one. But 'another. &c. 268 Aph. just like one bound by p.* [The fruit of Nature's ceasing to act].' i.' i. is liberation.e.. a. as is the case with the snake. again engage in creation. because we see. through the fault which may be described as her not accomplishing that soul's aim: such is the meaning. the mutual disjunction.e. the 'solitariness. To this he replies: p.. one devoid of discriminative knowledge. 64. Why? 'Through her fault. 269 he looks upon is a rope. Nature. even out of the [mortal] constituents of the p. through her fault. 'Of both.. in consequence of discriminative knowledge. things are created for the experience of another. because Nature consists of different portions.e.' i. a.] she does not desist. in respect of him who is ignorant [that what p. But then. .. the being alone. viz. but the same].] does not produce fear. [when Nature has left off distressing the emancipated. Liberation constists of what. 266 Nature.5 How Nature affects one. the solitariness of both [Nature and Soul]..' i. 66. in short. through the mood in the shape of discrimination.Liberation of one involves not that of all. &c. this is liberation. of Nature and Soul. that. she have desisted. but does produce it. or [which comes to the same thing. does not desist as regards her creative influence on another Soul. in respect of one Soul. his dust. 267 liberated person. [it is not another Nature. He mentions the fruit of Nature's ceasing to act: Aph.] in respect of him who is aware of the truth in regard to the rope [which another mistakes for a snake]. for the sake of another Soul? And you are not to say that this is no objection. on the liberation of a single Soul.e. e.* Moreover. in the case of him who is aware of the truth in regard to the rope. [which ceases to be a terror. having attained indifference. remains 'like another. Aph. how would Nature.. as the snake [so to speak. b. in regard to her creative influence on another.

calling themselves Vedántís. [the analogy of which is not to be overstrained. which is the cause. what is it that here determines Nature to act only in regard to this one.' 'This is I myself. not having discriminated herself [therefrom]. also. 'Desert. she creates. To this he replies: Nature's selection how determined. having quite failed to understand that such is the drift of such examples as those of the rope. Aph. p. &c. 68. inasmuch as they do not desire [Nature's interference]. which is likened to a rope. [towards their eventual emancipation]. and this it is that determines her: such is the import. b. The matters of Scripture and of the legal institutes are to be elucidated by means of this [or that] example offered by the Sánkhyas. not cognizable antecendently to.and not a snake]: such is the meaning. That is to say: although Souls are indifferent. 'This is my master.' serves Souls. Certain unintelligent persons. And so. 270 Another consideration why Nature should act. therefore. And Nature is likened to a snake. by creation. as if the cases were parallel throughout]. &c. yet Nature. she has the habit1 of showing herself. there is nothing to determine of which Soul what is the Desert. and. But then. Aph. a.. too. 271 a. in consequence of the conjunction of this. p. or something merely imaginary. the snake. because of her disguising Soul. in respect just of that one does Nature energize. just through [her own] non-discrimination. its fruits]. suppose that Nature is an absolute nothing. and to desist in regard to that one? And Desert is not the determiner. [Desert being inferrible only from. to what Soul.* And from connexion with Desert. for the sake of another Soul [than the emancipated one]: such is the meaning. since all Souls are alike indifferent. .* Though there is [on Soul's part. saying. who assert the reality of Nature: it is not the case that the matter is simply established to be as is the example. because here.' which is the cause of creation. 67. this] indifference. yet want of discrimination is the cause of Nature's service.

[and would not even appear to do so. Aph. To this he replies: Soul's relation to Bondage. Therefore is it fitting that p. ashamed at Soul's having seen her fault. b. they result only from non-discrimination: such is the meaning. ashamed at ascertaining that her fault p. a. really. and its disjunction.] but for non-discrimination. with the view of exhibiting a dance to the spectators. moreover. as a [frail] woman of good family.' i.. a. as a dancer. 71. and her taking the shape of pain.e.2 b. He states another reason for the cessation: This illustrated. 'like a woman of good family. desist. 272 Nature should desist. if Nature's energizing be for the sake of Soul. in the shape of the effectuation of Soul's aim.* Moreover.' i. Aph. do not 'actually. Bondage and Liberation. 70. and not universally. But then. even when discrimination has taken place? To this he replies: Nature energizes only till the end is attained. like a woman of good family. Since it is her nature to energize. 273 has been seen by her husband.e.—does not again approach Soul. belong to Soul.. .* Like a dancer does she. Aph.—in her transformations. who has been performing. though she has been energizing. Soul must be altered by Bondage and Liberation. Nature does not approach [Soul]. desists. a. but.b. how can she desist.* Bondage and Liberation do not actually belong to Soul. &c. [and not remain the unalterable entity which you allege it to be]. does not approach her husband. though she had been energizing. on the accomplishment of this: such is the meaning. That is to say: Nature. Nature's disposition to energize is only for the sake of Soul. consisting in the conjunction of Pain. when her fault is known.. in the way mentioned in the fourth aphorism. because of the end's having been attained. 69. when the end has been attained.

'like the silk-worm. Pleasure. really belong to Nature.e. Having pondered this.. in reality. through consociation.2 'through consociation. as a beast. 275 How Nature binds and liberates herself. through its being hampered by a rope. Non-dispassion. and its negative. viz. through Pain. which are the causes of Pain. Aph. Ignorance.] explains what was asserted in the fourth aphorism: . by Knowledge alone: such is the meaning. And that same Nature liberates herself from Pain 'in one way. Demerit. a. viz. can. like the silk-worm: in one way does she liberate herself.p. he himself [not leaving it to a commentator.. 276 quitted nor assumed. Dispassion. themselves.. as declared. 'does Nature bind herself' with Pain. belong to Nature alone: so he asserts: Bondage is really Nature's. b.e. because Non-discrimination can neither be p. by what causes is there Bondage? Or by what is there Liberation? To this he replies: p. through her being hampered by the habits.* They really belong to Nature. in the world. be neither quitted nor assumed: otherwise. like a beast. is improper. that Bondage and Liberation result from Nondiscrimination alone. as the worm that makes the cocoon binds itself by means of the dwelling which itself constructs. a.' i.. &c.' i..* In seven ways does Nature bind herself. b. causes of Pain. &c. by habits.e. there is disparagement of sense-evidence. Pain. 274 b.. Bondage and Liberation..' i. that which you assert. Aph. and Want of Power. experiences Bondage and Liberation: such is the meaning. But then. Supernatural Power. and because. By Merit. But. Here. 73. [if you still insist on retaining the opinion objected to]. Bondage and Liberation. 72. in the shape of these seven.

though we see that Pain and Pleasure cannot be directly assumed or quitted. or any of her products. Study. which is the essence of them: Aph. What was asserted before was this. among the means conducive to Discrimination. into the sluggish. 278 The means not efficacious everywhere. b. is Soul]. No. Discrimination will be accomplished: such is the meaning. in the shape of abandoning. yet we also see that causes of them can be assumed or quitted]: such is the meaning.. [so that] there is no disparagement of sense- evidence. He mentions. by a 'No. He states a speciality in regard to the perfecting of Discrimination: p. 76. therefore 'there is no disparagement of sense-evidence.* Non-discrimination is the cause [not the thing itself].* Discrimination is perfected through abandonment [of everything]. &c. among those competent.' in regard to things unintelligent.* Through the difference of those competent [to engage in the matter at all]. a.' through study of the [twenty-five] Principles. in this very birth.' [for. b. a. p. ending with Nature. 277 b. Since there is a division. expressed by a 'No. 75. Aph. a. there is no certainty that. No. Means of Discrimination. every one should.An objection met. Discrimination is effected through study of the Principles. and not that Non-discrimination itself is these two. He states that Liberation takes place solely through the effecting of Discrimination. Aph. All the others [enumerated in the list of means] are only supplemental to Study: such is the meaning. there is no necessity [that each and every one should at once be successful]. the conceit [that Nature. though study be made. that Non-discrimination is only the occasion of Bondage and Liberation in souls. Therefore. acquire for himself the highest degree of competency: such is the import. by strenuousness in study. 74. .

of the relation of preceptor p. even from medium [but imperfect. also. 80. one might become [qualified to be] an instructor. 79.. who.] Discrimination. antecedently to direct intuition.2 a. Of Liberation during life. a.* And there is Scripture. He adduces evidence for there being some one liberated. 78. 279 middling variety]. is liberated. i. Aph. and Meditating: such is the division [of Discrimination]. experience. b. Further proof. because it is only one liberated during life that can be an instructor [in this matter]. 280 and pupil.and not otherwise: Imperfect Discrimination inefficacious. To this he replies: . a. merely through hearing. 77. That is to say: it is proved that there are such as are liberated during life. consists only of Hearing. on the subject of Discrimination. a. But sluggish Discrimination [lower even than the p.* It is proved by the fact of instructed and instructor. Pondering. in the Institutes. There is also Scripture for there being persons liberated during life. while living. That is to say: he. Aph. is liberated is just in the condition of medium Discrimination. [which it is desired to get entirely rid of]. too.e. though still living: Proof that this may be. living.* Since what [Pain] has been repelled returns again. But then.* And he who. b. there comes. by the mention. Aph. Aph.

we should have a blind handing down [of doctrines which would speedily become corrupted or lost]. Even on the cessation of the action of the potter. or did not think these a secure depository of the doctrine]: such is the meaning. Aph. and Kapila. a. had heard. if he did not.* This [retention of a body] is occasioned by the least vestige of impression. through Knowledge. § 17. 83. Book I. since the continuance1 of experience. probably. Aph. a. there were blind tradition.* [And not through merely hearing is one qualified to become an instructor]: otherwise. yet. how can one retain a body? To this he replies: Difficulty of shuffling off this mortal coil. p. he remains living.2] is the cause of knowledge... 81. &c. yet liberated. [the emancipated sage goes on living]. That is to say: the retention of a body is caused by even the least remains of those impressions4 of objects which are the causes of having a body. true knowledge would cease to be handed down orally. 282 b. like the whirling of a wheel. yet. is put an end to by that 'Meditation with distinct recognition of the object. a. 82. But then. So. of itself. possessing an energizing body. But then. 281 b. revolves for some time. but if every one who gained true knowledge were. though actions do not arise.] have perished how can there [still] be life? To this he replies: How life is compatible with Liberation. one's works [which are the cause of mundane existence. That is to say: otherwise.A suggestion repelled.2 [and. since even a person of sluggish Discrimination [but who.* Possessed of a body. . after knowledge. on gaining it. Aph. did not contemplate books. p. to disappear.' which [see Yoga Aphorisms. through the [self-continuant] action of antecedent acts. when. the wheel. in consequence of the motal inertia resulting from the previous action.] would be an instructor.

p. the Rational Refutation. p. END OF BOOK III. when entire Cessation of Pain has resulted from Discrimination. p.* That which was to be done has been done. 24}. Ed. 36. . a. not otherwise. 84.. So much for the Third Book. He recapitulates the sense of the declarations of the Institute: p. 242 3 Chhándogya Upanishad. Ed.b. iii. xiv. * Remove the brackets which enclose 'promoting. not otherwise.. p. Ed.' Compare {Book VI. Recapitulation. Aph. 1. Next Footnotes 3 See. 283 Aph. Ed. on Dispassion... 248 2 The five are there called 'afflictions' (kle•a). &c. 246 3 Aniruddha and Vedántí Mahádeva transpose Aphorisms 33 and 34. for another rendering.

note 3. p. and liberality (dána). with Mr. 264 . 252 the suppression of the three kinds of pain. Davies: 'The divine class has eight varieties. 251 2 Quoted below. Ed. 255 3 Vásaná. p. four internal. on which vide supra. five. Ballantyne's edition of the Tattwa-samása. word or oral instruction (•abda). 263 2 As here. emanation. 29.) of living things. John Davies's translation: 'Nine varieties of acquiescence are set forth. and fortune. p. means. p. five external. named from Nature. in summary. Dr. p. Ed. 4 Here appended. for these. p. 258 1 To render sanskára. p. The three forementioned (conditions) are checks to perfection. Ed. Ed. note 2. from the Sánkhya-káriká. 253 3 It here follows. Ed. so again just below. p.' Ed. 260 2 Pratishedha. Mankind is single in its class. relating to abstinence from objects of sense. Vide supra. Ed.5 See. the world (sarga. with Mr. study or reading (adhya-yana). 112. p. acquisition of friends. p. § 63. with the translation of Mr. time. this word renders sanskára. This is.' Ed. Davies's translation: 'The eight perfections (or means of acquiring perfection) are reasoning (úha). the animal.

36.] does not give over effecting creation.' Ed. in truth.' &c. instead of 'in the following section.' 'effecting. MSS. More closely. this illusory snake keeping him constantly in a state of alarm.' in the view of both Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva. that which Vijnána seems to elect. Vide supra. who define it by kara•a. 274 2 Read: 'Bondage and Liberation belong to Nature alone. she [Nature. p. p. note 2. 61. 267 5 Of this Aphorism. of Vijnána's treatise afford a much better text than that here reprinted. another soul than that of the spiritual sage.. Ed. p. though it ceases to affect him who has discovered that it is nothing more formidable than a yard or two of twisted hemp]. together with preferable deviations from the comment as given by Dr. Ballantyne. with reference to another. 280 . Ed. [i. The Aphorism in question. in so doing. as embodied in the expression s•ish•yuparága. because to it. p. .' 'by an enunciation. 29.] analogously to a snake. p. 4 Read. . &c. 273 2 See the Rational Refutation. 271 1 Vásaná. 13 of the variants appended to my edition of the Sánkkya-pravachana-bháshya. with reference to him who is unenlightened as to the real p.' Ed. [Nature persists] in effecting creation. . the original enunciation runs thus: 'Furthermore. Ed. in like manner as a snake goes on influencing him who ..e. 268 character of the rope' [which is mistaken for it. &c. though she creates for such a sage no longer. and of the comment on it.. signifies 'causing. belongs misery.3 See the Rational Refutation. p. p. and she acts. so far as regards the construction of the original: 'Furthermore. mainly as just exhibited. p. In one of its more approved forms. That uparága. will be found at p. .

Vide supra.' Ed.. Ed. 282 1 Vásaná. p. &c. p. . (3) beatitude (ánanda). Ballantyne's translation: '[Meditation. with Dr. 29. note 2. Ed.] from the attendance of (1) argumentation (vitarka). p. and (4) egotism (asmitá). see the Rational Refutation. 2 Which here follows. (2) deliberation (vichára). of the kind called] that in which there is distinct recognition [arises. and it is very doubtful whether even he does so. Ed.2 None of the commentators but Vijnána recognizes an Aphorism in these words. 281 2 For another rendering. Ed. in its fourfold shape. 31. p. 4 This is to render the technicality sanskára.

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Aph. for this purpose the Fourth Book is commenced. 286 •údras. a certain minister informs him: 'Thou art not a forester. in consequence of his being born under the [unlucky] star of the tenth portion2 [of the twenty-seven portions into which the ecliptic is divided]. saying. 285 As he. &c. the means of discriminative knowledge are to be displayed: so. to the effect that 'Thou. to prove that even women. may gain the [one desirable] end.] a portion thereof. too. rests simply upon its own nature. by hearing the instructions of a Bráhman: . in the case of the king's son. discrimination is produced by instruction as to the truth. 'Discrimination' is supplied from the concluding aphorism of the preceding section. thou art a king's son.Sacred-Texts Hindu Index Previous Next p. it [the Soul]. which manifests itself merely as pure Thought. Brahmá. that 'I am a forester. betakes himself to his true royal state. from instruction as to the truth [comes discrimination between soul and Nature]. by means of a collection of narratives. 1. 'I am a king. having been expelled from his city. Now.* As in the case of the king's son. different therefrom:' such is the meaning. b. The meaning is: as. p.. who didst originate from the First Soul.' Having learned that he is alive. in consequence of the instruction of some kind person. is as follows: A certain king's son. and reared by a certain forester. He exhibits another story. having abandoned the idean of his being an outcast. and not something mundane. recognized in the Institutes. immediately. 284 BOOK IV. Soul set right by hearing the truth. a. remains under the idea. I am. The story. saying.' p.' having abandoned the idea of its being Nature [or of being something material or phenomenal].' so. here. through a Bráhman. art [thyself. myself. 'Since I am the son of Brahmá.

of Soul's accompaniments: Transitoriness of mundane things. by illustrative stories. also. because. That is to say: a repetition of instruction.. With a view to the removal of desire. and others. the fragility. if knowledge is not produced from once instructing. and the departure. in the Chhándogya [Upanishad]. then a repetition of the instruction is to be made. [the end be gained]. knowledge of the distinction [between Soul and Nature] was produced in the case of a goblin standing near [and overhearing the discourse]: and so it may happen in the case of others. 4. And. This has p. since both are seen. is to be made. by the venerable K•ish•a. from once instructing. 2. through dispassion. and the other. a. he sets forth. Aph. 3. to die. to be born]. 287 Necessity of inculcation. in consequence of its being inferred.' b. there is mention of Áru•i. for Arjuna's benefit. the subservients to the perfecting of knowledge in him in whom knowledge has arisen. That is to say: Discrimination takes place.* As in the case of father and son. of Soul [entangled in Nature].1 and the like. b.* Repetition [is to be made]. that there is death and birth. also. to which effect he adduces another story: p. [the chance hearer may be benefited]. if not. as having more than once instructed •wetaketu and others. 288 been stated as follows: 'The coming into being. &c. since these are seen in the case of father and son.1 may be inferred from [the case of] father and son. a. b. with an illustration. Aph. That is to say: though the instruction in regard to the truth was being delivered. too. even when the instruction was for the sake of another. [to one. He next explains. a. Aph. in respect of one's own self.Even when the instruction is not addressed to the hearer.* As in the case of the goblin. and who is devoid of passion: .

not alternative]. a. Thus it has been said: 'As a snake .* As in the case of a snake and its skin. and effete. he says: Its resumption prohibited. How Soul ought to abandon Nature. if he be driven away5 by any one. a. Aph. 6. as in the case of a hawk. Aph. as in the case of Bharata. even though it may be a duty. and unhappy by [forcible] separation from them. when he has food [before him]. when abandoned. p. from knowing that it ought to be quitted.' [the import of the conjunction being superadditive. acceptance of them ought not to be made. So.' i.'4 For a hawk. 289 at being separated from the food.e. in regard to this. . he should not readmit: such is the meaning. just so he who desires liberation should abandon Nature.* Or as an amputated hand. when he knows that it ought to be quitted. still is 'not to be thought about. The word 'Or' is used in the sense of moreover.Voluntary abandonment distinguished from involuntary. he leaves it. intention of the mind towards the .. he should not again accept Nature and the rest. then he is free from grief. . Aph.' &c. Aph. And. just so this [Nature]. its old skin. a. from [voluntary] abandonment or [forcible] separation. a. As no one takes back again an amputated hand. That is to say: as a snake readily abandons its old skin.* What is not a means [of liberation is] not to be thought about. of his own accord. That which is not an immediate cause of Discrimination. Duty to be sacrificed to salvation. is grieved p. 7. [as this conduces only] to bondage. [but] if. 8. 5. 'as in the case of a hawk. That is to say: since people become happy by the abandonment of things. 290 b. when abandoned.* One experiences pleasure or pain [alternatively]. experienced through a long period.

became happy.. in this case. 293 b. Association is not to be made with many. from [the company of] two. also. through the manifestation of Passion. 11. 9. Having abandoned hope. 292 contact of the shells on a girl's wrist: such is the meaning. since it tends to Bondage. desiring a lover. resulting from the predominance of Purity in the mind.' that is to say. when she had left off hoping.* He who is without hope is happy. &c.* Just so.3 a.* From [association with] many there is obstruction to concentration. But then. Aph. when there is association with many. having found no lover. through passion. 10. though [this was] in accordance with duty. as was the case p. a. Just so.4 a. any need of means. Aph. because. which destroys concentration. p. on the departure of hope. And it is laid down that precisely this is happiness of Soul. from its making us forget Discrimination. as a jingling is produced by the mutual p. let a man become possessed of the happiness called contentment. granting that Pain may cease. yet how can there be happiness. &c. Aph. therefore one ought to abide quite alone: such is the meaning. which remains obscured by hope. Even that of one. like Pingalá. even from two there is obstruction to concentration. Company to be avoided. as is the case with the coolness of water which [supposed natural coolness] had been hindered [from manifesting itself. 'As in the case of Bharata:' that is to say. as in the case of a girl's shells. itself resumes its influence. 'like Pingalá. on the cessation of hope.performance thereof is not to be made. in the absence of causes thereof? It is replied: That natural happiness. as the courtesan called Pingalá. there is disturbance. . being despondent.. 291 with the royal sage Bharata's cherishing Dínánátha's1 fawn. Blessedness of those who expect nothing.] by heat: there is not.

* Though he devote himself to many Institutes and teachers. As. Since it is an obstructer of Concentration. Supply 'is to be made. A serpent. So it has been said:1 'The building of a house is. the essence. 294 Exertion needless. a. by reason of implications. 295 A bee-like eclecticism recommended. only the essence is to be accepted.' b.' The rest is simple.3 a. exertion with a view to experience is not to be made. a rat]. and from great. through maintaining Meditation. 12. Aph. 14. 13. Thus it has been said: 'From small Institutes.] even without exertion. &c.c. as he states: p. otherwise. as he tells us: Intentness on one object. with his mind intent solely on the making of . does find confort. it may be impossible to concentrate the attention. a. from there being. 'he may be happy. a taking of the essence [is to be made]. like a serpent happy in another's house. like the maker of arrows. as the bee does from the flowers. assuredly. Aph. and in no way pleasant.. from all quarters..g. and from the multiplicity of topics. the direct possession of Discrimination is to be effected only by intentness. since. in the case of a maker of arrows. as is the case with the bee. Supply.3 discussions. Aph.' The rest is simple. since this will be effected quite otherwise.' b. painful. discrepancies in declared unessential parts.From Institutes. the intelligent man should take.* [One may be happy.* The Meditation is not interrupted of him whose mind is intent on one object. and from preceptors. So he says: p. having entered the dwelling made by another [e. Be the other means what they may.

as in the case of the female frog. And she. when wearied with sport. This is plain. a. saw a beautiful damsel in the forest. without reflexion. this or that effect thereof will not be obtained. if the enjoined procedures. as in the world. of him whose mind is intent on one point there is in no way an 'interruption of meditation. Aph. then the end.* Moreover. or the like. though he sought her with nets. that. 297 b. the end will not be gained: Rules must not be forgotten. forgetting his agreement. 'Where is water?' The king. Whatever rule. And then the king.. if they be forgotten. did not regain her. having gone to hunt. too. 'As in the world. Then she. made this stipulation: 'When water shall be shown to me by thee. the effecting of knowledge. He mentions a story with reference to the necessity of reflecting on the words of the teacher. if the rules be forgotten.' i. a failure to exclude other thoughts. further. Aph. 16. she asked the king. in regard to a medicine.* Through transgression of the enjoined rules there is failure in the aim. 15. for the practisers of Concentration.* Not even though instruction be heard is the end gained. so. He states. as well as hearing. Aph. Rules not to be transgressed with impunity.e. if it be transgressed. p. on one occasion. too. 296 other thoughts is not interrupted even by a king's passing at his side.. is not attained. 298 b. entered the water. being solicited in marriage by the king. in ordinary life. then I must depart.' That is to say: just as. And the story of the female frog is this: A certain king. be neglected.' But. having become the she-frog Kámarúpi•í. as well as hearing them: Reflexion necessary. as in the case of Virochana. p. &c..2 daughter of the king of the frogs. has been laid down in the Institutes. a.4 . showed her the water. viz.an arrow. &c.. the exclusion of p. 17.

so in the case of another. 19. b.' reflexion [was seen. knowledge of the truth does not necessarily follow. 18. from want of reflexion: Of this further. Of those two who are mentioned. for instance. is there 'success.a. Without this.' as. one has success after a long time. 299 between Indra and Virochana. as in the Case of Vámadeva. that. in consequence of causes pertaining to a previous life.3 a. Aph.. And he tells us. reflexion was seen in the case of Indra: such is the meaning. knowledge arose. though hearing the instruction of Prajápati. . under a preceptor.' That is to say: as. And. not otherwise.' That is to say: as in the case of Indra. In the arising of knowledge. attendance on the teacher should be practised for a long time: p.. The time for the process may embrace successive states of being. as p. 'As in his case. that. Virochana. in its taking place only from causes dependent on the senses.e. 'As in the Case of Vámadeva.. there is 'no determination of the time. &c. &c. the duties of a student. Aph. even when in embryo. it [reflexion. though the instruction be heard. the revelation of truth. Aph. a. [indicated] by the expression 'of those two. as between those two.* Of those two. study of the Vedas.] was seen in the case of Indra [only]. only after having practised. 300 The process requires time. By 'reflexion' is meant such consideration as determines the import of the teacher's words. so it may in the case of another. service. Indra and Virochana. and attendance. in the case of Vámadeva.]. wanted discrimination. viz.* There is no determination of the time.' i. by him who desires to understand thoroughly. 20. as in his case.* Having performed reverence. reverence. too. a. for it is written.

but not directly. 303 a.' i. Scriptural proof that heaven gives not liberation.] have Qualities. Discrimination illustrated..' &c. •iva. 23. He exhibits an illustration.... would effect knowledge: Aph. Vish•u. to the effect that the effecting of knowledge takes place only in the case of him who is free from passion: Aph.. or else through the purification or the Good principle.] is other [than the state of emancipated soul]. &c. after the attainment of what [like the world of Brahmá. there is no certainty that successive rise to the worlds of Brahmá. and what is to be taken is taken. Brahmá. .. b. requiring to be expiated.g. as is the case with sacrificers [whose slaughter of animals. throws them back. &c. that. as in the case of those who devote themselves to sacrifices. by the successive attainment of p.e. knowledge may result from this. Why. [attainment to.* Moreover. or approach towards.' Through devotion to Souls. in the road to emancipation]: such is the meaning. since it is written. &c. moreover. a hard and subtle process of Concentration? To this he replies: Aph. there is return [to mundane existence].p. But then. 302 the worlds of Brahmá. 22. He tells us. so far. knowledge takes place] by degrees. 301 b. that the means of knowledge need be nothing other than devotion to those [viz. &c. Brahmá. because it is written [in the 5th Prapá•haka of the Chhándogya Upanishad4]: 'From conjunction with the five fires there is birth.* By him who is free from passion what is to be left is left. under the forms superinduced on them. then.. e.] who [unlike the Absolute. Inferior means not altogether unprofitable. the effecting of knowledge takes place 'by degrees. a. Supply 'there is attainment. as in the case of the swan and the milk.* Through devotion to something under a superinduced form. p. 21.

excellence in knowledge. as. That is to say: moreover. and a taking 'of what is to be taken.' That is to say: just as the bird [called a] parrot. has been obtained. And he states the harm of association with those who labour under desire: Of this further. as it is only the swan. through fear of being imprisoned by those who covet it for its beauty. He tells us that both of these also take place in consequence of association with a perfect1 man: Benefit of good society. of Soul. 305 Danger of unsuitable society. p. by conjunction with the cords. 25.4 as in the case thereof. Association is not to be made. voluntarily. from association with him by whom 'excellence. in the case of Alarka. &c.' i.—and not the crow.* [Else he may become] bound.* Not of his own accord should he go near one who is infected with desire.e. Aph. 304 b. .' i. Aph. a. out of milk and water mingled. Aph. with a person infected with desire. He tells us that we ought not to associate with those who are infected with desire: p. 26. does not [by going near people. 24.e.* Or through association with one who has obtained excellence. That is to say: only by him who is free from passion is there a quitting 'of what is to be left. of Nature.e. as in the case of the parrot.] act in a rash manner. b.a. just as in the case of the swan.' i. [as the Hindus insist that it does]. by reason of its being exceedingly beautiful. like the parrot. takes the valuable milk... 'Like the parrot. a.—that. the aforesaid [discrimination] takes place.. by means of leaving the unimportant water.. b. merely through simple association with Dattátreya. or the like. [§ 23]. Discrimination manifested itself spontaneously.

29.' that is to say. of consisting of pain. &c.* Not by enjoyment is desire appeased.. the means of [effecting] dispassion: Means of dispassion. does the appeasing of desire take place.* Not in the case of him whose mind is disturbed does the seed of instruction sprout. by two [aphorisms].e.a. so. punningly compared to cords]. in the case of associating with those persons. 28. also in the case of others. 'of both. But.. b. was afterwards dispassionate. by conjunction with their Desire. as in the case of Aja.. i. though delivered to him by Vasish•ha. the ropes.' That is to say: as not a sprout from p.' i. &c: Agitation excludes instruction. a. that Saubhari. That is to say: only 'from seeing the fault. Aph.e. he may become bound. of Nature and her productions.e. just 'as in the case of the p.* From seeing the fault of both.3 desire was not appeased by enjoyment. just as the bird [called a] parrot becomes bound by the cords. not even does a sprout spring up from that seed of the tree of knowledge which is in the shape of instruction. 27. That is to say: as. 306 parrot. He determines. as in the case of the saint.. Saubhari. In him whose mind is disturbed by desire. For it is written.. in the case of the saint.. just as in the case of the saint [§ 27]. &c. 'As in the case of Aja. b. a. And. a.. sprang up in the king named Aja. of being changeable. &c. Aph. 308 the seed of instruction. it is not. just from seeing the evil of society.' e. p. 'by conjunction with the cords. b. whose mind was .' i. further: Of this further. [the Qualities.g. 307 Aph. He tells us that incompetency even to accept instruction attaches to him who is infected with the fault of desire. of the hunter.

since the Soul's end is. indeed. to other objects. when the mud is faulty. What need of more? Of this further. a.g. to what purpose is the effecting of knowledge.' That is to say: just as the lotus.2 b. 'Like the lotus. Aph.* Not even on the attainment of glorification has that been done which was to be done. 309 b.. as in the case of a foul mirror.* Not even a mere semblance [of this true knowledge arises in him whose mind is disturbed].] of Brahmá. in one whose mind is disturbed. Aph. though the seed be of the best. is not in accordance with the seed.] in accordance therewith. from instruction. is that [knowledge. be in accordance with the instruction: Knowledge not necessarily perfect knowledge.. 30. like the lotus. 32. necessarily. for liberation? To this he replies: Heaven not perfect bliss.disturbed by grief for his wife. with so much toil. through the obstruction caused by its wandering away. Though sprung 'therefrom.* Nor. Even superficial knowledge does not arise.e. The mind of the student is compared to the mud [in which the lotus-seed was sown]. he tells us. still it may not. knowledge is not [necessarily. Or. &c.' i. even though sprung therefrom. e. gained by [the attainment of] supernatural power in the worlds [§ 21. through the obstruction caused by the impurities: such is the meaning.. Aph. But then. a. from instruction. as an object is not reflected in a foul mirror. p. a.] in accordance with the instruction. as is the case . in case this has not been entirely understood. if knowledge should spring up in any kind of way. p. 310 b. 31.

.' Ed.. b. END OF BOOK IV. has attained to their supernatural power.' That is to say: as.' i. a. So much for the Fourth Book. Just in like manner is the case with him who. i. the end has not been gained.. [still] practise Concentration. by the worship of these. because it is attended by the grief of deficiency and excess. that of Tales. p.e.e. 287 1 VI. Even though one attain to supernatural power. . 284 2 The Sanskrit yields 'under the star [named] Ga••a. 288 1 Read. &c. Ed. 4 See the Mahábhárata.. xii. 'that has not been done which was to be done. instead of 'of Soul. Ed.] belongs to 'the objects p. since it is written. [still] that has not been done which was to be done. 'of one's self... [from fear of losing what they have attained to]. to Brahmá.with the perfection4 of the objects worshipped. composed by Vijnána Bhikshu. as is the case with the perfection of the objects worshipped. 311 worshipped. while in the sleep of Concentration. Next Footnotes p. though the possession of perfection [so called. 'As is the case with the perfection of the objects worshipped. p.. &c.. 6648. Such is the meaning. that even these.' i. on Kapila's Declaration of the Sánkhya. in the Commentary.' Ed.' &c. &c.

compounded of dína and anátha. dínánátha. 6652. xii. 'miserable and having no master. 4. viii. viii.' For the story of Bharata and the fawn. 'acceptings' (of positions. see the Vish•u-purá•a. 297 2 Probably this is an epithet... Ed. 294 1 Quoted from the Mahábhárata. Ed. apahatya.5 Read. 3 Abhyupagama.' is an epithet of 'fawn. Ed. p. Ed. p. 298 4 See the Chhándogya Upanishad. 6447. p.. p. ii. iv.' not a proper name. 'changing one's form at will. Ed. p. p.. Dr. Ed. xiii.. Book ii. Ed.. 4 See the Mahábhárata. &c. p.. Chap.. 6649. 'molested' (upahatya). 289 out in the corrigenda to my edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya. Ed. p. Ed. 291 1 The original. xii.. 300 3 See the Aitareya Upanishad. which he did not observe that I had pointed p. 302 . xii.). xii. 292 3 See the Mahábhárata. 6651. 5. Ballantyne followed an error of the press. 295 3 See the Mahábhárata.

Vide supra. Ed.' by ai•warya. note 3. 115. is found..' Ed. explains siddhi. p. ch. however.. Ed. Ed. 308 2 See Kálidása's Raghuvan•a. commenting on this aphorism. p. here rendered 'perfection. 303 represent that the original of the words 'From conjunction. Ch. does not p. ii. and iii. 306 3 See the Vish•u-purá•a. 310. p. . literally. For the cognate siddhi. xvi. 304 1 Siddha. 4 See the Márka••eya-purá•a.4 This reference is taken from Vijnána.' &c. p. Ed. Book iv. Ed. 'supernatural power. Book viii. p. vide infra. in the Chhándogya Upanishad. p. who. note 4. 310 4 Náge•a.

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on the ground that the .] that this is accomplished. 1.. That is to say: it is not proper [to suppose] the effectuation of the change [of the elements] into the shape of the [appropriate] fruit of works. and by Scripture. a. a. in order to set aside the primâ facie notions of others in regard to his Institute.' in the first Aphorism [of Book I. which we made. The tenets of his Institute are completed. The [use of a] Benediction. in the first place he disposes of the objection that the Benediction implied by the expression 'Well. The word iti is intended to preclude the expectation of any other reasons. 312 BOOK V. such is the p.Sacred-Texts Hindu Index Previous Next p. 313 meaning. Next is begun a Fifth Book.. Needlessness of a Lord.] his existence is proved by his being the giver of the fruits of works:3 Aph. Aph. 'because it is not proved that there is a Lord' [see Book I. e. 92].].* The [use of a] Benediction [is justified] by the practice of the good. He repels those who entertain the primâ facie view. is proved to be proper to be made. by merit and demerit. by our seeing its fruit.* Not from its [the world's. Aph. Among those. is purposeless: Reasons for a Benedictory Opening. a. b. 2. that what was asserted in the expression. because [forsooth. is not made out. by these proofs.] being governed by a Lord is there the effectuation of fruit: for it is by works [i.

whilst there exists also a world. which are indispensable. the merit and demerit. If the Lord were the governor. then. If we agree that the Lord.] alone.' he says: a. since his desires are [on that supposition.2 b.e. that it is not the case that the Lord is the giver of fruit: The supposed Lord would be selfish. he cannot reward a man otherwise than according to his works]. as is the case [with ordinary governors] in the world. further. 'just like a worldly lord. then his government would be only for his own benefit. like ours. The difficulty perhaps originates in a mistaken expression. he. Aph. b. also. 'be it even so. as is the case [with ordinary rulers] in the world: such is the meaning. there be a Lord. 316 that soul which emerged at the commencement of the creation.' because. also. Aph. also.cause is 'governed by a Lord.: such is the meaning. be benefited: what harm?' he says: And. then let yours. 'grant that the Lord. In reply to the doubt. be] just like a worldly lord..* [If a Lord were governor.* [He must. [and. is benefited. his government [would be selfish]. therefore. If.* Or [let the name of Lord be] technical. be merely a technical term for p. [and] otherwise [than you desire that we should conceive of him]. because of the contradiction between mundaneness and the having an unobstructed will: such is the meaning. then] from intending his own benefit. 5. &c. 315 b. He declares. 4. if we do make the additional and cumbrous supposition of a Lord. since there cannot be an eternal lordship. he must be liable to grief. in [several] aphorisms.] not [previously] satisfied. a. Aph. In reply to the doubt. not the Lord spoken of. 3. must be something mundane. 314 the fruit to be effected by the works [i. . p. a.' because it is possible for p.

b. [not properties of Soul]? Or from an influence by reason of the mere existence of proximity. which we hold to be properties of Nature. because Passion is the determinate cause of activity. it would turn out that there is association. From the conjunction. further. a. viz. Aph. . he cannot be eternally free.e. that there is Passion in the Lord.] to be associated with properties. He states another objection to the Lord's being the governor: Objection to there being a Lord. To this he replies: This objection. 7. &c. and. a. Soul. 317 b.. of the wishes. as in the case of the magnet? Of these he condemns the former alternative: p.] cannot be established without [assuming that he is affected by] Passion. therefore. if it be agreed that there is conjunction [of the Lord] with Passion. 8. does lordship arise from the immediate union. also. b. &c. even. Aph. Pray [let us ask]. unless there be Passion. he could not be eternally free.* If it were from the conjunction of the properties of Nature.. that there is a Lord. be it so. on one branch of an alternative. it cannot be proved that he is a governor.. That is to say: moreover. with Soul. Desire. But then. with Soul. would turn out [contrary to Scripture. 318 Objection. because that is the determinate cause [of all energizing]. [which Scripture denies of Soul].. of 'the properties of Nature. were that [Pasion] conjoined with him. p. 6. a.' i.* This [position. Aph. thy tenet [of his eternal freedom] is invalidated. That is to say: moreover.* Moreover.

could be disproved by thousands of false reasonings of the like sort. not in association.' i. then lordship would belong to every one. because it is only by conjunction with all experiencers.* If it were from the mere existence [of Nature. He therefore says: Denial that there is any evidence of a Lord. the establishing that there is an eternal Lord. Aph. [may] have lordship. your tenet of there being only one Lord is invalidated. indifferently. Its establishment. But. a. Be it as you allege. 10.e. [in .. 11. Aph.* It is not established [that there is an eternal Lord]. that even all men. a. none exists.. 'Association. Of the Lord.* There is no inferential proof [of there being a Lord]. therefore. yet these are false reasonings.e. b. then it is settled. p. experiencers in this or that [cycle of] creation. that Nature produces Mind. The inapplicability he sets forth in two aphorisms: Denial that it can be established by inference. i. so that only the evidences of inference and of testimony can be offered. because they contradict the evidence which establishes [the existence of] a Lord. in the first place. because there is no evidence of it. &c. And. as in the case of the magnet [which becomes affected by the simple proximity of iron]. he says: Objection. in regard to the latter [alternative]. also. on the other branch. Nature. but simply in proximity]. p.e. 319 a. 9. because there is [here] no [case of invariable] association [between a sign and that which it might betoken]. 320 Aph. there is not sense-evidence. 'There is none. b..' i. as we quite intend it should be.b. and these are inapplicable: such is the meaning. invariable concomitancy. That is to say: if lordship is by reason of the mere existence of proximity. Otherwise.

a.this case]. or nonentity].' [conjoined with Soul]. it is plainly impossible for it to be united with the property of Ignorance. p. because. or the like.] what is to be asserted is. . He refutes. 322 Conjunction. in the case of the solitary. exclusively. Since Soul has no association [with anything whatever].' [the fact of] invariable concomitancy3 is not established. would be a contradiction. [it may be replied. Scripture asserts. there is a vicious circle. p. Such is the meaning. 321 b.* Moreover. by a cluster [of seven aphorisms].* With that which is solitary there cannot be conjunction of the property of Ignorance. is there [the evidence of] Testimony [to there being a Lord]: Denial that there is Scripture for it. Nor. he tells us. Aph. since this is no reality.3 A suggestion repelled. 'Bondage does not arise from Ignorance. And so there is no inferential proof of there being a Lord. To this he replies: Aph. 'Mind. has a maker. moreover. there is Scripture for [this world's] being the product of Nature. diffusely. b. [not of a Lord]. because it is a product. b. not that it has Soul for its cause. Aph. a.* Since the existence of this [alleged negative Ignorance] is established [only] on the ground of its [pretended] conjunction. there is no association occasioned thereby. since there is no compulsion [that every product should have had an intelligent maker]. 12. that the conjunction of Ignorance is simply through force of Ignorance [which is a negation.. But then. 14. 13.4 viz. in such arguments as.3 the opinion of an opponent in regard to that which was established in the first Section. that the world is the product of Nature. and so.

just like your 'Nature. p. [you Vedántís will say]. viz. specified by the Yoga. the regressus in infinitum is no objection.' then Brahma. a resting a thing on itself. Ignorance is technically so termed. 16.' since this [Ignorance] of ours has an unbroken eternity. there is 'a vicious circle. a. .a. [Further]: p. consisting of all undesirable things. Aph. through his being annihilable by knowledge. in p.. there is no disparagement of the solitariness thereof: in regard to this doubt. a. since he is other than knowledge: such is the meaning. and so.* Were there not exclusion. soul itself.. a regressus in infinitum. 17.' [literally. because there is Scripture for the fact that the mundane state of souls.. 324 the shape. or. e.* Then Brahma would be found to be excluded [from existence].' he objects to it: Soul and knowledge not identical. 15. that these cease to exist at the dissolution of all things. 323 a resting of each on the other. And. 325 Aph. b. &c. because he is something else than knowledge. 'but then. as in the case of seed and sprout. if it is by the conjunction of Ignorance that Ignorance is established. having deliberated on this artificial sense of the word 'Ignorance.' he replies: The world has a beginning. Such is the meaning. in short. &c.g. There cannot belong to it such a regressus in infinitum as that of seed and sprout. in profound sleep. For we hear. for Scripture teaches that the world has a beginning. alternately]. would be found to be excluded. If the meaning of the word 'Ignorance' (avidyá) be only 'otherness than knowledge. Ignorance. to perish. of supposing what is not soul to be soul. had a beginning. then there would be resultlesseness. But then. In reply to the doubt [suggested by the Naiyáyika]. though it be lodged in Soul.* It is not as in the case of seed and sprout. according to us. in Scripture. and is not. Aph. b.

By a cluster of [six] aphorisms.'12 &c.2 a. He censures the other alternative. but must have had a commencement. For it is proved. Mind.* If it [Ignorance. 328 . If. viz.] were of that nature it would be something that had a commencement. &c. would be resultless. in the case of the soul. on the other hand. [viz. Therefore. if. in like manner. by such recited p. also. 'Consisting of knowledge alone. since the Ignorance would be annihilated by one man's knowledge. of the world. Or suppose it to be the case. the being excludible by Knowledge. in that case 'the world. 327 texts as. the existence of ignorance were really not excluded by knowledge. Nature. which possesses properties. &c. p.a. than that stated in the Yoga system. what is meant by the being Ignorance. that Nature's energizing is due to Merit: p. b. would. the mundane system would become invisible to others. 326 be. then there would be resultlessness of knowledge. that to be Ignorance means simply the being excludible by Knowledge. not a property of the soul. it would be [predicable].. Aph.. the whole mundane system being merely Ignorance. not excluding ignorance. The Vedánta theory selfcontradictory..4 he clears up the primâ facie view of an opponent.. Knowledge. also. that knowledge might exclude Soul]: On the Vedánta theory. [which is the only result competent to knowledge]: such is the meaning.)]. Aph. a. Such is the import. b. in regard to that which was stated in the same Book [Book V. be Ignorance. 19. still such a thing could not have had an eternal existence in souls [as held by Vedántís (see § 15. it is settled that there is no other Ignorance. b.. in like manner.. And so.] meant the being excludible by Knowledge. also. But. Such is the meaning. § 2]. the soul consists of Knowledge alone. and this is a property of the understanding only. annihilable by Knowledge. indeed. because of its not debarring Ignorance. at the time of the universal dissolution. the world ought to vanish. that. 18.* If it [Ignorance.' the whole mundane system.

He shows to be a fallacy the argument of the opponent. also: Proofs of this. &c. because it is inferred. a. He proves that there exists Demerit. Aph. because things are subject to other proofs. He states further proof. since.* If the existence [of Merit] be as of course. moreover.* It is thus. 21. The proof of each the same. because of the diversity in the operations of Nature. a. 23. because of there being no sense-evidence of it: p. by tokens. otherwise. a. something would be unaccounted . 22.* There is. that Merit exists not.] is established by Scripture. for there is room for other proofs. That is to say: the proofs apply to Demerit. just as they do to Merit. 20. as well as Merit: Demerit as certain as Merit. Aph. Aph. Aph. 329 Sense-evidence not the only kind of evidence. no necessity. here. [because. Aph. a.] would be unaccounted for: such is the meaning. b. otherwise.Merit is undeniable. 24. That is to say: there is no necessity that a thing of which there is no mundane senseevidence must be non-existent.* There is no denying Merit. Merit is not to be denied on the ground of its being no object of sense. 'the diversity in the operations of Nature' [accommodating one person. b. in both cases. and inconveniencing another.* It [the existence of Merit.

. otherwise... 332 them an essence.for].] belongs to the iron. that. 'He should not approach another's wife. Mind.?' he says: Aph. viz. &c. Aph.* It is of the internal organ3 [not of soul] that Merit.. and their products. In the expression '&c.' i. happiness. b. viz.* By a conjunction of the five members [of an argumentative statement] we . viz. Aph. do we not deny p. 331 a. as peculiar qualities of soul.. &c. viz. &c. though not in soul. are the properties. &c.. again.. is debarred by Scripture.* And of the Qualities. just as we deny that heat [in red-hot iron. because.' would be unaccounted for. in consequence of souls' having properties. The Qualities. in the shape of natural consequence. as well as of the Qualities from which such might arise. merit is proved to exist by a natural consequence in this shape. In regard to the doubt. of both merit and demerit. a prohibitory injunction.. there is not absolute debarment. since there is proof. be replies]: The Qualities exist. He repels the doubt. b. But then.: Merit. the same is the case in respect of both. 'it is alike.e.' are included all those that are stated. but are denied only adjunctively in respect of soul. [To the objection. and their properties. but there is none such in respect of demerit: so how can Scriptural or logical argument be extended to demerit? If any one says this. a. Such is the meaning. then. an injunction p.. 27. otherwise. it is not so. 'Why.2 b. a.. 25. &c. they must be liable to modification. &c. in respect of both.. &c. &c. inhere in what.. Purity. that. in the Vai•eshika Institute. that the existence of an internal organ. be acknowledged [to exist]. 330 would be unaccounted for. also. if Merit. such as. 26. &c. p. as we do to what is meant by the words sleep. wish. are not denied essentially. &c..

as are sentient beings.] there is no truth in the assertion [of an inductive conclusion]. a. a pervadedness [or invariable attendedness of the token by the betokened.. 28. But then the Chárváka.* Pervadedness is a constant consociation of characters.* Not from once apprehending is a connexion established. that such and such is pervaded by such and such. all things.The above thesis argued. and frequency [of the same apprehension] follows1 [the rule of the single apprehension. &c. since [he contends. &c. in the case of both. the combination. one portion of the matter in dispute. discern [that] Happiness [exists]. of these. and Conclusion. 333 b. Here. 29. or of one of them. by the 'conjunction. 'we discern [that] Happiness.' i. next.. (4) And pleasure produces motion in things.] is not established.' i. [exist]. just as a thousand times nothing amount to nothing]. Therefore [argues the sceptic. in order to get a particular subject of his assertion. Reason. (2) Because it produces motion in something. and.] since the apprehending of an invariable attendedness is impossible. &c. as a representative of the entire matter. Happiness. nothing can be established by Inference. c. [This] he clears up: This point cleared up. Such is the meaning. (3) Whatever produces motion in anything is real. he takes happiness alone. And the employment [of the argument] is this: (1) Pleasure is real.3 p. are proved to exist. Synthesis [of the two premises]. p.' The five members of an argumentative statement are the Proposition. 334 The validity of inference questioned.. That is to say: from once apprehending concomitance [of a supposed token and the thing betokened].e. Aph. Aph. But the better reading is. in the way of horripilation.: (5) Therefore. viz. &c. a. doubts whether there be any evidence other than sense-evidence. . Example. a 'connexion.. it is real.e..

* [But certain] teachers say that it [Pervadedness. He declares that Pervadedness is not an additional principle. 'Consociation of characters. in addition to the twenty-five. that that concomitancy is 'pervadedness. every equiangular triangle is equilateral].] resulting from the power of the thing itself. b. a separate principle..] is [another principle. so that there is no impossibility in apprehending 'pervadedness. some entity as the residence of what constitutes 'pervadedness. for it is unsuitable to postulate entities [praeter rationem]. Such is the import. every equilateral triangle is equiangular. generated by the native power of the 'pervaded.a. concomitancy. For smoke. whether in the case of 'both. in the shape of a species of power.] 'Pervadedness' is not simply a power of the [pervaded] thing itself. consociation in the fact of being characters [or properties of something].] an additional principle [over and above the twentyfive (Book I.. And so we mean. when it has gone to another place [than the point of its origination]. and. p. He states the opinion of others: A heterodox opinion regarding 'Pervadedness. 'Of both' is mentioned with reference to the case of 'equal pervadedness': [e. e. Such is the meaning.. because it is unsuitable to suppose.g. 30. 336 a. 'Pervadedness' is not an entity other than a fixed consociation of characters. But other teachers assert that 'Pervadedness' is. a. [which 'pervadedness' does not do]. § 61)]. is not attended by . in short.' But we consider that what constitutes 'pervadedness' belongs to extant things simply.. 335 which is invariably non-errant. further.' i.' [and of inferring on the strength of it].' the predicate and the reason.] is not [as some think (see § 31). else it would exist wherever the thing is. b.' the reason only.* It [Pervadedness. conversely.' But [they continue.g. positively. 31. consisting. p.' [furnishing solid ground for inference].' Aph. And the invariableness may be apprehended through an appropriate confutation [or reductio ad absurdum of the denial of it]. Aph.e. of some such power as is to be mentioned [in § 31]: Pervadedness not an additional principle. or in the case of 'one of them.

that power is put an end to. 34. [as Intellect does not differ from Nature at all.' so. This is almost explained by the preceding aphorism. 338 [and this means that each product. and that 'Pervadedness'3 is the having the power which consists in being the sustained.'] is the possession of the power of the sustained.] replies: Pancha•ikha's reply to the objection.] mentions another objection: . But then..* Because we should find the distinction unmeaning.] there is no over-extension in the p. Opinion of Pancha•ikha Aph. To this he [Pancha•ikha.] by Nature. 32. He [Pancha•ikha. for Intellect. and. Such is the import. That is to say: Pancha•ikha holds that pervadingness is the power which consists in being the sustainer.' viz. why is a 'power of the sustained' postulated? Let 'Pervadedness' be simply an essential power of the thing pervaded. But 'the relation. 337 above-stated definition. are treated as being pervaded [or invariably attended. for we should [thus] have a tautology. because. there is none in the case of 'Intellect' and 'what is Pervaded' [by Nature.fire. p.* Pancha•ikha2 says that it ['Pervadedness. b. a. for. Therefore [contend these teachers. b. Such is the meaning. &c. p. and the rest. just as there is no difference between 'water-jar' and 'jar for water. by going into another place. 339 b.* The relation is not an essential power. of which Intellect consists]. a.' is not an essential power. for we should have [in that case. He himself explains the 'Tautology:' Aph. Aph. except as does the sustained from the sustainer]. 'Pervadedness. in succession] is sustained by what precedes it in the series]. 33. a.] a tautology. according to our doctrine. also. the smoke [which betokens fire] is to be specialized as that which is at the time of origination. The reason why..

&c. Aph. are invariably attended [at their origination.] is not [as token of something that is betokened. also. But this cannot be called simply an essential power [in the shoot].' the objection to Inference as evidence.. that the fact of 'Pervadedness' results from essential power. and thus the argument proves nothing.' it would be really settled 'by the like argument.e. Reply. That is to say: 'were it settled' that 'a power of the sustained' constitutes the fact of 'Pervadedness. so that there is no 'Pervadedness' then. 341 referred to in § 31. the objection of others to a word's being a means of right knowledge. viz.] does not depart. Because shoots. &c. that this would prove too much.] by the employment of the five-membered [form of argumentative exposition]. c. by parity of reasoning. is disposed of.. smoke. in order to establish the fact that words.. Such is the sense. where he contends that 'sustainedness' is what really expresses pervasion].' i. which consists in having the p. since smoke is not sustained by fire [see § 32. however. find it attended [by the tree. and the rest. are established [as realities. 342 of] its being inadequate. &c. a.. Such is the import. b.].. also.] would not be reconcilable in shoots. even then. But the power [(see § 32). by the like argument. It was with a view to substantiate what was stated [in § 27]. [§ 31. that the Qualities.3 in the shape of [the objection p.* And because it [Pervadedness. by means of an exposition of the powers. But then what? Pancha•ikha says that 'Pervadedness' is not a result of any essential power.' then. To this he says: Aph. are generators of knowledge. a. because. b. by an exposition of 'Pervadedness. Now.] accompanied by fire. it would turn out that it [viz. might be proved. a. no longer accompanies it].] by trees. since the essential power [that which belongs to the shoot as being a shoot. 340 character] of the 'sustained' is destroyed at the time of amputation. 36. even in the case of an amputated shoot. of words: . of which the five-membered [exposition] consists. Then. its dependence on an essential power. &c.A further reason. since it proves too much]. 35. we should. that he has repelled. [or as a means of attaining right notions]. [as pretended by the heterodox teachers p.* Were it [thus] settled that it is a power of the 'sustained. which.

] in regard to what is not to be done [being something already extant].* He who is accomplished in the secular [connexion of words with meanings] can understand the . to the 'word.* There is no restriction to what is to be done. as well as in regard to what is to be done. as it were.' the power termed expression: simply this is their 'connexion. 343 From one's knowing this [connexion between a given word and meaning].] by the word. and application to the same thing which has a familiar name.' because. 39. Aph. a. viz. because we see it both ways. a. 40..' their interrelation. the usage of the old man [whose orders to his sons we hear..] is apprehended by means of these three. [whence we gather the sense of the less familiar synonym]. in consequence (see the Sáhitya-darpa•a. 37. That is to say: and there is no necessity that this apprehension of the powers [§ 37. Aph. Scriptural and secular senses of words the same. a.* The connexion between word and meaning is the relation of expressed and expresser. b.3 p. p.] should occur only in the case of 'something [directed] to be done. Aph. To the 'meaning' belongs the power termed expressibleness.* The connexion [between a word and its sense] is determined by three [means]. we see the usage of the old man. § 11)]. information from one competent [to tell us the meaning].Sound and sense. the meaning is suggested [or raised in the mind. Such is the import. Aph. He mentions what things cause one to apprehend the powers [in question]: Sense of words how learned. in [the secular life and dealings of] the world. [§ 38. 344 Imperatives and predications. and then observe what actions ensue. &c. That is to say: the connexion [just] mentioned [in § 37. also. 38.

. viz. in themselves.. whence what is enjoined in the Veda must be beyond intuition. in the shape. still.' i. are. there can be no instruction by any competent person. [of which we are perfectly conscious. Here he entertains a doubt: p. Of these he first repels the assertion.. that. He repels also what was asserted [in § 41]. preeminently.] are not something transcending intuition. what constitutes merit..] is not the case. and what it means transcends the senses.e. because sacrificings. &c. objects some one. What is asserted [in § 41.g. &c.* Not by the three [means mentioned in § 38. in themselves..] is superhuman. are really. 41. because of their having preeminent fruit. how can there be apprehension of the sense of Vaidic terms. gifts.e.. inasmuch as it [the Veda. 'what constitutes merit. And sacrificings.] does not belong to something mysterious that resides in sacrificings p. e.* Not so [i.sense of the Veda. 42. a. can the sense of the Veda be gathered]. a. b. because the Veda is superhuman. since sacrificings. A doubt. 43. in the . But then. that what is meant [by the Veda] is something transcending the senses: Aph. e.. since they are in the shape of wishings. of the relinquishment of some thing for the sake of the gods. a. a. 346 &c.. 345 Aph. what is enjoined by the Veda. &c. &c.* The natural force [of the terms in the Veda] is ascertained through the conversancy [therewith of those who successively transmit the knowledge].' i. Such is the meaning. 'preeminently. what is meant by the Veda is not something transcending the senses].. But 'what constitutes merit' [which the objector supposes to transcend intuition.. [in regard to its import]: Knowledge of the Veda traditional. Aph. This cleared up.

&c..* Since the liberated is unsuited [to the work. [whom you allude to as being. because there is no such thing as the [Supreme] Man. because they [viz. which transcend sense? To this he replies: p. for there is Scripture for their being a production. 347 Intelligibility of the Veda undeniable.* This really takes place. he says: Who are not authors of the Vedas. 44. in the case both of things adapted [to sense] and of things not [so] adapted. b. To this he replies: .] are not the work of [the Supreme] Man.] their maker. The Lord not the author. the words. a. possibly. it follows that they are eternal. [by his want of power] neither of these can be author of the Vedas].* They [the Vedas. Aph. peculiarities which belong to words. just because this matter is connected with the question of the power of words to cause right knowledge:3 Eternity of the Vedas denied. since they are not the work of [the Supreme] Man. Aph. a. in that case. 47. Aph. 'because we deny that. 46. by his indifference].4 a. 'No': p. a. fruits [of actions]. Then are the Vedas the work of [the Supreme] Man? To this he replies. 45. But then..case of gods. and the unliberated is so. Supply.] give rise to knowledge. 348 Aph.* The Vedas are not from eternity.'1 [This is] simple. Adverting to the anticipation that there may be some other author. there is a Lord. He defines the.

for no one speaks of the respiration during profound sleep as being Man's work. b. a. [or voluntary act]. if it were the case that vegetables were works]. &c. the Vedas. Aph. as an invariable fact. since they were uttered by the Primal p. in respect of what thing there takes place 'an effort of understanding. It is seen. also. 50. really.. we must infer that they are the work of [the Supreme] Man.e. from the Self-existent. &c. even be it something invisible. since sprouts. [for we see no embodied Supreme Man to whose handiwork the sprouts of the earth can be referred]. Plants denied to be works. Aph.* That [only] is Man's work.' i. too. just like an expiration. so. moreover. 350 Man. their eternity does not follow from their not being the work of [any Supreme] Man. [This is] plain.3 that whatever is the work of Man is produced by a body. Thus it has been remarked p. To this he replies: Aph. in respect of which. &c.e.. in the world. proceed.2 a. 351 that a thing is not Man's work merely through its having been uttered by Man. are productions. of themselves.* Were this the case with these. Such is the meaning. wholly unpreceded by thought...3 that thing alone is spoken of as Man's work: such is the meaning. This would be debarred. an effort of understanding takes place. b.. also. As in the case of what is visible. just like jars.. [i. in the case of what is invisible. 49. are. Therefore. To this he replies: Only what is voluntary is a work. 48. But what need to speak of antecedence of Understanding? The Vedas.* As in the case of sprouts. a. 349 An illustration. the work of [the Supreme] Man. &c. But then. a consciousness that Thought preceded. But then. were the case as you contend. they . we should find a contradiction to experience.p. through the force of fate. &c.

and the like. &c. let the Qualities. by the establishing the Existence of Happiness.' i. Of pleasure.. moreover. viz. a. &c. also.2 To this he replies: The Vedas their own evidence. it is proved by mere consciousness. from the patentness of their own power [to instruct rightly].' because. b. moreover.* They are. 'And of the [existence of the] Qualities.2 p. because there is no cognition of a man's horn..' there was duly alleged. like the speech of a parrot. one argument.* There is no Cognition of what is no entity. And so there is the aphorism of the Nyáya [Book II.. But then. &c.' &c. 353 Scripture.e. p.. is proved by the reasoning [under § 27]. like the validity of invocations. as a man's horn. spontaneously. not by such a thing as its being based on the enouncer's knowledge of the truth. even the consciousness could not be accounted for.. That is to say: the authoritativeness5 of the very whole of the Vedas is established. and in the Medical p. a. be . &c. Such is the meaning. there is not absolute debarment. &c. But then.].1 the Vedas. but quite 'spontaneously. in that case. Aph. natural. since they are not preceded by a correct knowledge of the sense of the sentences. [the following of which leads to cures]. can convey no right knowledge. were they absolutely nonentities. conveyers of right knowledge. 51. Be it. In regard to the proposition [laid down in § 26. as for the Vedas' 'own. [interposes the Naiyáyika.. b. thereof we perceive the manifestation in the invocations6 [which produce the result promised]. 52. and the Medical Scripture. and developed [under § 27]. 354 Aph.] if such be the case.are not [a Supreme] Man's work. 352 b. &c. § 681]: 'And [the fact of] its being a cause of right knowledge.. viz. that the existence of pleasure. Now he states another argument in respect of that [same proposition]: Cognition is evidence of existence. power of generating right knowledge.

moreover. that the cognizance of the Qualities. the demurring to absolute debarment [in § 26.e. p. which belongs to another]? He replies. The import is. because there exists no such thing.' i. a rope. which belongs to another]. a.. a.' [or our fancying that nature to belong to one. This. 53.* There is no such thing as cognizing otherwise [or cognizing that as belonging to one. To this he replies: The Qualities. But then. 54. hence. b. do you really approve of [the Nyáya notion of] 'cognizing otherwise. is not proper [to be said]. exists no such thing. is that of the absolutely real... let the world be different both from real and from unreal. even on that showing. in the expression 'not absolute debarment' [in § 26]. the word 'absolute' is [superfluous.* It is not of what cannot be [intelligibly] expressed [that there is cognizance]. &c. Aph. on that showing. viz. because it is proper to form suppositions only in accordance with what is seen. Aph. 'No': Aph..] at the time of destruction [of the mundane system]. and. because your own proposition is self-destructive. nevertheless. a. because we see that they are excluded [and not admitted p. &c.. no cognizance of such [a thing] as is not to be expressed as either existing or not existing. 355 to exist. moreover. A Nyáya view rejected. And there takes place. 55. not absolutely real. also.g. under the character of a serpent.* It is not of the real [that there is here cognizance].quite absolutely real.] is untenable. &c. It is not proper [to say]. and then.] unmeaning. 356 b. 'because there. for which it . because exclusion is seen [of the Qualities]. But then. To this he replies: A Vedántic advance rejected. that one thing appears under the character of another thing [e. because nothing is known other than what exists. or what does not exist: such is the meaning.

because all things [and things are made up of the Qualities. the] word. which is something else . that there exists. 358 wrongly. It is held.] declare that the cognition of what does not exist is impossible.* A word does not consist of [what the Yogas call] the 'expresser' (spho•a).' How? 'Through their being denied and not denied.. Such is the meaning. 'because your own proposition is self-destructive. altogether and everywhere. &c. is [what is virtually] expressed by the word 'otherwise' [than the truth.' he sums up his doctrine: Summing up. Expounding what he had said above. being. Aph. in a pearl-oyster. in crystal. 357 proposition is self-destructive.. snakehood]. [which would. as far as regards their existing at all. such as 'jar. it having presented itself in this connexion. Now the consideration of Words. and the presence of snakehood in a rope mistaken for a snake. This investigation is concluded.'4 Of another nature [e. disprove it]. relatively..* They [the Qualities. [the Sánkhya not allowing to Testimony a coordinate rank with Sense and Inference]: Aph. For even those who contend for 'cognizing otherwise' [as one mode of cognition. or the like.2 b. [which they call] the 'expression. without its following that redness. [which has no redness. is taken in hand incidentally.. b. a rope]. at the end. an indivisible [unit. &c. in distinction from the several letters. in like manner. a. or with the redness.] and of non-cognizance. and [yet] its cognition [thus] otherwise is asserted.. in a different thing [e. 56. a. by reason both of cognizance [which would disprove the existence of such imaginary p. in the dusk]. for example.' &c. [as if that could be cognized which is equivalent to what can not be cognized]: hence your own p. in Soul..' There is non-denial. 'are cognized rightly and p.] 'not absolute debarment. All the Qualities. is nonexistent]. of all things. just as is the case with the imaginary silver. possessing parts. equivalence to a man's horn. by the followers of the Yoga. The Yoga theory of speech rejected.g.'1 just as there is a jar. alike. both a man's horn.. But there is denial.g. through their being denied and not denied [appropriately or otherwise]. &c. &c. 57.] are cognized rightly or wrongly.may be mistaken.] are eternal. [in § 26. otherwise than real]. 359 thing.

. the power of acquainting us with a meaning does not belong to an 'expression' which is not cognized. It is not proper [to say. on the latter alternative. that alone is the object in the cognition of its production. is eternal. The eternity of the Vedas was contradicted1 before. in opposition to the Yogas. it would turn out that a jar. 'as of a jar by a lamp.* Sound is not eternal. [viz.] by what collection of letters. e. the shell-shaped neck. whose existence was 'previously settled. Why? 'By reason both of cognizance and of non-cognizance. distinguished by a particular succession. as [the manifestation] of a [preexistent] jar by a lamp. 58. a.] is without evidence [of its existence].' [as thus]: Pray. a. what need of that idle thing. But then [some one may say]. by the cognition. let that be what acquaints us with the meaning. for they are proved to be non-eternal. this ['expression'] is manifested. &c. Aph. of Sound.' . or the like.. And the recognition p.] the manifestation of something whose existence was previously settled. A doubt. 59. p. 361 has reference to the homogeneousness with that [one which had been previously heard]. b.. Such is the meaning. [which you speak of in § 58]. viz. e. that letters are eternal. or not? On the former alternative.' because of its making apparent the meaning: such a word [we Sánkhyas assert. through noise. An example of manifestation [of a thing previously existing] is. Now he contradicts also the eternity of letters: The eternity of letters denied. He ponders a doubt: Aph. for.g. &c. that it is not cognized].g. is that word [which you choose to call the 'expression.'] cognized. termed a word.. the hypothesis of an 'expresser' is useless.' the manifestation. But. and that particular sound.* [Suppose that] there is [in the case of sounds. on the strength of our recognizing. inasmuch as it is recognized.than the parts. Therefore. [under § 45]. otherwise. because we perceive it to be made. that 'This is that same G'.. 360 b. [the supposed 'expression'? For.. as the Mímánsakas say]. that '[the sound of] G has been produced': such is the meaning. is called the 'expresser.

60.]. Such is the import. then we should find [on your theory. a. [for the jar is shown by the lamp. 362 b.* Non-duality of Soul2 is not. not previously mentioned. if 'manifestation' is asserted to be just in the shape of the cognition of what is presently real. are eternal. Non-duality of Soul denied on grounds of Inference.p. a. for its distinctions are cognized through signs. is to be adduced.. And.3 p. [not specially to Sound]. there is even sense-evidence destructive of the non-distinction of Soul from things [that are] non-Soul. § 149].* If the dogma of products' being real [is accepted by you]. An objection to the non-duality of Soul. If you say that 'manifestation' means the taking of a present condition by means of rejecting an unarrived [or future.. 363 b.] that the object in the perception of production. 'All this is Soul only.] condition. because it would be proper [on that theory. also... by the operation of the causes [the potter. 364 . &c. should be that of knowledge only. § 115]. He repels this: The doubt disposed of.] that jars. That is to say: because it is proved to be really different [in different persons].'4 'All this is Brahma only:'6 p. [having been already handled under Book I. therefore the refutation of the non-duality of Soul is recommenced. he tells us. &c. then this is our dogma of the reality of products [Book I. so that you are proving the already proved [or conceded]: such is the meaning. then this is a proving of the already proved. while another not does quit it. But. Aph.. not made by it]. &c. by the sign that one quits Nature [or escapes from the mundane condition]. and also in the case of jars. and such an eternity belongs to all products. 61. b. asserted in the Scriptural texts. Aph. as in the case of words. &c. &c.

e. because. a. [as well as by signs. But then. Aph. in the case or non-difference [between Soul and non-Soul. since the jar. there is not a non-distinction between the non-Soul. is there non-difference]. For.Non-duality denied on grounds of Sense. the aggregate of the experienceable. what is the drift of such Scriptural texts as.e. which constrains us to apprehend a distinction [between a jar and a web]. body and the embodied. a. with a view to eventually getting him out of it]. and Soul. he illustrates this point. would not be other than the web. which [by hypothesis. Aph. because this is disproved by senseevidence. That is to say: 'in respect of the undiscriminating. That is to say: moreover. b. a. the observation3 is [designed to be] provocative of worship.' with reference to undiscriminating persons.. 62. In order to clear the minds of learners.g. 64. the experienced and the experiencer. 'Between the two.. there is not [non-distinction of Soul] from non-Soul. in the secular world. though already established: The reasons combined. also. e. if Soul were not other than the whole perceptible. i. '[All] this is Soul only?' To this he replies: Scripture accomodates itself to human frailty of understanding. p.* There it is for the sake of something else. (§ 61)]. in respect of the undiscriminating. it would also not be different from a jar and a web.' i. the two together. it is 'there for the sake of something else.. because this is excluded also by senseevidence. p. for that same [couple of reasons]. there is not an absolute non-difference.] is not other than the Soul: and this is excluded by sense-evidence.* Moreover. 63. in that case. Aph.. through want of discrimination. b.' i. .* Not between the two [Soul and non-Soul.e. 366 [and Scripture humours the worldling's delusion. between Soul and non-Soul. apparently asserted in Scripture]. are regarded as indifferent. 365 for the couple of reaaons [given in § 61 and § 62]: such is the meaning.

because. since pleasure is not experienced at the time of knowing pain. § 145] decided that the soul consists of light. a. either. can be the material cause of the world. And. b. 369 .'1 that the essence of the soul is joy. 'Brahma p.* Neither soul.' hence the [ever] solitary Soul. Nor can it do so by means of [association with] Ignorance. A single subject has not the nature both of joy and of intelligence. according to the asserters of Non-duality [of soul]. knowledge. severally. what becomes of the Scripture. 66.' Such is the meaning. 65. Aph. since it is not associated. Aph. joy and knowledge do not belong to one. even as it is that either. and joy. that the two together should be the material is impossible. 'because of the solitariness' of Soul. as the air in the heavens. 368 is reality. because of the solitariness of [Soul]. Moreover. because the two are different. that. either: The Vedánta system supplies no material for the world. there can be no material cause of the world. cannot serve as a material cause. He himself [in Book I. The soul alone. then there is an abandonment of the non-duality of Soul.2 nor both. founded on the text. For things undergo alteration only through that particular conjunction p. simply 'because of the solitariness. that it [Soul. He declares. In regard to this. or both together. or Ignorance lodged in the soul. should be the material. he repels the primâ facie view. if you choose that Ignorance should subsist as a substance located in the soul. without a second. [or knowledge]. a. b. [for which you Vedántís contend].b. 367 which is called 'association. in that case.] consists of joy? To this he replies: p. nor Ignorance. also: Soul not joy and knowledge. like a pair of jarhalves [conjoined in the formation of a jar]..* The two natures. cannot be the material of the world. But then. pleasure and knowledge are different: such is the meaning. because the conjunction of Ignorance has been already excluded by the fact of solitariness. both.

Aph. moreover.* [The Mind is not all-pervading].] implies a distributive alternative. a. b. for it is an instrument. or the like. The Mind not all-pervading. because it is. that the Mind is all-pervading. which [cessation] is the essence of the soul.. consisting in the cessation of pain. p. Here. the emancipation. that. in the sense] of the cessation of pain. as an axe. pervading the body. [while the whole of the internal instruments are instruments. already p. Aph.' b. b. The meaning is this.1 But knowledge.' in the Aphorism. manas6]. 70. is metaphorical. 67.] the particular internal instrument. That is to say: the word 'joy. 69. there being a doubt whether this be convincing. He states the cause of this metaphorical employment: Why the term was used in a sense not literal.A Vedánta term explained away. Aph. the cessation of pain. 68. &c.4 is not all-pervading.4 [for the soul is such joy as consists of the absence of pain]. meaning the totality of the internal instruments.. [not an optional one]. 371 is not all-pervading. and because it is. a. [neither infinite nor atomic]. the third5 [the Mind.e. an organ. as an incitement to 'the dull. In order to manifest immediately the origin. since there is Scripture regarding the motion. .* It is [as] a laudation of emancipation. for it is moveable. he repels the primâ facie view. for the sake of the dull. This is stated in [the maxim]. really. are demonstrable as only of medium extent. he propounds an appropriate confutation: Proof of this. is.' i. the ignorant.' in the Scriptural expression which means.* The Mind is not all-pervading. as if it were joy. 'or. because it is an instrument. moreover. lauds. 'Pleasure is the departure of both pain and pleasure. an organ.* Metaphorical [is the word joy. a.1 of the internal organ. 370 declared. That is to say: the Scripture. Aph. The Mind. The word 'and' [literally.

with several Senses..' which occurs in a preceding aphorism.'6 since Soul and Nature. because it comes in contact therewith. To this he replies: . Aph. In order to prove that it is a product. when in the state of a cause. judgment. 'He should know Illusion to be Nature. § 51]. He demurs to the eternity of Mind.' simultaneously. [not developed into product]. cannot go] into another world.* Like a jar. it [the Mind. [and not modified and expanded. and him in whom is Illusion to be the great Lord. it cannot be allpervading. by reason of the absence of the special properties. And it is to be understood that the internal organ. e. 372 b.. when in the state of cause. the internal organ. And the Mind. atomic..g. p.. according to such Scriptural texts as. But.4 &c. and not Intellect. simultaneously]. Aph. 373 b. [This is] plain..2 the Ether. The Mind is not without parts. The word 'therewith' refers to 'organ. [§ 69].] is. inasmuch as there is Scripture regarding the going of the Soul [which. 'like a jar. a. a..* Everything except Nature and Soul is uneternal. are made up of parts. indeed. But then. 'because it comes in contact. 71. p.e. that is movable. Such is the meaning. 374 also. 72. it being settled that it is its adjunct. [see Book I. since. Time. p. That is to say. viz. b. he repels also the opinion that the Mind is without parts: The Mind has no parts. are called Nature.a. and this whole world to be pervaded by portions of him.] is not without parts. &c. into knowledge. and consists of parts. they must be uneternal. [i. which is its product. &c: Eternity belongs to what. [neither infinite nor atomic]. being all-pervading.3 &c.' it is of medium size. with several sense-organs.

and the essence [of Soul] is quite eternal.e. Such is the meaning.] are found in the Experiencer. unobjectionable.] which is motionless.'2 b. not something to be produced by means: therefore.. In order to corroborate this. in like manner. § 1. 73. a. a. Second view disputed. because there p. is it [Emancipation. moreover. Parts are not appropriate to 'the Experiencer.' i. Aph.. 375 Soul and Nature not made up of parts. Aph. in regard to Emancipation: A view of Emancipation disputed.* Nor. (see § 74)]. 74.p.] the destruction of special qualities. Emancipation is not a manifestation of joy: such is the meaning. for there is Scripture for their being without parts. There belongs to Soul no property in the shape of joy. a. 75. or to Nature. Aph. one might infer destructibility. as. It has been stated [in Book I. 376 are no properties [in Soul.] any particular going of that [Soul. A third view disputed. or in the shape of manifestation.. e. passionless.' Because there are absolutely no properties [in Soul. motioniess. 'In like manner.* Nor is it [Emancipation. Emancipation is. 'Without parts. Aph. 76. quiescent. because of such [texts] as.* No parts [from the presence of which in the discerptible.* Emancipation is not a manifestation of joy.g.] that Emancipation is the cessation of pain. . therefore. in the shape of joy]. for there is Scripture for its being without parts. not the destruction of all special qualities. to Soul. and. that is to say. he then repels the doctrines of others.

* Nor is it [Emancipation. a. 79. Aph. The meaning is.* So. by reason of the faults of momentariness. The annihilation of the whole universe. the entire destruction of the Soul. Aph. that Bondage is the modifying thereof by objects. Likewise. A fourth view disputed.a. A sixth view disputed.* And conjunctions terminate in separations. A seventh view disputed. consisting of cognition and the cognizable. by reason of the faults of momentariness.. b. Moreover.] destruction of all. the Void. is not emancipation. therefore. and that emancipation is the destruction of the influence thereof called Memory. that the Soul consists merely of momentary knowledge. since it is motionless.] is not the acquisition of .* Nor is it [Emancipation. 77.1 because the Soul. because. also. which consists of knowledge. Aph. He censures another [conception of] emancipation of the Nihilist's: p. a. a.3 is inadmissible. that also the doctrine of the Nihilist. does not go. because. 378 A fifth view disputed. thus. among other things. 377 of Brahmá. too. &c. the fault of not being the soul's aim. among other things. in the world. &c. 78. for this has. [such] emancipation is not the Soul's aim. that the annihilation of the soul is the soul's aim: such is the meaning. Aph. 80. not emancipation. we do not see. is. emancipation is not a going to the world p.] the destruction of the influence of [intellectual] forms. it [Emancipation. because Soul's aim is not effected by Soul's annihilation: such is the meaning.

. &c. the destruction of this. An eighth view disputed. 82.' i. because. conjunction with the rank of Indra. A tenth view disputed. just as in that case. 380 Aph.* Nor is it [Emancipation]. self-dissolution is not Soul's aim: such is the meaning. § 92]. moreover. p. the Supreme Soul. since. just as is the case with connexions with other superhuman powers. Nor is the attainment of the superhuman power of Indra.. either. is it [Emancipation].] conjunction of a Part with the Whole. for the reason assigned [in § 80].' i. &c. the assuming the size of an atom. viz.. a. follows..e. of necessity: such is the meaning. the Soul. a. is not Emancipation. Aph. A ninth view disputed. Emancipation is not absorption of 'a Part. thus. Moreover. 379 a. e.' and because we do not admit a Lord [Book I.* Nor. a. p. also.lands..* Nor is it [Emancipation. that of which it is [on the view in question.. into 'the Whole. 381 ..] a part. &c. as is the case with other conjunctions. and because.. the destruction of this must necessarily take place. Aph. 83. 81.. 'conjunctions terminate in separations.g.—just as is the case with other superhuman powers [such as assuming atomic bulk]. conjunction with superhuman power. moreover. &c. From its perishableness. p. Emancipation. conjunction with the [power of] becoming as small as an atom.e. possessorship is not Emancipation. viz.—by reason of perishableness: such is the meaning.

. because there is Scripture for their being derived from Self-consciousness. a. also. what has been already stated [in Book I. [as the Vai•eshikas maintain]. The organs whence. Although that text of Scripture is not seen by us.. which is held by the Vai•eshikas and others: The eternity of Atoms unscriptural. that the five Elements are products.. he repels the determination of categories [insisted upon by the various sects] of his opponents. and from the tradition of Manu.* [The five Elements being products. 85.b. Aph. § 61]. is it in the case of the sixteen [categories of the Nyáya].. [as alleged in the Nyáya]. a. in the lapse of time. And those of the Nyáya. [Ch. he rejects the eternity of the Earthy and other Atoms. because it has disappeared.* The Organs are not formed of the Elements [as the Naiyáyikas assert]. § 61]. a. I.* The rule of six categories is not [the correct one]. &c. Aph. § 62]. Atoms are not eternal. yet.* So. 382 The categories of the Vai•eshika objected to. &c. With advertence to the opinion that Power. He repels the objection of an opponent to what has been stated [in Book I. 86. too.. that the Organs are products of Self-consciousness: Aph. as declared in Book I. &c. v. and the notion that Emancipation comes through a knowledge of these [categories] merely: p. In order to establish. are principles.. nor does Emancipation result from acquaintance therewith. it is to be inferred from the words of teachers. 27]. for there is Scripture for their being products.. 84. &c. Aph. 87.

also: such is the meaning. viz. b. he decides the question of dimension. Aph. 90. and short. It is no rule. it is not without parts. as the cause. are not without parts. a. 384 A cavil disposed of... He repels the objection of the Nihilist. That is to say: since the fact. because direct cognition may result from Merit. 385 Dimension of what kinds. Aph. Such is the meaning. established by Scripture. or of Soul. if that be the case. the four varieties can be accounted for by merely two.* Since it is a product. the [so-called] Atoms of Earth. 88. or not? With reference to this. [as follows]: p. long. [or other object of sense]. great. mystical practices. There are not four kinds of dimension.. how can an Atom. Well. small.* There are not four varieties of dimension. because those can be accounted for by two. but there are only two sorts.* There is no necessity that direct cognition should have colour as its cause.. Aph. [viz. For the short and the long are merely subordinate kinds of . 'Because those can be accounted for by two:' that is to say. which is without parts. a. and so forth]. But then. because [forsooth.] and the great. &c. that direct cognition of Nature. &c. that to be directly cognizible should result from colour only.p. b. a. pray is the dimension of an Atom a reality. is impossible. of their being products. cannot be otherwise accounted for. be a product? To this he replies: The Scripture decisive of the question. 383 b. the atomic [or positively small.] the cause of a thing's being directly cognizable is colour: p. 89.

it is not proper to deny [the existence] of genus: And not to be denied. But then [it may be said]. 387 b.* It [genus. for.the dimension called great. for it is directly apprehended.* Though these [individuals] be uneternal. recognition.] is not to be denied. no end of dimensions. &c. p. recognition is to be accounted for simply by a nonexistence. else we should have. otherwise. 91. To this he replies: Likewise not a distinct principle.' p. 92. Aph. But still. 'This is not a non-jar. in the shape of the crooked. in the shape of the exclusion of what is not the thing [recognized]: and let this be what is meant by the word 'genus. the only thing cognized would be. b.. because it is cognized as an entity. He rebuts the Nihilist's denial of genera. because 'This is that same' is the cognition of something positive. That is to say: genus does not consist in exclusion [of something else]. Aph. [as one manifestation of Community]. 386 a.g. he says. [as follows]: Genus proved by recognition. e. 93.] does not consist in exclusion of something else. not negative.* Therefore it [genus. . a. Aph. a. is of genus. as being associated with constancy. recognition may be caused by likeness. Hence.' To this he replies: Genus positive. 94. Aph.* Likeness is not a separate principle.

&c. &c.. occasioned by the sight of either]. consisting in the sameness of the pleasurable feeling.] the name. [the likeness of a fair face to the moon. between two jars]. The conjecture. Moreover. likeness is not the manifestation of a particular natural power of a thing. the cognition of likeness. b.. moreover. [e. For the cognition of a power is not dependent on the cognition of another thing. a. of jar. let the likeness among individual jars. 97. To this he replies: p.g.' he repels: p. Aph. for it is directly apprehended as consisting in sameness. e. Such is the meaning.. is dependent on the cognition of a correlative. a. 95. because the apprehension of it is different. Aph. b.* Nor.. be merely that they have [all alike. e. 389 Nor the relation between names and things... But still. on the other hand. That is to say: likeness is nothing other than sameness in many parts.a.. between name and .] the connexion between name and named. 'But then. Because even he who does not know the connexion between a name and the thing named may cognize a likeness. let likeness be really an inherent power.1 as is the case with the cognition of a non-existence.] a manifestation of [something's] own power. is it [likeness. so that the two conceptions are heterogeneous.* That connexion [viz. and not [a modified aspect of] Community.g.* Nor is it [likeness. 96. Aph. b. because the apprehension of likeness is different from the apprehension of power.g. 388 Nor a peculiar power. Moreover: How it cannot be so. &c.

the likeness of a departed thing in a thing present? Such is the meaning. Therefore. viz. Aph.] is not eternal. there could be no such thing as the eternal [connexion called] Coinherence1 between those two eternals.e. the evidence of it is. is not eternal. the supposition is inconsistent with the definition of the term]. though the correlatives be uneternal.* The connexion is not so [not eternal]. 98. [i. then. Connexion is proved only where disjunction incidentally subsists.. a Quality and the thing qualified. 392 . a. connexion is not eternal. if connexion be eternal. Such is the meaning. 99. can there be. also. [which Coinherence. otherwise. for there is no evidence [for it]. b. Since both the name and the named are uneternal. or intimate relation.named. How. But then. because this is debarred by the evidence which acquaints us with the thing. let p. through that. p.—simply by the natural state of the matter. there is no room for the supposition of connexion. But then [it may be said]. [such as the Naiyáyikas insist upon]. Another suggestion repelled. To this he replies: p. a.. the perception that something is qualified [or conjoined with a quality which inheres in it]. for this reason. 391 b. otherwise. of the cognition of something as qualified. since both [the correlatives] are uneternal.* There is no [such thing as] Coinherence. and the unaccountableness. is one of the categories of the Nyáya]. And this incidental disjunction is impossible.—as will be explained. What is to hinder this? To this he replies: Aph. To this he replies: The Category of Intimate Relation rejected. because. 390 the relation be eternal. the relation between them. for this is debarred by the very evidence that acquaints us with Connexion. a. the case being accounted for. on this showing. But.

any longer existent. a. everything is momentary. which appeared to drop from the tree]. the perception of qualifiedness. and so forth. the case is otherwise disposed of. a. 'the case is otherwise disposed of. Since. that. In regard to that. therefore. since.e. To this he replies: Motion is a matter of perception. there is this objection of the atheists. He will mention.* Motion is not a matter of inference.Aph.3 This argued. for he who stands very near has. from the agitation of Nature the conjunction of Nature and soul takes place. that.' [the fruit. that 'Nothing whatever possesses the action called agitation. because many [heterogeneous things] are unsuitable as the material.' i. In Book Second the different opinions were merely mentioned.. but no particular one was considered. 'as regards both alike. that the Body is formed of five elements. the material of every Body is earth: . he denies the view of an opponent: p. In regard to this question. 100. for instance. indeed.* Neither perception nor inference [is evidence for the existence of Coinherence]. b. even there it perishes. no motion is proved to be inferrible from conjunction [of anything] with another place. as regards both alike. Aph. and the inferring of it. direct cognition both of it and of what it belongs to. a. where p. 101. It is a tenet. which appears to reach the ground not being that fruit. whilst there is but one material.'4 viz. 393 it arises. 394 The Body is of Earth only..* The Body does not consist of five elements. simply by the natural state [of the thing and its qualities]. neither of the two is evidence for [the imaginary category called] Coinherence: such is the meaning. and thence results creation. 102. Aph.

In order to substantiate this [point]. 103. other than the eye-ball. as the vital air. where there is no luminosity.—for they are. their revealing an object is simply their taking up an image of the object. because of their not reaching. Why? Because. for example. themselves. [and thus . have been already mentioned. too. that the senses reveal what they do not reach to: p. the gliding forth can be accounted for through a kind of modification. on the ground that light is seen to glide. Such is the meaning. Aph.' For we do not see that lamps. for there is. 105. under the modification called breathing. the vehicular [transmigrating or Subtile] one. For. &c. Or [in other words]. Such is the meaning. necessarily. the Gross one. the opinion [of the Naiyáyikas. those intercepted. 396 is quite right. Aph. a.] is the Sight luminous [or formed of Light]. He repels the conjecture: But then. Such is the import. glides out ever so far from the end of the nose. in that case. reveal what they do not reach to. Therefore there is an organ. And the instruments reveal the objects simply by delivering the object to the soul.] that the sight is luminous p. for we see Light alone glide rapidly to a distance. 395 Connexion between sense and object. just as in the case of the vital air. The senses do not reveal things unconnected with them. The Sight not formed of Light. unintelligent. Body. if they were to reveal what they do not reach to. without having at all parted from the body.* The senses do not reveal what they do not reach to.] is not. or because [else. Senses. [the organ of vision. because the thing is accounted for by [the theory of] modifications.* Not because Light glides [and the Sight does so. viz. a. we should find them revealing all things.There is a Subtile as well as a Gross.—as a mirror reveals the face. or the like. [to be now explained]. in the form of rays: Aph. and the like. also. he refutes the opinion. The Sight is not to be asserted to be luminous. and because. b.] distinct from the eye-balls.] they might reach everything. a. 'Because of their not reaching.* It [the Body.. for the sake of connexion with the distant sun. 104.

] to a distant object. a. [serving as] the cause of the revealing of objects. 399 'Modifications' may be qualities. by means of the species of change called modification. the 'modifications' are substances. that it accounts for the phenomena. or p. take place.? To this he replies: p. as well]. all in a moment will dart off [like the protruded feeler of a polyp. Aph. without. Colour. 106. He shows [us] the nature of the modification. such as the sun. [not technical. connexion of the sun. if it were a quality. is something else than a fragment. But. though a non-luminous substance. just so the Sight. b. like. because it is for the sake of connexion that it glides forth. if.* It [the term 'modification. and applies.'] is not confined to substances. or other sense. p. or a quality. 107. to account for the going.—or a quality. whilst a portion thereof. &c. 398 a quality. and. further. The modification is not a fragment of the Sight. &c. though without parting from the Body: Aph. etymologically.* By the sign of the display of the attained object the [existence of the] modification [which could alone account for that display. or other sense]. with the Sight would not.] is proved. how is [the term] 'modification' applied to the qualities of intellect. g. to a quality. because it is etymological. 397 b. quitting [connexion with] the body. if there were disruption. [of the Sight. thus. 108. [for a quality cannot move by itself]. in the shape of Desire. a. But what is the proof that there is any such modification? To this he replies: Proof of his theory of vision. Of the theory.—a part disjoined like a spark. . For. e.. Such is the meaning. but the modification. through it. indeed. as well as substances. Aph. the motion called 'gliding forth' would be unaccountable.* The 'modification' is another principle than a fragment.smells a distant flower]..

Aph. with us who live in this terrestrial world. In regard to this. Since it is also stated. with a p.g. of materiality. do the Organs.' as the world of Brahmá.. that the organs have any other material than self-consciousness. viz. results from the attendant Light. 110. There is designation as the material cause.. womb-born. Such is the meaning. in Scripture. Not through 'difference of locality. transmigrating generally throngh the different localities. b. of only one Subtile Body p. come to exist. whether the Scriptural texts are. he says: The materials of the organs everywhere the same. again.. Hence are they [the organs. e. is it. 109. Aph. 400 [made up of the organs]. As the subject presents itself. Such is the meaning. in that case. [or Heat. to be applied distributively. just as fire is [spoken of as a rising] from fuel. in Scripture. that those of all alike are formed of self-consciousness.. but the rule is. only in reliance on the support of Light. in the case even where the cause is [but] concomitant. &c. which cannot manifest itself alone].] is because there is [intended to be made. that the sense-organs are formed of the Elements. But then. or other Element.* Not though there be a difference of locality.4 a. perhaps. 111. For. in reliance on the support of earthly fuel. egg-born. is there a difference in the material [of which the organs are formed]: the rule is as with the like of us. as if it belonged to the organs. as fire. b. the doubt may occur. as is the case.* The heat-born.* The mention thereof [viz. For we hear. [formed] from the accompanying Selfconsciousness. the Sight. [which fuel is a necessary concomitant of. 401 view to indicating its importance. he determines the variety that belongs to Gross Body: Varieties of Gross Bodies. thereby.] spoken of as being formed of the Elements. a. and the like. .a. though not really the substance of. a more emphatic] mention of the concomitant cause. according to the difference of particular worlds. the fire]. Aph. how is the Scripture relating to the materiality [of the organs] to be accounted for? To this he replies: A non-literal text accounted for. the fact.

since the vital air is the principal thing in p. or spirit. in a dead Body.] of some speciality. 404 . and spell-born. &c. such is not an exhaustive division [of Gross Body. since the vital air is not the cause of the Body. To this he replies: p. in that case. on the ground only of there being a support. five. there is. But then. But then. or four. a. as follows: Aph. that Body has only one Element as its material. there is designation as this [or that other element than earth. The vital air not the source of the Body. the Body might come into existence even without the vital air.' i. a. Such is the meaning. p. b. To this he replies: Aph. as entering into the constitution of some given body]. 402 a. It was stated. before. 112.vegetable. The material of Bodies. though a rough and customary one]. designation as consisting of Elements. thought-born. 'In consideration of some speciality. there is the absence of the vital air. to be considered] the originant of the Body. does not subsist in the absence of the organs. b. the vital air is not the originant of the Body. consisting in the function of the organs. he observes discriminatively. In this same connexion.* In all [Bodies] Earth is the material: in consideration [however. however. as in the preceding case [treated under § 110].* The vital air is not [on the allegation that it is the principal thing in the Body. in consequence of the absence of the organs.. In all Bodies the material is Earth only. let the vital air itself be the originant of the Body. because it [the vital air. &c.e. as in the case of the materiality of the Organs. Therefore.. in consequence of intensity through excess. in the case of Body. as before [in the case of the Organs]. since.. The vital air. 113. 403 the Body.] subsists through the power of the organs.

.e. 'otherwise. just as in a dead body.' i. we should find putrefaction in the semen and blood. immediately.Soul essenial to a living body. a. and emancipation. not the Soul. that can be the superintender... because. It was stated before [Book II. b. the Body. But then [it may be said]. 'Through the superintendence. 'How can the p. &c. but 'through its servant.' i. 405 operates. since it is motoinless. the vital air is a concomitant cause2 of the Body. [exercised] 'by the master. is superintendence [exercised] by the master.] emancipated.] consists of Brahma. profound sleep. by Soul. he says: Soul ever free.2 a. that which has the vital airs].. by the several operations of circulating the juices.e. a. we should find putrefaction. is not 'directly. as in the case of a king's building a city: such is the meaning..' Aph. not directly.] is contructed [only] through the superintendence of the experiencer [Soul]: otherwise.' i. b.* In Concentration. 114. the Body. Soul [literally.e.' i. In the construction of the Body..e. only through the operation. if the operation of the vital airs were absent. § 1.' i. 406 soul be eternally free.' in the shape of energizing. viz. Then what is the difference of emancipation from profound sleep and concentration? To this he replies: . Aph. because it is this which p.* The site of experience [viz. it is only the vital air.] that Nature's [agency] is 'for the emancipation of what is [really. and since there is no use in the superintendence of what does not operate. 116. 'of the experiencer.e. through the sustaining of it: such is the import. 'superintendence. itself. And thus.. when we see it bound?' with a view to demonstrating its eternal freedom. Aph. To this he replies: The Soul 'acting by another's actions..e. is 'the construction of the site of experience.. Such is the meaning.' in the shape of the vital airs.. it [Soul. 115.' In reference to the objection of opponents in regard to this.' i.* Through a servant. though not apparently.

or the like. through the example of Concentration and profound sleep.e. in the case of the other. a. Aph... p. granting.. even notwithstanding the existence of the 'seed' [or source of return to the mundane state. since Emancipation. in the case of a person in profound sleep. 407 in emancipation. there are not the two. the identity with Brahma5 is 'with a seed. also [Emancipation inclusive].e.' viz. but Emancipation.] called Memory. lodged in the mind. To this he replies: p.' i. The meaning is. 119. [or reappearance in the mundane state]. this is wanting. But then [suggests some one. Desire. a. really is. as are the two. it is with a seed. &c.. there will really be cognition of objects. Such is the meaning. and it is precisely this that is Emancipation. concentration and profound sleep. this cause is absent: this is the distinction. Aph. is inferrible.. &c. associated with some cause of Bondage. consequently. is evident. is 'evident. But then. since Memory prevails. 'In the case of the two. And the argument is thus. b. then there results p. 408 a permanent condition.e..' i. and. viz.' i. The quitting of that identity with Brahma4 which [identity] exists during profound sleep.. viz. &c. by memory. only. profound sleep and Concentration. takes place only through a fault. 'in the case of the other.. that. that. if this fault be annihilated by knowledge.* In the case of the two. with reference to § 117]. also. 118..2 b. Concentration and profound sleep are evident: but what evidence is there of Emancipation? This objection of the atheist he repels: The reality of Emancipation. also. 409 Aph. 117. quite similar to profound sleep. it is not proper to say that there is identity with Brahma during profound sleep. inasmuch as Memory is [then] dulled [or deadened] by apathy.* There is not the revelation. yet. of an object likewise during the conjunction of a [more potent] fault [such as sleep]: the secondary cause does not debar . because the triad.* But there are not the two [only].3 a mental modification after the form of any object does not arise during concentration.Perfect and imperfect emancipation.

Experience is observed. 410 more potent fault of Sleep: such is the meaning. [where a single one may suffice]. incompetent to produce its effects. we should have a postulation of many. during profound sleep. the principal. there is not a Body.'2 To this it is objected as follows. just as is the case with Merit. In like manner. He repels the objection of the atheist. Memory does not reveal its own objects.] even though it may be constantly in respect of a single object: now. does not remind us of its objects. also when there is the conjunction of the fault of sleep. so.' the subordinate.Memory inactive during profound sleep. For the really more potent fault makes the memory powerless.3 called motal inertia. because the antecedent impression is annihilated.2 a. in the case of the whirling of the potter's wheel. is 'in consequenue of a mere vestige of impression. in the case of the [alleged person] emancipated during life. To this he replies: p. b.3 cannot defeat the p. that. continuing till the completion of the whirling.] that there are vegetable Bodies. b. that the retention of a Body by him who is emancipated while still living. [and so there is nothing. in this. 411 An objection met to the possibility of emancipation in one still living. is to be regarded as only one. one to each [instant of] experience. [and this experience continuous. and] lasts out2 the experience: but there are not different impressions. exactly on its having produced the first [instant of] experience. inasmuch as knowledge debars it. It was stated. a. any more than during apathetic Concentration]: such is the import. in the Third Book [§ 83]. just as in the case of the like of us. It has been stated [§ 111. Aph. As in the case of apathy. and because no subsequent impression arises. for the 'secondary. 412 .* A single impression [suffices to generate. this is unaccountable [on the hypothesis of his really being emancipated]. inasmuch as there is no knowledge of the external: p. Memory. the self-continuant principle. else. in the case in question. to prevent identification of Soul with Brahma. 120.

123. 'as in the former case. 414 distinguished by a Brahmanical Body. The Vegetable organism really a Body. Aph. as in the former case. p. even in the same way do withering. a. b. a. trees with invisible flowers. that vegetables have bodies and are conscious]. viz.. also: such is the meaning. Such is the meaning. in the form of being the site of experiencer and experience. belongs also to trees. take place in the Bodies of trees. sites of experiencer and experience. also. 121.* Not merely through a Body is there susceptibility of Merit and Demerit. And to this effect there is Scripture.* And from the Legal Institutes [the same fact may be inferred. are.. we should find merit and demerit accruing to them. 122. or the like [animal body.' meaning the putrescence already mentioned [see § 114]. for Scripture tells us the distinction. Why? 'For Scripture tells us the distinction:' because we are told.. not vegetable]. is authority for this. annuals. Showing that the liability to Merit and Demerit is solely through the kind of Body.. [which have internal consciousness]. &c. But then. 413 Law.* Knowledge of the external is not indispensable [to constitute a Body]:1 trees. which have internal consciousness. &c.1 a.Aph. To this he replies: Vegetables not moral agents. that the liability results just from the being p. in which there is knowledge of the external.. shrubs. but it is to be held that the being a Body. from the fact that trees. &c. grasses. of the Bodies of men. are thus conscious. &c. he mentions how Body is of three kinds: . creepers. [which takes place] in the absence of the superintendence of an experiencer [the living soul].. in Scripture. The vital spirit is not liable to the production of Merit and Demerit through a Body merely. as well as Scripture. climbers. Aph. because. There is no necessity that that only should be a Body. &c. &c. also..

a Body of merit belongs to the preeminent sages.. p. a.Body of three principal kinds. 417 Aph. is that of the apathetic. the Body of merit. as is the case with fire. b.—viz.' i.3 also. that of the supposed Lord]. because of the preeminence [of these]. 124. and a Body of both. &c. &c. desire. the Body of experience. and the Body of both. a Body of experience. moreover. Here the division is [not exhaustive. to Indra and others. lowest. and the Body of both: such is the meaning.. Aph. p. for. to the royal sages. 415 otherwise. [like Indra]. b.* Not any one [of these]. and others. Aph. Argument against the existence of a Lord. a..* And. for they possessed bodies consisting of mere knowledge.. That is to say: just as we infer. 416 knowledge.* Eternity does not [as is alleged by those who wish to establish the existence of a Lord. 127. 126. the supposed Lord] is unreal. That is to say: the Body which belongs to the ascetics is different from all these three. Of these. He mentions also a fourth Body: A fourth kind of Body. and intermediate. even in the case of the particular site. action.. which is accepted by others [as existing in the case of the Lord]: Aph.] belong to knowledge. that the empyrean fire.. because the site [viz. we should have all alike possessed of a Body of experience. 125. which was stated before. [it matters not. such as was that of Dattátreya. a. and to things immovable. is not eternal. In order to establish the non-existence of a Lord. among those highest. There is a threefold distribution of Body 'among the three. he disproves the eternity of p. from the example of ordinary fire.* Among the three there is a threefold distribution. the Body of merit. in .2 &c.—all living beings.e. [viz. but] into three. the Body of experience. Ja•abharata.

a. in mundane life. at the time of disjunction. &c. in the state of combination. or not]. adequate to the creation of the universe. which result from concentration. &c.. &c.. how can it. END OF BOOK V. That is to say: by the example of the effects of drugs.* The superhuman powers2 of concentration. He refutes him who asserts that Thought belongs to the Elements. and are adapted to the work of creation. just like the effects of drugs. whether knowledge. &c. or. Aph. moreover. since we do not behold.] arising from penance and the rest [of the alleged means of acquiring superhuman powers]? To this he replies: The height to which asceticism may elevate. are established. p. are not to be gainsaid.. moreover.—or. even when in the state of combination.The argument really ex abundantiâ the present instance. a. such superhuman powers [though we do see some. 129.. That is to say: Thought does not exist in the five Elements. But then. in the state of combination. 418 b.. Next . generally.. since this is hostile to the establishment [of the existence] of Soul: Argument against Materialism. [and there can be nothing in the product which does not preexist in the cause]. a.* Thought does not belong to the Elements. 128. may be eternal. even the superhuman powers of assuming atomic magnitude. be possible that there should arise Omniscience. for it is not found in them separately. &c. indeed. because we do not find Thought in them. in that case. &c. Aph.

for a somewhat different translation. by which sambandha.' Ed. or •atapatha-bráhma•a. p. 5. 4. Ed. p. p. see the Rational Refutation. 12. 327 1 B•ihadára•yaka Upanishad. the Rational Refutation. 4. 313 3 For another rendering. 78. p. 4 Pada.. p. 320 3 Vyápyatwa. Ed.' is interpreted just above. and of what introduces and succeeds it. Ed. here rendered. 12. &c. 24. Ed. note 4. p.... 2 Professor Gough has. instead of 'by a cluster. Ed. 257. .' Vide p. vide supra. and carelessly quoted in part. Hence I have bracketed the words 'the fact of.. supra. 'association.' Philosophy of the Upanishads. see the Rational Refutation. both my MSS. xiv. here used for adhyáya. 321 3 Read. p. which the translator renders by 'Book. 322 3 For a different translation of this Aphorism. p. &c. Ed. p. p.' &c. 264.' For the Aphorism referred to. 314 2 See. ii. &c. 153. p.Footnotes p. Ed. 326 2 Owing to a clerical defect. Ed. 'a pure indifference of thought. of Náge•a's work omit this Aphorism. is regarded as a synonym of vyápti. 'by enunciations. 78. and also much of the comment preceding and following it.

note †. a.' The 'connexion' in question is the swarúpa-sambandha. 61. 'by enunciations.4 Read. p. 64. 8.. . See Book I. 320. 341 3 'Being a means of right knowledge' here renders prámá•ya.' Ed. represented. p. Ed. p.. p. et seq. Aph. 3 This is to render vyápyatwa.. instead of 'by a cluster. Ed. read. 342 3 Instead of 'simply. of the translation of the Sarva-dar•ana-sangrana by Professors Cowell and Gough. p.' &c. p. Ed. is here referred to. see Professor Cowell's Aphorisms of •á••ilya. p. on which vide supra. Ed. such [a connexion] as [is seen] in anatheticity. 334 1 As suggestive of the correction here required. Ed. note 3. 337 2 The translator's 'the Pancha•ikha' I have everywhere corrected. &c. for which see Professor Cowell's translation of the Kusumánjali. p. b. Aph. 5. p. just before. 71. 331 2 Vide supra.. p.' &c. Ed. 330 3 The 'great internal organ' (mahat).. 13. p. by 'as evidence. 'this itself is their connexion.' Ed. see pp. text and foot-note. 333 3 For the Chárvákas' rejection of the anthority of inference. called also buddhi.

3 Instead of Vijnána's expression. Ed. Ed.. note 3. certainly. which latter I would represent.' Náge•a has: 'the idea that [its] being made was preceded by consciousness.' Ed. p. that which omits the clause rendered. and Vedánti Mahádeva agree in supplying kartari after ad•ish•e. Ballantyne accepted from me is.' Anuyogin and anuyogitá. at pp. the power termed expression. i. 'the idea of [its] being preeeded by consciousness.' of gha•ábháva. the notion that it was produced aforethought. 348 1 Vide supra. 'the expressibleness inherent in the meaning is the connexion [intended]. 93 and 94. and the pratiyogin. that. supra. provisionally. Ed. Náge•a. as being a production of an .' is gha•ábháva itself. 343 or 'anathetic.' According to Nagesa. a very much commoner technicality than anuyogin. occurs in the comment on Aph. Vedánti Mahádeva impliedly contrasts with a jar. the anuyogin. as Professor Cowell informs me. 112. that [thing] in respect of which there arises the idea of [its] being made is [what is meant by] a production by a person.' Aniruddha. 'non-existence of a jar. p. p. 'jar. Aph. to add. p. as I learn from Professor Cowell. Ed. by 'antithetic' and 'antitheticity. here. 'to the word.A better reading than the one which Dr. 349 3 'Invariable fact' is to translate vyápti. p. Ed. 350 2 Read: 'Even where an invisible [originator] is in question. or 'antithetic' of gha•ábháva is gha•a. 347 3 'Power to cause right knowledge' is to render prámá•ya. 114.' Pratiyogin.e. It must suffice. 95 of this Book. 4 See Book I. 113. are the opposites of pratiyogin and pratiyogitá. p..

which originates as a factor of a series of causes and effects alternating from the time when vegetation was first evolved. which. p. Ed. 6 Mantra.. issue. however. Aphorism 66. 359 . I have translated. 65: 'Not from the mere fact of [its] being uttered by a person [can one say there is] producedness [of a thing] by [that] person. instead of 'since they are. Also see the two aphorisms preceding the one commented on.' Ed. 267. soon after. Ballantyne was misled by the full stop mistakenly put. in the Rational Refutation. before ###. 5 As in the aphorism.' &c. &c. just like an expiration. pp..' &c. at p. Ed. and the rendering of it also calls for some alteration. 357 2 The text followed.intelligent and self-conscious maker. from Brahmá. Ed. p. p. p. is rendered by 'validity. 352 1 Read.' Dr. without ever being consciously produced [by him].. 'since the true sense of their sentences was not originated consciously. 23.' Ed. 2 The implied 'power to convey right knowledge' represents prámá•ya. supra. p. Ed. by [reason of its] production consciously. 24. a word of various meanings. in this paragraph is.. very inferior. See. [a thing is said to be produced by a person]. and by virtue of desert [of souls]. 356 4 See Book III. prámá•ya.Ed. a sprout. since it is not the wont to speak of the respiration of deep sleep as the production of a person: but. of the Appendix to my edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya. spontaneously. The Vedas. Ed. p. for the purer text. 351 2 Instead of 'a thing is not Man's work. throughout. Hence they are not productions of a person. in my edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya.

' Aphorisms of •á••ilya. near the foot. p.' Ed. Ed.' see Professor Cowell's edition of Colebrooke's Essays.. 24 and 26. xiv. 'Ignorance' is qualified as 'beginningless.' and also by 'expressien. he translates anuváda by 'confirmatory repetition' and 'illustrative repetition. 368 1 The passage thus rendered looks as if it were taken. 366 2 According to Náge•a's reading. 6. At pp. 362 3 Vide supra. et seq. Ed. p. signifies. . footnotes 2 and 3. 'eternal word. 28. 363 2 Nagesa.' which the translator renders by 'expresser. vii. 142. it may be with further details. but without dwelling on the purpose of the injunction itself. •abda is variously rendered. p. 'demurred to. 'the reiteration or reinculcation of an injunction. or •atapatha-bráhma•a. and the translation of the Sarva-dar•ana-sangraha by Professors Cowell and Gough. from the B•ihadára•yaka Upanishad. 6 For a very similar passage. vol. foot-note. besides that •abda and pada are not discriminated.' p.. 75. 243. 360 1 Pratishiddha. p.. p. It is likewise observable that. p. 365 3 To render anuváda. c. with the addition of its opening word. xxv.. has 'non-duality of souls. p.' or 'eternal a parte ante. vide supra. Ed.. p. i.1 For spho•a. Ed. iii.. 331. in what precedes and follows.' Ed. 2. pp. which. 4 Chhándogya Upanishad. p. 9.' Ed. &c. as also some copies of Vijnána's work. as defined by Professor Cowell. 209.

206.' Ed. 10. III. III. 224. under the misapprehension that 'the subtile body' was pointed to.' A foot-note explains 'Mahe•wara' as intending 'Í•wara. reading. p. p. Professor Gough translates differently: 'Let the sage know that Prak•iti is Máyá.' denotes not only one of the three internal organs. 3 The very inferior. text and foot-notes. § 12. Hara. &c. supra. 45.' Ed. in the original. supra. p. 370.' Ed. 30. as here. 369 4 For another translation. 208. 5 See Book II. Ed. &c. and have displaced Dr. Rudra.' Vide supra. 6 •wetá•watara Upanishad. All this shifting world is filled with portions of him. 34. 46. Ballantyne's corresponding 'Mind. because ambigous. a. §§ 14. p. For its synonym. adkyavasáya. manas. 4 Vyavasáya. 371 1 See Book II. see the Rational Refutation. vide supra. Ed. 34. I have changed to buddhi. and that Mahe•wara is the Máyin.. note 1.' Philosophy of the Upanishads. Ed... the translator's 'Mind. here added. Ballantyne. or arch-illusionist. pp. Ed. beginning with the introduction to Aphorism 67. Ed. 26. all three taken together. Aph. 375 . sometimes. 370 1 Dr. p. or •iva. iv. 6 The words here bracketed I have substituted for 'the subtile body. 209.. 15. mentioned under B.. Ed. 373 2 Intended to represent antahkara•a. &c. at p. note 4. See the Rational Refutation. Ed.. 4 The term manas. p. Aph. p. Ed. 'in B. 'internal organ. p.. in brackets. but. p.9. at p.

2 •wetá•watara Upanishad, vi., 19. Professor Gough renders as follows: 'Without parts, without action, and without change; blameless and unsullied.' Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 232, 233. Ed.
p. 377

1 See Book IV., Aph. 21, a., and Aph. 31, b., at pp. 301 and 310, supra. Ed. 3 Vásaná; for which vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed.
p. 388

1 Pratiyogin; on which vide supra, p. 342, note 3. Ed.
p. 391

1 Samaváya; of which the preferable rendering, proposed by Professor Cowell, is 'interpenetration.' Ed.
p. 392

3 Read, instead of 'the case is otherwise disposed of,' 'the establishment [which they lead to] is otherwise.' Ed. 4 See the preceding note. Ed.
p. 400

4 Nimitta, 'instrumental cause.' Nimitta-kára•a is rendered 'occasional cause' at p. 194, supra. Colebrooke's representatives are 'chief or especial cause' and 'efficient cause.' Ed.
p. 404

2 Nimitta-kára•a. Vide supra, p. 400, note 4. Ed.
p. 406

2 See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 33. Ed. 5 Brahmatwa, the abstract of Brahma. Ed.

p. 407

4 Brahma-bháva, the same as brahmatwa. Ed.
p. 408

2 See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 33. Ed. 3 Here and below, this renders vásaná, on which vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed.
p. 409

2 The rendering given above is susceptible of improvement; and so, very probably, is that which follows: 'Where, moreover, there is influence from an obstruction [like that offered by sleep], mental impression does not inform one of objects [and, hence, one is then exempt from desires, &c., and in a state identical with that of emancipation]: a cause [of desires, &c.; and such is mental impression,] does not countervail what is predominant, [e.g., sleep, which is, as it were, temporary Brahmahood or emancipation].' Aniruddha's interpretation of this obscure aphorism, possibly by reason of his elliptical mode of expression, is far from clear. His view of its sense is, certainly, peculiar. Ed. 3 Sanskára, here used as synonymous with vásaná. Ed.
p. 410

2 Here, and often below, 'impression' is to render sanskára. Ed.
p. 411

2 Read, instead of 'lasts out,' 'brings about.' Ed. 3 This phrase is meant to translate sanskára. Ed.
p. 412

1 Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva here end one aphorism, and treat what follows as a second. Vijnána formally defends the reading to which he gives the preference. Ed.
p. 413

1 Náge•a pretty evidently does not regard these words as an aphorism. Ed.
p. 416

2 Buddhi, rendered 'intellect' at pp. 196, &c., supra. Ed. 3 The world, viewed as Brahmá's egg, is fabled to be surrounded by seven envelopes. One of these is the ávara•a-tejas, Dr. Ballantyne's 'empyrean fire.' See Professor Wilson's translation of the Vish•u-purá•a (ed. 1864, &c.), vol. i., p. 40. I have to thank Prof. Cowell for this reference. Ed.
p. 417

2 Vide supra, p. 310, note 4. Ed.

Such is the meaning. that 'I think. and because arguments. because the method is that of fixing a stake. by refuting the opinions of opponents. . in addition [to what has preceded]. learners acquire an undoubting. an enumeration of the matters before mentioned. &c. and having. since we are aware of this. HAVING explained. a summary. namely. a. by repeated blows]. therefore. 420 The existence of Soul. Aph.. having been composed.' because there is no evidence to defeat this. are adduced. which is the essence of the Institute. 1. he recapitulates the same matter. Soul really is existent. all the matter of the Institute. while condensing it.* This [Soul. all that is to be done is to discriminate it [from things in general]. The discrimination of it he establishes by means of two proofs: Soul is not Body. generically. for there is no proof that it is not. For. thoroughly established it. &c. reiteration is not here to be imputed as a fault. accurate.* Soul is... p. b. and more solid knowledge. [viz.] is different from the Body. Aph. in the Fifth Book. [or complete difference between the two]. Therefore. now. not previously stated. because of heterogeneousness. in a Sixth Book. 2. in four Books. &c.Sacred-Texts Hindu Index Previous p. 419 BOOK VI. so that.

a. by Scripture and other evidences. through the cessation of Pain there is the p. since there is an equality of gain and loss. also. as there is annoyance from Pain. 422 [viz. 4. To this he replies: Pleasure no compensation for Pain.' &c. because there is [there] a contradiction to the evidence which acquaints us with the thing. 'The Soul's Thought' [Soul and Thought being identical]. &c. also.' there is no contradiction by evidence. 'for it is contradicted by the evidence which acquaints is with the thing. &c. . inasmuch as. In such a case as 'The statue's body. b. This expression by means of the possessive case.] is expressed by means of the sixth [or possessive. 421 such examples as. 'This [is] my body..' [sense being the evidence that there is here no body other than the statue].. Such is the meaning. 423 ceasing of Pleasure.The usage of language is evidence for this. Aph.* Also because it [Soul. 'My body' (§ 3)] is not like 'The statue's body. 3. 6.' for the possessive case would be unaccountable. is like the expressions. for the contradiction. 5. and the Soul. Having settled that Soul is different from Body. But.. b. or the like. Aph. 'The statue's body.* Through the entire cessation of pain there is done what was to be done. he settles its emancipation: Soul's aim how accomplished. a. in such an expression as 'My body. But then. p.* It is not as in the case of the statue.* Not such desire for pleasure is there to Soul.' there is a mere fiction. also because the learned express it by the possessive case. Aph. in p. 'Ráhu's head' [the trunkless Ráhu being all head]. that cannot be Soul's aim. That is to say: Soul is different from Body. But then. suppose that this.' 'This [is] my understanding.] case. a. to which it is thus attributed as a possession]. Aph. is only in supposing the Body to be the Soul. if there were absolute non-difference [between the Body. To this he replies: An objection disposed of.' &c.

Aph.. 8. so that there is not an equality of gain and loss: [but a clear gain. is happy. men.] is also mixed with Pain. For we see. inasmuch as there is no acquisition of Pleasure. brutes. b. very few. in comparison of Pleasure: p. a. a. He ponders a doubt: . He rejects the opinion that Soul's aim is not the simple cessation of Pain.* If you say that this [cessation of Pain] is not Soul's aim. having excluded also the desire for Pleasure. He declares that Soul's aim is simply the cessation of Pain. b. but this [cessation] tinctured with Pleasure: p. quite a distinct aspiration: [the first.' [and the latter is our conception of beatitude]. somewhere. then it is not as you say. &c. And so the aversion to Pain.—are happy: such is the meaning. abundant.a. gives rise to a wish for he cessation of Pain simply. 425 Cessation of suffering is a joy. Aph. or the like. 9. Among innumerable grasses. trees. in the desired release]. indeed.] Pain.] 'May I not be miserable. because Pain is. therefore the discriminating throw it to the side of [and reckon it as so much.—a man.] 'May I be happy. 7. 424 Pleasure sparingly dispensed. for there are two kinds [of things desired]. Aph. birds. Pleasure undeserving of the name. a god. amongst men.' [the second. a.* It [Pleasure.* For [only] some one.

* Non-discrimination [of Soul from Nature] is beginningless. they abide. For. And this has been set forth in the First Book. yet it exists in it [the Soul. otherwise. belong [only] to the Mind.A doubt. viz.] arises from non-discrimination: but from what does non-discrimination arise? With reference to this. they exist. in the shape of a reflexion. in it. two objections would present themselves. &c. bondage might befall even the liberated.' as the cause.. Aph.] it were produced by Desert. because.* The Soul [some one may suggest. &c. if it be without beginning. viz. 'through nondiscrimination. 11. 426 This cleared up. And then. indeed. To this he replies: . p. &c. Therefore the cessation of Pain. a. owing to the conjunction of Nature with Soul: such is the meaning.. The binding of Soul by the qualities [or fetters.. 10. he says: Two reasons why nondiscrimination must have been from eternity. for there is Scripture for its being unaccompanied. 427 and. also: such is the meaning. a. He clears up this [doubt]: p.] it arose quite spontaneously.] be the property of something else. if [secondly. Aph. b. it must be everlasting... Though qualities. i.. then. pain. b. &c.] has no quality. Aph. pleasure.] cannot be Soul's aim: such is the meaning. inasmuch as we should have to search for another [previous instance of] non-discrimination. b.] through non- discrimination. a. e. [a property which does not belong to it. 12. in Soul. there would be a regressus in infinitum. to stand as the cause of [that] Desert. if [first.* Though it [the Pain. had it a beginning.

a. also. as in the case of Darkness and Light.2 [Liberation taking place where Discrimination is. [which cannot be innate]. in the case of Bondage and Discrimination. it is non-discrimination alone that is [the cause of] Bondage. [as we affirm that it can be]. It is not everlasting. 16. be unfeasible. [viz. but it is beginningless. the cutting short of a beginningless entity would. indivisible.. [though the beginningless antecedent non-entity of a given jar may be readily understood to terminate. 13. else.. This enforced. viz. that Bondage cannot be innate. [viz.* It [non-discrimination. though from eternity. p. &c: p.* It [Bondage.] is annihilable by the alloted cause. and not where it is not]. may be cut short. For.* Since it cannot be [accounted for] in any other way. 428 b. Aph.3 viz. Such is the meaning. Bondage how destructible. and beginningless. discrimination of Soul from Nature]. Light]. He reminds [us] of what was mentioned in the first Book.Non-discrimination. Bondage not innate. 'Bondage' here means the cause of Bondage. Aph. as darkness is [annihilable by the allotted cause. as is established by Scripture. on the production of the jar]. 429 Aph. otherwise. named the conjunction of pain.] there is allotment. The rest is plain. in the same way as the soul is. in the shape of an on-flow [which may be stopped]. it could not be cut short. . 14. Having stated the cause of [Soul's] Bondage..* Here. [as is proved] both by positive and negative consociation. cannot be everlasting [in the same manner] as the soul is. a.. a. 15. he states the cause of Liberation: Aph.

since Bondage and Liberation are unreal. not merely the removal of a screen]. and. in that case. But then. 19. from its being a product. p. the liberated and the bound. how is it p. a.. 431 that you have asserted [Book I. Aph. [as some positive and real acquisition.] would not be the Soul's aim.* Else. Aph.] the eternal freedom [of all souls alike]? To this he replies: The nature of liberation. b. [which it is]. in that case. a. [but emancipation final and complete]. a. to which he replies: . it [liberation. is liable to destruction. § 19. such [perishable emancipation] is not Soul's aim. [if liberation were perishable]. which set forth what is Soul's aim. if you acknowledge that there is a distinction between the bond and the free. &c. also.b. because of their being alike liable to future bondage. 20. Liberation must be contradictory to the texts. Bondage should take place over again. therefore. But then.* What happened to both would be alike. Aph. because there is Scripture4 for its non- recurrence.* Further. That is to say: there would be no difference between the two.. Bondage does not again attach to the liberated. since liberation. 430 Evidence of this. 18. But then. To this he replies: Bondage does not recur. 17.* Liberation is nothing other than the removal3 of the obstacle [to the Soul's recognition of itself as free]. Aph. He states the reason why this is not Soul's aim: Force of the evidence.

432 b. a. a.e. Aph. a.. but not all are qualified to appropriate it. [which one has sought for in vain. p. That is to say: 'even in that case. if Liberation be merely the removal of an obstacle.* Of others [viz. § 34]. other means besides hearing] for the sake of confirmation. 433 Utility of other means besides hearing. on merely hearing it].An objection repelled. Aph. then it should be accomplished through mere hearing [of the error which stands in the way]. He speaks of these same other means: Formality in postures not imperative. Aph. 21. but that there are others. is attained.. He mentions that not mere hearing alone is seen to be the cause of knowledge. for there are three sorts of those competent [to apprehend the truth.' . a.* Even in that case.] is no necessity.* This [attainment of Liberation. 23. That is to say: there is no necessity that a 'posture' should be the 'lotus-posture. 22. while it was] withheld from one by ignorance [of the fact that it has been tied round one's neck with a string]. 24. there is no contradiction in its being Soul's aim. there is no contradiction. But then. [there is need].' i.* There is no [absolute] necessity that what is steady and promoting ease should be a [particular] posture.3 Another objection repelled. even if Liberation consists [only] in the removal of an obstacle. also: p. To this he replies: Aph.' or the like.. just as a piece of gold on one's neck. [such as any of those referred to in Book III. because whatever is steady and promotes ease is a [suitable] 'posture. on the mere hearing of the truth. [on one's hearing where it is].

that is 'Meditation.* Though it [Soul. He states the principal means [of Concentration]: The efficient means of Concentration. a.] of effect and cause. Aph. by those who discriminate the tinge [from the Soul.* Mind without an object is Meditation. b. what have we to do with concentration? Having pondered this doubt. a. in the shape of exclusion of the modifications of Intellect: by reason of the identity [here. That is to say: what Internal Organ is void of any modification. which it delusively seems to belong to]. since Soul is alike.' For it will be p. a tinge.e. 435 Soul tinged by what does not belong to it. or anything else]. That is to say: though there is not a real tinge in that which is unassociated [with tincture. it is not so: there is a difference. still there is a tingeing [reflexionally. 25. as it were. as Soul is alleged to be]? To this he replies: p. But how can there exist a tinge in that which is unassociated [with anything whatever. b. the word 'cause' is employed for 'effect.* If you say that even both ways there is no difference. hence the tinge is treated as simply a reflexion. whether there be Concentration or Non-concentration.] of the tinge [of reflected pain which exists in the other case]. 434 declared how Meditation effects this [exclusion of the modifications of Intellect].. A distinction not without a difference. But then.' i. 26.] be unassociated. Aph. through the excluion [in the one case.] through Non-discrimination. Concentration.b. he clears it up: Aph. He explains this same: . a. still there is. 27.

or the like. there is not a tinge.. by means of meditation.. 31. 30. &c..* It is by the exclusion of dissolution2 and distraction. and condition of [waking] Certainty. Now. say the teachers.Its seeming presence explained. should take place in caves and such places: p. such a place as a cave is not indispensable for it. on the exclusion of any [real] object. &c. b.] is debarred by Meditation.. b.]. Aph. 28. but a fancy [that there is such].* It [viz. He states the means of excluding the aforesaid tinge: How to be got rid of. &c.. lodged in the Mind. there is the exclusion also of its reflexion: so say the ancient teachers. He shows the means settled by the ancient teachers. a.the aforesaid tinge. Aph. The discussion of Liberation is completed. a. He states that there is no compulsion that Meditation. because. 437 Meditation may take place anywhere. Apathy. Restraint. Aph.' Therefore. Practice. &c.* There is no rule about localities. results simply 'from tranquillity of Mind. in regard to the exclusion— through Meditation. with an eye to the . c. &c. p.—of the tingeing of Soul: The ancient dogma on this point.. That is to say: through the removal. Aph. That is to say: Meditation. 436 a. a. 29. of the Mind's condition of [being dissolved in] Sleep. § 19. there takes place also the exclusion of the tingeing of Soul by the condition. for it is from tranquillity of Mind.* As is the case with the Hibiscus and the crystal [Book I.

the assertions of an illusory creation. Pain. That is to say: the various views. Aph.] belong. therefore. Hence it is to be understood that those. in regard to Soul's being a cause. To this he replies: p. the material of the world.unchangeableness of Soul. from Scripture. 'Many creatures have been produced from Soul.. the Naiyáyikas. which are conceivable are. that Mind. also. because of its want of suitableness. no product. from such Scriptural texts as. these. Aph. [and.1 have no knowledge of the nature of Soul. That is to say: suitableness to act as material implies possession of qualities. a.* The despicable sophist4 does not gain [a correct apprehension of] Soul. have no . 439 a.* Not to Soul does this [viz. Aph. are quite illogical. b. though it be eternal. But then. That is to say: since we learn.] who assert that Soul is the substance of the qualities Pleasure.. he replies: The opposite view unscriptural. also.. 438 Soul not the material of the world. because of the contradictoriness [of his notions] to Scripture. 34.* Nature is the primal material. who are accepters thereof. he handles compendiously the cause of the world: Nature the material of the world. since. the lowest of the bad reasoners. Soul. and others.g.. ought to be accepted. Nature is established under the character of the radical cause of these. But then.'2 we may gather the fact that Soul is a cause. Having pondered this adverse suggestion. a. 32. are products. b. 33. for there is Scripture [to the effect] that the others are products.] by reason of the absence of both of these. opposed to Scripture. though eternal. p. and the being associable: [and. &c. &c. [e. &c.] cannot serve as material. all. therefore. let Soul be the material..

Nature is inferred [as the ultimate cause of the intermediate causes. Nature all-pervading.. if it be asserted that Soul is a cause [of the world]. can it be said that. just as the sky is the recipient cause of the clouds. Aph. Aph. into the world.. as material. &c. according to the opinion of the Vai•eshikas: such is the meaning.].' [for what is unlimited] and fills all space.] being the radical cause. then we do not object to that. the material cause is nothing else than p. 35. that. for. . in the relation of a cause. &c. just as are Atoms. because [its] products are seen everywhere. Aph.] go [or act]. 440 earth.. To this he replies: An objection parried. locomotive. there does it [Nature. 36.* It [Nature. in the case of things motionless. in so far as. b. this does not prevent its [Nature's.correct knowledge of Soul. &c. Aph. towards it. 'Motion' means action. these could not exist].] is all-pervading. Since we see. just as is the case with Atoms. without the room afforded by it. Nature the proper substitute for eight of the substances in the Nyáya list. this does not destroy its character as ultimate cause.* Though motion may attach to it. only if it be limited. [by the Vai•eshikas]. a. 38. 37.* Though but mediately [the cause of products]. And. how can Nature be the material of all? To this he replies: Nature the ultimate material cause. 441 Atoms. a. [and stands. Though it be present. as product]. what we deny is only that there is transformation [of soul. just as is the case with the earthy and other p. can find no other space to move into]. But then.* Nature is something in addition to the notorious [nine Substances of the Naiyáyikas]: it is no matter of necessity [that there should be precisely nine]. 'Wherever a product arises.

a. Purity. Emancipation would be inexplicable: Aph. 40. and their 'reverse of equipoise' is their aggregation in excess or defect. 42. Nature's disinterestedness. if we held the energizing to be without a motive. a. Nature is the triad of Qualities. .* Purity and the others are not properties of it [viz.... arise from one and the same: such is the meaning. But then. p. is the Scriptural declaration. § 58]. that eight [of the pretended primitive substances] are products: such is the import. He determines the motive of Nature's energizing. 41. 443 Aph. 39. viz. because they are its essence.* The diversity of creation is in consequence of the diversity of Desert.* Nature. because they are what constitutes Nature. That is to say: Purity and the other Qualities are not properties of Nature. See Book III. Nature consists of the three Qualities. &c. like a cart's carrying saffron. the absence of this [reverse of equipoise] is 'equipoise:'2 through these two causes two opposite results. yet whence is destruction? For a couple of opposite results cannot belong to one and the same cause. though it does not enjoy [the results of its own energizing]. a. Aph. creates for the sake of Soul. [for the use of its master. b. granting that creation is due to Nature. Aph.a.* The two results are through equipoise and the reverse of equipoise. He states the concomitant3 cause of diversified creation: Nature treats every one according to his deserts. here.. 442 since. To this he replies: Contrary results from Nature how. a. p. And the argument. in the shape of creation and destruction. Nature].

But then. Nature does not create. Nature does not rest from creating. while others experience only sorrow.4 [e. To this he replies: p. he says: Multeity of Soul proved from the Veda. But then. 44. Non-discrimination. Bondage may come again. these are immortal. 43.b. in the absence of which there is no reason why the emancipated should be subjected to Nature's invasion].when the king's purpose has been accomplished]. for we see the mundane condition of the ignorant: and so. 45.. there should be the mundane state.] may invade others [with its creative influences]. That is to say: the multeity of Soul is proved.'3 . p. it is alleged. [which. [a minister does not toil. by the distribution of Bondage and Emancipation mentioned in such Scriptural texts as. 'Whoso understand this.] the emancipated has understood [that he never was really otherwise]. Having pondered this doubt. absolutely. the emancipated does not experience. Aph.* Even though it [Nature.1 Nature's energy does not debar emancipation.* The multeity of Soul [is proved] by the distribution [announced by the Veda itself]. this arrangement could be possible then. But then. in the world. a. just as. since Nature goes on creating. in consequence of the absence of a concurrent cause. No reason why Nature should invade the emancipated. even after [the discriminative] knowledge. [only] if there were a multiplicity of souls: but that is quite excluded by the text of the non-duality of Soul. since it is Nature's attribute to create.* Since [or when. to the emancipated.g. also. a. puts an end to it]. To this he replies: Aph. 444 Aph. 445 a.

if it did exist. He states another couple of objections. But then. Soul and Ignorance. along with Soul. 48.' [which. would.. is no reality]. so that by these there is no detriment to [the Vedántíc dogma of] non-duality.* The primâ facie view [of the Vedánta] is not [to be allowed any force. constitute a duality]. To this he replies: p. is not to be allowed]. [which. a. b. Soul and Ignorance]. With reference to this doubt.. 46. [upsetting the dogma founded on in § 44]. there is duality. But then. then. 447 Aph. by [admitting] two. the adjuncts. according to the Vedánta. consist of 'Ignorance. [which is alleged as] the authority for non-duality.* If [you acknowledge] an adjunct [of Soul]. because of the non-existence of a proof. moreover. Soul will be demonstrated by its self-manifestation. that one single Soul is the only reality. viz. Aph. as an objection]. To this he replies: . 446 Unity excluded by the supposion of Souls. viz. Thst is to say: even by acknowledging the two. there is no opposition [to our own dualistic theory of Soul and Nature]: and the subsequent [dogma.* Even by the two the authority is contradicted. on its being established.. [viz. a. Aph. a contradiction is constituted to the text. also: p. a. 47. The establishment of the Vedánta tenet implies a contradiction. because. But then. he says: The Vedánta cannot evade non-duality. the distribution of Bondage and Liberation may be through the difference of adjunct.b.

Aph. 52. But then. what becomes of the Scriptural text declaring non-duality? To this he replies: Aph. a.] no debarrer [of this view of the matter].* This [Soul]. itself.] being demonstrated by the light [of itself as you Vedántís say it is].Self-manifestation contradictory. He tells us that the assertors of non-duality are to be shunned. there is the 'opposition of patient and agent' [in one]. it is. which is a contradiction]. discrepant from the non-intelligent. But then. that no reality belongs to dream-objects. inasmuch as these are . can. A salvo for the Vaidic view. reveals the nonintelligent..] between patient and agent. 449 assert absolute non-duality] is [intended] to produce apathy in those who have desires. We see. because it [the Soul]. 51. in the shape of Thought. through the property of light which is lodged in it. but. in the world. a. a. 448 the relation to itself. object to itself. and the like. 49.* [And. there is the [unreconciled] opposition of patient and agent [in one. there is no contradiction [here. furnish p. &c. if duality be established in accordance with proofs.] in its [Soul's. because it results from an unobjectionable cause. Aph. in that case. a. Aph. not only for the reason above mentioned. [and who would be better for believing in 'the nothingness of the things of time']. 50.* The world is real. because of the non-existence of evidence to convince us that the world is unreal: The world's reality irrefragable. b. itself. that. To this he replies: Illuminating function of Soul. and because there is [in Scripture. also. because that [text of Scripture which seems to p. just as the Vai•eshikas declare. through the intelligence lodged in it.* There is no contradiction to Scripture [in our view]. or to the [fancied] yellowness of [invariably white] conch-shells. That is to say: if Soul be demonstrated by the light which Soul consists of.

results of the internal organ, &c., when [not normal, but] injured by [i.e., under the injurious influence of] Sleep,2 &c.: and this is not [the state of things] in the [waking] Universe, in which Mind is the first,3 [according to Book I., § 71].
p. 450

b. He declares that the Universe is real, not merely in its existent state [at any given instant], but, also, always:

Aph. 53.* Since it cannot be [accounted for] in any other way, manifestation [of whatever is manifested] is of what is real, [i.e., of what previously existed].
Creation excluded.

a. That is to say: since, through the aforesaid reasons, it is impossible that the unreal should come into existence, what does come into existence, or is manifested, is what really existed [previously,] in a subtile form. b. Though [it is declared that] the being the agent and the being the experiencer belong to diverse subjects, be asserts the distribution [of agency to Self-consciousness, and of experience to Soul,] by two aphorisms:

The real agent who.
p. 451

Aph. 54.* Self-consciousness, not Soul, is the agent.

Aph. 55.* Experience ceases at [discrimination of] Soul, [as being quite distinct from Nature]; since it arises from its [Soul's,] Desert, [which is not, really, Soul's, but which, while Non-discrimination lasts, is made over to Soul; just as the fruits of the acts of a king's ministers are made over to the king].
Experience is got rid of when.

a. He shows the reason for what was stated before, viz., that cessation of action does not result from enterings into the world of Brahmá:

Paradise no security against transmigration.

Aph. 56.* Even in the world of the moon, &c., there is return [to munane existence]; because of there really being a cause [of such return].

a. 'A cause,' viz., Non-discrimination, Desert, &c. b. But then, through the counsels of the persons dwelling in these various [supermundane] worlds, there ought to be no return [to mundane existence]. To this he replies:
p. 452

Aph. 57.* Not by the counsel of [supermundane] people is there effectuation [of Emancipation]; just as in the former case, [the case, viz., of counsel given by mundane instructors].
This point enforced.

a. But, in that case, what becomes of the text that there no return from the world of Brahmá? To this he replies:

Aph. 58.* There is Scripture [declaratory] of Emancipation, [on going to the world of Brahmá]; this [Emancipation] being effected [more readily in that world than in this, but only] by intermediacy [of the appropriate means].
A salvo for Scriptural text.

a. He alleges the Scriptural text of Soul's going [to the locality where it is to experience], even though it be all-filling, [and can, therefore, have no place into which to move]:

Aph. 59.* And, in accordance with the text of its 'going,' though it [Soul,] p. 453 is all-pervading, yet, in time, it reaches its place of experience [or body], through conjunction with an adjunct; as in the case of Space.
Another.

a. For, as Space, though it is all-pervading, is spoken of as moving to some particular place, in consequence of its conjunction with an adjunct, such as a jar, [when we say 'the space occupied by the jar is moved to the place to which the jar is carried'], just so

is it [here]. b. He expounds the statement, that the site of experience [the body,] is formed through the superintendence of the experiencer, [Soul]:

Aph. 60.* This [constitution of a body] is not accomplished in the case of what is [organic matter] not superintended [by Soul]; because we find putrefaction [in organic matter where Soul is absent].
The Body's existence dependent on Soul.

a. But then, let the construction of a site of experience [or a body,] for Experiencers [i. e., Souls,] take place p. 454 without any superintendence at all, through Desert. To this he replies:

Aph. 61.* If you say that [independently of any superintendence,] it is through Desert [that a Body is formed, it is not so]; since what is unconnected [with the matter to be operated upon] is incompetent thereto; as is the case with [unapplied] water, &c., in respect of a plant.
Desert not the author of the Body.

a. That is to say: because it is impossible that Desert, which is not directly conjoined with the semen and other [elements of the Body] , should operate through Soul, in the construction of the Body, &c.; just as it is for water, &c., unconnected with the seed, to operate through tillage, &c., in the production of a plant. b. According to the system of the Vai•eshikas and others, it is settled that Soul is the superintendent, [in the construction of the Body], in virtue of its being conjoined with Desert. But he tells us, that, in his own doctrine, p. 455 since Desert, &c., are not properties of Soul, the Soul cannot, through these, be the cause [of the Body]:

Aph. 62.* For this is impossible [viz., that the Soul should, through its Desert, &c., be the cause of Body]; because it has no qualities for these [viz., Desert, &c.,] are properties of Selfconsciousness, [not of Soul].
Reason for this.

a. And so, in our opinion, it is settled that Soul superintends [in the causing of the

Body,] quite directly, by conjunction simply, without reference to anything intermediate: such is the import. b. But, if Soul be all-pervading, then the limitedness of the living soul, which is set forth in Scripture, is unfounded. To repel this doubt, he says:
p. 456

Soul how limited and unlimited.

Aph. 63.* The nature of a living soul belongs to that which is qualified, [not to soul devoid of qualities, as is proved] by direct and indirect argument.1

a. To be a living soul is the being possessed of the vital airs; and this is the character of the soul distinguished by peraonality, not of pure Soul, [which is unlimited]. b. Desiring, now, to set forth the difference between the products of Mind [or the Great Principle,] and of Self-consciousness, he first states the products of Selfconsciousness:

Aph. 64.* The effectuation of works is dependent on the agent Self-consciousness, not dependent on a Lord, [such as is feigned by the Vai•eshikas]; because there is no proof [of the reality of such].4
The real agent what.

a. By this aphorism are set forth, as are also established p. 457 by Scripture and the Legal Institutes, the creative and the destructive agencies of Brahmá and Rudra1 [respectively], owing to their adjunct, Self-consciousness, [or peronality]. b. But then, grant that Self-consciousness is the maker of the others, still who is the maker of Self-consciousness? to this he replies:

The real agent whence.

Aph. 65.* It is the same as in the arising of Desert.

a. Just as, at the creations, &c., the manifestation of Desert, which sets Nature energizing, results solely from the particular time,—since, if we were to suppose other Desert as the instigator of this, we should have an infinite regress,—just so Selfconsciousness arises from time alone. as the cause; but there is not another maker

. he states that all philosophers reject.] if it [the relation between Nature and Soul.] be attributed to Non-discrimination [of Soul from Nature]. in common. [since an infinite regress which is in conformity with the truth is no sound cause of objection]: Orthodox recognition of Brahmá. likewise. without adjunct.* Or [the case is. also. which. is beginningless. 67. Aph. Passion. results from the Great Principle alone. It has been stated. &c. A theory which may be acquiesced in without detriment to the argument. p. b. And by this aphorism is established the character.] to Desert. Aph. as Preserver. preserve. that. &c. if attributed [as it is by some. Aph. caused by? p.. &c. also: thus. 460 . because. What is other than the products of Self-consciousness [or personality]. like [the relation of] seed and plant. it is moved solely by benevolence towards others: such is the meaning.. because this [regress] is valid. of Vish•u. Here. that the relation of Nature and Soul.. viz. before. inasmuch as it consists of pure Goodness. A second. on the supposition of a stream of Non-discrimination. [the Great Principle].* The rest is from Mind. in the case of Nature [and Soul]. one of infinite regress.. Preservation. as Pancha•ikha [holds]. 459 With reference to this doubt. p. 68. as experienced and experiencer. owing to the Great Principle. the two [cases] are alike: such is the meaning. nor destroy (see § 64)]. 458 a. Creation. is caused by Non-discrimination [of the one from the other]. 66. •iva. itself. as adjunct2 [of the soul.thereof. having no Conceit. [which takes the shape of an infinite regress of alternants]. and Vish•u. the doubt whether we should have an infinite regress. viz. what is Non-discrimination.* The relation of possession and possessor. put forward. would neither create.

7 and 23. as the teacher Sanandana does. vol. See also his translation of the Kusumánjali. and p.] to the Subtile Body. in the shape of its elemental causes.. in his comment on an Aphorism which soon follows. 429 4 Vijnána and Náge•a quote the text: ###1.. 430 Upanishad. note 2. p. A third. i. the cutting short thereof is Soul's aim. even during the periodical annihilations of the world].* [The case is the same. we attribute it [the relation between Nature and Soul. Prof. Ed. Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva cite the longer passage: ###2. 4. quotes them correctly. p. note 3. p. 4. 3. the twenty-third. Aniruddha. I have observed the words ###2 in the B•ihadára•yaka p.* Be that the one way. See note 4. and •atapatha-bráhma•a. Ed.. p. the cutting short thereof [viz. 8. 69.Aph. ventured in the note . pp. xiv. 182. at p.' in his edition of Colebrooke's Essays. 315.] is Soul's aim. a fact which suggests that my criticism on Váchaspati Mi•ra's quotation. of the relation between Nature and Soul. 5. 5. Since that note was written. 70. ii. or the other. note 3.. attends Soul. [which. 43. Sacred-Texts Hindu Index Footnotes p. Cowell defines anwaya-vyatireka as 'affirmative and negative induction. The summing up. with their ensuing context. a. THE END. 194.] if. He sums up the import of the declarations of the Institute: Aph. 5. supra. 3 Vide supra. 1. 428 2 Vide supra.

above referred to. 4 Nimitta. a. p. Ed. 4 Here I have offered a substitute for 'illogical outcaste. 70. p.. Vijnána and Vedánti Mahádeva explain by dhwansa.' Ed... p. Aph. Ed. supra. 439 1 'Lowest . p. 444 1 Compare Aph. 443 2 Compare Book I. 442 3 Nimitta. Ed. 436 2 'Inertness [of mind]' is a better rendering of laya. Ed. . 432 3 This Aphorism. p. supra.. Ed. 438 2 Mu••aka Upanishad. p. 66 of Book III. at p. note 4. Ed. p. thus rendered. Ed. p. ii. as given. thereof' I have put instead of 'base illogical holders of these. p. . 71. note 4. p. at p. supra. i. is a literal repetition of Book I. 61. 400. may be hasty. 400. 87. Ed.' Ed. on which vide supra. at p. 267. 431 3 The rare word dhwasti. 445 . 5. p.. on which vide supra. . Ed.

Ed. p. Aph.. 458 2 The text here followed is very inferior. 15. Ed. supra. Ed. p. 2. 'impeded by the obstruction [offered] by Sleep. 4 See Book I. 112.. . xiv. '[consisting of] the Great One. vide supra. &c.3 •atapatha-bráhma•a. 92. 428.' &c. 3 Instead of 'in which. read.' Ed. 7. 456 1 On anawaya-vyatireka.' &c. p. note 2. at p. p. Ed. 449 2 For 'injured. Ed. p..' read. 457 1 This is an appellation of •iva.' Ed.