This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
Elizabeth Pontikes University of Chicago Giacomo Negro Emory University Hayagreeva Rao Stanford University
Word count: 12,179
We thank participants in seminars of the Nagymaros Group, Dartmouth University, Harvard University, and University of Toronto for insightful comments. We are especially grateful to Bill Barnett, Mike Hannan, Henrich Greve, Damon Phillips, Joe Porac, Jesper Sørensen, Olav Sorenson, Anand Swaminathan, and Ezra Zuckerman for additional comments and useful advice. We also thank Sasha Goodman for very able research assistance. Financial support for this research was provided by the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University.
Stained Red: A Study of Stigma by Association with Blacklisted Artists during the ‘Red Scare’ in Hollywood, 1945-1960 Abstract Moral panics generate widespread fear of a stigmatized group. However, relatively few individuals from the deviant group tend to be targeted for direct punitive action. Given this, how is social control exerted over an entire population? We suggest that moral panics rely on stigma by association as a mechanism of social control and offer three arguments. First, mere association with a stigmatized affiliate is enough for stigma to spread. Second, individuals are harmed even if there is heterophily in mere association – that is, they work with dissimilar affiliates. Finally, moral panics exert social control because even high-status individuals can be stigmatized by mere association and their salience creates a ‘broadcast effect.’ We conduct an analysis of the American film industry from 1945 to 1960 and examine how artists’ employment in feature films was influenced by their association with coworkers who were blacklisted as Communists after working with the focal artist. We show that mere association with a stigmatized affiliate reduces an artist’s chances of working again and that one exposure is enough to impair work prospects. Actors don’t find employment when writers with whom they worked with in a movie are blacklisted as communists. Moreover, the negative effects of association with stigmatized coworkers hold even when the focal artist has won an Oscar or worked in box-office hits. We discuss implications for the propagation of moral panics.
After World War II, film artists who were named as suspected Communists were blacklisted by studios and deprived of work. The blacklist in Hollywood has been compared to the Spanish Inquisition as a tool of social control (Ceplair and Englund, 1979; Navasky, 1980). From 1945 when the blacklist started, to 1960 when the blacklist ended, over 38,000 artists worked in Hollywood, and more than 5,700 films were made. Of this large workforce fewer than 300 individuals were officially blacklisted, and even fewer of these could have posed a threat to the United States government. If so few individuals were punished, how did the blacklist exert social control over the film industry? This question is not just of interest to historians of the film industry but also to cultural and political sociologists and students of social problems. The ‘Red Scare’ in Hollywood was an instance of a moral panic, wherein a group is stigmatized as a threat to societal values and interests, and when the fear or concern that arises in response to the group is disproportionate to the actual threat posed (Cohen, 1972). We suggest that social control over a target population is exercised through stigma by mere association. At the heart of a moral panic is a ‘stigma contest’ in which partisans label targets as belonging to a dangerous and immoral category. Various auxiliary traits are then imputed to the targets and public opinion is mobilized against them (Schur, 1980). Although vigorous punitive action is taken against only a few individuals, through stigma by association the moral panic exercises social control. Because stigma transfers even through casual associations, once a group is labeled as deviant and the stigma becomes salient to the general public, the indictment of a few is enough to cast suspicion on the many. In this way stigma-byassociation is the conduit through which moral panics are sustained. People who speak out against the suspicion are themselves labeled deviant, creating incentives for others to comply We propose that stigma-by-association sustains social control of a target population through three inter-related mechanisms. First, mere association is enough for individuals to suffer from their affiliations with others, and this is true even if an affiliate is stigmatized after the association occurred. This type of ex-post mere association casts a broad net of suspicion. Once a person is labeled as deviant, others can stay away to avoid being named themselves. But 2
if people are culpable due to past casual associations, then the pool of suspects grows. Indeed, in Hollywood, of the 38,000 cast members, 10,274 of them worked in film projects with others who were later blacklisted. Through stigma by mere association these artists could potentially experience harmful effects. Second, social control is expanded when stigma-by-association flows through heterophilous affiliations – connections between dissimilar others. A canonical proposition in diffusion research is that things spread when connections are homophilous and occur between similar individuals (Rogers, 1995). However, negative information is diagnostically powerful and can traverse social divides (Rozin and Royzman, 2001), and so when stigma flows through heterophilous contact, social control is expanded. Finally, moral panics are sustained when stigma-by-association strikes down high-status individuals who have won public acclaim and recognition, creating a ‘broadcast effect’. We investigate these ideas in a study of the ‘Red Scare’ in the Hollywood film industry in the period starting from 1945 and ending in 1960. In 1944 a group of producers, elite actors and writers created the Motion Picture Alliances for the Preservation of American Ideals (MPA) to espouse conservative causes. The founders included Walt Disney, John Wayne, Gary Cooper, Hedda Hopper, and Roy Brewster. The MPA provided names of alleged Communists to the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) to facilitate the first blacklisting of ‘Red’ artists in 1947, which reached its zenith under Senator Joseph McCarthy between 1952 and 1954, and eventually declined by 1960 (Belfrage, 1973). The Hollywood blacklist of suspected Communists ended when director Otto Preminger took the decisive step and announced that previously proscribed Dalton Trumbo had written the script for his film Exodus and that the writer’s name would appear on the screen. Thereafter “the lepers began to return from their valley” (Ceplair and Englund, 1979:419). We focus on the ‘Red Scare’ in Hollywood for two reasons. First, it is a compelling example of a diffuse moral panic created by larger political elites and fuelled by interest groups. A specific ideology, Communism, was the threat that spread but its far-reaching effects can be measured within the specific context of the film industry and its labor market. Blacklisted artists 3
suffered social exclusion and, most importantly, were denied work because they were – or were suspected to be – ‘Reds.’ Even more interesting is the question of how far the stigma spread during this panic. The blacklisting was partly a bureaucratized and systematic process, where studios appointed their own clearance officers to screen their employees. As a result, one might expect stigma-by-association effects to be minimal since individuals were carefully selected for blacklisting. Yet, we document that artists who were merely associated with blacklisted individuals but were not blacklisted themselves, had difficulty finding work in Hollywood during the ‘Red Scare.’ In particular, artists were less likely to work again when their affiliates were blacklisted as Communists after working in the same film(s) with them. Ceplair and Englund (1979:126) labeled the broader consequences of blacklisting as ‘wholesale butchery’ for its insidious nature. Second, despite the importance of the blacklisting episode in American social history, it has received little attention from sociologists (Ceplair and Englund, 1979) and its social costs – in particular, how stigmatization damaged the employment prospects of artists – have yet to be chronicled. As Navasky (1980:336) observed, “We do not, of course, know what we have lost in the way of movies unmade, ideas unhatched, scripts not written, talent undeveloped, careers abandoned, consciousnesses unrevised”.
THEORY: MORAL PANICS AND STIGMA BY ASSOCIATION Moral panics arise when partisans perceive a threat to the social order and attempt to raise public consciousness to root out this threat. Both material and moral interests drive partisans to create and sustain the perceived threat, and these partisans may be elites, general interest groups, or grassroots movements. For example, Erikson (1966) chronicles how Puritan religious leaders fostered hysteria about the witches in Salem and launched trials to denounce them in order to preserve the moral boundaries of the Puritan community. Gusfield (1963) observes that Prohibition in America during the First World War was the outcome of a grassroots social movement built around the fear of drink and German identity. In moral panics, an entire sub-
population is made deviant on the basis of ideology, nationality, religion or race. In short, a tribal or collective stigma is created. The literature on moral panics gives importance to activists or partisans who create the anxiety or fear in the first place. Yet, an unexplored issue is how partisans or activists exert social control when they punish a few individuals through direct action. Moreover, activists can be in short supply and lack an organizational infrastructure. How then is social control exerted over a target population? Partisans who select an issue and target a group often have incomplete or ambiguous information about individuals. However, what can they can do is create a stereotype – labels that become connected to negative attributes (Link and Phelan, 2001). A stereotype refers to the content of a set of assumed characteristics associated with a particular social group; stereotypes are involved in collective stigmatization because not only is the response of the perceiver negative, but also because a specific set of characteristics is assumed to exist among the entire group (Dovidio, Major and Crocker, 2003). In moral panics, once a category for deviance has been constructed and is generally accepted, stereotyping can help justify society’s strong condemnation of suspected members of the deviant group (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994). The stereotypes contain markers that allow individuals to become directly stigmatized and punished. But even if only a few individuals are directly punished, stigma-by-association expands the social control of a population and by implication, propagates the moral panic. Mere Association. Goffman (1963) described courtesy stigma as the taint that afflicts individuals associated with others who are blemished by mental illness or disreputable occupations. Since then, a number of laboratory studies have shown that stigma by association is rampant (Burk and Sher, 1990; Neuberg et al., 1994; Goldstein and Johnson, 1997; Mehta and Farina, 1998). Even arbitrary associations can transfer stigma – hence, a person sitting next to an obese female suffers from lowered evaluation on whether he or she would be an acceptable job candidate (Hebl and Mannix, 2003).
In conventional laboratory experiments, stigma spreads forward to ego from an alter who is stigmatized ex-ante. – e.g., the person is already obese or suffers from a disability. In such cases, ego has information about alter and yet chooses to affiliate with her. By contrast, stigmaby-association can also propagate backward from an affiliate who is stigmatized ex-post, or after the association with ego. Of course, ego lacks knowledge that alter will become stigmatized and so such voluntary affiliations are based on imperfect information. When people can become stigmatized due to ex-post affiliations, stigma-by-association is likely to diffuse panic and expand social control of a target population. In moral panics, stigma-by-association links ego to the deviant group and leads to discriminatory behavior. One relevant form of exclusion is employment, as it directly impacts both social and economic standing. Thus, the transmission of stigma through mere association can have grave consequences for an individual. Taken together, these arguments imply: H1: Mere association with alters who are stigmatized after working with ego is enough to taint ego and to harm job prospects.
How “mere” do associations need to be to produce stigma? The effects of stigma-byassociation are especially powerful because they persist after a single exposure. Risen and Gilovich (2007) found that the juxtaposition of a rare group member with a rare behavior is sufficient to produce a one-shot illusory correlation and set the stage for more elaborate stereotyping. They concluded that a single action on the part of minority group members exerts disproportionate effects on judgment not only because they are memorable but also because they trigger the attribution that group membership is responsible for the behavior. In the case of moral panics, a one-shot association with alters who later become assigned to the negative category is enough to lead to the stigmatization. This suggests: H2: One association with alters who are stigmatized after working with ego is enough to taint ego and to harm job prospects.
Heterophily in the transmission of stigma. Stigma-by-association sustains social control because it can also spread through heterophily – contact between dissimilar individuals. A staple proposition in diffusion research is that ideas and innovations spread through homophily – contact between individuals similar in race, gender, or roles (Rogers, 1995). Similarity fosters exchange, information sharing and trust, and powers diffusion (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001). Conversely, stigma can spread through heterophily. One reason is that negative information is stronger than positive information and so can traverse social distances. Bad events, memories, odors, and relationships are more salient than good events, memories, odors and relationships (Baumeister, Bratslavsky and Finkenauer, 2001). For instance, minimal contact with lower castes produces more contagion than contact with higher castes in countries with caste systems (Meigs, 1984). These findings suggest that a negativity bias exists in social evaluations because negative events are salient, yield complex representations, are perceived to be more diagnostic and evoke wider repertoires than positive events (Rozin and Royzman, 2001). Stigma is a relationship between an “attribute” and a “stereotype” (Jones et al., 1984) rather than being something triggered by the distinctive qualities of an individual. Winter and Uleman (1984) suggest that the transmission of stigma hinges on trait activation, trait association and trait transfer, so that stigma can be transferred to other individuals with minimal contact. Any contact is all that is necessary for an “essence” to pass between two actors and leave a trace (Rozin and Nemeroff, 1990). One implication is that that stigma transfers from one individual to another even if the two individuals are dissimilar. H3: Mere association with alters who occupy dissimilar roles and are stigmatized after working with ego is enough to taint ego and harm job prospects.
The Broadcast Effect of High-Status Victims: Moral panics thrive because stigma-byassociation can harm even high-status and publicly acclaimed individuals. Merton (1968:62) suggested that graded rewards in science are distributed according to the coin of recognition and labeled it as the Matthew effect, which “consists in the accruing of greater increments of 7
recognition for particular scientific contributions to scientists of considerable repute and the withholding of recognition from scientists who have not yet made their mark.” A number of studies show that individuals with greater recognition receive more rewards than less recognized peers for work of similar quality (Podolny, 2005). Phillips and Zuckerman (2005) found that high-status actors would be exempt from the harmful consequences of norm violations. This line of reasoning implies that public recognition should buffer the harmful effects of mere association with stigmatized others. Does this mean that people who have received public recognition are immune to the harmful effects of mere association with stigma? We argue no. In moral panics, deviance is assumed to lurk in all corners of the social fabric, and this assumption fosters widespread fear. Further, the ‘discovery’ that well regarded individuals are part of the deviant group has a ‘broadcast effect’ that upholds the attention for the concern and justifies a pervasive search. In the European witch craze, although widows and ‘spinsters’ were the initial victims, in later stages social status and even gender made little difference so that eventually all women and men could be targeted (Ben-Yehuda, 1980). Greater recognition can magnify exposure to stigma-by-association. Stigma-byassociation and stereotyping operate through automatic cognition and rely on heuristics (Dovidio et al. 1997). One such heuristic is availability (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), wherein memorable and recent events have greater recall than others. Individuals who have occupied higher status positions attract more attention and represent more salient targets than those who have relatively invisible positions (Fiske, 1980; Adut, 2005). In our context, individuals that are publicly awarded recognition by an audience are more likely to be available for stigmatization. Moreover, individuals with higher recognition not only receive greater attention but also face higher expectations from audiences – so the higher the actor’s social position, the harder is her fall. We argue that such recognition does not protect individuals from the harmful effects of mere association with stigmatized others. Thus:
H4: Mere association with alters who are stigmatized after working with ego taint ego and harm job prospects even if ego has received public recognition.
THE ‘RED SCARE’ IN THE HOLLYWOOD FILM INDUSTRY; 1945-1960 After World War II, a group of producers, actors and writers formed the MPA to espouse antiCommunist causes, and started collaborating with the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) – a committee of the House of Representatives investigating threats of subversion – by providing names of alleged Communists. This led to the initial blacklisting of ‘Red’ artists in 1947 (Belfrage, 1973). On September 21, 1947, the HUAC issued subpoenas to 43 members of the Hollywood film industry requiring that they appear as witnesses before the committee during its October hearings in Washington. When ten of the subpoenaed refused to testify, they were cited for contempt of Congress and indicted. The event attracted vast attention, also due to the fact that some of the Ten were prominent artists. Among them, writers Adrian Scott, Ring Lardner, Jr. and director Edward Dmytryk all enjoyed high salaries and long-term contracts at major studios, while writer Lester Cole was on the verge of being made a producer. Writer Dalton Trumbo had recently signed with MGM one of the most lucrative screenwriting contracts in Hollywood annals, giving him a $3,000 weekly salary (Ceplair and Englund, 1979). Later that year, studio executives assembled at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York and released a statement announcing that they had fired the Ten and would not rehire them until they recanted and cleared themselves with the committee. Those who supported the Hollywood Ten such as Humphrey Bogart and Lauren Bacall were also branded as Communists, and were eventually forced to repudiate their support. The press, especially papers published by populist magnate William Hearst and an expanding list of anti-Communist newsletters, demanded that Hollywood do more to eradicate subversive infiltration in its ranks. The HUAC summoned many witnesses, some friendly and some unfriendly, who named Hollywood artists as affiliated with Communist activities. During 9
1951 more hearings were arranged, and 90 Hollywood artists appeared before the committee and were asked to admit their Communist affiliation or names of Communist colleagues. A list of over 300 personalities of the entertainment industry was made available to the public in the committee’s 1952 and 1953 annual reports and the hearings continued until 1955 (Cogley, 1956). Garfinkel (1956) suggests that degradation ceremonies are critical to the stigmatization of individuals. These entail denouncers, moral indignation, a public ceremony, and the recategorization of the individuals into the negatively valenced category. In a riveting description, Navasky (1980) points out that the HUAC hearings featured denouncers (usually exCommunists), and transformed the identity of those called into the hearings as anti-patriotic individuals guilty of treason. Denouncers and targets confronted each other at the hearings; the target was named as a Communist, and put on a blacklist that rendered the artist unemployable. Note that the blacklisting was (at least in part) a rationalized and bureaucratized process. Schrecker (1994) described two stages of identification and elimination, in which political undesirables were detected by one agency and then fired by another (the division of operations made it easier for those doing the firing to deny that they were accomplices in an inquisition). In the first stage, either the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the investigating committee of the HUAC identified the undesirables. In June 1950, American Business Consultants (an outfit run by a trio of FBI agents) funded by Alfred Kohlberg and the Catholic Church issued a 213 page book Red Channels (1950) that inaugurated the ‘graylist,’ – 151 actors, writers, musicians, and other entertainers were named as Communists on the basis of their ‘Red connections’ (Ceplair and Englund, 1979). Employers were expected to be more involved in the second stage that included an official clearance process (Navasky, 1980), wherein, mistaken identities were corrected, alleged Communists were allowed to repudiate, or send out letters declaring that needed to be approved by watchdogs. Studios had their own clearance personnel, and an officer in charge of the process. A number of people had to clear themselves by writing letters, which then had to be approved by anti-Communist professionals like J. B. Matthews – a linchpin of the HUAC. 10
Actors put on the blacklist or graylist faced identical consequences – they lost their jobs. Rabbi Benjamin Schulz who directed the American Jewish League against Communism, and supermarket owners threatened to boycott films with Communists. Laurence Johnson, a supermarket owner in Syracuse, New York, threatened to place signs in his stores warning customers not to buy the products of any company that sponsored a program featuring one of ‘Stalin's little creatures.’ Since the studios depended on banks for financing and in turn, banks were leery of backing films likely to be boycotted in theaters, the studio heads accepted the Red Channels guide along with the list of names supplied by the HUAC and by Senator McCarthy’s staff as the basis for their blacklist. Although blacklisting violated worker protections guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Board, blacklisted artists did not receive support from the guilds because management felt the need to pander to conservative public opinion. One of the members of the investigating committee quoted in Cogley (1956:88) indicates that the studios’ eagerness to enforce blacklists was partially a result of the special nature of film: “The entertainment industry is the only one I know where livelihood depends on the attitude of the public toward a person’s name.” McGilligan and Buhle (1997) conducted interviews with 36 film artists who experienced the blacklists. In this powerful collection of memoirs, screenwriter Alvah Bessie recalled that, after someone was blacklisted, “[p]eople began avoiding each other, people began crossing the street when they saw you – people with whom you had associated for years.” Actress Karen Morley explained that “it was really murder to find work after being blacklisted, not just for me particularly but for all actors who were prominent, because their faces were well-known. I couldn’t work anyplace where people might spot me. I couldn’t even work as a saleslady in a fancy shop, for example, which I might have done in New York.” Her colleague Anne Revere, a character actress who had won an Academy Award for her performance in National Velvet and had been nominated twice more, was simply ‘guilty’ of participating in protests against the hearings: “In 1947 her career was ascending, and that year she worked 40 weeks. “In 1950, when her name appeared in Red Channels, she worked only three weeks…When the Hollywood 11
hearings were resumed in 1951, Anne Revere was one of the first subpoenaed. She invoked the First and Fifth Amendments and has not worked in films since” (Cogley, 1956:89). Artists had to abandon their careers (e.g. Charles Chaplin, Joseph Losey) and more than one black-listee ended up waiting tables. Some writers used aliases and sought to get work, actors could not. Zero Mostel said “I am a man of 1000 faces, all of them blacklisted”. While historians acknowledge that most artists called to testify before HUAC had active political pasts, they also note that the industry’s blacklists and graylists were indiscriminate and artists in the film industry were targeted beyond the rational machine of the hearings. Ceplair and Englund (1979:388) state that the “people and organizations which assembled in HUAC’s shadow threw their nets far wider than the Committee and obeyed far fewer rules.” People were found guilty by mere association and suffered economic sanctions. It was not just the blacklisted that were affected but also their affiliates. In moral panics, both anxiety and social control are achieved by the backward travel of stigma, so most people comply because of apprehension that they too would be tarred by the indiscriminate sweep of suspicion. Writer Millard Lampell remained in doubt about why he was graylisted and did not find work in Hollywood after 1952, and guessed it was because his work was reviewed in a friendly way by The Daily Worker, the Communist Party’s newspaper (McGilligan and Buhle, 1997). Actress Marsha Hunt active in the Screen Actors Guild but never attended the Party’s meetings and described herself as politically ‘innocent’, ‘not as a partisan political advocate’ but simply ‘someone who cared about issues like fair housing’ (ibid:311). Or, actor Michael Knox had the chance to review the FBI’s file of his case that read: “No evidence has been developed reflecting Communist Party membership or activity. No further investigation is deemed warranted, and this case is closed.” His career too suffered (ibid:369). The blacklisting era effectively ended in 1960. In 1959 screenwriter Dalton Trumbo revealed that he was behind the identity of writer Robert Rich, who worked on the script for the film The Brave One, (1957). The announcement was made after another blacklisted writer, Nedrick Young, had declared he was the ‘Nathan E. Douglas’ who had written the script for The 12
Defiant Ones (the film had been made in 1956 but was released almost three years later). Since the film was favoured to win a screenwriting Oscar for ‘Douglas’ and his co-author Harold J. Smith, the rule disqualifying Fifth Amendment witnesses from Academy Award consideration would have been overturned. In 1960 director Otto Preminger announced that Trumbo was the screenwriter for his film Exodus and that the writer’s name would appear on the screen. That same year, actor-producer Kirk Douglas agreed to give Trumbo screen credit for the film Spartacus. Indeed, the year 1960 represents a dividing line in the history of blacklisting in Hollywood (Ceplair and Englund, 1979). Central to our reading of the ‘Red Scare’ in Hollywood as a moral panic is the idea that normative concerns were generated, gained consensus and diffused, and were tied to facts but in a disproportionate way (Ben-Yehuda, 1980). In Hollywood activists maintained that the threat of Communism and its infiltration in the film industry were real and characterized Communism as unconventional behavior and evil which was harmful to society. (In fact, while the many artists involved in the blacklisting denounced the violation of constitutional rights very few defended Communism as an ideology.) Hostility built against Communism was symbolized by what Cohen (1972:61) called a ‘folk devil,’ the stereo-typical portrayal of certain social actors as atypical and threatening against a background that is made overly-typical. However, the Communist Party in Hollywood or the US has never been large enough that it could reasonably be regarded as a menace to American security and freedom (Ceplair and Englund, 1979). In the case of the ‘Red Scare’ figures and accounts were exaggerated or fabricated via the creation of blacklists, graylists, and systems of repudiation. Three factors strengthened the disproportionality of the concern. One is the expansion of powers of the action groups and moral entrepreneurs engaged in the repression – we noted that blacklisting violated worker protections but Ceplair and Englund (1979:367) note that discriminated artists did not receive any help or even token support from the guilds. Another factor is the process whereby an altered set of connotations for the words ‘Communist,’ ‘Red,’ liberal,’ ‘labor,’ and ‘union’ was encouraged, as Marsha Hunt’s case suggests. Finally, the concern about Communists thrived on 13
guilt-by-association with the weakly defined discredited category. In situations of anxiety and uncertainty social actors were more likely to pass on and rely on noisy information, a behavior stimulated by the ambiguous nature of Communist affiliations (that were at least in part secret). Even weak stimuli like past coworker affiliations could sensitize the film community to the alarm of Communism so that different identities would be assimilated into the same cognitive framework.
DATA AND METHODS We gathered data on the Hollywood film industry during the period starting in 1945 and ending in 1960. Our primary source is the American Film Institute Catalog of Motion Pictures (AFI), a comprehensive encyclopedic publication that provides information on all motion pictures released in the U.S. The AFI directory provides detailed information on each film released during our study period, including the production and distribution companies, release date, length, cast, and genre. We start our observation period in 1945 because i) the anxiety about Communist penetration of American society really manifested itself after World War II, and ii) in that same year the MPA provided the first names to the HUAC to espouse conservative causes, inaugurating the blacklisting of Communists and sympathizers among Hollywood artists. We end our observation in 1960 because at that point the blacklist was effectively broken with the public acknowledgement of Dalton Trumbo as writer for Spartacus and Exodus (Ceplair and Englund, 1979). The AFI catalog provides the names of all cast members, artistic and technical, credited for their work on a feature film. We use these data to construct career histories for every artist that worked in a film. Our analysis comprises all feature films produced and released in the United States during the study period, and focuses on individuals who hold four key roles: actress/actor, director, writer, and producer. In fact, these four roles include jobs credited under various titles. The director role includes the jobs of ‘director’ and ‘2nd unit director’; the writer role includes ‘screenwriter’, ‘treatment’, ‘story’, ‘script’, and ‘dialogue’; the producer role 14
includes ‘producer, ‘associate producer’, ‘executive producer’, and, for films where no other producing role is provided, ‘presenter’; the actress/actor roles include the first 50 credited names on the end of title list. We restricted our sample of films by excluding films produced and released for non-commercial purposes, imported films and short films. Dependent and Independent Variables: We investigate whether stigma-by-association harmed job prospects by estimating the likelihood that an individual received employment. Our primary dependent variable is thus an artist-year binary variable equal to 1 when a focal artist gained employment in film in the next year, and 0 otherwise (Bielby and Bielby, 1999; Zuckerman, Kim, Ukanwa and von Rittman, 2003). In supplementary analyses, we also analyze whether an artist was blacklisted as a second dependent variable, equal to 1 when a focal actor was blacklisted in the current year, and 0 otherwise. Our independent variables are ‘mere’ association with blacklisted artists, to test hypotheses H1–H3, and whether the artist was an Oscar winner or worked in at least one film that was featured in the ten largest box-office rentals each year, to test H4. Data for the blacklisted artists refer to those individuals who were listed whose names were leaked by the HUAC to the press, or were listed in the unofficial ‘Bible’ of alleged Communist sympathizers, and come from Vaughn (2004) and Red Channels (1950). An artist A has mere association with a blacklisted artist B at time t if A and B had worked in (at least) one film together until time ti-1 and B is blacklisted at time t. We therefore examine employment in film for actor A between time ti+1 and tI, with I = 1960. Data on Oscar winners come from Shale (1993) (but are also available from the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences’ website, www.oscar.com) and data on film rentals come from the periodical Variety’s lists of “All-time Film Rental Champs.” We only consider ‘mere’ association, so we do not include in our risk set those artists who were themselves blacklisted. In some cases, artists worked with another artist who had already been blacklisted. These cases do not constitute mere association since the artist has exante information, and so were excluded. We defined the measures included in the estimation as follows: mere association with blacklisted artists is the number of artists who had worked with 15
focal artist and been blacklisted after having worked with the focal artist. We lagged this measure by one year. To test whether one association is enough to lead to discrimination, we include in our risk set only those artists with mere exposure of less than or equal to one – those who have only been in a movie with one person subsequently blacklisted. We examine heterophily by measuring mere association between a focal actor and blacklisted writers, thereby capturing role dissimilarity. We expect that writers and actors had minimal role interdependence, maximal role distance, and hence, very high dissimilarity. Finally, to investigate whether publicly recognized artists are harmed by mere association with stigmatized alters, we use two measures of public recognition: box office success and Oscar wins. In the first model, we separate into two variables 1) mere association with blacklisted alters for artists who worked in a top-ten box office rental film and 2) mere association with blacklisted alters for all other artists. In the second model, we separate into two variables: 1) mere association with stigmatized alters for artists who had won an Oscar, and 2) mere association with blacklisted alters for all other artists. We can then compare the effects of mere association with stigmatized individuals for critically acclaimed and publicly recognized artists as compared to all other artists. There are 38,000 cast members in the data and 5,712 films over 16 years, with 358,934 cast-year observations. Of the 38,000 cast members, 267 were officially blacklisted between 1945 and 1960. 1 There are 31,781 individuals in our hypothesis testing risk set. These individuals were not blacklisted and did not work in a film with another artist who was already blacklisted. We test our hypotheses on this set of artists, for 297,444 cast-years. Of the 31,781 artists, 10,274 had mere association with blacklisted individuals. Control Variables: We used a number of control variables to account for artist characteristics that influence the probability of them finding gainful employment. One is the actor’s degree centrality to account for location in the artists’ network, and we used the number of total connections for a focal artist, defined as the number of artists with whom the focal artist had worked in the past, as a proxy for centrality. Tenure was included as the number of years an 16
artist had worked in the film industry since 1945 to control for career span (Bielby and Bielby, 1999). The number of total films an artist had previously worked in was used as a measure of perceived skill. We added a dichotomous variable as a control for artists who worked in only one film. We also control for effects of public recognition by including the number of Oscar wins the artist has received, and the number of Oscar winning films and top-ten rental films the artist has worked in. Following previous studies on employment in the film industry, we accounted for career specialism in film genres – how artists’ work is spread across the various stylistic categories. Zuckerman at al. (2003) found that specialist actors, i.e. actors who concentrate their roles in fewer genres, have higher likelihood of employment due to more focused identities. We coded data on genre classification for all films in our sample using the classification used by the Internet Movie Database (www.imdb.com) (Zuckerman et al., 2003). We calculated genre concentration scores for artists as a Hirschman-Herfindahl index of roles by genre (films can be categorized under multiple genres and we used only the primary genre for the calculation of the concentration scores (Zuckerman et al., 2003)). In addition, we also included an interaction term between genre specialism and the number of films in which an artist worked to account for contingent effects of specialism during an artist’s career. Zuckerman et al. (2003) found that veteran actors benefit less from focused careers because employers interpret participation in multiple categories as signals of broad skills rather than a lack of skills. Also, we include a variable measuring the number of years spent without working in film to control for biases in access to the job market. Previous studies suggest that artists who combine roles obtain preferential access to social and material capital, which influence their career opportunities (Baker and Faulkner, 1991). We included controls for the specific role in which the artist was employed, and introduced dichotomous variables which defined whether an artist worked as an actor, director, producer, or writer. Artists who played a combination of these roles were the reference group. Moreover, we included another dichotomous variable to account for actors working in films produced by one of the major Hollywood studios (Columbia Pictures, 20thCentury Fox, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Paramount, RKO, United Artists, Universal Pictures, and 17
Warner Bros.). To our knowledge information on which of these individuals were studio employees and the duration and nature of the contractual relationship are not available (See Zuckerman, 2005). 2 As a proxy for an artist’s affiliation with a major studio, we employ a dummy equal to 1 if in the previous year the artist made at least one film produced by one of the Major studios (Columbia, Fox Film, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Paramount, RKO, United Artists, Universal, and Warner Bros). We also take into account a number of macro-level control variables. Thus, the calendar year, and yearly measures of number films produced, number of producer organizations, attendance in theaters (in millions), and television advertising (in million dollars) were included to account for the availability of job opportunities to artists. AFI provides film release dates, which was the basis to calculate the number of films made every year. We calculated the measure of the number of producing organizations based on the reconstruction of their life histories. We reconstructed organizational life histories through the release dates of the films made by each organization. Producer organizations enter the population with the release of their first film, and exit it the first day following the release date of their last film.3 Data for film attendance and television advertising come from Quigley’s Motion Picture Almanac and the Television Factbook. The control variables were lagged one year. Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables. (Table A1 in the Appendix displays correlations). Self-Selection, Causality and Inverse Probability of Weighting Treatment: If we invoke the vocabulary of experimental design, our ‘treatment group’ consists of artists who worked in movies with other artists blacklisted as Communists after the movie(s) were made. Our ‘control group’ consists of artists who did not have such an association with blacklisted artists. The biggest threat to the validity of an analysis claiming causal effects is the non-random selection of individuals into a treatment group (here, movies that feature artists who are later blacklisted). Namely, the problem here is that Communists may have been more likely to work with each other in a movie, and so if an artist is blacklisted after the making of the movie, it is possible other affiliates will suffer because they are likely to be Communists too. 18
Many of the strategies used to deal with such self-selection issues are problematic. For example, controlling for time-varying endogenous confounders is difficult because endogenous time-varying confounders can also induce a correlation between the treatment and response even when no causal association exists (Robins, 1999). Similarly, instrumental variable approaches are problematic because finding plausible instruments that meet the identifying criteria is difficult. Often, one person’s instrument is another person’s hypothesized effect. We address the problem of confounding variables by invoking counterfactual methods of inference where the sample population is divided into a treatment group (those who are exposed to affiliates that get blacklisted later) and a control group (those who are not). Counterfactual methods assume each individual has two outcomes. The first outcome is the treatment condition, Yt., and the second is the control condition, Yc. For each individual, only one of these outcomes can be observed. Thus, issues of causality are treated as a “missing data problem” of the unobserved counterfactual (Winship and Morgan, 1999), usually addressed in experimentation through randomization. In other words, if we assume equivalence of controls and treatments, we can estimate the causal effect, Yt- Yc. When the treatment, the confounding covariates, and the outcome vary over time, estimates can be biased (Hernán, Brumback, and Robins, 2001; Robins, Hernán, and Brumback, 2000). One powerful approach developed by Robins et al. (2000) is inverse probability of weighting treatment (IPWT) models where each subject i is weighted at time k by the inverse of the probability that the subject actually received the treatment at time k. This weight is estimated given prior treatment history, time-varying, and time-invariant covariates. Following Robins et al. (2000) we use stabilized weights, where the denominator is the probability that a subject received his observed treatment at time k given past treatment and covariate history, and the numerator is the probability that the subject received the past treatment history without adjusting for covariate history. To compute the stabilized weights we used the control variables (for the numerator and denominator) and a series of indicator variables (for the denominator) measuring whether a 19
person was a member of the Communist Party or several arts and labor organizations perceived to be part of the Communist front. Data on membership in these organizations were obtained from the Red Channels guide and FBI reports on Communist infiltration in the Motion Picture Industry (COMPIC), which contain information classified at the time but released after the Freedom of Information Act in 1966. We reasoned that members of these organizations were also likely to have worked with associates who became blacklisted later. We included indicators for membership in 17 Communist and Communist-front organizations. We assume that mere mention that an artist was a member of the aforementioned organization in these reports was enough to trigger scrutiny and targeting. To determine the weights, we estimate the odds that an artist works in a film with alters who will be later blacklisted. 4 The dependent variable in this equation is a dummy that is 0 if the artist has not been affiliated with any blacklisted individuals, and becomes 1 when a previous co-worker of the artist becomes blacklisted. We calculate weights for each artist in each year as described above, and then estimate weighted logit models (IPWT logit) to test our hypotheses. The models have the following form:
where к represents the linear transformation of the log of the probability, π, of the dependent variable occurring, working in at least one film in a given year indicated by 1, divided by the probability of it not occurring. This is estimated with α as the constant, X’ as a vector of covariates, and β as the estimated coefficients of those covariates. Since the data are clustered by artist, we used a robust variance estimator in STATA 9.0 to account for the non-independence of observations.5
RESULTS Results testing hypotheses H1–H2 are reported in Table 2. These are IPWT logit models estimating the odds of an actor finding work in the given year. All covariates are lagged by one year. These models are run on the set of artists who are not blacklisted, and who have not worked
in a film with someone already blacklisted. Model 1 in table 2 shows the effects of control variables. Results show that the prior number of total associations, prior number of films in which the artist has worked, number of Oscar wins and number of top-ten films in which an artist has worked significantly increase the odds of employment in the next year. Number of Oscar winning films in which an artist has worked does not have a significant effect, likely because of the overlap with the artists’ Oscar wins and having worked in a box office champion film. Specialists gain more employment as revealed by the effect of the concentration ratio, and the interaction of (number films x specialism) also has significant effects on the odds of employment, such that more experienced artists benefit less from more focused genre-based careers. We thus replicate the results found by Zuckerman et al. (2003). The effect of artist tenure is not consistent across these models; possibly because we start tracking tenure from 1945. Note that prior research has also found unstable effects (Zuckerman et al. (2003) find positive effects of veteran status but Bielby and Bielby (1999) find negative effects of tenure and argue that reputations in the entertainment industry fade quickly so experience is a disadvantage to sustaining a career). In Model 9 reported later we analyze a reduced dataset of artists for which we know career histories and find that the longer artist’s industry tenure, the lower the odds of working in the next year. (The effects of the stigma by association, however, are stable across the various specifications.) Artists that have been unemployed for long periods or have worked in only one film have lower odds of employment, and those associated with studios have higher odds of employment. The number of films produced, the number of producer organizations, and attendance in theaters boost the chances of employment. On average, writers and producers have lower chances of finding employment than those who perform multiple roles, a finding compatible with previous studies of role integration (Baker and Faulkner, 1991). [Insert Table 2 about here] Effects of mere association with stigmatized alters. Model 2 tests hypothesis 1, which argues that when an artist has worked with someone who is later blacklisted, this mere association with stigma will harm the artist’s chances of finding work. Results support this hypothesis. Mere 21
association with a stigmatized individual has a negative effect on the odds that an artist works again, significant at p<0.001. If one previous co-worker of an artist is later blacklisted, the artist’s odds of working in subsequent years are reduced by 13%. Figure 1 illustrates this effect. As an artist’s mere association with stigmatized others increases, her chances of working in subsequent years decreases. Model 2 also shows an improvement in fit over Model 1 at p<0.001. [Insert figure 1 about here] Effects of single exposure to stigmatized alters. Model 3 tests hypothesis 2, which states that one exposure to a stigmatized alter is enough to harm the career chances of an artist. We test this on the set of artists that have mere exposure of 0 or 1 – that is they have either not worked with someone who has later been blacklisted, or they have worked with one person who was later blacklisted. Results show that one exposure is enough to reduce the career chances of an artist. One mere association with a blacklisted artist has a negative and significant effect at p<0.001 on the odds of working. These results show support for hypothesis 2. Model 3 is an improvement over its base model of controls only (run on the subset of respective artists) at p<0.001. Effects of role interdependence. Table 3 reports results for H3–H4. Model 4 tests hypothesis 3, which argues that mere association with stigmatized individuals that have minimal role interdependence with a focal artist will harm the artist’s career prospects. We test this hypothesis for one role – actors – which are the majority of artists in these data. Because films are generally cast by producers and directors, actors and writers have the least amount of role interdependence. Therefore, we separately compute each actor’s mere association with other actors or with other writers who are later blacklisted. Note here that films employing writers who were blacklisted were not found to be more Communist in nature: a study analyzing the content of films in which blacklisted writers received credits found these films to represent ‘main, routine Hollywood fare’ and no Communist propaganda could be identified (Jones, 1956:206). The complex and differentiated nature of film production keeps the decision making process with production heads, which diminishes the possibility that propaganda instigated by a single individual reaches audiences (Caves, 2000).6 22
Results show that mere association with both blacklisted actors and blacklisted writers decreases the odds that the focal actor will work again and the effects are significant at p<0.001. Model 4 is an improvement over a base model that includes controls only, run on the same subset of artists, at the p<0.001 level. An actor that was in a film with another actor who was later blacklisted would reduce her chances of working again by 13%, from the time of blacklisting. If she were in a film with a writer who was subsequently blacklisted, her odds of working again would be reduced by 21%. Figure 1 also shows the effect of mere association with stigmatized actors and writers on the odds that an actor will work again. Exposure to both stigmatized actors and stigmatized writers decreases the odds that an actor will work again, and proximity to an additional stigmatized writer has a stronger effect than proximity to a stigmatized actor. These results show strong support for hypothesis 3. Effects of Public Recognition. Next we test hypothesis 4, that mere association with stigmatized alters reduces the chances that a focal artist will work again even for artists who have received public recognition. We also investigate whether public recognition buffers or exaggerates the effects of such mere exposure. Models 5-6 test this using two measures of public recognition, having worked in a film that is a top-ten box office hit and having won an Oscar. These models consider public recognition for two types of audiences: “outsiders” or the general public who attend movies and determine commercial success, and “insiders” or other artists who determine artistic achievement. Both models show that mere association with stigmatized alters harms the career prospects even of individuals who have received public recognition. Effects of mere association with stigmatized others for artists who have received recognition are negative and significant at p<0.001, and the models show an improvement in fit over model 1, which includes controls only. These results show support for hypothesis 5: even artists who have received public recognition suffer in terms of odds of working again if they have mere association with alter who are later stigmatized. Models 5-6 also speak to the discussion of whether public recognition buffers or exaggerates the effects of mere association with stigmatized alters. Public recognition could lead 23
producers and directors to give an actor the benefit of the doubt, or to second guess an urge to overlook an artist simply because she happened to work in a film with another artist subsequently blacklisted. However, public recognition can increase salience, and attract attention to the fact that an artist has worked with other artists who were later blacklisted. Model 5, which separates the effect of mere exposure by artists who have worked in box office champion films from those who have not, shows that those who have been in box office champion films are more susceptible to the harmful effects of mere association with stigmatized alters. A test for equality of the two coefficients indicates that we can rule out that they are the same at p<0.001. An artist who has been in a box office champion film and has mere exposure of 1 to a stigmatized alter, is 16% less likely to work again, whereas an artist who has not been in a box office champion film and has the same mere exposure of 1 to stigmatized artists, is only 11% less likely to subsequently work. On the other hand, model 6 separates the effects of mere association with stigmatized others for Oscar winners and those who have not won Oscars, and shows that Oscar winners are buffered from the harmful effects that arise from mere association with stigmatized others. A test for equality of the two coefficients indicates that we can reject that they are equal with marginal confidence, at p<0.05. Oscar winners who have mere exposure of 1 to a stigmatized alter reduce their chances of working again by 9%; whereas artists who have not won an Oscar receive a 14% reduced odds of working. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the effects reported in Models 5 and 6. [Insert Figures 2 and 3 here] Consistent with hypothesis 4, mere association with stigmatized alters harms the career chances even of artists who have received public recognition. However, we cannot predict whether public recognition will buffer or exaggerate the effects of mere exposure. Results indicate that arguments for both sides may be correct, and that this might depend on the type of recognition the individual has received. When artists have been in films that were box office champions, their career prospect suffer more from mere exposure, as compared to others that were not in box office champion films. On the other hand, when artists have won an Oscar, their 24
career prospects suffer less from mere association with stigmatized alters, as compared to others that did not win Oscars. The discrepancy in these effects may result from differences in public recognition measured by affiliation with a film in general, rather than individual acclaim. It may also reflect differences in success among the masses and acclaim from one’s peers, for example commercial success can be more volatile and more influenced by emotional reactions. Table 4 presents results of models run to test robustness of the reported effects, and to test alternative explanations. [Insert table 4 about here] Does mere association with a stigmatized other also make an artist more likely to be blacklisted? One alternative explanation for the effects we present might be that mere association with stigmatized alters is an indicator that the focal artist is more likely to be Communist. Note that we address this objection generally by using IPWT models, where we weight each artist by his propensity to work in films with artists who later are blacklisted. Here, we also address this objection by modeling the effects of mere association with stigmatized others on the odds that a focal artist will be named on the blacklist. Results are presented in model 7. This is an IPWT logit model estimating the odds that an artist will be blacklisted. We include membership in Communist-affiliated organizations tracked by the FBI. Our reported estimation includes those that improve model fit in terms of predicting an artist will be blacklisted: the American Communist Party, the Communist Political Association, the Hollywood Writers Association, and the Independent Citizens Committee for Arts, Sciences, and Professions. We use dummies to measure membership in these organizations. Note that all of these membership dummies have significant positive effects on the probability of being blacklisted; however, the results show that mere association with stigmatized others has a negative effect, significant at p<0.05, on the odds that an artist will be blacklisted. These results imply that those who were Communists may have avoided working with other Communists. The effect holds even when the model is estimated without organizational affiliations. Our measure for mere association does not simply indicate that the focal artist is more likely to later be blacklisted. Rather, these effects lend credence to 25
our argument that mere association with blacklisted artists is a mechanism through which nonCommunists were harmed. Do the effects of stigma-by-association persist over time? Another question that might arise is whether adverse effects are due to recent associations, or whether the harm of stigma-byassociation persists over time. Model 8 tests whether stigma-by-association is detrimental to career outcomes even after the passage of time. We include a time-decayed measure of mere association, where we divide the exposure measure by the (square root of the) number of years since the artist worked with the stigmatized alters. The time-decayed measure discounts past affiliations with stigmatized alters. This model shows similar effects to those in model 2, in terms of significance levels and magnitude of the coefficients. Time discounted mere exposure is negative and significant at p<0.001, and the magnitude of the coefficient is slightly smaller than the coefficient of mere exposure reported in model 2. This model is an improvement in fit over model 1, which includes controls only, at p<0.001. We also included the “difference” term, in models not shown for the sake of brevity, between mere exposure and time-discounted mere exposure, and do not find that recent exposure is more consequential. These results suggest that harmful effects of stigma by association persist. Do effects result from censoring in career history? Another objection to our results can be that we do not control for the age of artists, nor do we know when they are not viable for taking another role. To address this, we test the robustness of our results to include effects of actor age and deaths on a subset of our data for which we have this information. Our data is the most comprehensive data on artists in films of which we are aware but AFI does not include personal biographies in the film records. We collected information on artists’ birth and death dates available on the IMDB website. In model 9, we re-run model 2 on the subset of artists for which IMDB provides dates, including controls for actor age and industry tenure measured from the artist’s first film, and removing artists from the risk set after death. Model 9 shows that our results are robust to these inclusions. Mere association to blacklisted actors and writers reduces the likelihood that an actor will work again. 26
Are effects driven by artists who work only once? Another objection might question whether the effects we report are driven by artists who work in only one film. To address this, we include a control for artists who have only worked in one film. In unreported models, we re-ran all of our models on the subset of artists who have worked more than once, and the results we report are robust to this test. Do Harmful Effects of Mere Association with Stigmatized Alters Hold in an Experiment? Earlier, we noted that social psychological studies of stigma have studied how individuals are harmed when they work with individuals who are already stigmatized – that is, they are obese or suffer from a disability. We then suggested that in moral panics guilt-by-association is so insidious that an individual suffers when their associates are stigmatized ex-post. It is also fair to ask whether such effects are reproducible in an experiment to assess both the generality and robustness of our results. We conducted a vignette-based experiment where subjects were asked to indicate whether they were likely to choose a male candidate to be on the board of their company. Biographical information and a photo of the male candidate standing next to other males registering for a conference according to the letter by which their last name began were provided to the subjects. In the control condition, subjects were provided only the names and titles of the candidate and other males with a last name starting with the same letter. We have two treatment conditions: in condition A, subjects are told that the person standing to the next to the candidate won a Nobel Prize six months after the photo was taken. In the condition B, subjects are told that the person standing next to the candidate was convicted of a felony six months after the photo was taken. Our results show that subjects in condition B were less likely to hire the candidate or perceived him to be trustworthy. These results suggest that our findings are more general. Appendix B provides details of the experiments.
DISCUSSION We began our paper with a simple question. If less than one-hundredth of Hollywood artists were blacklisted, how was social control exerted during the ‘Red Scare’ in Hollywood? We suggested 27
that this is because of the unique nature of stigma, in that it readily transmits through associations. Thus stigma-by-association facilitates social control and by implication, the
propagation of moral panic. Much of the work on moral panics emphasizes the impact of the public, dramaturgical factors, and the role of reputational entrepreneurs. By contrast, we emphasize the informal, insidious and micro-level process by which the demonization of a small group led to widespread discrimination and prejudice, such that even the thinnest of social connections with the stigmatized was enough to jeopardize artists’ careers. We demonstrated that mere association between an ego and alters who were stigmatized or blacklisted after working with ego had negative effects on the job prospects of ego. One exposure to a co-worker who was blacklisted later was enough to harm an artist; stigma-by-association jumps across heterophilous contacts and even victimizes those who had public acclaim. As such, stigma-by-association spreads panic broadly – through any connection – and ‘broadcasts’ its reach by affecting wellknown individuals. This uncontrollable process fosters anxiety thus leading to even greater discrimination in Hollywood. The findings show that that moral panic propagates because of the social structure of guilt-by-association. Our study also contributes to the literature on stigma. Much of the literature on stigma has been dominated by social psychological studies conducted in the laboratory (Link and Phelan, 2001). In general, these studies show that casual associations can be conduits for the spread of courtesy stigma, or stigma by association. Thus, heterosexuals who casually interact with homosexuals get devalued by others (Neuberg et al., 1994), teenagers with parents who are alcoholic or mentally ill are rated more negatively than teenagers whose parents do not have these problems (Burk and Sher, 1990; Mehta and Farina, 1998; See also Corrigan and Miller, 2004), and average-weight male applicants who sit next to an overweight female stranger are disfavored by evaluators (Hebl and Mannix, 2003). However, laboratory studies of stigma say little about how stigma by association can be a potent method of social control in polities (Becker, 1963:9). Our findings help to explain why, even if a very small fraction of Hollywood artists were directly targeted for blacklisting, many more were potential victims of stigma-by28
association and lost jobs. Through this process there are many false positives – and these very false positives created further panic and allowed conservative politicians to exercise social control over and exact compliance from a large sector of the economy. We looked at one aspect of the compliance – excluding people from jobs, but there were others too – films that could have been critical of America were not made, and films positive of American power were made. These findings also correct an imbalance in economic sociology. Too often, economic sociologists have emphasized the positive side of the social ledger at the expense of the negative side, by showing how social ties provide social capital (Burt, 2005) and signal social status (Podolny, 2005). In the latter case, social ties communicate high quality because they are voluntary -under the control of the sender and are costly for low-quality players to imitate. The neglect of the negative side seems all the more striking since negative relationships have stronger effects on individuals and organizations than do positive relationships (Rozin and Royzman, 2001). On the negative side of the social ledger, stigma is remarkable precisely because superficial associations are adequate for its transmission. These casual relationships cannot be construed as signals because they are inexpensive, not under the control of actors, and entail little voluntary choice. Our findings show that mere association with stigma is enough to trigger discrimination in labor markets. To date, much of the work shows how discrimination is triggered by the demographic characteristics of candidates – thus, criminals (Pager and Quillian, 2005), African-Americans (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004), mothers (Correll, Benard and Paik, 2007) do not find jobs in labor markets. We demonstrate the significance of a distinct mechanism of evaluation – categorization by association. Prospective candidates are evaluated on not only the basis of their individual features but also something beyond their control – mere associations with previous coworkers. In turn, the fates that affect co-workers also cast a shadow on the focal employee. Our study focused on how stigma-by-association underlies the spread of social control in moral panics. A next step for future research is to understand how moral panics subside and decay. In the case of the ‘Red Scare’, although it ended by 1960, secondary effects took a decade 29
or so to subside in allied industries like television. Other moral panics exhibit durations of striking diversity – the Inquisition lasted for a few hundred years, and the Salem witch hunt started in 1692, exacted its main tool during that year, and was deemed to have ended in the next year, when Sir William Whipps ordered the release of remaining witches on the payment of fines. Clearly, institutional infrastructures matter for the longevity of moral panics. However, it is also possible that the very expansion of a moral panic contains the seeds of its own destruction. Moral panics expand as individuals are labeled and stereotyped as members of a deviant category. Stigma-by-association accelerates the process, and many people are discriminated against who have nothing to do with the stigmatized category. Eventually, the deviant category becomes vague and meaningless. Consider Lazarsfeld and Thielens’ (1958) study of American college teachers in the decade after World War II decade, which found that most incidents on college campus were connected to threats to academic freedom in the form of charges of subversion: “A teacher is a ‘Communist’ in some eyes if he appears to suggest a criticism of any established American institution (italics in the original)…Such cases suggest in this period an individual could be called a Communist for almost any kind of behavior, or for holding almost any kind of attitude. In them, we suspect, the word ‘Communist’ became a vague and angry label, a ‘dirty name’ with which an individual showed his disagreement with a teacher’s thinking” (Lazarsfeld and Thielens, 1958:57). So as moral panics spread, the scope of the deviant category expands, until the deviant category becomes a black hole and the moral panic eventually dissolves.
Note this is the number of artists who were blacklisted and are also film artists in these data (blacklisted
individuals also included television stars and radio personalities).
Sources like Joel W. Finler’s The Hollywood Story (1988) provide data on names of artists working for
the major Hollywood Studios. Such data, however, are limited in two main ways. First, the information does not come from actual contractual affiliations but film roles, so it does not improve on our measure. Second, it is limited to prominent stars, while our measure includes comprehensive details.
To determine the identity of organizations we mainly relied on information available in the AFI
catalog’s entries, and consulted additional sources including the Library of Congress Catalog of Motion Pictures for copyright owners, A. Slide’s historical dictionary of the film industry (2001), and the 12volume reference set The Motion Picture Guide 1927-1982 edited by J. R. Nash and S. R. Ross.
Note this is measured at the time when alter is blacklisted. Note that all results reported below are robust to estimations that do not use IPWT. Our model
specifications use calendar year to control for time effects and industry descriptors but all results are also robust to non-IPWT estimations that use year dummies instead of industry effects.
Jones (1956) notes: “[A] detailed analysis of the original screenplay submitted by Dalton Trumbo for the
movie, WE WHO ARE YOUNG (M-G-M, 1940), indicates that this script’s unequivocable condemnation of the American way of life would have served the Communist cause if it had been produced as originally written. However, this script underwent a thorough-going revision under the direction of the producer and the studio, and when released never raised controversy of any kind.”
REFERENCES Adut, Ari. 2005. “A Theory of Scandal: Victorians, Homosexuality, and the Fall of Oscar Wilde.” American Journal of Sociology 111: 213–248. American Film Institute (AFI). 1999. The American Film Institute Catalog of Motion Pictures Produced In the United States: Feature Films, 1941-1950, 1951-1960. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Baker, Wayne, and Robert R. Faulkner. 1991 “Role as Resource in the Hollywood Film Industry.” American Journal of Sociology 97:279–309. Baumeister, Roy F., Ellen Bratslavsky, Catrin Finkenauer, and Kathleen D. Vohs. 2001. “Bad is Stronger than Good.” Review of General Psychology 5: 323–370. Becker, Howard S. 1963. Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New York: The Free Press. Belfrage, Cedric. 1973. The American Inquisition, 1945-1960. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Ben-Yehuda, Nachman. 1980. “The European Witch Craze of the 14th to 17th Centuries: A Sociologist’s Perspective.” American Journal of Sociology 86: 1–31. Bertrand, Marianne and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004. “Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than. Lakisha and Jamal?” American Economic Review 94: 991–1013. Bielby, William T., and Denise D. Bielby. 1999. “Organizational Mediation of Project-Based Labor Markets: Talent Agencies and the Careers of Screenwriters.” American Sociological Review 64: 64–85. Buhle, Paul, and Dave Wagner. 2003. Hide in Plain Sight: The Hollywood Blacklistees in Film and Television, 1950–2002. New York: Palgrave. Burk, Jeffrey P., and Kenneth J. Sher. 1990. “Labeling the Child of an Alcoholic: Negative Stereotyping by Mental Health Professionals and Peers.” Journal of Studies on Alcohol 51:156–163. Burt, Ronald S. 2005. Brokerage and Closure. New York: Oxford University Press. Caves, Richard E. 2000. Creative Industries. Contracts between Art and Commerce. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Cedric Belfrage. 1973. The American Inquisition, 1945-1960: A Profile of the ‘McCarthy Era’. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.
Ceplair, Larry, and Steven Englund. 1979. The Inquisition in Hollywood: Politics in the Film Community, 1930-60. Champaign: University of Illinois Press. Cogley, John. 1956. Report on Blacklisting – Vol. I. Movies. New York: Fund for the Republic. Cohen, Stanley. 1972. Folk Devils and Moral Panics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Correll, Shelley J., Stephen Benard, and In Paik. 2007. “Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?” American Journal of Sociology 112: 1297–1338. Corrigan, Patrick W., and Frederick E. Miller. 2004. “Shame, Blame, and Contamination: A Review of the Impact of Mental Illness Stigma on Family Members.” Journal of Mental Health 13:537–548. Douglas, Mary, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1982. Risk and Culture. Berkeley: University of California Press. Dovidio, John F., Kerry Kawakami, Craig Johnson, Brenda Johnson, and Adaiah Howard. 1997. “On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and Controlled Processes.” Journal of Experimental and Social Psychology 33: 510–540. Dovidio, John F, Brenda Major, and Jennifer Crocker. 2000. “Stigma: Introduction and Overview. Pp. 1–28 In The social psychology of stigma, edited by T.F. Heatherton, R.E. Kleck, M. R. Hebl, and J.G. Hull. New York: Guilford Press. Erikson, Kai. 1966. Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance. New York: J. Wiley. Fiske, Susan T. 1980. “Attention and Weight in Person Perception: The Impact of Negative and Extreme Behavior.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 38:889–906. Garfinkel, Harold. 1956. “Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies.” American Journal of Sociology 61: 420–424. Goffman, Erving. 1963. Stigma. Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. New York: Simon & Schuster. Goldstein, Susan B., and Vera A. Johnson. 1997. “Stigma by Association: Perceptions of the Dating Partners of College Students with Disabilities.” Basic and Applied Social Psychology 19:496–504. Goode, Erich, and Nachman Ben-Yehuda. 1994. Moral Panics. The Social Construction of Deviance. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Gusfield, Joseph R. 1963. Symbolic Crusade: Status, Politics and American Temperance Movement. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Hebl, Michelle, and Laura Mannix. 2003. “The Weight of Obesity in Evaluating Others: A Mere Proximity Effect.” Personality and Social Psychological Bulletin 29:28–38. Hernán Miguel A, Babette Brumback, and James M. Robins. 2001. “Marginal Structural Models to Estimate the Joint Causal Effect of Non-Randomized Treatments.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 96:440–448. Jones, Dorothy B. 1956. “Communism and the Movies. A Study of Film Content.” Pp. 196–233 in John Cogley, Report on Blacklisting – Vol. I. Movies. New York: Fund for the Republic. Jones Edward E., Amerigo Farina, Albert H. Hastorf, Hazel Markus, Dale T. Miller, and Robert A. Scott. 1984. Social Stigma: The Psychology of Marked Relationships. New York, NY: Freeman and Company. Lazarsfeld, Paul M., and Wagner Thielens, Jr. 1958. The Academic Mind. Glencoe, Il: The Free Press. Link, Bruce G. and Jo C. Phelan. 2001. “Conceptualizing stigma.” Annual Review of Sociology 27: 363–85. McGilligan, Patrick and Paul Buhle. 1997. Tender Comrades. A Backstory of the Hollywood Blacklist. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin. McPherson, Miller, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M. Cook. 2001. “Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks.” Annual Review of Sociology 27:415–44. Mehta, Sheila I., and Amerigo Farina. 1998. “Associative Stigma - Perceptions of the Difficulties of College-Aged Children of Stigmatized Fathers.” Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 7:192–202. Meigs, Anna S. 1984. Food, Sex, and Pollution: A New Guinea Religion. New Brunswick: NJ: Rutgers University Press. Merton Robert K. 1968. “The Matthew Effect in Science.” Science 159: 56–63. Navasky, Victor S. 1980. Naming Names. New York: Viking. Neuberg, Steven L., Dylan M. Smith, Jonna C. Hoffman, and Frank J. Russell. 1994. “When We Observe Stigmatized and “Normal” Individuals Interacting: Stigma by Association.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 20:196–209.
Pager, Devah, and Lincoln Quillian. 2005. “Walking the Talk: What Employers Say Versus What They Do.” American Sociological Review 70: 355–380. Phillips, Damon J., and Ezra W. Zuckerman. 2005. “High-Status Deviance or Conformity? Professional Purity or Impurity? Silicon Valley Law Firms’ Engagement in Family and Personal Injury Law.” Working paper, MIT. Podolny, Joel M. 2005. Status Signals. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Red Channels. 1950. Red Channels: The Report of Communist Influence in Radio and Television. New York: Counterattack. Risen, Jane L., and Thomas Gilovich. 2007. “Another Look at Why People are Reluctant to Exchange Lottery Tickets.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 93: 12–22. Robins James M. 1999. “Marginal Structural Models versus Structural Nested Models as Tools for Causal Inference.” Pp. 95–134 in Statistical Models in Epidemiology: The Environment and Clinical Trials, edited by M.E. Halloran and D. Berry. New York: Springer-Verlag. Robins, James M., Miguel A. Hernán, and Babette Brumback. 2000. “Marginal Structural Models and Causal Inference in Epidemiology.” Epidemiology, 11: 550–60. Rozin, Paul, and Carol J. Nemeroff. 1990. “The Laws of Sympathetic Magic: A Psychological Analysis of Similarity and Contagion.” Pp. 205–232 in Cultural Psychology: Essays on Comparative Human Development, edited by James W. Stigler, Richard A. Shweder and Gilbert S. Herdt. New York: Cambridge University Press. Rozin, Paul, and Edward B. Royzman. 2001. “Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance, and Contagion.” Personality and Social Psychology Review 5:296–320. Schrecker, Ellen W. 1994. The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Schur, 1980. The Politics of Deviance: Stigma Contests and the Uses of Power. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Shale, Richard. 1993. The Academy Awards Index: The Complete Categorical and Chronological Record. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1974. “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.” Science 185: 1124-1131. Vaughn, Robert F. 2004. Only Victims. A Study of Showbusiness Blacklisting. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Limelight Editions.
Winship, Christopher, and Stephen L. Morgan. 1999. “The Estimation of Causal Effects from Observational Data.” Annual Review of Sociology 25: 659–706. Winter, Laraine, Uleman, James S. 1984. “When Are Social Judgments Made? Evidence for the Spontaneousness of Trait Inferences.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 47: 237–252. Zuckerman, Ezra W. 2005. “Typecasting and Generalism in Firm and Market: Genre-Based Career Concentration in the Feature-Film Industry.” Research in the Sociology of Organizations 23: 173–216. Zuckerman, Ezra W., Tai-Young Kim, Kalinda Ukanwa, and James von Rittman. 2003. “Robust Identities or Non-Entities? Typecasting in the Feature Film Labor Market.” American Journal of Sociology 108:1018–1074.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the analysis of film careers Artists in hypothesis testing risk set
Artist is in film in the current year Mere association with blacklisted artists Mere association with blacklisted for Oscar Winners Mere association with blacklisted for non-Oscar winners Mere association with blacklisted for artists in top ten films Mere association with blacklisted for artists not in top ten films Time discounted mere association with blacklisted artists Number of connections to other artists Number of total films Number of Oscar wins Number of Oscar winning films artist has been in Number of top ten films artist has been in Duration of unemployment Tenure (since 1945) Specialism Specialism x no. total films Only in one film Association with Studio Year (since 1945) No. films produced No. producer organizations Attendance in theaters TV advertising Actor Director Writer Producer Mean 0.1259 0.8104 0.0086 0.8018 0.2244 0.5860 0.4502 95 2.5652 0.0041 0.0088 0.0950 3.2290 5.1187 0.7145 1.5422 0.5234 0.3889 10.0843 342 139.5247 48.3269 836 0.8326 0.0167 0.0817 0.0559 Std. Dev Min 0.3317 0 2.2875 0 0.2702 0 2.2746 0 1.6183 0 1.6962 0 1.4099 172 4.7342 0.0658 0.0932 0.3620 3.5664 4.0508 0.3674 2.5417 0.4995 0.4875 4.2073 63.8058 22.9035 15.9065 563 0.3734 0.1281 0.2740 0.2298 Max 1 47 19 47 45 47
0 45 0 3717 0 102 0 2 0 1 0 9 0 14 0 15 0 1 0 95 0 1 0 1 1 16 228 424 89 173 28 85 0 1590 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Table 2. IPWT logit models on the likelihood to find work. Excludes individuals who have been blacklisted or who knowingly worked with people who did so. Effects of mere association with stigmatized individuals.
Model 2 Model 3 DV: Artist is in a film -0.1399 *** One mere association with blacklisted artist (0.0308) -0.1458 *** Mere association with blacklisted artist (0.0059) 0.0006 * 0.0027 *** 0.0026 *** Number of connections to other artists (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 0.1868 *** 0.1690 *** 0.4535 *** Number of total films (0.0149) (0.0152) (0.0222) 0.6498 *** 0.6667 *** 0.6444 *** Number of Oscar wins (0.0928) (0.0948) (0.1056) -0.0121 0.10 0.0282 Number of Oscar winning films artist has been in (0.0826) (0.0826) (0.1096) 0.0877 *** 0.0828 *** 0.0749 ** Number of top ten films artist has been in (0.0258) (0.0256) (0.0290) -0.4307 *** -0.4188 *** -0.3603 *** Duration of unemployment (0.0083) (0.0081) (0.0088) 0.0057 0.0210 *** -0.0390 *** Tenure (since 1945) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0065) 2.935 *** 2.886 *** 3.542 *** Specialism (0.0474) (0.0474) (0.0487) -0.2196 *** -0.2400 *** -0.5293 *** Specialism x no. total films (0.0133) (0.0135) (0.0199) -1.835 *** -1.749 *** -1.733 *** Only in one film (0.0312) (0.0312) (0.0326) 0.4631 *** 0.4127 *** 0.2411 *** Association with Studio (0.0197) (0.0189) (0.0193) 0.3208 *** 0.4079 *** 0.3970 *** Year (since 1945) (0.0307) (0.0315) (0.0365) 0.0039 *** 0.0049 *** 0.0040 *** No. films produced in industry (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 0.0054 *** 0.0029 *** 0.0042 *** No. producer organizations (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 0.0854 *** 0.1020 *** 0.1188 *** Attendance in theaters (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0067) -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** 0.0001 TV advertising (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 *p < 0.05 +p < 0.10 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors in parentheses. Model 1
Table 2 (cont’d). IPWT logit models on the likelihood to find work. Excludes individuals who have been blacklisted or who knowingly worked with people who did so. Controls.
Actor Director Writer Producer Constant Model 1 -0.4276 *** (0.0554) 0.0428 (0.0756) -0.3132 *** (0.0596) -0.1445 * (0.0629) -11.76 *** (0.5751) Model 2 -0.4439 *** (0.0550) 0.0337 (0.0756) -0.3177 *** (0.0592) -0.1362 * (0.0627) -13.47 *** (0.5892) Model 3 -0.3555 *** (0.0580) 0.0918 (0.0774) -0.2391*** (0.0624) -0.0957 (0.0660) -15.14 *** (0.6810)
-79839.55 -79098.56 -62848.14 Log pseudolikelihood 20 21 21 Degrees of Freedom 297444 297444 252871 Number of Observations *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 *p < 0.05 +p < 0.10 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors in parentheses. .
Table 3. IPWT logit models on the likelihood to find work. Excludes individuals who have been blacklisted or who did so. Effects of role interdependence and public recognition.
Model 4 DV: Actor is in a film Actors Only Mere association with blacklisted for Oscar winners Mere association with blacklisted for nonOscar winners Mere association with blacklisted for artists in top-ten films Mere association with blacklisted for artists not in top-ten films Mere association with blacklisted actors Mere association with blacklisted writers Number of connections to other artists Number of connections to other actors Model 5 Model 6 DV: Artist is in a film All Artists -0.0987 *** (0.0250) -0.1469 *** (0.0060) -0.1790 *** (0.0084) -0.1141 *** (0.0088) -0.1401 *** (0.0107) -0.2325 *** (0.0193) 0.0027 *** (0.0003) 0.0027 *** (0.0003)
0.0015 *** (0.0003) Number of connections to other writers 0.0186 *** (0.0029) Number of total films 0.1784 *** 0.1698 *** 0.1691 *** (0.0196) (0.0154) (0.0152) Number of Oscar wins 1.096 *** 0.6736 *** 0.5663 *** (0.1434) (0.0948) (0.1077) Number of Oscar winning films artist has 0.1455 + 0.1114 0.1045 been in (0.0864) (0.0813) (0.0826) Number of top-ten films artist has been in 0.0902 ** 0.1840 *** 0.0813 *** (0.0285) (0.0274) (0.0256) Duration of unemployment -0.4235 *** -0.4162 *** -0.4185 *** (0.0089) (0.0081) (0.0081) Tenure (since 1945) 0.0196 ** 0.0150 ** 0.0209 *** (0.0067) (0.0064) (0.0062) Specialism 2.9428 *** 2.9021 *** 2.8871 *** (0.0556) (0.0486) (0.0473) Specialism x no. total films -0.2433 *** -0.2422 *** -0.2404 *** (0.0168) (0.0138) (0.0135) Only in one film -1.814 *** -1.747 *** -1.750 *** (0.0361) (0.0313) (0.0312) *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 *p < 0.05 +p < 0.10 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3 (cont’d). IPWT logit models on the likelihood to find work. Excludes individuals who have been blacklisted or who did so. Controls.
Association with Studio Year (since 1945) No. films produced in industry No. producer organizations Attendance in theaters TV advertising Actor Director Writer Producer Constant -14.67 *** (0.6609) Model 4 0.4241*** (0.0209) 0.4372 *** (0.0354) 0.0048 *** (0.0003) 0.0030 *** (0.0004) 0.1111 *** (0.0066) -0.0005 *** (0.0001) Model 5 0.4019 *** (0.0190) 0.3986 *** (0.0315) 0.0048 *** (0.0003) 0.0032 *** (0.0004) 0.1012 *** (0.0058) -0.0005 *** (0.0001) -0.4429 *** (0.0549) 0.0313 (0.0755) -0.3137 ** (0.0591) -0.1341 *** (0.0624) -13.38 *** (0.5893) Model 6 0.4125 *** (0.0189) 0.4081 *** (0.0315) 0.0049 *** (0.0002) 0.0029 *** (0.0004) 0.1020 *** (0.0058) -0.0005 *** (0.0001) -0.4459 *** (0.0549) 0.0307 (0.0755) -0.3179 *** (0.0591) -0.1376 * (0.0626) -13.48 *** (0.5892)
Log pseudolikelihood -63244.79 -79023.41 -79095.33 Degrees of Freedom 19 22 22 Number of Observations 247641 297444 297444 *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 *p < 0.05 +p < 0.10 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4. IPWT Logit models on likelihood to be blacklisted and to find work. Supplementary analysis and alternative explanations. Effects of mere association with stigmatized individuals.
Model 7 DV: Artist is blacklisted Time-decayed mere association with blacklisted artists Mere association with blacklisted artists Member of Hollywood Writers Mobilization Association Member of Independent Citizens Committee Association Member of Communist Political Association Member of Communist Party USA Number of connections to other artists Number of total films Number of Oscar wins Number of Oscar winning films artist has been in Number of box office champ films artist has been in Duration of unemployment Tenure (since beginning of career) Tenure (since 1945) Age -0.1631 *** (0.0525) 0.0088 (0.0062) Model 8 Model 9 DV: Artist is in film
-0.1261 *** (0.0087) -0.1544 * (0.0640) 6.966 *** (0.9450) 7.789 *** (0.4408) 2.765 *** (0.4574) 2.561 *** (0.4901) 0.0065 *** (0.0016) -0.2142 ** (0.0682) 0.7502 + (0.4001) 1.521 *** (0.4443) -0.3824 (0.2987) -0.1488 * (0.0694) -0.1323 *** (0.0064)
0.0015 *** (0.0003) 0.1772 *** (0.0150) 0.6585 *** (0.0936) 0.0502 (0.0826) 0.0837 *** (0.0259) -0.4284 *** (0.0083)
0.0027 *** (0.0003) 0.1366 *** (0.0187) 0.7340 *** (0.1191) 0.1420 (0.0965) 0.0723 * (0.0304) -0.3582 *** (0.0086) -0.0059 *** (0.0015)
-0.0053 *** (0.0010) Specialism -0.4663 2.920 *** 2.874 *** (0.3564) (0.0475) (0.0695) Specialism x no. total films 0.0058 -0.2262 *** -0.2064 *** (0.0678) (0.0134) (0.0157) Only in one film -0.6539 * -1.813 *** -1.435 *** (0.3012) (0.0313) (0.0485) Association with Studio 0.2980 0.4505 *** 0.4802 *** (0.1985) (0.0195) (0.0286) *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 *p < 0.05 +p < 0.10 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4 (cont’d). IPWT Logit models on likelihood to be blacklisted and to find work. Supplementary analysis and alternative explanations. Controls.
Year (since 1945) No. films produced in industry No. producer organizations Attendance in theaters TV advertising Actor Director Writer Producer Constant Model 7 0.0185 (0.6386) 0.0175 *** (0.0041) -0.0631 *** (0.0067) -0.4191 ** (0.1326) -0.0077 *** (0.0021) -1.819 *** (0.3452) 0.2754 (0.4490) 0.5861 + (0.3380) -1.006 * (0.4494) 22.83 + (12.41) Model 8 0.3764 *** (0.0311) 0.0046 *** (0.0002) 0.0038 *** (0.0003) 0.0932 *** (0.0058) -0.0006 *** 0.3764 -0.4357 *** (0.0553) 0.0377 (0.0757) -0.3168 *** (0.0595) -0.1401 * (0.0629) -12.62 *** (0.5818) Model 9 0.5477 *** (0.0473) 0.0054 *** (0.0004) 0.0041 *** (0.0005) 0.1246 *** (0.0087) -0.0009 *** (0.0001) -0.1072 (0.1240) 0.4022 * (0.1802) -0.2545 (0.1852) 0.1702 (0.2185) -15.53 *** (0.8809)
-1156.34 -79650.53 -32236.61 Log pseudolikelihood 25 21 22 Degrees of Freedom 297444 297444 76497 Number of Observations *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 *p < 0.05 +p < 0.10 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors in parentheses. .
Figure 1. Odds of working in film by mere association with blacklisted artists.
Figure 2. Odds of working by mere association with stigmatized artists, for artists who were in top-ten films vs. were not in top-ten films.
Figure 3. Odds of working by mere association with stigmatized artists, for artists who were Oscar winners vs. non-Oscar winners
Appendix A. Correlation table. Table A1. Correlations among variables in hypothesis testing risk set
(1) Artist is in film in the current year Mere association with blacklisted artist Time discounted mere association with blacklisted artists Mere association with blacklisted for artists in top ten films Mere association with blacklisted for artists not in top ten films Mere association with blacklisted for Oscar Winners Mere association with blacklisted for non-Oscar winners Number of connections to other artists Number of total films Number of Oscar wins Number of Oscar winning films artist has been in Number of top ten films artist has been in Duration of unemployment Tenure (since 1945) Specialization Specialization x no. total films Only in one film Association with Studio Year (since 1945) No. films produced No. producer organizations Attendance in theaters TV advertising Actor Director Writer Producer (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 0.10 0.15 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.33 0.32 0.06 0.05 0.15 -0.26 -0.11 -0.08 0.25 -0.21 0.18 -0.23 0.21 -0.11 0.23 -0.24 -0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
0.92 0.67 0.71 0.11 0.99 0.68 0.60 0.04 0.14 0.31 0.09 0.33 -0.15 0.40 -0.24 0.27 0.08 -0.03 -0.02 -0.09 0.07 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.64 0.64 0.10 0.92 0.65 0.58 0.04 0.13 0.30 0.00 0.21 -0.14 0.39 -0.22 0.25 -0.01 0.06 -0.11 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.13 0.66 0.52 0.45 0.05 0.20 0.53 -0.01 0.14 -0.11 0.28 -0.14 0.15 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.71 0.41 0.38 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 0.13 0.31 -0.10 0.28 -0.19 0.21 0.09 -0.04 -0.01 -0.09 0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
-0.01 0.07 0.06 0.51 0.05 0.09 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01
0.67 0.59 -0.02 0.13 0.30 0.09 0.32 -0.15 0.40 -0.23 0.26 0.08 -0.03 -0.02 -0.09 0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
0.95 0.05 0.14 0.42 -0.08 0.25 -0.20 0.74 -0.36 0.37 -0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.03 -0.06 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.03
0.04 0.11 0.34 -0.08 0.25 -0.17 0.87 -0.35 0.32 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.00
0.08 0.09 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.07 0.04 0.06 0.00
Table A1. (Continued).
(11) Number of top ten films artist has been in Duration of unemployment Tenure (since 1945) Specialization Specialization x no. total films Only in one film Association with Studio Year (since 1945) No. films produced No. producer organizations Attendance in theaters TV advertising Actor Director Writer Producer (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 0.30 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.07 -0.04 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 (12) -0.05 0.11 -0.09 0.22 -0.16 0.19 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26)
0.84 0.36 -0.04 0.30 0.04 0.53 -0.46 0.38 -0.53 0.53 0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.02
0.25 0.23 0.03 0.24 0.56 -0.46 0.38 -0.55 0.55 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.02
0.03 0.81 0.01 0.24 -0.17 0.17 -0.25 0.22 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
-0.22 0.24 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01
-0.17 0.18 -0.14 0.13 -0.18 0.17 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.10 -0.01 -0.02 -0.11
-0.82 0.69 -1.00 0.99 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.02
-0.47 0.79 -0.84 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.02
-0.68 0.68 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.02
-0.97 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.02
0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.02
-0.29 -0.67 -0.54
Appendix B. Experiment We used a vignette-based laboratory experiment to assess the transmission of stigma through mere exposure. We told participants that they were participating in an experiment designed to test how they process information when making a decision. They were presented with a vignette to choose a board member for a new biotechnology company that they had started. Seventy-five undergraduates were enlisted to participate in the experiment for a monetary reward, and randomly assigned into three conditions. All participants were presented with a potential board member, Andrew Byrd, and given his biography – Andrew was described as a Vice-President of Research at Genentech. A photo of Byrd was also presented to the participants, and they were informed that that the photo was taken when Byrd was standing in line to register himself for a biotechnology conference, and that registration was in alphabetical order. The three persons standing next to him also had last names starting with a B or C. Participants were asked how likely they were to choose Andrew as a board member, how they evaluated his competence, and his trustworthiness using seven-point Likert scales. In the control condition, participants were informed only of the titles and companies of all individuals in the picture. We also distinguished between two treatment conditions; mere association with status, and mere association with stigma. In the mere association with status condition, participants were informed of the titles and companies of all individuals, and in addition were told that the same person standing to the left of Byrd was described as having won the Nobel Prize in medicine six months after the picture was taken. In the mere association with stigma condition, the person standing to the left of Byrd was described as having been convicted of a felony for misbranding drugs six months after the photo was taken. In a pre-test with Stanford undergrads, the Nobelist was seen as positive (4.2) and the felon was seen as negative (-
3.8), and the magnitude of the felon stigma was lower than the magnitude of the Nobelist status. In both the stigma and status conditions, the alter gained status or stigma after the casual association had already occurred. Table B1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis, and table B2 presents the results from multionomial logit regressions of the likelihood of appointing Andrew Byrd as board member. We chose the multinomial logit specification over an ordered logit specification because the latter implies parallel regression lines and we found that such assumption had been violated. We found that the seven-point scale could be collapsed into a three point scale. We used 0-4 as the reference category, and 5 and 6-7 as the outcome categories. We used dummies for the Nobel and felon conditions, and treated the control condition as the reference group. We used the age of the respondent as a control (gender and race and educational background had no effects). [Insert Table B1 and B2 here] Model B1 shows that age of the respondent has significant negative effects on the propensity to choose Byrd. The felon condition dummy has significant negative effects (at the top levels 6 or 7) significant at the p < 0.10 level. The Nobel dummy has insignificant effects. Model B2 shows that these results are robust to inclusions of the participants’ evaluations of competence and trustworthiness 1 . Thus, mere physical proximity to the felon lowers the propensity of respondents to choose Andrew as a board member, but mere physical proximity to the Nobelist has no significant effects. Note that in both cases, the person standing to the left of Andrew becomes a felon or a Nobelist six months after the photo was taken.2 Discussion. The results from the experiment support and extend the findings presented in the analysis of the Hollywood film industry, and indicate that harmful effects on career outcomes
derived from mere association with stigmatized individuals are not just specific to moral panics, but apply more generally. Effects of stigma transmit not only through casual associations, but also through casual associations with someone who is not yet stigmatized. This is likely a result of how stigma operates. Stigma tends to be attributed to the core of an individual in a holistic way. Rather than being one bad trait or characteristic, it becomes synonymous with the whole person. Perhaps this is what causes stigma to transmit through weak associations and even mere association with an individual who was not stigmatized at the point of affiliation. If the stigma by association – even when stigma is assigned ex-post – can affect career outcomes more generally, this indicates that the nature of stigma might account for how rapidly moral panics can spread throughout a society. Once partisan groups ignite the flame of suspicion, and trigger a widely held social stigma for a group of individuals, perhaps it is human nature for that stigma to spread, even unconsciously, to any person who can be associated in any way with the stigma.
In these models perceived competence and trustworthiness are defined as dummy variables for high and
low competence and trustworthiness.
We post-tested for participants recall that the felony or prize was awarded after the men were
photographed together, and that the men were grouped alphabetically for the photograph.
Table B1. Descriptive statistics for experimental analysis
Mean Likelihood to select Felon condition Nobel condition Age of respondent Evaluation of competence Evaluation of trustworthiness 5.467 0.3733 0.3200 20.88 5.867 4.973 Std dev 0.4869 0.4696 5.1856 0.8595 1.090 Min 2 0 0 18 4 1 Max 7 1 1 48 7 7
N = 75
Table B2. Experiment Results. Multinomial logit of selecting an individual for board appointment. Effects of mere proximity on the likelihood to select an individual, and on evaluations of competence and trustworthiness
Model B1 Likelihood to Likelihood to select 5 select 6 or 7 6.254 * 7.787 * (2.970) Mere Proximity to felon -2.170 (1.3760) -0.448 (1.6305) -0.191 + (0.1027) (3.028) -2.298 (1.334) -0.308 (1.587) -0.234 (0.1079) + Model B2 Likelihood Likelihood to to select 5 select 6 or 7 3.739 1.891 (4.969) (5.122)
-2.337 + -2.563 + (1.4526) (1.525) Mere Proximity to Nobel -0.535 -0.556 Prize winner (1.7882) (1.837) Age of respondent * -0.149 -0.103 (0.0996) (0.1008) Evaluation of competence 2.239 + 4.613 ** 1.224 (1.328) Evaluation of 0.2146 0.171 trustworthiness (0.7105) (0.7364) Log-likelihood -64.0671 -52.1573 Pseudo r-squared 0.0983 0.2659 Observations 75 75 *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 *p < 0.05 +p < 0.10 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors in parentheses.
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
We've moved you to where you read on your other device.
Get the full title to continue listening from where you left off, or restart the preview.