ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DIGESTS General Principles to Quasi-Legislative Powers Executive Secretary vs.

Southwing President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo , issued EO156, entitled “PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DIRE CTIONS FOR THE MOTOR VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES . Article 2, Section 3.1 prohibits the importation into the country, inclusive of the Special Economic and Freeport Zone or the Subic Bay Freeport (SBF or Freepor t), of used motor vehicles, subject to a few exceptions. Respondents, Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc. (SOUTHWING), United Auctioneers, I nc. (UNITED AUCTIONEERS), Microvan, Inc. (MICROVAN), Subic Integrated Macro Ven tures Corporation (MACRO VENTURES), and Motor Vehicle Importers Association of S ubic Bay Freeport, Inc. (ASSOCIATION), filed actions for declaratory relief, pra ying that Art. 2, Sec. 3.1 of EO156 be declared unconstitutional because it was an unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by the Constitution with Cong ress– it was decided in their favor. Hence, the current petition questioning the decision. Issue: Whether Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO156 is a valid exercise of the Presid ent’s quasi-legislative power. Ruling: Art. 2, Sec. 3.1 of EO156 is void insofar as it is made applicable to the secur ed fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area but valid insofar as it applies to the Philippine territory outside the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base. Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional li mits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of socie ty. It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of valid delegation, it may also be exercised by the President and adm inistrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, inc luding the barangay. Quasi-legislative power – authority delegated by the law-making body to the admini strative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provision s of the law and implement legislative policy. Requisites for valid administrative issuance: Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature; This requisite was satisfied by EO156, which as both constitutional and statutor y bases. Sec. 28(2) of Art. VI of the Constitution provides that the Congress may, by law , authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such li mitation and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quot as, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. Tariff and Customs Code, EO226 (Omnibus Investment Code), RA880 (Safeguard Measu res Act; SMA) – authorize the President, when general welfare and national securit y require, prohibiting imports of commodities. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; Difference between legislative rules and interpretative rules: Legislative rules – subordinate legislation, crafted to implement a primary legisl ation. Interpretative rules – which give no real consequence more than what the law itsel f has already prescribed. Notice and hearing is required when an administrative rule goes beyond merely pr oviding for the means that can facilitate or render less cumbersome the implemen tation of the law and substantially increases the burden of those governed (legi slative rules).

EO156 is a legislative rule because it seeks to implement or execute primary leg islative enactments intended to protect the domestic industry by imposing a ban on the importation of a specified product not previously subject to such prohibi tion. However, there being no objection from the respondents as to the procedure in th e promulgation of EO156, presumption is that it duly complied with the procedure s and limitations imposed by law. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and The third requisite is not complied with as EO156 exceeded the scope of its appl ication by extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to the Free port (SBF), which RA7227 considers to some extent, a foreign territory. > RA7227 provided for the conversion of the Clark and Subic military reserva tions to a Subic Bay Freeport, wherein SBF enterprises may import and export fre ely. The subject matter of the laws authorizing the President to regulate or forbid i mportation of used motor vehicles, is the domestic industry or the customs terri tory that is the portion of the Philippines outside the SBF. It must be reasonable. Issuance of the ban to protect the domestic industry is a reasonable exercise of police power. > The problem it seeks to solve is the deterioration of the local motor-manufa cturing firms due to the influx of imported used motor vehicles. However, it becomes unreasonable when such ban applied to the SBF. > As long as the used motor vehicles do not enter the customs territory, th e injury or harm sought to be prevented will not arise. Lupangco vs. CA In October 1986 PRC issued Reso. No. 105 as part of the "Additional Instruction to Examinees" to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinat ions in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following provisions; "NO EXAMI NEE SHALL ATTEND ANY REVIEW CLASSES, BRIEFING,CONFERENCE AND THE LIKE CONDUCTED BY OR SHALL RECEIVE HANDOUT FROM ANY COLLEGE REVIEW CENTERS...DURING THE LAST 3 DAYS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDDING EVERY EXAMINATION DAY".€ Petitioner (all reviewees preparing for the next licensure examinations in accou ntancy) filed on their own behalf and in behalf of all those similarly situated with RTC a complaint for injunction with prayer for the writ of preliminary €injun ction against PRC to restrain the latter for enforcing the Resolution that is fo und to be unconstitutional. PRC filed a motion to dismiss with CA on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and enjoin the enforcement of its resolution because PRC and RTC is a co-equal body hence does not have any power to control each other o r interfere with each other s acts.€ PRC further invoke Sec 9 paragraph 3 of BP 129 saying that it is CA who has juri sdiction over the case not the RTC. Issues: 1. W/N RTC AND PRC is of the same category, where RTC cannot pass upon the valid ity of the Admin Acts of the latter and it is CA who has proper jurisdiction not RTC. 2. W/N the Resolution is constitutional? Ruling: 1.€No, in order to invoke Sec 9 of BP 129, there has to be a final order or ruling that resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body involved quasi-j udicial function. QUASI-JUDICIAL function refers to action, discretion, etc. of public administrative €officers or bodies required to investigate facts or ascerta in the existence of facts, hold hearings and draw conclusions from them as the b asis for their action. This DOES NOT cover rules and regulations of general appl


icability issued by the Admin Body to implement purely administrative policies l ike Reso. No. 105.€ SC further held that orders and resolutions of PRC fall within the general juris diction of RTC because of the absence of a provision in the law creating the Com mission that its orders and resolutions are only appealable in CA or SC. And sin ce PRC is attached to the office of the President for general direction and coor dination hence as settled in our jurisprudence, even the acts of the Office of t he President may be reviewed by RTC. 2. No, Reso No. 105 is held to be unconstitutional. It is an axiom in ADMIN LAW that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in t he issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations MU ST BE REASONABLE and FAIRLY adapted to secure the end view. Res No. 105 is not o nly unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinee s right to lib erty guaranteed in the constitution. It further violated the academic freedom of schools concerned Biak na Bato vs. Tanco During the mining boom in 1933, a group of hopeful and enthusiastic individuals from the North, appeared to have located from November, 1933 to February, 1934 o ne hundred seventy (170) mining claims in hinterlands of the Cordillera Mountain s in Sitios of Pasil and Balatoc, Municipality of Lubuagan, Mountain Province (n ow known as the Municipality of Balatoc, Province of Kalinga-Apayao). The land c overed by said 170 mining claims is adjacent and surrounds the mining properties of Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. On February 8, 1969, the petitioner Biak-na-Bato Mining Co. was created as a par tnership in accordance with law. And on November 19, 1969, the locators, namely: Bernardo Ardiente, Emilio Peralta, Mario Villarica, Anastacio Cano and Salvador Ellone, each executed a Deed of Transfer of Mining Rights assigning, transferri ng and conveying to the petitioner the mining claims covered by the aforesaid de clarations of location On December 4,1969, Biak-Na-Bato Mining Co. filed with the Bureau of Mines the a pplication for lease and a petition for an order of lease survey of the aforemen tioned mining claims (Rollo,€Ibid., p. 42). However, it received a notice of the l etter of the Director of Mines refusing to issue the order of lease survey becau se the areas covered by the mining claims were allegedly in conflict with the fo ur (4) groups of mining claims purportedly owned by the Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc. (Rollo,€Ibid., pp. 45-46). On January 12, 1970, Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company filed its separate protest with the Bureau of Mines against Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. In said protest, BiakNa-Bato Mining Company contests and disputes the right of Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines , Inc. to eleven (11) mining claims and the right of Mountain Mines, Inc. to ano ther nine (9) mining claims (Rollo, Vol. I, Petition, p. 12). After the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Mines inspection team, a report was submitted with topographic map and pictures of the improvements. Acco rding to the report, the ground works improvements and other form of assessment works in the mining properties of said respondents were significant and extensiv e, all evaluated and assessed at P582,996.60 (Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 621-690). The Director of Mines promulgated its decision in both cases, holding that as ag ainst Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company, the Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc., have a better right to the 170 mining claims of about 1,520 hectar es located at the Cordillera Mountains, in Pasil, Municipality of Balatoc, Provi nce of Kalinga-Apayao (Rollo, Annex "B", pp. 134-145). From the said decision of the Director of Mines, petitioner appealed to the Secr etary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, docketed as DANR Case No. 3613 entit led "Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company vs. Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc." and DANR Case No. 3613-A entitled "Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company vs. Mountain Mines, Inc." (Rol


lo, Petition, p. 9). In its appeal, the Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company questioned the first ocular inspe ction report. The Secretary in the exercise of his appellate power and in justic e to the petitioner ordered a second ocular inspection, after which the second i nspection team submitted a report confirming the findings of the first ocular in spection team, and also reported that Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company despite opport unity afforded was not able to show its location in the area (Rollo, Vol. II, pp . 693-701). On September 17, 1971, the Secretary rendered his decision on the appeal, affirm ing the findings of facts of the Director of Mines and declaring Balatoc-Lubuaga n Mines, Inc. and Baguio Mines, Inc. s mining area not open for relocation in 19 67-1968 and therefore Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company s locations null and void. The Secretary also declared that its mining claims are table located, and therefore , null and void, and that it had no legal personality to file the protest in the Bureau of Mines. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: ISSUE: W/N the contention of the petitioner is correct. HELD: As a general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction, decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed b y the courts, except when the former have acted without or in excess of their ju risdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Findings of administrative offici als and agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confi ned to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times eve n finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence (San Luis v. C ourt of Appeals, 174 SCRA 261 [1989], Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Lopez Enag e, 152 SCRA 80 [1987]) and are controlling on the reviewing authorities (Doruelo v. Ministry of National Defense, 169 SCRA 448 [1989]) because of their acknowle dged expertise in the fields of specialization to which they are assigned. Even the courts of justice, including this Court, are bound by such findings in the a bsence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which is not present i n this case at bar (Gordon v. Veridiano II, 167 SCRA 53 [1988]). There is no question that the decision of the Director of Mines as affirmed by t he Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is substantially supported by evidence. Substantial evidence has been defined or construed to mean not necessa rily preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases but such kind of rel evant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclu sion (Castro v. CA, 169 SCRA 383 [1989]; Bagsican v. CA, 141 SCRA 226 [1980]; Lu stre v. CAR, 10 SCRA 659 [1964]). PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is hereby AFFIRMED. Euromed vs. Batangas Province of Batangas: defendant; respondent Euro-Med Laboratories: plaintiff; petitioner The Province of Batangas, through the various authorized representatives of the government hospitals by Euro-Med Laboratories, were identified to have purchased various Intravenous Fluids (IVF) which were products of the petitioner. The res pondent was found to have an unpaid balance of P487,662.80 which were evidenced by invoices recieved and signed by defendant s authorized representatives. Over the course of the trial where the petitioner s side concluded their present ation of evidence, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that t he primary jurisdiction over the money claim is with the Commission on Audit (CO A). Issue: Who has primary jurisdiction over the case: COA/RTC? Held: Merits of the case is well within the jurisdiction of COA.




- Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, if a case is such that its determi nation requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administ rative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding befor e resort to the courts is had, even if the matter is within their proper jurisdi ction. - Under the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, it is well within the s cope of COA s authority to take cases for liquidated claims, or those determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices and such other papers within re ach of COA s jurisdiction. - Both parties agreed that the transactions were governed by the Local Governmen t Code provisions on supply and property management in which its implementing ru les and regulations are promulgated in COA s Code. "the authority and power of t he commission [on audit] shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to xxxx the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, and in strumentalities. xxxx" - Such matters are found to be not within the usual area of knowledge, experienc e and expertise of most judges but within the special competence of COA auditors and accountants.

Biraogo vs. Truth Com The petitioners raised in Court that E.O. No. 1, which created the Truth Commiss ion, should be declared unconstitutional and to enjoin PTC from performing its f unctions. The petitioners alleged that E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of pow ers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appr opriate funds for its operation. They also asserted the fact that the role of th e president, as stated in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new p ublic office, which was inexistent before, the "Truth Commission". According to them, the said Executive Order violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public o ffices, agencies and commissions. The respondents, on the other hand, contested that E.O. No. 1 did not arrogate t he powers of the Congress to create a public office because the President s exec utive power and power of control necessarily includes the inherent power to cond uct investigations to ensure laws are faithfully executed. More so, it does not violate the principle of separation of powers as alleged by the petitioners. The y strongly argue that the said Executive Order, is valid and constitutional. ISSUE Does E.O. No. 1 transgress on the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office? HELD No. E.O. No 1 does not transgress on the power of the Congress to appropriate fu nds for the operation of a public office. In the said E.O., there will be no app ropriation but only an allotment or allocations existing funds already appropria ted. Thus, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of C ongress to appropriate funds. According to the Solicitor General, "whatever fund s the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very sou rce of the funds for the commission," and thus, will be subject to auditing rule s and regulations. However, the Court stressed that, "The end does not justify t he means." No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, b ut if the means to be employed in accomplishing its goals is simply irreconcilab le with the constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. The Cour t cannot just run a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold





the Constitution and its enshrined principles. The Philippine Supreme Court, ac cording to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judi cial Power that "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual con troversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amountin g to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." Hence, the petitions were granted. MIAA (Petitioner) vs. CA & Paranaque authorities (Resp.) MIAA operates the NAIA Complex in Parañaque EO No. 903 (MIAA Charter). As operator , it administers the land, improvements and equipment within NAIA. In March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opin ion No. 061 to the effect that the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of its Chart er. Thus, MIAA paid some of the real estate tax already due. In June 2001, it received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from Paraña que for the taxable years 1992 to 2001 estimated at P624 million. The City Treasurer of Parañaque ssued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. It also threatened to sell at public auction the Ai rport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquenc y. Later on, the OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying its earlier opinion. OGCC c orrected it saying that Sec. 21 of the MIAA Charter is the proof that MIAA is ex empt from real estate tax. Thus MIAA filed a petition with the CA seeking to res train the Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auction ing for public sale the airport lands and buildings, but this was dismissed for having been filed out of time. Hence, this present petition. Paranaque’s Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdre w the tax exemption privileges of “government owned and controlled corp.” upon. Resp ondents also argue that a basic rule of statutory construction is that the expre ss mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all others. An international ai rport is not among the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Governme nt Code. Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax. MIAA’s contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The gove rnment cannot tax itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is tha t its taxation would not inure to any public advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor. Issue: W/N Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax. Held: Yes. Real estate tax assessments issued by the City of Parañaque are void. 1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into sha res. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. A non-stock corporation must have members. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform eff iciently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumen tality; the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate power, the instrume ntality does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumen tality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA ex ercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority and the levy ing of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises “all the powers of a cor poration under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent

with the provisions of this Executive Order.” 2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the Republic a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 o f the Civil Code, like “roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constru cted by the State,” are owned by the State. The term “ports” includes seaports and air ports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a “port” constructed by the S tate. The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use. The fact that the MIA A collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the c haracter of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The ch arging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property wh ether it is of public dominion or not. The terminal fees MIAA charges constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the com merce of man, cannot be the subject of an auction, levy, encumbrance or disposit ion through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auctio n sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public p olicy. c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic - Only the President of the Republic c an sign such deed of conveyance. d. Transfer to MIAA was meant to Implement a Reorganization The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air Transport ation to MIAA was not meant to transfer beneficial ownership of these assets fro m the Republic to MIAA. The purpose was merely to reorganize a division in the B ureau of Air Transportation into a separate and autonomous body. The Republic re mains the beneficial owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings. MIAA itself is ow ned solely by the Republic. e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned by the Republic of the Phil ippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use ther eof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person follow ing are exempted from payment of the real property tax. However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. For example, the land area occupi ed by hangars that MIAA leases to private corporations is subject to real estate tax. GSIS (Petitioner) vs. City Tresurer of Manila (Respondents) A suit to nullify a suit to nullify the assessment of real property taxes on cer tain properties belonging to petitioner GSIS GSIS owns or used to own 2 parcels of land (Katigbak property and Concepcion-Arr oceros property). Title to the Concepcion-Arroceros property was transferred to this Court in 2005 pursuant to Proclamation No. 835. Both the GSIS and the MTC o f Manila occupy the Concepcion-Arroceros property while the Katigbak property wa s under lease. The City Treasurer of Manila addressed a letter to GSIS President and General Ma nager informing them of the unpaid real property taxes (from 1992 to 2002), brok en down as follows: (a) PhP 54,826,599.37 for the Katigbak property; and (b) PhP 48,498,917.01 for the Concepcion-Arroceros property. They warned of the inclusion of the properties in a public auction in Manila sho uld the unpaid taxes remain unsettled. GSIS wrote back emphasizing the GSIS’ exemp tion from all kinds of taxes, including realty taxes, under RA 8291. 2 days after, GSIS filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition for a restrai ning relief. Hoping for the nullification of the assessments and that respondent is permanently enjoined from proceedings against GSIS’ property. GSIS would later

amend its petition8 to include the fact that: (a) the Katigbak property has bee n leased to and occupied by the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC), which has contra ctually bound itself to pay any realty taxes that may be imposed on the subject property; and (b) the Concepcion-Arroceros property is partly occupied by GSIS a nd partly occupied by the MTC of Manila. RTC dismissed GSIS’ petition. Issues: W/N GSIS is exempt from real property taxation; assuming that it is so e xempt, whether GSIS is liable for real property taxes for its properties leased to a taxable entity; and whether the properties of GSIS are exempt from levy. Held: Petition is MERITOUS. Yes, GSIS is exempt. GSIS is a government instrumentality. GSIS is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares and no stockholders or voting shares. GSIS is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. The Republic owns properties under GSIS’s name. GSIS is but a mere trustee of the properties. This particular property arrangement is shown by the fact that dispo sal or conveyance of such are done through the authority of the President of the Philippines. GSIS manages the funds for the life insurance, retirement, survivorship, and dis ability benefits of all government employees and their beneficiaries. This const itutes an essential and vital function that the government, through one of its a gencies or instrumentalities, ought to perform. Thus the Republic guarantees the fulfillment of the obligations of the GSIS to its members (government employees and their beneficiaries) when they’re due. GSIS enjoys under its charter full tax exemption. As an instrumentality of the n ational government, it is itself not liable to pay real estate taxes assessed by the City of Manila against its Katigbak and Concepcion-Arroceros properties. Following the "beneficial use" rule, however, accrued real property taxes are du e from the Katigbak property, leased as it is to a taxable entity. But the corre sponding liability for the payment thereof devolves on the taxable beneficial us er. The Katigbak property cannot in any event be subject of a public auction sale, n otwithstanding its realty tax delinquency. This means that the City of Manila ha s to satisfy its tax claim by serving the accrued realty tax assessment on MHC a s the taxable beneficial user of the Katigbak property and, in case of nonpaymen t, through means other than the sale at public auction of the leased property. Petition is GRANTED. The RTC Manila decisions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Tax as sessments issued by the City of Manila are VOID, except that the real property t ax assessment pertaining to the leased Katigbak property shall be valid if serve d on the Manila Hotel Corporation, as lessee that has actual and beneficial use of it.

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWERS Chiongbian vs. Orbos Pursuant to Article X Sec 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed RA No. 67 34 "The ORGANIC ACT for the AUTONOMOUS REGION in MUSLIM MINDANAO" calling for a plebescite to be held in 23 provinces. 4 provinces voted in favor of creating the Autonomous region and these are LANAO DEL SUR, MAGUINDANAO,SULU and TAWI-TAWI. Hence, in accordance to RA No. 6734 th ese 4 provinces became the ARMM.€ On the other hand, with respect to the remaining provinces who did not vote in f avor of creating ARMM. Artcle XIX Sec RA 6724 provides;€"THAT ONLY THE PROVINCES A ND CITIES VOTING FAVORABLY IN SUCH PLEBISCITE SHALL BE INCLUDED IN ARMM AND THE PROVINCES WHO DID NOT VOTE FOR THE INCLUSION IN ARMM SHALL REMAIN IN THE EXISTIN G ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT MAY BY ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION, MERGE THE EXISTING REGIONS".€

Pursuant to the authority granted by the above provision, then President Cory Aq uino issued EO No. 429 "PROVIDING FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMM" where in t hose who are not in favor in creating the ARMM where transferred (provinces of a certain region to another) some of which are;€a. Misamis Occidental, at present p art of Region X will become part of Region IX. b. General Santos, at present par t of Region XI, will become part of Region IX. c. Transfered the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian.€ Petitioners, protested and challenges the validity of EO 429 contending that the re is not law which authorizes the President to make alterations on the existing structure of the governmental units in other words REORGANIZATION. And that the authority merge granted in RA 6724 does not include the authority to reorganize even if it does not affect the opportionment of the congressional representativ es. €In addition, they contend that Aricle XIX Sec 13 of RA 6724 is unconstitution al for 1) it is invalid delegation of power by the Legislative to the President 2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.€ Issues: 1. W/N Article XIX Sec 13 of RA 6724 is invalid because it contains no express s tandard to guide the President s discretion and whether the power given fairly e xpressed in the title of the statute.€ 2. W/N the power granted authorizes not just to merge but even the reorganizatio n of those who did not vote or not infavor to it.€ 3. W/N the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the reg ional center of Region IX from Zamboanga to Pagadian since it should be the acts of Congress.€ Ruling: While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provide d for in the constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged wit h the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision o ver local governments (Article X sec 4 of the Constitution). The regions themsel ves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities,municipal ities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contagouos provinces for adminstr ative purposes. The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries".€ 1. No, A legislative standard need not to be expressed. It may simply be ga thered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legisla tion. And with respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, th e standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the Preside nt in RA No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Exec Department to " Promote si mplicity, economy, and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue progr ams consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic developme nt and to improve the services in the transaction of public business.€ 2. No, while Article XIX Sec 13 provides that "THE PROVINCES AND CITIES WHI CH DO NOT VOTE FOR INCLUSION IN THE AUTONOMOUS REGION SHALL REMAIN IN THE THE EX ISTING €ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS" This provision is subject to the qualification tha t the PRESIDENT MAY BY ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION MERGE THE EXISTING REGIONS. This means that while non-assenting provinces are to remain in €the regions aas de signated upon the creation of the Autonomous region, they may nevertheless be re grouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of admin istration may require.€ 3. Yes, for administrative regions are mere "groupings of contiguous provin ces for administrative purposes hence are not territorial and political subdivis ions like provinces, cities, municipalities and brgys. Therefore there is no bas is that only Congress can determine the region center.€ Tanada vs. Tuvera


Subject of the contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code, to which the petitione rs seek clarification. Art. 2 provides: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the complet ion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provide d. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. Issue: W/N publication is indispensable for the effectivity of laws. Ruling: Yes. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or extended. “unless otherwise provided” – refers to the date of effectivity and not to the require ment of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. “laws” – refer to all laws not only to those of general application, for strictly spea king all laws relate to the people in general although there are some that do no t apply them directly. Presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the ex ercise of legislative power when they are validly delegated by the legislature. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. No publication is required however for: Interpretative regulation and those merely internal in nature – regulating only th e personal of the administrative agency and not the public. Letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their d uties. The court also recognize that newpapers of general circulation, as compared to t he Official Gazette, could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider reade rship, and come out regularly. As the law however, requires publication in the Official Gazette, the Court leav es amending such to the legislature. Smart vs. NTC Pursuant to their rule-making and regulatory powers, the NTC issued on June 16, 2000 a MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on th b illing of telecommunication services by providing call balance announcement and prolonging the validity of prepaid SIM and call cards. And subsequently on Augus t 30, 2000 NTC issued another Memorandum this time regarding measures to minimiz e if not totally to eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units by requiring ID for SIM and call card buyers . Petitioners filed against NTC an action for declaration of nullity of the Memora ndum Circulars issed by NTC alleging that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulat e the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since the jurisdicti on belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines. €They further alleged that the Memorandum are confiscatory and viola tive of the constitutional provision against deprivation of property without due process. NTC on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the case for the petitioner fai led to exhaust administrative remedies regarding the matter. Issue: W/N NTC has jurisdiction to regulate the sale on consumer goods such as prepaid and SIM cards? Ruling: Yes, Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE or RULE

-MAKING POWER is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delega ted legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doct rine of non-delegability and separability of powers.A QUASI-JUDICIAL or ADMINIST RATIVE ADJUDICATORY POWERS is the power to hear and determine questions of facts to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with th e standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.€ In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need NOT to exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle only applies where the act of the adminis trative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function a nd not when the assailed act pertained to its rule making or quasi-legislative p ower. Eastern Shipping vs. CA - On Dec. 4, 1981, two fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from Yokohama, Jap anfor delivery vessel "SS EASTERN COMET" owned by defendant Eastern ShippingLine s under Bill of Lading No. YMA-8. The shipment was insured under plaintiff sMari ne Insurance Policy No. 81/01177 for P36,382,466.38. On Dec. 12, 1981, uponarriv al of shipment, it was discharged unto the custody of defendant Metro PortServic e, Inc. (The latter excepted to one drum, said to be in bad order, whichdamage w as unknown to plaintiff.) On Jan 7, 1982 defendant Allied BrokerageCorporation r eceived the shipment from defendant Metro Port Service, Inc., onedrum opened and without seal. On Jan. 8 and 14, 1982 defendant Allied BrokerageCorporation made deliveries of the shipment to the consignee s warehouse. Thelatter excepted to one drum which contained spillages, while the rest of thecontents was adulterate d/fake. - Plaintiff argues: [a] due to the losses/damage sustained by said drum, theconsignee suffered losse s totaling P19,032.95, due to the fault and negligence of defendants. (Claims we re presented against defendants who failed and refused topay the same)[b] As a c onsequence of the losses sustained, plaintiff was compelledto pay the consignee P19,032.95 under the aforestated marine insurance policy, sothat it became subro gated to all the rights of action of said consignee againstdefendants - Defendant/s argue/s: [a] As for defendant Eastern Shipping (carrier) it alleged thatthe shipment was discharged in good order from the vessel unto the custody of Metro Port Service so that any damage/losses incurred after the shipment was incurred after the sh ipment was turned over to the latter, is no longer its liability;[b] Metroport ( arrastre operator) averred that although subject shipment wasdischarged unto its custody, portion of the same was already in bad order; [c] AlliedBrokerage (bro ker)alleged that plaintiff has no cause of action against it, not havingnegligen t or at fault for the shipment was already in damage and bad ordercondition when received by it, but nonetheless, it still exercised extra ordinary careand dili gence in the handling/delivery of the cargo to consignee in the samecondition sh ipment was received by it. - Trial Court ruling: [a] Defendants to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally: 1) Theamount of P19,032 .95, with the present legal interest of 12% per annum from October 1, 1982, the date of filing of this complaints, until fully paid (the liability of defendant Eastern Shipping, Inc. shall not exceed US$500 per case or the CIF valueof the l oss, whichever is lesser, while the liability of defendant Metro Port Service,In c. shall be to the extent of the actual invoice value of each package, crate box orcontainer in no case to exceed P5,000.00 each, pursuant to Section 6.01 of th eManagement Contract); 2) P3,000.00 as attorney s fees, and 3) Costs. [b] Dismis sedthe counterclaims and crossclaim of defendant/cross-claimant Allied Brokerage




Corporation.- CA affirmed the decision of the Trial Court in toto. ISSUES 1. WON a claim for damage sustained on a shipment of goods can be a solidary, or joint and several, liability of the common carrier, the arrastre operator and t hecustoms broker 2. WON payment of legal interest on an award for loss or damage is to be compute dfrom the time the complaint is filed or from the date the decision appealed fro m isrendered 3. WON the applicable rate of interest, referred to above, is 12% or 6% HELD 1. The common carrier s duty to observe the requisite diligence in the shipment of goods lasts from the time the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placedin the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation unti l deliveredto, or until the lapse of a reasonable time for their acceptance by, the personentitled to receive them (Arts. 1736-1738, Civil Code; Ganzon vs. Cour t of Appeals,161 SCRA 646; Kui Bai vs. Dollar Steamship Lines, 52 Phil. 863).- W hen the goods shipped are either lost or arrive in damaged condition, apresumpti on arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence, andthere need not be an express finding of negligence to hold it liable (Art. 1735, Civi lCode; Philippine National Railways vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 87; Metro Por tService vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 365).- There are, of course, exceptional cases when such presumption of fault is notobserved but these cases, enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code, areexclusive, not one of which can be applie d to this case.- The question of charging both the carrier and the arrastre oper ator with theobligation of properly delivering the goods to the consignee has, t oo, been passed upon by the Court. In Fireman s Fund Insurance vs. Metro Port Se rvices (182 SCRA455)- Since it is the duty of the ARRASTRE to take good care of the goo ds that are in itscustody and to deliver them in good condition to the consignee , such responsibilityalso devolves upon the CARRIER. Both the ARRASTRE and the C ARRIER aretherefore charged with the obligation to deliver the goods in good con dition to theconsignee.- We do not, of course, imply by the above pronouncement that the arrastreoperator and the customs broker are themselves always and neces sarily liablesolidarily with the carrier, or vice-versa, nor that attendant fact s in a given casemay not vary the rule.- The instant petition has been brought s olely by Eastern Shipping Lines, which,being the carrier and not having been abl e to rebut the presumption of fault, is, inany event, to be held liable in this particular case. A factual finding of both the court a quo and the appellate co urt, we take note, is that "there is sufficient evidencethat the shipment sustai ned damage while in the successive possession of appellants" (the herein petitio ner among them).- Accordingly, the liability imposed on Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., sole petitioner inthis case, is inevitable regardless of whether there are others solidarily liable with it.2, The date of the decision of the court a quo . Notice the Disposition portion of thiscase which says: “The legal interest to be paid is 6% on the amount due computedfrom the decision, dated 03 February 1988, of the court a quo. A 12% interest, inlieu of 6%, shall be imposed on such amou nt upon finality of this decision until thepayment thereof.”3. Art. 2209 CC: If th e obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, andthe debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation tothe contrary, sha ll be the payment of interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, th e legal interest which is six percent per annum. (This was upheld in anumber of cases. Kindly check original text)- The ostensible discord is not difficult to e xplain. The factual circumstances mayhave called for different applications, gui ded by the rule that the courts are vestedwith discretion, depending on the equi ties of each case, on the award of interest.Nonetheless, it may not be unwise, b y way of clarification and reconciliation, tosuggest the following rules of thum b for future guidance:A. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law , contracts, quasi-contracts,delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contraven



or can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern indetermining the measure of recoverable damagesB. Wit h regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual andcompen satory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, isimposed, as follows:i. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment o f a sum of money,i.e. a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be thatwhich may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shallitself earn legal interest from the time it i s judicially demanded. In the absenceof stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed fromdefault, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to theprovisions o f Article 1169 of the Civil Code.ii. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, isbreached, an interest on the amount of damages award ed may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however,shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until thedemand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the inte rest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudic ially (Art. 1169, CivilCode) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably est ablished at the timethe demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only fro m the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification o f damagesmay be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for thecomputation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finallyad judged.iii. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls underparagraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its sa tisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then anequivalent to a for bearance of credit. Disposition Petition is partly GRANTED. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED withthe MODIFICATI ON that the legal interest to be paid is 6% on the amount duecomputed from the d ecision, dated 03 February 1988, of the court a quo. A 12%interest, in lieu of 6 %, shall be imposed on such amount upon finality of thisdecision until the payme nt thereof. Phil Assoc vs. Torres To address then recent published stories regarding abuses suffered by Filipino h ousemaids employed in HK, DOLE (dept. of labor and employment) Sec. Ruben D. Tor res issued dept. order no. 16, series of 1991 on June 1, 1991 which temporarily suspends the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic he lpers going to Hong Kong". DOLE through the facilities of POEA (Philippine Overs eas Employment Administration) took over the processing and deployment of househ old workers going to HK. Pursuant to the DOLE circular, POEA issued Memorandum Circular 30, series of 199 1, dated july 10, 1991 which provides guidelines on the government processing an d deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to HK and the accreditation of recruit ment agencies intending to hire filipino domestic helpers. On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, ser ies of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for H K.

On September 2, 1991, petitioner PASEI (Philippine Association of Service Export ers), largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agenci es duly licensed and authorized by POEA, filed a petition for prohibition to ann ul aforementioned POEA and DOLE circulars and prohibit their implementation: Reasons: 1. POEA and DOLE acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing circulars, 2. The circulars are contrary to the Constitution 3. The requirements of publication and filing with the Office of National Admini strative Register were not complied with. Issue: W/N dept. No. 16, memorandum circular no. 30 and 37, be annulled. Held: the writ of prohibition is granted. The implementation of the dept. Order and memorandum circulars are suspended pen ding compliance with the statutory requirements of publication and filing under the aforementioned laws of the land. The vesture of quasi-legislative and judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppresive. It has been necessitated by t he growing complexities of the modern society. Though questioned circulars are valid excercise of police power, they are legall y invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in book VII o f the admin code of 1987. Sec. 3 filing- 1. Every agency shall file with the UP law center, 3 certified co pies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of t his Code which are not filed within 3 months shall not thereafter be the basis o f any sanction against any party or persons. Sec. 4 effectivity- in addition to other rule making requirements provided by la w not inconsistent with this book, each rule shall becomd effective 15 days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, o r specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying t he rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules know n to persons who may be affected by them. Corona vs. United The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 505. On December 23, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPAs c harter. Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession, 1 the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 2on March 21, 19 85, which embodied the Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Co nduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports. These rules mandate, inte r alia, that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses 3 and must train as probationary pilots in outports for three months and in the Port of Manila fo r four months. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory performance 4 th at they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself 5 to exer cise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by re ason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager. 6 Harbor pilots in every harbor district are further required to organize themselves into pilot

associations which would make available such equipment as may be required by th e PPA for effective pilotage services. In view of this mandate, pilot associatio ns invested in floating, communications, and office equipment. In fact, every ne w pilot appointed by the PPA automatically becomes a member of a pilot associati on and is required to pay a proportionate equivalent equity or capital before be ing allowed to assume his duties, as reimbursement to the association concerned of the amount it paid to his predecessor. Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92 7 on July 15, 1992, whose avowed policy was to instill effective discipline and thereby afford better protection to the port users through the improvement of pi lotage services. This was implemented by providing therein that all existing reg ular appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Cust oms or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only and that all appoi ntments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, b e only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to yearly ren ewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of per formance. On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the Department of Transportation and Communication, but they were inform ed by then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that the matter of reviewing, recallin g or annulling PPAs administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing body. Meanwhile, on August 31, 1992, the PPA issued Memorandum Order No. 08-92 8which laid down the criteria or factors to be considered in the reappointment of harbo r pilots, viz.: (1) Qualifying Factors: 9 safety record and physical/mental medi cal exam report and (2) Criteria for Evaluation: 10 promptness in servicing vess els, compliance with PPA Pilotage Guidelines, number of years as a harbor pilot, average GRT of vessels serviced as pilot, awards/commendations as harbor pilot, and age. Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92, but Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the PPA. Compas appeal ed this ruling to the Office of the President (OP), reiterating his arguments be fore the DOTC. On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyan ce the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that said administrative order was issued in the exercise of its administrative cont rol and supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6-a (viii), Article IV of P . D. No. 857, as amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was in tended to restore order in the ports and to improve the quality of port services . On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraini ng order issued earlier. 11 He concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all ha rbor pilots and, for all intents and purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely implementing Section 6 of P.D. No. 857, mandating it t o control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port dis trict. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violated respondents’ right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law in issuing PPAAO No. 04-92 which limits the term of appointment of harbor pilots to 1 year sub

ject to yearly renewal or cancellation? HELD: € After carefully examining the records and deliberating on the arguments of the p arties, the Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disrega rd of respondents right against deprivation of property without due process of l aw. Consequently, the instant petition must be denied. Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the due process claus e of the Constitution It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbo r pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the pa st, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five examinati ons and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for men tal or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent dependi ng on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a rigid evalua tion of performance which is conducted only after the license has already been c ancelled. Hence, the use of the term renewal. It is this pre-evaluation cancella tion which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally in firm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of la w. The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-MO No. 08-92 are already covered b y PPA-AO No. 03-85, which is still operational. Respondents are correct in point ing out that PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a surplusage 23 and, therefore, an unnecessary enactment. PPA-AO 03-85 is a comprehensive order setting forth the Rules and Reg ulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports. It provides, inter alia, for the qualification, appointment, performance evaluation, disciplining and removal of harbor pilots - matters whic h are duplicated in PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing memorandum order. Sinc e it adds nothing new or substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be struck down. Finally, respondents insinuation that then PPA General Manager Dayan was respons ible for the issuance of the questioned administrative order may have some factu al basis; after all, power and authority were vested in his office to propose ru les and regulations. The trial courts finding of animosity between him and priva te respondents might likewise have a grain of truth. Yet the number of cases fil ed in court between private respondents and Dayan, including cases which have re ached this Court, cannot certainly be considered the primordial reason for the i ssuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In the absence of proof to the contrary, Dayan shou ld be presumed to have acted in accordance with law and the best of professional motives. In any event, his actions are certainly always subject to scrutiny by higher administrative authorities. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the court a quo dated September 6, 1993, in Civil Case No. 93-65673 is AFFIRMED . No pronouncement as to costs. CIR vs. CA Fortune Tabacco Corporation in engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes. However, on various dates, the Philippine Patent Office issued to t he corporation a separate certificates of trademark registration over CHAMPION,H

OPE and MORE cigarettes for these are classified as foreign brands since they we re listed in the WORLD Tabacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies.€ With this, Fortune Tabacco changed the names of Hope to HOPE LUXURY, More to PRE MIUM MORE hence removing the said brands from the foreign brand category. AD VAL OREM taxes were imposedon these brands for 45% per 100 s pursuant to RA 7656 An Act Revising the Excise Tax Base which took effect on July 3, 1993. However, to address the issue on these 3 brands. Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 dated July 1, 1993 was issued by BIR which provides that HOPE, MORE and C HAMPION should be considered as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreig n brand hence should be subject to 55% advorem tax on cigarettes regardless of w hether or not the right to use or title to the foreign brand was sold or transfe rred by the owner to the local manufacturer. If the ownership of the cigarette b rand is not determinable, the listing of brands manufactured in foreign countrie s appearing in the current World Tabacco Directory shall govern. The RMC 37-93 w as sent to Fortune Tobacco via telefax and was not addressed to any one. CIR ass essed an advorem tax defieciency amounting to 9,598,334 Fortune Tabacco, upon receipt of the RMC filed a petition for review with CTA an d eventually CTA upheld the position oif Fortune Tabacco cancelled the assessed amount of almost P10M for lack of legal basis and further found RMC 37-39 invali d and unenforceable such that when RA No. 7654 took effect on July 3, 1993 the b rands in question were not CURRENTLY CLASSIFIED AND TAXED at 55% and therefore s hould still be classified as locall manufactured cigarettes with 45% advorem tax .€ CIR then filed a petition to review the decision of CTA questionning its decisio n to upheld Fortune Tabacco Corp.€ Issue: W/N the RMC is valid and effective administrative issuance? Ruling: No, prior to the issuance of the questioned circular, Hope luxury, Premium More and Champion were categorized as locally manufactured cigarettes NOT bearing for eign brand and subject only to 45% ad vorem tax. Hence without RMC 37-93 the ena ctment of RA 7654 in July 3, 2003 2 days after the issuance of the circular, wou ld have no new tax rate consequence on private respondent s products. Evidently in order to place these 3 brands to amendatory law and subject them to an increa sed tax rate, the RMC 37-93wasd issued where BIR not simple interpreted the law; verily it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of notice and hearing and publication should not be ignored. Further, RMC 37-93 might have likewise infringed uniformity of taxation for uniformity requires tha t all subjects or objects treated alike or put on equal footing both in privileg es and liabilities. Lina Jr (Petitioner) v. Carino (Respondent DECS Secretary) Topic: Necessity for notice and hearing of the quasi-legislative power of admini strative bodies – A prior hearing is not necessary for the issuance of an administ rative rule or regulation. Facts: Petitioner (taxpayer, senator) was questioning the authority of the DECS Secreta ry in his issuance of DECS Order #30. He said that such authority to promulgate rules regarding imposition of school fees had been transferred to SAC (State Ass istance Council). He also said such order is inconsistent with RA 6728. DECS Order #30 – Prescribes guidelines concerning increases in tuition or other sc hool fees; Allows private schools to increase tuition and other school fees, sub ject to the guidelines set; Outlines the rate of increase in tuition. RA 6728: Consultation: Any proposed increase in the rate of the tuition fee shall be cond ucted through consultation of the school admin with parents, teachers, and assoc



iations. It granted to SAC the power to promulgate rules and regulations relevant to the purpose of that law that may be made by SAC. Respondent denied such allegations saying: Power to prescribe max tuition and fees granted by BP 232 was not withdrawn by R A 6728 and remains vested with the DECS Secretary. Solicitor General found that DECS Order #30 conforms with RA 6728 except for the 1st item stated (to raise tuition in college to not more than Php80/unit). Soli citor Gen then says that the order must be upheld except for the 1st item. Issue: W/N respondent DECS Secretary has legal authority to issue DECS Order #30 ; W/N such order is valid. Ruling: YES, SC upheld DECS Secretary’s authority. The court basing the facts on the case of Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. the Secretary of DECS, maintained that the DECS order No. 30 was valid and s hould be implemented by the schools. It followed that “since no other government agency was vested with the authority t o fix the maximum school fees, that power should be considered with the DECS Sec retary.” RA 6728 did not vest upon SAC the legal authority to establish maximum permissib le tuition and other school fees for private schools. SAC was only permitted to issue rules relevant to the purpose of that law that may be made by SAC. PD 451 authorized the DECS Secretary not only to “regulate” but also to fix the very tuition and other school fees to be charged by any private school. Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Holy Spirit Homeowners (Pet) vs. Defensor et al (Resp) The instant petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 which seeks to prevent respon dents from enforcing the IRR of RA 9207 (NGC: National Gov’t Center Housing and La nd Utilization Act of 2003) Petitioner Holy Spirit is a homeowners association from the West Side of the NGC . Respondents are ex-officio members of the NGC Administration Committee. NGC is a parcel of land in Constitution Hills QC covering a little over 440 hect ares reserved by Prex Marcos by proclaiming it as a national site. The propertie s were distributed to bona fide residents pursuant to the drive to help urban po or by Prex Corazon; this law was further developed by Prex Ramos and GMA who dis posed of the West Side of NGC. Petitioners seek to invalidate IRRs issued by NGC Administrative Committee alleg ing that IRRs run contrary to the object and purpose of the law. Example of stuff in IRR: imposition of a limitation of land area which can be bo ught by residents (Petitioners say there should be no limit, parameter should be based on land actually occupied not those appropriated by committee) and some p rovisions require an execution of a contract to sell and an imposition of Php700 /sq also contravenes law. Petitioners filed this petition for prohibition before SC. Issue: W/N petition for prohibition is a proper remedy. Held: NO A petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail IRR issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative functions.

Prohibition – an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, bo ard, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial funct ions. It is to order such entity/person to desist from further proceedings when the said proceedings are in excess or without jurisdiction, or is a grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal or any other remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions and NOT against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Purpose of a writ of prohibition – keep lower court within the limits of its juris diction to maintain the administration of justice orderly. A proper remedy for petitioners is an ordinary action for nullification which fa lls under the RTC jurisdiction (e.g. writ of injunction or TRO) Hierarchy of Courts: Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-m aking powers and quasi-judicial or adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule making power is the power to make rules and regulation s that results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the grant ing stature and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a part need not exhaust administrative remedies bef ore going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrat ive agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function and n ot when the assailed act pertains to rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Commi ttee expressly authorized by RA 9207. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule/regulation issued by the administrative agency in th e performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdi ction to pass upon the same. Since regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctri ne of hierarchy of courts. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Ople vs. Torres The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the rightto privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice B randeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Orde r No. 308 entitled"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz :(1)it is a usurpation of t he power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it impermissibly intrudes on our citize nry s protected zone of privacy.We grant the petition for the rights sought to b e vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against furthererosion.A.O . No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant pe tition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torresand the heads o f the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Commi ttee, arecharged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we i ssued a temporary restraining orderenjoining its implementation. Issue: W/N the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308 HELD: YES. As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold i ssues relating to the standing to sue of thepetitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no leg alinterest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitione r Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. Asa Senator, petitioner is posse


ssed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service InsuranceSystem (GSIS), petitio ner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the mis use of GSISfunds to implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as inva lid per se and as infirmed on itsface. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, therespondents t hemselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for th e rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) c aused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Ide ntification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announ ced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system. All signals from the respondents show t heir unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the form ality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right. KMU vs. NEDA 1. This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, an d mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of Exe cutive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the ground that it is unconstitutional. EO 420, was issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005, which REQUIRE S ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO ST REAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING FOR SU CH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. This applies only to government enti ties that issue ID cards as part of their functions under existing laws and with the following data requirements;€ Name, Home Address, Sex, Picture, Signature, Date of Birth, Place of Birth, Mari tal Status, Names of Parents, Height, Weight, Two index fingers and two thumb ma rks, any prominent distinguishing features like moles and others Tax Identificat ion Number (TIN) 2.Petitioners €allege that 1) EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes us urpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of the government. 2) EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy because it allows access to per sonal confidential data without the owner’s consent. 3) There are no compelling reasons that will legitimize the necessity of EO 420. 4)Executive Order was issued without public hearing And 5)EO 420 violates the Co nstitutional provision on equal protection of laws and results in the discrimina tory treatment of and penalizes those without ID.2 Issues: 1. €W/N €EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy. 2. W/N EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the President Ruling: SC held that the petitions are without merit. 1. The data needed €were the usual data required for personal identification by go vernment entities, and even by the private sector. Any one who applies for or re news a driver’s license provides to the LTO all these 14 specidata. Hence, does no t violate the right of citizens to privacy. 2. On the Alleged Usurpation of Legislative Power €EO €420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of

their functions under existing laws. These government entities have already been issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420. Examples of these government entities ar e the GSIS,3 SSS,4 Philhealth,5 Mayor’s Office,6 LTO,7 PRC,8 and similar governmen t entities. Hence, the purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility, a nd provide convenience to the people served by government entities. This is also purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the e xercise of legislative power. The President may by executive or administrative o rder direct the government entities under the Executive department to adopt a un iform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constit ution provides that the "President shall have control of all executive departmen ts, bureaus and offices." The same Section also mandates the President to "ensur e that the laws be faithfully executed." Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate. The President has not usurped legislative power in issuing EO. T hus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation. The a ct of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data for imprinting on the ID card does not require legislation.€ Further, EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420 doe s not compel all citizens to have an ID card. EO 420 applies only to government entities that under existing laws are already collecting data and issuing ID car ds as part of their governmental functions. Hence, there is nothing legislative about unifying existing ID system for government entities under the Executive de partment. Thus, the issuance of EO 420 does not constitute usurpation of legisla tive power. ABAKADA vs. PURISIMA Petitioners question the Attrition Act of 2005 and contend that by establishing a system of rewards and incentives when they exceed their revenue targets, the l aw (1)€ transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters; (2) violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protecti on as it limits the scope of the law to the BIR and BOC; (3) unduly delegates to the President the power to fix revenue targets without sufficient standards; an d (4) violates the doctrine of separation of powers by creating a Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the law’s implementing rules. ISSUE: Is R.A. No. 9335 constitutional? HELD: YES. R.A. No. 9335 is constitutional, except for Section 12 of the law that crea tes a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to review the law’s IRR. That RA No. 9335 will turn BIR and BOC employees and officials into “bounty hunter s and mercenaries” is purely speculative as the law establishes safeguards by impo sing liabilities on officers and employees who are guilty of negligence, abuses, malfeasance, etc. Neither is the equal protection clause violated since the law recognizes a valid classification as only the BIR and BOC have the common disti nct primary function of revenue generation. There is sufficient policy and stand ards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets as the revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC. However, the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for the purpo se of reviewing the IRR formulated by agencies of the executive branch (DOF, DBM , NEDA, etc.) is unconstitutional since it violates the doctrine of separation o f powers since Congress arrogated judicial power upon itself.

Perez vs. LPG 1. BP Blg. 33 as amended penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adult eration, under delivery, and under filling of petroleum products, as well as pos session for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of under filled liquefie d petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders. The said law sets the monetary penalty for viol ators to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000.€ 2. In June 2000 CIRCULAR no. 2000-06-010 was issued by DOE to implement BP Blg 3 3 that provides for corresponding penalties for each violation.€ 3. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines filed a petition for prohibition and annulment with prayer of temporary restraining order and writ of preliminar y injunction before the trial court €contending that the Circular induces new offe nses not included in the law. Also, the penalties in the circular exceeded the m aximum penalty under the law since it provided for penalties on a per cylinder b asis for each violation.€ Issue: W/N the provisions in the Circular is valid and to be considered as an ad ministrative regulation to have the force of penal law? Ruling: Yes, for an administrative regulation, such as the circular in this case , to have the force of penal law must satisfy the 2 requirements; 1) the violati on of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statu te itself and the 2) the penalty for such violation must be provided in the stat ute itself.€ The circular satisfies the 1st requirement for it merely lists the vario us modes by which the said criminal acts in BP Blg 33 may be perpetrated, namely : no price display board, no weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare we ight markings, no authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, n o serial number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on cy linder under filling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders and unauthorized dec anting of LPG cylinders. THESE specific acts and omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law, which seeks to curb the pernicious practices of so me petroleum merchants. For the second requirement, SC held that the circular is accord with the law, although it is silent on the maximum penalty for refillers, marketers and dealers. Nothing in the Circular that contravenes the law. The circular provides for DOE s administrative and penal measures with which to effectively curtail r ampant adulteration and shorselling, as well as other acts involving petroleum p roducts, which are inimical to public interest. To nullify the circular would re nder inutile government efforts to protect the general consuming public against nefarious practices of some unscrupulous traders.€


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