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ELEMENTS OF A CRIME 1. Actus Reus [voluntary commission of an act or an omission that is illegal] 2. Mens Rea [‗guilty mind‘ blameworthiness entailed in choosing to commit a criminal wrong] 3. Concurrence of actus reus & mens rea 4. Causation and Proximate Cause --Burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt --No absolute definition of beyond a reasonable doubt (prefer to have a false-negative than false positive) --Burden of proof is on the defense for all affirmative defenses --- MPC 1.12(2): burden of proof is on defense; burden of persuasion is on prosecution --Justification for punishment: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation LEGALITY §1.02(1): ―to give fair warning of the nature of the conduct declared to constitute an offense‖ [Note: no MPC Rule of Lenity] McBoyle v. US (SupCt 1931-Holmes): [D arrested for transporting stolen airplane - NG] Legality requires (1) fair warning and (2) clarity; language of statute has common understanding of meaning on land, not sea/air travel --Nulla poena sin lege: no punishment without law --Why legality? (1) Legitimacy of the CJ system, (2) efficiency, (3) controls the PD and avoids abuse of discretion, (4) deters judicial discretion [judge-made law], (5) deters crime, (6) respect for individuals Ex Post Facto Commonwealth v. Mochan (PA 1955): [D arrested for leaving vile messages on CW‘s machine - G] Act is indictable at CL if its nature scandalously affects the morals/health of the community (indictment upheld in this case); Dissent: lacks fair warning and violates separation of powers by giving legislative authority to courts Rogers v. TN (SupCt 2001-O‘Connor): If change is foreseeable, court less concerned w/ EPF/notice where it did not play into D‘s actions. Bouie to be read narrowly, applies only to indefensible unexpected changes (Scalia dissented) --Ex Post Facto Clause: SC systematically hostile to EPF determinations of law; Rogers special outcome due to (1) year and a day was a CL rule and (2) not a conducttargeting rule --Conflicting ideas of role of judges: McBoyle – extending criminal statutes violates separation of powers & doesn‘t provide fair notice VS Mochan – it is the court‘s job to fill it gaps and correct imperfections in criminal statutes States must be clear & specific Keeler v. Superior Ct (CA 1970): No CL crimes in CA, court didn‘t extend meaning of statute; legislature later revised PC §187 to include feticide City of Chicago v. Morales (SupCt 1999-Stevens): Court found statute to be unconstitutionally vague; O‘Connor/Breyer concurrence: focus on lack of standards to assess ‗apparent purpose;‘ Scalia/Thomas dissent: taking discretion away from POs US v. Dauray (2nd Cir 2000): Interpretation tools: (1) Plain meaning of words, (2) Canons of construction – limit interpretation to words associated with included words, (3) Statutory construction, (4) Legislative history, (5) Avoiding absurdity, (6) Rule of Lenity (last resort) --Rule of Lenity: Narrowest plausible interpretation to prevent judicial speculation; when in doubt, read in favor of D ACTUS REUS - VOLUNTARINESS §1.02(1): ―to safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal‖ --Involuntary: done by muscles w/o control of mind; not conscious (concussion/sleepwalking) --Voluntary: doesn‘t remember, could not control impulse, unforeseen consequences -- cogitationis poenam nemo patitur – no one is punishable solely for his thoughts Act must be voluntary Martin v. State (AL 1944): Rule is to be guilty of a crime, have to have committed that crime voluntarily. People v. Decina (1956): Importance of amount of time looked at for voluntariness – epileptic voluntarily drove car on public highway, so G. People v. Cogden: [D killed her daughter while sleepwalking – NG] Actions done while sleepwalking are completely involuntary People v. Newton (CA 1970): Unconsciousness is a complete defense for homicide (burden on D to prove w/ experts). NOTE: Black Panther case --Voluntary: habit, unintended consequences, some unremembered acts, uncontrollable impulses --Involuntary: hypnosis, reflex, spasm, convulsion (epilepsy), somnambulism --An involuntary act will not negate actus reus if D knowingly put himself in the position to impose the risk (Decina) Must be an act – not a thought, verbal expression, or status Robinson v. CA (SupCt 1962-Stewart): Timeline impt – voluntary drug use but involuntary addiction, medical condition can‘t be criminal Jones v. City of LA (9th Cir. 2006): [LA ordinance criminalized homelessness; cannot criminalize ‗being;‘ ordinance didn‘t target conduct. --Status VS conduct: cannot criminalize status (being a drug addict VS possessing drugs) ACTUS REUS - OMISSION & AFFIRMATIVE DUTY §2.01(3) Liability may not be based on an omission w/o action unless (1) omission is expressly sufficient in the law defining the offense, or (2) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law No Duty People v. Beardsley (MI 1907): [CW took fatal overdose of morphine that D did not know she had, hides her from his wife instead of getting help – NG] No special relationship, no duty to act. Jones v. US (DC Circuit 1962): Affirmative duty from special relationship, etc. necessary, does not arise from moral obligation alone Pope v. State (MD 1979): Don‘t want to penalize good Samaritans, statute read not to include D, direct relationship required --Policy reasons for NO DUTY: (1) autonomy/freedom, (2) disincentivize dangerous/ineffective rescues, (3) encourage custodial relationships w/o fear of liability, (4) litigation is waste of time --Affirmative duty scenarios: (1) statutory duty, (2) contractual duty, (3) special/status relationship [husband/wife, parent/child, shipmaster/passenger, innkeeper/guest, teachers/minor students], and (4) voluntarily assume duty and seclude victim from other rescue *(5) from Cardwell, when you create peril, affirmative duty to rescue Affirmative Duty: Status Relationships Barber v. Superior Court (CA 1983): public policy reasons for making withdrawal of heroic life support an omission, not affirmative act [Airedale v. Bland similar, Cruzan v. MO DPH said state could require patient consent] People v. Carroll (NY 1999): Stepmother/child relationship sufficiently direct to create an affirmative duty State v. Miranda (CT 2005): Boyfriend‘s family-like relationship not sufficient for affirmative duty to act re: girlfriend‘s baby Affirmative Duty: Assume duty & seclude from rescue Commonwealth v. Pestinikas (PA 1992): G of murder 3rd degree = Secluding from rescue. Affirmative Duty: Create the risk = duty to rescue Commonwealth v. Cardwell (PA 1986): When you create the danger (here by maintain the status quo), assume an aff. duty to act --Bystander duty: MN, RI, VT criminalize refusing to render aid to person in peril; FL, HI, WI require rescue when person is victim of a crime BUT all 6 states have it as only a misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor --Misprision (duty to report): federal law-active concealment required, failing to report not sufficient MENS REA §2.02: Apply the relevant state to each element of the crime, if no def. apply the highest included state MPC on criminal negligence: no criminal negligence unless statutorily clear (1) Purpose: conscious object w/ conduct & result; must be aware of circumstances or believe/hope they exist -Note: purpose satisfied if purpose is conditional (Holloway) (2) Knowledge: conscious awareness that results are practically certain to occur -Note: knowledge satisfied by knowledge of high probabilty (3) Recklessness: conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk (4) Negligence: should have been aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk Intent must match outcome Regina v. Cunningham (England 1957): Malice must be associated w/ intent and foreseeability, not mere wickedness.
--Courts will usually choose the least cost avoider for liability CL otherwise unwilling to impose strict liability Morissette v. Lane (NC 1994): [D punched intoxicated CW in face. diff object/person or b-not too remote/accidental and kind contemplated (transferred intent applies). Hazelwood (AK 1997): Civil neg standard sufficient. still fully responsible Staples v.. Stewart (NY 1976): [D stabbed CW who underwent surgery and subsequently died from hernia operation – NG] Death had to be sufficiently related to D‘s conduct Regina v. (2) Actual result must be in contemplation of D unless a-same result. public welfare. pay fine.02(3): Presumption of mens rea requirement §2. (3) deterrence --Policy CONs: DP concerns (Guminga) – balancing test between due process/personal liberty and the public interest concerns Parental Vicarious Liability State v. but the danger of such that the statute aims to prevent. same standard. (5) Conviction does no grave damage to D‘s reputation --Policy reasons for SL: deterrence (greater control. needn‘t be foreseeable (FM) State v. Holloway v. Deitsch (NY 1983): [D blocked fire exits with piles of material. Jewell (9th Cir 1976): D‘s positive knowledge or willful blindness satisfy knowledge. or deception State v. (3) For recklessness/negligence crimes: harm must be within the risk created w/ same exceptions as (2).05: Permits SL where: the punishment is a violation [unless at least one element of the crime has a mens rea req. (3) No injury to person/property. later suffered heart attack – G] D takes CW as he finds him. then D not but for cause Regina v. fire.03: causation is 2-part test: factual and legal (only considered for mens rea analysis). (4) for SL. killed by passing truck – G] Foreseeable & risk created by Ds People v.5(1): criminal homicide for causing another to commit suicide only if by force. MD thought he was fine. Blaue (1975): Religious belief preventing lifesaving care is a SUPERSEDING CAUSE – NG. harm must be probable consequence of D‘s conduct. have to take societal responsibility to guide them --Policy CONs: anti-family (discourages people from having children) and offends due process concerns CAUSATION §2. Dissent: Palsgraf zone of danger test-D created risk on road. NM (NM 1993): [D cut his 7 YO w/ knife while fighting – NG] Court found that mental culpability necessary. intent to impose SL CL Rule: impose SL when regulatory area of law. producers/buyers). Shabazz (CT 1998): [D stabbed CW. United States (SupCt 1999): Conditional intent to harm sufficient to satisfy ―purpose‖ mens rea --General intent: convicted if prohibited act is intentional based on plain meaning (assault) --Specific intent: convicted if prohibited act done with further intention in mind (assault to kill) Willful ignorance = knowledge United States v. Guminga (MN 1986): Court can‘t convict someone w/o knowledge/active involvement. Foreseeability: outcome must be foreseeable consequence of D‘s criminal wrong [EXCEPTION: eggshell victim] People v. (2) may profit from employee‘s wrong. the original wound is still an operating AND substantial cause. not air People v. no mens rea but felony murder? --If the harm is a foreseeable consequence of D‘s action. United States (SupCt 1994): SL here may cross line bc constitutionally permitted to possess legal guns but highly regulated area of law. civil has lower BOP CL recklessness=heightened criminal negligence (greater probability of harm + greater degree of unreasonableness) Shimmen (1986): [D trained in karate. then it can be higher] AND statute expressly requires SL OR non-MPC crime w/ clear legis. Brady (CA 2005): More foreseeable than Acosta bc nature of risk created (start a fire. (Kibbe. not of a deadly explosion *harm w/i the risk analysis only separating factor from Deitsch People v. courts willing to lower threshold for causation when D voluntarily assaults/attacks CW Insufficient Intervening Causes People v. children aren‘t free/autonomous. administrative ease --Policy reasons against SL: goes against requirement of MR for criminal liability.CRIM LAW OUTLINE 2 Regina v. duress. purpose of statute considered United States v. public good concerned. criminal-spend time in jail. many employees died during factory fire – G] Deaths were foreseeable. D knows it had been stolen --Actively seeking out truth is not necessary. Dissent argues SL State v. higher standard Santillanes v. courts usually find death of responding person is foreseeable if D created the risk to which they were responding unless PO grossly neg. has to be tended to. Giovannetti (7th Cir 1990): Willful ignorance not rewarded. exemplify risk created by D‘s conduct Commonwealth v. policy reason: deterrence (stigma of criminal sanctions) --Civil VS criminal negligence: civil-found liable for making someone whole. civil standard for negligence not sufficient for criminal liability State v. air likely in this case) People v. concern: D‘s lack of control over the situation --Policy PROs: (1) employers have some level of knowledge. Dotterweich (SupCt 1943): SL imposed b/c of information gap. Balint (SupCt 1922): proof that Ds knew they were selling it is not required-public good. CW died– G] CW susceptible to injury b/c alcoholic. Welansky (MA 1944): [HARM W/I RISK-D owned club where exits were routinely locked to prevent dine/ditch. §210. criminal liability helps w/ deterrence. information gaps. purpose of FDA legislation. & public welfare (regulatory cases. US (SupCt 1973): Permitted inference that if D has recently stolen property. not affirmative action. criminal intent not necessary. Akers: Court struck down a statute imposing vicarious liability on parents for actions of their children --Policy PROs: like exotic animals. Muro (NE 2005): Role of possible benefit from medical care – if CW may not have survived w/ care. taken). broke window – G] D thought he eliminated the risk. showing friend. keeping conservative businesspeople out of industry for fear of liability while inviting those overconfident in avoiding risk Vicarious Employer Liability State v. CW died from medical negligence in surgery – G] D put CW at risk of being harmed. explosion killed many employees – NG] Harm created was of a fire. Arzon) Harm within the Risk: must prove conditions created foreseeable risk of death w/ certain trigger (conditions alone not sufficient) People v. (4) Penalty is small (no jail time). affecting liver. Kibbe (NY 1974): [Ds abandoned helpless intoxicated robbery victim half clothed in winter by side of road. but actively hiding from it is knowledge CL criminal negligence = courts split on civil standard vs. then D criminally liable for death. information gap between D/CW United States v. 100s of patrons die – G] Also vicarious liability probably at play Intervening Causes: foreseeable supervening negligence State v. Cheshire (1991): If at the time of death. criminal law says D caused the injury --Eggshell victim: take your victim as you find them. even where medical intervention contributes to death --POs/Firefighter: Where there are multiple causes. Stamp (CA 1969): [CW robbed at gunpoint. Policy: narrow definition of ―knowingly‖ goes against law‘s purpose United States v. still liable w/o gross negligence interfering . guilty b/c of recklessness STRICT LIABILITY §2. unrelated fire on another floor combined with that one to kill a firefighter – G] Exclusive cause not necessary if expose CW to risk People v. etc. Thomas dissent would req knowledge b/c guns legal to possess in some forms CL factors for assessing SL in the absence of statutory language (1) Public welfare offenses. Beaudry (WI 1985): Vicarious employer/employee liability. Montoya (NM 2002): Action does not need to be factual cause in order to be legal cause State v. United States (SupCt 1952): strict liability for taking govt property not imposed because non-regulatory and non-public welfare Voluntary delegation of control = full responsibility State v. Warner-Lambert (NY 1980): [HARM W/I RISK-D used 2 chemicals they knew to be explosive in manufacturing. care. conviction for minor offenses (speeding). Faulkner (England 1877): Act committed in the midst of another criminal act requires its own intent. criminal liability still possible Barnes v. Arzon (NY 1978): [D intentionally set fire in abandoned building. Baker (KS 1977): If D voluntarily delegates partial control. (2) Violation is neglect/omission. Acosta (CA 1991): Highly Extraordinary Result standard (MPC) and all deaths from chase covered.
smothered to death – could not find culpable negligence Edgmon v. Glucksberg (SupCt 1997): Those who wish to commit suicide have no constitutional right to obtain assistance. rape. not the outcome (blocking exists not people dying). criminal negligence. Valade : young girl jumped out window to escape rapist vs State v. Carroll (PA 1963): amount of time taken to premeditate is not dispositive – can be found in instant you pull trigger (erasing difference btw 1st and 2nd) Commonwealth v. looked like an explosion of violence – NG of 1st deg State v. Intervening Causes: create risk of intervening crime. gave him gun. thought it was dead.5: May be convicted of criminal homicide only if purposely cause suicide by force. dies – G] Religious beliefs not considered on a subjective basis. sobbing. died from CHF. Court didn‘t apply subjective standard People v. court analogized to collapsing from CHF right after incident. and premeditated‖ Young v. Stamp (CA 1969): FM not limited to deaths which are foreseeable – eggshell victim rule. deliberate. State (AL 1982): [D grabs gun during card game. Henderson (CA 1977): CA applies an abstract test to see if felony in question is inherently dangerous NOTE that if you apply this standard. Commonwealth (VA 1988): Not a foreseeable or causal result of the felony (would be different if crashed b/c low to avoid POs) Commonwealth v. Burden: D let child starve bc he didn‘t care – negligence/omission where an affirmative duty = active participation. willful. Drum (PA): ―no time is too short for a wicked man to frame in his mind murder. risk was foreseeable Assumption of Risk & Joint Enterprises Commonwealth v. problematic outcomes (Anderson. son murdered – NG] People v. driven to ignore an immediate/obvious danger --Wanton: arrogance/indifference to risk to human life FELONY MURDER §210. Phillips (CA 1966): Cannot eliminate the intention of malice from FM People v. CW secretly bought poison to kill herself. kidnapping. Welansky (MA 1944): [D owned nightclub where fire exists purposely blocked/locked to prevent dine/ditch – G] Willful modifies the action. terminally ill father. dies – G] Prosecution has to show that her desire to die was caused by injuries inflicted by D – ―mentally irresponsible‖ for herself Rex v.15 – manslaughter when D ―intentionally causes or aids another person to commit suicide‖ differs from MPC. Barnett (SC 1951): degree of negligence necessary for criminal liability varies court to court People v. suicide supersedes D‘s conduct People v. Root (PA 1961): [Deceased invites D to race & recklessly crashes. less restrictive approach --Losing will to live: Garcia case. Kern (NY 1989): [Ds chased CW beating/threatening to kill. he shot and killed him. still liable unless gross deviation from standard of care Suicide: providing means to commit suicide is NOT murder People v. Earnest (PA): ―space of time is immaterial if the killing was in fact intentional. but jurisdictions are free to permit assistance by statute (Oregan has done so) §210. Williams (WA 1971): Negligent only when RP would realize infant needed care and didn‘t provide it. arson. D offered to bring her to hospital.2(1)(b): recklessness/indifference presumed if victim murdered during the commission of: robbery. kills 2 people – G] Find premeditation in the instant it took to pull the trigger State v. McFadden (IO 1982): [D racing decedent. Serne (1887): [D took insurance policies out on house & son. refused. G. Indifference to human life elevates the crime (MPC) People v. burglary. Williams (PA 1938): Act that is a felony must be the proximate cause of the death People v. Stewart (RI 1995): Felony must be considered as committed—question of fact for the jury if it is inherently dangerous in the particular case Hines v. G of 1 st degree murder --Intended killings murder if: w/ intent (with or without premeditation) –Unintended killings murder if: recklessness w/ extreme indifference to human life --Distinguishing 1st and 2nd degree murder can lead to problems IDing malice afterthought. ran across highway and hit by car/killed – G] Forced dangerous escape. fires set in the house. Forrest (NC 1987): D took pistol to visit his hospitalized. shortly after he left he shot himself – NG] Hope for outcome is not intent to satisfy murder. Guthrie (WV 1995): Some level of reflection is necessary to distinguish 1st and 2nd degree murder – TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES Anderson Case: If no evidence that D planned the killing. died – NG] Assumption of risk. CW trapped in car. heat of passion/sudden fight will not be considered premeditated State v. or felony escape Commonwealth v. State (IN 1932): [D kidnapped woman and raped/assaulted her. Superior Court (CA 1988): [D elected to treat daughter w/ prayer not medicine. still as would RP perceive the risks to the child? Commonwealth v. Bateman (1925): facts must show such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime and conduct deserving punishment State v. NOTE: no criminal negligence in MA. old woman lost her will to live after being raped. some not inherently dangerous felonies that are dangerous as committed will go unpunished for felony murder (Henderson) People v. rape. Dissent would require a highly probable risk of death to separate criminal liability from civil liability People v. if harm realized D1 may be liable People v. gross negligence nec. vehicular homicide --Gross negligence: willfully blind. or deception. 2 friends shot another gangmember that night and killed him – G] his act was committed w/ mens rea for murder & retaliation foreseeable --Superseding/intervening cause distinction from tort law applies to criminal liability unless D creates risk of subsequent criminal act Trauma-Induced Death: causal link must not be too tenuous but D liable for driving CW temporarily insane/causing risky behavior Stephenson v. Main (9 Cir 1997): [D crashed while fleeing. Roe: Another child Russian roulette case: where conduct creates a substantial risk of death. State (GA 2003): Standard: dangerous as committed if it creates a foreseeable risk of death. who hits 3rd party killing self and 6 YO – G] Decedent‘s own assumption of risk doesn‘t bar liability for D. Burton (CA 1971): [INDEPENDENT PURPOSE TEST] Felony must have purpose independent of homicide (armed rob is to get property) Ireland: FM instruction not permitted because it bootstraps mens rea for lesser offense and lets prosecution skip on proving mens rea of 1st deg . Atencio (MA 1963): [D and deceased playing Russian Roulette– G] Intervening cause not present w/ encourage to join enterprise MURDER §210. direct causal result of felony = FM King v. arson. dec‘s own recklessness State v. medical evidence to show this.3: (a) committed recklessly or (b) would be murder but under extreme mental/emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable [and provable] explanation/excuse determined from viewpoint of actor‘s situation under the circumstances as believes them to be (subjective standard) Commonwealth v. Everhart (NC 1977): [SUBJECTIVE] D with very low IQ gave birth to baby in her bedroom. that act establishes malice. Campbell (MI 1983): [D encouraged CW to kill himself. Cervantes (2001): [D shot gangmember. starts firing. CW died – NG] Jury has to find proximate cause --MED MAL: if D injures CW and exposes them to risk of medical negligence. Thompson (AZ 2003): proof of actual reflection is not required. kidnapping. PO didn‘t move b/c neck injuries. deviate sexual intercourse by force/threat of force.2: (a) committed purposely or knowingly or (b) recklessly w/ extreme indifference to human life MODIFIED FM RULE: recklessness/indifference presumed if homicide occurs during robbery. duress. State (AK 1985): [OBJECTIVE] individualities considered for recklessness NOT negligence Walker v. didn‘t kill him. Hall (CO 2000): 4 questions to ask: (1) Did D‘s conduct create a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death? (2) Would RP conclude that D‘s creation of that risk of death was unjustified? (3) Did D‘s conduct constitute a ―gross deviation‖ from standard of care a reasonable person would observe in the circumstances? (4) Could RP entertain belief that D consciously disregarded the risk? State v. brings criminal standard in line w/ tort standard for proximate cause *directly opposes reasoning from Root Commonwealth v. wrapped it in a blanket. it will override the subjective standard of intent --Intended killings manslaughter if: w/ intent but in heat of passion/emotional disturbance –Unintended manslaughter if: reckless. Rex v. Presler where exposure to risk was not necessary or caused by D (woman froze 200 yards from father‘s home fleeing abusive husband) People v. felonious escape Regina v. Forrest) premeditation given too much weight MANSLAUGHTER §210. Aiding/soliciting = manslaughter --NYPL for Assisted Suicide: 125. 2nd degree murder State v.‖ vague time minimum for finding premeditation Commonwealth v. Kevorkian (MI 1994): [D built assisted suicide machines that let deceased choose how to die/kill themselves painlessly – NG] Distinguish btw preparation and participation in final act Washington v. no motive for killing her. Malone (PA 1946): [Older D convinces younger CW to play Russian Roulette—kid dies – G] Where a person commits an act of gross negligence & can anticipate risk of death. burglary.CRIM LAW OUTLINE th 3 United States v.
Women who do physically resist are more likely to escape. Klimas: After months of conflict. Martinez (7th Cir 1994): Death of co-felon qualifies for FM for the other co-felon if in commission of crime (transporting bombs) --FM comes close to SL: sets up the rebuttable presumption that D is guilty of murder & possessed an indifference to human life --In the abstract/CA Standard: Is the crime dangerous in the abstract? (Henderson) Can you imagine it being committed in a non-dangerous way? --As committed/RI Standard: Is crime dangerous as committed? (Stewart) Was risk of death foreseeable? (Hines) Was there a high probability of death? (Hines dissent) --Murder has to be causally related to the accompanying felony to qualify for FM --Merger Doctrine: Combines lesser felony w/ homicide to make them one crime – assault as part of facts of a burglary or possessing a weapon as part of armed robbery --Note there are no mens rea defenses for FM because of merger rule. but also more likely to be injured. charged w/ murder. cumulative effect of taunting caused D to kill CW – G] Generally doesn‘t apply to rekindling provocation Commonwealth v. PTSD not considered (wrong probably) --CL elements of provocation: (1) Provocation that would inflame the reasonable man. doesn‘t qualify for FM United States v. objective looks for reasonable explanation for passion. (3) illegal arrest. then threatened to ―fix her face‖ unless she followed him to a house nearby. Cabaltero (CA 1939): Murder committed in perpetration of crime qualifies for FM State v. Boro – Dr. TEST: TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES: can fact-finder understand how reason was overcome State v. FM RAPE Sexual intercourse: Forcibly or under threat of physical injury: (1) must be physical force or under threat of physical force NOT non-physical threats: NO rape conviction for principle who threatened to withhold graduation of his student (Thompson). People v. def. same case as Ireland. Is it about notice? ―If I do what you want. D shot/killed wife.CRIM LAW OUTLINE 4 Wilson: D committing burglary w/ intent to commit assault w/ deadly weapon. (4) NO FORCE: Some courts have removed the force requirement altogether (NJ. (4) injury/serious abuse of close relative. better off claiming an intent to kill?) --Independent felonious purpose rule: FM should apply when death arises in the commission of a felony not intended to cause the death (cannot be premised on the felony itself . 1973): Co-felons actions unanticipated (a frolic of his own) = NO FM. (3) Cooling time-not enough for reasonable man to be acting from reason rather than passion --Classic applications of provocation: (1) extreme assault/battery.ex: assault w/ a deadly weapon) --NY FM rule: commit a felony and someone dies. relationship handicap). W/O consent: People v.‖ Today the trend is moving away from this requirement (State v. then killed her in rage – G] COOLING TIME – he had it. did not have to prove he knew he was in school zone People v. NO rape conviction for foster parent who threatened to send 14yo girl back to juvie (Milnarish). killed her – G] 2 part analysis for parital excuse under NY law-subjective and objective. just extreme emotional disturbance Girouard v. provocation defense accepted. Canola (NJ 1977): [MURDER BY NONFELON– NG] Murder of by victim co-felon went against the crime. Robertson (CA 2004): again shows problem of having independent purpose – no mens rea defense available People v. Scriva: [D saw driver hit and seriously injure his daughter. Mattison (CA 1971): [IND. stabbed Roberts – G] cannot use provocation you elicit yourself People v. State VS State v. brought her gift she refused. Steele: D was war veteran with severe PTSD. Amaro (FL 1983): [KILLING POST-FELONY] Deaths caused in commission of arrest for felony = FM US v. Turner: Dennis found wife in sexual embrance. Johnson (1989): [ELICITING PROVOCATION-D made threats to Roberts and friend who then threw beer on him and punched him. Casassa (NY 1980): [DIMINISHED CAPACITY-CW told D she was not falling in love w/ him and he couldn‘t handle it. subjective picks up on individual characteristics (age. told patient that she had a terminal illness and the only cure was sex. Rusk – woman laid passively – even undressed herself) Women ―freeze‖. People v. FM instruction not permitted People v. contemplated all day and then killed him – G] COOLING TIME – he had it State v. She complied. asked for depressed man standard-rejected. Taking someone‘s keys = force (State v. or Negates material element of offense (statute says it‘s a defense) Not a defense where Δ‘s act would cause Δ to be liable for another crime but may reduce grade of crime. She told him she didn‘t want to have sex. When she tried to leave he said ―look where you are. NJ + WI have an opt-in policy (State of the Interest of MTS – 15 yo girl slept while her 17yo cohab crept into her room and had sex w/her. Evans – naïve college girl picked up at airport by a charlatan. D waited and shot CW he thought was bouncer – NG] Provocation did not have to be given by individual killed in this case Rex v. Alston – ct reversed conviction. MORE ABOUT OWNERSHIP THAN EMOTION Commonwealth v. throwing him downstairs and injuring him.‖ She never protested – ct reversed conviction. Turner found partner cheating. I could rape you…‖ Ct reversed conviction. Benniefield: Prosecution only HAd to prove he knew he possessed drugs. Rusk – controversial) (2) Implicit threat of force: People v. but ―since not legally married‖ no prov. You‘re in the apt of a strange man. Affirmative defense: thought you were committing the felony w/ no reason to think there was harm to human life (unarmed) --Foreseeability promises accomplice liability. while fleeing POs. (5) sudden discovery of spouse‘s adultery (CONTROVERSIAL) --CL requires visual evidence of provocation (affair) (WORDS ALONE ARE NOT ENOUGH) --Remember: provocation on its own terms is incoherent: a reasonable man would (theoretically) never kill MISTAKE OF FACT (EXCUSE) (FAILURE TO PROVE) §2.04 Mistake of fact / law Negates mens rea. Mauricio (NJ 1990): [NONPROVOKING CW-Bouncer ejected D from bar. Gounagias (WA 1915): [CW committed act of sodomy against D then bragged about it. killed bystander trying to stop him– G] No provocation defense for non-provoking CWs People v. but is it necessary for it? --Police reason for FM: deterrence – may discourage the felony itself/committing it recklessly --Misdemeanor manslaughter: MISD resulting in death can result in involuntary manslaughter conviction w/o proof of recklessness or negligence (unlawful act doctrine) – need only show act caused death --Human Shield Cases: when Ds thrust innocent CW in front of them as a shield and they are killed. broke into her apt. Rusk – controversial) State v. Alston – victim‘s ex followed her to school. State v. Warren – woman stopped by D in an isolated area – he carried her to the woods saying ―this will only take a minute. (2) Actual anger/heat of passion. (3) Deception ≠ Force: People v. Gillis (MI 2006): [KILLING POST-FELONY-D attempted to burglarize home. Conviction rev. how do you know that I‘m really who I say I am … I could kill you. WI) Against the will of the victim: Traditionally – cts required woman to ―resist to the utmost. who brought her back to his apt. Bordeaux (8th Cir. Warren – ct reversed conviction. heard helicopter and snapped. Heinlein (DC Cir. still in rage killed his son – G] No provocation defense for non-provoking CWs Regina v. Berry (CA 1976): [Provoked D waited in CW‘s apartment for 20 hours before killing her – NG] Not cooling time but stewing time. killed him. shot/killed man. applies to killings not in furtherance of the crime People v. LeClair (MA 1999): [D had known for weeks his wife was cheating. PURPOSE] Independent purpose and FM would have deterrent effect on drug sales so permitted People v. Pierce (MA 1994): [D killed man in response to unwanted but nonviolent homosexual advance – NG] Highlights connection of morality and law – not the most common outcome United States v. killed someone. my gf doesn‘t meet my needs. Olsen (CA 1984): [STATUTORY RAPE . Prince (1875): D‘s mistake of fact was not a defense because the act was wrong in itself State v. Jur may accept rape conviction for coercive sex IF it‘s part of the statute (Lovey – PA store owner coerced employee to continuing sexual relationship). State (MD 1991): [D and wife terrible relationship. No affirmative consent = rape) PROVOCATION (EXCUSE) (IMPERFECT DEFENSE) MPC doesn‘t require provocation. only when D aims to kill (irony of an accidental homicide. but otherwise was passive. (2) mutual combat. Regina v. she taunted him endlessly until he killed her w/ knife hidden behind pillow – G] Doesn‘t fit classic scenario and words are not enough Maher v. 1992): [D found out CW raped his mother many years ago. Spurlin (CA 1984): [D killed wife after intense argument over cheating. killed 2 people – G] Still fleeing = FM State v. contributed to heat of passion State v. Ct overturned conviction bc no evidence that victim resisted. People (MI 1862): [D had evidence of adultery btw CW and wife w/i hour of assault – NG] Jury question: evidence the kind that would inflame reasonable man? Dennis v. will you let me go without killing me?‖ was enough for non-consent (State v. Hansen (CA 1995): Highlights problem w/ independent purpose test: person who intended to kill may get off more easily People v.
M’Naughten Rule (Cognitive Test): has an insanity defenses if. forcible rape. MPC Test: 1. it is merely a failure of proof defense. didn‘t know that act was wrong. Retreat: retreat is generally required unless ∆ is at his home. ∆ can be mistaken in his belief that harm is imminent as long as the mistake is reasonable (unreasonable -> imperfect self-defense that knocks down charge but is not complete defense) Self defense. (3) risk of according greater certainty to the evidence than field purports to have. mistake in mental element will not bar liability for any crime. Sherry (MA 1982): [RAPE-3 MDs take RN cw to house.04 Δ‘s belief that his conduct is not illegal is a defense where: unpublished or no reasonable notice. Mistake (or Ignorance) of Law: usually not a defense. . alcoholism. or 2. Multiple personality) Cannot manifest itself only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social behavior.CRIM LAW OUTLINE 5 Garnett v. CW was 13. even given his mental state Commonwealth v. People v. LEAVES TO STATES TO DECIDE STATUTORILY McCarthy: Diminished capacity evidence only in specific intent crimes if there is a general intent crime D can be charged with --Different from insanity/incompetent to stand trial: in this case. is justified in using force if: (1) Δ honestly believes such force is immediately necessary to protect Δ‘s person .g. (6) Possibly if a retreat is available. Brawner (DC Cir 1972): Distinguishes insanity (not knowing act is wrong/not being able to control yourself) from diminished capacity (not able to form mens rea to intentionally commit crime). or Acts in reasonable reliance on official statement of law (statute. but it will erase the mental element required for the higher crime (ex: steal $$$ watch thinking it‘s $-petty larc) --Statutory Rape: consent falls out of equation because law deems person incapable of giving it.04 Δ.01 Must have severe mental disease or defect (MDD) (Usually NOT recognized are battered spouse syndrome. didn‘t know nature or quality of act 2. mistake of having sex) Moral Wrong Doctrine – If believe doing x but in fact doing y.F. Judicial Opinion) SELF DEFENSE (JUSTIFICATION) (AFFIRMATIVE) §3. (5) Non-aggressor. Reliance of official statement (Reasonable notice. prevention of possible future harm. NOT whether they THOUGHT she consented (M. generally (objective standard – reasonable person would think): (1) threat of unlawful force. strict liability in these cases comes from policy aims: protect kids --Courts can deny mistake of fact defense by saying: (1) mistaking the law (not knowing action is illegal) will not be considered a mens rea eliminating mistake. Where Mistake of Law is allowed: Negates mens rea of element of crime. If causes permanent condition (i. State v. GBH. may even be property damage) --Underlying Judge/jury considerations: Utilitarianism function – least cost to society (Schoon). (2) harm is unlawful. United States v. you must: Not know substance ingested was intoxicating. not whether you had it AND reduces sentence. must be proved by preponderance of evidence. Imminence (Leno). all have sex with her – G] Court uses this to debunk old theory that CW has to fight to her utmost to make lack of consent clear. (4) Proportionate. Conform conduct to the requirements of law. didn’t know that act was wrong (i. or (2) mistake D made is not the mistake court is looking for (ex: mistake of consent vs. even if a weapon backs up the threat. May negate mens rea of purpose and knowledge but not recklessness § 2. OR 2. impairment caused him to believe that his action was legally permissible). Situation not cause by the D. then it is okay to hold liable for y. at time of crime. (2) potential of mental health evidence to mislead jury. solicitation doesn‘t count as consent. homicide.08 (2) Involuntary intoxication Complete defense if rendered Δ insane as defined by jurisdictional insanity test. intoxication not considered when determining D‘s guilt.02 Basically. Hood (CA 1969): battery is included in specific & general intent interpretations. Cannot use voluntary intoxication as a defense. not seeking acquittal but lesser charge.e. Q is whether she consented.e. or Knew the substance ingested was intoxicating but did so under direct and immediate duress. Stasio (NJ 1979) Specific intent crime (some additional or future intent require) – can introduce intoxication as a defense against mens rea General Intent crimes – Not relevant. A threat without that purpose is not deadly force. even from a co-dweller (unless initial aggressor). brain damage). or kidnapping. (2) and immediate. then it is akin to insanity DIMINISHED CAPACITY (EXCUSE) (FAILURE TO PROVE) §4. Legal Wrong Doctrine – If believe doing x but in fact doing y. no defense unless statute req‘s ―knowingly killing PO‖) --If mistake is to gravity of the crime. mens rea element cannot be proven --Voluntary intoxication does not qualify for diminished capacity INSANITY (EXCUSE) (AFFIRMATIVE) §4. Wetmore: anticipate practical problem from Clark: statutorily require commitment hearings for diminished capacity defenses --Different from diminished responsibility: there. Post Partum Depression. is otherwise unable to find safe retreat Evidence: characteristics about aggressor may be admissible if they go towards determining reasonableness of ∆‘s response to the perceived threat (objective standard) Mistake: Under CL. at time of crime. medical marijuana. this shouldn‘t be different. MISTAKE OF LAW (EXCUSE) (FAILURE TO PROVE) §2. prosecution proves all elements & D gets lesser sentence. is if they had intercourse) --Mistake of fact will always qualify as a defense to the extent that it negates a requisite mental element of the crime (ex: kills X. What seems morally right INTOXICATION (EXCUSE) (FAILURE TO PROVE) § 2. --ELEMENTS (varies based on jury): Greater harm. if not the aggressor. drug addiction. was unable to control his own actions Look for statutory language distinguishing between wrongfulness and criminality. OR 3. that holding a flame to a building will cause it to burn). If Δ know/realizes he can be completely safe by retreating Δ must. he does not lose his privilege of self-defense if V escalates it into a lethal assault. judicial decision. mental health evidence permitted to negate mental element required for crime Clark v. PTSD. then self-defense not available. here. administrative order or grant of permission). if x is immoral. If Δ uses (3). Arizona (SupCt 2006-Souter): 3 reasons for limiting mental health evidence to insanity defenses: (1) controversial nature of some categories of mental disease. Reasonable belief that D‘s actions will avert harm. NECESSITY (JUSTIFICATION) (AFFIRMATIVE) CL Necessity sometimes permitted: prison break CL Necessity usually not permitted: economic need (stealing food). Drafters‘ intent. doesn‘t know X is PO. If Δ unlawfully starts a non-lethal conflict. if x is illegal. Nature of the harm (not required to be serious. Lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of conduct. Δ has no duty to retreat from home. it‘s whether you were capable of forming mens rea. Kennedy dissent: contested evidence is routinely evaluated for its value by jury. State (MD 1993): [STATUTORY RAPE-D was 20 w/ intelligence of 11/12 yo.08 Intoxication Voluntary: Can be an affirmative defense if a pathological reaction and you are rendered temporarily insane (see insanity). they had sex and she gave birth to his baby – G] did not allow D to proffer evidence that he believed she was 16 based on what she and friends told him. as result of mental impairment: 1. No legal alternative (Schoon). (3) and the reasonably believed that the response was necessary to protect self. then okay to hold liable for y. didn’t know nature or quality of act (e. To be in a state of involuntary intoxication. (3) Deadly force is justified if one faces a threat of death.O. there is not specific diminished capacity defense. as result of mental impairment: 1. doesn‘t eliminate it --Ban on capacity evidence: permit mental health evidence to establish if had the mental state required but ban capacity to form mental state evidence --Allow evidence to negate mens rea for reasons other than lack of capacity only for specific intent crimes (reason is specific intent is aggravating factor in otherwise general offense so want to find lesser sentence) --People v. Davis Approach (Volitional Prong Test): (M‘Naughten Rule plus Volitional Prong) has an insanity defenses if.
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