Contemporary issues in public international law

The role of international law in non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea: The search for a grand bargain solution continues1


Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................................3 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Prologue .........................................................................................................................................................................3 Definitions and explanations on North Korea’s involvement in nuclear activity ...........................4 North Korea’s potential motivation –the North Korean mind ................................................................4 Potential implications ..............................................................................................................................................5


Legal Framework and Legal Analysis of the role of international law ...............................................................6 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 The international law actors .................................................................................................................................6 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) ................................................................................................6 Article X(1) of the NPT –A Legal Lacuna? ........................................................................................................8 Analysis of the impact of Security Council’s resolutions ...........................................................................8 The International Court Justice’s (ICJ) advisory opinion –A Legal Conundrum ...............................9 Has international law in general succeeded or failed given what happened so far? ................. 10


A tangled web of legal and political factors in international law...................................................................... 11 3.1 3.2 Lessons from past experiences ......................................................................................................................... 11 Six-party talks- the attempt at a multilateral security order ............................................................... 12


The potential solution .......................................................................................................................................................... 14 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 Current development, six-party talks is revived again ........................................................................... 14 Last resort- Military intervention? .................................................................................................................. 15 Functional Cooperation -Going beyond the nuclear issue ..................................................................... 15 Could the answer lie in the EU as a mediator?............................................................................................ 16 How the EU can play the role of a mediator................................................................................................. 17

5. Further prospects and conclusions : An Opportunity in Risk................................................................................. 188


The subtitle for this essay is inspired by the title of the article written by O’Hanlon and Mochizuki, ‘Toward a Grand Bargain solution with North Korea’, The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2003


Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea


Epilogue: What next for North Korea? ........................................................................................................... 19

Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 19

The question of threat to peace and security from nuclear weapons has been lingering around for 50 years since the world witnessed the devastation of World War II. However, it rose to prominence recently, in particular, the risk of North Korea holding on to their nuclear weapons, not knowing the fate of its usage is becoming more prevalent today. Coupled with uncertainties that surround its future, North Korea certainly deserves special attention, more so with the sudden demise of its long-standing ‘Dear Leader’ and as power transition takes place, we are plagued with serious questions yet to be answered. Against this background, this essay is organized as follows. First, it seeks to assess why and how North Korea is inspired to keep to its nuclear ambitions, and to make an analysis on how international law has fared in curbing this issue. Likewise, this essay also endeavours to draw an analysis by looking at the various potential solutions that can complement the role of international law and how best to convert this nuclear security risk into an opportunity. It is our opportune moment to address this problem as a global concern. Consequently, it is crucial for all corners of society to learn from past lessons, address this problem via an effective international global cooperation mechanism and delicately manage this situation. The last section presents some final reflections and proposes to complement political cooperation with international law as it becomes more recognized at the turn of this century that pursuance of an international objective would be more difficult where there are misalignments in political goals and objectives. More efforts should focus on achieving political unity in willpower. In confronting the interplay of all these elements, this paper discusses the possibility of the European Union entering the picture as the ‘neutral’ third party to ‘mediate’ the political differences between the existing parties involved and help to achieve the desired political unity.

“In our interconnected world, a threat to one is a threat to all, and we all share responsibility for each other’s security. If this is true of all threats, it is particularly true of nuclear threat”2 -Kofi Annan


Statement made by Kofi Annan, the United Nations Secretary General, in the address made at the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty review conference on May 2005 in New York.


the then defense secretary of the United States of America (US). Croatia signed the Accession Treaty with the European Union on 9 December 20113. For the past decade. a top US envoy on North Korea claimed that some progress “moving in a positive direction” has been made during talks over North Korea's nuclear (Last accessed on 20 December 2011) 4 5 Tania Branigan for the Guardian. but marking the beginning of the nuclear age. amidst the financial turmoil.1 Introduction Prologue As a starting and thus ending World War II. swept the country with grief and on the other hand. can be accessed at . In January 2011. The world now anticipates a better progress in this area. Historically. It wasn’t long after the horrific atomic explosion that we entered into another era. warned that North Korea was within five years of being able to strike the continental US with an intercontinental nuclear ballistic missile5. but must also be complemented by the political dimension. Kim Jong-un4. wiping out the cities of Hiroshima and states without nuclear weapons to pledge not to acquire them. this can be a start to put a rest on this nuclear threat from North Korea. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) which is at the forefront of this issue aims for. and the country's greatest ally. In October. ‘North Korea is direct threat to US. says defence secretary Robert Gates’. Kim Jong-il's death: an uneasy legacy Whether Kim Jong-il's death really is 'turning point' for North Korea depends on his son. and on the other side of the world. Though no sources can be found to base this statement. can be accessed at http://www. others watching from outside of North Korea are filled with anxiety over the fate of the country. while nuclear-armed states to commit to eventually giving them up. it is noteworthy that December 2011 has seen numerous historical events taking centre stage in the world. UK. it is in the author’s personal view and analysis that international law cannot be purely assessed in its legal dimension. Stephen Bosworth. Robert Gates. On one side of the world in Europe. Despite skeptisms to international law curbing issues of non-proliferation of nuclear. It is expected that the new leader will pick up where the previous leader left on. we witnessed the mixed reactions to the recent demise of the North Korean’s ‘Dear Leader’ which on the one hand. the Cold War period with the threat of 3 This will pave the way for Croatia’s full membership into the EU block by July 1. nuclear weapons have been detonated only twice.Contemporary issues in public international law 1. 1. It is optimistically hoped that there will be a peaceful and stable transition to a new leadership and that Kim Jong-un will better recognize the need of better engagement with the international community. and if a “solid and sincere foundation” can be built based on enhanced trust and (Last accessed on 15 December 2011) 3 .2 Definitions and explanations on North Korea’s involvement in nuclear activity Nuclear non-proliferation in this essay is recognized as a need of the prevention of nuclear increasing or spreading. 11 January 2011. drawing from legal essays written by pro-Americans and more unbiased proponents. this may be one of the reasons why the US re-ignited talks with North Korea. Kim Jong-il's sudden death certainly leaves an uneasy legacy and whether this could be a 'turning point' or ‘breaking point’ for North Korea depends on his son. North Korea presented numerous challenges to the global non proliferation regime.

it is well-known that those international sanctions and international law repercussions did not hold North Korea back from carrying out its second nuclear test in 2009.3. That is only an inevitable immediate foreseeable consequence. (2006) 4 . Both sides have worked through a painstaking process to reach a consensus for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. (The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis. United States Congressional Research Service. as well as having such a fluid character. a 30megawatt research reactor. and U. In fact. 9 Determining the motivations of a secretive government such as North Korea is extremely difficult. SPECTOR & J. are known to be of such grave magnitude to humankind as it would cause deaths of thousands of lives in an instant and many more would suffer or die from exposure to radiation. Implications. and is the logical option for aspiring nuclear states with limited industrial capabilities.S. Most writers in this area omit the need to look into and analyse the historical past of North Korea which has led them to where they are today. See more in L. 1. before delving in the issues. This design is well suited to produce plutonium. even though the Cold War officially ended in 1990s. as it would strip-off hard-earned and won freedoms and compromise. the nuclear conflict escalated as a political issue in and around the Korean peninsula. but is also a regional and global concern. the responsibility lies not just in international law nor in the regional players concerned alone. the worst consequence out of such a recurrence of the nuclear detonation would be more farreaching than ever fathomable. Henceforth. Needless to say. Given this understanding. Despite having been subjected to punishment by way of Security Council’s resolutions. but Emma Chanlett-Avery and Sharon Squassoni compiled a list of potential range of possibilities made by analysts in. in a seemingly act of defiance against the United Nations.Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea nuclear annihilation hanging over mankind6. Athanasopulos. Between 1980 and 1987. No. but have found no ultimate solution yet. they remain a critical issue in post-Cold War regional and world politics. Nuclear disarmament in International Law (McFarland & Company 2000). XVII. of the gas-graphite design that uses natural uranium as fuel. North Korea's Nuclear Test: Motivations. NUCLEAR AMBITIONS: THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. it is pertinent to try9 to identify the potential motivation behind North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and what they are trying to accomplish by developing nuclear weapons against the protest of the United Nations and the world at large. 8 North Korea seems to have undertaken its secret nuclear weapons program in the late 1970s. China and Japan in the Far East. North Korea conducted another nuclear test in 2009. but as long as countries remain in possession of them. but rather –a bold proposal is put forth for the concept of a global cooperation in respect for peace and security. shaking the cradle of global peace and security. SMITH. though it only first gained international attention after the launch of its first nuclear test in 2006 and. At the inception of Cold War. 7 This is why Jangho Kim. Vol. The reasonbeing that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be in our radar of concern is because the catastrophic nature of a nuclear disaster. and expresses intention to use them as a weapon of attack. the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that threatens peace and security in North Korea is not just a national concern for North Korea. being well-aware of the full-blown negative international reaction to its conduct. nuclear threats remain since then until today7. whether intentional or unintentional. and that in itself is a crucial point to bear in mind when tackling this sensitive matter. See more in H. and views that the future would depend much on how the relationship between North Korea and the US is managed. Options. was built near Yongbyon. is still a risk at large.3 North Korea’s potential motivation –the North Korean mind Nuclear development in North Korea is not an alarmingly new recent phenomenon8. my aim is to show how the historical background leads to such a demeanor. In this essay. Winter 2005) argues that the current post-Cold War era is being prolonged. North Korea’s strategic location between the Soviet Russia. served the US as the perfect location to indirectly attack Russia without directly confronting 6 Although nuclear weapons are gradually becoming prohibited under international law. 1989-1990 123-24 (1990). As North Korea launched its nuclear weapons development program in the early 1990s. Thus. in ‘Prospects for a Northeast Asian Multilateral Security Order and the United States’.

kcna. 2006. which produced plutonium for North Korea's nuclear weapons program. on May 25. In so doing. amongst others. 24. leading to the ultimate division at the 38th parallel line. as this would only work against themselves. 12 Israeli suspicions of the remote Syrian site. if business continues as usual. Zooming ahead to the more present future in 2002. Kim Il-Sung. Even though the event of North Korea intentionally detonating their nuclear arsenal is highly unlikely. those two parties ‘ended’ that period of conflict through an armistice signed in 1953. Thursday. the US Marshall who led the troops in South Korea which threatened to use nuclear weapons and warned the North Koreans and those supporting them would end in similar fates as Hiroshima and Nagasaki. David E. This is because. The fact that the US itself is a major nuclear weapons North Korea is suspected to be a willing exporter of weapons and possibly nuclear materials through providing technology. USA Today. Sees N. but also to the world at large. separating the North and the South. At that point in time.4 Potential implications The potential implications are far too great if the nuclear activity in North Korea is left to the status quo ante. along with tightening economic sanctions and blockades against them. North Korea interpreted that as an ‘act of war’ and soon after. www. This event is pivotal as it also marks the beginning of a period of the North Koreans’ distrust against the US. Korean Links to Reactor. North Korea withdrew from the NPT and stated its reasons were that because the US was threatening its security by its hostile policy. The Korean Central News Agency Report on one more successful underground nuclear. the North wasted no time in the search of nuclear development. ‘N. such as Syria12. The video apparently also showed North Koreans working at the Al Kibar site. 5 . The images appeared to show the design of a reactor similar to the reactor at the North Korean Yongbyon plant. North Korea alleged that if they were to give up their nuclear ambitions. which would not serve to anyone’s interest. A nuclear armed North Korea is a destabilising situation which not only poses profound threat to the US. Motivated by the thought of gaining such power through igniting fear in owning nuclear weapons. 1. 2008. President Bush labeled North Korea as part of the “axis of evil”. The North Koreans announced that “the test will contribute to safeguarding their sovereignty and socialism and guaranteeing peace and safety on the Korean peninsula and the surrounding region” 11. is one of the biggest nuclear weapon holder in the world while the North Koreans would have nothing to defend themselves against with. As a direct result of that. and North Korea realizes this fact. 2009. this was potentially one of the factors which shocked and ‘drove’ the North Koreans and their Communist Chinese support armies back to the 38th parallel line. Apr. only points towards inconsistency in treatment as it receives no opposition in the realm of international law. its neighboring region. code-named Al Kibar.’ New York Times. were verified by video images secretly acquired by Israeli intelligence. they would open themselves up to vulnerabilities of being a potential target of a pre-emptive nuclear attack by the US which itself.S.’ Washington Post. the danger of such ownership should not be disregarded since there is always a possibility that it may fall into the wrong hands and be used as a tool to manipulate world politics. But that was not before twist of events took place. in addition to the threat of its own weapons capabilities. officials have said that Israel shared the video with them before the September 6th attack. 2008. See more in Robin Wright. Sanger. Essentially. or terrorist organizations or individuals13.Contemporary issues in public international law it. 24. the North Korean leader saw the ‘mighty potential’ of nuclear power that also drove the Japanese off the Korean soils after nearly 50 years of reign. the Communist Chinese were also embroiled in conflict between the North and South Korea. and if nothing is 10 11 ‘North Korea threatens pre-emptive strike against the US’. fissile materials and ballistic weapons to rogue states. Koreans Taped At Syrian Reactor: Video Played a Role in Israeli Raid. Apr. Officially. ‘U.S. The North Korean ministry announced that the nuclear weapons were made to confront a nuclear threat from the US10. This potentially led to the first test carried out by North Korea in 2006 despite international resistance –to demonstrate to the world its nuclear-capable state status and to build on perception that building such nuclear stockpile will strengthen its security posture in the world. March 22.

S. (2006) 14 Ibid. 2009 6 . If North Korea keeps conducting test and threatening its neighbours to use nuclear weapons against them. actors. until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea done to deter North Korea from further increasing or proliferating its nuclear capacity.” 13 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Sharon Squassoni compiled a list of potential range of possibilities made by analysts in. Furthermore.2 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) “As globalization continues to present new challenges to the non-proliferation community. the UN through the Security Council is empowered under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter to carry out duties for the maintenance of international peace and security. Nonetheless. “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations. In this respect. Implications. as the consequences of inaction is far greater than anything but dire. 2. it is also pertinent that the UN’s role does not remain static. in which the uncertainties of nuclear instability may create a cascading effect on other powers in the region14. what is feared by most analysts and experts are the possibilities of North Korea fuelling a ‘nuclear arms race’ in Asia. but is fully adaptable and useful as an instrument of the world’s peace and security ultimate guardian. foundations. North Korea's Nuclear Test: Motivations. and U. South Korea. Options.” 16 Page 203. the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating. United Nations University Press. as it is uncertain how events would take turn. in verifying treaties and in creating tools of inspection in the name of achieving in international peace and security in the world. At this juncture. and the potential risks from such implications should not be undermined. In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources. In these circumstances it is foreseeable that Japan. innovative approaches that capitalize on its opportunities are also necessary16. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. The United Nations and nuclear orders: Context. China and Taiwan may try to derive legality to do so by defending15 themselves from acts of aggression. United States Congressional Research Service. with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47. we are impliedly ‘stimulating’ the growth of nuclear black market activities. tools and future prospects. this could result in an undesirable scenario where the rest in the region may seek to develop its own nuclear weapons program in the face of a clear and present danger from North Korea. 2. 15 Art 2(4) of the UN Charter. the potential implications are non-exhaustive. plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. as it is recognised the needs and circumstances of the 21st century are constantly evolving.1 Legal Framework and Legal Analysis of the role of international law The international law actors This essay seeks to evaluate the role that the United Nations (UN) has played in attenuating the risks of nuclear weapons possession and proliferation. 2. This is was how the birth of NPT came about –with the UN as the custodian of non-proliferation.

(2004) 18 7 . as President Bush clearly had another approach to the issue. in future talks involving different countries. analysts can derive and try to duplicate the successful elements of the Agreed Framework which would have optimistically led to a better compliance with the NPT. One cannot help but wonder what if the Agreed Framework had been carried on consistently? Trying to presuppose what would have been the eventual outcome would not be of help now. This claim is substantiated by the amnesty that was granted by North Korea to two American journalists as a result of a successful negotiation secured by President Clinton with the North Koreans in 2009. At the same time.’ See more in Eric Yong-Joong Lee. where politics plays a large part in it. ‘The Six-Party talks and the North Korea Nuclear dispute resolution under the IAEA safeguards regime’. through the conclusion of the Agreed Framework under the Clinton administration19. Vol. while nuclear-armed states committed to eventually give them up. With the Agreed Framework. which drastically reshaped the principles of international law so differently as one who studies international law is introduced to President Bush’s justification of ‘preemptive war against terrorism’. Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal. Vol. matters took a complete ‘U-turn’ the moment the cooperative mood changed into one of hostility and instability. one should also not just see that case as a bygone. However. One can also learn from this experience that diplomacy works best when both parties to the negotiation try to be mutually sincere to each other. since many lessons can be extracted from that experience. ‘The Six-Party talks and the North Korea Nuclear dispute resolution under the IAEA safeguards regime’. especially in international law. For instance. an unexpected event took place in 2001. North Korea was in fact one of the 190 countries that joined the NPT up till it withdrew itself in 2003. beginning with labeling North Korea as ‘axis of evil’. to allow ad hoc and routine inspections with respect to the facilities not subject to the freeze. With the framework. and to come into full compliance with the safeguards agreement with the IAEA including taking all steps deemed necessary by the IAEA.5. the spirit of the Agreed Framework also faded away with him.5. with steps that would be taken gradually in stages. (2004) 19 Eric Yong-Joong notes that ‘The Agreed Framework was adopted as a compromise between North Korea and the United States after painstaking negotiations under President Clinton and Kim Jong-Il.Contemporary issues in public international law Forty years ago. Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal. Analysts view that the desirability of North Korea remaining in the NPT is noticeably related to its relationship with the US at any range of period of a point in time18. the relationship of the concerned parties dramatically shifted from confrontation to a cooperative approach.-DPRK relationship—through a package deal. among others. the NPT allowed for the peaceful use of nuclear technology by non-nuclearweapon states under strict and verifiable control. The Agreed Framework contained a provision that “Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime”. both sides tried to solve the two critical issues—freezing North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons development program and normalizing the U. perhaps the hallmark for the UN in the movement towards a nuclear-free world was set into place as one of the most important international security bargains of all time: states without nuclear weapons pledged not to acquire them. at the point when North Korea formed a somewhat unique relationship with the US. to this North Korea agreed by doing the following: to remain a party to the NPT and accept its safeguards agreement. As President Clinton left office. prospects of North Korea moving towards denuclearization were optimistic. The author is convinced that as President Clinton has reflected that successful diplomacy strategy has the power to make a difference.S. Then. Just as the mood under the previous Presidency was strategically poised for making a progress with North Korea. 17 The NPT was introduced by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1968 Eric Yong-Joong Lee. For instance. the NPT17.

have jeopardized the supreme national interests of its country. and acting under its enforcement capacity under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These procedural conditions in fact.. ‘A solution in sanctions’. 24 Masahiko Asada. 2. ‘Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events. related to the subject matter of this Treaty. sought to ‘demand’ North Korea to immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal.3 Article X(1) of the NPT –A Legal Lacuna? North Korea exercised its national sovereignty right under Article X of the NPT20 to withdraw itself from the NPT. return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards. as a result of the Security Council not accepting North Korea’s legal position on withdrawal. have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country”.’ 21 In fact. except that this one wouldn’t have an exit. financial sanctions and travel bans. 22 The NPT can be accessed from http://www. the Security Council is empowered to adopt enforcement measures in response to a threat to peace.htm (last accessed on 11 December 2011) 23 Under Article 39 of the UN Charter. March 2011 8 . which is then followed by a procedural condition of giving three months’ advance notice to all other parties and to the Security Council. as noted by analysts –produced an odd juxtaposition. alarm bells are ringing about the absence of a credible firewall between peaceful and non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy. related to the subject matter of this Treaty. Although peaceful use of nuclear energy is an “inalienable right” under Article IV of the NPT. UN sanctions23 have notably emerged as one of the most powerful tools that the international community can resort to in its quest to maintain international peace and security24. This fact is in the author’s view slightly contradictory in the sense that if in the first place the Security Council and the parties to the NPT did not accept North Korea’s legal position to withdrawal but still maintained the status list of the NPT. However. according to legal analysts. together with a statement of the events the state regarded as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Needless to say. but also imposed extensive sanctions measures on North Korea such as trade-related measures. the Security Council responded with resolutions which not only demanded suspension of all related ballistic missile activity. … giving three months notice to all the parties and the UN Security Council.fas. the Security Council had deplored North Korea’s announcement of withdrawal from the NPT. there are also other several loopholes identified in the NPT such as the ‘marriage’ of ‘two incompatible goals’ such as ‘atoms for peace 22’ and ‘non-proliferation’ on the other. breach of the peace. Article X(1) of the NPT provides for withdrawal only if a party “in exercising its national sovereignty” decides “that in extraordinary events.. It is asserted that following North Korea’s withdrawal.4 Analysis of the impact of Security Council’s resolutions Over the years. North Korea has been continuously carried as a party to the NPT on status lists maintained by the official depositories of the treaty.Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea 2. have given rise to legal questions as to whether given that North Korea had withdrew without fulfilling this procedural requirement. even though this sanction appears to be extensive. if they were not recognized to have had even ‘left’ the NPT in the first place? In addition to this. the parties to the NPT and the Security Council never seem to have accepted North Korea’s legal position on its withdrawal21. why would they then go on to ‘demand’ North Korea to ‘return’ to the NPT. could the Council legally have had the power to block such a withdrawal? The response to this would be analogous to a maze. despite this lack of legal recognition of North Korea’s purported invocation of its right to withdraw. As a result of North Korea conducting its nuclear tests in 2006 and in as well as in the lists carried on the records of the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs and the IAEA. or act of aggression. the intended goal of the Security Council is to maximize the impact by targeting coercive pressure on those suspected to be 20 Article X of the NPT provides that.

cargo inspection and interdiction activities. and ‘requested’ UN member states to inspect cargoes from North Korea. the adoption of sanction resolution is not the end of the story. There were only about four cases which successfully involved the seizure of arms and related material from North Korean cargoes. Thus. by the persons or entities designated by the Security Council’s sanctions Committee. whereby about ten or more different entities and countries appeared to have been involved in a single incident of illegal transfer alone. one need not analyse all the cases. directly or indirectly. To illustrate the difficulty of enforcing such a sanction.5 The International Court Justice’s (ICJ) advisory opinion –A Legal Conundrum Another notable source of international law which may lend light to whether the use of nuclear weapons is permissible in any circumstances under international law is the ICJ advisory opinion on this matter. eventually. where the survival of a State would be at stake. manufacture. shortly after the adoption of the last resolution 1874. arms conflict control and customary international law. the ICJ decided that it could not definitively conclude whether the threat would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self defence. the US Ambassador to the UN. As for measures which require involvement of other UN member states. services or assistance related to the provision. humanitarian law. technical training. is praiseworthy and laudable for such a creatively-crafted solution. maintenance or use of such items. Notwithstanding the foregoing. it is of little force and effect. The foregoing judgment which constitute a landmark decision in the realm of international law. In this aspect. but look only at the seizure that took place in Thailand. 2. advice. may have inadvertently provide countries to ‘recourse of nuclear’ in an ‘extreme circumstance of self defence’. This demonstrates that in fully securing the effectiveness of UN sanctions. sanctions can only work effectively if those at the forefront such as member states embrace and respect the spirit of international cooperation and collaboration. also known as ‘smart sanctions’. 9 . whilst at the same time to minimize unintended impact on the innocent populations. Bearing in mind the above. the beginning and this only suggests that without effective implementation and international collaboration. two out of the three resolutions on North Korea obliged UN member states to freeze financial assets owned or controlled. Such specificities that have been given much deliberation as truly laudable in the context of evolving needs of the century. Even though the ICJ firstly acknowledged that the threat of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to applicable treaties. but rather. Indeed. sanctions no matter how creative or clever they are. this would only hold effect if member states cooperate true to the spirits of the resolution. The trade-related measures also included a ban on the transfer of luxury goods to the DPRK. can be evaded easily by the designated entities and individuals by changing names or creating bodies that can act for or on behalf of the designated entities. a measure intended to have impact on the NK elites.Contemporary issues in public international law responsible for the wrongdoing25. Susan Rice praised the resolution as ‘unprecedented’ and ‘innovative’ and expressed that such sanctions regime has “teeth that will bite”. no matter how clever a resolution is formulated. In addition to that. The adoption of such resolutions. travel bans were imposed on designated persons. 25 This sanction also extended to financial transactions. only an orderly promulgation of coordinated international willpower and effort is the answer to effective export control.

he opines that it is arguably the most successful arms control treaty in human history. As one observer29 recently noted. to see if it is viable to build on that success. another instrument of international law implies that the use of nuclear weapons may be justifiable where the survival of a State would be26 at stake.” Kofi Annan A most frequently-asked question. They fail when many breaches pile one on top of the other. 27 Jim Walsh of Harvard University asked three questions in his paper – First. if anything. is on the verge of failure or will inevitably fail with a resulting cascade of proliferation. Paper prepared for the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Stockholm. ‘Learning from Past Success: The NPT and the Future of Non-proliferation’. The NPT is stronger when member states are convinced that it is working and that nations can be counted on to abide by the rules. what accounts for this success or failure? Third. yet again. where there is a long running. depending on how one reads this phrase. This general skeptical attitude 30 is dangerous as it creates a vicious cycle. a government begins to pull back 26 The language employed here is ‘would be’ instead of ‘is’. where as ‘would be’ is as a matter of literal interpretation. Observer Research Foundation 30 Jim Walsh notes in his article that for most observers and commentators. “Will the NPT Regime Survive?. The judgment of the ICJ presents a legal conundrum for the use of nuclear weapons. Indeed. 1:2 (October 6. broad consensus that the NPT has failed. is whether this institutions have failed or succeeded27 in addressing the nuclear issue in North Korea.”. See more in Jim Walsh. 2003). 2. “It has become fashionable. the NPT seeks to achieve a nuclear-free world and on the other hand.6 Has international law in general succeeded or failed given what happened so far? “International regimes do not fail because of one breach. 29 Rajesh Rajagopalan. the post-Cold War and post9/11 challenges that confront the international non-proliferation regime? In the end. more ambiguous and therefore maybe stretched by nuclear misusers and as an implication go against the intended original meaning and purpose that the ICJ may have had in mind when giving out the judgment. wider scope. 10 . Focusing only on failure is misleading. it is pertinent to consider first what has already worked. In assessing this. to predict the collapse of the NPT….Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea Hence. however serious or unacceptable. on the one hand. In such a spiral potentially dangerous cycle.” ORF Strategic Trends. to the point where the gap between promise and performance becomes unbridgeable. he comes to the conclusive analysis that the NPT has been ‘surprisingly successful’. there is little debate regarding the success or failure of the NPT. has the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) been a success or a failure? Second. about how to address the problem of proliferation and in particular. there is neither international law or customary international law that contains “any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such”. (October. given the existence and establishment of the international law above. what do the lessons from the first thirty-five years of the treaty suggest. they are not explicitly prohibited by the international law. and runs the risk of generating a spiraling crisis of confidence28. The difference between the usage of the two phrases is that the latter suggests element of ‘imminence’ as a condition to use nuclear as a self-defence. It is weaker when governments believe that the treaty is not working or is failing. however. Even though the ICJ acknowledges the threat that nuclear activity poses to security and peace. 2005) 28 Ibid. A perception of failure encourages states to consider alternatives such as hedging and gives pro-nuclear bomb advocates an opening to make their case. since it is ultimately justifiable in an extreme circumstance of self defence. Sweden.

the lack of enforcement provisions of the NPT has been a topic of particular interest to American analysts. Jim Walsh prudently suggest that what is really required is an objective assessment.Contemporary issues in public international law from its commitments because of doubts about the treaty. as fewer states seeking nuclear weapons today than at any point since World War II. Article IV then goes on to read that ‘both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime’. it was interpreted by the world at large as an act of defiance against international law in general for not taking heed of the Security Council’s resolution issued pursuant to its first nuclear test in 2006. one can see that since the NPT. so did the stance towards North Korea change under President Bush’s regime. has been subjected to political penalties. which in turn is taken as evidence that the treaty is weak and encourages other governments to follow suit. flew out of the window. One can aptly describe that the cooperative relationship that President Clinton tried to build on. along with the transition from President Clinton to President Bush. North Korea agreed to remain a party to the NPT and accepted its safeguards agreement. Not only they tried to achieve normalization in relationship. where it is often seen as a critical flaw— the so-called “Achilles heel. this Agreed Framework is indeed an epoch-making event. As stated earlier. Given the strenuous past and tense experiences between them. fewer countries have had nuclear ambitions. Following these Articles. Hence.” -George Santayana The historical tensions between North Korea and the US was first attempted to be resolved through bilateral meetings between them in the 1990s which led to the adoption of the Agreed Framework31. and so is the relationship built31 Eric Yong describes the ‘Agreed Framework’ as the offspring of the resolution of the North Korean nuclear dispute.1 A tangled web of legal and political factors in international law Lessons from past experiences “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. 11 . On the other hand. the United States and other countries promised to provide North Korea with alternative energy source. Statistically.” Can one conclude that North Korea has gone unpunished? This is hardly the case. when North Korea launched its second nuclear test in 2009. By virtue of this framework. 3. Article II of the Agreed Framework stipulated that “the two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations. concluded between President Clinton and Kim Jong-il. and to allow IAEA to carry out ad hoc and routine inspections. the unexpected happened. Then. a new relationship developed between the two countries. as North Korea as witnessed by the world. the whole world was shocked into silence. in exchange. economic and military sanctions and even threatened with actual use of force. The Agreed Framework on North Korea’s nuclear program required that North Korea cease activities that could have given it a nuclear arsenal of 50 weapons by the decade’s end. but also constructive and concrete goals were explicitly expressed pertaining to the nuclear dilemma. as the debris of 9/11 swept past the city of New York.” Another notable provision is Article III which stipulated that both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. rather than ignoring or hyping success. which shook the notion of peace and security that we hold valuably. 3.

(rather than being pro-active with pre-planned strategic objectives).Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea up so far. US. this talk proved how difficult it is to appease everyone at the same time. The key lesson from this is to be able to draw the will of the six nations through putting them altogether at the hexagonal table. and the interests of these other five nations and their existing relationship with North Korea. Overall. as he took over the baton from his predecessor with many retracted steps. being that there is much patching-up to do considering how talks have fallen apart before. However. The former being that this has been done before. Russia and South Korea. who is the Secretary of State of the US. there may be a chance that Hilary Clinton. The latter. added with a lack of common interests in the Northeast Asia. may be inclined to take the same route in dealing with North Korea. just like how we have seen in the previous talks. Consequently. and lack of willpower to compromise for a strategic common aim and goal. Such initiative was undoubtedly brilliant. As described by O’Hanlon and Mochizuki. there is good news. so previous elements of success can be ‘duplicated’ in the current re-initiation of the six-party talks in reigniting the engine of the six-party talks. who also happens to be President Clinton’s spouse. US policy toward North 12 . this six-party talks is bound to head for another round of failure. only time will tell as the world now watches in anticipation how President Obama will take the lead on. Whatever it is. and that relationship and trust had been strained along the years. Japan. the most effective way forward would be a unified and collective approach taken by all these 5 nations. Given the differences in motivation. given that the past Agreed Framework was rolled out under President Clinton. The next question that ensue is – where do we stand today? Well. Stepping stones needs to be strategically planned out and carefully implemented to rebuild the path towards an effective relationship. but the discussions held between them were nonetheless futile since they have been thus far not reached any consensus. such as the analysis of international reaction in approaching this matter. this countries all display different responses. were formed to provide a platform for them to ‘coax’ North Korea to come back to the NPT through dialogue. one should not completely disregard the experience from this accord. Ideally. The Bush administration was well known for its military policy of ‘eliminating the slightest elements of North Korea’s military power’. US’s response towards this development of cooperation has been ad hoc and reactive. As for the relationship between the US and North Korea. 3. As long as there are divisions in opinion and cold treatment towards North Korea. objectives. and mostly crisis-driven. This action immediately pushed back whatever relationship had been established between the two countries to see déjà vu of the US’ hegemony at the height of the Korean War 50 years ago. and also bad news. Nevertheless.2 Six-party talks -the attempt at a multilateral security order The six-party talks originated as a result of North Korea withdrawing from the NPT in 2003. we are now back to square one again. one should bear in mind that the Obama Administration has much catching up to do. As symbolically shown. These talks involving China.

Contemporary issues in public international law Korea in the last decade has been. this is seen as a lack of action by the Chinese. Japan not only restricts more of its outflow of Japanese personnel to North Korea. weapons and counterfeiting trade. Initially. eventhough China is not in favour of such a growth of nuclear ambition in its neighboring soil. thereby motivated to be more of a ‘middle-power’. this holds them back from openly presenting their views. China is known to have given a degree of latitude towards North Korea despite being aware of North Korean’s illegal drugs. (Autumn 2003) 33 Though in principle. Comparing Russia and China. In a nutshell. Of all the six-party countries. Deducing from the fragmented and different approaches taken by the countries above. North Koreans has more faith and trust in the latter. in reality. On the one hand. especially if it is perceived to be intrusive to the Chinese’ sovereignty. and Beijing is forward as a kick-start to solve this denuclearization dilemma. one thing is for sure here: the most promising route to resolve the worsening nuclear crisis in Northeast Asia is for Washington. Nevertheless. Russia’s influence on North Korea has lost its grip. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Washington Quarterly. Since the North Koreans have not always been consistently in favour of having an official level talks with the South. this ‘functionalist’ relationship has proven to be a convenient opportunity for North Korea to deal with the South. Hence. South Korea. they are extremely cautious at such meetings. thereby. China is the only country perceived to be most trusted by North Korea. on the other hand. focusing on the crisis du jour rather than on a broader game plan32. As many academics note. This explains its pursuance of modest goals. ‘Toward a Grand Bargain with North Korea’. for the most part. In this context. In fact. Japan is thought to be most committed party in carrying out the UN sanctions and severing its ties with North Korea to a greater extent especially after the second nuclear test. the Chinese supports the idea of multilateral dialogues to promote mutual cooperation and understanding. desiring only for reduced tension on the peninsula. Russia’s involvement can generally be perceived as not wanting to be left out of the equation and hopes to retain some form of control and influence over this matter. such as approaching this with functionalism and 'moderation'. China is not the biggest fan of US-led infamous interventions in the middle eastern region. narrow and tactical . North Korea’s nuclear ambitions is drawing China’s agitation. more so if the topic relates to sensitive matters as regional conflicts. However. 13 . this platform could be leveraged by all the parties involved to try to first build confidence and base of trust. in that it tries to diffuse the tension with its Northern counterpart through improving ties by way of expanding trade relations and facilitating the movement of people between the two Koreas for the purpose of business cooperation. its approach to this matter is not be too pressing on North Korea. it also went to the extent of amending its law to carry out inspections on cargoes originating from North Korea. Seoul. Tokyo. on the other hand. the author deems that the most plausible and realistic way forward is to follow the 32 O’Hanlon and Mochizuki. tries to avoid a further conflict with North Korea. some analyst view this as China’s strategy of slowly building a confidence base with North Korea. having a common communist historical background. The participation of the Chinese is thought to be reluctant and defensive in general33.

Afterall. with the sudden change of leadership. the humanitarian problems in North Korea resulting from a repressive regime and lack of basic necessities are another huge concern for the 34 Jishe Fen. Certainly now. the impact of nuclear proliferation in North Korea is not in anyone’s interest. the biggest priority would be to gain North Korea’s trust enough so that it would feel secured and assured in gradually giving up its nuclear programs.Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea diplomacy route. as the threat over security and peace in the Northeast Asian region looms over dauntingly. Without establishing trust or confidence. the only thing missing is just a piece of puzzle to fit in to ‘reactivate’ the negotiation in the right direction. King’s College London Centre for Science and Security Studies. In spite that much is not known about the characteristics and personality of the new leader36.1 The potential solution Current development. As proposed by Jishe Fen34. sincerity is the most important ingredient in building trustworthy relationship and mending the broken trust between the parties. it is hoped that he will pick up the six-party talks on where it was left. six-party talks is revived again Despite the foregoing discussion. and return to the hexagonal table that was reignited just before his father’s sudden demise. this is the most viable suggestion in attempting to reach a common solution that would best serve the interest of all parties. all hope is not lost for North (Last accessed on 27 December 2011) 14 . each side would retain leverage over the other as aid would be provided gradually to North Korea while they would cut or eliminate its weapons and reform its economy over time. as long as tactics and strategies towards this negotiation remains unchanged. policymakers would be able to provide a road map for the vital and ultimate goal of denuclearizing North Korea.cnn. Through the stages of implementation. 4. In the long run. However. the parties cannot effectively move an inch towards reaching any goals collectively. especially in this period of uncertainty for the political regime in North Korea. 4. the parties have to keep in their mind the historical conflict North Korea had with the US giving rise to its legitimate security concerns. In order to do this. ‘Seeking the best or the second best: Lessons learned from Six Party talks’. the time is more opportune than ever for to convince the new leader to kick-start his leadership with improved international relations ties for the betterment of North Korea’s prosperity which can be done in no other better way than through the sixparty talks platform. as simple as this may sound. paper presented at the Third Trilateral Meeting on Nuclear Stability and Nonproliferation. If it is going to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions.blogs. Besides that. characterized by a functional approach with the aim of building trust between the parties. it is highly unlikely that we will see any improvement in achieving denuclearization in North Korea. the platform for negotiation is there. As already pointed out earlier. See more at http://globalpublicsquare. Unfriendly rhetoric during the process can only bring the negotiation process a step back instead of taking them forward. In this simple act of sincerity. it is only doable once North Korea feels more confident and at ease to do so. October 2007 35 36 Ibid. thus reassuring each side that it was not being hoodwinked35. In this regard.

it is crucial to focus on this now. In view of that. prevent any further development of North Korea’s nuclear inventory39. both sides would cut the overall number of conventional forces as well as accompany those cuts with a commitment by South Korea. ‘Toward a Grand Bargain with North Korea’. China. to launch a major global campaign on September 2011 to seek the establishment of a UN Commission of Inquiry to investigate crimes against humanity in North Korea. most importantly. 15 . any military strike at North Korea’s nuclear reactors and plutonium reprocessing facilities at its Yongbyon site north of Pyongyang would be extremely risky in light of the possibility that a larger war would result38. in the light of its experiences over the 37 When the Clinton administration considered military action on North Korea’s nuclear facilities in 1993. The Washington Quarterly. Beyond nuclear issues. with an untold number of civilian deaths. is military intervention. along with 40 other organizations from around the world. the estimated human casualties from an invasion was about 52. The longer the delay in attaining denuclearization in North Korea. As noted by O’Hanlon and Mochizuki.Contemporary issues in public international law international community. this point will not be discussed in detail.000 armies and nearly half a million South Korea soldiers dead or wounded. ‘Toward a Grand Bargain with North Korea’. this option is least desirable and is the very last resort that should only be considered in the event that all other options have been fullyexhausted and proven to have failed.Military intervention? Amongst all the options laid on the table. a grand bargain is more likely ultimately to denuclearize North Korea and. (Autumn 2003) 39 O’Hanlon and Mochizuki. leading to the world’s three largest international human rights organizations. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. thus. (Autumn 2003) 40 Ibid. Japan and the United States to help North Korea gradually restructure and rejuvenate its economy40.3 Functional Cooperation -Going beyond the nuclear issue One of the viable and possibly most sustainable solution to achieving gradual denuclearization in North Korea is through a grand bargain solution via a functional cooperation methodology. 4. most academics and observers view that such an event is not a plausible scenario as North Korea will only jeopardize its own interest in acting in such a way. Coercion is certainly not the way to go in making North Korea change its policy. The Washington Quarterly. Functional cooperation in this context refers to O’Hanlan and Mochizuki’s view that by not fixating on just the nuclear program. we are incidentally prolonging the sufferings of the North Koreans. China could provide technical help. Also. and would only be a replay of the 1950 Korean war where history repeats itself but this time with even worse catastrophic consequences as the scale of the disaster would be bigger and most likely affect its regional neighbours much to the regional neighbour’s worst fears. 4. Human Rights Watch and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH). 38 O’Hanlon and Mochizuki. Such an event is beyond any imaginable comprehension. given their talent for concealing activities underground. Amnesty International.2 Last resort. Nevertheless. Bearing the lack of human rights in North Korea. it would be difficult to launch attack on North Korea’s nuclear facilities. as the resources deployed by the North Korea on its nuclear weapons could have been used for the citizens instead. The consequences of igniting a ‘war’ in North Korea as a result of military intervention would see deaths of millions of innocent civilians37. However. ironically. The danger of intervening through military means could also possibly trigger North Korea to activate its nuclear weapons if it views that it has nothing to lose by doing so.

it is noteworthy that no mention has been made as to who should play this role. Economists view that the potential economic benefits is massive if North Korea’s economy is open-up to its regional neighbours. Conceivably. the EU possibly will help instigate a ‘functional mechanism’ by seeking a more normalized relations through economic and social means. to build a mutual base of trust with North Korea. In this regard. It is proposed that the EU would be the best bloc of nations to advocate a pro-active and play a creative role in this dimension. and through this. contribute to peace. Through building confidence measures. the EU would befit this role best. as North Korea is strategically located at the gateway between Asia. and followed by ability and capability to sit and negotiate sincerely with each other on the rights and obligations expected of one another. it is believed that the role of a mediator is crucial one. security. the choice made as to who should fit in this role must be thought very carefully. this could be an opportunity for them to demonstrate its ‘Third World friendliness’ by taking an important role which. the Consolidated Treaty of Lisbon 16 . Russia and Europe which is also sometimes dubbed by few as the Belgium of Europe would not only help attain the much-needed peace and security in the region. If the EU comes into the picture. Moreover. the US.Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea last 25 years in gradually injecting entrepreneurial activity and its own mode of capitalism into a Communist economy. The EU is also a good choice geographically. In my view. 4. as it is one of the most powerful bloc of nations in the world. The Treaty of Lisbon provides that the EU shall among others. having a great deal of experiences in ensuring that interested applicants joining the EU must put in place the minimum requirement of human rights law. if all goes according to what is envisaged. The EU. In this essay. including respect for the principles of the UN Charter41. This proposal is much inspired by the EU’s success in having enlarged to as many as 27 Member States. and to attempt bridging the gap among the confrontational issues. the EU reflects considerable amount of valuable experience in negotiations and arriving at compromises. For the EU. the proposed solution would be to introduce an influential bloc of nations which has not previously been too involved in this matter to come into the picture to take on the role of a muchneeded ‘mediator’ and 'moderator' to reconcile the divergent stances of the 5 countries. would also strengthen the EU’s reputation in the Asian region. being one of the world’s biggest aid contributor to developing nations should try to encourage North Korea to gradually give up its nuclear ambitions in exchange for economic aid to assist the country out of poverty. as it is located in between the US and the Northeast Asian region.4 Could the answer lie in the European Union (EU) as a mediator? Despite that the idea of a ‘mediator’ has been occasionally propounded by experts and academics alike. by faithfully conveying messages to the parties of the six-party talks that cannot see eye to eye. and potentially the EU. this may well ‘kill two birds with one stone’. but this could also help to pull the North Koreans out of poverty and 41 Article 3(5) of the Treaty of European Union. and to help bridge the gap between North Korea and the world. as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law.

5 How the EU can play the role of a mediator The EU. the EU has a great potential in contributing towards breaking the stalemate between the six-parties with a fresh and neutral viewpoint. 17 . where the level of negotiation between the parties take place. European Council and the Council of Ministers. that would make the US counterpart of a ministerial level in the EU’s terms. 4.” 44 45 Article 21(2) of the Treaty of the European Union. Baroness Ashton would be rightly and proper in position to represent the EU’s common voice on this matter. the institutional role of the European Council has been further clarified to be the driving force. is rightly in position to lead the configuration in handling this North Korea matter. including an explicit pursuance of common policies and actions in fields of international relations in order to promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance44. However. As the US counterpart is a special envoy appointed for the North Korean mission. instead of 27 muddled different approaches 43. In the exact wording of Article 15 of the TEU. is jointly competent with its 27 member states to carry out coordinated external actions. This ideal vision is operationally feasible. Once North Korea obtains consistent supply of oil. but to participate by treating itself equal as the rest of the world. By not merely fixating on the denuclearization issue. A more assertive role by the EU may also put some pressure on the US to stop playing the ‘hegemonic’ role. which makes the position unique as it is a hybrid of the European Commission. for the first time ever. Under Article 15 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). and soon its people will also move out of poverty and starvation. the Lisbon Treaty The position of the High Representative is a new creature of the Lisbon Treaty. a new special portfolio has been specifically created to carry on this new function to reflect the EU’s common stance. In this regard. after the Lisbon Treaty that came into force in 2009. the Lisbon Treaty provides for a longer external action objectives compared to all its predecessors. to the detriment and 42 Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki. more businesses would be operable and feasible in North Korea. the full-potential has not been fully-exploited yet. Even more so now. via speaking through one clear voice. this could lead to a more fruitful prospective negotiation where neither parties perceive to be under any form of duress42. As this is a new post.Contemporary issues in public international law famine. It is only when differences are reconciled and harmonized that a strong and unilateral action can be effectively rolled out on North Korea. potentially speeding up the six-party talks which has been excruciatingly slow. “The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political directions and priorities thereof. this would need the consensus of the European Council to be the impetus to Ms Ashton to be able to then take on this task with her EEAS. It shall not exercise legislative functions. having its own ‘supranational nucleus’ due to its unique structure among others. but given the right mix of political leadership and pursuance of objectives. ‘Toward a Grand Bargain with North Korea’. the detailed explanation on how the EU can play a role in this matter will not be delved in. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Washington Quarterly. Baroness Catherine Ashton who has the power to call the shots in foreign affairs matters. and to give it visibility and influence. and through display of genuine concern over the North Korean citizens’ welfare. The first High Representative of the Foreign Affairs and Security Policy45. (Autumn 2003) 43 In the interest of word limit for this essay. as a matters such as nuclear and weapons of mass destruction are of a degree of high importance in the EU. With more openness. It is viewed that given this threat to security and the recurring human rights violation in North Korea should be an alarm strong enough to warrant a diplomatic intervention by the EU at the six-party talks to play the role of mediator between those inherently divided on the North Korean issue. it would slowly spur the economy. Besides that. and businesses. as the economic situation in North Korea can start improving right away through a trans-railwork linking Russia to the Northeast Asian region.

It will also be advantageous for those in the North East Asian region to be able to be “contaminated” with the EU’s unique notion of acting in the “community’s spirit” with the notion of “common interest” of the EU as successfully proven in the past. ‘The Six-Party talks and the North Korea Nuclear dispute resolution under the IAEA safeguards regime’. It is high time to collaborate towards putting an end to the potential 46 Andrew Salmon. 48 Eric Yong-Joong Lee. that North Korea has for the US.Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea expense of the North Korean citizens. nuclear weapons at large and Beijing and Washington in disagreement or even conflict. (entered into force whether it is conclusively definitely proven that North Korea holds destructive nuclear weapons is still a threat for the world. a military coup. Vol. A stronger and more effective stance has to be taken on the enforcement of a potentially agreeable solution which would hopefully close this nuclear chapter in North Korea. available at http://www. It is also reiterated that this domain of North Korea deserves serious world attention and awareness of what goes behind the curtains. 5.iaea. The author believes and hopes that the idea of the EU acting as a mediator in upholding respect to international law principles of peace and security is a viable proposal. as it is definitely certain that the nuclear tests launched by North Korea is assessed by the IAEA experts to be equivalent to the impact of the impact of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. Like it or not. refugee flows. 5. they are part of life and had better be managed. Further prospects and conclusions : An Opportunity in Risk “As much as risks can be avoided. dodged or denied. (2004).46 Even though the UN is a significant actor in this dilemma. BBC News. possible civil war.” ‘Facing Risk’.pdf (last accessed at 7 November 2011). it is clear that North Korea which has been given the cold shoulders and politically hostile treatment over the years by the US have destroyed the trust if any at all. This is due to the fact that this type of politically sensitive matter would only work in painstakingly gradual stages. As we have tried to understand the motivations behind the nuclear ambitions in North Korea. Despite that the safeguards regime under the IAEA. much work still needs to be done in pursuance of North Korea giving up its nuclear ambitions. before the six-party talks commences again. 1968. Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal. to effectively and durably cope with this threat to international peace and security which has the potential to shake the very survival of humanity. ‘Why succession poses tough challenge for both Koreas’. we have to look beyond that institution to seek that cooperative multilateral action. The roadmap to a complete denuclearization in North Korea is still a long way to go.5. 18 . assertively hailed as the ‘world’s organisation’ (representing global interests as a whole). July 1. and the NPT47 have played pivotal roles in maintaining the peaceful use of nuclear energy and in creating a restraint system on the use and development of nuclear weapons48. Topic of the 42 St Gallen Symposium nd The future of North Korea is beset with potential shocks that are uncertain whereby it really has no control over such typical issues as factional infighting. 20 December 2011 47 TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. 1970) [hereinafter NPT].

Tibetan. (2003) Journal Articles and Reports Masahiko Asada. ‘North Korea Hails Kim Jong-un as 'Supreme Leader' by Voice of America. EU could help to make that happen sooner or later. ‘Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea’. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. ‘The United Nations and Nuclear Orders’. Beijing. 2006) Cole Harvey. Ramesh Thakur and Thomas Weiss. as it would be a means for the ‘Supreme Successor’ to earn the loyalty of the military and the people of North Korea. Options’. a really sustainable win-win deal for all parties concerned is the only realistic way going forward. ‘Major Proposals to Strengthen the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: A Resource guide for the 2010 Review Conference’. The time to strike a grand bargain with North Korea is now. ‘A Solution in Sanctions: Curbing Nuclear Proliferation in North Korea’. The Washington Quarterly.Contemporary issues in public international law nuclear crisis together not only for the sake of security and peace in the Northeast Asian. Bibliography Books Edited by Jane Boulden. Consequentially. United Nations University Press.voanews. chances are high for a change of the system to a certain extent with the international community in order to be able to feed his people50. http://www. (December 12.1 Epilogue: What next for North Korea? For Washington. March 2011 Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki. (2009) Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki. North Korea will be insisted on making concessions toward giving up its nuclear weapons. (Autumn 2003) Emma Chanlett-Avery and Sharon Squassoni. McGraw-Hill. it is likely that in exchange for that. and U.S.html (Last accessed on 29 December 2011) 19 . but there is no doubt that time is the essence of what is next. Seoul. they should now be on a common stand to aspire to maintain stability on the North Korean soil and the North East Asian region49. Undoubtedly. 50 See more in. in order for him to obtain such kind of aid and investment from the international community. United States Congressional Research Service (CRS). ‘Toward a Grand Bargain with North Korea’. 5. Arms Control Association (ACA). this warrants for Beijing and Washington to have an aligned contingency plan in the event this occurs and how to maintain stability if such fears materialises. (March 2010) 49 There is a faint possibility that North Korea's designated successor may try to consolidate his power by conducting a missile or nuclear test or launching a limited military attack. Finally. Tokyo or Moscow it will not be of beneficial to anyone’s interest to remain at loggerheads over this North Korean dilemma. ‘North Korea's Nuclear Test: Motivations. Instead. but also to see this issue as an opportunity to address human rights derogation in that country.

Paper prepared for the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Stockholm. (October. George Hodgson. (January 2003) Beomchul Shin. Goldman Sachs. Mark Christopher. (2005) Clara Portela. Vol. Le Mon. Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Report. as presented at the Third Trilateral Meeting on Nuclear Stability and Non Proliferation at Kings College London. Ryan Phillips. Mike Hunzeker. No. XVII.. (June 2008) Daniel Joyner. a publication of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Weston S. Global Economics Paper No. Kirgis.32. (2008) Elizabeth Bakanic. Florentina Mulaj. ‘The Role of the EU in the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The Way to Thessaloniki and Beyond’. Vol. The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis. South Korea and Egypt’. (September 2009) Jim Walsh. but 2003 onwards) Sung-Han Kim. ‘A United Korea? Reassessing North Korea risk’. Sandya Das. Volume 11. IIRI Working Paper Series. ‘A Review of the legalities associated with a sudden change in North Korea’. The American Society of International Law Insights. Issue 14. Issue 8. ‘The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Taking Stock after the May 2008 Preparatory Committee Meeting’. ‘The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Taking Stock after the May 2008 Preparatory Committee Meeting’. ‘North Korea’s Withdrawal from the Nuclear Non proliferation Treaty’. Sung Hwan Lee. The American Society of International Law Insights. Issue 5. Volume 12. (September 2011) 20 . Konishi. Asian Perspective. (April 2008) Christopher J.3. Volume 12.5. The American Society of International Law Insights.Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea Eric Yong-Joong Lee. 65 (date of paper not ascertainable. (2004) Jishe Fan. Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal. The American Society of International Law Insights. pp. ‘Six-Party Talks Produce Action Plan on North Korean Nuclear Disarmament’. ‘The Six-Party talks and the North Korea Nuclear dispute resolution under the IAEA safeguards regime’. ‘Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan. ‘North Korean Links to Building of a Nuclear Reactor in Syria: Implications for International Law’.127156. ‘Searching for a Northeast Asian Peace and Security Mechanism’. Issue 14. (June 2008) Report by Mr. Sweden. Volume 12. ‘Learning from Past Success: The NPT and the Future of Non-proliferation’. The American Society of International Law Insights. (January 2008) Frederic L. ‘Seeking the Best or the Second Best: Seeking the Best or the Second Best: Lessons Learned from Six Party Talks Lessons Learned from Six Party Talks’. R Scott Kemp. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) Reports No.188. in ‘Prospects for a Northeast Asian Multilateral Security Order and the United States’. (2006) Goohoon Kwon. (October 2007) Jangho Kim. Laurie Freeman. Associate Director of Asia Pacific Studies. 2005) Lisa Tabassi and Jacqueline Leahey. (March 2007) Lisa Tabassi and Jacqueline Leahey. Vol. ‘Denuclearizing North Korea: Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building’.

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