Broadcasting Revolution The Power and Limitations of Satellite News Broadcasting in the Middle East

Keenan Duffey Professor Joseph Amar Senior Arabic Thesis

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The upheaval of the Arab Spring was a time of unprecedented change in the Middle East and North Africa. The protests in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Martyrs Square in Bahrain and elsewhere in the Middle East have challenged the incumbent consensus about the region. The Arab Spring, as it is now popularly known, penetrated the clouds of oppression and everyone from political prognosticators on television to the protestors in the streets looked forward to the possibilities of an invigorated and free Middle East. Looking back on the Arab Spring, the perspective has changed. Revolutionary fervor has receded, replaced by the reality of difficult post-revolution decisions. Scholars, pundits, journalists and protestors are now in the process of analyzing the causes and events of the Arab Spring in order to better understand the roots, processes and outcomes of this seemingly spontaneous outburst of protest. The causes and long-term outcomes of anti-regime protests during the Arab Spring have been examined and debated in the pages of the foreign policy monthlies and on the airwaves of the 24-hour news networks. The search for a unifying factor among the different protests has yielded mixed results. Every Middle East expert and pundit has been searching for something to explain why certain countries have seen rebellions while others have not or something to explain why some rebellions have succeeded and some have not. Thus far, no convincing, conclusive, all-encompassing explanation has been posited. It has been suggested that the causes of the upheaval were the draconian natures of the ruling regimes that have been challenged or overthrown. There is no doubt that the fields of revolution were fertile across the Arab World. The problem, however, that some places were more fertile than others. The countries that have been rocked by upheaval and the rulers that have been challenged or ousted are not monolithic in policy or practice. Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia and Muammar Qaddafi of Libya were both multi-decade autocrats but this is where

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their similarities ended. They created two very different societies during their reigns. Tunisias unemployment rate in 2010, the year before the overthrow of Ben Ali, sat at 13%, while Libyas in 2004, the last year of available data, was a bloated 30%.1 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), an indicator of economic stability, also varied dramatically between these two countries despite their similar population sizes and geographic proximity. Tunisia received over $31 billion in FDI in 2010 while Libya received only $19 billion.2 Tunisia ranked 40th in the 2011-2012 World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report ahead of Italy and Portugal while Libya is not even ranked in the report, which included such economic featherweights as Nepal and Malawi.3 Economics cannot be the unifying factor of the Arab Spring when such diverse and in some cases exceptional economic conditions existed in the region. Socially, not just economically, Tunisia and Libya are very different places as well. Tunis, the Tunisian capital, has a reputation as a European city in North Africa. The public intellectual Christopher Hitchens described Tunisia as a country where people discuss microcredits for small business instead of macro schemes such as holy war and as a country with no grandiose armed forces, the curse of the rest of the continent, feeding parasitically off the national income and rewarding their own restlessness with the occasional coup. 4 Libya, along with most of the rest of the region, is the polar opposite of this description. The paranoid Muammar Qaddafi maintained a large military and siphoned off oil revenues to enrich himself and fellow members of his Qaddafi tribe. No one would mention Tripoli in the same breath as
1

The data is the most recent available pre-Arab Spring data available. The rate for Tunisia is from 2010 and the date for Libya is from 2004. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 2 Tunisia and Libya, Inward and outward foreign direct investment stock, annual 1980-2010, in United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Statistical Database, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx. 3 Tunisia, in Index of Economic Competitiveness, World Economic Forum, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GCR_CompetitivenessIndexRanking_2011-12.pdf. 4 Hitchens, At the Deserts Edge, politics.

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Paris or Rome. The fact is that the autocrats that have been deposed in the past year ruled in different ways and their ruling practices, while all restrictive of personal freedoms, cannot be lumped into one group. The major underlying cause, while partially related to the restrictive ruling practices of Arab and North African leaders, must also be a growing sense of solidarity among Middle Eastern and North African people. They have realized collectively that, on the whole, they live with far fewer freedoms and enjoy far fewer opportunities than most of the rest of the world. The struggles and aspirations of one country in the Arab World are now the struggles and aspirations of every country in the Arab World. If this were not the case then the protests in Egypt would do little to cause an uprising in Yemen and the overthrow of Ben Ali in Tunisia would do little to incite rebellion against Bashar Al-Assad in Syria. So, where did this unity and solidarity come from? The unity and solidarity sprung from an emerging commonality of information in the region. Arab publics had disparate views of the world because they were exposed to different, highly censored sources of news, which were vetted by government ministers. The emerging commonality of information came from the now ubiquitous satellite dishes that dot the rooftops of every apartment building in every Arab city. The images, which have been beaming across the Middle East for the past months, depicted a strong popular challenge to a shared and despotic reality. In the past one effective protest was easily lifted off the airwaves by government censors, which in turn would strip a movement of any momentum it might have gained. In the satellite age, however, one successful protest is beamed across the Middle East and government censors are, for the most part, are incapable of doing anything about it. A protest in Tunis reaches Yemen as though it happened in the Yemeni capital of Sanaa. This unifying phenomenon has been happening gradually since the first appearance of satellite television news in the 1990s and

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served to unify the movements of Yemen, Egypt, Bahrain and elsewhere despite their different social and economic settings. What they had in common was information. The second question asked and answered in print and on television is why did the revolutions start when they did? The autocratic rulers challenged and toppled in the past year, almost across the board, have been in power for decades. The fashionable response to the timing question has been, for the most part, that the growing power of social media and its ability to rouse massive protests rapidly triggered the protests because of increasing Internet access. The assumption has been that the Arab Spring was simply, as Malcolm Gladwell might suggest, the tipping point for social media. Social media, undoubtedly, was a powerful factor in some cases. Facebook and Twitter are extremely efficient organizational channels for people already connected to the Facebook and Twitter networks. A well-organized Facebook page can certainly contribute to organizing a protest and a good Tweet can communicate updates about the movements of riot police or military forces or rouse other tech-savvy citizens to come and join a protest. Certain events, like the now notorious Day of Rage on January 25, 2011 in Egypt and others, were undoubtedly planned and executed with the assistance of Facebook.5 The Arab Spring was a preview of the potential power of social media in civil society. There is one key weakness, however, to the theory that social medias influence in the Middle East and North Africa triggered the Arab Spring: the Internet has yet to penetrate a majority of the population in any Middle Eastern country outside of the Gulf. Gulf countries like Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates all have above 50% of their populations using the

The Day of Rage was created as a Facebook event and people were invited to the event. The event is notorious because it provided a name for the January 25th protests in Tahrir Square. 95,000 people were attending the event according to the Facebook page. Amira Nowaira, Egypts Day of Rage goes on. Is the world watching? The Guardian (UK), 27 January 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jan/27/egypt-protests-regime-citizens.

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Internet. Internet penetration stands at a formidable 33.9% in Tunisia, in Egypt it stands at 24.5%, but in Libya, where one of the most violently suppressed expressions of the Arab Spring ensued, Internet penetration stands at a meager 5.4%.6 The revolutionary momentum of the Arab Spring met its toughest challenge in Libya, with the possible exception of Syria, and still overcame that challenge despite low Internet usage. So how did the movement begin in Libya? Or Yemen? Or Syria? There must be another explanation. Another problematic example for the social media crowd is the example of Saudi Arabia. It is a country where Internet penetration stands at 43.6% but paradoxically the country is rated at the maximum of unfree by Freedom House.7 In the Kingdom, there is no sign of revolution, coup dtat, or otherwise looming on the horizon. Oddly enough, the country with the largest total number of Internet users in the region is Iran with 36,500,000 users accounting for 46.9% of its population. 8 This number dwarfs that of other Middle Eastern countries and yet there has been no sequel to the Arab Spring in Iran. The reality is, unfortunately for Saudis and Iranians, that access to social media and the Internet is no guarantor of popular resistance to oppressive regimes or successful protests if and when they do ensue. Hence, Saudi Arabia and Irans ruling regimes remain in firm control of their countries. Social media can contribute to protests but it does not assure their existence or success. Despite the suggestions of a recently published report, titled Opening Closed Regimes: What was the role of Social Media in the Arab Spring? which was written by several scholars at

There are only two requirements for a person to be considered an Internet User: (1) The person must have available access to an Internet connection point, and (2) The person must have the basic knowledge required to use web technology. Internet Usage Statistics for Africa, in Internet World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm (accessed January 28, 2012). 7 Freedom House, Middle East and North Africa, http://www.freedomhouse.org/regions/middle-east-and-northafrica (accessed January 29, 2012). 8 Internet Usage Statistics, Internet World Stats Usage and Population Statistics.

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the University of Washington-Seattle and American University,9 social media cannot explain the events of the Arab Spring in Yemen, Libya and other internet starved countries and can only partially explain the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. The report suggests that social media was the driving force behind the organization and execution of protests in Egypt and credit it, as the title suggests, with opening closed regimes.10 In reality, television is a more ubiquitous force than social media and has been opening closed regimes in the region for the last decade and a half. Television, unlike social media, permeates the whole of society rather than only the intellectual and economic elite, and is transforming the Middle East in profound and allencompassing ways. Social media absolutely played a role in the Arab Spring. About this there can be no doubt. But the role of satellite television in the Arab Spring has been unfairly and incorrectly discounted. Arabic language satellite television news, unlike social media, presents news to a broad Arab audience. This technology unified and spread the revolutions to all social and economic levels of Arab society and deserves far more credit than it has been given in the wake of the Arab Spring. Access is what makes satellite television such a powerful force. Satellite dishes and televisions are widely available for purchase in major Arab cities. They are no longer only the luxuries of the elite and wealthy. Even those who cannot afford to buy one will likely find one at their village, town or neighborhood caf. The Arab public is tuning into Arabic language satellite news channels on a daily basis in houses, apartments, offices and cafes from Marrakech, Morocco to Manama, Bahrain. Arab citizens are engaging with the world around them and being

This report analyzed Twitter usage during the Egyptian protests leading up to Mubaraks ouster. They looked at many aspects including content, origin and traffic. Philip N. Howard, Aiden Duffy, Deen Feelon, Muzammil Hussain, Will Mari, Marwa Mazaid, Opening Closed Regimes: What was the Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring?, (University of Washington-Seattle: Project on Information Technology and Political Islam, 2011). 10 Howard, Duffey, Feelon, Hussain, Mari, Mazaid, Opening Closed Regimes.

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exposed to information previously kept behind government censors. The effectiveness of television stems from its ability to span social and economic classes. It does not simply serve the moneyed aristocrats or the savvy intellectuals because no prohibitively expensive iPhone, MacBook or Blackberry is required. Satellite television is a part of life for a majority of Arabs. A 2010 poll of Arab publics found that 85% of Arabs get their news from television while only 8% get their news from the Internet and 5% from newspapers.11 Television reigns supreme as an information distribution mechanism in the Middle East. This force, ever present, passive and yet captivating, has changed the mindset of the Arab public and fuelled the inferno of disquiet and rebellion that has engulfed the region. The images of protest reinforced one another. The demonstrations on television in the streets of another Arab city quickly became the protests outside the viewers own window. Satellite television networks are ideal mediums for spreading revolutionary ideas and images in an information-starved region. For the most part, they lie beyond the reach of governments that would rather the networks silence the protestors. What were missing before the Arab Spring were images of successful protest and change. All that was needed was a spark and the massive distributive power of satellites would beam civil disobedience across the deserts of North Africa, through the Arab peninsula and up into Mesopotamia. The perfect spark is difficult to forecast. A monk famously self-immolated at a crowded Saigon intersection in Vietnam and brought global awareness to the religious intolerance of the South Vietnamese government. A lone citizen stood before a line of imposing tanks in China and showed the world that China was not the tranquil country the Chinese government purported it to be. Mouhammad Bouazazi became the spark that ignited the Arab
11

The survey was conducted in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and UAE. The sample size was 3,976 with a margin of error of +/- 1.6%. Shibley Telhamey, 2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll, The Brookings Institute, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2010/08_arab_opinion_poll_telhami/08_arab_opinion_poll_telh ami.pdf.

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Spring when he committed his act of self-immolation in front of the provincial governors office in Tunisia on December 17, 2010.12 Satellite television, over the past decade and a half, washed out the dam of governmentcensorship and released a deluge of information onto the previously insulated Arab publics. It has brought point-counterpoint style television shows into Arab homes and a point-counterpoint mentality to the public square. Debates are featured programming on the most popular Arab news networks like Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, and BBC Arabic. Dissension was rarely if ever featured on government television when government ministers monitored the programming. Onair conflict and disagreement was non-existent, obviously, because it was in no dictators best interest to debate the merits of their rule on their own state-run airwaves The emergence of Arabic language satellite television networks, which began appearing in the mid-1990's, however, circumvented all government interference except for that of their home country. While they are based in one country, they are capable of reaching the whole of the Arabic-speaking world. The ramifications of this information revolution are still being uncovered and analyzed throughout the region. The effect is as profound as it is uncertain. What Arabs will do with this new stockpile of information remains to be seen. It does appear, however, that Arab citizens are now better informed than ever before and will no longer tolerate gross abuses of power, which have defined Middle Eastern and North African leaders for the past half-century. A widespread assumption in the West, and the world for that matter, is that this cascade of previously unseen images and unheard opinions will spurn democratic movements throughout the previously stagnant Arab World. Even before the Arab Spring, many assumed that satellite

12

Yasmine Ryan, The Tragic Life of a Street Vendor, Al Jazeera English, January 20, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/201111684242518839.html (accessed January 31, 2012).

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television would cause a gradual democratization of the Middle East. The Public Broadcasting Station (PBS), on a 2007 episode of their well-regarded newsmagazine series Wide Angle, ran a program titled Dishing Democracy: Satellite TV Spurs Evolutionary Democracy in the Arab World.13 The episode suggests that American influence on television programming is having a democratizing impact in the Middle East by exposing Middle Eastern audiences to open debate style programming. The former Chicago Tribune foreign affairs correspondent and current Arabic media professor Marda Dunsky, writing in collaboration with the PBS series, stated, Arab satellite broadcasting plays a key role in the democratization of the region.14 Supposedly, point-counterpoint programs and group discussion programs, modeled in the style of ABCs The View, are fostering basic democratic ideas by reinforcing that everyone has a right to be heard in the Middle East and North Africa. Beyond the airwaves of PBS, the halls of academia are echoing the sentiment that democratic inclinations are sprouting from the fields of satellite dishes dotting Arab rooftops. Yale Global, a publication of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, in an article published in 2005, suggested that Al-Jazeeras coverage of Washington D.C. during the war in Iraq, has done more to educate Arabs about democracy than any other broadcaster.15 The article, by former NBC Cairo Bureau Chief S. Abdallah Schliefer, also suggests that satellite television cultivates a democratic consciousness.16 This assumption, however, assumes that only democratic ideas ply the sea of Arab news channels. Unfortunately for democratic activists,
13

Wide Angle, Dishing Democracy: Satellite Television in the Arab World, dir. Bregtje van der Haak, PBS, July 31, 2007, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/?p=4378. 14 Marda Dunsky, Dishing Democracy: Satellite TV Spurs Evolutionary Democracy in the Arab World, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/lessons/dishing-democracy/satellite-tv-spurs-evolutionary-democracy-in-thearab-world/4337/. 15 S. Abdallah Schliefer, The Impact of Arab Satellite Television on the Prospects for Democracy in the Arab World, Yale Global Online (13 May 2005): http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/impact-arab-satellite-televisionprospects-democracy-arab-world (accessed January 24, 2012). 16 Schliefer, Impact of Arab Satellite Television.

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this is hardly the case. The current Arabic language satellite news landscape is rife with ideological and stylistic competition. News networks with disparate interests, biases, and motivations compete for an increasingly information hungry Arab population. This wave of information will bring with it contrasting and conflicting ideas. Some will definitely promote democratic values while, undoubtedly, others will not. Which ideas will resonate with a majority of Arabs remains to be seen. To understand the current situation of Arabic language satellite television in the Middle East, it is critical to understand the history of television and the history of journalism in the Middle East. Arab Television History Television is not new to the Middle East or North Africa and it has been associated with politics dating back to the time of Gamal Abdul Nassers reign during the 1950s and 1960s. Even before the emergence of the satellite dish in the 1990s, television had gained a featured place in the Middle Eastern and North African cultural mosaic. Egypt, in the pre-satellite era, was the television capital of the Arabic speaking world. The rapid modernization of the television industries in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in the 1990s and early-2000s unseated Egypt from this role. Before this modern era, however, Egypt was an Arab world leader in the development of broadcasting and has influenced radio and television in the region.17 Television was associated with the misry Arabic dialect and Egyptian soap operas. The Egyptian television infrastructure was considered one of the most extensive and effective among all undeveloped countries of Asia and Africa.18 Egypt functions as a microcosm of the history of television in the Middle East because it has the longest television history in the region
17

Douglas A. Boyd, Broadcasting in the Arab World: A Survey of Radio and Television in the Middle East (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1982), 3. 18 Encyclopedia of Television, 2nd ed., (Chicago, Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2004) s.vv. Egypt.

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and during the pre-satellite terrestrial era it possessed the most complex terrestrial network. It also has a rich history of broadcasting government propaganda, which was emulated by many of its neighbors, and it was this propaganda that came to define the medium in the region for nearly three decades. Egypt began broadcasting television on July 21, 1960 after President Gamal Abdul Nasser had arranged for the creation of a television network with the assistance of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA).19 Nassers purposes, as might be expected from the antiimperialist and pan-Arabist, were not merely to entertain the Egyptian population. His aim was to persuade Egyptians. During the formative phase of Egyptian broadcasting, the majority of all programming focused on propaganda. Television was a tool, like Nassers famous Voiec of the Arabs radio station. The broadcasts fell under the auspices of the Ministry of Culture and National Guidance, an organization that figured prominently in the Nasser regime from the start and that used radio and television broadcasting to disseminate propaganda in support of the ruling regime.20 Television became synonymous with the regime. Two conflicts between Israel and Egypt, the first in 1967 and the second in 1973, illustrate the role that television played in the region during its first decades. The 1967 Six Day War between Israel and Egypt was an embarrassment for Nassers regime in Cairo. Israel decimated the Egyptian Air Force in a surprise attack and its army invaded Egypt and crossed the Sinai Peninsula in a matter of days. In the blink of an eye, the Israeli military sat on the East bank of the Suez Canal. All that separated the Israeli army and Cairo was a one hundred kilometer stretch of desert and the narrow channel of the Suez. Egypts Arab allies, Transjordan

19 20

Encylcopedia of Television, s.vv. Egypt. Encylcopedia of Television, s.vv. Egypt.

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and Syria, were simultaneously expelled from the West Bank and the Golan Heights. Nassers credibility and the credibility of the Pan-Arab movement he led were dealt a serious blow. His regime needed an outlet in which to express its side of the military conflict, or at least spin the outcome in a way less embarrassing for the regime and its allies. In addition, they also needed a forum to attack those internal foes that sought to take advantage of the regimes weakened position. Television proved to be this outlet. [In] these news broadcasts, as well as other programs, the policies of President Nasser were clear to the viewer, as were the identities of those who were considered the enemies of those policies.21 The airwaves became a device for Nasser to rally his supporters and to silence his detractors especially at times when the future of the regime was in doubt. Television was a new and potent tool of power consolidation for Middle Eastern and North African governments. Government intrusion was one of two major factors that influenced the development of television in the region. The second major factor that shaped television during this period was scarcity. There were only a few channels in most Arab countries, if not just one channel, and not enough programming to fill their airwaves each day. News programs were the only Arab produced programs on the air. These programs, as might be imagined, were always friendly towards the ruling regime. And there were no other programs portraying a contrasting reality. Nearly all other programming came from the West. In states such as Kuwait and Dubai that have two channels, one channel is devoted exclusively, or nearly so, to non-Arab programming.22 The Western programming, because it was so radically different than the reality of Arabs daily lives was seen as merely entertainment. Regimes found Baywatch perhaps corrupting but not revolutionary. Even in Egypt, the most advanced of the Arab states in terms of
21 22

Encyclopedia of Television, s.vv. Egypt. Boyd, Broadcasting in the Arab World, 8.

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television, there were only two television channels being broadcast as recently as 1982.23 NonArab programming, because there simply was not enough Arab produced programming to fill the airtime, came to define most Arab channels non-news programming. This led to the strange fact that in a region known for being at odds with Western culture and specifically American culture, viewers in the Middle East and North Africa were inundated from the 1960s until the early 1990s with the most ubiquitous of American cultural symbols: American television shows. A dramatic shift in the trajectory of Arab television began in the mid-1990s when satellites capable of transmitting to the Middle East and North Africa were, for the first time, launched into space. Initially, all channels hoping to broadcast to an Arab audience had to make use of European-owned satellites in orbit. These satellites provided a medium for transmitting Arabic language programs to a broad Arabic speaking audience. Nilesat, after being launched into orbit on April 28, 1998, became the first Arab-owned broadcasting satellite in space.24 After this came the Arab owned ArabSat and Hotbird satellites. All of these satellites broadcast hundreds of free-to-air Arabic language channels across the Middle East and North Africa.25 These satellites have the capability to carry hundreds, if not thousands of channels. There was, for the first time, an outlet for large-scale production of Arabic language programming. Satellites reshaped the potential audience for an Arabic-language show from a national audience to the entirety of the Arabic speaking world. Chairman of the Journalism and Mass Communication Department at the American University in Cairo, Hussein Y. Amin, speaking at the Institut du
23 24

Boyd, Broadcasting in the Arab World, 9. Hussein Y. Amin, The Current State of Satellite Broadcasting in the Middle East, Transnational Broadcasting Studies 5 (Fall/Winter 2000). http://www.tbsjournal.com/Archives/Fall00/Amin_Paris.html (accessed February 22, 2012). 25 Free-to-air means that nothing more than the satellite dish itself is required to receive and view channel signals. This is different than the encrypted transmissions of American satellite companies which require an additional subscription.

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Monde Arabes first Arab broadcasting seminar in 2000 predicted, Plentiful supply of satellite capacity should restrain entry costs and should keep down other barriers for private broadcasting, as well as providing a superb setting for quality programs. [] In the final analysis, the picture of satellite broadcasting in the Middle East looks very promising.26 Amins predictions proved prescient. The ability of these satellites to broadcast hundreds of channels to Arabic speaking audiences triggered significantly increased production of Arabic language television across the board, including the creation of new, dedicated Arabic language news networks. Satellites eliminated the barriers of transmission capacity and limited audience, which had previously restrained massive production of Arabic-language programming. The third factor, which had prevented increased production of original Arabic programming until the 1990s, was not just the lack of Arab produced programming but also the lack of production capability. The facilities available to producers in the Middle East paled in comparison to those in the United States and Europe. Around the same time satellites were being launched into orbit in order to broadcast to the Arab World, governments and private companies came together in Egypt to help close this production gap by building the mammoth Egyptian Media Production City. Construction on the facility began in 1992 was completed in 1995. The project, funded in part by the government owned Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU), is located in the ultraaffluent Cairo suburb of Sixth of October City. The complex is massive and at the time of its completion had 29 state-of-the-art production studios, ten outdoor shooting areas, an amusement park, a shopping mall and a five-star hotel.27 The complex offers studios and production companies massive tax breaks and exemptions if the companies are willing to produce their

26 27

Amin, The Current State of Satellite Broadcasting in the Middle East. Heba Kandil, The Media Free Zone: An Egyptian Media Production City Finesse, Transnational Broadcasting Studies 5 (Fall/Winter 2000). http://www.tbsjournal.com/Archives/Fall00/Kandil.htm (accessed February 18, 2012).

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programs in Egypt. The goal of the project was to create the Hollywood of the East and a producers paradise in Cairo in order to create more original Arabic programming.28 The government, which was the largest investor in the project, also sought the prestige associated with becoming a modern media production hub. Cairo is not the only place that has been building state-of-the-art production infrastructure in an effort to increase original Arab programming. Dubai Media City (DMC) was officially launched in 2001 and offers similar benefits to Egyptian Media Production City but on a much larger scale. It offers free-zone tax status for media outlets willing to produce and operate in their facilities. Al Arabiya, the Saudi-owned Arabic news network, broadcasts from Dubai Media City. The Saudi Pan-Arab newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat also maintain facilities in DMC. In addition to these Arab-based news outlets, many international outlets including CNN International, Reuters and BBC News maintain Middle Eastern bureaus there. Dubai Media City has not stopped its ambitious growth plan either. Dubai Media City has followed up its original development with the creation of the ingeniously titled Dubai Studio City. As you might imagine, Dubai Studio City provides state-of-the art studios for television and film production. Jamal Al Sharif, director of Dubai Studio City, said of the projects goals, Our aim is to attract the broadcast industry and the rest of the value chain such as the manufacturers, solution providers and systems integrators. [] Studio City has been designed specifically for them (broadcasters). We also have a tax-free policy and a politically stable government with a vision that is aimed at helping businesses grow.29

28 29

Heba Kandi, The Media Free Zone. Vijaya Cherian, Dubai Studio City to Woo Broadcast Crowd, Arabian Business, August 27, 2007, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/dubai-studio-city-woo-broadcast-crowd-57060.html (accessed February 12, 2012).

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The prestige, visibility and business that these production cities bring to their host country spur competition between governments to lure production to their location. Additional media cities, similar in concept and structure to the ones in Cairo and Dubai have also been erected in Amman, Jordan and Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Satellite broadcasting capacity and vastly improved regional production facilities lit the fuse for the explosion of Arabic language programming in the region. The two channels available in Egypt in 1982 have multiplied to 733 channels available by satellite in 2010.30 Of these 733 channels, 551 are broadcasting in Arabic and many of the non-Arabic channels are broadcasting with Arabic subtitles.31 The Current Television Landscape and Ownership The current Arabic language news landscape encompasses all news networks whose target audience is the Arabic speaking population stretching from as far West as Morocco to as far East as Iraq and the Gulf states and north up to the southern border of Turkey. The Arabiclanguage aspect of this definition is crucial because Israel, Cyprus and Iran, while some would say are part of the Greater Middle East, have their own individual media landscapes unique from the Arabic speaking countries. They have played no role in unifying or spreading the Arab Spring. Some might take issue with this understanding of Arabic language news landscape. Noted Middle Eastern media scholar Tarik Sabry from the University of Westminster suggests that Arabic media cannot be spoken of as a monolithic entity. He writes, How does one write a history of a fieldin this case, the latent field of Arab media [] when such a field only exists

30

Arab Satellite Broadcasters Annual Report, Arab States Broadcasting Union Statistics, http://www.absu.net/cc/report_sat2010.pdf (accessed November 16, 2011). 31 Arab Satellite Broadcasters Annual Report

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in a latent, incoherent and unconscious form?32 Sabry raises a valid point. Egyptian media, as we would think of media today, has existed in some form or another for over a century while media in Kuwait and Bahrain have existed for slightly less than half that time. They have a very limited common heritage. Egypt has a rich history of journalism from newspapers in the 19th century to radio and television in the 20th century while in Yemen, Oman and other Arabic speaking backwaters this is certainly not the case. Arabic languages satellite news networks, however, have been in existence for only two decades and their reach extends across national borders. Not only do they transcend borders but also they transcend each countrys media history. Al Jazeera in Iraq looks and sounds exactly the same as it does in Morocco and it is reaching these audiences at the exact same time. Satellites have circumvented the disparate media histories of Arab and North African countries unified populations. Arabic language satellite news networks, their rise, message and impact can be studied as a phenomenon that has affected the entire region simultaneously and is unique from the broader media context in the Middle East. The new generation of Arabic language satellite news networks are different from their government-owned and operated terrestrial predecessors. The most important feature of these satellite networks is the basic fact that nearly all of them are privately owned. All this growth would be meaningless if governments maintained their monopoly over broadcasting in the Arab World; however, Arab governments have not filled the satellite channel listings with government owned channels. Out of the 470 Arab Broadcasting Corporations registered with the Arab Satellite Broadcasters Union in 2010, only 26 were state owned.33 Out of the 733 channels that

32

Tarik Sabry, Arab Media and Cultural Studies: Rehearsing New Questions, in Arab Media: Power and Weakness, ed. Kai Hafez, 237-252 (New York, NY: Continuum Press, 2008). 33 Arab Satellite Broadcasters Annual Report.

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these corporations were broadcasting, only 124 of them were state owned.34 Arabs not only have access to a vastly wider array of channels than before but these channels do not operate under the thumb of national regimes. Three decades ago there were only two channels available in Egypt and they were both state-run. As of 2010, with a satellite dish, you can watch at least 609 privately owned channels.35 The remaining 124 state-owned channels are tempered by the fact that they must compete with the private sector. The world of television broadcasting in the Arab World has undergone a seismic shift from scarcity and government control to infinite choice and private ownership. Information has been emancipated from the manacles of government censors. Arabic Satellite News Networks and Content The freedom that has accompanied privatization has also brought with it a large degree of uncertainty. What type of content would accompany this shift? The shift in content has been towards familiar Western styles particularly in the news market. The world of Arabic language television news, today, is heavily influenced by pre-existing Western formulas for news broadcasting. It has created a unique Arabic language news landscape that combines Western styles of news programming with bolder and unfiltered content unseen on Western and especially American news networks. Beyond just the styles, biases attributed to Western news networks like the Fox News Network and MSNBC have also accompanied the proliferation of Arabic news networks. Private ownership has not eliminated political and even some degree of government influence from networks. If a Middle Eastern businessman is wealthy enough to launch his own private satellite television network, then in all likelihood he is beholden in some way, large or
34 35

Arab Satellite Broadcasters Annual Report. Arab Satellite Broadcasters Annual Report

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small, to a government that assisted them or at least allowed them to accrue that wealth. Even if a network owner were so inclined to challenge their national regime, their very presence in the media landscape often softens their rhetoric. Satellite broadcasters broadcast across borders but they must broadcast form somewhere. Naomi Sakr, a scholar of Middle Eastern media at the University of Westminster, suggests this additional complication. She wrote, Authoritarianism need not sustain itself primarily through repression, but through the structuring of governmentopposition relations in ways that give privileged opposition elites incentives to join with incumbent elites in excluding other groups by denying them power to mobilize.36 The governments, oftentimes, are able to obtain a certain degree of restraint from network owners by allowing them the right to broadcast in their country. The license extended by the government, and the governments ability to revoke that license if they deem the broadcasts obscene in some way, ensure a certain amount of cooperation from station owners. A broad and loyal audience, luckily, often tempers the governments willingness to revoke the license of a broadcaster if it means facing the popular wrath of a networks viewers. The highly interconnected nature of businessmen in the Middle East and Middle Eastern governments mean that almost no station owner is devoid of some government influence. Even in the seemingly liberal and independent bastion of Lebanon, the Hariri Corporation pulled the license of Al Jadeed television after they aired programming critical to the Saudi Arabian regime. Rafiq Hariri, the assassinated former Prime Minister of Lebanon, had significant financial connections to Saudi Arabian businesses and in turn the Saudi Royal Family. He was unwilling to anger his Saudi connections over matters of press freedom. Sakr laments this caveat in the increasingly liberalized Arabic news market, saying, Episodes like these demonstrate the
36

Naomi Sakr, Law and Policy on Ownership and Content, in Arab Television, 15-47 (New York, NY: I.B. Taurus, 2007).

Duffey 21

scope for overlap between media laws on the one hand and the personal whims of political leaders on the other. Al Jazeera offices were closed in numerous Arab countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Tunisia) when the channels political debates upset powerful people.37 Unfortunately, as analysis of the major news networks will demonstrate, the news network that is beholden to no one has yet to be founded in the Middle East and North Africa and perhaps anywhere. The Current Keys Players in Arabic Language Satellite Television News The explosion of Arabic language satellite news networks was triggered, initially, by the sounds of war emanating from Iraq and Kuwait during The First Gulf War. CNN beamed video of the American military swiftly and decisively expelling the Iraqi army from Kuwait. The image of a destroyed Soviet-built Iraqi tank sitting among the blazing oil fields of Kuwait and Southern Iraq came to define the war for those who watched it through the lens of CNN. Most government owned terrestrial stations in the Middle East sheltered their audiences from images such as these. They did not share with their audiences the extent to which the Iraqi Army had been completely and utterly decimated despite the fact that many Arab countries fought alongside the Americans. Nabil Khatib, the executive editor of Al Arabiya, described the epiphany that many Arabs felt when they realized the discrepancy between the government produced news and CNN during the Gulf War. He said, Lots of Arabs realized that all the information they were getting from Arab sourceswhether government or form Iraqis or from Kuwaitis or from their own media about the war was fake. I mean, most of the information was not true.38 The wealth of uncensored images that CNN brought with it in 1991 awakened Arabs appetite for greater and more accurate
37 38

Sakr, Law and Policy on Ownership and Content, 15-47. The Stanley Foundation, 24/7 The Rise and Influence of Arab Media, http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/radiopdf/24_7.pdf.

Duffey 22

information. Khatib recalled, in an interview for a 2006 Public Radio Documentary, Until 1991 all the broadcast media in the Arab world used to be government controlled and government owned and none of the programs used to be live. [] So, I think before Al Jazeera, you had a very sort of stagnant Arabic-speaking media in the Arab world.39 The era of information stagnation ended in the Arab World following The First Gulf War. Middle East Broadcasting Center The experience of Arabs with CNN during the Gulf War demonstrated that a demand existed for an Arabic language news networks in the 24-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week style. This demand was met with multiple entries into the Arabic language satellite news market. The funding for these preliminary ventures came primarily from Saudi Arabian businessmen and members of the Saudi Royal Family. The first free-to-air, Arabic news network began broadcasting from London in September 1991. Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC) was first launched from London, England, where it continued to broadcast until it moved to Dubais Media City in 2002.40 Initially, it broadcast news programming as well as other entertainment programming. It now operates multiple channels and its own 24/7 news network is known as Al Arabiya. The man behind this venture is Sheikh Walid bin Ibrahim al-Ibrahim, a brother-in law of Saudi Arabias now deceased King Fahd. The Saudi influence over their initial broadcasts was undeniable and even until today Al Arabiya is seen as partial to the Saudi Royal Family. Partiality, despite networks seemingly operating beyond the reach of government interference, affects the content of every major news broadcaster that enters the arena. The aforementioned Middle Eastern media scholar Naomi Sakr writes, A quick glance at the six leading free-to-air
39 40

The Stanley Foundation, 24/7 The Rise and Influence of Arab Media. Allied Media, Middle East Broadcasting Center, http://www.alliedmedia.com/ARABTV/ana_tv_and_middle_east_broadcast.htm.

Duffey 23

Arabic-language operators [] reveals that, where free speech is concerned, ownership matters more than location.41 MBCs offspring, Al-Arabiya, will be discussed in more detail shortly. BBC Arabic 1994-1996 The conflict between ownership and editorial content came into clear focus when looking at the first incarnation of the BBC Arabic Satellite Television channel. A second group of Saudi investors decided, in conjunction with the BBC, to launch a BBC Arabic satellite television news network. The Saudi investors were capitalizing on BBCs well-known and well-respected brand in the region. The BBC Arabic Radio Service has been broadcasting in the Middle East since 1938 and currently, approximately 13 million people listen to BBC Arabic Radio on a weekly basis.42 The television network was launched on March 24, 1994. The network, unlike MBC, lasted only two years before it was shut down on April 21, 1996. The reasons for the shut down were never disclosed publicly but there were constant conflicts between the news editors of the network and Saudi investors who had financially backed the venture. Hussein Y. Amin, the previously mentioned Middle Eastern media expert from American University in Cairo, wrote, During its short life, there were numerous disputes between Orbit [Saudi-owned satellite transmitter] officials and the BBC World Service Arabic language management on the editorial independence of the latter, particularly about the BBCs failure to observe the cultural sensitivities of the Saudisespecially when it comes to the Saudi royal family.43 BBC was

41

Naomi Sakr, Satellite Television and Development in the Middle East, Middle East Report, 210 (Spring 1999). http://www.merip.org/mer/mer210/satellite-television-development-middle-east (accessed February 10, 2012). 42 BBC Press Office, BBC World Service Language Services: Bringing the World to Arab Audiences, http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/keyfacts/stories/ws_langs_arabic.shtml. 43 Orbit is a Saudi Arabian owned satellite television company based out of Italy. Hussein Y. Amin, The BBC World Service Arabic TV: Revival of a Dream or Sudden Death by the Competition? Transnational Broadcasting Studies Journal, TBS 15. http://www.tbsjournal.com/Archives/Fall05/Amin.html (accessed February 8, 2012).

Duffey 24

unable to maintain editorial independence. Interference from and the demands of the Saudi investors proved too much for the networks directors. The general objectivity of BBC Arabic troubled the Saudi investors who probably assumed favorable Saudi coverage would accompany their investment. There were also more specific incidents that deepened the rift between the investors and the journalistic side of the networks operation. The most notable clash occurred when, as Amin describes, The BBC had crossed an invisible line when its reporting focused on a Saudi dissident, Al Mesari, living in London and criticizing the Saudi royals.44 The BBC provided a soapbox on which Al Mesari, a well-known militant anti-monarchy activist, was able to criticize the Saudi regime from the safety of the BBCs London studio. Saudi pressure on the British government earned Al Mesari a deportation to Dominica in the Caribbean. That decision was later overturned by an appeals court and Al Mesari was allowed to stay in the United Kingdom. This instance, however, demonstrated that physical distance from the Middle East and sanctuary in the liberal United Kingdom did not isolate the BBC from the realities of governance in the Middle East. Another major problem was the issue of cultural sensitivity, as in the BBC being sensitive enough not to mention certain unsavory aspects of Saudi Arabian culture. The BBC program Panorama aired a special called Death of a Principle that focused on the death penalty in Saudi Arabia and The Kingdoms deplorable record on human rights. The program focused on the beheading of a Saudi man and also focused on the prohibition of the intermingling of the sexes in public spaces. Orbit, the Saudi owned satellite transmitter of the BBC Arabic feed, released a statement by their president saying, This programme was a

44

Amin, The BBC World Service Arabic TV, TBS 15.

Duffey 25

sneering and racist attack on the Islamic law and culture.45 The network discontinued its transmission on April 20, 1996. BBC Arabic attempted to gain traction with its audience by touting its supposed editorial independence and quality journalism. This was its eventual undoing, however, and BBC Arabic on television would not reemerge, in any form, for nearly a decade. The Arabic language news landscape during the 1990s had minimal competition and ownership groups were able to exert more control because it was unlikely another network would carry a censored story. This is what happened in the case of BBC Arabic Television. As the number of networks grew, and ownership spread beyond wealthy Saudis, such censorship became less and less feasible but it certainly did not go away. The failure of BBC Arabic was a rough patch in the development of Arabic language satellite news in the region. As Amin points out, The failure of the first BBC Arabic television is a sad story, not just because of the death of a dream but also because its closure represented a blow to press freedom and freedom of expression.46 The BBC Arabic situation was more speed bump than setback for news in the region. The market for high quality satellite news remained, however, and it was only a matter of time before new networks began to fill the void left by the departure of the BBC. Al Jazeera The network most well known in the West and the most watched in the Middle East and North Africa is Al Jazeera. The Qatar based network came into existence in 1996 and has been a lightning rod of controversy since its launch. Al Jazeera has become known for challenging the status quo in Arab journalism. The network really began to gain credibility and notoriety during
45

Hugh Miles, Al Jazeera: The Inside Story of the Arab News Channel that is Challenging the West, (New York, NY: Grove Press) 32. 46 Amin, The BBC World Service Arabic TV, TBS 15.

Duffey 26

its coverage of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Americas subsequent occupation of that country. Notably, it aired pictures of dead American servicemen and women, which American news outlets are not allowed to do. Stunts like these exemplify the raw nature of Al Jazeeras broadcasting and journalistic ethos. Lieutenant General John Abizaid famously castigated Al Jazeera for the airing of those images at a press conference during the early stages of the Iraq War. He remarked to an Al Jazeera reporter, saying, Youre from Al Jazeera Television. Im very disappointed that you would portray those pictures of our servicemen. I saw that and I would ask others not to do that. I regard showing these pictures as absolutely unacceptable.47 Al Jazeera operates outside of the American tradition of news and was willing to take risks and show things that Western and especially American news outlets would never show. The networks reputation has grown by leaps and bounds since that time. At the beginning of the Iraq war, Americans thought of Al Jazeera as unprofessional, unreliable and virulently anti-American. Compare that view with the comments of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011 about Al Jazeera and its coverage of the Arab Spring, In fact viewership of Al Jazeera is going up in the United States because its real news. You may not agree with it, but you feel like youre getting real news around the clock instead of a million commercials and, you know, arguments between talking heads and the kind of stuff that we do on our news which, you know, is not particularly informative to us, let alone foreigners.48 The impact of the network on the world of global news, not just Arabic language news, is undeniable. Secretary Clinton points out that there are editorial issues at Al Jazeera, however,
47

Terrence Smith, A Different Language: How the Arab Media are Covering the War, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-june03/arabnews_04-06.html. 48 Kirit Adia, Sec. of State Hillary Clinton: Al Jazeera is Real News, U.S. Losing Information War

Duffey 27

they are informing their audience rather than imposing endless commentaries upon them. Even the United States government, which has rarely been the beneficiary of Al Jazeeras coverage, is conceding that it is a force in the global news industry. Al Jazeera is different than the major Arabic news networks because it was not the brainchild of a Saudi investment group. Al Jazeera is the venture of the Qatari ruling family and specifically its Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani. Qatar, the small peninsula that juts off of Saudi Arabia into the Persian Gulf, was an Arab backwater for much of the 20th century. Qatar, like the United Arab Emirates, is a former protectorate of the British Empire. It gained its independence in 1971 and at the time the country only had a population of 111,133.49 Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani became Emir in 1972 following the departure of the British from the region. Sheikh Khalifa opened Qatar up to foreign oil investment. He signed co-production agreements with Standard Oil Company of Ohio and Amoco in the 1980s that enriched Qatar but mostly enriched him.50 Sheikh Khalifas son, Sheikh Hamid, came to power in a bloodless coup dtat, which he carried out against his father in 1995. Sheikh Khalifa was vacationing in Zurich while Hamid carried out the coup. Hamid called his fathers hotel room and it is said that Shiekh Khalifa hung up the phone immediately upon hearing the news.51 Khalifa worked to regain the throne but was unable to do so. Sheikh Hamid was too well organized and would not be dethroned and has maintained control over Qatar for nearly two decades. Al Jazeera has become synonymous with challenging the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East but it might surprise some to hear that Khalifa is no democratic activist. He seized his power and maintains an absolute monarchy in Qatar. He certainly has had the opportunity
49 50

http://www.qsa.gov.qa/QatarCensus/HistoryOfCensus.aspx CENSUS DATA http://www.qnaol.net/QNAEn/Qatar/History/Pages/SheikhKhalifaBinHamadAlThani.aspx 51 Danna Harman, Backstory: The Royal Couple that put Qatar on the map, The Christian Science Monitor, March 5, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0305/p20s01-wome.html.

Duffey 28

and capability to implement stronger democratic institutions in his emirate but he has thus far failed to do so. He is in fact mythically anti-democratic. It is rumored that, during boyhood trip to London with his father, he laughed uncontrollably in the House of Commons in London after witnessing his first parliamentary debate.52 His relatively smooth and internationally uncontested ascent to the throne would prove to have profound impacts on Arabic language news television and the behavior of Middle Eastern and North African governments. Sheikh Hamid, while not strengthening the democratic institutions of his country, has worked to consolidate his power by raising the international profile of Qatar. He is, paradoxically, working to define Qatar as the intellectual capital of the Middle East. One of the most high profile projects undertaken in this vein is the creation of Education City. Education City has lured major American universities to Doha, Qatar where they set up branch campuses in exchange for substantial donations from the Qatari government. Universities that have set up campuses in Dohas Education City include Weill Medical College of Cornell University, Georgetowns School of Foreign Service, Carnegie Mellon, Virginia Commonwealth University, Texas A&M, and Northwestern Universitys Medill School of Journalism.53 In addition to education, Qatar has raised its global profile by hosting major sporting events such as the Asian Games and has been chosen, albeit tenuously, to host the 2022 World Cup. Al Jazeera, however, has had a larger impact on Qatars profile in the Middle East than any of these other endeavors. The origins of the network itself stem from the ambitions of Sheikh Hamid to gain not only prestige but also political leverage over his more affluent and powerful neighbors on the Persian Gulf. Plans for the network existed as far back as 1994 but the impetus
52 53

Miles, Al Jazeera: The Inside Story, 13. Tamar Lewin, U.S. Universities Rush to Set Up Outposts Abroad, The New York Times, February 10, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/10/education/10global.html?pagewanted=all.

Duffey 29

for the creation of the network came after Qatari national television came into conflict with the Bahraini government. Qatari state television aired the opinions of several Bahraini dissidents, which drew intense criticism from Qatars neighbor. Bahraini officials accused the Qataris of conspiring to undermine their government. As a show of resolution, Sheikh Hamid issued the founding decree of Al Jazeera the next month as a show of commitment to the opinionated and controversial format that defined Qatari state television and would soon come to define Al Jazeera.54 The network began with an initial investment of $147 million from Sheikh Hamid and has continued to rely on Qatari ruling family benevolence.55 The network has gained a serious share of the Arabic language news market but it continues to struggle financially. Al Jazeera expert Hugh Miles, author of Al Jazeera: The Inside Story of the Arab News Channel that is Challenging the West, wrote in the foreign affairs journal Foreign Policy, The network (Al Jazeera) has consistently lost money since its launch, which is unsurprising, as no Arab channel makes a profit.56 The fact is that profit is rather low on Al Jazeeras list of objectives. The Qatari government has access to more than $100 billion in assets under the auspices of the Qatari Sovreign Wealth Fund. Zubair Iqbal, a scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington D.C., said, Al Jazeera is funded essentially for strategic reasons. Qatar has ambitions to become a major player in the regionI dont think they are interested in making money [on the network].57 The goal of the network is to show that it is willing to be different than its more conservative neighbors and in the long term develop an international reputation as a liberal
54 55

Miles, Al Jazeera: The Inside Story, 28. Jonathan Berr, Can Al Jazeera Capitalize on Its Newfound Popularity? Daily Finance, February 2, 2011, http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/02/02/will-al-jazeera-capitalize-on-its-newfound-popularity/ (accessed February 17, 2012). 56 Hugh Miles, Think Again: Al Jazeera, Foreign Policy (June 12, 2006), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/06/12/think_again_al_jazeera?page=0,1. 57 Berr, Can Al Jazeera Capitalize on Its Newfound Popularity?

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bastion in The Persian Gulf. Strategically, the perception of Qatar that Al Jazeera generates is more important than the financial realities of maintaining the network. Quality production and journalism, though thus far unprofitable, have garnered Al Jazeera the largest market share of any Arabic language satellite news network. The failure of the initial BBC Arabic venture in 1996 proved to be Al Jazeeras gain. 120 laid off BBC Arabic employees, including broadcasters, technicians and administrators immediately signed on to work for Al Jazeera.58 Al Jazeera quickly rose to a level of professionalism typically associated with the BBC because so many of its employees were in fact veterans of the BBC Arabic venture. In the long term, quality came to become a critical tool in growing each satellite networks audience and in the case of Al Jazeera it has elevated it above the competition. Al Arabiya Al Jazeeras success and independence has not gone unnoticed nor has it gone unchallenged. Al Jazeera, operating without Saudi restrictions placed on its predecessors at MBC and at BBC Arabic, has drawn the ire of many Saudis. Al Jazeera is not subject the same amount of external pressure that ultimately destroyed the initial BBC Arabic venture. Not to be outdone by its pint-sized neighbor, a group of Saudi investors from the original MBC with the assistance of the previously mentioned Rafiq Hariri launched Al Arabiya in 2003.59 The channel is an offshoot of the initial MBC channel, which has expanded from one general interest channel to more than five. Al Arabiya marks the companys entrance into the 24/7 news arena. Al Arabiya is known throughout the Middle East for its moderate reporting of news and partiality to American and Saudi issues. The network was undoubtedly started as a reaction to the
58 59

Miles, Al Jazeera: The Inside Story, 33. Peter Feuilherade, BBC News Profile: Al-Arabiya TV, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3236654.stm.

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uncensored, unwieldy and wildly successful Al Jazeera. Saudis and others who have been harmed by Al Jazeeras coverage see that network as unnecessarily and unprofessionally provocative. Al Arabiyas editorial leadership said from day one, We are not going to make problems for Arab countries. [] Well stick to the truth, but theres no sensationalism. Their leadership is unabashedly conservative. The viewership of Al Arabiya reflects its conservative Saudi foundations. As of 2010, Al Arabiya was the news network of choice for 9% of all Arabs. Most of this viewership, however, comes from Saudi Arabia where Al Arabiya is the network of choice for 30% of the population. In Egypt it is preferred by just 4% of the population and in Lebanon the number is just 2%.60 The style is unsuccessful outside of Saudi Arabia where most of the Arabic speaking population remains unimpressed with the editorial content and style. BBC Arabic 2008-Present BBC Arabic returned to the Arabic language news market in 2008 to much optimism and fanfare. British taxpayers, fund the new network, which is an important departure from the previous incarnation, which was infamously beholden to its Saudi Arabian backers. The network aims to cover events in the Arab world, at least according to its motto, without fear or favor.61 The expectations for the BBC this time around were different. Hussein Y. Amin wrote in 2008, Those running the BBCs Arabic television news channel must understand that Arab audiences expect the service to support democracy and human rights aggressively. This means that Arab audiences are looking for the BBC to tackle issues of democratization

60 61

Shibley Telhamey, 2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll. Eric Pfanner, BBC Set to Open Its New Arab World TV Channel, The New York Times, March 4, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/world/middleeast/04bbc.html (accessed February 18, 2012).

Duffey 32

and corruption as well as to open the door of free debate to different players in the region.62 The professionalism and objectivity of BBC Arabics second incarnation has not resulted in rating success for the network. BBC Arabic has failed to secure any real market share. The network continues to broadcast high quality and professional programming but its impact on the region remains minimal. Britains imperial history in the region, despite the goodwill generated by the BBC Radio Service, has kept Arab viewers from tuning-in in large numbers. The history of Arabic language satellite television networks is brief but dense. A distinct group of key players have emerged in the market. Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya and MBC dominate the market outside of Egypt and still comprise nearly half of the market in Egypt. The privatization of the industry has allowed for international groups to enter the market as evidenced by the American government owned Al Hurra, BBC Arabic, France 24 Arabic, the Russian owned Rusiya Al-Yaum. These networks all provide high quality programming but have failed to gain traction in the market because they lack credibility with Arab audiences who view them as nothing more than appendages of foreign governments and tools of their foreign policy. The networks that have emerged as the leaders of Arabic language satellite news environment are indigenous to the Middle East. Middle Eastern audiences have voted with their remotes against Western backed and produced networks. This field has become a competition of styles, ideology, and content between the Arab based and backed networks. The Information Ministers Last Stand

62

Amin, The BBC World Service Arabic TV, TBS 15.

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Governments are still able to exert a degree of control over owners of Arabic language news networks as demonstrated by the actions taken by Rafiq Hariri against Al Jadeed Network in Lebanon and by the dealings of Saudi Arabian investors with the original BBC Arabic. Beyond simple coercion, the Information Ministers of the Middle East and North Africa have not sat idly by while these Arabic satellite news networks have circumvented their government censors and regulations. Arab Information Ministers like nothing more than to find new and complex ways to limit freedom of the press. It took Arab governments nearly a decade and a half but in 2008 they finally convened together in attempt to create and implement an Arab equivalent of the Federal Communications Commission, which would regulate satellite television in the region. Their objective, or so they stated, is to prevent obscenity from reaching Arab televisions weather terrestrially or from a satellite.63 The proposed charter, which the Arab League as a whole collaborated on, stated, Freedom of expression is a cornerstone of Arab media provided that such freedom is practiced with full conscious and responsibility, in respect to protecting the supreme interests of the Arab countries, the Arab world, the freedoms and rights of others and commitment to media professionalism and ethics. [] [Also] Abstaining from broadcasting anything that would contradict with or jeopardize Arab solidarity and PanArab cooperation and integration.64 The Charter, comically, claims that its is to prevent anything that would jeopardize Arab solidarity and Pan-Arab cooperation and integration.65 Ironically, it was the free flow of information they would limit, which was most effective in strengthening Arab solidarity during
63

Daoud Kuttab, Satellite Censorship Arab League Style, Arab Media and Society, March 2008, http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=651. 64 Kuttab, Satellite Censorship Arab League Style. 65 Kuttab, Satellite Censorship Arab League Style.

Duffey 34

the Arab Spring. Despite their grand declarations about protecting Arabs, the main objective of this charter and the organization as a whole is not to protect citizens but the regimes that citizens might be inclined to overthrow if they had access to more information. The charter was a thinly veiled ploy to assert more control over Arabic language satellite news networks, which were eroding Arab and North African governments monopoly over information. The Arab League eventually passed the charter. The charter is limited significantly by the fact that it only applies to Arab League members and broadcasters operating within their borders. This is good news for BBC Arabic and other London or Italian based broadcasters, which lie beyond its jurisdiction. The charter, though seemingly harsh, remains largely unimplemented. However, it does give governments, especially in Egypt where a large number of broadcasters remain, added legitimacy should they decide to ban a network or program. The Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the de facto ruler of Egypt at the time, has not been shy in limiting the ability of even non-Egyptian based broadcasters to broadcast from Egypt. SCAF demanded, in early-September 2011, that a sister channel of Al Jazeera which embraced a C-SPAN type format called Al Jazeera Mubasher Misr (Al Jazeera Live Egypt) end its broadcasts immediately. Al Jazeera reported, uniformed security personnel raided the bureau, seizing live broadcasting equipment and detaining engineer Islam al-Banna.66 SCAF claimed that Al Jazeera Mubasher Misr did not have the proper permits to continue broadcasting in Egypt, however, Al Jazeera officials said that they had already applied for the permit and were assured that their continued broadcast was acceptable. The Committee to Protect Journalists reported soon after that, Although the SCAF said the shutdown was the result of the

66

Egyptian military institutes new media restrictions, CPJ.com, http://www.cpj.org/2011/09/egyptian-militaryinstitutes-new-media-restriction.php.

Duffey 35

channel operating without a license, CPJ research indicates that this was merely a pretext to silence the critical broadcaster.67 Documents like the Arab League Satellite Charter and the statements from SCAF indicate that some Arab governments still utilize jingoistic rhetoric as an effective pretext for limiting press freedom. Governments are utilizing more subtle and insidious tactics than just broad, publicly declared charters while attempting to limit press freedoms. Information ministers continue to try to assert their influence into the writings and biases of journalists throughout the region. Many journalists remain on government payrolls, directly or indirectly, and government propaganda is still alive and well on state-run networks and in state-controlled newspapers. While their influence has certainly been eroded since the advent of satellite television, they nonetheless continue to play a role in informing citizens. The Federation of Arab Journalists (FAJ) is a living artifact from a more censored time in the Arab World but it is attempting to remain effective and relevant in the era of the satellite dish. Kamel Labidi of The Daily Star, an English-language daily newspaper in Beirut, reminds readers that the FAJ is an umbrella organization for statecontrolled Arab press syndicates.68 The group is a union of regime hacks, who claim to advocate for journalistic excellence and freedom of the press. They have presented liberal leaders such as the ousted Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia with awards for championing the rights of journalists in his country. They claim in their motto that they use their pens and professional skills in the struggle for the total and comprehensive liberation of the Arab nation from any foreign intervention or colonial influence.69 The deceptive nature of their mission is especially insidious because they advocate for a shedding of foreign intervention or colonial influence
67

Egyptian military institutes new media restrictions, CPJ.com, http://www.cpj.org/2011/09/egyptian-militaryinstitutes-new-media-restriction.php. 68 Kamel Labidi, At 40, the Federation of Arab Journalists is Still Valueless, The Daily Star, May 22, 2004. 69 Labidi, At 40, the Federation of Arab Journalists is Still Valueless.

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but at this point in history it is not so much colonial influence that threatens Arab people as much as the autocratic rulers who support the FAJ. Labidi emphasizes illogical structure of the federation, writing, The FAJ relies for survival on financial assistance from the Arab League and donations from Arab rulers who remain unwavering enemies of media freedom.70 The FAJ, unfortunately for credible journalists in the Arab World, discredits journalism and journalists in the region. It still serves as an organ of autocratic regimes in the Middle East, although the list of active leaders who support the Federation is quickly dwindling. The organization, rather than advocating for and strengthening the reputation of journalists and journalism in the region, has reinforced the popularly held notion that journalistic scribes are nothing more than extensions of government information ministers. Unfortunately, in some cases, this is not an unfair conclusion. The continued interference in the editorial workings of news networks by Arab governments is a self-destructive practice in the new media landscape. It might be effective in the short term but it will not pay off over time. The silencing of Al Jazeera Mubasher Misr drew more attention to the network because the story was widely reported by its sister-station Al Jazeera Arabic as well as other satellite news networks. It simply reinforces the idea that these regimes have something to hide. The increased competition and diversity of broadcasters also limits the credibility of any conspiracy theory of a broadcaster against the state. Viewers can easily change to a different news network and check the validity of the a governement reported story. Al Jazeera and Qatar were widely reported to be conspiring against the Egyptian regime on Egyptian state television in late-January and early-February 2011. Egyptian government officials came on state television and explained the motives of Al Jazeera, one of them saying, To hell with Al Jazeera. These channels serve the interests of specific parties. Its a Qatari policy, not a

70

Labidi, At 40, the Federation of Arab Journalists is Still Valueless.

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media agenda. It serves Israel, Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria.71 Such outrageous claims hold little weight when the scene being depicted on every other network, not just Al Jazeera, contradicts what is being shown on state television. Competition has limited governments ability to spin grassroots insurrection into conspiracy. Arab Journalism and Arabic News Networks Network owners and information ministers are not the only ones shaping the news being broadcast on Arabic language satellite news networks. Journalists and editors, themselves, have incredible power to shape the narratives and stories at each news network. These journalists and editors are shaped by the challenging history of journalism in the Middle East. Arab journalism, as a whole, has spanned the spectrum of credibility. It has been considered a champion of the people and also a tool of the most oppressive of regimes. Like television history, each country has had its own unique experience with journalism. Noha Mellor, a scholar of Arab journalism at Kingston University in London, wrote, It is hard to talk in general terms about Arab press. Rather, each Arab country has developed its press and media systems and discourses at a different pace to that of their native countries.72 The famous AlAhram newspaper in Egypt began publishing in 1875 while in the Gulf States there were no papers published locally until the 1950s and 1960s. The histories are different and like many cultural developments in the region, Egypt proved to be the trendsetter. The public conception of journalists has been in flux beginning during the colonial period and continuously changing until today. Media outlets, in the colonial period this meant mainly
71

The Revolution Through Arab Eyes, Manufacturing the truth, dir. Sherif Saeed. Al Jazeera, February 14, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/revolutionthrougharabeyes/2012/02/20122612918497347.html. 72 Noha Mellor, The Arab Journalistic Field, in Modern Arab Journalism: Problems and Prospects, 42-72 (Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh Press, 2007).

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newspapers, were initially propaganda outlets for the foreign powers in order to keep the colonized as docile as possible. Journalists were affiliated with the colonial power and the local ruling regime. In the eyes of the Arab elite, journalists were considered worthy of respect but so was any other position that associated someone with the colonial power. Colonial-era newspapers were associated with subservience to the colonial powers during the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries and in fact contributed to enhance journalists image.73 In a complete inversion of todays reality, association with the colonizing power did not immediate discredit someone with the majority of the native population and it fact it contributed to their legitimization. Journalists were not working for the best interests of the native population during this time but they were still held in high-esteem by Arabs. Decolonization, as a broad movement among all the European powers, began initially following World War I and began in earnest after World War II. Colonized populations in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and South America emerged from under the yoke of their colonial masters and each did it in their own way. In some regions the transitions were relatively smooth such as in Egypt where British influence was shed gradually. Elsewhere, such as in former French territories like Algeria; the product was militant and bloody. Journalists in the Middle East quickly took up the mantle of calling for independence and advocating on behalf of the Arab population during this period. The role of Arab journalists shifted drastically from one of colonial support to anti-colonial activism. Mellor points out that this was not only good for the citizens but also for the journalists and newspapers, The newspapers issued then called for independence and unity, which attracted a wide readership. In the beginning of the 1940s for example, several Lebanese journalists who
73

Mellor, The Arab Journalistic Field, 58.

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called for the independence of the country from the colonial power boosted their public image.74 The moved marked a shift in the opinions of the intellectual elite in the Middle East. Journalists were part of this intellectual elite and naturally their opinions shifted as well. The populations of Middle Eastern and North African countries were eager to shed colonial influence, which had benefited them so little. The anti-colonial agenda of many journalists during this period attracted large audiences and grew the credibility of journalism as a profession. This cannot be discounted as one of the reasons that the journalistic shift took place during this time. No matter their motivations, however, journalistic credibility with Arabs reached its zenith during the process of decolonization. Decolonization left in its wake a chaotic political scene in the Middle East and North Africa. Colonial governments did not give way to fair democratic governments despite the democratic ornaments of many despotic Middle Eastern regimes. The shift from colonial governance to authoritarian governance also marked another shift in the role of journalists. PanArabism emerged as the new modus operandi for unifying Arab people around oppressive governments and journalists played their parts in supporting this new ideology. Unfortunately, the journalistic environment was altered dramatically from one where journalists were the champions of the native populations during the decolonization period to a new environment where they functioned as little more than stooges for the emerging oppressive regimes that began dotting the region. Rulers such as Gamal Abdul Nasser emerged on the scene and journalists ability to advocate on behalf of the people was almost completely eliminated. The regime coopted the media and used them as propaganda outlets.
74

Mellor, The Arab Journalistic Field, 58.

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The era of the despotic autocrat might well be ending in the Middle East. The leaders that have defined this era like Hosni Mubarak, Zine Abidine Ben Ali, Bashar Al-Assad, Muammar Gaddafi and Ali Abdullah Saleh have all been ousted or are on their last legs. The era began with Gamal Abdul Nassers rise to the Egyptian Presidency in 1956 and signaled the beginning of this half-century era of government interference in and utilization of journalists. The reputation of journalism in the region suffered, and rightly so, during this period. Mellor points out, in her study on the evolution of Arab journalism, Journalists integrity has been questioned by a readership that saw their national press turning into a mouthpiece for the government. [] Because of the difficult conditions in which they operate, journalists have not been able to gain the sympathy of readers.75 Journalists leading and admired role in society, gained during the decolonization period, evaporated while they emerged as favored instruments of the regimes. The period from the beginning of Nassers reign until the early 1990s was a period that reset the credibility and quality of journalism in the Middle East. Modern Arab Journalistic Practice Modern Middle Eastern newsrooms, despite their perceived independence and liberality, are not without their own mixed motivations biases. A 2005 examination of Al Arabiyas newsroom exposed that despite private ownership, the satellite news editors and news reporters have their own biases and that these biases are being applied to the content of the network. The general manager of the network in 2005, Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed, described the media landscape in the Middle East at the time, saying, The region is being filled with inaccuracies and partial truths. I think people will always make good judgments if they have the right

75

Mellor, The Arab Journalistic Field, 58.

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information and the whole information. What we lack right now is truth and information.76 AlRasheds delivered a not-so-subtle jab at Al Arabiyas largest competitor, Al Jazeera. Al Rasheds concern with Al Jazeera is not that it is limiting content, which was the critical failing of the pre-satellite era, but rather he is concerned with the presentation of content that does make it on the air. This gets to the core of the biggest issue in Arabic satellite news. There is no agreement on facts in the current Arab media landscape. Each network is portraying what they consider to be the truth but each sides truth has been filtered through a subtler but more complex sieve than government censors. The biases of business, governments and journalists are all brought to bear on the news in insidious ways. Some think the truth means the raw reporting of Al Jazeera while others view it as the highly tempered reporting from Al Arabiya. He later says, Sensationalism [in the news] has incited people to hatred. I have smelled the blood of hatred and I cannot understand how someone in an air-conditioned newsroom feels that he has the right to manipulate peoples emotions, to rile up or to generalize about a group, when he sees the repercussions.77 Al Rashed and in turn Al Arabiya fear visceral public reaction and view it as an excuse to limit information. Al Rashed exposes the true mission of his news organization. If Al Jazeera is meant to stir passion and foment dissent, then Al Arabiya is meant to maintain the status quo or at the very least temper the reporting of Al Jazeera. Neither network is doing what could be called objective journalism. The late The New York Times Middle Eastern correspondent Anthony Shadid, while working on a story in 2005 about evolving Arabic news ethics, wrote,

76 77

Samantha Shapiro, The War Inside the Arab Newsroom, The New York Times Magazine, January 2, 2005. Shapiro, The War Inside the Arab Newsroom.

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In few other places do the rules of journalism feel so fluid, so competitive, with the stakes so high. And never in the history of Arab media have two channelsAl-Arabiya and AlJazeera, based in Qatarhad so much influence and leeway in determining the very definition of news and, by default, the priorities of their viewers.78 The rules of the game are being made up on the fly and this makes the news networks impact all the more uncertain and the information environment they are creating all the more unstable. The problems that have accompanied the proliferation of Arabic news networks go well beyond the fact that the two most prominent networks, Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, define their editorial standards and practices in relation to one another. In addition to this, the Arab journalists are not maintaining objective distance between themselves and the issues on which they report. Samantha Shapiro of The New York Times Magazine wrote in an article about Al Arabiya in 2005, Many employees in Al-Arabiyas newsroom have intimate connections with the conflict they cover.79 This raises the issue that many journalists in the Middle East are not only reporting the news but they are simultaneously advocating on behalf of one of these connections. The history of journalism in the region is devoid of a historical basis for objective journalism. The pendulum of objectivity has swung from pandering to colonial powers, then to supporting anti-colonial fervor, and more recently to bending to will of authoritarian regimes. The pendulum is now shifting once more, without the obstruction of major government censorship, towards activist journalism imposing their biases on the news agenda. This new generation of activist journalists, especially those employed by the satellite television networks that have tremendous visibility, have become the news agenda setters in the
78

Anthony Shadid, A Newsman Breaks the Mold in Arab World, The Washington Post, May 1, 2006 (national edition). 79 Shapiro, The War Inside the Arab Newsroom.

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region. Objectivity, however, sits low on the list of factors that determine their news agendas. Their newfound power is immense and unprecedented and has emerged in the wake of the decline of the Arab information minister. Thus far there has not been a concerted effort on behalf of these newly empowered journalists to separate their personal beliefs from their profession. Lawrence Pintak, Arab media expert and founding dean of the Edward R. Murrow College of Communication at Washington State University, wrote, Arab journalists at the dawn of the twenty-first century see their missions driving political and social change in the Middle East and North Africa. They most closely identify with the pan-Arab region and the broader Muslim world, not with an individual nation-state; they see political reform, human rights, poverty and education as the most important issues facing the region.80 This sums up the ethos of the activist journalist. The Arab identity of these activist journalists in is playing a powerful role in the personal biases they are imposing on content. Arab journalists are now thinking in supranational, pan-Arab terms rather than in national terms. This will inevitably translate into a news agenda that operates in pan-Arab rather than national terms. A survey taken by Pintak further illustrates the supranational way Arab journalists now see themselves. His results are jarring because they stand in stark contrast to Western ideas about objectivity being central to journalism. When asked what the role of a journalist was, 75% of Arab journalists polled responded that their role was as a political reformer.81 This was the most chosen response. When asked to identify themselves personally, the journalists chose Arab 23% of the time, Muslim 25% of the time, and their national identity 15% of the time.
80

Lawrence Pintak, The Mission of Arab Journalism, in The New Arab Journalist: Mission and Identity in a Time of Turmoil, (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 2011) 155. 81 Pintak, The Mission of Arab Journalism, 162.

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It is not just a highly biased and activist identity that is surprising about the journalists responses but also that they are aware that their very responses threaten the credibility of their profession. Professionalism and matters of credibility are the most widely held concerns about the future. When asked what the greatest threat facing Arab journalists was, 71% responded professionalism, 70% responded that it was government control, and 66% responded ethics. Professionalism will only be threatened if these journalists allow their motivations obscure the facts. Unfortunately, this is a definitional aspect of activist journalism. In addition, government interference also remains a concern and rightly so based on the experiences of Al Jadeed in Lebanon and the initial BBC Arabic venture in London. This new and wild journalistic environment will test the ethics of journalists in a region where journalism has been devoid of ethical practice for decades. The new, liberalized journalistic environment, which is supplanting the lethargic and passive past, will put the ethical practice of Arab journalists under the microscope. Pintak notes, The survey responses [] were indicative of the fact that the flow of news in any given period is dictated as much by events as by the journalists perception of what is important in the broader scheme of things.82 Journalists new power brings with it new responsibility. He later goes on to write, seven of the top ten roles Arab journalists considered most significant together constitute what my be considered an agenda setting or change function, and two other in the top ten are interpretive or development functions that, in this context, support change.83 The problem with activist journalism is that it is inherently not objective. Anecdotally, journalists admit that they are not objective but view this lack of objectivity as an asset. A broadcaster for the Lebanese Broadcasting Company (LBC), Tani Mehanna, summed it up this way, If you do
82 83

Pintak, The Mission of Arab Journalism, 162. Pintak, The Mission of Arab Journalism, 166.

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not have a mission to try to change [the world] around you in a positive way, you might as well work for any of the intelligence agencies.84 Right or wrong, the biases of journalists are being unabashedly applied to the news agenda. The identity of this new breed of journalists is multifaceted. Satellite televisions ability to cross these borders has created an identity in which Arab journalists see themselves as the guardians of the Arabs. The guardian role, yet another aspect of activist journalism, shapes what becomes part of the news agenda, what does not, and how each story that does make it gets reported. Pintak expounds further on this role, The guardian function demonstrates that the worldview of Arab journalists in the post9/11 era has a significant defensive aspect, in which they see themselves defending the Arab homeland at a time when an Arab country is being occupied by a foreign army and the Islamic world as a whole is, in the view of many Arabs and other Muslim, under siege. Arab journalists, noted the Saudi writer Fatany, are not only defending the Arab nation, but also the Arab causes.85 The guardian role of Arab journalists, as Arab journalists themselves admit, is defensive in nature. At a time when they see themselves defending the Arab homeland, it seems that Arab journalists might adopt the same sort of mentality that Arab information ministers had maintained for years.86 As the Federation of Arab Journalists assert, their goal is to prevent the defamation of Pan-Arab causes. This is where the ethical standards of the Arab journalist will truly be put to the test. As the news agenda setters, stories that would be unflattering for Arabs might not get the attention they deserve if they get any at all.
84 85

Pintak, The Mission of Arab Journalism, 166-167. Pintak, The Mission of Arab Journalism, 168. 86 Pintak, The Mission of Arab Journalism, 168.

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The final major threat facing Arab journalists and journalism in the Middle East, as the journalists themselves observed, is quality. The quality of writing and reporting declined dramatically during the era of the autocrat in the Middle East. Certain predictable patterns began to emerge, especially in state run media. The art of the editorial suffered greatly. Pandering became rampant in prominent newspapers and on the airwaves. Columnists developed penchants for writing tired diatribes against familiar straw men and utilizing common pro-government clichs to fill opinion columns. The best way to maintain large readership and to stay in print, during this period was not to challenge conventional wisdom but rather to reinforce it. Abdul Rahman Al-Habib wrote a critical column about this phenomenon for Arab News. The article was titled Out of Ideas? Then Curse the West. He wrote, Arab writers and columnists have a tendency to affirm populist notions, whether theyre good, bad, factual or false.87 This phenomenon lowered the level of discourse in the Arab civil society. The intellectual agenda setters of the region, traditionally columnists and other public intellectuals, reinforced conventional wisdom. This became a cultural attribute. The idea of the lethargic and passive Middle East emerged as a result because of the failure of journalists to question the status quo. There are two major reasons for the break down in quality of Arab journalism. The first was the tendency, on the part of journalists, to pander to Arab audiences in order to maintain a large audience. The second major problem for Arab journalists is that there is a basic lack of training materials for journalism students to utilize in Arabic. From a purely academic standpoint, the opportunities for developing the craft of journalism in the classroom are very limited in the Middle East. Few universities offer substantial and rigorous programs, the American University in Cairo being a notable exception, and this obviously limits the pool of

87

Abdul Rahman Al-Habib, Out of Ideas? Then Curse the West, Arab News, April 5, 2006.

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able and professional Arab journalists. While Arabs certainly can leave the Middle East and pursue a journalism degree elsewhere, the financial requirements of this also severely limit the pool of potential journalists. In addition, the caliber of student that enrolls in a Middle Eastern journalism program is reduced because of the negative perception of journalism as a professional field in the region. Egypt, especially, still discourages people from studying journalism academically. Mellor raises this point about Egyptian students, writing, Students are more inclined to major in subjects other than press journalism partly because they want to be guaranteed suitable jobs in the public service sector and partly because of their fear of getting into conflict with the government authorities that control the press, albeit indirectly.88 Journalism is more trouble than it is worth in the minds of potential students and it continues to lack legitimacy as a career option. Beyond the fact that it is no guarantor of future employment and that Arab society holds it in relatively low esteem, the curriculum itself at journalism programs in the Arab World is lacking. Journalism as an academic discipline owes almost all of its inspiration from Western paradigms. Mellor writes about this constraint, saying, One important characteristic of the materials available is that they are based on foreign, that is, Western, traditions, which, according to some Arab scholars, do not address the development of Arab trainees.89 A more regional specific curriculum would not only improve the professional skills of journalists who work in the region, which could in turn raise the profile of journalism in the Middle East. Conclusion

88 89

Mellor, Arab Journalism as an Academic Discipline, 169. Mellor, Arab Journalism as an Academic Discipline, 168.

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Satellite television played a significant role in creating the proper conditions for the Arab Spring. The emergence of satellite news networks in the 1990s signaled the end of the Arab governments monopoly over the media and over journalism. These networks have pushed the boundaries of journalism in the region. They have also been subjected to, and in certain cases overwhelmed by, the unique set of journalistic challenges that are part and parcel of operating in the Middle East. In certain, more notable situations like the closures of Al Jadeed in Lebanon and BBC Arabics initial incarnation in London, it was the content that drew the ire of the business community or the Saudi Royal Family. What the violated parties failed to realize is that it was not any individual story that threatens their hold on power. It is the medium itself, more so than the content, which is transforming the region. Arabs now watch previously unseen political debates and point-counterpoint programming plays out in their own living rooms. This shift in programming inevitably triggers a shift in mentality on the part of the audience. The stagnation that had come to define the intellectual and political atmosphere of the Middle East is receding. The cultural and intellectual environment now trends towards an atmosphere of vigorous debate and discussion. Satellite television news is changing more than just how Arabs think in an abstract sense; it is changing how they relate to each other and their governments. The deluge of information that has accompanied the emergence of satellite television in the region has demonstrated that Arab governments, in the past, were almost entirely unaccountable to their people. Satellite news viewers are quickly realizing the bevy of human rights and civil liberties violations that their governments regularly undertake. Transparency in governance is now paramount and the satellite networks are the largest contributor to rapidly increasing Arab government transparency.

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Arab governments, especially those toppled during the Arab Spring, failed to grasp the shifting mentalities of their people and made only token reforms to appease their increasingly discontented populations. In Egypt, token reform meant allowing candidates with connections to the Muslim Brotherhood to run in parliamentary elections. Elections under the Mubarak regime, however, were massively rigged and the Muslim Brotherhoods candidates stood no chance of success. This symbolic gesture, and others undertaken by Arab rulers, proved to mean little to an increasingly informed and engaged population. Arab peoples unwillingness to tolerate blatant abuses of power is the most important outcome that has arisen since the advent of the satellite dish in the Middle East. Transparency, which is increasingly demanded by Arab viewers and increasingly provided by Arabic news networks, will moderate the behavior of Arab regimes. Massive abuses of power as well as violations of civil and human rights will no longer go unnoticed or tolerated by Arabs who can see them play out on theirs televisions at home. If Arab regimes fail to heed this new reality than protests and movements similar to the Arab Spring will become the rule rather than the exception. These news networks, while at the forefront of demanding accountability from Arab regimes, are not bellwethers of democratic change in the region. Authoritarian regimes have been ousted across the region and these news networks will play a major role in determining who and what replaces the previous rulers. Journalists, editors, businessmen and government officials now shape and influence the news agenda. All these competing voices will be advocating on behalf of their own cause and interest. To be sure, this is vastly superior to the era of the government information minister vetting all content on national television. The past few years have demonstrated, however, that the outcome of this new media agenda is on-air competition

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between differing ideologies. Secularists will be able to get out their message but so will Islamists and everyone on the political spectrum in between. If the era of the activist journalist in the Middle East continues then the only thing that is certain is that this ideological competition will continue. The ideological competition will shape the region in the years to come as viewers look more and more towards their television screens as drivers of intellectual and political discourse. The legacy of the Arabic news network cannot be fully understood yet. Its most profound impact, of increased transparency from Arab regimes, is reverberating across the Middle East. What can be said of the satellite era, even if it is still in its adolescence, is that it ended Arab governments monopoly over information. Nothing is more important to human and civil development than access to information. Satellite television news impact was felt during the Arab Spring and will continue to be felt as this new access to information reshapes the Middle East.