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The Architectonic of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Author(s): Jon Stewart Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Dec., 1995), pp. 747-776 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: . Accessed: 23/05/2012 17:06
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Research Philosophyand Phenomenological
Vol. LV, No. 4, December 1995

The Architectonicof Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit

HumboldtUniversitatzu Berlin After the virulentcriticisms of Nietzsche, Kierkegaardand much of the analytic tradition,systematic philosophy has for the most part gone into eclipse in contemporaryEuropeanthought.' The main target of these criticisms was often the dauntingedifice of the Hegelian system which dominatedso much of Nineteenth Centuryphilosophy. Despite a small handful of scholars who try with might and main to salvage this edifice,2 the general belief among scholars today is that at bottom Hegel's philosophical project as a system is Of simply bankruptand indefensible all around.3 all the texts in the Hegelian corpus, the Phenomenology of Spirit with it plethoraof themes and troubled composition has been in particularsingled out for criticism as a disunified and unsystematic text.4Typical of this general belief is Kaufmann'scharacterization: "the Phenomenology is certainty unwissenschaftlich, undisciplined, arbitrary,full of digressions, not a monumentto the austerity of the intellectual conscience and to carefulness and precision but a wild, bold, unThe question of the possibility of a systematic philosophy today formed the topic of the International Hegel Conference in 1975. Henrich, Dieter (ed.), Ist systematische Philosophie mdglich? Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17, Bonn: Bouvier, 1977. E.g., Leonard, Andre, "La structuredu systeme hdgdlian,"Revue philosophique de Louvain, (69), 1971, pp. 495-524. Trede, Johann Heinrich, "Phdnomenologie und Logik. Zu den Grundlageneiner Diskussion," Hegel-Studien, (10), 1975, pp. 173-210. Even as great of an admirerof Hegel as John Dewey writes, "The form, the schematism, of his [sc. Hegel's] system now seems to me artificial to the last degree." Dewey, John, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism,"in ContemporaryAmerican Philosophy, volume II, edited by George P. Adams and W. P. Montague.New York: The Macmillan Co., 1930, p. 21. Haering, Theodore, "Entstehungsgeschichteder Phdnomenologie des Geistes," in Verhandlungen des III. Internationalen Hegel Kongresses 1933, edited by B. Wigersma, Haarlem:N/VH. D. Tjeenk Willink & Zn. and Tubingen:J. C. B. Mohr, 1934, pp. 11836. Also see Haering, Theodore, Hegel sein Wollen und sein Werk II. Leipzig and Berlin: Teubner, 1929, pp. 479ff. Poggeler, Otto, "Die Komposition der Phanomenologie des Geistes," in Hegel-Tage Royaumont 1964. Beitrage zur Phanomenologie des Geistes, edited by Hans-GeorgGadamer.Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 3, Bonn: Bouvier, 1966, pp. 27-74. Cited from the reprint in Materialien zu Hegels Phdnomenologie des Geistes, edited by Hans Friedrich Fulda and Dieter Henrich. Frankfurta. M.: Suhrkamp, 1973, pp. 329-90.




precedented book."5The Phenomenology is thus seen simply as an eclectic and at times bizarrecollection of atomic analyses on sundrytopics. This preconception of the Phenomenology as a disunified text then leads to a predeapproach. terminedand, in my view, erroneousinterpretive The strategy of a numberof specialists, who have found Hegel's system in so impenetrable its overall architectonicand so problematicat its particular transitions, has been simply to give up entirely on his project as a system and to approachhis philosophy in an episodic manner.With this interpretive method one tries to understandindividual sections of the Phenomenology in abstractionfrom the systematic contexts in which they appear. This seems intuitive enough since the contexts of Hegel's analyses are so varied that it is often difficult to imagine what could be the schematic connection between them in any case. This leads many scholars to try to exploit the isolated sections and analyses of the Phenomenology for their own purposes. Poggeler expresses this tendency with the following rhetoricalquestions: "Should we not simply keep to the things that the Phenomenology offers as positive results-for example, concerning physiognomy or the Roman world? Should we not, when possible, exploit Hegel's work as was done in the Middle Ages when people went to ancient buildings in searchof constructionmaterialsfor their own structureswithout any regard or consideration given to their disparate forms?"6In this way the commentator can make Hegel topical by showing how the individual issues that the philosopher treats are similar to contemporary problem constellations, thus emphasizing, for example, Hegel's philosophy of action,7his philosophy of language' or his account of demonstratives.9Scholars of this persuasion try to explicate these sections out of context as containinginterestingand relevant issues in themselves. In this way, it appearsthese commentatorscan save Hegel from himself, given that his system appearsso hopeless. However, this strategy of selection and
Kaufmann, Walter, Hegel: A Reinterpretation.Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978, p. 158. Cf. "The Phenomenology of Spirit is a profoundly incongruous book" (ibid. p. 142). "I should prefer to speak of charades: now a tableau, now a skit, now a brief oration"(ibid p. 127). Elsewhere, Kaufmannwrites in a similar vein, "One really has to put on blinkers and immerse oneself in carefully selected microscopic details to avoid the discovery that the Phenomenology is in fact an utterly unscientific and unrigorous work." Kaufmann, Walter, "Hegel's Conception of Phenomenology," in Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding, edited by Edo Pivcevic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 229. Poggeler, Otto, "Die Komposition der Phanomenologie des Geistes," in Materialien zu Hegels Phdnomenologie des Geistes, op. cit., p. 372. (My translation.) Cf. Stepelevich, L. S. and Lamb, David (ed.), Hegel's Philosophy of Action. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1983. Cf. Lamb, David, "Hegel and Wittgenstein on Language and Sense-Certainty," Clio, (7), 1978, pp. 281-301. Cf. Plumer, Gilbert, "Hegel on Singular DemonstrativeReference,"SouthernJournal of Philosophy, (11), 1980, pp. 71-94.

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Enz p. is seriously misguided since Hegel himself."2 example. "the and truths of philosophy are valueless. Oxford: ClarendonPress. Miller.. accordingto Hegel. 19 of Gesammelte Werke. and he explains this in numerousplaces. vol. Freiburg and Munich: Karl Alber. Likewise in philosophy."he writes. EL = Hegel's Logic. or personal convictions" (EL ?14. Enz pp.. Cf. Kemp Smith. and an atomic thesis asserted without relation to a wider system cannotrely on such a system to provide a context and thus to support it since apartfrom such a-system it stands without relation to other concepts and theories which give it meaning in the first place." Kant. a tile in For a mosaic seen on its own in abstractionfrom the other tiles of which the mosaic is composed is in a sense meaningless. New York: St. Enz = Enzyklopddieder philosophischen Wissenschaften. Hamburg: Felix Meiner. and must then be treated as baseless hypotheses. 41). Hegels Idee einer Phdnomenologie des Geistes.10 expressly insisted on the systematic natureof philosophy as an intellectualenterprise. translatedby A. Otto.e. The tile has its true meaning only in its relation to the rest of the tiles and to the mosaic as a whole. makes a system out of a mere aggregate of knowledge. Hamburg: Felix Meiner. 1975.edited by the Rheinisch-Westfilische Akademie der Wissenschaften. "The True is the whole" (PhS ?20. i. 9 of Gesammelte Werke. A832/B860. architectonic is the doctrine of the scientific in our knowledge. edited by the Rheinisch-Westfiilische Akademie der Wissenschaften.Any attempt to change even the smallest part at once gives rise to contradictions. ibid.. vol. "For pure speculative reason has a structurewherein everything is an organ. Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Critique of Pure Reason. Martin's Press.. and therefore necessarily forms part of the doctrine of method. Cf. 1973. the whole being for the sake of all others. PhG p. like the rest of the Germanidealists before him. THE ARCHITECTONIC HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY SPIRIT 749 OF OF .) Cf. 19).1 A truth in a philosophical system has its truth value only in relation to the other members of the system. 1968ff. (PhS = Phenomenology of Spirit." Kant. EL ?16. is by no means less energetic in his insistence on systematic philosophy than Hegel: "As a systematic unity is what first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of science. A840/B869. one could not divine the picture of the mosaic as a whole with knowledge of the single tile alone. See Poggeler. I take this to be the point of the well-known passage in the Preface of the Phenomenology where Hegel claims. that is. ibid. 1929. 1968ff. but in human reason in general. translatedby N. Hegel believed that truth could only be expressed in terms of a system. 121-22. whatevertruththere is in the individualclaims of a system lies in the organic 10 12 13 Kant. V. 1977. PhG = Phdnomenologie des Geistes.omission. 41-42. insisting that the particularparts of the system are meaningful only inside the systematic context in which they appear. for instance. not merely in the system. also Kant. translatedby William Wallace.1' In other words. Oxford: Clarendon Press.. the truthand meaning of the individual propositions depend upon the context in which they are found in the system as a whole."Apartfrom theirinterdependence organicunion. Bxxxvii-xxxviii. pp. althoughattractiveto modernscholars bent ever more toward specialization.

Lamb. according to Hegel's holism.Unless it is a system. pp. Hegel is quite forthcoming with respect to the relation of truth to a systematic philosophy. 80. (Letters = Hegel: The Letters.. Hegels. Labarriere. W. is only possible as a universe or totality of thought. PhG p. (38). Cf.By excerpting individual analyses out of their systematic context. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.. Puntel. essentially bound up with the very notion of truthitself. 1973. simply to admit this up front than to give up on it. but ratherit is. If we are going to talk about Hegel at all. 1968.14 As we can see from these passages. Bonn: Bouvier. May 1. Gerd. In the Encyclopaedia Logic.Structures et mouvement de dialectique dans la Pheinome6nologie l'esprit de Hegel. Untersuchung zur kategorialen Einheit von Vernunftund Geist in Hegels Phdnomenologie des Geistes. translatedby Clark Butler and Christian Seiler. and can only be expounded. "knowledge is only actual. PhG p. "Des mouvements paralleles dans la Phinome'nologie de l'esprit. "The science of this Idea must form a system. I would not wish to claim that my emphasis on Hegel's philosophy as a system is entirely unique or novel. David. This approach misunderstandsthe spirit of Hegel's systematic enterpriseand dismisses his own clear statementsof explanationand intentionin this regard. History and Truth in Hegel's Phenomenology. Hegel: From Foundation to System. we must also talk about the Hegelian system. as Science or as system" (PhS ?24. 1979. and Hegel with it. also a little later in the Preface where he says. L. Methode und Struktur. Merold. Kimmerle..Pierre-Jean. Bonn: Bouvier. Darstellung." One of the central interpretivechallenges of the book as a whole is in a sense posed by what Hegel says about the Phenomenology in a letter to Schelling. Hegel flatly claims. 1969. 11).Untersuchung zur Einheit der systematischen Philosophie G. If truthcan only be expressed in the form of a philosophical system. F. Frederic. then we do Hegel a disservice by randomlyexcerpting parts of his system which we find interesting and relevant to our contemporaryphilosophical agenda while ignoring the role they play in the system as a whole. pp. The notion of a philosophical system is not something that one aspires to attain merely for the sake of some mild aesthetic pleasuregainedfrom a certainorderor symmetryor from the satisfactionwon by being able to pigeon hole sundry concepts under orderly headings.or systematic relation of those claims to one anotherinside the whole of the system. 1980. Briefe I.. 41).it is more advisable. Enz p. Hegel to Schelling [95].Truth. then. Escaraffel. 93-105. p. also in the Preface of the Phenomenology. Cf. Sein und Selbst. Although perhaps we will not be able to understandthe most opaque parts of the Hegelian architectonic. 21). 159-62." L'Arc. Bamberg. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Bruno. given Hegel's conception of philosophy. BloomJON STEWART 750 . Paris: Aubier. "The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of such truth"(PhS ?5. Hegel says of the absolute Idea. There he claims that the work contains an intricate"interlacingof was that back and forth"16 he unfortunately unableto make as cross-references 14 15 16 Cf. 1978. a philosophy is not a scientific production"(EL ?14.. altogether.. Westphal. Letters. we lose the very meaning of those analyses. 1807.

in my view. (69). edited by Johannes Hoffmeister." Revue philosophique de Louvain. Hamburg:Meiner. when pursuedconsistently. 209-22. have long been subject to attack. blur the systematic relation between the two works by collapsing them into a single project. some scholars have attempted to read the Phenomenology by transposingthe structureof Hegel's Logic onto it. pp. 1971. 1974. In this essay. "La estructurade la Fenomenologia del esp(ritu de Hegel y el problema del tiempo.we will also be in a position to criticize the "patchwork" interpretaington: Indiana University Press. Leonard. pp. will lead us to a picture of the general economy of the text which contains parallel chapters and sections as Hegel indicated in his letter to is hoped. Johannes. Instead. will in turn help us better to understandthis difficult text as it was originally intendedto be understoodby allowing us to place the individual analyses in their proper context. "Pour une exegese renouvelee de la 'Phe'nomenologie de l'esprit' de Hegel. Leonard. I wish to argue. Briefe = Briefe von und an Hegel. It seems to me then that one of the appropriate tasks of the secondary literatureon the Phenomenology is to try to uncover these cross-referencesand by so doing to uncover the hidden structureof the work as a whole. "La structuredu systeme hegelian. as I have indicated. and thus a study which could indicate how this part of his system might be at least plausible would be valuable in its own right. 1984.clear as he would have liked. 1976. Albizu. Bonn: Bouvier. (7). 495-524. Heinrichs. 1981. 1961. 572-93. holds the of key to the structureof the work as a whole. An understanding this hitherto neglected structure. I will linger somewhat on the "Reason"chaptersince it. this can amount to little more than a sketch since a full-length commentarywould be requiredto demonstratethe systematic connections one by one.I will not treatthe biographical questions concerning the turbulent composition of the Phenomenology since this too would requirea study in itself. pp.Moreover. Die Logik der Phdnomenologie des Geistes. In my account.) Notably. I will not be able in my discussion to offer more than the most cursory account of the unitarymovement of the contents of the individualsections and chapters." Revue philosophique de Louvain. 17 THE ARCHITECTONIC HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY SPIRIT OF OF 751 .especially in the Phenomenology. my strategy for establishing the unity of the text will be to take as a model the revised version of the table of contents that Hegel wrote after the completion of the work and then to test this organizationalscheme against a numberof passages throughoutthe Phenomenology that serve as indicatorsfor the systematic structureas a whole. Hegel's systematic pretensions. However. Edgardo. These passages. however. Andre. Of course. this is in itself not a negligible service since. I would like to attempt to reconstruct the systematic structureof Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit with respect to its formal unity. Andre. In order to establish the unity of form. in an investigation of this kind.17 These attempts. (74). although this analysis will serve only as a general outline. Since my principalaim is to demonstrate the unity of form in the Phenomenology." Revista Latinoamericana de Filosoffa. By uncovering this structure. 4 vols.

"Die Komposition der 752 JON STEWART . B. Force and the Understanding IV. Phanomenologie des Geistes. Observing Reason B.""Spirit. Also see Poggeler. however. for the "Consciousness. Self-Alienated Spirit. Hegel. Sense-Certainty II. and C. Culture C. one will notice straightaway ratherconfusing mixtureof Latin letters and Roman numerals. The True Spirit.e. Freedom of Self-Consciousness V. Otto.. NaturalReligion B. Werke 3.M." "Religion" and finally "Absolute Knowing. 595ff.tions thatare so inimical to Hegel's own expressedmethodology and conception of philosophy. Lordshipand Bondage B.'8In the second scheme he used the Latin letters A." "Self-Consciousness" and "Reason" chapters respectively. The story of how this confused table of contents came about is not a simple one. revised this table of contentsin a very illuminatingway when he was reading the proofs for the book. Perception III.e.. Frankfurta. "Sense-Certainty") Hegel. some of which include as few while others as nine pages in the English translation(i. "Zur Feststellung des Textes. Absolute Knowing This organizationalscheme has caused a great deal of confusion concerning the disproportionate lengths of these sections. F. Morality VII. See also the "Nachwort"to the Hoffmeister edition (G. it is due to this change that the argument arises that the originalplan for the work consisted of only three chapters). 1952).: Suhrkamp.When one critically examines the outline indithe cated there. Individuality which takes itself to be Real in and for itself VI. Phanomenologie des Geistes. Religion A.""Perception.""Force and the Understanding. The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness Through its own Activity C. Hamburg:Meiner. contain as many as one hundredand forty-six (i.sufficient to discouragethe most intrepidinterpreter who wishes to insist on the systematicity of the work." This first scheme can thus be as represented follows: The First Scheme I. I. he used the Roman numerals for the sections "Sense-Certainty." "TheTruthof Self-Certainty. The Truthof Self-Certainty A. W. 575-78. The Ethical Order B." "TheCertaintyand Truthof Reason. The Certaintyand Truthof Reason A. When Hegel first wrote the Phenomenology. Religion in the Form of Art C.1986." pp. (and thus. Spirit that is Certain of Itself. Spirit A.At 8 See the Suhrkamp edition of the Phenomenology for a detailed account of these changes. The Revealed Religion VIII. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. pp. "Spirit"). The Table of Contents The first major difficulty with respect to the systematic unity of the work concernsthe table of contents.

it does not follow that the text itself is disunified. (AA. that Parts V and VI (Reason and Spirit) grew far beyond the bounds originally contemplatedand that Hegel himself was a little confused about what he had actually got when he was finished" (ibid. have combined these two organizationalschemes instead of opting for the one or the other. BB. Consciousness B. pp. however. according to this view the text must be disunified since it compresses two different organizational schemes into one. 13ff. "La de l'esprit comme discours syst6matique: histoire.) Absolute Knowing The confusion aboutthe table of contents stems from the fact that the various editions of the Phenomenology in German.20Thus. Nothing here necessarily excludes the the possibility thathe was able to incorporate first scheme adequatelyinto the Phanomenologie des Geistes. Cf. Kahler. The Ethical Order B. CC.. The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness Through its own Activity C. Individualitywhich takes itself to be Real in and for itself (BB. cit.. and DD. The key argumentthat this change gives rise to is that Hegel changed his mind about the structureof the work during its composition and was compelled to revise the table of contents as a result of the change.""Religion"and "AbsoluteKnowing"respectively. both single and double." op. p. 133-36. as well as the English translations. I see it as misguided that Labarrieretakes both of these versions together in his attempt to reconstruct the unitary structure of the text. Frankfurt:Klostermann.: "The table of contents bears out that the work was not planned painstakingly before it was written. Spirit that is Certain of Itself.) Spirit A.This. Die Vernunft in Hegels Phanomenologie des Geistes.that time he also affixed the double letters AA. 143ff. 1992. Observing Reason B. and Roman numerals. also Kaufmann. The Revealed Religion (DD. religion et sciPhinomenologie ence. Klaus and Marx. This is of course the thesis of Haering and Poggeler.'9The result is an extremely confusing mixture of Latin letters. Labarriere. Werner. Culture C. 1978. pp.""Spirit. to "Reason. pp. Self-Consciousness C. Hegel: A Reinterpretation. 1974. Thus. Simply from the fact the Hegel changed his mind about the structureof the text and subsequently revised the table of contents in accordancewith that change. Self-Alienated Spirit. NaturalReligion B.) Reason A. Pierre-Jean. The True Spirit." Hegel-Studien. Esp. This argument is perhaps valid enough when applied to the editors of the Phenomenologywho combined the two versions of the table of contents into one. Religion in the Form of Art C. is simply a problemwith the editing of Hegel's text and not with its intrinsicstructure. 19 20 THE ARCHITECTONIC HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY SPIRIT OF OF 753 . Morality (CC. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. but it amounts to a simple non sequitur when it is applied to Hegel's text itself. 135). (9). the second plan for the work appearsas follows: The Second Scheme A..Walter.) Religion A.

I wish to test this thesis in a very general way againstthe actualanalyses of the Phenomenologyand in a more detailed fashion against Hegel's own explicit statementsabout the systematic structureof the work.second. In the following. ple change so illuminating?As I will arguebelow in more detail. then we have a fairly clear outline of the structureof the work itself What then makes this simwhich correspondsto its internalargumentation. thus. The "Consciousness" predetermined the object sphere or what Hegel refers to as the "in-itself. and "Force and the Under"Perception" The analyses of "Sense-Certainty."The challenge in the "Consciousness"chapteris to give a complete account of the determination of objectivity with reference to the object sphere alone. "Reason. a thing with propertiesor an unseen force behind the appearances. what he indicates with the double letters is that the dialectic is to returnto the beginning. one must examine the argumentsof the text itself. there may be reason to suspect that there is a discontinuityin the text. but in orderultimately to prove this. which he then representedin the revised table of contents. What consciousness learns is that even in its most basic attemptsto conceive of an object as. The most this argumentcan establish is that due to the perceived need for revision in the table of contents on Hegel's part. the changes that Hegel made in his revised version of the table of contents are in fact quite helpful. The importantpoint for our purposes is that Hegel's revision of the table of contents is a welcome aid to those searchingfor a key to the systematic unity of the work.since after all it representshis considered opinion. I will thus briefly work through the text of the Phenomenology section by section with an eye toward the natureof the relationships of the variouschaptersand sections to one another. In my view. however." standing"representattemptsto demonstratethat objects are simply given as chapterthus concerns above all entities. in the course of the dialectic this conception proves to be inadequateand collapses under the weight of its own internal contradictions. what Hegel means to indicate with the single letters of the second version is a set of parare and allel structures. 754 JON STEWART .""Spirit"and "Religion"returnto the same starting point that we saw in "Consciousness"and work through the same material again underdifferentaspects in accordancewith the spherethateach governs. for example. strictly speaking. When we regardthe ultimate organizational scheme as authoritative. there are certainuniversalconcepts involved which are not. thus. "Consciousness" "Self-Consciousness" meant to run their course in a fashion parallel to one another. II. Consciousness Hegel begins the Phenomenology with his account of "Consciousness" which consists of three discreteconceptionsof objectivity all sharingthe fundamentalrealist belief in an independentlyexisting externalworld of objects which are ontologically prior to human subjects and their capacity to know.On the other hand.

with the world of objects thought to be dependenton it. referred to with the letter B. Freedom of Self-Consciousness. in fact.however... First the "Self-Consciousness" chapter.2'which accordingto some interis pretationsis only introductory. III. Cf. PhS ??166-77. Lordshipand Bondage"and "B. In the Spirit of Hegel. Solomon. 401: "It should be seriously questioned whether these first pages are really a distinct form of consciousness at all. p. PhG pp. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. there is some confusion about the status of the section "The Truth of SelfCertainty. Now what are we to make of the question of the structureof "Self-Consciousness"?My thesis is that the material that precedes the "Lordshipand Bondage" section. the problembecomes less acute."Does it encompass the entire "Self-Consciousness"chaptersince it is the only heading with Roman numeralsor is it a simple introductionto the chapterwhich officially begins with "Lordshipand Bondage"?This typiof cal understanding the problem. I wish to argue that this section. As a necessary presupposition for the determination of objectivity." OF THE ARCHITECTONIC HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY SPIRIT OF 755 . here we seem to have only two. These two units "Consciousness"and "Self-Consciousness" run parallel to one anotherin their respective spheres of in-itself and for-itself. and thus the human subject is drawn into what was originally an attemptto think the object as an independentontological entity. " be found in the empiricalmanifold or in the object sphere. without any furthercommentaryabout the organizationor division of the contents of the chapter. The Truth of Self-Certainty. Self-Consciousness The structureof the "Self-Consciousness"chapteris somewhat problematic. Specifically."Because of this asymmetry. Whereas Hegel in the rest of the book orders his chapters into three sections.e. Robert C.. 1983. 103-9. Its appearancein the table of contents displays straightawaya certain asymmetry. The analyses in the "Consciousness"chapterthat are given with respect to individual objects are then in "Self-Consciousness"reapplied to the selfconscious subject. This then leads us to the "for-itself' sphere of "Self-Consciousness" where the categoriesare reversedandthe self-conscious subject is given ontological priority. seems unchapter." both of which apparentlyfall under the heading of "IV.. forms the first argumentative step in the "Self-Consciousness" chapterand thatit representsthe first of a three-stepargument that is complementedby "Lordshipand Bondage" and "Freedomof 21 22 I. But when we concentrateonly on the second version. These concepts can only be accounted for by an appeal to the human capacity for thought. the subject sphere must be taken into account as well. once again rests upon an interpretation that combines the two versions of the table of contents.which bears the letter problematicallyto follow the "Consciousness" A.22 in fact expected to do philosophical work and thus is not merely intended as an introduction.

I Self-Consciousness. and "3. The Truth of Self-Certainty"(PhS ??166-77). 23 24 This view is also held by. Thus. In the Philosophy of Mind. (38). Escaraffel. in its formativedevelopmentor movement." where the key category is recognition (Anerkennung). I propose to read the "Self-Consciousness"chapteras containing the following structure:"1. 1971. the "Self-Consciousness"chapteris organizedas follows: B) Self-Consciousness cx)Appetite 3) Self-ConsciousnessRecognitive y) Universal Self-Consciousness From the contents of this chapterit is clear that "cL) Appetite"correspondsto "The Truth of Self-Certainty"where the key term is "desire. translated by William Wallace and A." althoughoriginally this title was apparently intendedto cover the dialecticalmovementsof "Lordship Bondage" and and the "Freedomof Self-Consciousness"as well."It is likewise obvious that "j) Self-Consciousness Recognitive" correspondsto "Lordship and Bondage. three stages: (1) Of Desire in so far as it is directedto otherthings. when Hegel reworked the same material in the Encyclopaedia. and finally that "y) Universal Self-Consciousness" corresponds to "Freedom of Self-Consciousness. in additionto Hegel's accountof "Self-Consciousness" the Encyclopaedia. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 756 JON STEWART . "Self-Consciousness." according to the discussion there. V. In English as Hegel's Philosophy of Mind. likewise containsthreedifferentmoments: Self-Consciousness has.24which constitutes part three of the Encyclopaedia. he removed the apparent asymmetryin the "Self-Consciousness"chapterand used the material that I am calling "The Truth of Self-Certainty"as the first part of a three-step argument in precisely the way I have indicated above. 93105. 1969. Freedomof Self-Consciousness"(PhS ??197-230).First. we also have his analysis from The Philosophical Propaedeutic. "2. Frederic. Miller."23 will refer to this materialfor the sake of simplicity as the "TheTruthof Self-Certainty. Escaraffel." in Second. Lordship and Bondage" (PhS ??178-96). writtenduringHegel's Nurembergperiod from 1808 to 1811. shortlyafter the Phenomenology. There are three importantargumentsthat speak in favor of this view and against the thesis that "The Truth of Self-Certainty"constitutes only introductorymaterialor forms somethingdistinct from the course of the argumentation of the rest of the "Self-Consciousness"chapter. among others. Cf. pp. "Des mouvements paralleles dans la Phenomenologie de espritt" L'Arc.

This parallelism is. Nidrnbergerund Heidelberger Schriften 1808-1817. V. Wolfgang.and the catea gories of identity and difference become relevantfor the determination obof jectivity. 160."the first section of the "Consciousness" chapter.Finally. 1977. p. as Moreover."Bonsiepen. i. 1986. I have argued separately for this last parallelism in the following article: "Die Rolle des unglucklichen BewuBtseins in Hegels Phdnomenologie des Geistes. (3) Of the Universal Self-Consciousness which recognizes itself in other self-consciousnesses and is identical with them as they are identical with it. that of "desire. which at the beginning of "Self-Consciousness"becomes reinterpreted the pure being of the subject. 117.M. Beiheft 16. the "Freedomof Self-Consciousness"parallels the "Force and Understanding"section. pp. 12-21." Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophie. however. we see that the argumenthere parallels the argumentthat was given in "Sense-Certainty. overlooked by Burbidge who would instead see the section entitled "Legal Status" from the "Spirit" chapter as re-examining the material from the "Freedom of Self-Consciousness.In "Sense-Certainty" we are concernedwith the pure being of the object." in the Propaedeutic. translatedby A. p. Hegel-Studien. and it is this standardwhich then serves to determine the self-conscious subject. 1986.(2) Of the relationof Master and Slave in so far as it is directedto another self-consciousnessunlike itself.e. edited by Michael George and Andrew Vincent. Miller.26Instead of forces operating behind the scenes causing the world of experience to appearas in "Forceand the Understanding. 1978. pp. Frankfurta. The thirdargumentthat speaks against the thesis that the materialpreceding "Lordshipand Bondage"forms only an introductory section concerns the subjectmatterof the section itself. Although he interprets it somewhat differently than I. Hegel Werke. Bonn: Bouvier. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1991. pp. Der Begriff der Negativitat in den Jenaer Schriften Hegels. In "Perception" second object is introduced. esp. THE ARCHITECTONIC HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY SPIRIT OF OF 757 . between the here and the beyond in the 'Force and Understanding'chapter correspondsto the relation between the individual and the Unchangeable. So also in "Lordshipand Bondage"we see a se ond sblf-consciousness introducedfor the first time which forms a standardfor comparisonand contrast for the other. (11). vol. John. 59-60. The Philosophical Propaedeutic.: Suhrkamp. Bonsiepen also points out this parallelism between the Unhappy Consciousness and Force and Understanding:"The opposition between the sensible and the supersensible world." Burbidge." the "UnhappyConsciousness"section it is a self-conin 25 26 Hegel. (39). When we examine the text closely.25 The course of his discussion there likewise leaves no ambiguity about the fact that the materialpreceding the "Lordshipand Bondage" dialectic in the Phenomenology corresponds to the first stage. "Lordshipand Bondage" parallels the "Perception"section in a similar fashion. 71-72. "Unhappy Consciousness in Hegel-An Analysis of Medieval Catholicism?" Mosaic. 4.

Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag. M. Wigersma. Band 11. Thus. even within all the mutability of the world and despite the frustrationsof his aims and the loss of his interests and possessions. "The Phenomenology of Spirit: Its Structure. p. 129ff. "Einleiting des Herausgebers. op. an account of the interactionof one self-consciousness with other self-conscious subjects must be given in a how the social whole serves to shape the determination way thatdemonstrates of objectivity in the course of this dialectical interaction among self-conscious subjects. PhG p. 7 of Sdmtliche Werke. pp. at The task of the "Self-Consciousness" chapter is to fulfill the original goal-to give a complete accountof objectivity-but this time with reference to the subject sphere. This structuralparallelism between the two chapters indicates that this material at the beginning of "Self-Consciousness" is intended as an independent argument in its own right just as "Sense-Certainty"was an independentargument the earlierstage.. vol. also Solomon. IV."in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Phanomenologie des Geistes. Jubildumsausgabein 20 Bden. Kritische Ausgabe." (PR = Hegel's Philosophy of Right."27 tutes the otherworldlyreality which is responsible for the mutable mundane sphere. also Haering." the self-conscious subject there operateswith the conception that it is an isolated atomic entity. 758 JON STEWART . 1937. Reason The structure of "Reason" is somewhat problematic due to its inordinate length. 350: "It is for this reason that in religion there lies the place where man is always assured of finding a consciousness of the unchangeable. If. this length is only troublesomeif we consider the "Reason"chapteras a whole to correspondto "Consciousness"and "Self-Consciousness"respectively as seems to be indicated by Hegel's first table of contents. xxxv. Samtliche Werke. shows that self-consciousness is in fact ontologically bound up with other self-conscious subjects. Johannes. then the problem disappears since "Reason" would then correspond to takentogetherand not as individ"Consciousness" "Self-Consciousness" and 27 28 PhS ?208. RP = Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. however.) Cf. p. 1952. Hoffmeister. we see "Reason"as going back to the beginning of the dialectic and working through the same material as at "Consciousness"and "Self-Consciousness" a higher conceptuallevel. Cf. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. on the other hand. edited by B.This is the task of the "Reason"chapter. See PR ?270 Remark. Cf. "Entstehungsgeschichte der Phanomenologie des Geistes. 19271940. translatedby T. edited by Hermann Glockner."in his In the Spirit of Hegel." in Verhandlungendes III.28 However. Theodore. as we learn in the dialectic of the "Unhappy Consciousness.. cit. Knox. 122. RP p. 1983.which constiscious other. esp. God or what Hegel calls "the Unchangeable. Leipzig: Felix Meiner. Internationalen Hegel Kongresses 1933. The dialectic. This too proves to be inadequatesince. Hegel uses the same language to refer to God in the Philosophy of Right. Robert C. of the highest freedom and satisfaction. which seems to set it apartfrom the "Consciousness"and "Self-Consciousness" chapters. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 213.

. ObservingReason B. Individuality in-and-for-itself to be real in and for itself itself The final section of "Reason. we see that "Reason"is meant to return to the beginning of the so-called highway of despair. cit. op.) and works throughthe same forms of consciousness again but at a different level. 98. In my view. Self-Consciousness 29 in-itself for-itself Cf. Robert. Likewise "Spirit"and "Religion." Hegel relates two results of the dialectic examined in that section.the single and double letters are meant to indicate the parallelisms among the various parts of the text. to "Consciousness. (38).. return to the beginning of the cycle as well and work througheach of the figures again undertheir own aspect." which are also represented with double letters (BB. p. Solomon who has a glimmering of this structurewhich he orders according to categories of theory and practice. Reason] A. and CC. esp. which I think is supportedby the text internally by virtue of the correspondingargumentsin the relevant chapters. i. His comments there seem to A. and B..)." The three sections of the "Reason"chapteralso have the single letters A. in-itself and for-itself. which precede "Reason"in the second version seen in of the table of contents. "Des mouvements paralleles dans la Phinominologie de espritt" L'Arc. and C.of ual units. 1969.). The key question here is what the single and the double letters in the revised version are supposedto indicate about the structure of the text. OF OF THE ARCHITECTONIC HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY SPIRIT 759 . and thus seem to correspondto the single letters A. but yet here something is different. At the end of his account of "ObservingReason. Escaraffel who seems to follow these parallelism but who in my view somewhat confuses the in-itself. Frederic. Consciousness B. Evidence for this interpretation the structureof the work can be the double letters AA.Hegel means to indicate that the dialectic at this point chapter(represented goes back to the originalposition in the "Consciousness" by A. Escaraffel. p. would then bringthe dialectic to a close by uniting subjectand object. Thus.e. which also forms a substantiveindependentunit (hence Then comes "Reason" the C.This readingrendersthe following structure29: [AA. Solomon."which has no previous parallel. and B. The Actualizationof Rational Self-Consciousness throughits own Activity which takes C. "Consciousness" and "Self-Consciousness" are meant to form independentunits that build upon one another (hence the A.). of "Consciousness"and "Self-Consciousness"respectively. B. for-itself and in-and-for-itself moments. In the Spirit of Hegel. Cf. By inserting the AA. 218. in front of the "Reason"chapter.

" in Hegel and the History of Philosophy.then the disparityin length becomes nominal. the truth of self-certainty. The analysis thus moves from the objective to the subjectiverealm between these two chapters. it thought that what was immediately given as a propertyless "This"was true and thus was the object of certainty. The Hague: MartinusNijhoff. i. Proceedings of the 1972 Hegel Society of America Conference. Here in the "Reason" chapter. Here naturalconsciousness. 760 JON STEWART . Keith W." i. Thus. Frederic G. the first section of the "Reason" chapter.naturalconsciousness thoughtthatit had sense-certainty.30 certainty of Reason. Joseph C. the apparently disproportionatelength of the "Reason"chapterbegins to make sense. in addition. in this respect overlapswith the "Consciousness" When seen in this light.e.e. Algozin. and. i. but here. "ObservingReason."Hegel says precisely this. The Unhappy Self-Consciousness renouncedits independence."In the first section of the "Consciousness" chapter."returnsto a treatmentof the object sphere and precisely chapter.and struggledto make its being-forself into a Thing. what is a Thing is self-consciousness" (PhS ?344. edited by Joseph O'Malley. When we see that is "Consciousness" supposedto correspondto "ObservingReason"and not to the entire "Reason"chapter. PhG pp. In the first section of the "Self-Consciousness" chapter. 190-91). deemed itself the true and the certain. 52ff. A furtherparallelismwith the preceding chapterscan be seen predictably Here the issue is the enough with respect to Reason's relation to its object. "The History of Philosophy and the Phenomenology of Spirit.. 1974. It thereby reverted from self-consciousness to consciousness. This chaptermust be longer than the chapterssince it is intendedto and "Consciousness" the "Self-Consciousness" work throughthe same materialfound there. it even adds a third section which is supposed to complete the sequence. Weiss.e. after realizing that it played the crucial role in the account of the determinationof the subject-objectNotion." and it is at this point that the "Reason" chapter begins.e. pp. we saw a new sort of certainty arise. to the consciousness for which the object is something which merely is. whereas whatever was other than the self it considered non-being and something inessential. Hegel explains this relation between as and "Consciousness" "Self-Consciousness" follows: 30 See Flay.give evidence for this thesis about the structureof "Reason.i. explaining that "Reason""is a completion of the outcome of the preceding movement of self-consciousness. that the "Reason"chapteris intendedin a sense to go back to the beginning of the dialectic and to repeatat a higher level the dialectic of "Consciousness. a Thing. Here Hegel says expressly that the Unhappy Consciousness at the conclusion of the "Self-Consciousness" chapter reverts "from self-consciousness to consciousness. and this is the key to our comparison with "Consciousness" and "Self-Consciousness.

he gives us a clear explanationof the way in which the section. i. that what is.""perceiving" that and the "understanding" the dialecticalmovementsthatwe have examined "Perception."In the first of these. Perception and Scientific Understanding. which we met with in the form of 'meaning.i. Observationof Self-Consciousness in its Relation to its ImmediateActuality 31 Cf. PhG p. 1975. 136).e. OF OF THE ARCHITECTONIC HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY SPIRIT 761 ."Now here at the level of "Reason"we are concernedwith the certainty of Reason.London: George Allen and Unwin. and what is for consciousness is also in itself or has intrinsic being. Observationof Self-Consciousness in its Purity and in its Relation to External Actuality 3. (PhS ?233. Charles."is intendedto fit with what has come before."and the second "Self-Consciousness." See also Taylor." will be repeatedhere at a higher level. Hegel. Observationof Nature 2. Consciousness 1. the other in which it had the determinatenessof being only for consciousness."Thus. "Since Reason is all reality in the sense of the abstract 'mine' and the 'other' is for it something indifferentand extraneous. PhG p. Here Hegel indicates with his reference to "meaning. p. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Observing Reason 1. individual sections of the "Consciousness"chapter.31 we end up with the following parallelisms: A."and from the "Consciousness"chapter. one after the other: one in which the essence or the True had for consciousness the determinatenessof being. "ObservingReason. "Sense-Certainty." which come together in the third. Perception A. Sense-Certainty 2.' which apprehendswhat is 'meant' and what is 'perceived"'(PhS ?238. 1958. viz.e. "Reason. He writes.There appearedtwo aspects. 162. "Consciousness. John.' 'perceiving' and the 'understanding. only is in so far as it is for consciousness. of course. 102: "In the treatmentof Observation which follows Hegel retraces at a higher level some of the ground covered in his previous study of Sense-Certainty.e.what is here made explicit is that kind of knowing of an 'other' by Reason. at "Forceand the Understanding" the level of "Reason. ObservingReason that The generalstructure I have sketchedso far is made even more precise by comments at the beginning of the individualsections of Hegel's introductory "Reason. or the in-itself. A. Hegel: A Re-Examination. Reason then constitutesthe in-and-for-itselfmoment which will ultimatelybring both subject and object together. p. i. "ObservingReason"will correspondas a whole to the "Consciousness"chapterwhile its three sections will correspondto the Using this as a guide. But the two reduced themselves to a single truth. Force andUnderstanding 3. 133) The first aspect mentionedin this passage is. Findlay.

191) In "Consciousness. however. PhS ?348. is determined as self-consciousness over against it. PhG p. in the course of observation. it is precisely the isolated individualwho determinestruth. is the object as still unmediated. (PhS ?344. and consciousness is equally unmediated in its relation to it. Hegel expresses this as follows: "Reasonappeals to the self-consciousness of each and every consciousness" (PhS ?234." example. PhG p. The given object is consequently determined as a negative object. The pure category.despite this importantsimilarity and parallelism."indicating that the movement from "Consciousness" to "Self-Consciousness" 32 Esp.there is also an important difference. whereasin "Self-Consciousness. The Actualizationof Rational Self-ConsciousnessThroughIts Own Activity Hegel in the introductoryparagraphsto this section32gives us a fairly thorof chapter. "TheActualizationof Rational Self-Consciousness ThroughIts Own Activity. Hegel then immediately shifts over to a descriptionof the movement of "Reason.However.A scientific experimentmust in principlebe able to be carriedout by a universalsubject. as merely given. Although emphasis is still placed on the object sphere as in "Consciousness."the subject-objectNotion is socially determinedby a group whose members are for partsof a largersocial whole. In the passage cited above. 762 JON STEWART . Rather it is the group which is important in the determinationof objectivity.Here he summarizes ough discussion of the structure the "Reason" the movement from "Consciousness"to "Self-Consciousness"as well as the movement from "ObservingReason"to the next stage. He writes." categoryof being was consideredin its immediacy as the something "merelygiven." this time the self-conscious subject is not considered atomic. in other words. 193." His comments are instructive in helping us with our reconstructionof the structureof the text. which is present for consciousness in the form of being or immediacy. and in this sense science is impersonal. PhG p. The moment of that infinite judgement is the transition of immediacy into mediation. 134)." Naturalconsciousness ascribedontological priority to the object. has run through the form of being is now posited in the form of being-for-self: consciousness no longer aims to find itself immediately but to produce itself by its own activity. consciousness. the category which.Hence. It is itself the End at which its action aims. or negativity. whereas in its role of observer it was concerned only with things. at the level of "Reason. "ObservingReason" is no mere repetition of the "Consciousness" chapter. With respect to natural scientific inquiry. the individual with his own characteristicsand idiosyncrasies is not what is important. B. But then in the course of the dialectic this proved to be inwhere adequateand eventuallyled us to the dialectic of "Self-Consciousness" the object was consideredto be something negative and inessential over and against the self-conscious subject.

"be concernedwith the sphereof the self-conscious the role of observer. Just as in the "Consciousness"chapter. must then correspondto the individual sections of "Self-Consciousness. following "ObservingReason" as they do." Now. "ObservingReason"has just run throughthe dialectical movement that correspondsto the simple "formof being. however. 1946."By this he seems to mean that althoughthe contentof the variousdialecticalmovements changes and gradually becomes richer. Here by "Reason.correspondsto the movement in "Reason"from "ObservingReason"to "The Actualizationof RationalSelf-ConsciousnessThroughIts Own Activity. the individual sections of "Observing Reason" run parallel to the sections in the "Consciousness" will Reason again run through the double movement of self-consciousness. the "Freedomof Self-Consciousness."(here referredto as "its freedom"). repeated." Now we will. as we have seen. so too in "ObservingReason" the conscious subject "was concerned only with things.Hegel's formulationof the parallelstructureshere is particularly important. p. the movement of consciousness. in the element of the category.Then." corresponds to the "Self-Consciousness" chapter which included first the and "Independence Dependenceof Self-Consciousness. This suppositionis confirmedwhen we analyze the place and role of this section in the Phenomenology as a whole.He tells us specifically that the sections run parallel to each other "in the element of the category. viz." it is clear that Hegel means to refer to the section "ObservingReason" as a whole. 65. he says that Reason."(herereferredto simand ply as "independence").neverthelesswith respectto the form of the dialectic. and pass over from independence into its freedom"(PhS ?348."33 Hegel confirms this structure rather straightforwardlyat the beginning of the present section when he writes." At this point. will "pass over from independence into its freedom. we will see different forms of the individual self-conscious subject in its attemptto determineitself by distinguishingitself from others." "Structure la Phe'nome'nologie" his Genese et structure de la Phinominologie de esprit de Hegel." As he puts it. Since. as in "Self-Consciousness. referringimplicitly to the presentsection. PhG p. certain categorialelementsremainthe same andin fact are repeatedat the various 3 See Hyppolite: "Ce que Hegel nomme 'T'actualisationde la conscience de soi rationnelle par sa propreactivity n'est pas autre chose que le d6veloppementrdpdt6de la in de de conscience de soi dans F'616ment la raison. In this passage he explicitly indicates once again that the three sections of "Observing Reason" correspond to the three sections of the "Consciousness"chapter. OF THE ARCHITECTONIC HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY SPIRIT OF 763 . 193). the moment of negation or otherness is introduced as in "Self-Consciousness. "Justas Reason. perception."Here Hegel indicates that the present section. Paris: Aubier. in the role of observer. sense-certainty. "The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness Through Its Own Activity. we can infer that the analyses of the present section. and the Understanding. just like self-consciousness.

have known all along. 214). 1970. the various dualisms such as universal and particularcome together. 34 35 Kline also notes these parallelisms with a slightly different role given to the "Unhappy Consciousness. The Truthof Self-Certainty 2." Kline. the section. partof the "Reason"chapterimplied by Hegel's remarkshere as follows34: B. 764 JON STEWART ." Review of Metaphysics. (23). In this self-recognition in the world of objects. The Actualization of Rational Through Self-Consciousness its own Activity 1." PR ??189-208." contains roughly the same argument that we find in the Philosophy of Right under the heading "The System of Needs." The fundamental terms on which he bases these parallelisms are "action" and "passion. externalother that standsin contradictionto the individualsubject or the moral sphere: self-consciousness. units which are repeated here at the level of "Reason. the philosophical audience. With this. namely the unity of subject and object. Virtueandthe Way of the World Self-Consciousness The two units of "Consciousness"and "Self-Consciousness"thus form the basic structuresfirst of the object sphere and then of the subject sphere. What self-consciousness learns from "Virtueand the Way of the World"is that the world is not an evil. Thus. IndividualityWhichTakesItself to be Real in andfor Itself In this third and final section of the "Reason"chapter. C. 679-89.Here we have "the interfusionof being-in-itself and being-for-itself.were levels. Just as the categoriesfrom the variousstages of "Consciousness" repeatedin "ObservingReason." so also now we will expect to see the cateturnup gories and forms of consciousness examinedin "Self-Consciousness" We can briefly sketch the outline of this once again in the present section. self-consciousness finally comes to realize what we. PleasureandNecessity 1. George L. LordshipandBondage Frenzy of Self-Conceit 3." Now the task of the "Reason"chapteris to unify the subject and the object and to overcome the various forms of dualism that have plagued the dialectic up until this point. PhG p. of universal and individuality"(PhS ?394. On the contrary. "The Dialectic of Action and Passion in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.35 external sphere and to see himself in it by means of his work and activity. the new forms of subject and object which appearhere in the first two sections of "Reason"are subsequentlyunifiedin the thirdsection. pp. Freedomof Self-Consciousness 3. "being now absolutely certain of its reality. B. The Law of the Heartand the 2. no longer seeks only to realize itself as End in an antithesisto the reality which immediately confronts it" (PhS ?394. the world is in harmony with the individual and allows him to fulfill his needs The individual is now able to identify with the cooperatively with others. "Virtue and the Way of the World.

Then in "The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness Through its Own the Activity" as in "Self-Consciousness. and is occupied not with an other. This can interpretation be represented the following graph: by Consciousness Self-Consciousness Reason Reason as Testing Laws in-andfor-itsel _ Freedomof SelfConsciousness for-itself / / Lordshipand Bondage X Reason as Lawgiver /XTe / _ Virtueandthe Way of the World j t Kingdom ~~~~~~~~~~~~Animal Spiritual / * The Law of the Heartandthe Frenzy Self-Conceit ~~~~~of Pleasureand Necessity SelfConsciousness in its l || e Truthof Self. At first.-_* //Certainty Force and the Understanding / in-itself Perception / ObservationCof ~~~~~~Immediate Actuality|| Observationof SelfConsciousness in its Purityand in its Relationto External Actuality Observationof Nature Sense-Certainty. in "ObservingReason" as in "Consciousness.and the subjectwas consideredsomething secondary.e." individualself-conscious agent was OF OF THE ARCHITECTONIC HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY SPIRIT 765 . 215). in viewing the world. 'Observing Reason'] and also active [i. subject-object Notions which posited an opposition or split. self-consciousness has returnedinto itself out of those opposed determinations which the category had for it. Self-consciousness."prioritywas given to the object sphere. and which characterizedthe relation of self-consciousness to the category in its observational[i. Hegel indicates the overall structureof the "Reason"chapterand simultaneously locates the presentsection with a referenceto the first two sections that we have just discussed. therefore.e. 214). 215)." is. implicitly views itself since it sees its own individuality expressed in the external sphere: "it starts afresh from itself. PhG p. 'The Actualizationof RationalSelf-Consciousness Throughits Own Activity'] roles" (PhS ?395.PhG p. PhG p. Both of the two that previous forms of consciousness represented"opposeddeterminations. He writes. In making this point about the closure of the dualisms explored heretofore. "Withthis Notion of itself. but with itself' (PhS ?396.

V. PhG p." the third and final section of "Reason. as a particular individual. the for-itself and the in-and-for-itself.""SelfConsciousness" and the sections in "Reason" which run parallel to them. looked at from the side of substance. which busies itself with all kinds of content of the essence. referringto "Reasonas Testing Laws. Thus. In an importantpassage.This isolating of those moments presupposes Spirit itself and subsists therein"(PhS ?440. 239). and either makes arbitrarylaws or fancies that in simply knowing laws it possesses them in their own absolute nature. but this account was always abstract. 766 JONSTEWART ."In "Reason" self-consciousness had only a "formal knowing" of spiritualessence. this section forms the apex of the pyramidconsisting of "Consciousness. and which is at the same time actual as consciousness and aware of itself. Or. he writes. 238) Here Hegel makes the distinction between the level of "Reason"and that of "Spirit. the lines with arrows are intended to representthe parallelismsthatwe have been following. It was abstractedor alienatedfrom its immediateethical relations.given priority." where there is no longer any opposition.absolute. Hegel at the beginning of the "Spirit"chapter proceeds to answer just this question about the role of "Spirit"and to justify the rest of the work. All previous shapes of consciousness are abstractforms of it." is meant to form a thirddiscrete unit which brings together the two preceding sections. This consciousness. "Individuality which takes itself to be real in and for itself.. Spirit Let us first turn to the question of what. and the world stood opposed to it as something negative.It was never any particular community..What is the status of the discussions found there vis-a-vis "Consciousness. this is Spirit. Here in this third section. As he says later.The road to Science is an ascendingone which I have triedto indicate by verticallyrepresentingthe sequence of moments of the in-itself." "Self-Consciousness" and "Reason"? After the brief summaryof the firstthreechaptersdiscussed above. real being." This still abstract determinationwhich constitutes the "matterin hand" itself is at first only spiritual essence. PhG p. and its consciousness [only] a formal knowing of it. these two moments of in-itself and for-itself come together as the "real in and for itself. This outline should be read startingfrom the lower left-handcornerwhere we begin the dialectic at the level of common sense and the dualisms contained therein. But essence that is in andfor itself. In "Reason"an account of the communityand the social whole was given. the account of self-consciousness was always abstract. with respect to content..Likewise. (PhS ?438. It is clear that this final section. Finally. does the "Spirit"chapter add to the truthproblematic. "Spiritis thus self-supporting. is still in fact distinct from substance. but which is not yet consciousness of itself. this is spiritual essence that is in and for itself. Finally. here this dialectic seems to come to an end since the subject-object split is apparentlyovercome.

Labarriere'saccount.For instance."With the reading I am proposing. PhG p. are shapes of a world" (PhS ?441."we need to examine concrete social situations. and this movement shapes the truth claims of peoples and historical periods in a way that the "Reason"chaptercould not account for. PhG p. Concerningthe content of the "Spirit"chapter. OF THE ARCHITECTONIC HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY SPIRIT OF 767 . one of the traditional problems of the continuity of the text has been how to reconcile the epistemological analyses of the first three chapterswith the account of history that we find here in "Spirit. we can begin to make sense of this difficult transitionby understandingthe epistemological import of the historicalfigures which Hegel analyzes. also: "Only the totality of Spirit is in Time. From this analysis we can see that the key point of "Spirit"is that it introduceshistoryinto the accountof the self-developmentof the subject-object Notion."The movement of carryingforwardthe form of its [sc. pp. Cf. and instead of being shapes merely of consciousness. but ratherwith any rationalmoral agent at all.Pierre-Jean. however. Spirit's] self-knowledge is the labor which it accomplishesas actual History" (PhS ?803. are distinguished from the previous ones by the fact that they are real Spirits. we must include an accountof concretehistoricalcommunities. PhG p. The most obvious hint is that Hegel divides his abbreviatedver36 37 Cf. we must first give an historicalaccount of how that communitydeveloped and how it came to hold certain truths or values. In orderto get beyond the formal account of ethical life examined in "Reason.Hegel writes. Now in order to give an account of the Notion. and the 'shapes. Such an historical account is thus presupposed in any abstractaccount of the role of the communityin the self-determination of truthclaims. in the final two sections. 1968. 240). 430).37In "Spirit"the dialectic departsfrom the abstract account of the individual and the community found in "Reason"and moves through history. "These shapes.and this is only possible by an examinationof particular historical communities. actualitiesin the strictmeaning of the word. 221-31. As Hegel says of Spirit in the "Absolute Knowing" chapter. 365).This then forms the next major step in the argument." we were not concerned with a particularhuman subject in a particularcommunity.' which are 'shapes' of the totality of Spirit. display themselves in a temporal succession" (PhS ?679."In order to give an account of how communities mediate truthclaims. The question that this explanationraises for us is how these real or historical forms of "Spirit"fit in with our analysis of the architectonicof the work given so far. We are now concerned with the actual historical development of communities or as he says "actualitiesin the strictmeaning of the word. Labarriere. "Reasonas Lawgiver"and "Reasonas Testing Laws. Paris: Aubier.Structures et mouvement dialectique dans la Phenomenologie de l'esprit de Hegel. These a abstractedanalyses "presuppose" concrete social and historical community from which they were originally abstracted.36 In the literature on the Phenomenology.

-- Dissemblance or Duplicity * The Spiritual Animal Kingdom Freedom of SelfConsciousness _. The True Spirit. Most obviously. "C.." Similarly. The Ethical Order. The MoralView of the World Virtueand the Way _ Absolute Freedom of the World and Terror . For the sake of simplicity we can graphically represent the parallelisms that are implied by this readingin the following fashion: Consciousness Self-Consciousness Reason Reason as Spirit * The Beautiful Soul Laws Testing Reason as Lawgiver ." This would seem to imply a correspondence of "Spirit" with the three sections of "Reason"and their respective correspondents "Consciousness"and "Selfin Consciousness. Morality. Spirit that is Certain of Itself' would to which takes itself to be real in form the apex.. Self-Alienated Spirit." In other words. this would mean that "A." Finally. Self-Alienated Spirit" would then correspondto "Self-Consciousness" and "The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness Through its own Activity. corresponding "Individuality and for itself. the third section. Spirit That is Certain of Itself." and "C.sion of world history here in the "Spirit"chapterinto three major sections as follows: "A. Lordshipand Bondage The Law of the Heartand the Frenzy of Self-Conceit *- The Enlightenment The Truthof SelfCertainty Force and the Understanding * Pleasureand Necessity The World of SelfAlienatedSpirit Legal Status Observationof Self. The True Spirit" corresponds to "Consciousness." and "Observing Reason.""B.-* Consciousness in its Relationto its ImmediateActuality Perception Observationof Self. Culture." the third and final section of the "Reason"chapter. "B. this correspondenceis indicated once again by the double Latinletters "BB."of the "Spirit" chapterwhich are 768 JON STEWART .0 EthicalAction Consciousness in its Purity and in its Relationto External Actuality Observationof Nature _b.The EthicalWorld Sense-Certainty There are a numberof importantpieces of evidence that supportthis thesis about the parallel sections.

"In other words. "Spirit"will returnto the beginning of the dialectic and will then go through all of the same stages as "Reason.clear thatthe individualsections inside of these chapters to and subsectionsalso correspond one another. and Spirit-Spirit. the ethical order is considered to be something objective. "But the moments are consciousness. This then clearly corresponds to the realms of "Consciousness" and "ObservingReason" where priority is given to the object sphere at the expense of the subject. for instance." "Self-Alienated Spirit."The forms of consciousness in the first threechaptersrepresentwhat In Hegel here calls "universaldeterminations. as immediate Spirit. This implies that the "Spirit"chapterwill have ipsofacto the same parallelismswith "Consciousness"and "Self-Consciousness"as the "Reason"chapterbefore so far as in its self-analysis Spiritholds fast to the moment of being an objectively existent actuality to itself."These two chaptersrun parallel to each other as wholes or complete units.contains the previous structured shapes. citing the Antigone.. 239). Third. "If on the contrary. "Spirit.Sophocles' Antigone acknowledges them as the unwrittenand infallible law of the gods. self-consciousness. which is not yet consciousness of Spirit. "Spirit. PhG p. From this passage it is. in the "Religion" chapterhe writes." other words." represents the break and the move to the for-itself moment." of "Reason. "Thus. by the actualcontents of the individualsections of the "Spirit" The first section. they constitute universalpatternsof thoughtwhich can assume a numberof differentforms. PhG p. Hegel. constitutes Spirit in its mundaneexistence generally. The ethical laws and principles are facts about the world that stand over and above all human opinions and authority. that is. taken together. Here is it clear that the dialectical movements that we have examined in the first three chapters repeat themselves again in "Spirit. then is consciousness in generalwhich embracessense-certainty."representsthe in-itself moment of the [sc. and ignores the fact that this actuality is its own being-for-self" (PhS ?440.these parallelismsare confirmed chapter. Spirit] holds fast to the other moment of OF THE ARCHITECTONIC HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY SPIRIT OF 769 . 365). Spirit as such contains the previous structured shapes in universal determinations. "TheTrue Spirit."Here Hegel says unambiguously. PhG p. 236). Hegel indicatesthis parallelism explicitly in a couple of different the momentsjust named"(PhS ?679. Here in the discussion of the Antigone. Reason. writes of these ethical principles. These same universal forms are all contained in "Spirit"in their historical manifestationsas Hegel indicateshere. but everlasting / Though where they come from. Hegel writes most explicitly. 'They are not of yesterday or today. moreover..and the Understanding. The second section of "Spirit. perception. Their totality.intended to parallel the double letters "AA. none of us can tell"' (PhS ?437. Hegel indicates this when he writes. The moral laws are ontological facts about the world according to this view. For instance.

" Finally. the beautiful soul's appeal to conscience as the criterionfor moral living unites the universallyvalid moral law with the individual. 368. In this third section. the movement of the dialectic in the Phenomenology tends to be one towards ever greatercomplexity. In "The Moral View of the World. epitomized for Hegel by the nephew of Rameauin his alienation. This self-awareness is what Hegel calls "universal"or "absoluteSpirit. PhG p."38 "Spiritconceived as object. Here in "Religion" Spirit becomes aware of itself. as unity of consciousness and self-consciousness. 770 JON STEWART .Thus. In "Consciousness. VI. "Here. 323). which he sees as contradictory hypocritical. PhG p. PhG p. in the third section. "knowledge appears at last to have become completely identical with its truth. The dualisms of the two previous dialectics are at this point overcome. PhG p. that its object is its own being-for-self." the triad comes to a close with the "Self-Consciousness"the role of the self as individual was all important. then it is self-consciousness" (PhS ?440. it is thoughtto be conducive to moral life since obeying moral laws is thought to lead to happiness. instead. natureis not an obstacle to morality. 239).the analysis." for instance. the moment of alienation has been overcome and with it the dualism between the inner private law and the external world of natureor culture.Here we can clearly recognize or the for-itself aspect with its rejectionof the objective sphereand its insistence on the truthand validity of the individual subject. the historical forms of "Spirit"run throughthe same dialectical movements as the abstractforms of "Reason. Here the historical subject. This then correspondsto and "Self-Consciousness" the second section in "Reason. PhG p. Religion As we have seen."It now remains to be seen how the dialectic of "Religion"fits into this picture." Hegel writes. and any antithesisbetween the two sides has vanished" (PhS ?596."the role of the self was unrecognized.rejects the acceptedtraditions and ethical orderwhich were so importantin the previous section."Hegel writes. "has for itself the significance of being the universal Spirit that contains within itself all essence and all actuality"(PhS ?677.Hegel explains this as follows: "But as immediateconsciousness of the being that is in andfor itself. "Religion" likewise represents a more complex configurationthan what we saw in the "Spirit"chapter. Spirit is consciousness that has Reason" (PhS ?440. Likewise.for its truthis this very knowledge. "Spirit that is Certain of Itself. He accepts only his own ethical views as valid and negates those of the tradition. the thirdsection representsthe reconciliationof the two previous spheres.and finally in "Spirit"the role of the historically changing community was essential. then. 364). viz. 239). Thus. This self38 PhS ? "Reason"the role of the community was all important.

which. therefore.Necessarily implied in this developmentis the self-awarenessof Spirit. and Spirit-return and have returnedas into their ground. but ratherGod is man or Spirit in the world. in relation to religion.which ran throughthe various figures of consciousness in their historical or temporalforms. and they all form a unitarywhole which is representedby religion. for Hegel. and Spirit. Hegel then goes on to explain the role of the "Religion"chapter." Spirit becomes self-aware in the revelation of God on earthin the Christianreligion. It sees that God and the absolute are not something otherworldly or different from man. is in Time. self-consciousness. have no existence in separation from one another.consciousness is implicitly implied in Spirit's awareness of its object sphere but must be made explicit in the course of the dialectic."a form which expresses itself as Time. Thus. Only the totality of Spirit. and the "shapes. 365) All of the previous forms are implicitly contained here in religion." which are "shapes"of the totality of Spirit. display themselves in a temporal succession. (PhS ?679. The genesis of religion in general is contained in the movement of the universal moments" (PhS ?680.He tells us that in contrastto the "Spirit"chapter. just because they are moments. Hegel indicates at the beginning of "Religion" that the parallelisms that we have been following up until now will continue in this chapter. 366)." "Self- OF OF THE ARCHITECTONIC HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY SPIRIT 771 . The conceptualmovement of "Religion"thus correspondsto the fundamental structureconstituted by the moments of "Consciousness. comes about for the first time in "Religion. In order to give an account of the Notion we must not just give an account of the developmentof the historicalcommunity. selfconsciousness. moreover. But the moments of the whole. PhG p. namely that Spirit encompasses the previous forms and runs through them once again. He first repeats what we have already learned. for only the whole has true actuality and therefore the form of pure freedom in face of an "other. Hegel lays out for us in some measure the architectonicof the second half of the Phenomenology. in Christ. Reason. "Religion" representsa furtherunpackingof the presuppositionsimplied in the subjectobject Notion. Reason. Spirit becomes aware of itself. religion is the perfection of Spirit into which its individualmoments-consciousness. not to be represented as occurring in Time. PhG p. In this extremely importantpassage. This is what Hegel means when he says thatthey are momentswhich "haveno existence in sepaThe variousforms of consciousness are thus organrationfrom one another. which is only as the differentiatingand self-returningmovement of these aspects. "Religion"will do the same atemporally: The course traversedby these moments is. Specifically. consciousness." ically related and have their meaning only in their relation to the other moments. they together constitute the existent actuality of the totality of Spirit.He indicates that the forms of religion will correspondto the forms of the chapters we have examined so far: "If." and specifically in "Revealed Religion.

can Religion"correspondsto "Consciousness" be seen from That "Natural the emphasis on the object sphere and above all from a number of explicit references. . PhG p." the first section of "NaturalReligion." Hegel says. "Plantand Animal"correspondsto the "Self-consecond section of the "Consciousness"chapter. "Perception": 772 JON STEWART ." corresponds to the first section of the "Consciousness"chapter:"Inthe immediate. 371)._ LegalStatus Consciousness in its Relation to its Immediate Actuality - TheArtificer Perception Observation of Self.first diremptionof self-knowing which belongs to immediate absolute Spirit its 'shape' has the determination consciousness or to sense-certainty" (PhS ?686. Hegel confirms this parallelism when he declares that "God as Light. "The first reality of Spirit. The World of Self.Revealed Dissemblance or Duplicity Religion * / The Spiritual Animal Kingdom - F The Moral View/ of the World Freedom of SelfConsciousness Virtue and the Way W Absolute Freedom-b and Terror of the World The Spiritual Work of Art Living Lordship and Bondage _ The Law of the >. This information now helps us to complete our diagramas follows: Consciousness Self-Consciousness Reason Reason as Testing Laws Reason as Lawgiver Spirit Religion ** The Beautiful Soul .e. 368). or religion as immediate. Hegel tells us that the second section. Likewise. Hegel is quite forthcoming about the structureof the chapter.i.0 The Abstract Work of Art Alienated Spirit Forceandthe Understanding of Observation Self.Consciousness"and "Reason"which we have alreadyseen. Here the divine is thought to dwell in the realm of objects. In this. Spirit knows itself as its object in a naturalor immediate shape" (PhS ?683. PhG The Enlightenment -The Work of Art Heart and the Frenzy of Self-Conceit Pleasure and Necessity The Truth of SelfCertainty ...Ethical Action -_ Consciousness in its Purity and in its Relation to External Actuality Plant and Animal Sense-Certainty Observation of Nature -* The Ethical World _' God as Light Throughoutthe "Religion"chapter itself. "is the Notion of religion itself. and thereforeNatural Religion.and we can thus find evidence in many places for the parallelismsindicatedhere.

and is the religion of spiritualperception" (PhS ? the Religion of Art. This. 373). PhG p. Thus. "The first form.scious Spiritthat has withdrawninto itself from the shapeless essence. is abstract and individual. therefore. Hegel confirms that this section corresponds to the transition to "Self-Consciousness"that we saw earlier in the dialectic: "The first work of art. This account contains. The shift to the for-itself moment and to "Self-Consciousness" comes with "Religion in the Form of Art. Spirit in general is in the form of consciousness. "Revealed Religion. it has to move away from this immediate and objective mode towards self-consciousness" (PhS ?705. It has the shape of being-in-and-for-itself. Here God is no longer something transcendentand otherworldlybut. in the first reality. in the third it is in the form of the unity of both. (PhS ?683. and the work is not yet in its own self filled with Spirit" (PhS ?692.e. or has raisedits immediacyto self in general. because it is immediate. in Christianity. Here the emphasis is no longer on the naturalentity as something given. namely "Forceand Understanding. the dialectic is thrown back to the subject sphere. for the shape raises itself to the form of the self through the creative activity of consciousness whereby this beholds in its object its act or the self' (PhS ?683. or of the self. Hegel tells us. The final section. Finally.determinesits unitarynatureas a manifoldness of being-for-self.and when it is thus conceived as it is in and for itself." Here the divine is thought to be in the self-conscious subjectas artist. on Hegel's view." Hegel tells us this explicitly when writes. If. this is the Revealed Religion. As for itself. 372)." forms the apex of the triad and representsthe in-and-for-itselfmoment. PhG p.Hegel introducesthis section as follows: "The second reality. PhG p. but ratheron self-consciousness' reshaping and reworkingof it. Finally the thirdform of naturalreligion. however. a deep metaphysical truth expressed in THE ARCHITECTONIC HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY SPIRIT OF OF 773 . In revelation man recognizes himself in God and through this recognition becomes reconciled with the world. is necessarily that in which Spirit knows itself in the shape of a superseded naturalexistence. is a particularman living in this world. "TheArtificer" corresponds in turn to the third section of the "Consciousness" chapter. i. It thus correspondsto the final third of the "Reason"and "Spirit"chaptersrespectively in which the dualisms and oppositions are overcome. the third reality overcomes the one-sidedness of the first two. the self is just as much an immediacy. PhG p.where God is revealed on earth as man. PhG p. 368) Here in "RevealedReligion" the subject-objectsplit is overcome in the concept of revelation. as the immediacy is the self. 368). instead. in that of self-consciousness. This reconciliation comes about in the revealed religion. In the artisticproduction. as immediate. 378).self-consciousness becomes aware of itself. is the abstractform of the Understanding. and in the second.

We thus see the great unity and interconnectednessof the subject with the object. and the self-differentiatedmoments within it.) 774 JON STEWART . "The content of religion proclaims earlier in time than does Science. He metaphorically. Absolute Knowing. This would mean that in a sense our story of the determination of subject and object ends with the "Religion" chapter42 since at that point a complete account has been given. Cf. fall within the sphere and of picture-thinking in the form of objectivity.""Spirititself as a whole. Quentin S. The truth of subject-object unity and the individual selfawareness is expressed by the Christianaccount of God as revealed.-The ultimate truth is found at first in Religion and then in Science as the result of the whole.RP p. The upshot of this account was to show the ultimate unity of all the various factors.40 What these passages tell us is that. by the time we reach "Religion"the content of our account of the selfdeterminationof truthis complete and exhaustive. Philothis same truthin a difsophical or scientific thinkingin its turnunderstands ferentway. 1952. Absolute Knowing Hegel claims that "Religion"has the same content as philosophicalknowing. VII. or in the form of a universal-correspondingto the the overall truthprocess. "The content of religion is absolute truth. it is true. determinateness-correspondingto perception. PhG p. an othering of itself. Christensen."4' Thus. but only Science is its true knowledge of itself' (PhS ?802. at first thoughtto be unrelated. Lauer. J. pp. edited by Darrel E.e. and being-for-itself. shortof everythingwith everythingelse in the broadest sense. This interpretation is confirmed by Hegel's announcement of the publication of the Phenomenology in which he clearly separates "Religion" from the other forms of consciousness and associates it with truth and science: "The Phenomenology contains within itself the various forms of Spirit as stations along the road by which it becomes pure knowing or Absolute Spirit.The content of this picturethinking is absolute Spirit" (PhS ?788. 430). 422). "Hegel on the Identity of Content in Religion and Philosophy. 1970..e." in Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion. in general a Thing-corresponding to immediate consciousness. Cf. and consequently the religious is the most sublime of all dispositions" (PR ?270 Remark. of the subject with the community. (My translation.. but that it understandsit in a different way. Enz p. what Spirit is. namely. its relationship or being-for-an-other.39 says that at the moment of "Religion. for Hegel..terms of a story. Hegel expresses this in more straightforwardly the EncyclopaediaLogic: "The objects of philosophy. the content that the dialectic has reached in "Religion"is the same as in "Absolute Knowing. 27). are upon the whole the same as those of religion"(EL ? 1. it is from one side a shape 39 40 41 42 Cf. Hamburg:Meiner." Cited from Hoffmeister's introductionin his edition of the Phanomenologie des Geistes. in part. 261-78. PhG p. 349). Hegel explains this as follows: Thus the object is in part immediate being or.. i.. XXXVIII. and in part essence.of the communitywith other historicallyrelated communities. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

the religious interpretation personifies the great monistic unity of the universe. alis thoughthe monistic content of both interpretations the same. Cunningham. "The Significance of the Hegelian Conception of Absolute Knowledge. The dialectic has thus demonstrated truthof a certain sort of epistemic monism in which everythingis necessarily relatedto the whole. these most abstracttruthsmust thus be seen throughthe veil of simplified concrete examples drawn from normal human experience. 1983. individuals. 433). in which the totality of the moments of the object and of the relation of consciousness to it can be indicated only as resolved into its moments. This is thereforethe actualcontentthatthe dialectichas produced. 619-42. W. symbols and metaphors or what has been In translatedas "picture-thinking. pp. (17). he writes. The philosophical consciousness.Their goal is the revelation of the depth of Spirit. The question is now how to interpretthis account of the monistic unity of the world. PhG pp. Patzold. 33-37. Detlev. OF OF THE ARCHITECTONIC HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY SPIRIT 775 . Absolute Knowing is the panoptic overview of all previous Notions. Every individual truthor value must be understoodin a largercontext. PhG p. on the other hand. Here we find at the end of the Phenomenology a powerful statementof Hegel's holism." Philosophical Review. For Hegel. Thus. and this is the absolute Notion" (PhS ?808." Annalen der Internationalen Gesellschaft fur Dialektische Philosophie. and the whole thus correspondsto the ultimateaccount of the Notion.of consciousness as such. (PhS ?789. pp. the difference exists in how that content is understood. there are two possibilities: the religious interpretation The religious interpretation understands and the philosophical interpretation." the figure of God. G. 1908.43 Hegel thus makes clear that Absolute Knowing is not the knowing of any particularfact or ultimate piece of wisdom but ratherit is merely the grasping of the various forms of thoughtas a whole. institutions and 43 Cf. The absolute Notion is thus the Notion which encompasses all other Notions within itself. "The realm of Spirits which is formed in this way in the outer world constitutes a succession in Time in which one Spiritrelieved anotherof its charge and each took over the empire of the world from its predecessor.. For the religious consciousness. and from the other side a number of such shapes which we bring together. In other words. "Das absolute Wissen als Theorie des Gesamtzusammenhangs. 422-23) of The dialectic has shown us the totality of the interconnectedness all forms of subject and object in the attemptto give a complete account of the subjectthe object Notion. Only with this overview of the complex network of interrelationsof truth claims. It is the complete or exhaustive Notion. this monistic truth with stories. For instance. (1). sees these truths for what they are and is able to extricatethem from their metaphoricalform.Hegel tells us in a fairly straightforward fashion in a number of different places that Absolute Knowing is merely the understandingof all of these previous modes of knowing in their conceptual form.

esp." Hegel-Studien. the logic which governs our understandingof a Notion of a particular. In other words. 776 JON STEWART . 4 This is the reproachin Wim van Dooren's review of Labarriere'sbook. does show us that Hegel in fact had a systematic structurein mind when he wrote the book. It remains to be seen. die Phanomenologie des Geistes zu interpretieren. But. is overlooked when we analyze individualargumentsof his philosophy in abstractionfrom their systematiccontext. the risk that we run by ignoring his systematic pretensionsentirely is not understandinghim at all. 299. This analysis can by no means by seen as the final word on the systematic structureof the Phenomenology.historical events are we able to come to understandthe true nature of such claims and give a complete accountof objectivity. 1972. (7). on the other hand. The Philosophical Import of a Systematic Reading Is there anythingphilosophically interestingthat this interpretation the arof chitectonic of the Phenomenology as a whole brings with it. for-itself and in-and-for-itselfand the dialectic of universaland particularare not categories which apply only to a particular and limited subject matter. VIII. they are universal categories or "universal determinations"which govern all human thought and which as such can be found in any subject matter. instead. Much work still remains to be done above all with respect to establishing the unity of the content of the work which I could only sketch here in the broadest of strokes. One can always dispute the question concerningto what degree he adheredto this structure in any given analysis. or are these parallelisms simply of interest to the despairing Hegel philologist trying to patch together the Hegelian system for its own sake?44The philosophically provocative point that these parallelisms implicitly indicate is that the conceptual logic that governs the developmentof the object-Notionand the subject-Notion is the same logic that governs world-historicalforces.apparentlyisolated object is the same as thatwhich governs our understanding the variousepoches of world of history with their manifold interrelations and complexities.This analysis. which is essential for Hegel's idealism and his monism.with respect to exactly which "categories" varioussections correspond to one another.Thus. however. but it would be absurdat this point to claim that such a structuresimply does not exist. the moreover. "Zwei Methoden. the moments of in-itself. Precisely this point. we need not find Hegel's structurehere philosophically compelling in orderto use it to understandthe individual analyses which he gives. Moreover. p.

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