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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

What is Foreign Policy? Foreign policy is the set of policies that a sovereign State adopts and all activities it undertakes unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally within the international arena with the aim to achieve its international goals and interests. Lets now examine all the components of this definition separately. First of all, only sovereign States can have a foreign policy in the commonly understood meaning. I am sure that you all know what sovereign State means. Sovereignty is the quality of being a State that is fully independent, self-governing, with unlimited power in its actions and decisions, free of any foreign intervention. The only sanctions against its acts may be reprisals by other countries or war. I have to add that, today, sovereignty is a much more flexible concept than it was even just a few decades earlier. Today, Sovereign States accept with their own free will and before the international community not to use some rights which are inherent in their sovereignty, and they may choose to transfer these to some international or supranational bodies. However, one should keep in mind that the source of these transferred sovereignty rights continue to be the States that have transferred them, and this is not considered as an encroach upon the sovereignty of these States. There are also cases where the sovereignty of a State is limited by international agreements. It is not possible for these to have independent foreign policies. For instance, at the time when they were still part
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of the USSR, Ukraine and Belorussia used to enjoy the right to vote separately in the UN. Nevertheless, this meant that in practice, the USSR actually enjoyed three votes. International recognition is also important for a State to be able to implement foreign policy decisions. In fact, if a State is not recognized as such by a notable number of other States, it is not possible for it to establish necessary international contacts enabling it to shape and implement policies on the international arena. In this case, though sovereignty remains a de facto situation it is not an internationally legitimate one; sovereignty in itself is not enough to sustain an applicable foreign policy. Otherwise, the establishment of full sovereignty on a territory often does open the door for recognition, allowing the implementation of foreign relations. For example, that is exactly what happened to the Ankara Government after victory was won over Greece at the end of World War I. One may point out that, even though Palestine is not a state, and even though it does not enjoy full sovereignty on its territory, it still prevails on the international scene. In reality, Palestine is recognized by a number of countries as a State, and those countries which do not recognize it as such only approach it in order to help find a solution to the Middle East Issue. Therefore, international political activities of Palestine are limited to this problem and do not constitute fruits of real foreign policies as we understand them. The same also applies to TRNC. As noted above, the primary aim of foreign policy is to help achieve national interests. The concept of national interests is a very wide one. One may observe this concept has also been evolving. In fact, up until the French revolution, the State was at the service of monarchs; national interests were most of the time
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nothing but the interest of these rulers themselves. When we look back at the history, we see a big number of wars that had for main aim the establishment of hegemony of one or some countries over one or many other countries. Today, States are at the service of nations; this means that they are at the service of citizens who demand, for example, economic and technological development, a better life, or more security. The Main Factors Which Shape Foreign Policy. a) Geographic factors. Until recently the geographic situation of a country was the major element to be taken into consideration when shaping its foreign policy. Geopolitics, which studies the role of the geographic situation of a country in preparing and implementing its national policies vis a vis other foreign countries, has evolved into a distinct science only since the beginning of the 20th century. However, one may say that there is not just one definition of this science over which all interested scientists agree. Consequently, there exist different definitions that are more or less close to each other. I will mention only two of these: 1. 2. Geopolitics is the science which studies world policies and policies of States in consideration of geographical factors. Geopolitics is the science seeking the best use of geographical circumstances for the achievement of determined foreign policy goals. Geopolitics is affected by: - Geographic location. The countrys location on the map, its distance to seas, to continents, main roads, its climate, natural resources etc. These have in fact crucial effects on national policies vis a vis other countries. We all know for instance that those countries which are located far from main maritime lines

have continuously sought to reach rich sea coasts throughout history (e.g. Tsarist Russia as well as the USSR). - Other invariable geographic conditions. The climate, the size of the country, rivers, physical formations, and natural resources all have important effects over the social and economic life of the people living in the territory as well as over their security. No need to explain the constant effects of these on the policies to be adopted either in domestic or in foreign policies. - Dynamic geographical conditions. These are geographic factors which change continuously, such as demographic conditions. For example, the number and composition of the population, races, religions, etc., also have the same effects as the variable conditions cited above. b.Economic circumstances c.Political situation prevailing in the country. d.Policies followed by neighboring and other influential countries. Those who are convinced in the utmost importance of geopolitics have pushed it forward as to cause the emergence of various different theories. I do not want to go deep with these theories because my understanding is that they have lost their values today as a consequence of technological development. e) Ideologies or national aspirations . Ideologies or national aspirations also play an important role in the determination of foreign policy. In the near past, we have witnessed how capitalism and communism had divided the world in two or even in three different camps. Those countries that want to export their ideology choose to follow aggressive policies, while those who want to protect themselves take defensive measures. Members of each camp coordinate their activities and policies among themselves. The main conclusion we can draw from the above is that the foreign policy of a country has a very strong base which causes it to develop on a more or less a determined line unless drastic changes occur in the geographical or political environment.
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Tools of Foreign Policy a) Diplomacy. When we talk of Foreign Policy, we generally understand Diplomacy. In fact diplomacy is the most efficient and most frequently used means to try to achieve foreign policy goals. What is diplomacy? The meaning of the word is a combination of two things: the management of relations between countries by each countrys representatives and the set of skills needed to achieve this. It is indeed an art that country representatives need to master if they want to talk with their foreign counterparts efficiently enough to convince them to intervene with their national authorities to act in favor of the policies of their own country. Efficient diplomacy should not only be be backed by a strong and stable government, high economic and technological capability, and accurate information, but should also be handled by skillful diplomats. During my carrier I have observed big changes in diplomacy. Today, a Diplomat may not easily lie for the benefit of his country. Today, information circulates the world so quickly and widely that any such approach would quickly put the credibility of this gentleman at stake. In democratic countries especially, there remains little room for secrets. One is not obliged to disclose eveything, yet one should not lie. In addition to this, half a century ago a diplomat posted in a foreign country had to have the ability to imagine very well the attitude that his government might want to adopt vis a vis an emerging situation, while today all the information he needs can be ready for him in few minutes. He or she can

execute all of his/her interventions on the basis of clear and recent instructions that are received almost as fast as they are needed. Another important change is that, earlier diplomacy was state-to-state and mainly bilateral. Today, a wide range of multilateral talks are being held. Different aspects of relations are being carried out within international organizations. Bilateral contacts are mainly used to give support to delegates in multilateral talks. Last but not least, todays diplomacy is not being carried out exclusively by diplomats. Statesmen, presidents, chiefs of Governments, ministers are also working as diplomats, though naturally with more authority than these might have had. b) Governmental and non- governmental agencies. Today, technical ministries have their own foreign contact within their own field of activities. Armed Forces are often represented in foreign capitals by military attachs. These play a role that is very important especially in armed conflicts. Non-governmental organizations such as the Red Cross, trade unions, businessmens associations etc. keep their own contacts and activities in foreign countries, thus contributing towards the achievement of national goals. c) Press and information. Mainly in democratic countries, public opinion exercises a tremendous influence over Governments. Thus, all activities that influence foreign public opinion stand as a guide to the direction of national interest and help diplomacy enormously. In this context, the press and the media assume a very important part.

Main factors influencing the Turkish Foreign Policy. Let us now give a look on the impacts on the Turkish foreign policy of the factors I explained earlier. Lets start by geographic ones. Geostrategic location of Turkey. Balkans, Caucasus, Fertile Crescent of the Middle East, between countries with raw materials and industrially developed countries. Energetic resources, oil. Roads to historical emigrations, which give the feeling of insecurity. Neighboring countries. Today 11 with those who are separated with seas. Increased feeling of insecurity. Need to alliances. Straits: strategic importance unchanged despite of nuclear technology. Create int. problems for Turkey, and open Turkey to the influences of international disputes. Difficult to defend. Dilemmas. To be member of NATO without irritating the USSR, Balkans are access door for Turkey to Europe, She needs to be present there without creating problems with Greece and/or Bulgaria, Avoid to be encircled by Greece in Aegean and Mediterranean while continuing to be ally to Greece in NATO, to have influence in the Middle East which is full of oil and with a Muslim majority while staying out of the range of the endless intestinal conflicts, to weaken the Russian influence in Caucasus without irritating Russia, Is Turkey an Asian or European country? 97% of its territory in Asia. Traditions. Democratic institutions developing. Islam. Turkic people in Caucasus and central Asia. Opposition to Russian policies. Support from the USA. On the other hand with only 3% of its territory in Europe European vocation. The only secular State with Muslim population. Cultural rupture with the past. Double cultural identities which oppose. Especially between elites and ordinary people. Those who decide the foreign policies are absolutely westernized which help pushing Turkey towards Europe.

Model of Economic development: Capitalism. This also guides Turkey towards the West. National security. * Military aspect: Turkish army is highly qualified. Dependency on foreign countries in arms, equipments, ammunitions. Turkish defense industry: Relatively new. Although strong enough Turkish Armed Forces are not up to give support to the Turkish Foreign Policy beyond a certain limit. * Economic aspect: internal disequilibrium .agricultural character which is changing. Dependency on importations and growing dept burden. Need to external economic, financial and technological assistance which limits the economy as a support to foreign policies. Social, political, religious division, weakness of solidarity is also against a strong foreign policy. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE WAR OF SALVATION I. The Armistice of Mondoros (Limni) The principal international document which declares the end of the first World War for the Ottoman Empire is the armistice of Mondoros. Concluded in 30 October 1919, the main provisions of the Mondoros armistice were: 1. The immediate immobilization of the Ottoman army with the exception of the units necessary for the internal order and control of frontiers. All the ottoman war ship at seas under ottoman control would be surrendered. The Ottoman army had to withdraw from the north west of Iran, TransCaucasus and south Caucasus, Cilicia (Mersin, Adana, etc.) 2. The Allied Powers would have free use of all ottoman facilities. All of the wireless communication stations, of the railways would be left to

Allied control. Among these, facilities for Allies to buy oil and coal were to be offered as well as sea vehicles. 3. The Ottoman government would cease all contact with the Axis Powers. All war prisoners and detained Armenians would be turned unilaterally into to the Allied Forces. All German and Austrian citizens would leave the Ottoman territory. 4. Allies would occupy all strategic places in case any emerging situation was perceived to be threatening in terms of their security. They would do the same in 6 provinces with Armenians in case of disorders in these provinces. Following the signature of the armistice, a) The Allied fleet anchored in Istanbul (13th November). They occupied Istanbul on March 16th 1920.
b) Great Britain occupied Musul (15 November) and sent units to Izmit,

Eskiehir, and Samsun; on the other hand, Italy occupied Kuadas, Antalya, and sent units to Konya. France occupied Adana, Urfa, Mara, Antakya, Iskenderun, and sent units to Zonguldak. They pushed Greece to occupy Izmir (May 15th 1919).

II. The Treaty of Sevres Frontiers Europe: The Ottoman Empire was to withdraw from all of its European territories, except Istanbul under the condition that the rights of the Christian minorities were to be respected. Gke Ada, Bozcaada to Greece The Dodecanese Islands to Italy The Region of the Straits was to be demilitarized (from ile, Izmit, Bay of Edremit) under the authority of the Commission of Straits, which had its own flag and budget. Only G.B., France Italy could use the region for military purposes.

Asia: Urfa

The frontiers were to pass from the north of Antep, Mardin and

Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin were to be left to Russia Armenia: Trabzon, Rize, Gmhane, Erzurum, Van, and Mu (frontiers to be decided by Wilson)

Kurdistan: Elazi, Siirt, Diyarbakr (with territorial autonomy) Izmir (from Kuadas Until Alaehir on the East and until Ayvalk on North) was left de facto to Greece Regions of influence Italy: Balikesir, Aydn, Mula, Isparta, Antalya Nide
o France: Sivas, Mersin. Adana, Mara, Malatya, Elazi, Diyarbakr,

Syria
o

G.B.: Siirt, Iraq Protection of minorities Use of languages

o o

Autonomy of schools, Return to the country of origin (voluntary)


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Surveillance of the L.N. Restrictions were brought to Armed Forces Financial restrictions
o A Finance Committee was to approve the State Budget and

control its realization. Resources other then those allocated to the payments of State debts were under the control of the Committee.
Capitulations were enlarged.

III. International dynamics Problems in GB, France and Italy: GB faced independentist movements in India, Egypt and Ireland and difficulties in meeting her promises of independence to Arabs of the Middle East. The Prime Minister Lloyd George supported Greece in her action in Anatolia, while Foreign Minister George Curzon was thinking this would make peace impossible. Defense Minister Churchill favored an allied Turkey that would be useful against communist Russia. France had to deal with the manifestations of catholic and communist-oriented trade unions and strikes. In Italy, the government had to face fascists who ended up acceding to power later, in October 1922. There also were problems among these countries as well. Italy was taking initiatives without consulting the GB in the Adriatic and Antalya, and G.B. was offering to Greece Izmir region she had promised to Italy, just the same way as Izmir had been promised to Greece. The interest of France was to bind Germany as strictly as possible while GB was making opposition to that. Similarly, GB occupied Musul and Antep even though they had been promised

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to France. At the end, France and Italys efforts were mainly to try to obtain economic concessions in Anatolia; they left GB alone to face Ankara. Another important development that occurred in the public opinion of these countries was that people were fed up with wars and were not able to understand well the aims of the continuation of war in Anatolia. The number of those who were against war was increasing every day and, for example, the French army was thinking that it would not be possible to recruit enough soldiers in order to force Turks to surrender in Anatolia. Wilsons declaration of fourteen points in January 1918 which backed ideologies such as self-determination of peoples and the principle of nations, also preoccupied these three colonialist countries. In fact, Wilsons 12th point was foreseeing sovereignty and security for Turkish provinces of the Ottoman Empire as well as to other nations so far under Ottoman rule. He was also putting forth the necessity of having free transit rights for trade ships through Turkish Straits. III . Domestic dynamics in Anatolia There was an important lack of infrastructure, of roads, and of communication facilities; for example, travel from Ankara to Eskiehir used to take 22 hours. Nothing was manufactured in the country. Mutinies and revolts. Ankara had to seek support of bands close to its. The Istanbul Government used to incite people to revolt against Ankara through declarations by the eyhlislam. People had been in war since 1911, and were completely weakened. They did not want to continue this way. Troops were inclined to escape from their units, facing trials in Liberation Courts (Istiklal Mahkemeleri).

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Lack of National Conscience. Regional conscience dominated. Elites around Mustafa Kemal did have national conscience; however, none had the skill nor the possibilities to provoke it in the mind of the masses. In this panorama two events changed the course of history:
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The occupation of Izmir By Greece. Greek people had lived for centuries under Turkish rule; and for the first time, a nation with a different religion was now occupying Turkish lands. Old subject were becoming rulers in a city that had been the main trading harbor of Anatolia. The fact that Istanbul and the Sultan did not react awakened the Turkish Muslim population in the area.

2. The establishment of Armenia. First, the idea of an Armenian

State in Anatolia with access to Black sea was already irritating enough. Second, Regional notables had shared among themselves all real estates belonging to Armenians which had been forced to emigrate, and now they did not want to restitute them to their real owners. In Antep, people who did not react before British occupation revolted when the French used military units composed of Armenians in order to impose their authority in the city. Third, Kurds were unhappy in seeing that some lands which had been promised to them in the first place were given to Armenians even though the number of Kurds in Anatolia was much superior to that of Armenians.

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IV. Relations with Europe Great Britain. The Ottoman Empire had established diplomatic relations with the GB in the 16th century, after the assignment of an ambassador by GB to Istanbul, an action which was reciprocated by the Empire in 1793. In fact from the 18th century onwards, the Ottoman Empire had been in decline and sought to continue to exist through the support of countries who influenced the balance of power in Europe, and one of these Powers was the GB. Reasons for GB to maintain a policy favoring the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire was mainly geared to prevent Russia from having access to the Mediterranean Sea. GB renounced to this policy of protecting the Ottoman Empire after Ottoman-Russian war 1877-1878, after she realized that Russia was too strong and that it was impossible for the GB to follow this policy by herself. Furthermore, she then reversed her policy; since the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire had already started, she sought to obtain as big a part as possible from the partition. A weak Ottoman State surrounded by small neighboring states like Greece, Armenia, Kurdistan, and Arab sheikhs in the South all under her influence would have allowed GB to control roads to India much more easily. Within this policy, the GB was facing two main difficulties:
1. Competition with France. The two states had come to a common accord

twice (in 1916 Sykes-Picot, and in 1920 San Remo) in order to share their influence zones in the area. And in Europe, France wanted to weaken Germany (which had lost the war) completely, and GB did not want to see France become too strong and influential.
2. GB had promised Arabs the establishment of a big Arab State. Now,

difficulties with the establishment of this big Arab kingdom, as well as the developments regarding the creation of Armenian and Kurdish States was
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creating disappointment among the population of the area, thus weakening British influence. 3. Another problem for GB was that Muslims in India were taking the struggle in Anatolia as a struggle in the name of Islam. Ankaras policy was to emphasize that the aim of the National Movement was to protect the Sultan and the Caliphate, and this in order to get the support of religious and traditional masses of Anatolia. In India, an Indian Committee for the Caliphate was established. This was disturbing for GB, because a movement that aimed to bring Islam on the fore line could provoke Muslims of India against British rule. This preoccupation of GB was only appeased when the National Assembly in Ankara abolished the Sultanate and the Caliphate. 4. The last point of annoy for the GB was the relations of Ankara Government with the USSR. Even if there was nothing of common between Turkish nationalist movement and the communist regime ideologically, the two countries were under western occupation directly or indirectly which led two Governments to cooperate. When Ankara concluded a treaty with Moscow in 16 March 1921, the GB would sign an agreement of trade with the USSR on the same day. As long as the Movement became stronger relations with the USSR lost its importance, for the Ankara government saw that these relation would constitute in the long rang a hand in cape in promoting in the future relation with western countries, included the GB to start with. Allied countries decided on February 10th1920 to occupy Istanbul. If the visible reason for this was disorders in Cilicia and resistance in Anatolia, its main aim was to facilitate the application of the Sevres treaty, which was under preparation. Allied forces occupied Istanbul on March 20th, 1920. Allies were saying that this occupation was temporary and was only aiming at strengthening the authority of the Sultan. They raided the Parliament and arrested parliamentarians. This caused reactions in GBs public opinion. In reality this allied move would constitute another event, which, after the occupation of Izmir
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by Greece, would enhance the authority of Ankara in Anatolia. This also helped M. Kemal to prove that the National Assembly could not work in Istanbul and that a new parliamentary body was necessary in Ankara. M. Kemal reacted severely and sent a protestation note to GB; he published a declaration against GB to Muslim countries, and ordered the arrest of some British citizens in Anatolia. However M. Kemal did not seek to come to a complete dissent with GB and continued to send unofficial messages to persuade this country for the principle of the National Pact (Misak-I Milli). By the time some amelioration in the relations between Ankara and GB started to take place. Reactions by the British public opinion against British policies towards Turkey were becoming stronger every day. The fact that the Nationalist Movement was gaining strength and the occurrence of the Gmr Treaty in the East helped this development. When Turks won in Inn in January 1921, GB understood that a policy that aimed at stopping Turks indirectly by using the ambitions of Greece without facing Turkish nationalist forces directly was not successful. She understood that dispersed national forces had managed to be as organized as a regular army. M. Kemal was responding positively to British approaches. Allies decided to organize a conference to bring some amendments to the Sevres treaty and to invite Ankara to this Conference. An invitation extended through Istanbul Government was not accepted by Ankara because it was not a direct invitation. Istanbul wanted Ankara to be represented within the Ottoman Delegation, which was not acceptable for Ankara either. At the end, Allies formulated a separate invitation for Ankara. For the first time, Allies were de facto recognizing the Ankara Government. During the Conference held in London on February 21st 1921, the Chief of the Istanbul Delegation Tevfik Paa left the floor to the chief of the Ankara Delegation Bekir Sami Bey. The Turkish part demanded the withdrawal of foreign forces from Istanbul, the evacuation of Izmir, and the assurance that the Turkish sovereignty
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in the Straits would be accepted; Turkish delegation would not be content with cosmetic changes, which Allies were proposing on the Sevres treaty. Even if this Conference was not a success, it helped the Ankara Government to be accepted as interlocutor and to bring the principle of the National Pact to the Allies public opinion. On the other hand the Conference made known the difference of views between the Allied Governments as well. Agreements that Bekir Sami Bey signed with GB, France and Italy did not get the approval of Ankara. In April 1921 and before the success of the Turkish National Army over Greek forces, the GB proclaimed its impartiality vis a vis the Turco-Greek war, and France as well as Italy joined GB thereafter. The Turkish victory at Sakarya led France to conclude an agreement signed on October 20th 1921 with Ankara. This was followed by the withdrawal of Italy from the region of Antalya. Now, GB was alone before Ankara. In February 1922, the Foreign Minister of the Turkish National Assembly Government, Yusuf Kemal was sent to London and to Paris. Yusuf Kemal was unsuccessful to make these countries recognize the National Pact. In March, Allied countries brought a new proposal to Ankara; but Ankara insisted the Allies to evacuate Anatolia at the same moment with the entry in force of an armistice., Allies did not accept this. Later, contacts of the Interior Minister Fethi Bey in London and Paris were also unfruitful, and Ankara concluded that the only remedy would be obtained by an overall victory over Greece. Later, the capitulation of Izmir by Turkish forces, and the subsequent move of these to the North to anakkale caused new tensions between Ankara and London (named Chanak tension). Scared that Turks would pass to Thrace, GB sent troops to the Anatolian coast of the Straits of anakkale and made it known that she would not refrain from armed hostilities in case Turks crossed the Straits. But Ankara had the support of the USSR, while France and Italy did not want to take the risk of being involved in new armed conflicts; on the other hand, the British public opinion was against war. Ankara accepted to start negotiations about an
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armistice on the condition that Thrace would be evacuated until the Eastern cost of the Meri River. Ismet Paa and the commanders of occupation Forces got together in Mudanya on October 3rd 1922; Allies agreed to evacuate Eastern Thrace, and Ankara accepted not to send troops to anakkale, Izmit and Istanbul until the opening of talks for a peace treaty. France. After the withdrawal of GB from these regions in November 1919, France occupied the regions of Adana, Mersin, Urfa and Antep in addition to southern parts of Anatolia she had occupied following the armistice of Mondoros. This French move created reactions in Anatolia and M. Kemal protested before allied countries. In December, the High Commissioner of France, Mr. Picot came to Sivas on unofficial basis, and offered to M. Kemal the return of Urfa, Antep and Adana in exchange for economic privileges. Facing the resistance of the population in these cities, France sent a delegation to Ankara again, and a truce of 20 days has been signed. The importance of this truce was that it brought a big Power to recognize the newly formed Ankara Government as interlocutor. Few days later, France sent troupes to Zonguldak, arguing that the truce only included Southern regions. In fact, France was aiming to get a hold of the mineral stratum of Eregli, and demanded related privileges in all its agreement tentatives. The new French Government under Aristide Briand convinced GB to organize the London Conference of February 1921. During this Conference, Bekir Sami Bey came to an agreement with the Prime Minister Briand; however, this agreement which foresaw not only economic privileges but also some political concessions with regard to minorities had been rejected by the Great National Assembly. However M Kemal made known that he was not completely against this agreement and that the problem was with some clauses only; he sent Bekir Sami Bey to France and Italy to continue discussions with
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France. In fact, French forces were facing strong resistance in the territories under their occupation on one hand, and the National Government in Ankara had become strong enough on the other hand. Military expenses in Anatolia were adding to the financial difficulties brought to France by the world war, and the relation of France with the GB was worsening. French forces were in direct war in Turkey, while GB controlled the Ottoman Government headed by Damat Ferit Paa and was using Greeks for pursuing her goals in Anatolia. France and Italy understood that their rapprochement to Turkey would weaken the rising British influence in the Middle East. In June 1921, France sent Mr. H. Franklin-Bouillon to Ankara and subsequent negotiations with the presence of M. Kemal in person, ended by an agreement on June 20th 1921. With this agreement, a Great Power recognized the Ankara government de jure for the first time. France withdrew from the Southern regions of Anatolia, leaving some arms and ammunition to Turks. Even if Iskenderun and Antakya stayed out of the Turkish borders, stipulations of this agreement would influence positively the future status of the Sancak. This agreement is abrogated with the Treaty of Lausanne. Italy. At the start of the 20th century and within the context of increasing imperialism in Europe, Italy was aiming at the Mediterranean basin as the heritage of the ancient Roman Empire. Its main target was the Ottoman Empire. She occupied Trablusgarb (Libya) and the Dodecanese Islands in 1911, which was recognized by the Ottoman Empire. During the 1st World War, The G.B. and France, in order to bring Italy to their side, had signed an agreement in London in 1915, giving a share to Italy in Anatolia. In 1917 they agreed in Saint Jean de Maurienne to leave the Izmir region to her. It was then a big disappointment for Italy to see that Izmir and connected regions were offered to Greece at the Paris Conference at the end of the War.
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She started to occupy South Eastern Anatolian coasts but gave direct and indirect support to Turkish national resistance. After the occupation of Istanbul, the Italian High Commissary Conte Sforza had contacted M. Kemal before the national resistance had started and Italy understood the nature of the national was of liberation. Thus Italy led Turkish national forces to be organized in areas under her occupation, did not react when Turkish national forces sought refuge in these territories before Greek advance, helped Ankara Government to get some arms it needed; Italian ships were used for the transportation of arms and ammunition to Turkish forces through Kuadas, Ske and Antalya ports under her control. Conte Sforza, who became Foreign Minister of Italy, intervened during the London conference for the direct invitation of Ankara to the Conference, and the Turkish delegation went to London on an Italian ship. In august 1922 the Partito Nazionale Fascista came to power and Italy started to try to obtain what she failed to obtain during the War. At the Lausanne Conference, She gave support to GB and France and worked for the demilitarization of the Straits, for the continuation of capitulations in a different way, for obtaining control of Ereli mines. It finally obtained the Dodecanese Islands. Germany. Germany surrendered and accepted unconditionally the Versailles Treaty. According to this agreement, She would break off all relations with Turkey. During this period, Turkish-German relations were thus at their lower level. The USSR. Bolsheviks had tried at the start to impose their regime in Eastern parts of Tsarist Russia through cooperation with the leaders of these regions. Out of old Russia, at the 3rd International in July 1920, it was decided to give support to
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those who were struggling against imperialism independently whether they were communist or not. The Western fold of the USSRs foreign policy at that time was to get profit from internal conflicts between Western States. In 1921 this policy would be based on peaceful coexistence, a policy mainly necessitated by the worsening of the economic situation. They signed a trade agreement with G.B. in 1921 according which each parties would refrain all action against each other and would stop adverse propagandas; subsequently, the USSR committed not to provoke Asian populations in India and in Afghanistan against G.B. Thus the USSR then abandoned its policy of giving support to national salvation movements. As to relations with the USSR, the situation looked as follows from the Turkish part: Both were struggling against imperialist countries There was a need for economic and military assistance To ensure security at the East for being freer at the West. To play the USSR against Western countries

From the part of the USSR, Common enemy, Turkish victory over Greeks could awaken Muslims under British rule; Need of security in the South-West Good relations with Ankara were a good reference in Central Asia Expectation to convert Turkey to Communism
Stability in the international system was depending on a solution of the

Eastern Problem and Moscow wanted it be resolved for the benefit of Turkey.

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After the October Revolution, a truce had been signed on 5th January 1917 between Moscow and Istanbul; with the Brest-Litovsk Agreement signed thereafter on 3rd March 1918, Moscow accepted to evacuate the Eastern Ottoman regions she had occupied. The final status of these regions would be decided by the peoples living there and by the Ottoman Empire. However, the withdrawal of Russian forces from the area created a vacuum that would be an opportunity for Mensheviks (Opponents of Lenin, social democrats) to found an independent State in Georgia. Independent States were also founded in Azerbaycan and Armenia. Bolsheviks took contact with the Turkish national movement from the start. A soviet delegation came to Havza and was received by M. Kemal in summer 1919. Foreign Minister Cicerin declared in September that the future of the Empire was in the hands of workers and peasants struggling against imperialists. The Commander-in-Chief of Bolshevik armed forces paid a visit to Istanbul and took contact with national Turkish forces in order to let them know that the USSR would recognize the rights of the Turkish People. On April 20th, 1920 Ankara decided to send a delegation to Moscow, merely to get assistance from the USSR. The Turkish Great National Assembly, in its decision on this respect, let Moscow to know that it was ready to cooperate with the USSR, accepted Azerbaycan to be member of Bolshevik group of nations, and requested 5 000 000 gold, necessary war material and food in exchange. Cicerin, in his reply, accepted to establish direct relations and cooperation with Ankara, emphasized the rights to self-determination of peoples living in Anatolia and underlined that the question of Straits should be solved in a conference with the participation of States with coasts at the Black Sea. The First Ankara Government was founded on 3rd of May and five days later Bekir Sami Bey, Foreign Minister, was sent to Moscow. In his instructions, reference was made to todays borders and not to the National Pact (which made the status of Batum open), and Turkey was accepting that the Straits issue
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concerned all Black Sea countries. Nevertheless, the mission of Bekir Sami Bey in Moscow would be unsuccessful. The Red Army was already in Armenia, and the Russians did not want to pressure Armenians for the benefit of Turkey. With Azerbaycan among Bolshevik groups, and with Greeks advancing into Anatolia, Moscow was not sure that arms delivered to Turks by France after the TurkishFrench truce would not be used against them. ierin requested Bitlis, Van, and Mu to be given to Armenia. Bekir Sami Bey left Moscow on the 11th of September. On the 19th of June 1920, right before the Greek attack started on 22nd of June, Armenian bands started to attack Muslims living in border areas. Ankara did not react for a while, because she did not want to accept combats in two opposite fronts and was scared of an intervention from the G.B. or the USSR in the favor of Armenians. In September, the situation was a little different K. Karabekir passed in action and took Sarkam back. In October, Tevfik Paa who supported national forces became Prime minister in Istanbul. Moscow was reported that this new Government in Istanbul was a maneuver approach to bring the National Movement closer to G.B. and further away from Bolsheviks as well as from the Islamic World. Bolsheviks understood that if they wanted Turks to continue their struggle against the imperialist, USSR should refrain from giving support to Armenian claims. The TGNA Government learned that G.B. (which was seeking contacts with Ankara through the new Istanbul Government) would not intervene in favor of Armenians. Thus the Ankara army undertook a second series of military operations on the East; Turkish forces occupied Gmr on the 7th of October. An agreement was concluded in this city on the 2nd of December, within which Armenia was renouncing territories given to her by the Sevres Treaty. But 3 days later, the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic that came to power with the support of Moscow made it known that it would not recognize the Gmr Agreement.
23

On the 5th of March 1921, the USSR Ambassador to Ankara presented his credentials. Ali Fuat Bey would be Ankaras Ambassador to Moscow in November. A second Delegation was sent to Moscow on February 1921. Cicerin demanded the abrogation of the Gumru agreement and the evacuation of Gmr, and complained about measures against communists in Anatolia. He added that they could not conclude an alliance with Ankara, but that they were ready to sign a friendship agreement. The Turkish Delegation was aiming at not talking about Armenia, at obtaining a de jure recognition from the USSR, and at obtaining money, arms and ammunitions. Stalin, who received the Delegation on the 22nd February, reiterated that an alliance was impossible due to the trade agreement they had signed with G.B., but that they could give any other assistance Ankara needed. In this development, the facts that Ankara had been invited to London for talks and that Greek forces had lost the battles in Inn played an important role. The Moscow Treaty was signed on the 16th of March 1921, at the anniversary of the occupation of Istanbul by allied troops. Stipulations of the Moscow Treaty:
1.

Parties will not recognize a peace agreement or

any other commitment imposed to the other Party against Its will. The word Turkey covers territories as expressed in the National Pact adopted by the Parliament in Istanbul on January 28th, 1920. 2 3. 4. Batum is left to Georgia under some conditions (freedom of the Nahcivan will be an autonomous region under the protection of Parties recognize the salvation movements of Nations at the East People and freedom of transit). Azerbaycan and their rights to opt their governmental regimes.

24

5.

Parties agree to leave the solution of the issue of the Straits to a

conference which would be held later with the participation of countries with coasts on the Black Sea 6. USSR) 7. 8. Parties declare invalid all capitulations. Parties will not receive governments in exile with the claim to be All the agreement made earlier between the two countries are now no more valid. Thus Turkey is free of her debt burden vis a vis Russia (or

the Government of the other Party. On the 13th of October 1921, Ankara signed a Treaty with Armenia, Azerbaycan and Georgia in Kars. This Treaty had more or less the same content with the Moscow Treaty. On the 2nd of January, a Treaty of friendship was concluded with Ukraine. The importance of theses documents was that all the obstacles for the aid of the USSR to Turkey were so far removed. During the Lausanne Conference, the Turkish and the USSR delegations would coordinate their position on the question of Straits. USSR was insisting that the Straits should be closed to all military ships both in peace and in war times and that the right of free passage should be recognized to all trade ships. Cicerin refused the demilitarized status of the Straits and insisted on The Turkish control over them He blamed the Turkish Delegation for being weak on this issue. Inn asked Cicerin whether the USSR would be ready to help Turkey in case the Conference failed for this reason and in case hostilities started again. As he could not receive a positive reply, he said to Cicerin that he could not afford to block these talks even if he shared common views with the USSR. Finally, the Conference agreed that the security of the Straits be ensured by the international commission.

25

Grece. The fact that Ottoman Empire was defeated in the World War and had signed the Mondoros Truce was a unique opportunity for Greece and the Greeks to realize their Megalo Idea. At the Paris Conference, Venizelos presented Greek demands on 30th of December 1919: North Epire, Eastern and Western Thrace (Except Istanbul and Straits), Trabizon (Pontus), East Anatolia, the Aegean Islands and Cyprus. He made it understood that he could give in from other demands in case of obtaining satisfaction in Anatolia and based this claim to the article 14 of the Wilson Declaration - arguing that Greeks were in majority in these territories. The G.B. and France to some extend were in favor for Greece to obtain a big share in Eastern Anatolia. The USA was not agreeing, knowing that Muslims were in majority in all cities other then Izmir, and the partition of Izmir region was not economically acceptable. Italy was also against these demands, because these were contrary to what she had been promised by the G.B and France earlier. On the 24th April Italian delegation left the Conference. After rumors circulated that Italy would send two military ships to Izmir, pro-Greek Lloyd George convinced President Wilson to allow Greece to sent troops to Izmir to avoid an Italian fait accompli. Later, they managed to convince Italy to join the conference again on the 12th of May. Greek forces landed in Izmir on the 15th of May 1919 and Greek occupation in Anatolia started. During the Paris Conference, Damat Ferit Paa tried to stand against Greek claims; yet at the end, the Ottoman Delegation was asked to leave the Conference. In 1920, allies started to show their impatience for a peace treaty with Turks. In the meantime new elections in the Ottoman Empire had been held and the new Parliament had adopted the National Pact. The G.B. and France were desiring a treaty which would not hurt their interests: Turks would get out of Europe, an international order would be set up in Istanbul; Greeks would be
26

granted other privileges in addition to the economic ones and would be asked to withdraw from Anatolia. However, in face of the strong resistance in Kilikya and following rumors that thousands of Armenians had been killed, they opted a policy of force. In March Istanbul was occupied. On the other hand For Venezilos, to loose in Anatolia would be a political suicide. At the and GB and France agreed with a Greek military move in Anatolia but they emphasized that they would not participate in that move. GB underlined that She would not give military help to Greece. Rallis, who came to power after new elections in Greece decided to follow the policy of Venezilos to make Turks accept the Sevres treaty by force. King Constantinos returned to Greece and this gave GB and France a motive to review their policies. For France, Sevres had to be reviewed and Greek forces had to be withdrawn from Anatolia. The G.B. wanted to continue the war with Ankara through the intermediary of Greece. After the Greek defeat in nn on the 9th of January 1921, the London Conference organized by allies brought an important change in Greek domestic policy. Karegopulos who was decided to prove Greek determination replaced Rallis, which was criticized for his moderation. After the failure of the London Conference Greek forces initiated a new attack but they were defeated again for a second time in nn. Greeks, in spite of these military failures, made new preparations; in July they tried their chances for a third time. They obtained some success at the beginning, yet they lost again in Sakarya. This was the end of the Greek expectation to force Turks to accept Sevres by arms, and this created important domestic difficulties in Greece. On March 1922, Allied Governments made a new attempt for peace talks but their conditions were unacceptable for Ankara. Knowing the Greek army to be in a difficult situation, Ankara wanted to give it a last coup. Turkish Attacks

27

continued until Izmir capitulated. The Turkish-Greek war was ended on the 22 nd of October 1922. Iran. During the period, relations with Iran were very distanced. Despite USSRs important efforts to promote bilateral agreements between Moscow, Ankara, Teheran and Kabul, an agreement between Turkey and Iran could not be realized. The reasons were:
1.

Lack of trust coming from history, created by conflicts between Pan-Turanist policies of ttihak Terakki Great Britain. Iran did not want to provoke the reaction of G.B. by The question of Kurdish Tribes. At the end of the 1st World War

Sunna and Shia.


2. 3.

establishing of relations with Ankara.


4.

Kurdish tribes living on the border areas felt themselves independent and started to threaten security on the both sides of the border. Hot pursuits, which occurred after these Kurdish attacks was creating tensions on the security forces of each side.
5.

Territorial claims. During the Paris conference, Iran made territorial

claims at the East of Turkey. These claims were not taken into consideration by the conference, but they added to the lack of confidence between the two countries.

Afganistan. Afghanistan obtained limited independence from the G.B. in 1919. Its leader Amanullah Han wanted to maintain the independence of Afghanistan and assure the stability inside the country; he was willing to establish relations with Ankara.
28

Even before the establishment of relations a known Afghan who had made his studies in Istanbul, Tarzi Mahmut Bey, had advised Shah Amanullah Han to profit from the Ottoman experiences in implementing new institutions in Afghanistan that would be based on the Western model. Elites from Turkey, mostly officers had thus been invited to Kabul. On the other hand, Cemal Paa, one of the leaders of ttihat Terakki had organized the Afghan army and had informed Ankara about his activities in this country. In 1920, Ankara sent an Ambassador to Kabul. In March 1921 The Turkish delegation that was in Moscow signed an agreement with Afghanistan with the encouragement of the USSR. G.B had suspicions about Turco-Afghan relations. In fact, in the 2nd article of the agreement, Parties were affirming the right of Eastern nations to liberation and to full independence. Within other articles, the two countries committed not to conclude any agreements that would be contrary to the interest of the other Party, and any attack from an imperialist country to one of the parties was to be considered by the other party as if it was made to itself. Muslims in India. The occupation of Istanbul by allied countries had brought the existence of the Caliphate in danger, and created some support among the Muslim population of India in favor of Turkey; this support manifested under the form of the Caliphate Movement. A Caliphate Committee was founded. The aim of the leaders of this movement was to organize manifestations against British rule and thus to advance on the road to independence. Muslim leaders informed London about their demands vis a vis the Caliphate and threatened to organize uprisings in India. This movement had four implications:
1.

Contributed to the division between Hindus and Muslims,

29

2.

A Turkish lobby in London was established. British government

made a declaration to appease Indian Muslim leaders. The Governments policy towards Islam had been criticized in the Chamber of Commons and in the newspapers.
3.

France started to have preoccupation with regard to her colonies

with Muslim majority. This preoccupation reflected on her attitude towards Ankara.
4.

The Committee of Caliphate raised funds, which it sent to M. Kemal

trough the Ottoman Bank.v THE END of THE WAR. of LIBERATION The armistice was signed in Mudanya on the 11th of October 1922, and three week later Allied countries invited Istanbul and Ankara to Lausanne for a Conference aiming at bringing clear peace in the East. Istanbul asked Ankara to send a representative and made it clear that if Ankara failed to send this representative, Istanbul would designate one for Ankara. On the 1st January 1923 TGNA adopted a resolution and let the world know that the sole Turkish Government was that of the TGNA: The Government in Istanbul resigned, The Padishah and leaders of ttihat Terakki left Istanbul. The Lausanne Treaty was signed on 24th July 1923.

The Main stipulations OF THE LAUSANNE Treaty. Frontiers In Thrace, todays borders. This border would be demilitarized. On the south
30

o o

With Syria, today's border with the exception of Hatay. Borders with Iraq This issue would be decided between Turkey and GB within nine

mouths after the Treaty. In case the to Governments could not come to an agreement over the question, the issue would be submitted to the League of Nations.
o

Aegean Islands North Aegean Island with the exception of Gkeada, Bozcaada The Dodecanese Islands were left to Italy. Capitulations were abolished. Minorities The Turkish Government committed to protect lives and freedoms living in Turkey without discrimination. Freedom of religion. Freedom to use mother tongue. Freedom to establish schools and foundations. Freedom to learn native tongues Financial stipulations. Debts of the Ottoman Empire would be shared bay all the countries Straits: Freedom of passage In case Turkey is in war, trade Ships of neutral countries can

and Tavan Islands were left to Greece. These would be demilitarized. o

of all people o o o o

issued from the dismemberment of the Empire.


o

transit. They would remain under the control of the Turkish Government; war ships can pass freely during peacetime but their numbers should not exceed the number of ships of bigger fleets around the Black Sea. In case Turkey is in war, only neutral countries war ships can enjoy freedom of passage.
31

Some parts of the Straits would be demilitarized. An International

Commission for the Straits would be established. This Commissions authority would be on the waters of the Straits and would watch over the application of the Treaty.

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN 1923-1930 I. International situation. This period is dominated by two developments: a) Competition and struggle between the Germany which had lost the war and the winners, G.B. and France, due to the Versaille treaty which was very strict and sometimes inapplicable. b) World economic crises started in 1929. This situation helped Turkey: a) Great European Powers had their own problems and could not intervene continuously with the countries in their periphery. b) Struggle between revisionists and those which were for the status quo would give strategic dimensions to Turkey. c) Russia was no more a threat. So that Atatrk could adopt a skilful balance policy. ll. Domestic Dynamics.
a)

Economy. At the economic congress of Izmir in 1923, businessmen

an landlords dominated the talks and they put down the principles which would lead the Turkish economy during years 20s. Economy would be open to foreign relations, foreign capital would be encouraged and liberalism would be the main slogan. The Government granted concessions to foreign companies and important amount of foreign capital could be brought in the country. Foreign investments became twice higher than domestic ones. This was normal because domestic capital was too little. At the same time important efforts were made to
32

replace Turks to minorities in the economic activities. Bookkeeping would be in Turkish and Companies owned by Minorities would employ 75 % Moslem employees. b) On the political field, this period is that of liquidation of the remaining influence of ttihat ve Terakki. Threads of Islamists and communists as well as Kurdish revolts are brought to an end. In fact the country needed calm and stability to take up reforms M.Kemal had decided to implement in the new Turkey. (Abolition of 1928). During this period where there was no external thread on the scene, the main preoccupation for the security of the country was however the Kurdish question. Kurdish tribes were revolting in border areas between Turkey, Iran and Syria and were crossing borders to take refuge in one of these neighboring countries. Turkey concluded agreements with Iran (1926 and 1932), with France as mandatory in Syria and with the G.B. as mandatory in Iraq promoting cooperation with these States against Kurdish tribes activities. Again during this period Turkish foreign policy priority would be the settlement of remaining problems with G.B. and France. Thus Mosul would be ceased to G.B., Good relations would be established with Greece, Turkey would take steps to adhere the League of Nations, would stay distant to Germany and Italy. Occupation of Dodecanese by Italy and Italys threads on Antalya contributed the coolness pf relations with Germany. c) Relations with the G.B. G.B refused longtime to transfer her Embassy from Istanbul to Ankara. She was not ready to admit that a new State had been found on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. She would open her Embassy in Ankara once the Mosul question was settled. Question of Mosul. When Mondoros armistice had been signed the main part of Mosul was at the hands of Ottomans, but GB occupied the city
33

Khalifat 1924, Civil Law 1926, criminal law 1927,

reform of alphabet 1928, constitutional amendment to delete official religion

thereafter. This city was important for Turks for human factors, for their security and for oil. For G.B for oil(which She never admitted) and for the situation of city on the road to India. Lord Curzon was saying that Euphrat was the western border of the GB in the area. In 1922 GB signed an agreement with King Faysal in order to enhance her position in Iraq which provoked reactions of Kurds, Shia and population of Musul but Bagdad ratified this agreement under the pressures of London. On the north Kurdish tribes were uneasy and revolting and their subversive activities were tolerated by Ankara. In Lausanne smet Paa proposed to discuss the issue bilaterally with the GB, explaining to Lord Curzon that Anatolia was in need of Mosul oil. Lord Curzon did not admit any relation of Mosul question with oil. Turkey based her calims on : a) the demographic composition of the city (263 000 Kurds, 146 000Turks and 74 000 others) arguing that Turks and Kurds were from Turan people, from the same race and wanted to live together with Turks, b) Mosul was occupied by the GB after the Armistice had been signed, and this occupation was not legitimate and was also against the Wilson principles; c) historically the region belonged to Turks since the eleventh century; d) geographically Mosul was closer to Anatolia then Iraq from the economical point of view; e) the city was important for Turkey for its strategic situation. The GB, from her side was arguing that a) In Mosul were living 455 000 Kurds and only 66 000 Turks; b) Kurds and Turks were not from the same origin; c) Mosuls economic ties were mostly with its south and west; e) in case Turkey get Mosul she would come 60 Km near to Bagdad; f) if the city was occupied after the armistice, the reason was simply that the British forces there had learned the signature of armistice late; Question is not a question regarding oil but the frontiers of Iraq. At the end it was decided that the question would be resolved through talks between Turkey and GB within one year and in case no agreement could come out of these talks, the problem would be submitted to the
34

League of Nations. In Ankara his agreement drew critics over the Government which was blamed to have given in to open the way to the westernization of Turkey only. M.Kemal stressed that Turkey could not afford the continuation of armed hostilities. On May 1924 talks started again with the request of the GB. (Conference of Hali) Turkey put forward the same argumentation and let the GB understand that if Sleymaniye, Kerkuk and Musul were given to Turkey, Turkish government would take British Government as partner in oil. But GB far from agreeing, asked Hakkari for Nasturis (Suryani branch) and incited Nasturis to manifestations and other disorders in areas near Hakkari. As there was not any possibility of agreement GB brought the question before the League of Nations according to Lausanne. In the League of Nation Turkey demanded the organization of a plebiscite in Mosul, but the GB argued that the problem was not that of the population but was connected directly with the determination of frontiers of Iraq. She said that anyway in the area the population was uneducated and self determination could not be applied. She proposed the formation of a commission to study the question. A commission composed of one Hungarian, one Swiss and one Swedish member was founded. At the same time armed conflicts occurred in the area and the Commission when it took over its mission drew a line separation from Mosul to Hakkari as border, which is called Brussels Line. In its report to the L.N. the Commission proposed Brussels Line as frontier between Turkey and Iraq and Syria, considering that population living in Mosul was not enthusiastic in been part of Iraq but were not eager nether to join to Turkey. It seems that eyhs and leaders of tribes or Airets acted by fear of the GB or preferred to be with rich GB than with poor Turkey. In this situation the decision of the Commission was that the territory should not be divided for the economic interest of its population and the south of the Brussels Line be given to Iraq on the conditions that a) LN would have mandate for 25 years, b) Civil servants and
35

officers would be recruited from Kurds. c) in case the population would not be given autonomy as the preference of the population would be Turkey which is economically in better situation, the city would be given to Turkey d) if the area is decided to be divided Zap would be frontier between Turkey, Iraq and Syria. This report was accepted by GB but not by Turkey. Turkey argued that a) the LN could not take a binding decision; b) Turkey was not member of the LN. The LN asked advice from the Int. Permanent Court of Justice which said as parties had agreed before in Lausanne on the authority of the L.N on the matter this latter could take decisions which would bind them. And The LN decided that the Brussels Line would be frontiers between Turkey and Iraq and Turkey lost Mosul. Why? a)
b)

Turkey was not member of the LN while the GB was the GB and France did not want to give this strategically end There were informations that Italy and Greece would

most influential member. economically important area to Turkey


c)

attack Turkey, and Turkey could not afford to combat in two fronts at the same time,
d)

Turkey did not sent representatives to the Int.Perm.Court Turkey did not receive the mission of a commission leaded Rumors and claims that Christians were oppressed created Coincided with the revolt of eyh Sait Abolition of Caliphate cut off Kurds from Turks Turkey could not afford a new war for Mosul Turkey was not sure of the position of the USSR in case of

of justice,
e)

by an Estonian general to make researches oil the area f)


g) h) i)

a hostile atmosphere against Turkey

j) conflict with the GB

36

k)

Most important: Ankara wanted to get rid of problems

with The GB and France in order to have free hands to start with reforms Even if Ankara did not recognize this decision she continued talks with the GB. i.) change on favor of Turkey. ii.)
iii.)

And on the 5th of June 1926 an agreement was signed between Turkey, Brussels line was accepted as border with small Turkey, GB and Iraq would cooperate against Iraq would pay Turkey for 25 years a 10% share from

BG and Iraq:

armed bandits on border areas Mosul oil revenues. On June 1926 GB proposed Turkey to exchange her share with 500 000 Sterling payment. (Some researchers are of the opinion that Turkey accepted the payment of this amount and renounced to monthly payments. Some others are not of this opinion. In fact annual payments always existed in budget projects of Turkey until 1980 where Iraqs debt was 2 000 000 Pounds. Taking into account the flourishing economic and trade relations between Turkey and Iraq, this debt will not take place in Turkish budgets since then. Turkey could not obtain minority rights for Turkmens because her argument was that Turks and Kurds were from the same race, and Turkey scared that GB asks the same minority rights for Kurds in Turkey After the settlement of Mosul question there was no move in Turkish British relations until 1929 when a British fleet came to pay an official visit to Turkey.. Diplomatic relations are established with Iraq in 1928 d) Relations with France. Two problems dominate the relations of Turkey with France: Question of the Ottoman debts and question of Hatay

37

During the Lausanne Conference France insisted on the continuation of the capitulations and on the Ottoman debts. But the immediate problem was to determine the frontiers of Syria with Turkey. According 1921 agreement between Turkey and France a commission would take the question up one month after the signature. The Commission could start to work only in September 1925 and failed to achieve its goal. In February 1928 a French delegation came to Ankara where an agreement was initiated but Paris did not sign it and waited until the Mosul question was settled to sign an agreement on this issue, until 1930. Another problem between the two countries, worth to mention is that of French schools in Turkey. Turkish Government decided foreign schools in Turkey be subject to Turkish law and follow the programs of Turkish Min. of Education and teach some of the matters in Turkish . France did not want to accept it. But before the determination of the Turkish Government France could not insist and recognized the situation. Ottoman debts. In fact France was the m ost concerned country with the depts. Left by the Ottoman Empire. In 1928 Turkish Ambassador in Paris and representatives of Duyun-u Umumiye made an agreement: Turkey accepted to pay 62% of the debts made before 1912 and 73% of those made after that date. Turkey paid the first installment timely but the 1929 economic crises broke out. The amount Turkey had to pay yearly was 14% of her budget and it was very difficult for her to pay. Turkish dept payments would be rescheduled in 1933 with some new arrangements in favor of Turkey. Question of Sancak. 1921 agreement between Ankara and France had granted the area a special status. But this agreement was never ratified by Paris. Frances argument was that the agreement concerned Syria and France did not need to ratify it. Ankara insisted that the stipulations of 1921 agreement regarding Sancak be incorporated in Lausanne Treaty. At the end, only article 3 of the 1921 agreement, regarding the borders between Turkey and Syria was
38

taken in Lausanne Treaty and France circulated a latter confirming that Lausanne Treaty did not bring any prejudice to the 1921 agreement which was meaning that the special status of Sancak would be respected. In 1923, the League of Nations approved the Mandate of France in Syria. France divided the territory in four districts: Halep, Damascus, Lebanon and Laskiye and established an autonomous Sancak attached to Halep. This created discontent among Arab populations which revolted. France suppressed the revolt using Armenian units. In 1925 unified the districts of Halep and Damascus and attached Sancak to Damascus. That time Turks, Alleviates and Armenians living at Sancak reacted. The problem would be solved later. In 1926, following of the settlement of Musul problem, Turkey and France signed an agreement of friendship and good neighborhood. e) Relations with Italy. Italy which had taken a positive stand vis a vis Ankara during the war of salvation changed her policy once Missolini came to power. Mussolini, in his speech at the parliament in 1925 said that Italy could not contend with Adriatic sea and that Italys interest was with Mediterranean. She forced Yugoslavia to border changes in favor of Italy, occupied Corfu, and established economic control in Albania. All this created discontent and preoccupation in Ankara. On the other hand Italy was seeking to bring about an alliance with Turkey and Greece to enhance her influence in Mediterranean. This would balance also the agreement Yugoslavia made with France under the thread of Italy. In 1927 Mussolini proposed to T. Rt who was in Milan for an official visit an agreement of friendship and neutrality between Italy, Turkey and Greece. One year later a Treaty was signed. Parties accepted not to participate in any political or economic arrangement against each others, to stay neutral incase one of them attacked by third country or countries, they would submit their

39

conflicts to the Int. Perm. Court of Justice of Den Hague. In fact in 1929 a conflict occurred on Meis which was brought to the Court. During this period, despite of Italian thread trade with this country increased. f) Relations with Germany. Germany was in a very difficult economic situation after the war. Turkey and Germany were old allies and there were not any difficulty between them. However Germany did not want to provoke the G.B. for some time. Later talks started in 1924 and an agreement of friendship was signed in Ankara on 3rd March 1924. Big number of qualified scientists and technicians, who had difficulties to find employments in Germany came to Turkey and their help and advise, proved to be very useful. Number of Turks was sent also to Germany for education. German militaries that were jobless due to the demilitarization of Germany came also to work in Turkey. In 1929 T. Rst paid a visit to Germany. During this period economic relations grew more quickly than political relations. In 1927 The Company Junkers interested to build an aircraft plant in Turkey. The company was in difficulty and the Turkish Government supported the project. Germanys main aim was to continue her researches on arms in foreign countries due to the military restrictions in Germany. Aircraft plant was completed in one year. Lufthansa started its flights Berlin-Istanbul. A trade agreement was signed in 1927 which would be renewed in 1930. g) Relations with the USSR. The first important agreement with the USSR was the Treaty of friendship and neutrality signed in 1925. Turkey was in a difficult position with Sheikh Sait revolt and the Mosul question had been solved against Turkish aspirations. As to the USSR, despite Western countries had started to recognize it, the fact that Germanys western frontiers were decided in Locarno in 1925 while her eastern borders were not consisted an element of insecurity for the USSR. In this context proposition of widening the 1921 Treaty with a new one came from the USSR Ambassador to Ankara.
40

According to this treaty signed in 1925 and came into force in 1926 Parties would refrain from all military action against each other and would not take part in any agreement or action third countries would make against one of them. In 1926 USSR opened her new Embassy in Ankara and initiated talks for delimitation of borders between the two countries. T.Rt met ierin in Odessa and both Ministers exchanged views on the membership to the LN, and on Balkans. ierin affirmed that the USSR would not take actions which would prejudice Turkish interests in Balkans. And Turkey made known that she would not be member of the LN unless a permanent seat was granted to her (which was not possible). After that Turkey was invited to the disarmament conference in 1928 according the proposal made by the USSR. On the other hand the USSR were not happy to see Turkey to sign a Treaty with Italy, to came to an agreement with Western States on Ottoman debts, to have let a British fleet to visit Istanbul in October 1929 and with the mistreatment of communists in Turkey. However a Protocol prorogating 1925 Treaty for two more years was signed in 1929. With this protocol the Two Parties were committing not to make agreements with neighboring States without informing the other Party. USSR opened trade representations in Turkey in 1922. Problem with these representations was that they were making communist propaganda. On the other hand, as trade was State monopoly in the USSR Moscow was insisting to obtain diplomatic privileges and immunities for the members of these representations. USSR put restrictions on the goods coming from Turkey. Talks started and ended with a trade agreement in 1927, the USSR obtained the status she requested for her trade representations which would be in Istanbul, Trabizon, Mersin, Erzurum, Konya and Eskiehir. The transits of goods would be free of duty.
b) Relations with Greece. The situation in Greece which lost the 41

war with Turkey and whose Anatolian adventure which had turn out to be Anatolian disaster, was confused. 1 000 000 Greeks of Anatolia had left Anatolia with the withdrawing Greek army for Greece and there were an important problem of immigrants. On the other hand, Greek units which had taken refuge in Midilli and Sakz islands after the withdrawal revolted. A Committee of Revolution was set up. Revolutionists were asking the abdication of the King and dissolution of the parliament. The king abdicated in favor of his son and the power was transferred to the hands of revolutionists. A process of trials of those who were responsible of the lost of the war started. Despite of the departure of the King the country was divided in two camps: supporters of the king and supporters of Venizelos. Committee of Revolution asked Venizelos who was in Paris to represent Greece in the peace conference with all the full powers. He was granted with the authority to decide for Greece without referring to Athena. Problems solved at Lausanne Conference. a) Frontiers. I. Thrace. Turkey asked the organization of plebiscite in western Thrace he had left at the end of Balkan wars in 1913, but as it was understood that this would not be acceptable by the Allies that recognized Meri line as frontiers with Greece and Bulgaria. Lands 30 km at each cost of the river would be demilitarized. ii. Islands.. Turkey claimed the small islands within her territorial waters, Imroz and Bozcaada who were recognized by the Allies as belonging to Turkey in 1914, Semadirek as being to close to Straits and renounced to recognize the transfer of Limni, Midilli, Sakz and Nikaria to Greece. An advisory military committee studied the question and proposed that the status of Imroz, Bozcaada, Semadirek and Limni be decided later with the status of the Straits, and the northern islands be demilitarized. The Conference decided to give Limni, Semadirek, Midilli, Sakz Sisam and Nikariato Greece with a demilitarized status. Greek aircrafts would not overfly Anatolian coasts
42

and Turkish aircraft Greek islands. Imroz and Bozcaada were given to Turkey on the condition that a local administration was set up on these islands which were demilitarized as well. b) Humanitarian questions. Exchange of population. Turkish delegation was instructed from Ankara to obtain an exchange of population agreement which would be as comprehensive as possible. While Turkish Delegation was scaring of the reactions of Allied countries before such a proposal, The League of Nations responsible of emigration Mr Nansen took the floor to explain his views and pointed out to the difficult situation the immigrants were in and advised that this problem be solved urgently, and in case of Turkey and Greece, two rural country, to give peasants opportunity to do their work before the season ends. Against Turkish position Venizelos supported an exchange of population more restricted and on voluntary basis, which would take into consideration the difficulties Greeks who had already emigrated from Anatolia was in. He was for the voluntary character of the exchange and the exclusion of Istanbul Greeks from this measure. In fact Greece was thinking that they had to reduce the number of immigrants to Greece, (1) not to provoke a wider disappointment in Istanbul Greeks who were convinced in the Megola Idea and (2) not to create a situation were staying without community Archbishop of Istanbul would be obliged to live Istanbul as well. As to the G.B., Lord Curzon was thinking that if Istanbul Greeks with whom Western countries managed their trade relations leaved Istanbul all Western trade with Turkey would suffer, even Turkey would economically suffer from this. A subcommittee touches the question up with that of exchange of all detainees. At the end two agreements were signed:
-

Agreement on the repatriation of civil detainees and war

prisoner. The two Parties agreed on a general amnesty for detainees and war prisoners, citizen of the other Party, no matter what their charges were.

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Convention regarding the exchange of population between

Turkey and Greece. Greek-Orthodox people of Turkey and Muslim people of Greece would be exchanged on the compulsory basis with the exception of Istanbul Greeks and west Thrace Muslims. Exchanged people would be allowed to take with them all their belongings, their properties would be liquidated and money which would come from these liquidations would be the dept of the Government vis a vis the other Government. Important is to underline that the exchange was done according to the criterion of religion. Problem of Archbishop of Fener. This question was discussed conference which did not take a decision on the matter and left it to the discretion of the Turkish Legislation. Question of reparation. Allies asked Turkey and Greece to renounce to their claims of reparations. Turkey argued that she did no ham in Greece, thus Greece could not have any claim for reparations from Turkey. Grecce was in economic and financial difficulties and could not afford any payment for reparations. At the end Turkey renounced his claim in exchange of Karaaga in the border. This was accepted in the Conference. Problems remained from Lausanne. i. problem of etabli. Mixt commission for exchange found by the agreement of exchange of population started its work on October 1923. Bigger problem was in the interpretation of the term tabli in case of Greeks of Istanbul. According the Agreement would be considered tabli those Greek population of Istanbul settled before 30 October 1918 in the city according to the law of municipality of 1912. Greece interpreted this as covering all Greeks coming to Istanbul at that period of time, regardless whether they had or not the intension of settling themselves down there. In fact Turkey wanted to send to Greece as in big numbers of Greeks as possible while Greece tried to reduce this number. In Istanbul 4500 Greek were not recorded in official records as living in
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that city and if Turkish interpretation was accepted they would be expatriated to Greece. As the problem could not be solved by the Mix Commission The League of Nation was asked for advise and this later brought the issue to the Court of Justice which decided. Would be considered tabli who had set down in Istanbul before 30 october1918 with the intention to live continuously there. This advise did not help parties. Greece started to take measures in WEST Thrace, seizing properties of Turks and settling there Greek immigrants. Turkey responded seizing properties of Orthodox Greeks in Istanbul. Question of Patriarchate of Fener. Archbishop Meletios behaved during the salvation war against Turkish independence and supported a Greek State in Asia Minor, thus it was impossible for him to continue with his mission in Istanbul after new state was found. Under the pressure of Greece Meletios resigned in October 1923.Papa Eftim with the support of the Turkish Government made pressing on the Patriarchate to obtain the election of Damianidis, a Karaman orthodox as Patriarch of Fener. But face to reactions in the Christian public opinion the Turkish Government withdrew its support from Damianidis and gave its consent to the election of Grigorios. In June 1924 Papa Eftim romped all his relations with Fener and found the Turkish Orthodox church. When Grigorios died in November Papa Eftim took up the same initiatives but that time the Turkish Government did not give him support and stayed impartial. Despite of this election of new patriarch brought about a new crisis in Turkish Greek relations. In fact new elected Patriarch Constantinos VI was of these etabli Greeks to be exchanged and the Turkish Government could not accept him as Patriarch. Greece wanted to submit the question to the international .Court of Justice. Turkey did not accept this, arguing that Patriarchate was a Turkish institution and expatriated Contantinos who submitted a personal memorandum to the League of Nations. The L.N. advised bilateral solutions. At the end Constantinos resigned. But this conflict had an
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important result: Turkey was not recognizing international status to patriarch of Fener, admitting him as a Turkish institution. She would not authorize foreigners to intervene with the domestic affairs of Turkey on the pretext of religion. Treaties of Ankara and Athens. Talks started between Turkey and Greece on the questions of tabli and Patriarch constituted the first steps in the settlement of disputes on these problems. The main reason of these talks from the Turkish part was the preoccupation of the Government of Inn to bring a solution to the questions remained from Lausanne to have the hands free from the problem created by the eyh Sait revolt and to start with the reforms. In Athens The Government of Mihalokopulos who was in economic difficulties and had problems with his Balkan neighbors profited from the situation. At the end of talks Ankara Treaty was signed in June 1925. With this treaty main problems coming from the exchange found solutions. Provisions of the treaty provided Turkey with the possibility of preventing the return of Greeks who left the country trough illegitimate ways, without a passport, Greece was no more obliged to evacuate some Greek immigrants from properties of Turks where they were installed. Ankara assigned an Ambassador to Athens but the Ambassador never took his office, because General Pangalos who toppled the Government and took the power started a different line of foreign policy for the revision of the Lausanne Treaty. He was making plans against Balkans and Ankara. But the carefull behavior of Italy and her refusing to make a pact with Greece and the settlement of Mosul issue did not allow Pangalos to initiate a military action against Turkey. In 1926 he lost the power. After Pangalos talks started again between the two States and Treaty of Athens was signed. This Treaty was solving mainly financial problems. Properties of these Moslems and Turkish Citizens who had left before October 1912 the Greek districts where the exchange of population was applicable would come to the Greek Government and properties of Greeks and Greek citizens who
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had left on the same date Turkish districts subject to the exchange of population and stood continuously elsewhere would come to the Turkish Government and a mechanism of clearing between the two Governments would be set up. The implementation of this treaty was not without problems. It was not easy to determine the value of real estates and the two Governments were acting very slowly. And difficulties stemming from the interpretation of the word tabli continued. f) Relations with Iran. Rza Han who became Defense Minister in Iran

in 1921 started the process of change in this country on the model of Turkey. New Iran regime was aiming at creating a modern country with western norms and institutions. Turkey and Iran had the same ideology (nation instead of religion), similarity in their enemies, inside (traditional economic class) and outside (the G.B.).Thus their relations were developing positively. Turkish reforms were a support for Rza Hans policies in Iran. Proclamation of republic in Turkey provoked the same desire in Iran, but abolition of Khalifat give the Iranian public opinion that this was a natural result of the republic and Rza Han, despite he was thinking otherwise, declared in 1925 that he was against republic. The same year Pehlevis replaced Kaars . Rza Pehlevi said to the Turkish Ambassador to Teheran that his choice was republic, but obliged to accept to be shah. Problems on the frontiers. Ottoman Iran frontiers delimitated by the treaty of Kasr- irin in 1639, and since it came without major changes until today. But small problems always existed. Iran desired to attend the Lausanne Conference to bring solution to this problem but the GB did not accept it. Then Iran sought bilateral solutions. Revolt of eyh Sait accelerated demarches in that direction and in April 1926 a treaty of friendship and security was signed in Teheran. Parties committed not to attack each others and be neutral if one of them is attacked by third countries. They agreed also to cooperate against
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he was

organizations which were to disturb public order in border areas, not to give refuge to them in their countries. Airets were pointed out directly. But despite this treaty problems created by Kurdish Airets on border areas could not be solved. In 1928 a second treaty was concluded in Teheran. This treaty was foreseeing solidarity of the two states against British or Soviet interventions. In fact these interventions were not very probable and the main problem was not the probability of such interventions but activities of Kurdish Airets. Question of border security turned out to be a crisis during Agr revolts in 1927-1930 because rebels were taking refuge in small Agr area in Iran. To combat them Turkey occupied the area and Iran could not intervene. Solution to border problems would take many years more.

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN 1930 1939

In the early 1930s equilibrium started to change both in Europe and in the Middle East: a)
a)

Jewish immigration into Palestine created discontent in the Middle In Europe, Hitler and Missolini formed a camp of revisionists and

East and provoked Arab nationalism. started to violate the restrictions imposed in Versaille. Italy occupied Ethiopia, which was taken as a threat to the British domination of the area. Germanys stand vis a vis Turkey and Italian political and military activities in Balkans and Mediterranean increased the importance of Turkey. b) The effects of the 1929 economic crisis decreased.

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For Turkey most of the reforms were completed, and most of the problems remained from Lausanne were solved. Facing the revisionist countries policies, GB and France sought to strengthen their relations with Turkey. Despite the fact that she could not have realized the goals of the National Pact Turkey did not take place at the side of revisionists. On the contrary, Italian policies concerning the Balkans and the Mediterranean area especially pushed Turkey closer to the countries that were defending the status quo. Relations with Great Britain Two events helped build good relations with GB: a) b) well. Fuelled by increasing economic relations, German influence was growing in the Balkans; this preoccupied GB as well as Turkey. The part of Germany in Turkish foreign trade was also increasing quickly, which was also a concern for Turkey. Despite better conditions offered by Krupp, the construction of the Karabk steel factory had been given to Brasset, a British company; only the control of the work was left to Germans. In June, a trade agreement was signed wit the G.B.. Turkey would give priority to GB in the maintenance of railroads and irrigation installations. When Turkey obtained the right to militarize the Straits, she asked Britain again to help achieve the work necessary to this purpose. GB responded by giving credit to Turkey. In 1936 King Edward VIII paid an official State Visit to Ankara. In 1937 Turkey was invited to join a conference on the security in the Mediterranean basin following the sinking of two ships. Turkey participated to
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The atmosphere created in GB by the 1930 Turkish-Greek agreement The fact that the USSR was seeking cooperation with GB and France as

and the amelioration of the relations of the two countries.

this conference and acted in line with GB while Germany and Italy refused to participate. In 1935, Italian aggression to Ethiopia and the military buildup which she undertook in the Dodecanese Islands incited GB and Turkey to build closer relations. Turkey accepted the sanctions imposed by the League of Nations against Italy; which became more and more a threat for Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. GB gave guaranties to France, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece in case they would be attacked by Italy; this was an offer for an alliance that Turkey joined in January 1936. However, GB suspended the accord once sanctions on Italy were removed. In fact, Turkey was desirous to make an alliance with GB; nevertheless, she was careful about this idea at that moment in order not to worsen her relations with Italy. GB was following appeasement policy that she would renounce to in 1939 when Hitler occupied Poland. Turkey was still seeking closer relations with GB and France on one hand and the USSR on the other while facing growing threats from the side of the German-Italian axis. In March 1938 France took the first step for an agreement with Turkey. Meanwhile, GB was looking for ways to support Turkey in case of war. In April 1939, Italy attacked Albania; Consequently, GB and France understood that it would not be possible for them to pull Italy to their side. The same month unilateral assurances were given to Greece and Romania against a German or Italian aggression; they intended to give the same assurances to Turkey as well. They were calculating to include Bulgaria in a Balkan cooperation against revisionists or to obtain her neutrality. However, Ankara found British reaction before Italian aggression to Albania to be too weak. She thought that unilateral assurances would not be sufficient to stop aggressions and sought her security in an alliance. Thus,
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Turkey proposed to the G.B. Turkish-British cooperation in case of extension of a war in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. However, Ankara found British reaction before Italian aggression to Albania to be too weak. She thought that unilateral assurances would not be sufficient to stop aggressions and sought her security in an alliance. Thus, Turkey proposed to the G.B. Turkish-British cooperation in case of extension of a war in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. In may 1939, Chamberlain and Refik Saydam made declarations before their respective parliaments that both countries decided to actively cooperate and give each other all possible help in case of a war in the Mediterranean region. After the Sancak problem was solved, a declaration with the same content was signed with France. Contacts had been made in three capitals for financial and military aid to Turkey. Turkey informed the URSS about all these developments; on the other hand, the URSS was not informing Turkey about any of her activities concerning the Germano-Soviet pact of non aggression: it came as a surprise for Turkey. Occupation of Poland By Germany and the URSS increased Turkish concerns. As a result, . Saracoglu paid a visit to Moscow, however, he returned without any tangible result On October 19th, 1939 a Turkish-British-French alliance was signed and was followed by an economic and financial aid agreement. We can thus say that Turkey achieved her goal of forming an alliance with GB and France, though in difficult circumstances. On the other had this meant that Turkey and the URSS would follow different roads from then on. Relations with France. The 1926 agreement helped to ameliorate Turkish-French relations. This also helped the situation in Sancak, which was closely following

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all the steps taken by Turkey: all the reforms Turkey had made at home were realized in Sancak as well. When GB renounced to her mandate in Iraq in 1930, national feelings rose among Arabs and in Sancak as well. To appease this, France added some dispositions about the special status of Sancak to the Syrian constitution. In 1936 France, face to the difficulties in Europe, declared that she would give an end to her mandate in Syria. It was better for France to have an allied independent Syria then to rule on a territory with hostile population. Financial difficulties of France as well as the ideology of the new French Prime Minister Mr. Blum contributed to this decision. On the 9th of September 1936 France declared that she would end her mandate in Syria three years later when Syria would become member of the League of Nations. France was transferring all her rights and commitments to Syria. This provoked important reactions in Sancak and in Turkey. T. Rt asked France to make the same declaration for Sancak as well; yet this proposition was not accepted and was countered by the argument that such a declaration would mean a partition of Syria. The Sancak problem was referred to the League of Nations in January 1937. The League of Nations brought up a report which proposed the following points: Sancak would be considered as a different entity with autonomy in domestic affairs yet attached to Syria in terms of Foreign Affairs; it would also be part of a customs and monetary union with Syria; its official language would be Turkish;
a French delegation would watch the implementation of Sancaks

special status; Sancak would have police forces only;

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Turkey and France would respect the territorial integrity of Sancak; Turkey would be allowed to use the Iskenderun harbor; The Council of the League of Nations adopted this report. In all, the League of Nations adopted three documents: (1) the Status of Sancak, (2) the Constitution of Sancak, and (3) the Frontiers of Sancak. Frontiers as proposed in this report would be the same, though with small changes, as they were at the moment when Sancak joined Turkey. An agreement to guaranty the territorial integrity of Sancak and another to determine Turkish-Syrian borders were signed by Turkey and France. The Syrian parliament protested France for these arrangements on the 3rd of June. An election committee sent by the League of Nations to make necessary arrangements for the elections to be held on April 15th 1938 took advice and assistance from French mandate officers; this provoked reactions in Sancak due to the decisions disfavoring Turks. It set up election regulations without consulting Ankara and sent them to the League of Nations. As a reaction to that, Turkey abolished the 1930 treaty, and M. Kemal, despite his illness, went to inspect army units in Adana and Mersin. Some 30,000 troupes were deployed on the border. Taking the developments in Europe and the increasing importance of Turkey into consideration, and with the advice of GB, France, amended the regulations in question according Turkish wishes. France also suspended all the operations of the election committee. On the 3rd of July 1938 a military treaty was signed between Turkey and France in Antakya, foreseeing an arrangement in case of an attack to Sancak. France and Turkey agreed that they would have the equal number of troupes in Sancak. On the 4th of July, Turkish troupes were already deployed in Sancak and on the same day a treaty of friendship was signed between Turkey and France in Ankara.

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At the elections held in August, 22 of the 40 seats of the parliament were earned by Turks. Sancak adopted all the laws that Turkey had previously adopted, as well as all the reforms she had realized. Arabs and Armenians started to leave the area. Following the Turkish-British declaration, Turkey did not want to make a similar declaration with France until the Sancak question was resolved. This declaration, identical to the Turkish-British declaration, was made on June 1939, and the French Ambassador in Ankara signed with M. Kemal the Agreement on ten final points regarding territorial questions between Turkey, Syria and France. With this agreement, France officially recognized the annexation of Hatay by Turkey. The Sancak parliament took a decision in the same direction. Syrian protests supported by Italy gave no results. Note: There are two main differences between the cases of Hatay and Musul: the presence of oil addressed. RELATIONS WITH ITALY. In May 1929, Turkey and Italy signed a protocol about the status of Meis and of other small islands around it, agreeing to submit this problem to the International Permanent Court of Justice. However, after a visit made by Inn to Rome, Turkey and Italy concluded an agreement on the status of these islands without referring the problem to the Court. Some 20 small islands and Karaada were left to Turkey, while Meis and some 12 small islands were given to Italy. Nevertheless, from 1933 on Italy started to act in a more aggressive manner. Mussolini was saying that Italy's historical goals were in Asia and in Africa, and that the Mediterranean was in any case Italys Mare Nostrum. and the conjuncture during which these issues were

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Mussolini felt the need to declare that these declarations were not aiming at Turkey. In 1935 Italy proposed an alliance to Turkey and Greece. Turkey perceived this offer as a maneuver against the Balkan Pact concluded in 1934 and declined it. Turkey was seeking a general alliance in the Balkans that would include all countries while Italy was for bilateral arrangements. Italy on the other hand was increasing her military activities in the Dodecanese and attacked Ethiopia. The League of Nations adopted sanctions against Italy and Turkey joined these sanctions. Italy protested against the attitude of Turkey and came up with new threats. As a result of a Turkish initiative, similar replies were given to the Italian protest notes by Turkey, GB, France and some Balkan countries to show that all these countries were concerned by the developments. Turkish-Italian economic relations suffered from this situation as well. The Italian occupation of Ethiopia generated new preoccupations.

RELATIONS WITH GERMANY. A first reason of conflict with Hitler's Germany was the Balkan Pact. Turkey had played an important role in its conclusion. Germany did not like to see Turkey as active in a region Germany liked to see as her own area of influence whereas Turkish activity in the area pointed out British and French influence. Germany was already discontented with the small entente formed by France. Germany was taking the Balkan pact as an action against Bulgaria as well. The second problem with Germany was with the provisions of the Montreux Convention relative to the right of free transit recognized to Soviet ships.

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Despite these, there were no major problems in the Turkish-German bilateral relations. In 1938, Ribbentrop invited Turkey to the revisionist camp and proposed a treaty of neutrality. Turkey said she was concluding such treaties with her neighbor countries only. On the other hand, Germany made efforts to prevent Turkey from joining the other camp. Von Pape, who was assigned as Ambassador to Ankara, drew the attention of Berlin the negative impacts of Italian behavior and urged to make pressure on this country to give assurances to Turkey. Italy was very important for Germany, and Berlin did not comply with his ambassador's warnings. Later, when Turkey's relations with GB and France became more important, Rebbentrop would take some measure against Turkey by stopping delivery of arms and war materiel. However, it was difficult for Germany to bring restrictions on bilateral trade relations because she was importing from Turkey items that she needed for her war industry. On the 1st of September, Germany attacked Poland and the war broke out. Turkey led Germany know that she would remain neutral. During this period, despite political difficulties, Germany was importing 50% of Turkish exportation goods and had a share of 45% in Turkish importations. This preoccupied GB as well. Thus, she offered a cleaning agreement and a credit of 10,000,000 Pounds. Germany retaliated with an offer of 150,000,000 DM in 1938.

The Adhesion of Turkey to the League of Nations. For a long time, Turkey stayed distant vis a vis the League of Nations. She was not happy with the position the League of Nations had taken in the settlement of Mosul issue and did not want to go against the attitude of the URSS either, given that the USSR thought of the League of Nations as a
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ramification of imperialist countries. Turkey kept telling GB and France that she would be member of the organization only if she was provided with a permanent seat in the Council. At the start of 1930s, an improvement of the relations with GB and the experience of Mosul had shown that being outside of the Organization was more harmful then being inside. This pushed Turkey to change this policy. The USSR was no more against the membership of Turkey. Turkey informed the Organization that she would join if she was invited to. Consequently, she was invited following a motion made by Spain and seconded by Greece. Relations with the USSR Until the years 1930s, relations between Turkey and the USSR were shaped by cooperation under the impacts of the international situation. However during these years we notice the establishment of some sort of balance in the relations between the two countries due to the fact that Turkey had solved her problems with Western States and that Turkish foreign policy was no longer dependent on the URSS. In 1930, T. Rt visited Moscow. In 1931, a Protocol on the limitation of naval forces in the Black Sea as well as in neighboring seas was signed in Ankara. The two parties committed not to increase their naval forces without informing each other six months in advance. The 1925 Treaty was also prorogated. In 1932, Inn paid a visit to Odessa, Moscow, Leningrad and Harcow. During this visit,
i.

Inonu convinced the URSS not to oppose Turkish membership to the League of Nations, but Turkey would not take part in any sanctions that might be imposed on the USSR as long as the URSS was not the aggressing part in an armed conflict.
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ii.

The USSR gave financial credit to Turkey. Turkey was given important contributions by Soviet experts in the preparation of her five-year economic development program. The credit obtained, one third of which was needed for the implementation of this program, would be used for building the Kayseri and Nazilli textile factories. A meeting between Ataturk and Stalin in September 1934 was

decided upon, yet could not be realized. In 1933, Voroshilof, Defense Minister of the URSS, paid a visit to Turkey. Turkey was seeking the amendment of arrangements adopted in Lausanne vis a vis the Straits. She raised this question during diverse international environments in 1933 and 1935, and bilaterally with GB and the URSS. In 1936 she made a note and asked the Lausanne Convention to be amended. The USSR were not happy with the clauses that were allowing free passage to all ships and wanted this be restricted to countries with coasts on the Black Sea only. The USSR were also in favor of the militarizing the Straits but wanted to be the country that would realize this for Turkey. When the Montreux Conference was held, The USSR offered alliance to Turkey. Turkey proposed instead a commitment of the USSR to help Turkey if attacked form the Mediterranean. USSR did not think it could afford that. Turkey let GB be informed of these talks and GB warned that an additional alliance over the Montreux Convention would make the Convention lose its value. All of these developments cooled down the relations between Turkey and the USSR. In 1937, T. Rt went to Moscow but could obtain no positive development. In 1938 Saracoglu, the Minister for Foreign Affairs paid a visit to Moscow. In 1939, talks on the possibility of a pact did not give any result. However, Turkey stayed out of the war that broke out and this was
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comfortable for the URSS because the straits would be closed to ships belonging to fighting countries. RELATIONS WITH GREECE By 1928, Turkey had normalized her relations with GB and France, and had started to be active in maintaining peace and the status quo in the Balkans. In Greece, Venizelos who had come to power with strong majority votes gave an end to the long lasting instability in the country, left his irredentist policies and adopted a peaceful policy defending the status quo as well. The two countries were aware of the negative effects of military expenses resulting from the lack of confidence they had with respect to each other. They also understood that they were in need of each other in the face of threats originating from Italy and Bulgari. After 1928, an agreement about the Islands and mutual neutrality was signed between Ankara and Rome. That same year, Greece signed a similar agreement with Italy. Italy was desirous to conclude a Balkan pact with Turkey and Greece. She was trying to help these countries in finding compromises to overcome their bilateral difficulties. However, Turkey and Greece did not trust Italy and started to improve their relations with each other. In 1928, Venizelos stated in a letter to Inonu that Greece had no territorial claims on Turkey and expressed the expectation that Turkey as well did not hold any such claims on Greece either. Inonu responded positively. These developments led the two States to sign in June 1930 a Convention on the final settlement of problems stemming from the Lausanne Treaty. This convention made a clear cut definition of the word etabli. New arrangements were made with regard to the properties of exchanged populations and some financial problems were resolved as well. After this, relations improved quickly. Venizelos came to Ankara the same year and a period of friendship started.

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During Venizelos visit three documents were signed: - the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitrage (a protocol on the limitations of naval forces), a Trade, Settlement and a Communications Agreement. This last agreement recognized for each partys citizens the right to hold property, to trade, to found companies, and to exploit maritime lines within the other partys territory. The main goals of the agreement were to: 1. Create a free trade area in Aegean region to promote economies;
2. Bring solutions to the deficit of qualified manpower in Turkey after the

departure of the Greek population, and to 3. Lessen unemployment in Greece. After this agreement, a great number of Greeks came to Turkey. Despite this agreement, some Greek etablis still emigrated to Greece due to the Turkish law consacrating some jobs to Turks only. In 1931, Inn visited Athens. Good relations between the two countries continued after the resignation of Venizelos from his post of Prime Minister. In 1933, Ismet Pasa and Caldaris signed in Ankara the Document of Sincere Agreement between Turkey and Greece. This document was obviously addressing to the potential of Bulgarian aggression.With this agreement, parties assured the defense of common frontiers mutually and agreed to consult each other on all international issues of common interest. The same year an agreement of clearing was signed. In 1934, a Turkish-Greek Trade Office was founded. Venizelos came to power again and was proposed as candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize.

THE BALKAN ENTENTE

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The issue of Cooperation for the security between Balkan countries was raised several times but the first important step was taken in October 1929 in Athens. During the 27th World Peace Congress, Papanastsiu, Greek Prime Minister, proposed the foundation of a Balkan Union Institute. The proposal was welcomed by participating Balkan states and it was decided that yearly meetings among them would be organized. The 1st Balkan Conference met in Athene in October 1930. (Albany, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece) They decided: 1. Yearly ministerial meetings; 2. Elaboration of a Balkan Pact which would ban war, would ask parties to proceed to peaceful solutions of conflicts 3. Foundation of an organization for Balkan cooperation. The 2nd Balkan Conference met in October 1931 in Istanbul; economic and technical relations were taken up. Ankara and Greece undertook all efforts to prepare a pact, yet Albania and Bulgaria under Italian influence were staying cool to the idea. The 3rd Balkan Conference in 1932 in Bucarest took up minority issues, and Bulgaria left the conference when she understood that decisions would not be the ones she wished to get. The remaining five countries decided to found a Balkan Chamber of commerce and Industry, a Balkan Office of Workers, a Balkan Union of Post and a Customs Union. In September 1933 Inn visited Sofia to convince Bulgaria to come back to the Balkan conferences but failed.

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The 4TH Conference in 1933 occurred in Salonique; it was decided to conclude the Balkan Pact without Bulgaria. The Pact would be signed in 1934. It was more against a Bulgarian aggression then against an Italian one. With this document Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece and Romania reassured each other mutually about their borders in Balkans, adopted consultations, agreed not to take any commitment vis a vis a third Balkan country without the permission of the Signatories. Turkey and Greece made reservations to the Pact: Turkey would not participate in any action that might be taken against the USSR and Greece would not be forced to fight a war against Italy. The Turkish-Greek rapprochement opened the way to the Balkan Pact; yet, as Albania and Bulgaria were not included in the pact, this one was not up to assure enough protection for its members in case of war. Thus Turkey and Greece increased their common defense efforts and their cooperation in the military field. In 1936, when Turkey sought the revision of the dispositions of the Lausanne Treaty regarding the Straits, she had the support of Greece. The friendship was pushed so far that T. Rt Bey declared in a speech on the Montreux Convention that this convention was abolishing the militarized status of Limni and Semadirek islands. This declaration would be exploited later by Greece when violating the militarized status of these islands according to Montreux. In 1936 Metaxas came to power in Greece. He was also convinced to the necessity of Turkish-Greek cooperation on the military filed because Greece would not be able to defend herself alone. In 1937 Yugoslavia signed a friendship agreement with Bulgaria and the Balkan entente decided the abolishment of the militarized status of borders in Balkans. These developments increased the preoccupations in Greece. In 1938 Turkey and Greece signed new documents to complete the 1930

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friendship agreement and the 1933 Sincerity agreement. Each party committed not to allow their territory to be used against the other party by hostile activists. The Rapprochement also covered the cultural field. Minorities in both countries benefited from these developments. Turkey stopped to give support to Papa Eftim and refrained to intervene to the elections of the Patriarch, diminished her pressures on Greek schools, and in Greece similar measures were taken in Western Thrace, expatriating opponents of the Turkish regime, and adopting the use of the Latin alphabet in Muslim schools. Nevertheless, Greece took profit from these good relations with Turkey and took advantage in order to fortify her position in the Aegean. In 1931, she declared that she was expanding her air space from 3 miles to 10 miles, and in 1936 her territorial waters were expanded from 3 miles to 6 miles. Turkey failed to react in the good atmosphere of friendly relations. RELATIONS WITH IRAN The 3rd Agr revolt which had started in 1930 turned into a crisis between Turkey and Iran. Revoltees were escaping from the forces of order and were taking refuge in Kk Agri in Iran. Turkey was forced to occupy this area militarily in order to put an end to this situation. She proposed a piece of land without strategic importance in exchange; this was not accepted by Iran. She insisted on keeping the 1913 protocol on the borders unchanged. This protocol was never ratified by Turkey. The aim of Iran was to obtain recognition of this protocol - which contained dispositions in favor of Iran, with regard to borders with Iraq on Sattul Arap. She wanted to use this against Iraq. In 1932, T.Rustu paid a visit to Teharan. The problem was solved through the signature of two documents. Small points upon which no agreement was reached would be submitted to arbitrage. The arbitrator was Riza Sah Pehlevi; he decided in favor of Turkey.
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In 1937 a Treaty determined Turkish Iranian frontiers as they are today. THE SADABAD PACT There were two major reasons for interested States to make a pact among themselves: 1. Desire to give a final end to border problems. In fact most of these problems had been solved in 1937 and now they wanted that situation to continue without further problems. 2. The desire to underline the independence and the sovereignty of these countries. In 1931, King Faysal of Iraq and his Prime Minister Nuri Sait Pasa paid a visit to Turkey. As the border problems were already solved, they took up problems created by the Kurdish airets at border areas. Iraq asked the mediation of Turkey to normalize Iraqi-Iranian relations. In 1933, Iraq proposed a nonaggression Treaty between Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Turkey wanted the GB and the URSS to become member to such a Treaty. (Iraq was under control of GB despite the independence of Iraq; on the other hand the presence of the 1929 agreement with the USSR also played a role). GB was thinking that the League of Nations was a sufficient means for her and was against participation to regional pacts and proposed Afganistan to join this new pact. As GB declined the membership, that of the URSS became no more necessary, thus in October 1935, Turkey, Iran and Iraq initialed Treaty and Afganistan joined later on. However Iraq had some difficulties with the pact, first due to differences with Iran about the borders on Sattul Arap; second, she did not want to be the only Arab country in the pact facing the Hatay problem opposing Syria to
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Turkey. But after the solution of the border problem between the two countries, the Minister of Foreign Affaires of the four countries signed in June 1937 the treaty already initialed in 1935. With this Treaty they committed to the following:
1.

not to intervene with each others the domestic affairs to proceed to consultations on matters of common interest, to refrain from any action against each others

2. 3. 4.

As the War broke out, the pact was shelved until 1979 when Iran abolished it.

The Montreux Convention Turkey had accepted restrictions on the Straits within the Lausanne Treaty because at that time, besides her desire to complete the peace talks as soon as possible, she was thinking that the collective security system established by the League of Nations would work and a general disarmament would be realized. The League of Nations obtained some success with the limitation of naval weapons, but this did not last long. from 1931 on, an arms race started again. Talks on the limitation of land weapons were completely unsuccessful. Germany withdrew from the talks as soon as 1934. The situation was much different as compared to that in the aftermath of the war. In fact, Turkey had been taking steps to change the Lausanne stipulations with regard the Straits since 1933 (Disarmament conference of London). She continued her actions in the Council of the League of Nations in 1935, at the Council of the Balkan Entente. She did find a favorable atmosphere in the League of Nations during the discussion of sanctions against Italy who had aggressed Ethiopia. On 10th of April 1936, with a note to all the signatory states, she argued that the situation in
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the Black Sea as well as in the Mediterranean had completely changed since the signature of Lausanne, and that the collective security system was no more effective The Straits regime now needed to include provisions with regard to the immediate danger of war, while it was not possible to work with Lausannes stipulations. In the face of these Turkish demands the URSS, unhappy with Lausanne as well, was seeking the possibility to amend it in her own favour; Bulgaria was thinking that negotiations about the Turkish Straits would provide her with the occasion to raise the issue of its demilitarized status imposed by the Neuilly Treaty. France did not want to go against the Russian desire of amending the Lausanne stipulations. GB, who wanted to pull Turkey on her side, did not want to antagonize this latter either. The only objection came from Italy, which wanted to take revenge on Turkey for backing the decision of the League about the sanctions against Italy. The conference was held on the 22nd June 1936 in Montreux within the presence of all the signatories of Lausanne except Italy. Turkey wanted to obtain a limitation of the total tonnage and time of journey of ships belonging to nonBlack Sea countries, in order to have more control over the transits in situations where Turkey would feel herself under threat, and in order to get rid of the Commission of the Straits and the demilitarization imposed by Lausanne. GB was against of the abolishment of the commission. She was thinking to give the League of Nations the right to cancel if it deemed it appropriate, in case of a Turkish decision declaring any threat of war. She was also against the restrictions proposed against those States without shores in the Black Sea. URSS was favorable to Turkish views but was not agreeable with restrictions on passage of ships of Black sea countries. The conference ended on 20th June 1936.

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The Montreux Regime 1.


-

Trade vessels. ( Peace time ) Free passage, day and night, inform about their

name and qualifications, no formality other then sanitary ones, guiding services voluntary.
-

(In danger of war) passage only day time and through the road (War time but Turkey is not in war) as peace time (If Turkey is in war) passage of ships belonging to those Passage of ships belonging to countries which are not in war

given by Turkey. Guiding services may be compulsory.


-

countries in war with Turkey: on the discretion of Turkey.


-

with Turkey: free on the conditions that they will not help Turkeys enemies and will pass during day time and following road given by Turkey. 2. i) 000 t. passage with notice, during day time and without stopping War ships with weight more then 15 000t. alone and accompanied maximum by two torpidoes No limitation of duration of journey in the Black Sea War vessels. (Peacetime) Auxiliary ships, light surface ships, small war ships: total number of foreign ships in the Straits no more then 9 total tonnage of foreign ships in the Straits no more then 15

Black Sea countries:

ii)

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Non Black sea Countries: i) ii) iii) 45 000t.) iv) v) No one Black sea country can have in the Black Sea more the 1/3 of the total tonnage of all non-Black Sea country ships (War Time) (Turkey is not in war) All war vessel like peace time Ships forcing LNs sanctions can pass Those which are under an assistance agreement Turkey is (If Turkey is in War or under imminent threat of war) member can pass
viii)

Auxiliary and small vessels: same as for Black Sea countries. Aircraft-carriers and submarines cannot pass Total weight permitted: 30 000t. (may be augmented. until

except: those which had left their port of attachment can return
vi)

vii)

Passages are at the complete discretion Turkey.

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE I I . W O R L D WA R

The Three Partite Alliance Italy occupied Albany on April 1939. Italy who was disappointed at the end of the 1th World war, not being able to obtain a share in Anatolia, but became a neighbor to Turkey by obtaining Dodecanese islands was now giving signals of expansionism in Balkans. Missolini was declaring publicly that the main interest of Italy was in Asia and Africa. For him the Mediterranean was mare nostrum. All these created big concerns in Turkey who was mainly a Mediterranean country with major parts of territories in Asia.

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Great Britain gave guaranties to Greece and Romania in the case of an Italian aggression. Turkey didnt accept a unilateral guaranty from the U.K. and, instead, proposed an alliance with reciprocal engagements. She was in contact with the USSR as well, and, in accordance with the 1929 Protocol, brought the UK proposal to the knowledge of this later which wanted to start immediately to discuss with Turkey the measures to be taken to prevent an Italian aggression. The aim of Turkey was to approach U.K. and France while continuing her friendly relations with the USSR. She was not aware that the USSR was preparing to sign a non aggression treaty with Germany and did not want Turkey to cooperate with other European countries against Germany. Turkey, unaware of all these, was sparing efforts to harmonize her friendship with the UK, France and the USSR, in vain. On May 1939Turkey and the UK made a common declaration and on June, the day Hatay problem had been solved between Turkey and France in Ankara, Turkey, UK and France signed in Paris a common declaration regarding to the conclusion of a definitive long term agreement, and until such an agreement was signed, to cooperate effectively in case an of an aggression in the Mediterranean region. The agreement was not against any other state. Germany made efforts to prevent the signature of the declaration unsuccessfully. The USSR was not happy to see Turkey closer to the UK and France. Italy took it against her and pretending that the Dodecanese Island were under threat, concluded a military alliance with Germany. Conclusion by the USSR a non aggression treaty with Germany in August 1939, at a time when Turkish-British -French negotiations were highly progressed, was a shock for Turkey. Friendship with all these four countries was no more compatible. Now Turkey had no other choice than to count on the guaranties of the UK and France. However when Germany attacked Poland and the Second World War started the negotiations between Turkey and these four states were on way.
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Always in August, the USSR approached Turkey and stating that the non aggression agreement with Germany aimed at preventing a complot of the UK with Germany against the USSR proposed a reevaluation of Turkish-USSR relations according the new changing situation in Europe. In September Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Saracolu visited Moscow. His main aim was to look for compatibility between Turkeys friendship with the USSR and western countries. Intentions of the USSR were different. They wanted to profit from Moscow talks in seeking to amend the Montreux treaty in their favor and to learn more about the Three Partite Alliance which was taking shape. On the other hand Germany asked the USSR to obtain neutrality of Turkey. Saracolus 26 days negotiations in Moscow ended with failure. The Three Partite Alliance, officially called Treaty on Mutual Aid Between Turkey, Great Britain and France, was foreseeing the following:
i)

In the face of an aggression by a European country in the

Mediterranean area, which may lead to a war involving GB and France, Turkey would effectively cooperate with them and lend them all aid in her power;
ii)

In case of an aggression by a European country in the

Mediterranean area, which may lead to a war involving Turkey, GB and France will effectively cooperate with her and lend her all aid in their power;
iii)

If France and GB enter in a war in virtue of their guarantees

to Romania and Greece, Turkey would effectively cooperate with them and lend them all aid in her power. iv) If GB and France due to an aggression against them enter in a war with a European country allied countries will proceed immediately to consultations. In such a case Turkey would at least adopt a benevolent neutrality towards GB and France.

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On the other hand, according to a secret protocol, GB and France were committed to cooperate effectively with Turkey and lend her all aid in their power if requested by Turkey in case a military action initiated by a European country reached the Bulgarian or Greek frontiers. Another secret military agreement was foreseeing arrangements in case Bulgaria participated in a military action against one of signatories. GB and France committed to give financial and other material aid to Turkey by a special agreement. Commitments of Turkey would come into force after GB and France would honor their commitments in the special agreement. With a protocol Turkey made the reservation that she would not be forced to be led to an armed conflict with USSR under the commitments she undertook with this Treaty. But we may note that USSR which had qualified the TurkishBritish declaration as a peaceful initiative at the start, declared that She was taking the Three Partite Alliance as an element of war. They condemned Turkey for serving the interest of GB and France which wanted to extend the war to the Balkans, for creating a common military camp with these States against Germany, for spoiling URSS-German relations. Molotov was saying that Turkey would regret this. Thus Turkey who was seeking alliance with GB and France faced Italian threats was running into a Soviet threats just in the first months of the War. Turkeys Efforts to stay out of the War.

Turkey, although adhered tone of the adverse camps, with the desire to stay as neutral as possible, tried to continue her trade relations with both parties. Both parties were importing chrome ore from Turkey; as the production was not sufficient to meet all the demand, Turkey was forced to apply limits to her chrome exportations to each customer country. By so doing She was not

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allowing one country to obtain the monopoly of Chrome importations from Turkey. On the other hand each camp was pressuring Turkey not to provide the other camp with this strategic raw material. She wanted to balance her economic relations through an agreement with GB, although she had difficulties to convert her industrial demands from Germany to GB. But in August 1939, as talks on the prorogation of Turkish-German trade agreement failed due to the German insistence on minimum chrome ore deliveries, Turkey proceeded to sign some agreements with GB and France, recognizing for them the right to purchase all Turkish Chrome ore production for two years. With this agreement GB and France were giving Turkey credits of a total of 27,000,000 Pounds. In the mean time, talks continued also with Germany; in the end, a one year trade agreement which did not include chrome ore delivery was signed in June 1940. At that time, Germany and the USSR were thinking that the only way to prevent Turkey to enter in the war was to keep her fearful from the Soviet Union and invoke her reservation with regard the USSR in the Tri-Partite Alliance. Turkey would not enter the war as long as Italy was not in war. They were thinking that even in this case Turkey would raise her reservation with regard to the USSR in order to stay out of the War. In fact Turkey was affirming herself this possibility, to both camps, herself. Italy declared war to GB and France on June 10th 1940, after the withdrawal of allied forces from Dunquerque. This was giving force to the Tri-Partite Treaty. When Turkey was discussing what to do before this situation, Italy was warning the Mediterranean and Balkan countries that if they would leave their neutrality war would be extended these areas. Germany was urging Turkey not to break off her relations with Germany and Italy. On the other side, GB and France were saying that Turkey should then enter the war.

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In fact GB and France gave notes to Turkey to ask her to join them in the war. But armaments promised by the tripartite Treaty were not yet delivered. How to be sure that USSR would not attack Turkey in case Turkey would enter the war at the side of GB and France? There were rumors that USSR was preparing a campaign with Bulgaria towards the Dardanelles. Turkey, referring to her reservation with regard to USSR, decided to maintain her neutrality. Allies continued to pressure Turkey, arguing that her preoccupations about possible Soviet behavior were not valid. The collapse of France and its truce with Germany gave Turkey a new argument: one of the countries that were to aid Turkey had surrendered. The French press wrote that the Vichy Government might declare war to GB. Thus GB was alone before her strong enemy and was not able to give the promised aid to Turkey any more. Turkey made a declaration on 26th June on her determination not to be party in the war in virtue of her reservation. In fact the wording of the Tripartite treaty which foresees all aids in her power may be discussed and be interpreted as meaning entry of war as well as aids without entering to war which was not possible for Turkey due to the Soviet Threat. But in GB people were thinking that in this situation GB would have the right to consider her own position, had Turkey need GB for the commitments of this latter. On the 7th October German forces entered Romania and on the 28th October Italy attacked Greece. This brought to the agenda the provisions of the Balkan Entente as well as the provision of the Three Partite Treaty concerning an aggression in Balkans. Normally the Balkan entente was an assurance for the frontiers inside the Balkans and not for exterior frontiers, thus this could not force Turkey to enter to war. Against the assurance given to Greece, there was Turkish reservation again with regard to USSR. In fact GB did not also ask Turkey to enter the war, thinking that deployment of Turkish troops in Greece would jeopardize the security of Turkey.
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There were also different views in London as to forcing Turkey to enter in the War. Churchill was affirming that GB wished Turkey to enter in the war as soon as possible but this would be necessary only if Bulgaria took military action alone or with the support of Germany. Turkey was contented with letting Bulgaria know that, Turkey would declare war to Bulgaria according the Balkan Entente if Bulgaria attacked Greece. But with Italians in Greece Turkey felt herself completely surrounded. In fact France could no longer fulfill the requirements of the Three Partite Alliance. G.Britain not only could not give adequate equipment to Turkey, but also she herself faced the possibility of a collapse under the strain placed on her. On July 1940 Germany published a White Book based on the captured French documents in occupied France related to Allied plan of attacking Soviet oil centers. The German publication manufactured the lie that Turks were preparing to undertake an offensive with Allied aid. Turkey categorically denied the existence of such a plan. But this publication disturbed the Turkish efforts to prepare the way for a more intimate Russian-British-Turkish relation. Events would prove the Turkish attitude to be right. GB stayed alone once France was out of the War, and was unable to give necessary aid to Greece. In Germany the thought was that if Turkey took action in Greece the Straits would be attacked to open the way to Syria, but Hitler who focused his attention to the USSR after his meeting with Molotov, was thinking that an operation on Turkey would delay German military initiatives on USSR and decided to avoid any conflict with Turkey. The extension of the war from Western Europe to Eastern Europe shook the Germen-Soviet cooperation seriously. Soviet started to think that Germans were entering in their zone of security and Germans and Italians did not like the USSR to dominate the Balkans. Conflicts of interest had started.

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In the mean time, while making efforts to convince Turkey to make a pact by giving Turkey guarantees, Germany was seeking to include the USSR among the Axis countries and to this end she was bargaining over Turkey. During Molotovs visit to Berlin on the 12th of November, Molotov and Ribbendrop agreed that in case the USSR, Germany, Japan and Italy could find common ground, Turkey would join them. Ribbendrop said that Germany understood the Soviet attitude vis a vis the Montreux Convention, that this convention should be redrafted between Turkey, USSR, Germany and Italy; and that Germany was always ready to help USSR to amend the Convention according to Soviet wishes. They agreed on the free passage of war and trade ships through the Dardanelles with special privileges to USSR. For that Molotov was thinking that it would be necessary for Germany to give guarantees to Bulgaria. In his talks with Hitler, Molotov insisted on the same point. Hitler said that Bulgaria should be asked whether she would like to have such guarantees and pointed out that he also needed to consult with Mussolini. Molotov added that Russia wanted to obtain a guarantee against an attack on the Black Sea via the Straits not only on paper, but in reality and asked some points of control on the Aegean islands and on the Straits. It meant that the USSR was asking for bases in the Aegean and in Dardanelles in return for joining the Axis. Molotov requested Kars and Ardahan as well. The USSR also wanted that the South of Batum and Baku would be recognized as Soviet influence zone. Germany, in order to gain some time until military action on USSR could start, wished to take the views of Bulgaria and Italy. In October 1940, the USSR gave Germany a written document about Soviet demands. Before Molotov left Berlin, Ribbendrop gave him a project of a Treaty dividing the world into German, Japanese, Italian and Soviet zones of influence, amending the Montreux convention to recognize unlimited right of passage to the USSR while closing the Straits to warships of non Black sea countries other then Germany and Italy. Turkey was not in a zone of influence, which meant
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that Germany would not allow the USSR to control Turkey through Balkans and Dardanelles. In its reply to this project, the USSR included among its conditions a Soviet Bulgarian mutual assistance pact and a Soviet base on the Straits. But Germany did not want to share the Straits with a third country and the Soviet claims on Dardanelles reminded Hitler that it was time to bring to an end the Germano- Soviet cooperation. . In its reply to this project, the USSR included among its conditions a Soviet Bulgarian mutual assistance pact and a Soviet base on the Straits. But Germany did not want to share the Straits with a third country and the Soviet claims on Dardanelles reminded Hitler that it was time to bring to an end the GermanoSoviet cooperation. Turkey heard about the Germano-Soviet bargain over Turkey for the first time in March 1941 by what Hitler said to the Turkish envoy. The only difficulty for the USSR to join the Axis was the German refusal to Soviet claims for bases on the Dardanelles and in Bulgaria. German pressures on Turkey in 1941-1943 In January 1941, German troops were sent to Romania via Hungary with full concurrence of Hungarian and Rumanian Governments. The German Foreign Minister said that they were aimed exclusively at getting a foothold in Greece and not at the Balkans, nor Turkey. The USSR suspected that these German troops were aiming at Bulgaria, Greece and the Straits. The Soviet Union was considering Bulgaria and the Straits to be within their influence zone and let Germany know that the appearance of any foreign forces in these areas would be considered by the USSR as a violation of its security interests. Germany replied that she had no

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intention to occupy the Straits and that it would respect Turkish territorial integrity unless Turkey committed a hostile act against Germany. A Turco-Bulgarian Declaration on February, referred to as the mutual confidence and friendship declaration, stressed the mutual respect of territorial integrity, good-neighborhood and non aggression between the two countries. This declaration was interpreted to be a victory of Germany. But the declaration contained an escape clause to reassure GB. The entry of the German army into Bulgaria on March 1st, 1941 alarmed the Turkish Government. Hitler sent a personal letter to Inn on the 4th of March assuring him that German troops would be kept at a distance of 6 km. from the Turkish border and that Germany had no aggressive intentions against Turkey. Despite these assurances Turkey blew up the bridges on the Meri for good measure. On March 18th, a meeting took place between Saracolu and Eden in Cyprus. A communiqu issued on March 19th stressed the points of view of the Parties. In March 24 Turkey demanded complete neutrality of the URSS in case of an attack to Turkey. USSR replied positively. On April 4th, 1941, Rait Ali - a former Prime Minister of Iraq - made a coup and seized power in Bagdad. He was in touch with the anti-British Arab Leader, the ex-Grand Mft of Jerusalem. Ankara refused to transmit arms from Syria to Rait Ali via Turkey. On April 6th, Germans and Hungarians attacked Yugoslavia, and Germans and Bulgarians attacked Greece. Churchill concluded in the House of Common that at present time Hitler was driving South East to the Balkans and at any moment he might turn upon Turkey. Yugoslavia was crushed on the 17th of April and Greece surrendered on the 23rd of April. The German Foreign Minister instructed German Ambassador in Ankara to endeavor to obtain from Turkey the permission of secret passage of arms to Iraq through Turkey. In order to attract
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Turkey in the orbit of the Axis, Hitler seemed considering to offer Syria to Turkey. The Turco-German Treaty of non aggression. In May 1941, Germany envisaged a Treaty of friendship to be presented to Turkey as a German guarantee against Soviet designs and a secret agreement by which Germany would have the right to transit for war material and troops. Ribbendrop also proposed the rectification of Bulgarian frontiers in favor of Turkey. Before the success Germany obtained in the Balkans, in the Aegean and North Africa, it could easily be realized that Turkey was in no position to stand against that country. The Turkish Government kept the G. Britain informed of her talks with Germans and resisted German demands of omitting references on validity of the Treaty of Turkey with G.B. Germans even tried threatening Turkey, saying that She would be attacked if they did not conclude the Treaty. Thus, on 18th June 1941 Turkey signed a Treaty of non aggression . The Preamble of the Treaty was stating that the two countries concluded this Treaty subject to the reservation of their existing engagements. The two countries undertook to respect each others territorial inviolability and integrity, to refrain from any kind of direct or indirect action against each other. Turkey gave GB assurances that she would not allow German troupes and military materiel pass through Turkey. Italy attempted to make a similar agreement with Turkey without success.. Nazi troops had crossed the Soviet frontiers by the 22nd June 1941. Moscow discovered that the Montreux convention contained some provisions extremely beneficial for Soviets. By virtue of the Montreux settlement, Turkey could guard the Straits, and therefore, Soviet security. Turkey announced her neutrality. If the Russian war was successful German forces would drive through Iran in the winter and ten German divisions would pass from Bulgaria to Syria
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and Iraq trough Anatolia. In case Turkey resisted, the Germans planned that they would need double that strength. When German armies advanced towards the Turkish speaking areas of Russia, the German Ambassador in Ankara hoped to secure Turkish cooperation by conceding to Turkey the right to organize the liberated Turkish lands. Von Papen considered offering to Turks two Caspian provinces of Iran in return for a break with G.B. When Hitler hinted that Turkey might take over Turkish speaking areas of Russia, Turkish Ambassadors in Berlin did not want to discuss such a suggestion. However, some documents indicate that German success in Turkish speaking areas of Russia aroused hopes among Turco-Tatar leaders, in Turkey and elsewhere. The fact that Britain and the Soviets had now made common cause against Germany would affect their relations with Turkey. In fact, on the 10th of August the British and Soviet Ambassadors in Ankara presented declarations to the Turkish government confirming their fidelity to the Montreux Convention and assuring that they had no aggressive intentions or whatever claims regarding the Straits. They pointed out that they were prepared scrupulously to observe the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic and that they would render Turkey every help in the event she would be attacked by any European country. Sea communications between Turkey and Western Europe having been interrupted, Turkey felt the necessity of resuming commercial relations with Germany. The guarantee to sell chrome production to Britain had expired and Germans insisted that Turkey should sell it to them. Turkey was selling exclusively to GB since the beginning of the war. GB proposed to extend the chrome arrangement. In the end, Turkey preferred to extend her chrome agreement with the G.B. for one more year. Nevertheless, despite this Turkey entered in 1942 into a chrome agreement with Germany with British consent, and under the condition that Germany sold Turkey some war materials.
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Four days prior to the Japanese attack to Pearl Harbor, The USA declared that the defense of Turkey was essential for the defense of the USA, and extended land-lease assistance to Turkey on December 1941. After the USA declaration of war to the Axis Powers, Turkey maintained her neutrality in the new conflict. On July 8 th 1942, the Turkish Prime Minister died; Saracoglu, old friend of the Allies became Prime Minister. Despite this, relations of Turkey with Allies were impaired during the summer of 1942 by the strong tone of the Anglo-American press. The enthusiasm of the Western countries for the heroic resistance of the Russian population created suspicion about Allied intentions among Turks, suspicions that Allies would make concessions to the USSR at the expense of Turkey. October brought the successful British counter-offensive at El Alamein and the Soviet victory at Stalingrad. The news on Romels retreat was a great relief for Turkey who had never been happy at the proximity of German forces. British defeat would not coincide with Turkish interests, which demanded equilibrium of forces in the Mediterranean and not the total predominance of Germany or Italy. Turkey feared also that a complete Soviet victory would give Russians a free hand in an impoverished and exhausted Europe. Churchill set out to develop a strategy that would take full advantage of the success won in North Africa and at Stalingrad. The plan he set forth in November 1942 was threefold. In Western Europe, he wanted the Americans to sent large number of troops to the British Isles, ready to descend upon Continental Europe at an appropriate moment. He advocated an attack on Italy in the Central Mediterranean. In the Eastern Mediterranean, he entertained hopes of bringing Turkey into war in the spring of 1943. Turkey was an Ally and she would ask a seat at the peace conference. He suggested to offer Turkey a
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Soviet-American-British guarantee of territorial integrity as well as to equip her with tanks and guns. URSS agreed with these ideas. In the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, Churchill said that if Turks were not inclined to enter the war he would tell them that he could not undertake to refrain Russians in the Straits issue. However, Americans were reluctant about Turkish participation in the war, thinking that a new front in the Balkans would entail more men and more war materiel. But in the end, GB and the USA agreed on doing everything to bring Turkey into the war. The Turkish President accepted to meet Churchill, and they met in Adana on 30th January. Churchill made everything to attract Inn to into the war, yet there were also strong arguments against encouraging Turkey to take too great a risk; by prudence no formal request was made for Turkish entry into the war. The official communiqu referred to the identity of Turkish and British points of views and that the British Government had viewed Turkish policy with sympathy and understanding. As a result of the Adana Conference G.Britain undertook to provide the Turks with additional war material. Britain also did not seem to object to the German material aid to Turkey since this would only strengthen the defenses of an Ally. Churchill and Roosevelt met on 12-16 May in Washington. While discussing the possibility of landing troops in the South of Italy, they took up to induce Turkey in war and to attack Rumanian oil fields (which were on the hands of Germans) from Turkish airfields and to open a second front in the Balkans. Roosevelt was for landing troops via the British Channel instead of opening a new front. They met again in Qubec on 11-24 August. They decided that even if it seemed early for a Turkish entry into the war, they would demand Turkey to open her airfield for Allied use. They decided also to continue to help Turkey militarily, to demand Turkey to stop her sales of Chrome ore to Germany and not to let German Ships pass through the Dardanelles. What was
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interesting for Turkey was that at this conference, the USSR made opposition to the idea of a new front in the Balkans and insisted to obtain that Turkey enter into the War. This insistence was aiming also to avoid having an additional front in the Balkans. The Italian armistice was announced on the 8th of September, 1943. GB sent troops to the Dodecanese and to other Islands under Italian occupation. However, the problem was about how munitions and provisions were to be supplied to British troops positioned there. The Turkish Government came to the help of GB without hesitation and supplies were regularly shipped from the Turkish mainland. Turkey allowed also stores dispatched from Syria by rail to the Turkish port opposite to Laros. But without the use of the Turkish airports the British troops would find it difficult to keep their position. This question was brought up at the Moscow Conference of the Big Three in October-November. Roosevelt supported efforts to get Turkey into the war. Eden could not persuade Turks. On November 16th, Germans occupied the Aegean islands and the British troops and Greek civilians were evacuated from Samos to pass Turkey. At the Moscow Conference on October 19th, it was agreed that a hopeful contribution to an early victory would be obtained with Turkey to become belligerent, preferably by the end of 1943. Eden invited Menemencioglu for a meeting in Cairo on November and eloquently set forth the reasons in favor of Turkeys entry into the war. It was decided that the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs should return to report to his Government.. By the 17th of November, The Turkish Government and the National Assembly had thoroughly examined British requests. Germans had already compelled to surrender the British garrisons on the Islands of Kos and Leros. These British failures at areas too close diminished the Turkish willingness to enter the war. However, the Turkish Government announced to the British Ambassador in Ankara the Turkish decision to enter in war, however making it clear that this would be impossible

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unless Turkey received adequate defense material and that all planning for military cooperation in Balkans should be made beforehand. The question of inducing Turkey to enter into the war was discussed at the Teheran Conference on 28th November-1st December. Stalin admitted that Turkey would be a useful Ally, but added that an eastern Mediterranean campaign would be a waste of time when the direct road to Germany passed by France. It seems that Stalin wanted to see the Allied forces in the West of Europe but not in Southern Europe. Churchill insisted on Turkish entry in war. He thought the Allied interests would be served best if AngloAmericans as well as Russians participated in the occupation of the Balkans. But the GB would give only limited air protection to Turkey and the US was against to new commitments in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, the Turkish entry into the war would facilitate communication with the USSR through the Dardanelles, would attract some German forces to Turkey and would diminish military pressure over the USSR and would make possible for the Allies to realize air attacks to Rumania and Bulgaria via Turkey. On the 29th November the chiefs of Staff of the USA, GB and the USSR met together but they could not reach an agreement about future operations, with GB proposing an attack to Rhodes, while the USSR argued that this would delay the attack on France. Thus, Churchill argued again to Roosevelt for operations in Mediterranean. The next day Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin discussed Russias need for ice-free ports west to the Baltic, South of the Turkish Straits, and East Pacific. Roosevelt and Churchill made no commitment to Stalin. At the end it was decided that when Churchill and Roosevelt were in Cairo they should make another effort to persuade Turks. Churchill was authorized to offer Turkey 20 squadrons of fighter planes and to use threats of cutting off all supplies and of refusing to support Turks against any Russian claim for rights in the Straits.

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Churchill and Roosevelt invited Inn to Cairo. The Turkish reply was that if the President was being asked to come to Cairo for discussions on the basis of decisions already taken in Teheran, he would not show up. The Allies gave assurances and Inn accepted the invitation. Roosevelt and Churchill sent their private planes and Inn chose the American one. The representative of the USSR did not attend the Conference. Before he left Turkey, Inn had obtained from the T.G N Assembly the authorization to enter in the war. He let the two leaders insist. Inn said they could not afford more time. Then the talks covered the subject of supplies and the time to train Turkish troops in the use of modern weapons. Roosevelt was not agreeable with the diversion of large quantities of arms and as the talks came to a stalemate Churchill arranged another meeting of his own with Inn. The two leaders agreed on the use of air bases. Pending the Turkish decision preparatory work, including radar installations was to be carried out. Churchill told Inn that if Turkey was obdurate, he personally would favor a change in the Straits regime. The Americans were relieved rather the disappointed because of the failure to bring Turkey to war immediately. The communiqu issued on the 7th of December stated the closest unity existed between three leaders. In Ankara The German Ambassador learned the negotiation as a result of theft of documents from the British Embassy; he warned the Turkish Foreign Minister that compliance with The British request would inevitably lead to German reprisals with the complete destruction of Istanbul and Izmir. After the Cairo meeting, the Turks replied that they accepted the proposal in principle but added that by allowing RAF to fly Turkish bases they would be risking reprisals by air and by land and asked for proper equipment. The British too understood Turkeys reluctance to declare war to Germany until her needs had been sufficiently met. TurkishBritish taks were at deadlock and the British mission left Ankara on the 3rd of February.

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Turkey, again in isolation, started to follow a more conciliatory policy towards the USSR. Turkish policies became more favorable to the Allies as well. On the 20th April, the Turkish Foreign Ministry announced to suspend all chrome ore deliveries to Germany. Ribbentrop reacted with a sharp message threatening with reprisals. On April 1944, planes appeared over Istanbul and the Government ordered black out. TURKISH DECLARATION OF WAR TO THE AXIS POWERS. While the Soviet armies were positioned on the borders of Romania, Churchill thought that Turkeys entry at this stage would have a potent in future of Southeastern Europe; yet he feared that Turkey would ask for aircrafts and for joint military operations in Bulgaria and the Aegean. He preferred for Turkey to break all her relations with Germany as a first step. The growing power of the USSR made it impossible for Turkey to risk falling into Allies bad grace. Ankara decided to break off her relations with Germany on the 2nd August 1944. On January 10th, Stalin raised the question of the Straits in Yalta. He said that he would not accept Turkey to have a hand on Russias throat. Roosevelt expressed a firm conviction that the USSR would have access to a warm-water port. In Yalta, it was decided that the three Foreign Ministers would meet in London to make proposals on the Montreux Convention. The big Three agreed at Yalta to invite to the post war Peace Conference only those nations that had either fought the Axis or would declare war by the 1st March. The Turkish National Assembly unanimously approved in February 1945 the Governments decision to comply with the Yalta decision. In a message to the House of Common, Churchill welcomed Turkey into the ranks of the United Nations.

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If we rapidly review the position of Turkey during the war we can say that, before all, the rapid defeat of France face to Germany put in a difficult situation Turkey which had been calculating that Germany would vest time and loose strength before French troops, and French navy would prevent Italian fleet from acceding to the Mediterranean. As this calculation had been proved wrong, Italy entered in the war and the war was spread out to the Mediterranean. In such case Turkey had to enter into the war as well, according to the Three Partite Alliance. Plus Turkey suddenly found German troops on her borders. Second development which was interesting for Turkey was the German aggression to the USSR. So the risk of being invaded by Germany and the USSR at the same time disappeared. Third important development for Turkey was the defeat of Germany before the USSR, creating again Soviet threat over her. Turkey didnt want to see one of them to obtain a definite success, scaring that the winner would turn against her. What were the impacts of the war on Turkey, in the country? The war had enormous negative effects on Turkish economy, even if she was not a belligerent country. Mobilization of more than one million men deprived of manpower the sector of agriculture the economy was based on. Industry declined intensely. Turkey made acquaintance with inflation which was due partly to circumstances, partly to bad administration. Black market developed. New riches from lower social classes proliferated. Public investments stopped. In 1942 tax on the wealth (varlk vergisi) was put into force.

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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AFTER WORLD WA R I I

1. TURKEY IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER A. The International Situation The first tangible consequence of the World War II was that at the end of the war, Western Europe that was at the center of the world system - lost its privileged position. The war was won not by European countries, but by the USA and the USSR. These two states were militarily stronger, while they represented two opposite economical and political systems and two different ideologies. As a result, other countries in their respective fields of attraction grouped around them, forming two hostile camps. We name this a two-pole system. One pole - the USA supported capitalism, liberal economy and free trade, democracy based on individual freedoms and political parties. On the other hand, the other pole led by USSR - advocated communism, state monopoly in the whole economy and trade, and a dictatorship of workers which, in practice, turned out to be a dictatorship of a small group of rulers. These two poles were organized militarily in two politico-military organizations: NATO and the Warshow Pact. This political, economical and military division of the World bore what we call the Cold war. In the economic area, the US organized the new world economy under her leadership through two main international economic organizations: the IMF and the World Bank. We call this the Bretton Woods System. In fact, an
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international conference held in 1944 in Bretton Woods, USA, led to the decision to found an organization which would help member countries with their balance of payments by giving them credits through a Stability Fund. Turkey became member of the IMF in March 1947. A second international economic organization was also created in Bretton Woods: the World Bank, which was designed to grant long term investmentminded credits to member countries which were also members of the IMF. In both of these organizations, decisions were largely based upon the quotas or financial contributions of member countries; rich capitalist countries such as the USA had the biggest quotas, with the consequence that these latter had an efficient control of the international economy. Later, a third international economic organization - the GATT - would join these in 1947 with the aim to liberalize world trade. The USSR, in response to this western organizations system, and after replacing the leaders of the communist governments of Eastern Europe by prosoviet leaders, founded in 1949 an organization called the COMECON. This latter aimed at promoting the economic developments of member countries and at the coordination of their respective economic activities. As the USSR exploited this organization for its own political goals, it naturally did not yield the same efficiency as the Bretton Woods system. B. Relations with the USSR until the early 1950s

The Soviet economy suffered very much during the War, where 27 million Soviet citizens lost their lives. In 1946, the federation accepted its 4th five-year economic plan, envisaging a restructuring of the Soviet economy.

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However, if this plan reached its goals in the industrial area, it failed in promoting agriculture. In the domestic policy, The Cyrillic alphabet was imposed to all nations in the Union, while the Communist Party was reorganized. Stalin took all the powers into his own hands. Despite economic difficulties, the Soviet Union felt - for security reasons - the need to obtain the nuclear weapons to face the USA. As to foreign policy, the Cominform was founded in 1947 with the participation of the C.P. of the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, France and Italy in order to ensure cooperation between these countries. By this time, all Eastern European Communist countries were under the Soviet influence. In 1949, Communist China joined the Communist camp. Moscow, with a note to the Turkish Ambassador in March 1945 had denounced the 1925 Turco-Soviet Treaty arguing that the circumstances had now changed after the War, and, a few days later, offered that new talks be started with a new Treaty in view. Turkey asked the Soviets what conditions a new Treaty would bear. In June, Molotov proposed to the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow that amendment be made to the Montreux Convention. As the Ambassador replied that this question could not be treated bilaterally, he asked that the Turco-Soviet frontiers delimited in 1921 be review, claiming Kars and Ardahan. Molotov received Ambassador Sarper again ten days later and renewed these Soviet propositions. The Soviets were aiming to obtain amendments on the Montreux Convention; it seemed that they also wanted to make territorial claims in order to force Turkey to agree on such amendments in favor of the USSR.

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The USSR brought these claims up again in the Potsdam Conference between allied countries to settle the questions related to Poland, the frontiers of post-war Germany, issues concerning indemnities, etc. Molotov pointed out to Churchill that, if it was not possible to provide the USSR with an enhanced position in the Marmara Sea, the Allied should concede them a military base in Dedeaa. Churchill let him know that he was backing these claims on the Straits, but that these requirements should be met while keeping in full respect to the Turkish territorial integrity. USSR tabled a document requiring the abolition of the Montreux Convention; this document was proposing that the security of the Straits should be assured by both Turkey and the USSR, and that the USSR should be given territorial concessions. At the end of the Conference, Parties declared that they had agreed on proceeding to the amendment of Montreux, but that the question would be settled through bilateral talks which each Party would undertake with Turkey. There was no clear agreement on other issues. Truman was thinking that territorial questions were up to Turkey and the USSR. In other words, Turkey was left to face the USSR on her own. Open-air meetings were held in Istanbul with the USSR. In the mean time, a Georgian professor wrote an article claiming Ardahan, Artvin, Oltu; Tortum; Ispir, Bayburt, Gmahe, and Giresun for Georgia. After Potsdam, First note came to Turkey From the USA on 2nd November 1945 :1)Straits should always be open to all countries trade ships, 2) free transit for Black sea countries war ships, 3) passage of non-Black sea countries war vessels should always be prohibited with the exception of under a certain tonnage or under UN authorization 4) League of Nations should be replaced by the UN, 5) An international Conference should be held to achieve these amendments.

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Soviet Note arrived on the 7th August 1946: Montreux regime does not correspond to the security interests of the Black sea countries. The USSR propose: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Free transit of all trade ships; 2) Free transit far war vessels of Black sea countries; 3) prohibition of transit for war vessels of non-Black sea countries with 4)Straits regime should be under the authority of Turkey and other Black 5) As the most interested and most able countries Turkey and the USSR

pre-agreed exceptions sea countries; should assume in common the security of the Straits and they would take necessary measures to avoid that the Straits be used against the interests of the Black sea countries. This note awakened the USA and the GB. USA took this note as intended more to put Turkey under Soviet hegemony rather then to give Straits a new regime. Both countries replied the USSR on 19 and 21 August refusing the proposal to give the regime of the Straits solely to the authority of the Black Sea countries and stressed that Turkey was responsible of the security of the Straits. Turkey encouraged by the USA note, replied on the 22nd of August: Turkey was agreeable with a Conference to be held to adapt Montreux regime to new technological changes and was not against of the first three Soviet proposals but declared 4th and 5th proposals unacceptable. USSR insisted on their claims with another note on September. Turkey refusing again Soviet claims informed the USA and the GB about Soviet insistence. This Soviet demarche made to Turkey was replied by the GB who were asking the USSR to stop this correspondence started according to the decisions taken in Potsdam .The USA in her note to the USSR emphasized that Montreux Convention could only be changed through negotiations of all signatory countries , included the USA. USA let the USSR know that in case of
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an attack to the Straits the USA would proceed to activate the UN Security Counsel procedures. Moscow who disposed the right to veto in the Security Counsel did not take this last threat serious. We have to note that in adopting these policies, the aim of the USA was not to protect Turkey against USSR but to defend their own national interests. In fact as the relations were tending with the USSR, the USA was taking in every point of the world such policies challenging the USSR. Turkey sent her reply to the USSR to all signatories of Lausanne Convention with the exception of Japan, to inform them about the developments. As her second demarche was refused also, the USSR would not raise the issue again. TRUMAN DOCTRNE The USA-USSR relations started to deteriorate since the beginning of 1947. Fear from the Red Danger In the American public opinion conditioned the attitude of the people and the Administration vis a vis the USSR. In 12th March 1947 President Truman, in a speech before the parliament stated that the world was at the threshold of division between two series of ideological principles. On this speech he was declaring also the financial help to Greece and Turkey which is known as Truman Doctrine. We shall come back to this point again when treating the relations with the USA. Truman Doctrine was followed by Marshall Aid in 1948 while the USSR was taking all the control in the East Europe. The press in the Soviet Union started a campaign against the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. She protested by a Note the Turkish demarches to be member of NATO with a note on the 3rd November 1951.Turkey replied that NATO was a defensive organization and adhered to NATO in February 1952. The USSR would protest the Middle East Command initiative also, as we shall see later. It is to be noted that The USSR not only failed to achieve her goals on Turkey but pushed her also to join the Western Alliance. As to Turkey, it is to be
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discussed weather Turkey would join Western camp against her powerful neighbor if the USSR had not come up with territorial claims. On the other hand it was true that had the USSR obtained the control in Turkey and Greece all the equilibrium in the Middle East and Mediterranean would change. That is why the USA backed these two countries. Thus Turkey slid rapidly to the West, joined NATO , accepted military bases on her territory and became a militarily strong partner of the West in the Middle East and Mediterranean. Turkey was taking this as an assurance for her territorial integrity and sovereignty face to Soviet threats C. .

Relations with the USA until the early 1950s.

It was important for the vital interests of USA to keep Turkey out of the Soviet influence zone. That is why They were interested with the question of the Straits despite they were not a signatory of the Montreux Convention. According a report of the Foreign Service, The American policy for the Straits was : free transit for all trade ships of all the countries and war ships of Black Sea countries in time of peace; prohibition of transit for war ships of non-Black Sea countries if the Black Sea countries are parties in a war; fortifications on the Straits could be made by no country except Turkey; freedom for Turkey to take any measure on the Straits when Turkey is in war or in danger of a war. Before Potsdam what was important for the USA was to avoid a full Russian control over the Straits, She was not impressed so much with the territorial claims of the USSR and suggested that this issue could be solved bilaterally between Turkey and the USSR. At the Potsdam Conference, Parties decided by a protocol that they would discuss the possibility to amend Montreux Convention with Turkey separately. This was giving the USA the right to have a say on the issue for the first time. But Truman who agreed with Stalin to amend the Montreux Convention and who was thinking that the Straits should have a status of
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international waters would change his ideas slowly as the USSR would become stronger in Balkans, and would start to defend that the Straits should be under full Turkish sovereignty. On the 20th August 1945 Turkey demanded from the USA and the GB that freedom of transit through the Straits and the peace in the aria should be put under the US guarantee, new arrangements on the Straits should not constitute obstacle for Turkish sovereignty and asked them to intervene with the USSR to bring her claims to an end. In fact Turkey was asking for the first time Western help against the Soviet threat. Amendments the USA was willing to bring to the Montreux Convention which were made known by the US Embassy in Ankara in November were not harmful for the Turkish Sovereignty on the Straits. The USA will change her policy on the straits and start to give more support to Turkey from the early 1946 when an autonomous Republics of Azerbeycan and Mahabad ( Kurdish ) were founded in Iran with the initiatives of the USSR. USA took such moves as being part of the USSRs plan to advance in Europe and to challenge the USA anywhere on the earth. Thus USA decided to attract Turkey in the Western block . American and British press started to treat Soviet territorial claims over Turkey to stimulate in Turkey anti-Soviet feelings. In March the biggest vessel of the American fleet, Missuri was to bring to Turkey the body of Mr. Mnir Ertegun , Turkish Ambassador in Washington who had died there some 16 months earlier. This symbolic visit was giving the USSR the message that Montreux convention could not be amended without the approval of the USA. The same day President Truman declared that countries in the aria were not up to defend themselves against an attack and the USA would help them if necessary. On the 7th May 1946 The USA erased Turkish debts due to credits taken during the War within the context of American Land and Lease law. Exchange of Notes between the USSR on one hand and Turkey, USA and GB on the other took place in this atmosphere.
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In 1947 Truman declared what is called the TRUMAN DOCTRINE aiming at giving financial aid to Greece and Turkey. In the Congress some criticized the US Administration for replacing the GB in the Middle East, for assuming the defenses of Greece and Turkey without any national requirement, these two countries were not ruled by true democracies etc. Some were against a help to Turkey because she had enough reserves or because of what Turks had done to Armenians. At the end the Congress decided to grant $ .300 000 000 to Greece and 100 000 000 to Turkey. American advisers would be sent to these two countries to help them to use this aid. Greek and Turkish civil and military personnel would be sent to the States for training. This aid was welcomed in Turkey in general. Turkey was feeling alone face the Soviet threats. She was under economic difficulties. She had enough reserves, but she was keeping this money as an assurance against the soviet threats. Turkish armys armaments were very old. Thus Turkey was in need of this aid. An American delegation headed by General Oliver came to Turkey to explain how to use this aid. According to the USA Turkey should demobilize some of its troupes, modernize her armament and use the sum of USD: 100 000 000 for this purpose. On 12th July 1947 an agreement was signed. The aim of the aid was, as it was written in the agreement, to assure the enhancement of Turkish security forces Turkey needed to safeguard her freedom and independence and to defend the stability of her economy. Turkey would report to the US Embassy on the use of the aid and all developments on this respect and would allow American press to guess freely the use Turkey would make of this aid. The agreement was foreseeing that Turkey could not use this aid as well as all material and information she would obtain through this aid for other purposes than stated in the agreement. This meant that these would be used only in Turkey to defend the country against an attack. This clause will be raised later by the USA when Turkey intervened in Cyprus to prevent Turkey to use in Cyprus the armaments
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and material She obtained through this aid. In fact American aids were always given under special conditions which end up with not only military but also political dependence vis a vis the USA. In 1948 the aids given to Greece and Turkey were taken in the context of American Foreign Assistance Law and thus gained a permanent status. Between 1947-1949 Turkey received aid of value of USD. 152 500 000. 147 500 000 of it were used for the modernization of Turkish Armed Forces and USD 5 000 000 for the construction of roads. During 1947-1951 this figure increased to USD 400 000 000. We may point out that aid received under the Truman doctrine contributed a lot to the development of the Turkish armed forces. Truman Doctrine symbolized the end of USA-USSR cooperation established during the II. World War. As to its impacts on Turkey, Turkish Statesmen, taking also into consideration Soviet policies in the Middle East started to follow completely American oriented policies. Some researchers are pointing out to the negative effects of this aid. They say for instance that military surplus material given to Turkey necessitated to purchase spare parts and to make maintenance expenses which reduced considerably the reserve money Turkey had spared during the war time. We may not forget that Turkey was facing a threat which was not new, which was if I may say traditional and she had to take it serious. To defend herself Turkey should break off her isolation, find friends sharing the same security interests and money to maintain a strong army with a certain degree of deterrence. If there was no American help Turkey had to make bigger expenses for her security. They say that due to this doctrine Turkey became economically and politically dependent of the USA. Did Turkey have a choice? She had no luxury to follow non alignment policies. They establish parallelism between Turkish pro-American policies and recognition by Turkey of Israel which brought cold winds on her relation with
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Arab countries. I think importance of relations with Israel is something apart from her relations with the USA and we shall return to this question later. Turkey did not participate in the Conference of Asian States held in 1949. But Turkey had already made her choice between Asia and Europe since Atatrk and this orientation was not something of new. Did Truman Doctrine have impacts on the Turkish domestic policies? It is true that the Turkish public opinion found the opportunity to know the American democracy and the American way of life more closely. But I think it is not right to link Ismet Inns orientation to democratize the country with Turkish American relations. Critics are saying that with the aim to promote friendly atmosphere with the USA, oppressions over opponents of the official ideology increased. If we evaluate the developments with todays concepts you can say that oppression on the opponents of the capitalist ideology was enormous. But do not forget that at that time the words communism, Soviet and Russian had the same meaning in the understanding of the majority in Turkey and Russians were traditional threat against the territorial integrity an the full sovereignty of Turkey. The Truman Doctrine showed clearly that sincere relations between USA and the USSR would no more continue. Two military camps were established and this was the beginning of the cold War. As to Turkey, Turkish policy makers took the Doctrine as a means for closer relations with the USA and a strong element supporting Turkish resistance before Soviet claims. Turkey, face also Soviet policies in the Middle East, started to implement pro-western and especially pro-American foreign policies. The needs of maintenance and spare parts for the military equipment we received from the USA was necessitated importations from that country, with a cost three or four time higher than the cost of the equipment, and Turkey had no resources for that. These caused a large economic and military
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dependence on the USA. So, Turkey who gave support to Arab countries during long years and years became the first country to recognize Israel, ten months after its establishment.

Truman Doctrine was followed by THE MARCHALL PLAN. Americans was rightly establishing a parallelism between economic and social collapse the European countries faced with after the Second War with the rise of the Communism and the USSR. They thought that the only way to stop this trend was to help Europe, starting with the GB, France and Germany, to solve its economic and social problems and to promote European economic and political cooperation. A Europe with no power of purchase would negatively affects the US economy as well. In order to increase their exportation, the USA had to help Europe to product and increase the income of Europeans. Efforts made through IMF, World Bank and the U. N. were not enough and thinkers in the USA were saying that if economic difficulties in Europe were not overcome a world chaos would be unavoidable. The Foreign Secretary G. Marshall, in a speech on the 5th June 1947 made known that the USA was determined to realise a joint American and European plan of reconstruction and invited all European countries, included the USSR to join this plan. Differences of Marshall Plan with the Truman Doctrine was that the former was economic oriented and did not include any military aid. Marshal plan was at regional level while Truman doctrine was at national level., dealng with individual countries. Thirdly the USA made it known that the USA would resist against Governments or parties which would obstruct the implementation of this plan. This was a warning to the communist parties and to the USSR. Plan was welcomed by the G.B. and France but criticized by Pravda. However Molotov met his British and French colleagues to discuss the feasibility of the
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plan, and put forward some conditions which were not acceptable . After the failure of these talks GB and France invited all the European countries except Spain to Paris, to elaborate a European plan of Development. USSR and East European countries did not attend the conference. On the 12 July 1947 representatives from Austria, Denmark Greece, Island, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Nederland, Norway, Switzerland , Turkey, GB, France founded an Organization named Conference of European Economic Co-operation to determine and meet the urgent economic needs of Europe. In the conference Turkey demanded an economic aid of USD.615 000 000 to unable her to implement again her development plan interrupted by the War. American experts who examined the Turkish demands refused them, because the program was aiming at vitalizing the economies of the countries which suffered from the war while Turkey wanted to develop her own economy independently of problems coming from the war, Her balance of payments was better then other 15 European countries and she had enough reserves of foreign currency and golden. In the report of the Foreign Office to the Congress Turkey was offered in the contest of the Marshall Plan only some material which would help Turkish economy to keep its level in the short term. This behavior of the American expert preoccupied Turkey because the USA who was leaving Turkey alone in the economy could do the same in the political ground also. Turkey insisted to be included in the plan. The USA, in order to be able to include her into the plan asked Turkey to make some change in her five year plan. Aid to be done would be used to increase agricultural products, to modernize agricultural equipment and to improve roads. On the industrial field emphasis should be put on the production of chrome ore. It seems that with these changes the aim was to make of Turkey a food producer of Europe. Chrome ore was important for the defense industry of the USA. Turkey accepted and was included in the Plan according the agreement signed between Turkey and the USA on 4th July 1947.. With this agreement Turkey accepted
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also in Turkey an American Mission for Economic Co-operation which would watch the use of the aid in a way conforms to the Agreement. Within the framework of Marshal Plan, Turkey received between 19481952 total aid of USD.352 000 000. (The military aid Turkey received during the same period was USD. 687 000 000.) %60 of the aid was used in agriculture. This helped Turkish agriculture to develop rapidly. As he aid was also for the development of the roads (but railways are neglected). E. Relations with the Arab world and Israel during early 50s. At the end of the 1st World War seven Arab states were independent: Egypt (1922), Iraq (1932), Syria (1946), Lebanon (1945), Jordan (1946) , Saudi Arabia (1926) and Yemen (1932). These countries founded on March 1945 the Arab League. Turkey welcomed this Arab initiative. The Secretary General of the League made declarations underlining the importance of the Turco -Arab friendship. In fact Turkey had always looked with understanding and sympathy to these newly independent states with which she shared a long history and a common religion. She deployed efforts to develop her relations with them. A first official visit was realized by the Regent of Iraq, Abdullah to Ankara on September 1945. Following this visit the Treaty of friendship and Good Neighborhood between Turkey and Iraq was signed on March 1946. This first step of good relations with an Arab country had impact on the relations of Turkey with other Arab countries. The more problematic was Syria due to the Hatay question. Syria who declared on July 1944 that She would respect all international commitments France had taken on Her name, had changed her policy once France had left the region. Damascus made declarations that Turkish sovereignty on Sancak was illegal and this question was a common concern of all Arab countries. These declarations postponed the recognition of Syria by
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Turkey. A compromise had been found by the mediation of the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Sait Pasha. Turkey accepted not to insist to obtain an official recognition from Syria of the annexation of Hatay to Turkey and Syria accepted not to raise this issue officially. After that compromise, Turkey recognized the independence of Syria and Lebanon. This understanding between Turkey and Syria would not last long and the question of Hatay would always shadow the relations of the two countries. Relations with Lebanon were without problem. Lebanese President visited Turkey on 20th June 1946. The king of Jordan, King Abdullah visited Turkey on 8th January 1947 and a Treaty of Friendship and good neighborhood was signed. The foreign policy of Jordan was different from those of other Arab countries even at that time. King Abdullah was pride of being friend of the G.B. on the West and Turkey on the East. Other Arab countries were thinking that the G.B. would not renounce to her interests in the area and were not happy with the policies of Jordan which, in their eyes was trying to form a new block with Turkey and the G.B. Turkey voted with the Arab countries in the U.N. when the question of Palestine was taken up in 1947. She voted against the partition of Palestine on 30th November 1947 despite the USA and the USSR who voted positively. This welcomed by the Arab world. and kr El Kuvvetli sent a message of thanks to Ankara. But this will not last long neither. Ideas to found a Jew State in Palestine were not new. During the First World War The declaration of Lord Balfour, British Minister for Foreign Affaires, was stating on November 1917 that His Majestys Government was seeing fit to the establishment of a national land for Jew people and would endeavor to realize this goal. Since San Remo Conference in April 1920 it was
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decided to put Palestine under British control after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In fact when the British rule was established there Jews started to immigrate to these lands. Local crashes happened between Arabs and Jews. On 3rd June 1922 the British Government felt the need to send a letter to the World Zionist Organization to let it know that the G.B.s intention was to establish a national land for Jews and not to create a Jew Palestine. British Government was not ready to share the sovereignty in Palestine with Jews. The league of Nation was sharing also the British position. But Jews organizations had already started to struggle for a Jew State in Palestine. After the Second World War the G.B. raised this issue in the U.N. in April 1947. On 15TH May 1947 the General Assembly established a Special Palestine commission and asks it to prepare a report. This report contained a Majority Plan proposing an independent Palestine State divided into Arab and Palestine States with Jerusalem under international control and a Minority Plan foreseeing a Federal Palestine composed of Arab and Jew federated states. Arabs were against of the partition of Palestine. But in November USA and the the USSR gave their support to the partition of Palestine and this was decided by the General Assembly of the U.N. on the 29th November 1948. At the start Turkey was also against of the partition of the Palestine and against a Jew State and advocated an independent Arab Palestine State. In fact She voted with the 12 Arab States against the partition. This attitude of Turkey welcomed by Arab countries, but it seems that Turkish behavior was due not to her sympathy for the Arab cause, but, rather than that, to the fear of instability that the creation of a Jew State might provoke in the area. In fact just after the UN took the decision of partition crashes broke out between Arabs and Jews. The Arab League took a series of decisions to prevent the implementation of the decision. Terrorist actions started to take place from both parts. Few hours before the end of the British mandate on Palestine Jews National Congress declared the foundation of the Jew State and the first Jew Government was formed the same day by David
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Ben Gurion. 11 minutes later USA recognized the new state. The USSR recognized Israel on 17th May 1948. Turkey did not welcome this development. The establishment of a Jew State despite of strong opposition of Arab States was making the peace impossible in the area. Maybe she was not neither sure of the place this new State in the region would occupy on the political map. Terrorist Jew organizations had good relations with the USSR and Jews from the east European countries under control of the USSR were immigrating in Palestine.. In Jew settlement in Palestine were establishing cooperatives and working places with a certain communist approach, all giving the preoccupation that a Soviet satellite was coming up. Immediately after the proclamation of independence of Israel, armies of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq entered in Palestine, but their attack was not successful. On the 22nd of May 1948 UN Council of Security invited the parties to refrain from military actions. This decision was followed by another one inviting Parties to a cease of fire of four week. Armed conflicts which were appeased after Arabs accepted these decisions started again in October between Egyptian and Israeli forces. Israel armies occupied big parts of Egyptian territory. Parties accepted the invitation of the UN Security Counsel for cease of fire. Israel concluded armistices separately with Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. During the war Security Counsel founded a Palestine Conciliation Committee composed of French, British and Turkish representatives. France was chosen as neutral and Turkey pro-Arab while the G.B. was pro-Israel. Arabs were against of such a committee. Turkey not only gave support to its foundation but accepted also to be one of three members of it. This could be
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interpreted as a sign of the change in the Turkish policy vis a vis Israel. During the works of the committee Turkey instead of taking part of Arabs preferred to play a neutral role and tried to reconcile the Parties. This Turkish position would constitute the start of more distanced and cooler relations with the Arab countries. It is possible that new relationship of Turkey with Western powers started with the declaration of Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan played an important role in this change of the Turkish policy. Before Turkey recognized Israel, She concluded with this new state a postal agreement on 30th June 1948. Face to Arab protest, Turkey explained the reason for which she concluded this agreement by the existence in Israel of some 10 000 Turkish citizens. On the other hand Turkey took a neutral stand at the start of the ArabIsraeli war and took restrictive measures against Turkish citizens who wanted to join the war. But later as the war lost its intensity She relaxed this measure. Radio Ankara announced that Turkish citizens could emigrate any country they would like to. Big number of Turkish Jews started to immigrate to Israel. On 28th March 1949 Turkey became the first Muslim country to recognized Israel. Foreign Minister Necmeddin Sadak was explaining this as a necessity for Turkey to assume her functions appropriately in the Palestine Reconciliation Committee. In the reality: 1. Turkey needed to align her policies with these of the Western countries in order to be admitted to the Western club. In fact she aspired also for the membership of NATO that was shaping at that time. Turkish Foreign Minister would soon pay a visit to USA and be received by Truman who was giving his full support for Israel and may be it was time for Turkey to make a political gesture before this important visit. 2. Turkey had understood that Israel would not be a satellite of the USSR. Israel started to have closer relations with the USA
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3.

In Turkey elites were criticizing the Governments pro-Arab policies.

Souvenirs of Arabs behaviors at the end of the First World War were yet alive. F. Relations with Iran Iran was occupied by Allied countries in 1941 until 1947. During that period there was no relation with Iran. Turkey approached the G.B. on two issues related to Iran. The first issue was with regard Kakay Turks who were under heavy pressure of the G.B. who was considering them as pro German. Turkey was shoving for the first time interest with the fate of Turks living out of Turkey. The second issue was the fear that Iran would be dominated by the USSR like East European countries and Turkey drew the attention of the British Government to this danger Turkey and Iran resumed their relations again in 1948 with exchange of ambassadors.

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER DEMOKRAT PART Accession of Turkey to NATO NATO was established in 1949 under the auspices of the USA. Why Turkey was interested with this organization:
1.

Turkey was always under the shock created by Soviet demands in 1945. Even if she was entered in good cooperation with the USA, this was not enough guaranties against threads coming from the north.

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Turkish statesmen was thinking that membership of NATO would be a result of pro-western policies Turkey followed since the independence.
2.

If Turkey stayed out of the NATO, economical and military aids she was receiving from the USA could diminish by the time.

3. Turkish politicians were of the view that new establishes multi-

party system could only continue if Turkey could take its place among other democratic countries. Turkey should be part of all western establishments in order to implement in the country political and economical liberalism. As an invitation didnt come from initiators of the organization Turkey made known officially his desire to accede it. If this was impossible a Mediterranean Pact could be established with the participation of Turkey, Italy, Greece, France and the UK. All these efforts gave no fruit. In June 1950, When the United Nations decided to sent international troops in Korea, the Menderes Government decided to participate to that force. Normally this was a decision the Parliament could take and the decision was an infringement of the Constitution ad the opposition parties were against. The Government was taking the war of Korea as a chance to be accepted in NATO, but a second application was refused again by the NATO Counsel which proposed instead a Mediterranean pact with the participation of Egypt, which was far from satisfying the Turkish Government. Turkey found this proposal unrealistic. It was impossible to see Egypt and UK within the same organization, Egypt would not like to be the only Arab country in such a grouping and as long as Arab-Israeli war continued it would be unconceivable to establish a defensive organization in the Mediterranean. However Turkey didnt reject the proposal. In 1952 U.S. National Security Counsel reported that, taking in account Soviet nuclear stocks and its capability to launch them, The USSR would be at a
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level to make fatal attacks to the USA in 1954. In order to respond in time to a Soviet nuclear attack The USA should possess bases in countries near USSR. They approached Turkey to that end, but Turkey made clear that this can not be possible unless Turkey became member of NATO. On the other hand, SSCB could repeat in Europe what they did in Korea, an in that case the first country to be attacked would be Turkey. Invasion of Turkey by the USSR would jeopardize the security of Europe. Yugoslavia which left the Commintern in1948 had become a Soviet target. NATOs southern Flank had to be strengthened in order to be able to defend Yugoslavia and Southern Europe. All these reasons pushed the USA to propose to NATO the membership of Turkey and Greece. But to the British eyes, Turkey with its strong army, could better serve to British interest in the Middle East. With this in mind, in 1951 the UK proposed Turkey an alliance in the Middle East with the UK, USA and Turkey in it. The USA didnt like this idea. On the other hand Denmark and Norway didnt want to be obliged to go in war for such a far area like the Southern Europe. They were also looking at NATO as grouping countries with similar social and cultural values. Despite of all these oppositions, The North Atlantic Counsel invited Turkey and Greece for membership to NATO. The UK proposed the establishment of a new command, Middle East Command, under a British commander which would be responsible of the defense of the area included Egypt. Turkish and Greek forces would be part of this Command. But Egypt didnt want to cooperate with such a command, and turkey didnt like to assume responsibility out of NATO area. So This British initiative died down. The two countries became member on 18 February 1952. BLATERAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE USA AND RELATONS WTH THE USA
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With the development of the Turkish- American relations, and especially military ones, many agreements were signed between the two countries. Nobody knows how many there were, because a large number of these were ratified by the Government and not by the Parliament, although this was not compatible with the Constitution. Some of these were: The Common Security Agreement (1951): Turkey undertook to support military initiatives of the USA and, if necessary, to participate in these even before being a member of the NATO. Advantages given to the goods imported from the USA in the context of economic aid was extended to military equipment as well. The Statue of Forces Agreement (1952): Turkey accepted the establishment of US bases and military installations on her territory and agreed on the statue given to US military personnel deployed in Turkey. During the following years many amendments were brought to this agreement. Other technical agreements were also signed as a part of it. Among these was the Agreement on NATO Installations which was allowing the US Army, Navy and Air Force to use Turkish territory. The Agreement on Nuclear Energy (1955): Turkey would establish a nuclear center for peaceful and humanitarian aims; USA would lend the necessary nuclear fuel for it. Turkish armed forces would be reshaped on the American Model. By the time, some conflicts arose between the two countries. At first, from 1955 on, foreign aid received by Turkey from the USA and other developed countries proved to be not enough to meet the expenses necessary for Turkey to achieve the economic development she was planning for. The USA and IMF did not want to extend new credits unless measures aiming at economic stability were taken. At the end, The Turkish Lira devaluated (From 1 $= 2,80 TL, to 1$ = 9 TL) . On the other hand, the attitude of some American newspapers (criticizing oppressive political measures in Turkey) created problems. Moreover, the Turkish opposition was not happy with the privileges recognized to American investing companies in Turkey. Other difficulties were
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as regards to US policies in the Middle East and we will come to them later. However, all these difficulties were not of a nature to have drastic impacts on the general path of the relations. In 1957, USSR launched the satellite Sputnik successfully. To the US experts eyes, Soviet ballistic missiles were a direct nuclear threat to the USA. At that time, NATOs nuclear strategy was massive retaliation which means that any nuclear attack should have immediate nuclear response. President Eisenhower proposed the installment of the middle range Jupiter missile launchers in NATO member countries in order to deter The USSR from a first strike. Only the UK, Greece and Turkey accepted these launchers on their territories. These missile launchers became fully operative in 1962 only. They increased the threat on Turkey. In May 1960, a US spy plane U2 based in Diyarbakr, was shot down in Russia. This created a limited crisis between USA and USSR and between Turkey and USSR. RELATONS WTH THE USSR AFTER STALN Stalin death in 1953 was a turning point in Soviet History. First Malenkov, and then in 1955 Kruschev took over. Pacific coexistence became one of the foreign policy principles. In May 1955, the Warsaw Pact was established. The USSR made it clear with a note to Ankara in May 1953 that: 1) The USSR was desirous to ameliorate its relations with Turkey; 2) The USSR had no territorial claims over Turkey; 3) The USSR had revised its views on the question of the Turkish Straits. Turkey and her allies commented this offer as 1. A change in Soviet Policy resulting from Turkeys membership of NATO; 2. It might have been a maneuver to separate Turkey from her allies or to sabotage the initiatives of the Mediterranean Command or the Balkan Pact. Only
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France thought that this demarche was an indication of the Soviet desire for normalization between East and West. Turkeys concerns were different: such a Soviet attitude could end up reducing aids Turkey was receiving from the West. The Soviets could proceed to abrogate the Montreux Treaty. These concerns proved unfounded. In fact, the USSR was not happy with the US basis in Turkey and with the participation of Turkey in the US encirclement policy. The USSR made this clear during the establishment of the Baghdad Pact. The USSR severely criticized Turkish policies during the Crisis of Syria in 1957 an in that of Iraq in 1958. Despite of her discontent of the Turkish policies, the USSR didnt adopt negative attitudes vis a vis Turkey. Attenuation of tension between the two blocks in 1950 reflected to Turkish- Soviet relations. Once again, the first step came from Kruschev who reiterated the desire of normalization of relations between the two countries. Reciprocal declarations followed. The Turkish Minister for health visited Moscow in 1959. In 1960, a visit to Moscow of the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was on the agenda. This visit would not be realized due to the military intervention in Turkey in 1961. . TURKISH- GREEK RAPPROACHMENT: During the war The USSR negotiated a security belt with its western allies to protect its borders and to expand the effects of Communism. So, Balkans was divided into influence area, and Greece was left to British influence. Soviet claims over Turkey regarded upon positively by the West at the beginning as well. From 1946 on, Western countries were restless about the extreme military strengthening of the USSR and started to take measures against it. This was the beginning of the Cold War. Turkey needed western economic and military aid to sustain her economic development which was also a precondition to make a
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multiparty political system survive. She needed the West to resist the Soviet threat as well. In Greece the civil war ended with the liquidation of communists with the help of the USA. She also had to take place in the Western camp. In 1947 the Paris Treaty was signed and the Dodecanese Islands were given to Greece. In fact, as Italy had lost the war, the Greek-Orthodox majority in the Islands addressed the winners in order to annex the Dodecanese Islands to Greece. The UK was looking to these demands positively to compensate the war efforts of Greece and to politically strengthen the King and the royal government in Greece. Turkey pointed out that these islands were important for her security despite the fact that a Greek majority was living there and was in favor of their autonomy under condition that they would be given a demilitarized status. However, yielding tothe pressure from the UK, Turkey accepted the transfer of these islands to Greece provided that they were demilitarized and some Aegean islands closer to Turkish shores be given to Turkey. The Dodecanese islands were put under Greek sovereignty in March 1947, and Turkey kept her silence, since Turkish-Greek friendship under the US umbrella against the USSR was more imported for her. Two mouths after the declaration of the Trumann doctrine, a TurkishGreek cooperation committee was established in Athens, and a trade agreement was signed the following year. The role the USA was playing in Turkish-Greek rapprochement would be seen more clearly in the question of the election of the new Fener Archbishop. During the war the USSR Governments did not hesitate to exploit the Orthodox religion to their benefit. An archbishop was nominated at the Moscow church in 1947 and tried to establish relations with other Orthodox communities. Despite the fact that Turkey was taking the Fener Church as a national institution, Moscow started to support the claims that the Fener Archbishop should be elected by all Orthodox Churches. This pushed the USA to make efforts to obtain the election of men they could trust on as archbishops of Fener.
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In 1948 the archbishop was forced to resign due to her political activities against Turkey, and when Turkey refused three candidates proposed by Greece, the name of the Archbishop of the Orthodox church of the North America, Aristokles Spiru Athinagoras was put forth by the USA. Turkey and Greece agreed. The biggest resistance came from the Fener church itself because the candidate was not one of theirs. Greece convinced them at the end. The last difficulty was the citizenship of Mgr. Athinagoras who was thus given the Turkish citizenship. Athinagoras was able to establish good relations with the Turkish Government and would assume his functions some 24 years until his death in 1972. During 50s we see a lot of similarities in Turkish and Greek domestic policies. Both countries ruled by center-right parties backed by the USA. Turkey wanted to make a multi partite democracy to survive. Greece, following the civil war proceeded to elections which ended by the victory of the rightist parties. Both countries needed economic and military aid, only the USA could provide them. Both countries were dependent on the USA. In 1952 Greek Prime Minister Venizelos visited Turkey. A Permanent Turkish Greek Committee was established to strengthen political and economic relations. Venizelos qualified the Turkish- Greek friendship declaring that in short time the two countries would make one. The same year Turkeys Prime Minister Menderes paid this visit back. This was followed by the visit to Turkey of the King of Greece. The King visited The Fener archbishop which was seen positively by the Turkish public opinion. President Celal Bayar in his turn visited Athens and Western Thrace and opened Celal Bayar Gymnasium in Gmline. Shadows will start to come on these relations with the emergence of the Cyprus question. Balkan Pact After the 2nd World War Balkans were divided in two: Socialist countries backed by Moscow and Turkey and Greece supported by the USA. When in
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Communist Yugoslavia Tito tried to follow policies different from those of Moscow, he was excluded from the Communtern. This created economic and security problem for Yugoslavia. The USA profited the situation by providing that country with economic and military aids. But this was not enough. Yugoslavia would be part of the US encirclement policy. As it was not possible to admit a communist country to NATO, the only possibility could be to include this country in western security system by encouraging her to military cooperation with Turkey and Greece. In fact the three countries were feeling the Soviet threat on them. All the three needed US economic and military aids. Plus Yugoslavia was in dispute with Italy over Trieste and needed political international support. In that context, a pact was signed in Ankara in 1953. According several clauses of the Pact, the three countries would cooperate permanently, would proceed to political and military consultations on the matters of mutual interest. The Chiefs of Staff of the three countries would cooperate on determining common defense problems. Cooperation would be in economic and technical matters as well. They committed not to adhere any agreement against one of them. A secretariat was also established with a separate agreement in 1953. It is clear that this arrangement was not a military alliance. But in 1954 a new Treaty will be signed by the same three countries and the Pact turned out to be the Balkan Alliance. With this Treaty Parties agreed on resolving their problems by peaceful means, refusing all use of threat and force. An attack to one of them would be regarded as directed to all of them. In such a case they would take in common all necessary measures, included the use of armed forces, to help the attacked party. Balkan Alliance established a Permanent Counsel, as well. But face the changing in Soviet policies towards Balkan countries after the death of Stalin in 1953 (Soviets declared that they were not against national communism) Yugoslavia inclined to non aligned policies. In the mean time the question of Trieste was settled as well and the Alliance was no more a military
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necessity for Yugoslavia. New difficulties between Turkey and Greece with the emergence of the Cyprus question added to that. The pact and the Alliance died. EMERGENCE OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM After the occupation of Crete by Germany, UK started to pay more attention to Cyprus, the strategic importance of which was undisputable. Augmentation of the number of British troupes and British investments for the defense infrastructure of the island, financial aides from London created a real economic activity in Cyprus. We can say that this relative improvement in the economy laid to political activity in the island. In 1941 UK decided to organize municipal elections and to that end authorized political activities. That year was founded AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People). Against it KEK (Cyprus National Party) was found with the support of the Church. In 1943 AKEL get an important victory in local elections. If Greek Cypriots were divided among themselves ideologically, Turkish Cypriots were divided on personal basis. However as either AKEL or the Church manifested frequently their aspirations for ONASS (annexation to Greece), Turks unified and founded KIBRIS ADASI TRK AZINLII KURUMU (KATAK) with two opposing leaders Mr. Fazl Kk and Mr. zkan who was known as close to the CHP in Turkey. The following year Mr. Kk left KATAK and found KIBRIS MLL TRK HAREKET PARTS (KMTHP) and profited from the support of DP which was on power in Turkey. At the end, Mr. Kk became the only leader of the Turkish- Cypriots. In 1946 UK started some economic and political reforms and established a Constituting Assembly where Greek Cypriots insisted on self government which was not acceptable for Turks. AKEL left the meetings of the Assembly when the Governor General Tabled a Constitution which did not contain self governance. Thereafter AKEL directed all its efforts for ENOSS. In 1949 it submitted to the
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UN General Assembly a memorandum for self determination in Cyprus. The Church could not remain indifferent to these efforts and organized a referendum in the Island where 96/100 of the population voted for ENOSS. With this the Church obtained the leadership of the Island, and it became more active in domestic politics with the election of Makarios III as Archbishop. Greece was in a difficult position: She could not remain indifferent to demand of ONASS and had to continue to have friendly relations with Turkey and the UK. In 1953 Mr. Eden, Prime Minister of the UK was asking Mr. Papagos, Prime Minister of Greece, if Greece would demand also the annexation to Greece of New York where more Greeks were living then in Cyprus. Mr Eden did not accept the existence of a question as Cyprus question. In fact for the UK which lost her supremacy in the Middle East after the Suez Crisis, Cyprus was strategically more important. From that point Greece would left her efforts to seek solution to the problem by bilateral talks and would try to internationalize the problem. Turkey wanted to continue friendly relations with Greece and the UK and in 1950 Turkish Minister of foreign Affaires declared that there was not such a problem like problem of Cyprus, and in fact the UK would never leave the island, but face to pressings from Cyprus he declared that Turkish Cypriots would be given all necessary help. In 1955 Menderes said to his Greek colleague that the Cyprus question would be settled within the framework of TurkishGreek friendship. In 1954 Greece raised the Cyprus issue in the UN Assembly General. This was the first attempt to internationalize the conflict. During the negotiations Turkey and the UK have put forth the following arguments: - Cyprus was under the domestic jurisdiction of the UK - Cyprus was given to the UK by the Lausanne Treaty signed by Greece as well.
-

It was strategically important for the UK


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- Turkish-Cypriots had not been consulted before such a proposition had been submitted to the UN - Cyprus was closer to Turkey or Syria then Greece - Cyprus had never been under Greek hegemony in the history. Assembly General did not accept to include the Cyprus question in its agenda. Thereafter Msgr. Makarios, in order to force the UK to accept the Greek demands, opted for a guerilla war in the island and he designed for this Mr Grivas, born in Cyprus, chief of an organization named X (hee) who founded the National Organization for the Straggle of Cyprus (EOKA). In 1955, face to the increased violence in the Island, the UK proposed (1) a three lateral Conference, (2) elaboration of a new constitution for the Island, and (3) elaboration of a program of economic development. Turkey accepted the British proposal of Conference. Makarios objected, and asked Greece to participate in such a conference in case the UK accepted the principle of self determination in the island. But Greece could not afford conflicts with her allies and participated in the conference which was held in London. In the Conference Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Zorlu disclosed Turkish views on the subject: 1. Cyprus is near by the Turkish costs, 2. There are historical, cultural and economic ties between the island and turkey, 3. If a State controls at the same time Cyprus and other island at the west of Turkey will thus encircle Turkey, and creates a security risk for Turkey. 4. Turkey is happy with the status quo, but if a change would deem necessary, the island had to be given back to its old owner. Turkey objected the idea to give self government to the island as well. Greece insisted on self determination. On the 6th of September the news reached Turkey that a bomb had been placed at the house of Atatrk in Salonica and Association Chyprus is Turk organized a protest meeting in Istanbul. Shortly the meeting turned out to riots,
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police could or did not intervene, and rioters attacked minority shops and schools. Results: 35 wounded, 5622 buildings destroyed, $ 300 000 000 of damages. Those who were responsible of these events of 6-7 September were never known. What is interesting is that the investigations in Greece showed that the bombe at the Atatrks house was given to an official of Turkish Consulate in Salonica by a Western Trace Turk. EOKA increased its actions and Turkish Cypriots established a resistance organization VOLKAN. Makarios was opposing to the political reformes put forth by the UK. Greece was obliged to send him to exile, but this let OEKA to increase its violent acts further. It became the leader of the Greek Cypriote community. After the Suez crisis and with the Eisenhower doctrine in 1957 the UK lost its domination in the Middle East and geopolitical importance of Cyprus decreased to her eyes. British Minister for Colonies was declaring that UK could accept the self determination but among the choices to be presented to Cypriots should figure the partition of the island as well. The fact that Greece cold not obtain satisfaction in the UN for her selfdetermination thesis, resistance of Turks to that thesis and determination of Turkey to support Turkish Cypriots swept the way for negotiations between Turkey and Greece and the UK, Turkey and Greece came to an agreement in Zurich in February 1959: A Basic Structure Document was adopted with parties Turkey, Greece, UK, Turkish Cypriot Community and Greek Cypriot Community. They all signed the document. According to this agreement the UK transferred the sovereignty to the two Communities who would enjoy the sovereignty rights together in common. President of the new republic would be Greek and Vice President Turkish with the right to veto of this latter on security, foreign policy and defense matters. Partition, enosis and accession to a political or economic union of which Turkey and Greece were not member were forbidden. Turkey and Greece would be on equal footing in the Island. Turkey and Greece recognized the continuity of British sovereignty in British bases in
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Cyprus. Three documents were signed: Agreement on the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus, Agreements on Guaranties and Agreement of Alliance which let Turkey and Greece to deploy troops in Cyprus. These agreements were ratified by Turkey in March 1959.

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST DURING 50s

1. The Baghdad Pact. The G.B. who had the Suez Canal under her control, who

was present in Cyprus, Iraq and the Gulf was against the membership of Turkey and Greece to NATO and advocating the establishment of a defense system in the Mediterranean under her leadership with the participation of these two countries plus some Arab countries. Such a defense system would counterbalance the American supremacy in the area and would help moderate the reactions against the British bases as well. The participation of Turkey was important because Turkey was a Muslim country with strong armed forces and her presence would alleviate the western character of the Alliance. In October 1951 Turkey disclosed that She was considering this alliance named the Mediterranean Command, useful and necessary. The second important country for the G.B/ was Egypt due to the strategic importance of the Suez Canal and to the influence of this country in the Arab League. On 13th October the G.B., USA, France and Turkey invited Egypt to participate to the Command. The GB made also known that in case Egypt would accept to join the Command GB would withdraw all her forces except those who would be under the Command. But Egypt refused the offer declaring that She would not consider such kind of proposals as long as British forces would continue to stay in her Country, and denounced the 1936 agreement. Turkey was also severely criticized in the Egyptian press. In November the USSR gave a Note on the Soviet concerns
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about the participation of Turkey to western defense plans in the region. Turkey had understood that she would not obtain any ally from Arab countries but was continuing to argue that she was the sole country in the Middle East to defend Western interests in the area. Face to the difficulty of forming a military alliance the USA and GB decided to change the project and instead of a Command they decided in July 1952 to convert It to a planning organization under he name of Middle East Defense Organization. The GB was thinking to contact also Arab countries other then Egypt. like Jordan and Iraq. The USA was insisting on the participation of Egypt, but contacts with this country proved unsuccessful. In 1953 Eisenhower became President of the USA and changed US policy towards the Middle East. The new US Administration was thinking The Mediterranean Command or the Middle East Defense Organization were not up to assure the security of the region under the changing international situation. The essential thread on Arab countries was coming not from the USSR but from Israel and it would not be possible to obtain the cooperation of the Arab countries by insisting on the dangers of the Communism. Arab countries, which obtained their independence recently would not like to join formations, which would recall French and British domination in the region. Arabs were seeking economic development and they would look with sympathy to the Soviet policies after the death of Stalin. It would not be possible to have the cooperation of Arab countries before the solution of the problems existing between Egypt and the GB (like the problem of the Suez Canal) . With these in mind the USA decided to take the initiative and in May 1953 Dulles, Foreign Secretary made a visit to all the countries of the region included India and Pakistan. Turkey argued that it was not possible to assure the defense the Middle Eat security with Arab countries a new approach was necessary and Pakistan had to be included to the Middle East defense system.

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After this visit Dulles put forward the notion of Northern Belt. This Belt was on the north of the Middle East and was including Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Syria. According to this policy only these northern Middle east countries were feeling the Soviet threat and a new security belt to be build on the south of the USSR should include these countries while other Arab countries were feeling more the threat of Israel instead of the Soviet threat. For Turkey who was seeking to fortify her security ties with the West was an occasion. The USA made first an economical and technical cooperation agreement with Pakistan in December 1953.In February Turkey and Pakistan disclosed their intention of concluding a defense treaty. USSR reacted and pointing out that this was but a NATO maneuver in a region where there was no threat and was putting the region in danger. Egypt declared this initiative as a threat to all the counties of the region. Iraq reserved her position while Iran disclosed that she will not join the treaty. Despite these reactions Turkey and Pakistan concluded the treaty of friendly cooperation between the two countries in April 1954. It was not a military alliance. Few weeks later Prime Minister Menderes was declaring in Washington that it was a necessity for Arab countries to recognize the existence of Israel. In fact Middle East countries were divided in two: Those countries cooperating with the West with Turkey as leader and those following non aligned policies with Egypt as leader. There was a real competition between Turkey and Egypt. Solution of the Suez Canal problem awakened new expectations in the West to take Egypt in western camp but attempts made by Menderes were not successful/ Then Turkey focused her demarches on Iraq. Iraq had already started to receive American military aid since 1954. Her position against Turkish Pakistani treaty was due to the negative reaction of other Arab countries. Suez agreement comforted Nuri Sait Pasha, Prime Minister, in his pro West policies. In January 1955 Menderes paid a visit to Bagdad. According the joint Communiqu issued after the visit was disclosing that a treaty would be signed
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to assure cooperation of the two countries against attacks from the region and from out of the region. With the term attack from the region was meant Israel and was aiming at comforting other Arab countries. The countries would conform to the UN decisions about the rights of the Palestinians and the treaty would be open to the participation of the countries determined to realize the peaceful goals of the Treaty. Menderes visited Syria and Lebanon also. Both countries refused to join. On 24 February 1955 Turkey and Iraq signed in Bagdad the Treaty that was foreseeing the cooperation of the two countries for their security and defense accordingly to the article 51 of the UN Charter. The Treaty was open to the participation of other countries interested with the security of the region. Nothing was put in the Treaty about the recognition of the UN decisions on Middle East despite the agreement reached earlier on the matter because Turkey was desirous to see USA and GB who had close relations with Israel, to join the Treaty. To satisfy Iraq Turkey accepted an exchange of letter with Iraq to confirm the recognition of the said UN Decisions. In April 1955 GB joined the Treaty. The GB committed with a new Treaty with Iraq to contribute in the training and equipping the Iraqi army. In case Iraq would be attacked GB would come to her aid following the demand of Iraq, if necessary, with armed forces. Arabs would interpret this Treaty as the continuation of the British presence in Iraq. After Musaddak , Prime Minisrter of Iran, who had rebelled against the Shah was toppled by the USA in September 1955 the Shah started to implement pro-Western policies. Thus Iran joined the Pact in November 1955 as well. This was the fourth adhesion required in the Treaty to establish a Permanent Counsel at the level of Minister. This Counsel held its first meeting in Baghdad. Why the USA did not join the Pact? In fact the USA did not want to deteriorate her relations with Egypt and the Saudi Arabia . Participation of the USA would provoke more the USSR. Israel was not happy with the Pact. She was thinking that The Pact was against her and Turkey would also change
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her policies vis a vis Israel. The USA did not want to preoccupy more that country. On the other hand the American Administration was not sure if it would be able to have the approval of the Senate where a discussion on the US Middle East policies could create domestic policy problems. Baghdad Pact contributed in the deterioration of the relations of Turkey with the Arab countries other than Iraq. On the other hand Egypt and the Arab League decided to conclude between Arab countries another Treaty covering political, economic and military fields and excluding Iraq. Turkey reacted against Syria and warned her Turkey would consider such an Alliance against her. In the mean time Turkey continued to try to attract other countries to the Pact. Celal Bayar visited Amman in November and gave Jordan assurances that Turkey would take part of Jordan in the Palestinian question in case Jordan join the Pact. But After this visit leaders who were supporting the policies of President Nasser of Egypt came to power in Amman and Jordan did not join the Pact. Another question was the policy of the USA who was giving support to the Baghdad pact while giving economic aid to Egypt with the World Bank in order to avoid that country to approach to the USSR. This US behavior was a signal to the Arab countries that to stay out of the pact would not be a handicap for the good relations with the USA. 2. Crisis of Suez Canal. Egypt established diplomatic relations with

communist China in September 1955 and in July 1956 President Nasser disclosed that he would pay a visit to Moscow. In August the USA made Egypt known that she had renounced the aid she promised to finance the Aswan dam. The GB and the World Bank followed the USA. Egypt reacted and declared that she was nationalizing the Suez Canal. Three days later USA, GB and France decided to hold a conference in London with the participation of signatory countries of 1888 Istanbul Treaty and those countries that used more the Canal. Egypt establishing similarity between the Canal and the Turkish Straits
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demanded Turkey to act as mediator, but Turkey was taking the question rather from political point of view. Turkey accepted to attend the London conference as one of the signatories of Istanbul Treaty but also taking into consideration that GB was an Ally and that 1954 GB- Egypt Treaty allowing the GB to use the Canal in case Turkey would be attacked and nationalization of the Canal was jeopardizing the use of the Canal by GB. According the Dulles Plan submitted to the conference, Suez would be steered by an international body which would include also Egypt, would be used freely by the signatories of the 1888 Istanbul Treaty. Egypt would get an equitable income and the Suez Canal Company would be indemnified. The USSR qualified the plan as colonialist and proposed a conference with wider participation, which would take up the question in full respect of the sovereignty rights of Egypt. Turkey who took the part of Western countries in the Conference supported however that the sovereignty of Egypt should not be given harm and the Dulles Plan was meeting this requirement. She joined Pakistan, Iran and Ethiopia to obtain that the respect to the sovereignty of Egypt should find its expression in a separate article. Conference adopted the plan but Egypt refused to accept it. A second conference held in London established the Union of the Users of the Canal and Turkey was among the countries who joined this formation first. GB and France submitted the problem to the UN. But the Security Counsel could not bring a solution. Then France and GB decided to profit from the Israeli attack to Egypt for a military intervention to the Canal. Israel attacked Egypt on 29 October 1956 and the following day they gave an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel to stop the war and to withdraw 10 miles far from the both coasts of the Canal. Israel accepted the Ultimatum, but as Egypt refused to accept it, GB and France attacked Egypt. This attack created a wide reaction in the international public opinion. The USA and the USSR condemned GB and France. Turkey qualified the France and GB attack to Egypt as a violation of the
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international law, but condemned Egypt as the main responsible. Under the international pressure GB and France agreed on the 3rd of December to withdraw from Egypt. This completed the nationalization of the Suez Canal. After the war broke out in the Middle East the Baghdad Pact countries chiefs of States met together in Teheran with the exception of the UK, condemned Israel, asked the withdrawal of French and British Forces, gave support to US initiative in UN Security Counsel and stated that the UN 1947 decision on the partition of Palestine which was rejected by Arab countries could serve a basis to negotiations. They refrained from condemning France and UK. Turkey withdrew her Minister (title of chief of diplomatic mission, lower then Ambassador) from Tel Aviv. This later when leaving his post declared that this was not a measure against Israel with whom Turkey would continue with her good political and commercial relations. On the other hand this measure, which was welcomed by Arab countries, was not sufficient to satisfy them taking into account that Turkey did not condemn the aggressors like even the USA had done. 3. Crisis of Syria Crisis of Suez Canal approached the USA to Baghdad Pact and USA representatives attended for the first time in June 1957 in the Military Committee of the Pact. It helped also the USSR to develop her relations with Arab countries. In August USSR made an economic and technical cooperation agreement with Syria. Few days later Syria expatriated three US diplomats with the allegation that they were spying for the USA. In reply USA declared persona non grada Syrian Ambassador in Washington. This was followed with large scale liquidations in Syrian army and Colonel Brizi who was known with his communist inclinations was assigned as Chief of Staff. This scared not Turkey only but Iraq and Jordan a well. King Faysal , King Huseyin came to Turkey and there they met with Celal Bayar American representative
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Henderson to discuss with him the situation in Syria. Egypt immediately condemned the USA for provoking these countries against their neighbors. Turkey was looking Syria as a Soviet satellite. USA declared her intention to sent troupes to the neighboring countries to Syria but made also Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon known that she would not intervene in Syria. In that Situation Menderes Government chose to deploy troupes on Syrian borders. Bulganin warned Menderes that Turkey would create disasters for herself in case she was thinking that an attack to Syria would lead to a local war only. Turkey expressed that she did not understand the USSR who advocating for Syria while this latter did not react. 8 months later Syria complained from Turkey for creating border incidents, for violating the Syrian air space and building in forces at the border. Turkey replied that there were only security measures necessitated by the tensions in the Middle East. USA made a declaration to support Turkey and the USSR condemned Turkey and the USA for following aggressive policies in the region. Two Soviet war ships showed up in Lazkiye and American Forth Fleet visited Izmir. Mediations offered by the King of Saudi Arabia were rejected by Syria. Egypt accused King Saud for being an American agent. Syria submitted the problem to the UN. During the debates started on 22nd October and which severely opposed Turkey and Syria at the General Assembly of the UN Indonesian proposal inviting parties to the conflict to seek solution through negotiations was accepted by Turkey and Syria. In the mean time USSR moderated her behavior vis a vis Turkey. In February 1958 Egypt and Syria founded the United Arab Republic. For Turkey a Syria united to Egypt was preferable then a Syria under Soviet influence and She recognized the UAR. On the other hand when Iraq and Jordan decided to form a federation Turkey gave support to that as well. We have to note that this artificial crisis was due also probably to the effort of the Turkish Government to divert Turkish public opinion from
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domestic problems to an international question just before the 1957 elections in Turkey, which would take place under severe economic conditions. 4. Foundation of CENTO. On 14 July 1958 a military coup in Baghdad toppled king Faysal and Nuri Said and opened way to important changes in the regional policies of Iraq. Other Baghdad Pact countries qualified the coup as the result of suggestions made by Nasser and communists and asked Washington to intervene conformingly to the Eisenhower doctrine. F.R.Zorlu, Turkish Minister of Foreign affaires declared that there was not \a new Iraqi Government and the only legitimate Government was that under King Husseyin., head of Iraqi Jordan Federation. In fact such a federation had died. On 2nd August Husseyin declared the end of the Federation. Turkey was seriously considering intervening in Iraq to restore the old regime, thinking that new regime would approach Iraq to Egypt and the USSR. USA who was afraid of a Soviet intervention warned Turkey not to pass to any action against Iraq. On 28-29July 1958 the Pact countries met together with the exception of Iraq in London and stated their conviction that the Pact was more necessary then any time and invited the USA to join. USA declined this invitation again and chose to strengthen her relations with Pact countries on bilateral basis. In October the seat of the pact was removed to Ankara. In March Iraq withdrew from the Pact. On 21 August the name of Baghdad Pact was changed as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). 5. Developments in Lebanon and Jordan n 1958. When President of

Lebanon Mr. Chamoun started demarches to change the Lebanese constitution to obtain a new mandate, pro Nasser nationalists provoked armed conflicts in the country. With President Chamouns approval the USA sent marines to Lebanon on July to help Lebanon Government to preserve its independence and territorial integrity. This was the first implementation of the Eisenhower
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Doctrine. Turkey gave support to this American intervention and offered also the Incirlik bases to be used for this purpose. USA did not accept this offer arguing that this was not a NATO operation. More that Turkey proposed to the USA to give military support by Turkish Air Forces. The use by the USA of Incirlik base provoked reactions in Egypt and in the USSR. King Husseyin was preoccupied with the possibility that incidents in Lebanon would occur in Jordan also and asked USA and UK to sent troupes in Jordan. British forces landed to Jordan from Cyprus with the support of USA. Jordan having military support of USA and the UK complained to the UN against UAR for intervening in domestic affairs of Jordan and broke off her relation with UAR. Turkey gave her support to USA,UK and Jordan during these developments. 6. Independence of Algeria Turkey manifested interest for the struggle for independence in Algeria, but voted with France against the adoption of the question in the agenda of the General Assembly of the UN in 1955. In 1957 and 1958 She abstained before the project of resolution for selfdetermination in Algeria. Relations with Israel Turkey after her decision to recognize the State of Israel waited one year to establish diplomatic relations with her. On 9th Mach 1950 Diplomatic relations at the level of Legation has been established. Relations between the two countries started to develop in all the fields. In fact, the two countries were secular in a region where the religion was predominating. The two countries had adopted the western stile of economic and political development. Both countries had good and close relations with the USA. Turkey was convinced on the influence of Jews lobby in Washington. Israel was also desirous to develop her
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relations with Turkey. Some Israeli politicians were thinking that Turkey could help Israel in her conflict with Arabs. In 1950 Trade agreement and payments agreement were signed between the two countries. Israel started to buy agricultural products of Turkey. Israel was re-exporting to Turkey products from East European countries Turkey had not good relations with. Some Israeli companies started to operate in Turkey. In 1954 balance of payments was for the first time in favor of Israel. During the first half of 50s cultural relations were developed as well. Some of the expressions in the decisions taken between Turkey and Iraq during the contacts leading to the Baghdad Pact uncomforted Israel. Israel was interpreting them as a signal showing that Turkey was taking part of the Arabs in Arab-Israel conflict. Iraqi prime minister had said that Pact would never accept Israel as member. Menderes was once declared in Damascus that Turkey was ready to help Arab countries in case of an Israeli attack to them. Israel tried to elude the formation of the Pact. In 1955 Israel gave a not to Ankara and referring to the positive declarations of Turkish authorities in the past asked weather a shift had occurred in Turkish policies towards Israel. Turkey replied that there was no change in her policies. But this affirmation was weakening her demarches to attract Arab countries to Baghdad Pact. However Israel stressed that Baghdad pact was against the existence of Israel and was encouraging hostile Arab feelings against this country. These Israeli attitudes were discomforting Turkey. In fact since the summer of 1955 Turkey started to revise her policy. All relations with Israel were limited to law level contacts. When Egypt was attacked by Israel at the start of the Suez canal Crisis, Turkey joined a declaration of the Baghdad Pact condemning Israel. Taking into considerations developments in the Turkish public opinion Turkish Government appealed Turkish Minister in Tel Aviv to Turkey. With this measure Turkey

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wanted also to moderate feelings against Turkey in Arab public opinions, but this did not help. In December 1956 Israel withdrew her Minister from Ankara. Expansion of pan Arab feelings in Arab countries after Nasser came to power in Egypt, close relations that country has established with the USSR and formation of Arab Federations pushed later Israel to approach to non Arab countries of the region. She was thinking that pan Arab development could only be stopped by a Pact composed of countries around Arab States. But a pact without Turkey would not be useful. Ben Grion and Golda Meir came in secrecy to Ankara in August 1958 and met with Menderes and Zorlu. Turkey was convinced to join the pact suggested by Israel. Why? Union of Egypt and Syria had discomforted Turkey. Iraqi coup dEtat jeopardized the security of southern borders of Turkey. At last the USA wanted to see Turkey member of the Pact. Pact was foreseeing the cooperation among member states against pan Arab and communist developments. After the establishment of that Pact Turkish Israeli relations gained their initial vivacity. Relations with Iran Turkey did not welcome the initiative of Musaddik to nationalize oil in Iran in early 50s. Furthermore at Musaddik period Iran took a nonaligned inclination. Communist Tudeh Party gained influence in the Iranian public opinion. Thus Turkish Iranian relation was in a crisis between 1951-1953 Turkey gave support to UK accepting embargo imposed on Iran. She gave support to the USA-UK operation against Iran. But following the CIA operation, which toppled Musaddik, the relations between the two countries were improved in one night. Iran joined the Baghdad Pact in November 1955. Bayar had gone to Teheran to convince the Shah to adhere. He understood that the reason Shah was
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acting slowly was to get more aid from the USA. Shah was also preoccupied with the probable reactions of the partisans of Musaddik and leftist groups. Shah did not want also to irritate the USSR. Following the coup in Iraq Pact was transformed in CENTO. Scaring that what happened to King Faysal could happen to him as well Shah wanted CENTO to become a stronger organization. Then came up the coup in Turkey.

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