The Role of Clausewitzian Friction in Military Simulation and Wargames

The Role of Clausewitzian Friction in Military Simulation and Wargames
Nicholas Edwards
The Role of Clausewitzian Friction in Military Simulation and Wargames Nicholas Edwards www.nicholascedwards.co.uk
Introduction
This report shall be looking into what role Clausewitzs concept of friction and its relation to chance has in the design of military simulation. If the unpredictability of conflict has an important influence upon the outcome of battle, then how military simulation may introduce such an element, if at all, shall be of great importance to the quality of these simulations as both a training aid and as a representation of conflict.
Chance in War Studies

Carl von Clausewitz (1993) felt that war consisted of what he termed a paradoxical trinity of passion, reason and chance, in which the balance and interconnection of these three factors defined the nature of conflict as a whole, and concluded that any theory of war that ignored this relationship would be in conflict with reality. To Clausewitz there was no other human activity as completely or as consistently imbrued with chance as war, which forces much of the decision-making process to rely on guesswork and luck.
Clausewitz (1993) coined the term friction to describe the process in which the element of chance influences military operations, through the small difficulties that occur in conflict at any level and pervade battle through, Countless minor incidents the kind you never really foresee (which) combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal. Friction is what separates real war from that on paper, making what should really be simple in battle difficult, as complications accumulate in all aspects related to the operation and what should have been a simple manoeuvre ends up halted long before its intended aim. Friction itself can be anything from the psychological state of those fighting, the weather conditions, the mechanical state of equipment, or anything else that is beyond the commanders complete control, and may come from elements that were known to have a chance of occurring or the totally unknown (Jones, 1985). Barry Watts (1996) compiled what he feels are the five main sources of friction:
1. Dangers impact on the ability to think clearly and act effectively in war.
2. The effect of exhaustion on the capability to both think and act in combat.
3. Uncertainties and imperfections in the information on which action in war is unavoidably based.
4. The difficulties that arise from the interaction between those who make the army, which can often stop effective cooperation.
5. The play of chance, of good luck and bad, whose consequences combatants can never fully foresee.
Clausewitz came to many of his conclusions on the role of chance in conflict through his philosophical approach to war studies, and as such is often compared with his contemporary Antoine-Henri Jomini, who saw war differently and felt instead that a scientific approach was more applicable to the subject (Luvaas, 1986). To Jomini, war was more of a clash of wits, not wills, and that conflict was better studied through rational calculation, with a focus on the quantifiable aspects such as movement and logistics. Due to his scientific methodology, Jomini did not feel that the idea of friction was as relevant, as war could be boiled down to a set of principles nevertheless (Biddle, 1989). Clausewitz (1993), however, criticised the idea of using a scientific methodology when studying war, feeling that such an approach underestimated the impact of friction.
The factors of chance, uncertainty and friction have been used as the basis to many of the arguments to why a philosophical approach to war studies the more appropriate way to view the nature of warfare, as it is these factors that often blur the line between how much
skill and luck individually contribute to victory. While the popular image of conflict is often one wherein the skill and courage of the victor were the backbone to their success, just as attributable could be the technical and psychological breakdowns that impeded the plans and caused the defeat of their opponent, who may have actually been the more capable commander (Beaumont, 1984). Ian Wallace (2010) feels that war itself is inherently unpredictable, the only guaranteed certainty being that the conflict shall be uncertain, and as such an army that is unprepared for the unpredictability of war shall be the ones greater influenced by its consequences. US commander in the China-Burma-India Theatre during the Second World War General Joseph Stilwell summed up the impact of friction upon a commanders job, commenting (Glick and Charters, 1983):
(The) Principal load (of a commanding general) is standing disappointment and upsetting of plans. Everything conspires against him; dumb execution, weather, breakdowns, misunderstandings, deliberate obstructions, jealousies, etc. (He) must be prepared to accept fifty per cent results in twice the time calculated
By looking at war just through its quantifiable aspects, such as troop numbers and quality of equipment, it becomes a predictable affair where victory and defeat account to a simple calculus of cost and benefits, judged upon physical destruction and casualties (Riper & Scales Jr., 1997). Clausewitz (1993), though, felt that it was the impact of friction that renders the idea of judging two forces on the material factors alone misleading, as unlike the physical element of conflict, friction cannot be analysed mathematically.
A well-publicised account of the impact of friction was Donald Rumsfelds speech on the unknown unknowns, the idea that there are things that a commander doesnt even know they do not yet know, and is an issue that may can be observed from the tactical to the strategic levels of war. The main dangers to a plan can quite often be those that were seemingly unpredictable in the first place (Foot, 2006), mostly down to the fact that it is
hard to prepare for issues that were never anticipated to occur (Gray, 2002). However, the idea of elements that are currently wholly unknown to the planners on each side highlights the power that friction can have over warfare, and any plan must have provisions pertaining to these unknown factors, such as redundancy. A commander must concede that any future events, whether they are at the tactical, operational or strategic level, shall always be in many ways completely unpredictable (Wallace, 2010).
Chance in Wargames and Military Simulation

The use of the term unknown unknowns to describe the unpredictable aspects of war long predates Rumsfelds use of the concept, and can in fact be traced back to the opinions of Lieutenant General Raymond B. Furlong on how friction should be applied to wargames designed for training purposes. Furlong (1984) felt that wargames must have a solid aim of developing a commanders ability to cope with the nature of friction and its impact upon battle, and do so through incorporating Clausewitzian uncertainty and chance within their game mechanics. A simulation must teach a commander to expect the unexpected and the basic fact that in the field they will be living under the umbrella of uncertainty.
Only a commander who has learned to deal with the stresses of friction shall overcome it and succeed in real war, and because of this Furlong (1984) stated that to him a welldesigned wargame was one that included all of the frustrations that chance and uncertainty bring to conflict in reality. The end result of adding a high amount of frustration to gameplay would, in Furlongs view, cause the player to lose more often than not, but concluded that a player would have more to learn from defeat than they would victory. Chance through unpredictable and unknown sources will lead to the player losing most games, but as this is the main cause of defeat in battle, such experiences will only prepare a commander to overcome uncertainty in the field, and to Furlong any links with fairness should be broken in military simulation.
Professor Phillip Sabin (2012) also takes the view that chance is critical to simulating conflict, but in contrast to Furlong, feels that it must be balanced carefully alongside the aspects of skill and the level of abstraction desired for the game mechanics themselves, or rather their realism.
Image 1.1
Each of the corners of Sabins (2012) trinity of wargames (Image 1.1) represents the extreme points at which a wargames mechanics shall always fall between. At the top of the trinity under Realism would be a book on the conflict, where the outcome is always the same whatever the readers input. A game that relies fully on Skill may be something like chess, as the game has little reliance on chance or a relation to battle in reality. Finally, a game completely under Chance would be a title like Snakes and Ladders, which again bears no resemblance to reality, but this time is based entirely upon the luck of the players. Sabin felt that a simulation of conflict needed to include a mix of all three elements of his trinity if it was to provide the right mix of gameplay and reality to be of use as a training tool.
Because of his trinity, Sabin (2012) stated that the application of chance in wargames must be balanced alongside the need for skill on the part of the players, and as such, a game that forces those playing to rely on luck more than their own capabilities would be missing the
point of the exercise. But Sabin was still of the opinion that the utilisation of chance in game mechanics is crucial to the development of a simulation, the real question not being whether chance should be included, but to what extent it is balanced with skill, linking his reasoning back to Clausewitzs concepts of friction and uncertainty. If Clausewitz was correct on both the importance of chance in warfare and the influence it has on its outcome, then any military simulation shall need to present this factor if the nature of the environment it is preparing students for is to be replicated. To remove the element of uncertainty from a wargame would be to create an environment unrealistic in comparison to how these same decisions shall be made in the field, and that much may be taken from the fact that Clausewitz compared war to a game of cards, not one of chess.
The main danger of using frictionless simulation environments is that training can ultimately become formulaic to those participating. If the students using wargames as an aid have perfect information of their environment and the outcomes of their decisions, then training shall end up becoming a series of set solutions that must be carried out to achieve correct answers. If those participating in a training exercise have been prepared well, then the lack of friction and chance shall result in textbook decisions that follow into an already determined optimal outcome. By preparing soldiers and their commanders to carry perfect decisions in a chanceless environment, the reality of the battlefield may be an overwhelming experience when these decisions must eventually be made within the confines of friction (Haffa Jr. & Patton Jr., 1998).
Both the commander and their troops may be prepared by utilising simulation for the influence of the unknown factors of combat, which chance and uncertainty may bring (Foot, 2006). Without the application of friction in game mechanics, a simulation will only be of limited value as one of the primary aspects of war in reality shall have been lost, teaching their users in an environment separate from that they are being prepared for (Wilton, 2001). As a commander is stressed to the influence of friction, the potential exists for them to learn how to work within the uncertain limits of chance (Beaumont, 1984), but also
understand that, ultimately, there shall be events in battle that cannot be foreseen however much preparation or intelligence has been utilised (Manley, 1999). By offering friction-filled environments, complacency on the battlefield may be guarded against, as wargames have the potential to ready their users for the moment that their assumptions of the situation change without notice (Haffa Jr. & Patton Jr., 1998).
Dr. Roger Beaumont (1984) suggested that the best way to inoculate students against the unknown unknowns, but also preserve the integrity of the purpose of the exercise, was for the instructor to have a controlling role over proceedings. Through Beaumonts method the one supervising the exercise would inject events into the game that were unexpected by the players, while also making sure that there was no sense of regularity, patterns, periodicity, or frequency in when these occurred. Others have suggested the same as Beaumont, and one of the main powers of simulation is that those running it may generate such unpredictable events at will, but with the control that it gives over doing the same in reality (Smith, 2009). Through the controlled use of uncertainty and chance by the instructors, what events transpire and when, may be set down in a way that allows students to be judged on their ability to improvise, removing the issues of comparison that occurs when the events are simply random (Manley ,1999).
The view that chance and uncertainty form a crucial element to the gameplay of military simulation is, however, not without opposition and an undercurrent of opinion feels that their application will only drag down the benefits of their use in training exercises. Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Leser and Dr. James Sterrett (2010), both of the U.S. Armys Command and General Staff College (CGSC), who stated that in their opinion the elements of chance and uncertainty have no place within military simulation. Leser and Sterrett agreed that friction is a major element of battle in reality, admitting that when their students are eventually deployed in combat it will cause their plans to sometimes go awry, but that also that was irrelevant to include in simulation as their students already know from personnel experience that accidents happen.
By removing the randomness of reality and allowing a students commands to be executed exactly as they anticipated, Leser and Sterrett (2010) argue, allows the instructor to analyse the quality of their planning clearly, without having to judge this around chance that may or may have not correlated with their personal skill. A player must understand just why they have failed and this should always come back to the quality of their planning overall, so that it may be disseminated and the mistakes that caused this failure pointed out to the student in question. To add the factor of chance into a training exercise would be to break the link between player decisions and the outcome in game, removing the feedback loop that, if without, a simulation would lose its ability to be an effective teaching tool. Dr. Peter Perla (1987) agrees that the use of chance in wargame can be problematic to the point of the exercise, feeling that players will only accept and learn from an unlikely result if the full range of options and the likelihoods of their decisions are laid out before them.
Conclusions
Friction has been seen to be a crucial factor in developing a picture of what makes up the nature of warfare, whose link with chance and uncertainty contributes to an element that may turn the tide of battle without any warning or desire on the part of the commanders will. Whether the influence that uncertainty has over conflict in reality should also be carried into the design of military simulations, whose purpose is to prepare soldiers for the battlefield, is a complex decision.
While the impact of chance in battle is indeed far-reaching, the shaping of a training exercise around this element can make it difficult to assess those that participated, due to the blurred line between whether their result was down to their own skill or blind luck. A chance-based simulation can also dull the lessons that the exercise was meant to teach them, as a player who has not completely comprehended the module may still pass through chance, or blame their failures on bad luck.
However, by removing all uncertainty from military simulation, the other risk that becomes apparent is that students shall only be taught how to operate on a limited picture of the battlefield, which leaves them preparing for war in a bubble unconnected to reality. The unpredictability of combat shall often mean that improvisation is as crucial as carefully constructed plans, and if this is so then training that does not force the player to think on the spot while overcoming unseen issues, shall potentially leave them lacking when such friction occurs in battle.
A wargame developed as a training aid must therefore utilise a balance of skill and chance in its design. A competent student must ultimately be more able to pass any exercise due to their higher level of skill, but that this must also include their ability to improvise, not just how well they can formulate set plans. While the ability to develop an overall plan and stay one-step ahead of an opponent is important, just as so is the ability to put this plan back on track after an unexpected incident. If the instructors running any simulation have the ability to introduce random events, then a methodology can exist behind the uncertainty, allowing the user to be assessed on how well they handled these events in comparison to others. Ultimately, chance has a vital role in preparing soldiers for battle and that simulation can be a key method in achieving this as long as the players own skill is not forsaken when introducing such uncertainty to gameplay.
Further Research
This study may be furthered by research into the methods available to adding chance into the game mechanics of wargames, such as an evaluation of Jim Dunnigans (1980) widely used Combat Results Table, designed to simulate battle through dice-rolls by adding modifiers such as terrain and morale to give weight to each sides relative chance. Whether methods such as Dunnigans are still applicable to modern wargames or if a new theory is
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required shall be important to developing a further understanding of how chance and uncertainty link to the design of military simulation.
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Bibliography
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Biddle, S. D. (1989). The State of Knowledge on the Determinants of Offensiveness and Defensiveness in Conventional Ground Forces. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses.
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Foot, P. (2006). Military Education and the Transformation of the Canadian Forces. Canadian Military Journal. 7 (Spring 2006) p.13-20.
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Gray, C. S. (2002). Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror. Parameters Journal. 32 (Spring 2002) p.5-14.
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Jones, F. S. (1985). Analysis and Comparison of the Ideas and Later Influences of Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz. Montgomery, AL: Air Command and Staff College.
Leser, J. & Sterrett, J. (2010). A Battle in Every Classroom: Gaming and the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College. In: Huntemann, N. B. & Payne, M. T. (eds). Joystick Soliders: The Politics of Play in Military Video Games. Abingdon: Routledge.
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Manley, P. R. (1999). Chaos, Clausewitz, Friction and Command. Washington, DC: National War College.
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Riper, P. V. & Scales Jr., R. H. (1997). Preparing for War in the 21st Century. Parameters Journal. 27 (Summer 1997) p.4-14.
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Sabin, P. (2012). Simulating War: Studying Conflict Through Simulation Games. London: Continuum.
Smith, R.D. (2009). Military Simulation & Serious Games: Where We Came From and Where We Are Going. Orlando, FL: Modelbenders Press.
Wallace, I. (2010). The Difficulties in Predicting Future Warfare. Australian Defence Force Journal. 183 (November-December 2010) p.27-33.
Watts, B. D. (1996). Clausewitzian Friction and Future War. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies.
Wilton, D. (2001). The Application of Simulation Technology to Military Command and Control Decision Support. In: Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation, SimTecT 2001. Canberra, Australia 28-31 May 2001. Sydney, Australia: Simulation Industry Association of Australia.
Images
Image 1.1: (Sabin, 2012, p.117, figure 8.1)
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Chance in War Studies

Chance in Wargames and Military Simulation

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