torts & damages

A2010

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prof. casis
- Re: Naguiat Enterprises’ liability Reasoning - The respondents were regular employees of CFTI who received wages on a boundary basis. They offered no evidence that Naguiat Enterprises managed, supervised and controlled their employment. They instead submitted documents which had to do with CFTI, not Naguiat Enterprises. - Labor-only contractors are those where 1) the person supplying workers to the employer does no have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools or machinery and 2) the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of the employer. - Independent contractors are those who exercise independent employment, contracting to do a piece of work according to their own methods without being subject to the control of their employer except as to the result of their work. - Sergio Naguiat was a stockholder and director of Naguiat Enterprises but, in supervising the taxi drivers and determining their employment terms, he was carrying out his responsibility as president of CFTI. - Naguiat Enterprises was in the trading business while CFTI was in the taxi business. - The Constitution of the CFTI-AAFES Taxi Drivers Association states that the members of the union are employees of CFTI and for collective and bargaining purposes, the employer is also CFTI. - Re: Antolin Naguiat’s liability Reasoning - Although he carried the title of general manager, it has not been shown that he had acted in such capacity. - No evidence on the extent of his participation in the management or operation of the business was proferred. - Re: Sergio Naguiat’s liability Ratio A director or officer may be held solidarly liable with a corporation by a specific provision of law because a corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only through its directors and officers. Obligations incurred by them, acting as such corporation agents, are not theirs but the direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent. In the absence of definite proof of who clearly are the officers of the corporation, the assumption falls on the President of the corporation. Reasoning - In his capacity as President, Sergio Naguiat cannot be exonerated. - An employer is defined to be any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. - Case in point is A.C. Ransom Labor Union CCLU vs. NLRC held that the identified employer A.C. Ransom Corporation, being an artificial person, must have an officer and in the absence of proof, the president is assumed to be the head of the corporation. - Both CFTI and Naguiat Enterprises were close family corporations owned by the same family. To the extent that stockholders are actively engaged in the management or business affairs of a close corporation, the stockholders shall be held to strict fiduciary duties to each other and among themselves. Said stockholders shall be liable for corporate torts unless the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance. > Nothing in the records indicate that CFTI obtained reasonable adequate liability insurance. > Jurisprudence is wanting in the definition of corporate tort. Tort essentially consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Tort is a breach of legal duty.

INTRODUCTION
NAGUIAT V NLRC (National Organization of Workingmen and Galang) 269 SCRA 565 PANGANIBAN; March 13, 1997
NATURE Special civil action in the Supreme Court, certiorari FACTS - Clark Field Taxi, Inc. held a concessionaire‘s contract with the Army Air Force Exchange Services for the operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base. Sergio Naguiat was the president of CFTI while Antolin Naguiat was its vice president. Like Naguiat Enterprises, Inc. which was a trading firm, it was also a family-owned corporation. - Respondents were employed by the CFTI as taxicab drivers. > They were required to pay a daily boundary fee of US$26.50 (for those on duty from 1AM-12N) or US$27 (for those on duty from 12N to 12 MN) > Incidental expenses were maintained by the drivers (including gasoline expenses). > Drivers worked 3-4 times a week depending on the availability of vehicles and earned no less than US$15.00 a day. In excess of that amount, they had to make cash deposits to the company which they could withdraw every fifteen days. - AAFES was dissolved because of the phase-out of the military bases in Clark and the services of the respondents were officially terminated on November 26, 1991. - AAFES Taxi Drivers Association, the drivers union, and CFTI held negotiations as regards separation benefits. They arrived at an agreement that the separated drivers would be given P500 for ever year as severance pay. Most of the drivers accepted this but some refused to do so. - Those who did not accept the initial severance pay disaffiliated themselves with drivers union and through the National Organization of Workingmen, they filed a complaint against Sergio Naguiat under the name and style Naguiat Enterprises, AAFES and AAFES union. - The labor arbiter ordered the petitioner to pay the drivers P1,200 for every year of service for humanitarian consideration, setting aside the earlier agreement between the CFTI and the drivers union. It also rejected the idea that the CFTI was forced to close it business due to great financial losses and lose opportunity since at the time of its closure it was profitably earning. The labor arbiter however did not award separation pay because to ―impose a monetary obligation to an employer whose profitable business was abruptly shot (sic) shot down by force majeur would be unfair and unjust.‖ - The NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter after respondents appealed by granting separation pay to the private respondents. It said that half of the monthly salary should be US$120 which should be paid in Philippine pesos. Naguiat Enterprieses should be joined with Sergio and Antolin Naguiat as jointly and severally liable.

Petitioners’ Claim: - Petitioners claim that the cessation of the business was due to the great financial losses and lost business opportunity when Clark Air Base was phased out due to the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement and the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. - They admitted that CFTI had agreed with the drivers union to grant the taxi drivers separation pay equivalent to P500 for every year of service. - They allege that Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were denied due process beause the petitioners were not furnished copies of the appeal to the NLRC. - They also allege that NOWM cannot make legal representation in behalf of the respondents because the latter should be bound by the decision of the drivers union. Respondents’ Comments: - The drivers alleged that they were employees of Naguiat Enterprises although their individual applications were approved by CFTI. They claimed to have been assigned to Naguiat Enterprises after having been hired by CFTO and that Naguia Enterprises managed, controlled and supervised their employment. - They averred that they should be entitled to separation pay based on their latest daily earnings or US$15 for working 16 days a month. ISSUES 1. WON the NLRC acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in granting separation pay 2. WON NOWM was authorized to represent the private respondents 3. WON Naguiat Enterprieses, Sergio Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat were liable 4. WON Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were denied due process HELD 1. NO, the NLRC did not act in excess of jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion. Ratio Findings of fact of administrative bodies and quasi-judicial bodies are afforded great respect by the Court and are binding except when there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or the decision was arrived at arbitrarily. Reasoning - Respondents showed that their monthly take home pay amounted to no less than $240 and this was not disputed by petitioners. - There is no record or evidence which shows that the closure of the taxi business was brought about by great financial losses no thanks to the Pinatubo eruption. It was rather brought about by the closure of the military bases. - Art. 283 of the CC provides that separation pay shall be equivalent to 1 month pay or at least ½ month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. The NLRC ruling was correct in terms of US$120 as the computed separation pay. 2. Petitioners can no longer question the authority of NOWM and are held in estoppel. Reasoning - NOWM was already representing the respondents before the labor arbiter and the petitioners did not assail their juridical personality then. - Petitioners also acknowledged before the Court that the taxi drivers are themselves parties in the case. 3. Naguiat Enterprises is not liable, Antolin Naguiat is not personally liable whereas Sergio Naguiat is solidarily liable.

torts & damages
> Art. 238 mandates the employer to grant separation pay to employees in case of cessation of operations or closure of the business not due to serious business losses or financial reverses which is the condition on this case. 4. There was no denial of due process. Reasoning - Even if the individual Naguiats were not impleaded as parties of the complaint, they could still be held liable because of jurisprudence (A.C. Ransom case). - Both also voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter when they filed a position paper. DISPOSITION The petition is partly granted. 1) CFTI and Sergio Naguiat are ordered to pay jointly and severally the individual respondents of US$120 for every year of service and 2) Naguiat Enterprises and Antolin Naguiat are absolved from liability.

A2010

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prof. casis
-The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him. -Barredo v Garcia (dual character—civil and criminal— of fault or negligence as a source of obligation): "The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued." "It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1402 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case aria for which, after un a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.‖ -Culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of a penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. -ART 1162: "Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, Article 2177 of the new code provides: "ART 277. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising front negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant." - According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa aquilian' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and 'culpa extra-contractual' or 'cuasi-delito' has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery," - Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth life" rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that me preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 12) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it‘s "more congruent with the

BARREDO V GARCIA BOCOBO; July 8, 1942
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - from CA, holding Fausto Barredo liable for damages for death pf Faustino Garcia caused by negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by Fausto Barredo - May 3, 1936 – in road between Malabon and Navotas, head-on collision between taxi of Malate Taxicab and carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis thereby causing overturning of the carretela and the eventual death of Garcia, 16-yo boy and one of the passengers - Fontanilla convicted in CFI and affirmed by CA and separate civil action is reserved - Parents of Garcia filed action against Barredo as sole proprietor of Malate Taxicab as employer of Fontanilla - CFI and CA awarded damages bec Fontanilla‘s negligence apparent as he was driving on the wrong side of the road and at a high speed > no proof he exercised diligence of a good father of the family as Barredo is careless in employing (selection and supervision) Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of Automobile Law and speeding > CA applied A1903CC that makes inapplicable civil liability arising from crime bec this is under obligations arising from wrongful act or negligent acts or omissions punishable by law - Barredo‘s defense is that his liability rests on RPC TF liability only subsidiary and bec no civil action against Fontanilla TF he too cannot be held responsible ISSUE WON parents of Garcia may bring separate civil action against Barredo making him primarily liable and directly responsible under A1903CC as employer of Fontanilla HELD YES - There are two actions available for parents of Garcia. One is under the A100RPC wherein the employer is only subsidiarily liable for the damages

arising from the crime thereby first exhausting the properties of Fontanilla. The other action is under A1903CC (quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana) wherein as the negligent employer of Fontanilla, Barredo is held primarily liable subject to proving that he exercising diligence of a good father of the family. The parents simply took the action under the Civil Code as it is more practical to get damages from the employer bec he has more money to give than Fontanilla who is yet to serve his sentence. Obiter Difference bet Crime and Quasi-delict 1) crimes – public interest; quasi-delict – only private interest 2) Penal code punishes or corrects criminal acts; Civil Code by means of indemnification merely repairs the damage 3) delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts; crimes are only punished if there is a penal law; quasi-delicts include any kind of fault or negligence intervenes NOTE: not all violations of penal law produce civil responsibility e.g. contravention of ordinances, violation of game laws, infraction of rules of traffic when nobody is hurt 4) crime – guilt beyond reasonable doubt; civil – mere preponderance of evidence - Presumptions: 1) injury is caused by servant or employee, there instantly arises presumption of negligence of master or employer in selection, in supervision or both 2) presumption is juris tantum not juris et de jure TF may be rebutted by proving exercise of diligence of a good father of the family - basis of civil law liability: not respondent superior bu the relationship of pater familias - motor accidents – need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles

ELCANO V HILL 77 SCRA 98 BARREDO; May 26, 1977
NATURE Appeal from an order of the CFI Quezon City FACTS - Reginald Hill, a minor yet married at the time of occurrence, was criminally prosecuted for the killing of Agapito Elcano (son of Pedro), and was acquitted for ―lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.‖ - Pedro Elcano filed a complaint for recovery of damages from Reginald and his father Atty Marvin. CFI dismissed it. ISSUES 1. WON the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was not reversed 2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last par) of the CC can be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the occurrence, Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married HELD 1. NO

torts & damages
spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress", to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. - Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. - Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. 2. YES (but…) - Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. (However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.) - While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he was of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian." - Under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." - In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual. - It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. - On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.

A2010

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prof. casis
NATURE Appeal by certiorari to review and set aside the CA decision which affirmed in toto the RTC‘s decision FACTS - Private respondent Marilou Gonzales (MG) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. **MG‘s allegations in the complaint: - That she is a 22 yr. old Filipina, single, of good moral character and respected reputation in her community. - That Baksh is an Iranian citizen, residing in Dagupan, and is an exchange student taking up medicine at the Lyceum in Dagupan. - That Baksh later courted and proposed to marry her. MG accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. They later agreed to get married at the end of the school semester. Petitioner had visited MG‘s parents to secure their approval of the marriage. Baksh later forced MG to live with him. A week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner started maltreating her even threatening to kill her and as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries. A day before the filing of the complaint, Baksh repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that he is already married to someone in Bacolod. She prayed for payment for damages amounting to Php 45,000 plus additional costs. - Baksh answered with a counterclaim, admitting only the personal circumstances of the parties in the complaint but denied the rest of the allegations. He claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married; neither sought the consent of her parents nor forced her to live in his apt.; did not maltreat her but only told her to stop coming to his place after having discovered that she stole his money and passport. He also prayed for 25,000 as moral damages plus misc. expenses. - The RTC, applying Art. 21 CC decided in favor of private respondent. Petitioner was thus ordered to pay Php 20,000 as moral damages and 3,000 pesos atty‘s. fees plus litigation expenses. Petitioner appealed this decision to respondent CA, contending that the trial court erred in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and in ordering him to pay moral damages, atty‘s fees, etc. - Respondent CA promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto the trial court‘s ruling which prompted Baksh to file this petition for certiorari, raising the single issue of WON Art. 21 applies to this case. ISSUE WON damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Art.21 of the Civil Code HELD 1. YES Ratio In a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction, Art. 21 may be applied. Reasoning - Where a man‘s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Art.21 not because of such promise

- Cinco filed on Feb 25, 19701 a complaint for recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito. - Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver Romeo Hilot arising from the same accident. - At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit. - The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner‘s MFR having been denied, he elevated the matter on Certiorari to the CFI Cebu., which in turn dismissed the petition. Plaintiff’s claims: - it was the fault r negligence of the driver in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision. - Damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision - There was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private respondents. Respondents’ Comments: - They observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees, particularly of Romeo Hilot. ISSUE WON there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action HELD YES - Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Art 2177 of the Civil Code. - The separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in sec 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court: Sec 2. Independent civil action. – In the cases prvided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code f the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. - Petitioner‘s cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of quasi-delict, as enunciated in Art 2176 of the Civil Code, is so broad that in includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction between ―damage to persons‖ on the one hand and ―damage to property‖ on the other. The word damage is used in two concepts: the ―harm‖ done and ―reparation‖ for the harm done. And with respect to ―harm‖ it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since ―harm‖ is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. DISPOSITION Writ of Certiorari granted.

CINCO V CANONOY 90 SCRA 369 Melencio-Herrera; May 31, 1979
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS

BAKSH V CA (Gonzales) 219 SCRA 115 DAVIDE, JR; Feb.19, 1993

ISSUES 1. qualified by treachery. she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. actual damages in the amount of P2. not a whimsical or fanciful doubt based on imagined but wholly improbable possibilities and unsupported by evidence. He handled the fertilizers without gloves. **Obiter: on Torts and Quasi-delicts .00.00. in the absence of Art. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Art. the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of P50.The group had barely left when their owner jeep was fired upon from the rear. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which. WON the trial court was correct in finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt 2.This notwithstanding. it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. Reasonable doubt is that engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and inability. false imprisonment and deceit. . with interest. .21. Having been found with gunpowder residue in his hands. and although the girl and her A2010 -4- prof. the constant interaction between them through the years (in the buying and selling of cattle and Bulusan was a classmate of Vidal) would necessarily lead to familiarity with each other such that. are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Art. and moral damages in the amount of P10. The costs. warrants for the arrest of Ballesteros.‖ . as the girl is above 18 yrs of age. WON the Court correctly ruled in finding that the offense was qualified by treachery 3. FACTS . Carmelo Agliam. Art. In short. Vidal Agliam. just consumed eight cigarette sticks prior to the test.Ballesteros interposed the defense of alibi. he busied himself with some chores.As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report: ―But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law.‖ .In his testimony.00. if considered. which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals. Intent. Article 21.21 fills that vacuum. even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury. moral damages in the amount of P20. . Robert Cacal. especially during the festivity. Considering the luminescence of the moon and the proximity between them.2176 CC. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or value which could alter the result of the case. It is essential however. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence. the instant petition is hereby DENIED PEOPLE V BALLESTEROS 285 SCRA 438 ROMERO. is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. 1998 NATURE An appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.00. Bulusan was not tested for nitrates. they decided to head for home instead of reacting to the perceived provocation of Galo and his companions. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino. Quasi-delict.2176 CC. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes. Under the present laws. would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. . on the other hand. not because of lust but because of moral seduction. and that his hand may have been contaminated by a nitrogenous compound. Reasoning . Galo claimed that he did not even talk to Bulusan or any of his companions.Art. which included fertilizing his pepper plants with sulfate. . The next morning. Raymundo Bangi and Marcial Barid converged at a carinderia owned by Ronnel Tolentino. The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. the said Code contains a provision. might affect the result of the case. with interest. . his brother Jerry Agliam. intentional and malicious acts. His younger brother Jerry also managed to jump out. Paraffin tests conducted on Galo and Ballesteros produced positive results.torts & damages to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.. The girl becomes pregnant.338 of the RPC because the private respondent was above 18 years of age at the time of the seduction. known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana. in the interest of justice. or can not be proved. and actual damages in the total amount of P61.000. the private respondent surrendered her virginity. 1991.755. He said that he uses his left hand in lighting cigarettes and he had no motive to kill the victims. Therefore. there is no crime.That accused-appellants had no motive in perpetrating the offense is irrelevant. Carmelo Agliam. though the grievous moral wrong has been committed. WON the Court was correct in the award of damages to the heirs of the victims HELD 1. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. that he went to a nearby store to purchase some cigarettes. January 29. but was shot in the stomach and died. Vidal Agliam Jr. with interest. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.785. which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless.000.. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code.. Also.All pleaded not guilty. . at the very least.40. the source of which is urine. Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino sustained injuries. from which We quote: ―The elimination of this chapter is proposed.Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and Vidal Agliam. his half-brother Eduardo Tolentino. and ordered them to pay jointly and solidarily: 1. 5. DISPOSITION finding no reversible error in the challenged decision.00 each. the victims could distinctly identify their assailants. the cherished possession of every single Filipina. Vidal Agliam was able to jump out from the jeep and landed just beside it. Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result.00. and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. 4. But under the proposed article.The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. he said that he was not even present at the crime scene . qualified by treachery. she and her parents would have such a right of action. YES Ratio Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by law to convict a person of a criminal charge. Carmelo Agliam. 2. Carmelo and Vidal Agliam both described the area to be well illumined by the moon.21 Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals.000.000.' A promise of marriage either has not been made. compensatory damages in the amount of P50. casis . Art.003. Sr. Galo attempted to exculpate himself from the results by confessing that he had been a cigarette smoker for the past ten years and had. Thus at one stroke.. Galo and Bulusan were issued.21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs. unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which. is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise. Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino.000. with interest. Ronnel Tolentino. scurried to the side of the road and hid in the ricefield. with certain exceptions. is the purpose to use a particular family have suffered incalculable moral damage. moral damages in the amount of P5.337 or Art. and actual damages in the amount of P35. 3.The trial court found the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. Syquia.In the instant case. good customs or public policy. it is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses. the Commission has deemed it necessary. in fact. In order to avoid trouble. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs.Moreover. Lastly. Eduardo Tolentino was not even able to move from his seat and was hit with a bullet which punctured his right kidney which caused his death. . They proceeded to attend a dance but did not stay long because they sensed some hostility from Cesar Galo and his companions who were giving them dagger looks.. which defines a quasi-delict. if the foregoing rule is approved.” ―An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: 'A' seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of 'X. but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery. Thus. moral damages in the amount of P20. to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. after such investigation. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The doubt to the benefit of which an accused is entitled in a criminal trial is a reasonable doubt. He returned home and cleaned his garlic bulbs before retiring at 9:00 o‘clock.00.evening of May 28.In their testimonies. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code.Bulusan echoed the defense of alibi of Galo and Ballesteros . to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule: “Art.000. would have been beyond redress.00. one would have been able to recognize the other easily . the legislator.

21 CC) [5] The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners. there was no legal injury. Mfr denied. or satisfaction for an injury sustained. may be determined by the trial court in its discretion. Positive identification prevails over denials and alibis. and the like. CA affirming TC judgment with modification. bookkeeper of said hospital. the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. or as otherwise expressed. viz. as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. Hence this appeal. As regards moral damages. but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of. She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having at the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows.000 as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. The second passageway is about 3m in width. upon his own property) in a lawful and proper manner. Reasoning . or harm which results from the injury. . casis therein. and Ester Francisco. .In granting actual or compensatory damages. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property. hired and boarded a PU car with plate No. to the public street. receipts. there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant. as corroborated by his testimony. WON CA erred in awarding damages to plaintiff-appellee Mabasa HELD 1. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners. an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court Reasoning .00 is given to the heirs of the victims by way of indemnity. 1996 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA -5- prof. the same having been fully substantiated by receipts accumulated by them and presented to the court. "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan. moral shock and so forth. although there was damage. and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means. petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right (Art. the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest. The prosecution need not prove motive on the part of the accused when the latter has been positively identified as the author of the crime. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way. Marcelino CUSTODIO V CA (Heirs Of Mabasa) . Here.None of them attempted to corroborate their alibi through the testimony of witnesses. 1971. to enclose and fence their property (See Art. must be amended. the accused must prove. from behind. or in recompense for. they never attempted to present as witnesses those who could have testified to having seen them elsewhere on the night in question. A2010 253 SCRA 483 REGALADO. Manifestations of their evil designs were already apparent as early as the time of the dance. FACTS . Reasoning [1] To warrant the recovery of damages. good customs or public policy. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. serious anxiety. Consistent with the policy of this Court. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20m distant from Mabasa's residence to P. [DATE] NATURE Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental. Contrary to the claim of private respondents. 2. Such path is passing in between the row of houses of defendants. without other limitations than those established by law. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right. there are 2 possible passageways. 1972. together with his wife. hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication THE CONCEPT OF QUASIDELICT GARCIA V FLORIDO [CITATION] ANTONIO. They were well-armed and approached the homebound victims.. Some of their footwear were even lost.When said property was purchased by Mabasa. one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises. awarding damages to plaintiffs (P65K as actual damages. Tipas. Reasoning .. Thus. and not as compensatory damages. unlike those found in gunpowder. Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital. Inc. YES Ratio Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation. . the amount of psychological pain. However. and had furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the offender‘s wrongful act or omission. In fact. DISPOSITION The appealed decision of CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial court is REINSTATED. . YES Ratio There is no cause of action for acts done by one person (in this case. FACTS . The facts show that the attack was well-planned and not merely a result of the impulsiveness of the offenders. the award of actual damages is proper. but wrongful. a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6m in length.TC ordered (a) defendant-appellants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access — ingress and egress. YES Ratio The requisites of treachery are twofold: (1) (t)hat at the time of the attack. there were tenants occupying the remises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. . whereas moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has experienced mental anguish. Luminosa L.on their excuses regarding the source of the gunpowder traces found on their hands: Experts confirm the possibility that cigarettes. The injury must result from a breach of duty or a legal wrong. Burgos St. damage is the loss. but these are minimal and. This accused-appellants failed to satisfactorily prove. recompense. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway. As access to P. denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. fertilizers and urine may leave traces of nitrates. German C. P30K as moral damages and P10K as exemplary damages). went to CA raising the sole issue of WON lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. may be washed off with tap water. ISSUES 1. Palingon. Defendant Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because there was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first passageway. as owners. totally unaware of their presence. Mactan Transit Co.. although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another. Zamboanga del Norte".The plaintiff-appellee Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P.Private respondents. he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. hurt. It is within the right of petitioners. . the claim for actual damages by the heirs of the victims is not controverted. the party making a claim for such must present the best evidence available. Metro Manila. it is obvious that the accused-appellants had sufficient opportunity to reflect on their heinous plan. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent.000.torts & damages means to effect such result. However.430 CC). although inestimable. 1982. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing. Garcia. there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. Hence. physical suffering. [3] In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage. not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime. and from the order of said Court dated January 21. petitioners. In passing thru said passageway. [4] In this case. sometime in February. WON the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper 2. the amount of P 50. hence not contrary to morals. that act must be not only hurtful. (b) the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses P8. DISPOSITION The decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Garcia. And it was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. the victim was not in a position to defend himself. has to be traversed. February 9. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom.Petitioners are already barred from raising the same. [2] Obiter: There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Tagig.On August 4. There was no opportunity for the latter to defend themselves 3. There must be damnum et injuria. and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.on the defense of alibi: for the defense of alibi to prosper. Burgos St. dismissing petitioners' action for damages against respondents. Therefore. method or form of attack employed by him. Ratio Whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case. and Pedro Tumala. the order granting compensatory damages to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. we see no reason to disturb its findings as to this matter. damage and injury caused to the heirs of the victims. loss or injury sustained. 2. vouchers.Here.

The lower court sustained Mactan Inc. Zamboanga del Norte. Sindangan. grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and character of the action. because the action in fact satisfies the elements of quasi-delict. and. . It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. guilty of negligence. may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law. it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others. owners and drivers.Article 2176 and 2177 definitely create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code. . 33 and 34 of the Civil Code. and driven by defendant. petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein. 2850) against the private respondents. for these articles were drafted .Accordingly. an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940.. 33 of the New Civil Code. which is procedural. which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action. as one based on culpa aquiliana. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co. with prayer for preliminary attachment. .Besides. As to the specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111. . 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan. By instituting a civil action based on a quasi-delict. Since Civil Case No.As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action. d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents. in a reckless. compensatory and exemplary damages .N. 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles. there being no showing that prejudice could be caused by doing so. Ricardo Vayson. and even if it were not substantive but adjective. it is my considered view that the latter provision is inoperative.Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No. with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case. et. Pedro Tumala. Reasoning SEPARATE OPINION BARREDO [concur] . . not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver. but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. subject to the limitation mentioned in the last sentence of Article 2177 of the Civil Code. or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be made. a complainant may be deemed to abandon his/her right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case.As we have stated at the outset. 25) with plate No.It is. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became effective on January 1. 620-621). the filing of the instant civil action is premature. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. . For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared. pursuant to Sec. and bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. hospital administrative officers. c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision. 2850 is predicated on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the Revised Penal Code. ANDAMO V IAC (Missionaries Of Our Lady Of La Salette. petitioners. Zamboanga del Norte. in the cases provided for by Articles 31. and dismissed the complaint ISSUES 1. et. the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasidelict or culpa extracontractual. and Ester Francisco. or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages. As a result of the aforesaid collision. therefore. that degree of care. petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case.In the case at bar. is not applicable because Art 33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide. petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization. grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car. the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter.At about 9:30 a. "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to . . 1971. respectively. German C. while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan. it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate. that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made. Articles 32. much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused. Ratio An action shall be deemed to be based on a quasi-delict when all the essential averments under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present. namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. WON the lower court erred in saying that the action is not based on quasidelict since the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral. WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for damages on the ground that since no express reservation was made by the complainants.It is true that under Sec. 607. under the peculiar circumstances of the case. while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence. therefore. said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. 7 at Zamboanga City. respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No.But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners. 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code. et all (73 Phil.The principal argument advanced by Mactan Inc. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners. This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. the actual filing of Civil Case No. and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case. there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala. Pedro Tumala. . . Articles 32. 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. and driven by respondent. for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hospitals. casis . . however. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case. YES. al to in a motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11. Luminosa L. which means that of the two possible judgments. having always had its own foundation and individuality. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. HELD 1.torts & damages Inesin. and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. 2850 may proceed. Garcia. Garcia. of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision. Reasoning A2010 -6- prof. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car. b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts." . Inc) 191 SCRA 195 . which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso. that Art. Al. for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action. filed on September 1. the injured party is entitled exclusively to the bigger one. may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. . precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute. We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal. . The proviso. The former is a violation of the criminal law. Garcia.. because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver. it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177. . but it should be noted. 2850 should be deemed as the reservation required. . YES Ratio An action based on quasi-delict may be maintained independently from a criminal action. in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police and that. . 2.The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless. 1964. whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case. Hence. provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately. for a roundtrip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31. the civil aspect of the criminal case would have to be determined only after the termination of the criminal case 2.m. evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages. 33. 77-4 W Z. 2 in relation to Sec. Inc. I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal of the trial court in order that Civil Case No. no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated. I cannot see why a reservation had to be made in the criminal case.

for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. whenever it refers to "fault or negligence".Article 2176 1 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence. an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. with a boy named Manuel Claparols. crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor. thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who. . Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages. and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasidelicts or culpa extra-contractual. for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31. March 22. to recover damages on both scores. and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two. this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own. now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike. And later on dismissed the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain . who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case HELD Ratio YES. . was at the time when he received the injuries complained of. . and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. 15 years of age. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight startling." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. casis . the son of a mechanical engineer. of ancient origin. having always had its own foundation and individuality. and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. including an artificial lake.On February 17. thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land. in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist. . waterpaths and contrivances. they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict. Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent.. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present. Indeed.In July 1982. As held in In Azucena vs. the boys. which has built through its agents. about 12 years of age. the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered. 1986. 1 TAYLOR V MANILA ELECTRIC 16 PHIL 8 CARSON. to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff. the Court applied Article 1902.Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang. which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land. 1984. (b) fault or negligence of the defendant. . separate from criminal negligence. 1905. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin. assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons.." Reasoning A2010 -7- prof. an employee of the defendant. is obliged to pay for the damage done. unless. . petitioners filed a civil case for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent corporation. in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. in quasi-delicts. respondent Appellate Court affirmed the order of the trial court. waterpaths.The decision was based on Section 3 (a). the trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in the civil case until after judgment in the related Criminal Case. There is therefore. whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. were constructed. that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.On April 26. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter. David Taylor. and the causal connection between the act and the damage.. a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act. Court of Appeals. prohibition and mandamus FACTS . spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. 2 . plaintiff. whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person. water conductors and contrivances within its land. Therefore. the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. 1990 NATURE Petition for certiorari. by his father. Consequently.While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the instant case is privately owned.Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake. petitioners instituted a criminal action against Efren Musngi. The plaintiff. but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.In the case of Samson vs. In the case of Castillo vs. his nearest relative. there being fault or negligence. shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party. Inc. 1983.The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 21772 of the Civil Code.torts & damages FERNAN. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land. The former is a violation of the criminal law. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. provided that the offended party is not allowed. the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners. FACTS .Within the land of respondent corporation. . the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence. damaged petitioners' crops and plants. is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. November 6. Finding on inquiry that Mr. .The waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners.After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal. caused a young man to drown. . Such fault or negligence. instituted by David Taylor. Dionisio. or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. . like the rest of the residents. . ISSUE WON a corporation. with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana. for the purpose of visiting one Murphy. more mature than the average boy of his age. the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case. stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river. impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery.On the 30th of September. There can be no logical conclusion than this. Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately.It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence. as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. . a minor. They are intended for use in the explosion of Article 2177. and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 1910 NATURE An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries. Moreover. .A careful examination of the complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. .On February 22. such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. a religious corporation. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court . washed away costly fences. Potenciano. Murphy was not in his quarters. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette." . Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land. or some other person for whose acts he must respond. (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally). of course. officers and directors of respondent corporation.The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. Article 2176.Article 2176. the recitals of the complaint.

.As laid down in Railroad Co. .In support of his contention. the principles on which these cases turn are that "while a railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it. S. they opened one of the caps with a knife. or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place.These proposition are. and necessity. . but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not. the plaintiff in an action A2010 -8- prof. he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred. therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. (3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage. and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches. We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap. was able to earn P2. nor how long they had been there when the boys found them. counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last resort in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases.We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff. "attributable to the negligence of the defendant. which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff. and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act. ART. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only. nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury. causing more or less serious injuries to all three. . awarding damages to the plaintiff. ART. his entry upon defendant company's premises. as under the generally accepted doctrine in the United States. and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case.The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. 1089 Obligations are created by law. so as to prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight to put in doubt. and that the defendant. which therefore was not. ART. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him. such as that under consideration. . was guilty.It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they were found. and for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place. and the cases based thereon. and this latter the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the injuries sustained by him. if such injury was.In the case at bar. by quasicontracts. if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant. wherein the principal question was whether a railroad company was liable for in injury received by an infant while upon its premises. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. and illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. must establish by competent evidence: (1) Damages to the plaintiff. from idle curiosity. . casis . more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age. 657). and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused — 1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence. Plaintiff contends. by contracts. despite his denials on the witness stand. The father. one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds. The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff. so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises. elementary. ART. for his own pleasure and convenience." and. and on his death or incapacity the mother. vs. TAYAG V ALCANTARA 98 SCRA 723 CONCEPCION. and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises.The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's premises.This conclusion is founded on reason. and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents. entered upon the defendant's premises. . such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. without other fault on his part. that because of plaintiff's youth the intervention of his action between the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident." . he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap. justice. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault. not only for personal acts and omissions. in order to establish his right to a recovery. Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties." and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of adult. . and knowingly produced the explosion. (84 U. But the doctrine of the case is controlling in our jurisdiction. under circumstances.Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts proven at the trial do not established the liability of the defendant company under the provisions of these articles.The trial court's decision. became frightened and started to run away. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded. received a slight cut in the neck. . .torts & damages blasting charges of dynamite.True. ISSUE WON the defendants negligence is the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries HELD NO . when they felt disposed so to do. but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible. but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act. and neither is contention that a man has a right to do what will with his own property or that children should be kept under the care of their parents or guardians. that we have thought proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in this decision. Jessie. and strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant. we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff. . and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule. recklessly. the real difficulty arising in the application of these principles to the particular facts developed in the case under consideration. we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff. on the other hand. 1903. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in several courts. and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. An explosion followed. it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts. and the intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident. and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act. and it is because we can not agree with this proposition. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that. upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902. Stout (17 Wall. of course.We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code. he had been to sea as a cabin boy. is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with them. although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable. . or some person for whose acts it must respond. . or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances. (2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally. 1980 NATURE . and 1908 of that code. and yet he willfully. who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap.). attributable to the negligence of the company). and do not admit of discussion.No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises unattended.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred. or for purposes of amusement.But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience. plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15. July 23. properly speaking. upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases.

Castillo. is the subject of conflicting versions by the prosecution and the defense. Payuan also prepared a Traffic Accident Report. telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao. Recto Avenue. He immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up right behind it. It is not controverted. this provision refers to a civil action based on an obligation arising from quasi-delict. however. 31. . there could be no reason for the latter to run after the Kombi and hang on to its window. a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the rear seat. and damage to his property would not have occurred. ISSUE WON Judge Alcantara correctly dismissed the civil case on the ground of no cause of action due to the acquittal of the driver HELD 1. a seventeen-year old working student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. the traffic light changed to green. particularly defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan. The Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down on the pavement near the foot of the underpass. Citing Elcano v Hill: a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act. the latter could not have fallen down.a careful review of the record shows that certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which. whether on reasonable doubt or not. Prudencio Castillo. Rosales to buy some cigarettes from him. where he was treated for multiple physical injuries and was confined thereat until his death on October 30. to alight from the Kombi.February 17. 1983 . Fermin Payuan. 1983 . such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter‖ . Rosales approached the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes. and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved forward. The taxicab driver.The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version. A2010 -9- prof. resulting in the latter falling down and hitting the pavement.October 31. Inc. not for civil liability from criminal negligence. . They drew their guns and told the driver. Order of CFI Tarlac set aside. casis was able to overtake the Kombi when the traffic light turned red. but Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's Office for further investigation. if taken into account. While waiting.The requirement in section 2. 1984 . Fernando Gabat. 1983. 1987 NATURE Appeal from the judgment of the RTC Manila FACTS . may be a disinterested witness with no motive. the acquittal of Romeo Villa was based on reasonable doubt. of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua where he robbed and killed Jose Rosales y Ortiz. Judge Alcantara granted this motion. they stopped. Castillo SEPARATE OPINION AQUINO [concur] . Rogelio Ligon. having already been able to balance himself on the stepboard. driven by Romeo Villa. Castillo pursued it as it sped towards Roxas Boulevard. under which according to the Code Commission. while he was trying to get from his pocket the change for the 5peso bill of Gabat. no vendor lets go of his precious box of cigarettes in order to change a peso bill given by a customer. was never apprehended and is still at large.October 23.00 more or less. Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor. Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi but apparently lost his grip and fell down on the pavement. filed an information against Rogelio Ligon charging him with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence.June 28. . While this transaction was occurring. was riding in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father and driven by the other accused. NO Ratio The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi-delict. When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal monument. but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana". that as the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo. Rogelio Ligon. He was allegedly robbed of his cigarette box containing cigarettes worth P300. stating that there can be no doubt that Gabat forcibly took or grabbed the cigarette box from Rosales because. . has failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. the heirs of Tayag instituted a civil action to recover damages from the company (Phil Rabbit Bus Inc) and the driver. the driver as acquitted based on reasonable doubt.Evidently. the trial court dismissed as incredible the testimony of Gabat that the cigarette vendor placed the cigarette box on the windowsill of the Kombi.M. Patrolmen Leonardo Pugao and Peter Ignacio. It was found out that there was a third person inside the Kombi.Moreover. Rule III of the Rules of Court that there should be a reservation in the criminal cases of the right to institute an independent civil action is contrary to law. even if not tainted with bias.Investigating Fiscal Cantos.m.The three were all brought by the police officers to the Western Police District and turned over to Pfc. through the sole testimony of the taxicab driver that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales and pried loose the latter's hand from the window of the Kombi. These affidavits were already prepared and merely sworn to before Fiscal Cantos on January 17. PEOPLE V LIGON 152 SCRA 419 YAP. The court said that it is of common knowledge that cigarette vendors plying their trade in the streets do not let go of their cigarette box. case REMANDED to lower court for further proceedings. Article 33 of the Civil Code also justifies the petitioners' independent civil action for damages since the term "physical injuries" therein embraces death (Dyogi vs. "acquittal .Pedro Tayag was riding a motorcycle when he was bumped by a Philippine Rabbit Bus. according to the court a quo. . provided that offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores DISPOSITION petition granted. secondary to traumatic injuries of the head. Gabat." The two men in the jeep joined the chase and at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard.Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another information against Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with Homicide based on a Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo and a joint affidavit of Armando Espino and Romeo Castil. 1095). Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital. is not entirely free from doubt because his observation of the event could have been faulty or from an accusation of criminal negligence. July 29. as plaintiffs in the civil case. 100 Phil. . cigarette vendors. would alter the result of the case in that they would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal. who allegedly witnessed the incident . can amend their complaint and base their action also on article 29 NCC which allows an independent civil action for damages in case of acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt." . also went along with them. Ligon which was coming from España Street going towards the direction of Quiapo. holding it with his left hand.prosecution tried to establish. The court also believed Castillo's testimony that Gabat forcibly removed or pried off the right hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi. . He sought their assistance in chasing the Kombi. 1984. and his companion." his testimony. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lino.I concur because petitioners' action for damages is based on article 2177 of the Civil Code. dated October 23.the co-accused.While the prosecution witness. The company and driver then filed for dismissal of the civil case on the ground that the heirs do not have a cause of action because of the acquittal. Pending the criminal case against the driver.Following close behind (about 3 meters) the Kombi at the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by Castillo. beeping his horn to make the driver stop.torts & damages Petition for review on certiorari the order of CFI Tarlac (dismissing petition for damages) FACTS . RTC convicted Fernando Gabat. In turn. which caused his instantaneous death.December 6. and immediately thereafter. As to what precisely happened between Gabat and Rosales at the crucial moment. . Yatco. Castillo saw an ownertype jeep with two persons in it.. 1986. At the intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street before turning left towards the underpass at C. bilateral. the acquittal of the driver of the crime charged is not a bar to the prosecution for damages based on quasi-delict Reasoning . .an autopsy was conducted by the medico-legal officer of NBI which stated the cause of death of Rosales as "pneumonia hypostatic. the company and driver filed a motion to suspend trial of the civil case on the ground that the criminal case was still pending. 1983.On the other hand.6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias were released early morning the following day. otherwise. otherwise. .In the criminal case. He was traveling on the same lane in a slightly oblique position. viz: ―6. WON he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted. Judge Alcantara granted this and dismissed the civil case. the accident in question which resulted in the death of Pedro Tayag. NCC provides: ―When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony. The petitioners. The complaint itself shows that the claim was based on quasi-delit. ISSUE WON the prosecution‘s set of facts should be given credence HELD NO . Sr. "other than to see that justice be done.Art. 1983 .‖ All the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action are present: (1) act or omission constituting fault /negligence on the part of respondent (2) damage caused by the said act or omission (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or omission and (4) no preexisting contractual relation between the parties.at about 6:10 p. . . shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action. The two men on board the jeep turned out to be police officers. Otherwise.

ISSUE WON the CA committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge HELD NO . The transfer to the San Pablo City District Hospital was without the prior consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the intended transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District Hospital. civil liability cannot be demanded.00 as actual damages. it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. They bought type "A" blood and the same was brought by the attendant into the operating room. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt. the CA reversed the findings of the CFI and acquitted the appellants based on reasonable doubt but nonetheless ordered them to pay P9. Prior to March 22.However.At around 10pm. NATURE Civil action for damages in a medical malpractice suit. FACTS . Since the standard of proof to be used in civil cases is preponderance of evidence. went to the public market to execute an alleged order of the Mayor to clear the public market of stalls which were considered as nuisance per se. a person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. the quantum of proof necessary to sustain Gabat's conviction of so serious a crime as robbery with homicide has not been met in this case. held that extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil. Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be postponed. why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? A2010 . The taxicab which Castillo was driving was lower in height compared to the Kombi in which Gabat was riding-a fact admitted by Castillo at the trial. which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission. thus making it visually difficult for Castillo to observe clearly what transpired inside the Kombi at the front end where Gabat was seated. Ercillo re-operated on her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. . These are circumstances which must be taken into consideration in evaluating Castillo's testimony as to what exactly happened between Gabat and the cigarette vendor during that crucial moment before the latter fell down. Bartolome Angeles. she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. . where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. quoting Section 3 (C) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and various jurisprudence including PNB vs Catipon. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. Ercillo went out of the operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought. . . the crime of grave coercion was not proved in accordance with the law. the petitioner informed them that the operation was finished. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice.Rowena and her other relatives waited outside the operating room while Lydia underwent operation. "This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. . The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime. Unfortunately. following it at a distance of about three meters.Article 29 of the Civil Code. on or about February 8. His testimony that he saw Gabat grab the cigarette box from Rosales and forcibly pry loose the latter's hand from the windowsill of the Kombi is thus subject to a reasonable doubt. casis DISPOSITION Appellant acquitted for the crime of robbery and homicide. Some thirty minutes after.600." It is just and proper that.Rowena Umali De Ocampo accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital. and both vehicles during that time were moving fast in the traffic. but sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz. PADILLA V CA (Vergara) 129 SCRA 558 GUTIERREZ. 1991. One affects the social order and the other. the court express a finding that the defendants‘ offenses are civil in nature. As the taxicab was right behind the Kombi.The SC. . she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to wipe the window and the floor with. . Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must be operated on as scheduled. Dr. . Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23. . unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the facts from which the civil action might arise did not exist.Considering the above circumstances.The petitioners were found guilty of grave coercion after trial at the CFI and were sentenced to five months and one day imprisonment and ordered to pay fines. . In the process however the stock in trade and certain furniture of Vergara were lost and destroyed. [date] NATURE Petition of rcertiorari to revies the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as soon as it arrived. The decision of the CA was based on the fact that the petitioners were charged with coercion when they should have been more appropriately charged with crime against person.10 282 SCRA 188 FRANCISCO.torts & damages mistaken. private rights. they were not able to comply with petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank. 1964. . and to determine the logical result of the distinction. the judgment of not guilty was based on reasonable doubt. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance. Castillo's line of vision was partially obstructed by the back part of the Kombi. 1991. About one hour had passed when Dr. only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages.After the lapse of a few hours. Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus. .Judicial notice may also be taken of the fact that the rear windshield of the 1978 Volkswagon Kombi is on the upper portion. Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother. While they were waiting.The Court also tackled the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code to clarify whether a separate civil action is required when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense. De Guzman vs Alvia. The petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two had a conversation. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party. The acquittal extinguishes the criminal liability but not the civil liability particularly if the finding is not guilty based on reasonable ground. the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Because of the untidy state of the clinic.Petitioners. . she was wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr.The following day. The operating staff then went inside the petitioner's clinic to take their snacks. The attending physicians summoned Dr.Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22. Hence. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility. In the case at bar. gasping for breath.On appeal. However. In our view. . occupying approximately one-third (1/3) of the rear end of the vehicle. when the latter is not proved. specially considering that this occurrence happened in just a matter of seconds. The stall of one Antonio Vergara was demolished pursuant to this order. but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished. The SC took the position that the said provision merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act. . has been explained by the Code Commission as follows: "The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of the accused Fernando Gabat has been established beyond reasonable doubt. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonable doubt.Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital. when CRUZ V CA (UMALI) . Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. who was attached to an oxygen tank. for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused. According to Rowena. head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District Hospital.The petitioner filed the appeal to the SC questioning the grant of actual damages despite a no guilty verdict.Thereafter. 1997 prof.

In fact. Thus.In litigations involving medical negligence. that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon. deprived petitioner of the right to appeal. the plaintiff was returning home by rail from his daily labors.11 - prof. . PHIL. Emilio Zuniga. the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence. It might have lost its right to appeal. in the generality of cases. The plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed and the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. Costs against petitioner. and as the train drew up to the station in San Mateo the plaintiff while making his exit through the door.The sack of melons on the platform is because it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for shipment to the market. unless the contrary is sufficiently established. it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due process. the judgment against him has become final and executory. not the court. . Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause. He was immediately brought to a hospital where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car. . and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED.The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act. 1915. nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. . the accused jumped bail and remained at large. but also with regard to its amount. (3) that it be without malice. petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee. took his position upon the steps of the coach.Jose Cangco. In the case before us.On Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment: . But admittedly. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. it can be said that by jumping bail.000 against the estate of the deceased James P. 1918 . thus. degree of intelligence. the absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person or property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence.WON has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. got off the same car. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period.Napoleon Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide. . and to pay damages. may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused HELD NO . DISPOSITION Petition is hereby DENIED. Expenses reached the sum of P790. April 14.After a judgment has become final. Rizal.To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend. the patient died. This row of sacks was so placed that there was a space of only about two feet between the sacks of melons and the edge of the platform. employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter‘s insolvency. then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former‘s civil liability. Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing when performing the same operation. RABBIT V PEOPLE [citation] PANGANIBAN. nullifying or defeating the judgment. After the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop. who dutifully participated in the defense of its accusedemployee. and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. 2004 CANGCO V MANILA RAILROAD CO 38 Phil 768 FISHER. ISSUE WON an employer.On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. and with serious injuries. and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked. . found the facts substantially as above stated.torts & damages Dr. taking into consideration his employment or occupation. especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. casis NATURE An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance disallowing the claim of the plaintiff for P1. time and place. (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary. Phil. physical condition. . . objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern. and the train station was lit dimly by a single light located some distance away. ISSUE WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide HELD NO .For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is. a matter of expert opinion. . . alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. . McElroy. Angeles arrived. there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a casual connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient. to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latter‘s consent would also result in improperly amending. Rabbit will be held liable for the civil liabilities. no cogent proof exists that any of these circumstances caused petitioner's death. As the train slowed down another passenger.Even without expert testimony.The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition. the accused-employee. as in the instant case. October 14. At the hearing in the CFI. Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as her blood pressure was already 0/0. where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. was employed by Manila Railroad Company as clerk. one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities.The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them. . he used a pass. In fact. 1915. it participated in the proceedings before the RTC. he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. But in the event the the accused becoems insolvent. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee. and although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers FACTS . . While petitioner was closing the abdominal wall.The accident occurred on a dark night. as they are deemed to have waived the appeal.January 20. multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years. It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted. By the same token. they cannot seek relief from the court. This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench. FACTS . located upon the line of the defendant railroad company. founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. . thus. and other circumstances regarding persons. he instituted this proceeding in the CFI Manilato recover damages of the defendant company. When Jose Cangco stepped off. 9 months and 11 days to 6 years. supplied by the company. there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients. While at large. NATURE Petition for Review A2010 . He lived in San Mateo. which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender.August 31. vested rights are acquired by the winning party. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited. (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence. but it was not denied its day in court. . also an employee of the railroad company. Consequently. the trial judge.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his curation.

torts & damages
passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed. ISSUE WON there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff HELD NO Ratio In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act - that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly - the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Reasoning - The employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform. Their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. - The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. - Its liability is direct and immediate, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations - In commenting upon article 1093, Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an "accident in the performance of an obligation already existing . . .." - In the Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. the court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract. - Under the Spanish law, in cases imposed upon employers with respect to damages due to the negligence of their employees to persons to whom they are not bound by contract, such is not based upon the principle of respondent superior - but upon the principle announced in article 1902 which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good the damage caused. - The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third persons suffer damage. Article 1903 presumes negligence, but that presumption is refutable. - In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, an action is brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the damage caused

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alight. The plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff, as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at this station. There could be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. It is the Court‘s conclusion that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence. DISPOSITION The decision of the lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances.

by the carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his employment The Court, after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. - Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if productive of injury, gives rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation. - The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case, if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant, whereas if the accident was caused by defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence. - The Court is of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence: "The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." - In considering the probability of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The cement platform also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to

SEPARATE OPINION MALCOLM, [dissent]
- With one sentence in the majority decision, we are of full accord, namely, "It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred." With the general rule relative to a passenger's contributory negligence, we are likewise in full accord, namely, "An attempt to alight from a moving train is negligence per se." Adding these two points together, we have the logical result - the Manila Railroad Co. should be absolved from the complaint, and judgment affirmed.

FORES V MIRANDA [citation] REYES, J.B.L.; March 4, 1959
NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of speed, the driver lost control thereof, causing it to swerve and to hit the bridge wall. The accident occurred on the morning of March 22, 1953. Five of the passengers were injured, including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. He was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment, and later was subjected to a series of operations; the first on May 23, 1953, when wire loops were wound around the broken bones and screwed into place; a second, effected to insert a metal splint, and a third one to remove such splint. At the time of the trial, it appears that respondent had not yet recovered the use of his right arm. - The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly. ISSUE WON the defendant is entitled to moral damages HELD NO.

torts & damages
Ratio Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code, which provide as follows: "ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; xxx xxx xxx ART. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstance, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith." Reasoning (a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages; and (b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the description term "analogous cases" used in Art. 2219; not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused by contractual breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in Act. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisting contractual relation between the parties." "ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission caused damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pro-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter." - In sum the rule is: Delict (breach of contract) Gen. Rule: no moral damages - Reason: the advantageous position of a party suing a carrier for breach of the contract of transportation explains, to some extent, the limitation imposed by the new Code on the amount of the recovery. The action for breach of contract imposes on the defendant carrier a presumption of liability upon mere proof of injury to the passenger; that latter is relieved from the duty to establish the fault of the carrier, or of his employees, and the burden is placed on the carrier to prove the it was due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure (Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil., 768 777). Moreover, the carrier, unlike in suits for quasi-delict, may not escape liability by proving that it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees - Exception: with moral damages if:  defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith  result in the death of a passenger in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206, that entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased" - The difference in conditions, defenses and proof, as well as the codal concept of quasi-delict as essentially extra contractual negligence, compel us to differentiate between action ex contractu, and actions quasi ex delicto, and prevent us from viewing the action for breach of contract as simultaneously embodying an action on tort. DISPOSITION The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified by eliminating the award of P5.000.00 by way of moral damages

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- Damages are awarded to petitioner at Php5,000, deducting Php 2,500, the amount fairly attributable to his own negligence.

M.H. RAKES V THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY 7 Phil 359 TRACEY; January 23, 1907
NATURE Action for damages FACTS - the plaintiff, Rakes, one of a group of 8 African-American laborers in the employment of defendant, Atlantic, was at work transporting iron rails from the harbor in Manila. The men were hauling the rails on 2 hand cars, some behind or at it sides and some pulling the cars in the front by a rope. At one point, the track sagged, the tie broke, the car canted and the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff who was walking by the car‘s side, breaking his leg, which was later amputated at the knee. - the plaintiff‘s witness alleged that a noticeable depression in the track had appeared after a typhoon. This was reported to the foreman, Mckenna, but it had not been proven that Atlantic inspected the track or had any proper system of inspection. Also, there were no side guards on the cars to keep the rails from slipping off. - However, the company‘s officers and 3 of the workers testified that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all against walking by the side of cars. As Rakes was walking along the car‘s side when the accident occurred, he was found to have contributed in some degree to the injury inflicted, although not as the primary cause. - Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through negligence lies only in a criminal action against the official directly responsible and that the employer be held only subsidiarily liable. ISSUES 1. WON Atlantic is only subsidiarily liable 2. WON there was contributory negligence on the part of petitioner and if so, WON it bars him from recovery HELD 1. NO - By virtue of culpa contractual, Atlantic may be held primarily liable as it failed in its duty to provide safe appliances for the use of its employees. Petitioner need not file charges with the foreman to claim damages from Atlantic; a criminal action is not a requisite for the enforcement of a civil action. 2. YES - Petitioner had walked along the side of the car despite a prohibition to do so by the foreman. However, the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the injured party's negligence. Petitioner‘s negligence contributed only to his own injury and not to the principal occurrence—it was merely an element to the damage caused upon him. Had it been otherwise, ―…parties being mutually in fault, there can be no appointment of damages. The law has no scales to determine in such cases whose wrongdoing weighed most in the compound that occasioned the mischief‖ (Railroad v Norton). In this case, petitioner may recover from the defendant, less a sum deemed suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.

SEPARATE OPINION WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent]
-the negligence of the defendant alone was insufficient to cause the accident—it also required the negligence of the plaintiff. Because of this, plaintiff should not be afforded relief

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V CA 241 SCRA 671 VITUG; February 23, 1995
NATURE Petition for review FACTS - In October 1986, Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch. Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to Clarita S. Luna. - In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was forthwith informed. In order to replace the lost card, Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank's internal security procedures and policy would appear to be- to meanwhile so record the lost card, along with the principal card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file. - On 06 October 1988, Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend, a Fil-Am, and another guest at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel Intercon Manila. To pay for the lunch, Luis presented his FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who promptly had it verified through a telephone call to the bank's Credit Card Department. Since the card was not honored, Luis was forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.13. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this incident. - In a letter, dated 11 Oct. 1988, Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from FEBTC the payment of damages. Adrian V. Festejo, a VP of the bank, expressed the bank's apologies to Luis in his letter which stated that: In cases when a card is reported to our office as lost, FAREASTCARD undertakes the necessary action to avert its unauthorized use to protect its cardholders. However, it failed to inform him about its security policy. Furthermore, an overzealous employee of the Bank's Credit Card Department did not consider the possibility that it may have been him who was presenting the card at that time (for which reason, the unfortunate incident occurred). - Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure the latter that Luis was a "very valued clients" of FEBTC. William Anthony King, F&B Manager of the Intercon, wrote back to say that the credibility of Luis had never been "in question." A copy of this reply was sent to Luis by Festejo. - Still evidently feeling aggrieved, Luis filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Pasig against FEBTC. - On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig ordered FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.

torts & damages
- On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, FEBTC has come to this Court with this petition for review. ISSUE WON the petitioner is entitled to moral and exemplary damages HELD NO - In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. The Civil Code provides: - Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. - Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed ) of the common carrier. - Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the appellate court, however, can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. - Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. - Article 21 states: Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. - Article 21 of the Code, it should be observed, contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. Thus, even if we are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a breach of contract, its application can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that clearly must, in any case, give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith. - Fores vs. Miranda explained with great clarity the predominance that we should give to Article 2220 in contractual relations; we quote: Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the same must be discarded. We have repeatedly ruled that moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code, which provide as follows: - Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; xxx xxx xxx

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- The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort even where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort. - Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are intended to serve as an example or as correction for the public good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. 2229, Civil Code. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances (Art. 2230, Civil Code). In quasidelicts, such damages are granted if the defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice. In contracts and quasicontracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner (Art. 2232, Civil Code). - Given the above premises and the factual circumstances here obtaining, it would also be just as arduous to sustain the exemplary damages granted by the courts below. - Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps inadvertent, to honor its credit card issued to private respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code providing thusly: - Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. - Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where the court deems such recovery to be just and equitable (Art. 2208, Civil Code). We see no issue of sound discretion on the part of the appellate court in allowing the award thereof by the trial court. DISPOSITION The appealed decision is MODIFIED by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to private respondents; in its stead, petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent Luis A. Luna an amount of P5,000.00 by way of nominal damages. In all other respects, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.

- Art. 2220. Wilful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. - By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes apparent that: (a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages; and (b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art. 2219; not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused contractual breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisitng contractual relations between the parties." - Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger, in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206, that entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. But the exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. To award moral damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant, as required by Art. 2220, would be to violate the clear provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation. xxx xxx xxx - The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts. 1170-1172); their consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code. - Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. - In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation. - It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, that this difference was in the mind of the lawmakers when in Art. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to malice; but the fact must be shown in evidence, and a carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached through negligence of the carrier's employees.

AIR FRANCE V CA (Carrascoso, Et. Al) 18 SCRA 155 SANCHEZ; September 28, 1966
NATURE PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS

therefore. that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight. WON the amounts awarded to Carrascoso was excessive HELD 1. YES . was cured by the evidence. Cuento. solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. action as we have said."The mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution". respect. Reasoning . Reasoning . serious anxiety. YES. but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats. accordingly. as it was only hearsay.Carrascoso testified that the purser of the air-carrier made an entry in his notebooks reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will. YES . generates a relation attended with a public duty. are admissible as part of the res gestae. the subject of inquiry is not the entry. YES Ratio. also. if the manager‘s actions could be justified. when they found out that Mr.also…From a reading of the transcript just quoted. Second. courtesy and due consideration.43 And is. be essayed. they should have presented the manager to testify in court – but they did not do so . many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class.Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso. 5. However. . fraudulent. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. Reasoning . through PAL.QUESTION OF LAW: one which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties 2. the plaintiff was issued. WON the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso regarding the account made by the air-carrier‘s purser is admissible in evidence as hearsay 7. The stress of Carrascoso's.FINDINGS OF FACT: "the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon". "bad . Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees. nor proved that the ―white man‖ had ―better right‖ over the seat. there was a 'white man'. Testimony of the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment-just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. WON the Court could review the questions of fact Substantive 2. but the ouster incident. may result.If. CA held that Air France should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not. The petitioner contents that it should not be admitted as evidence.The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat. a civil engineer. notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed. embarrassments and humiliations. a first class ticket without any reservation whatever. casis faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes 4. For. It invites people to avail of the comforts and I advantages it offers. WON Carrascoso was entitled to attorney‘s fees 9. then why did they confirm Carrasco his seat? 3. because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. and if the ―white man‖ had a better right to the seat. is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. . Obiter. Unless. in the words of the witness Ernesto G. if forms part of the res gestae Ratio. he imposed his arbitrary will. by reason of which he suffered inconvenience. then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. NO. refused. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a wanton. For. Reasoning .torts & damages . although he had tourist class protection. Damages are proper. as was to be expected. indignities and abuses from such employees. and that the captain refused to intervene". A2010 . and. Also. WON moral damages could be recovered from Air France. amongst others. he was granted the ―first class‖ seat. and paid for. if not confusion. injurious language. From Manila to Bangkok. contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions. It is (therefore) unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. granted that their employee was accused of the tortuous act 5. as petitioner underscores. must answer. as proved by written documents (tickets…) 3. WON damages are proper in a breach contract 6. Statements then.Carrascoso.15 - prof. they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". WON Carrascoso was entitled to moral damages. Cuento.There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering. However. the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride.Air France did not present evidence that the ―white man‖ made a prior reservation. the plaintiff. the Manager alleged. the said entry was made outside the Philippines and by an employee of petitioner. When asked to vacate his 'first class' seat. if any. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness. bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. YES. Air France. the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. WON the CA failed to make a complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it. reckless. that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. WON Carrascoso was entitled to exemplary damages 8. there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith which the CA allegedly failed to find 4.both TC and CA decided in favor of Carrascoso ISSUES Procedural 1.The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Ratio . 7. . naturally. thereby causing him mental anguish." .Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. YES . So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals. and Third.xxx The law. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier. oppressive. when Carrascoso was asked to confirm his seat in Bangkok. is one attended with public duty. Carrascoso traveled in ―first class‖ but at Bangkok. NO Ratio A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity. . Deficiency in the complaint. WON Carrascoso was entitled to the ―first class‖ seat he claims. his employer. It would have been easy for Air France to contradict Carrascoso‘s testimony if they had presented the purser. and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body.16 They consist of the court's "conclusions with respect to the determinative facts in issue" . YES Ratio The Civil Code gives the Court ample power to grant exemplary damages-in contracts and quasi-contracts.Petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties. So it is. Carrasco was issued a ―first class ticket‖. petitioner. that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. he forcibly ejected him from his seat. the Bangkok-Teheran leg. Such testimony is admissible. a commotion ensued. could give ground for an action for damages. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying because.The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept 8. or malevolent manner". according to said Ernesto G. 6. said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok. that. when his action is planted upon breach of contract and thus. "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager]. this is bad faith. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner-air carrier-a case of quasi-delict. had a 'better right' to the seat. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct. If there had been no seat. Certainly. resulting in moral damages. left Manila for Lourdes w/ 48 other Filipino pilgrims. The trial court also accepted as evidence the written documents submitted by Carrasco and even the testimony of the air-carrier‘s employees attested that indeed. there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class. they came all across to Mr. (note: it was held that it was a case of quasi-delict even though it was a breach of contract) Ratio A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. and plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat in the plane. The excitement had not as yet died down. in this environment. Reasoning . and if such.A written document speaks a uniform language. issued plaintiff a ―first class‖ round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat. it. wounded feelings and social humiliation. when the dialogue happened. -Also. however. adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. worse.Constitution mandates that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based" and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before". Carrascoso to give his seat to the 'white man. is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense". who. The contract of air carriage. of course. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager.

in diameter near the bottom and it appeared that water drained out of the hole. the diligence to be observed in the performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.No quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or negligence. father of the deceased Vicente Syquia. say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from 'reversible error. 1993 NATURE Petition for review of CA decision dismissing Syquia family‘s complaint for damages against Manila Memorial Park Cemetery.Whatever kind of negligence it has committed. WON it can be liable for culpa aquiliana HELD 1. . it may still be liable under the law on contracts. VP. And the MFR was similarly dealt with. Trial Court’s Ruling . the Syquias discovered that the vault had a hole approx 3 in. Chief of Security and Assistant Chief of Security. beyond the terms of the contract. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. (b) coffin was entirely damaged by water. or in an outer wall of stone. circumstances of the case do not show negligence. the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased was removed from its niche underground. Treasure. Interment Foreman. . The reason for the boring of the hole was explained by Henry Flores. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court.Pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal Court of Parañaque.A stabbing incident on August 30. clothing of the deceased. a concrete vault was installed and after the burial. brick or concrete. DISPOSITION On balance."Sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". A contracting party cannot incur a liability more than what is expressly specified in his undertaking. January 27. Because. they caused the opening of the concrete vault and discovered that: (a) the interior walls showed evidence of total flooding.‖ . A2010 . who said that: ―When the vault was placed on the grave a hole was placed on the vault so that water could come into the vault because it was raining heavily then because the vault has no hole the vault will float and the grave would be filled with water. Juan Syquia. As the concrete vault was being raised to the surface. DISPOSITION the foregoing premises considered. WON Mla Memorial breached its contract with petitioners. preparatory to transferring the remains to a newly purchased family plot also at the same cemetery. JR. 1918 NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of La Union FACTS . Costs against petitioner. its President.Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of MLA MEMORIAL provides that: ―Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete box.16 - prof. . . Finding no evidence of negligence. . The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar Judgment for attorneys' fees. 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista on the premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Manila RTC. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. NO Ratio. the petition is DENIED. or alternatively 2. . which is the law between them. ISSUE WON respondent court is correct in denying dismissal of the case HELD Ratio Although a school may not be liable under Art.torts & damages Ratio. (c) entire lining of coffin. there is no reason to award damages. 2180 that the liability arises from acts done by pupils or students of the institution.Syquias claim that there was a breach of contract because it was stated in the brochures that ―lot may hold single or double internment underground in sealed concrete vault. When the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties.After about a month. But when an academic institution accepts students for enrollment.Respondent Trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Certainly. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. It cannot be extended by implication." . the complaint states no cause of action against them since academic institutions. filth and silt causing the wooden parts to separate and to crack the viewing glass panel located directly above the head and torso of the deceased. Petitioners the assailed the trial court‘s dispositions before the respondent appellate court which affirmed the trial court‘s ruling. NO Ratio Negligence is defined by law as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons. Inc. MLA MEMORIAL is deemed to be liable for desecrating the grave of the dead."Sealed" meant "closed." Standard dictionaries define seal as any of various closures or fastenings that cannot be opened without rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized opening. like PSBA. . 2. 2180 on quasi-delicts. chose the gravesite despite knowing that said area had to be constantly sprinkled with water to keep the grass green and that water would eventually seep through the vault. the actual installment of which shall be made by the employees of the Association. we. PSBA is not liable. 2180 of the Civil Code. the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.Defendants (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed alleging that since they are presumably sued under Art.The act of boring a hole in the vault was necessary so as to prevent the vault from floating away. no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or explore the realm of arts when bullets are flying or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb.\ 9. Costs against the petitioners. recklessness and lack of security precautions. It is expressly mentioned in Art. It was established that his assailants were not members of the school‘s academic community but were outsiders. the vault was covered by a cement lid." In the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary. The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent wit this ruling of the Court.Contract between the parties did not guarantee that the cement vault would be waterproof. Reasoning . . 2176) .‖ Pursuant to this. March 15. FACTS . then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control. .Private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave.The suit impleaded PSBA. of the time and of the place. NEGLIGENCE PICART V SMITH [citation] STREET. and because there was a pre-existing contractual relation between the Syquias and Mla Memorial. ISSUES 1. February 4. MFR was also denied. But respondent court‘s premise is incorrect. the school makes itself responsible in providing their students with an atmosphere that is conducive for learning. It sought to adjudge them liable for the victim‘s death due to their alleged negligence.Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana.They entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care. . (Mla Memorial) FACTS ." Mla Memorial bound itself to provide the concrete box to be sent in the interment. Dispositive CA decision affirmed in toto. are beyond the ambit of that rule. 1992 NATURE Petition to review the decision of Court of Appeals.SYQUIAS base their claim for damages against Mla Memorial on either: (1) breach of its obligation to deliver a defect-free concrete vault.The case should be tried on its merits.The father himself. authorized and instructed the defendant to inter the remains of deceased.CA affirmed judgment of dismissal. In this sense. . SYQUIA V CA (Mla Memorial Park) 217 SCRA 624 CAMPOS. (2) gross negligence in failing to seal the concrete vault (Art. NO PSBA V CA [citation] PADILLA.. Reasoning . .Juan SYQUIA. and the exposed parts of the deceased's remains were damaged and soiled. . (RCBC v CA) Reasoning . casis Ratio Parties are bound by the terms of their contract.

The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. the defendant guided it toward his left. became frightened and started to run away. hung them of a stick. Could a prudent man. but could not find one. the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing. but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge. Murphy was not in his quarters. an employee of the defendant. negligent in the eye of the law. and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. NATURE An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries. .When he had gotten quite near.The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. Reasonable foresight of harm. and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches. and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule. and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. was guilty of negligence that would give rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done HELD YES .CFI absolved defendant from liability . for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. 1912. and from this moment it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. and carried them home. less than 9 years old. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed.17 [citation] CARSON. in the case under consideration.Stated in these terms.The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. in our opinion. . it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. . that being the proper side of the road for the machine. . They thrust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. March 22. crossed the footbridge of the Isla del Provisor.He did this because he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side.As the defendant neared the bridge he saw the plaintiff and blew his horn to give warning of his approach.As the defendant started across the bridge. the boys.As a result of its injuries the horse died. . who had promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm. David Taylor. and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. and have in themselves considerable explosive power. about 12 years of age. A2010 .The defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. La Union. there was an appreciable risk that. would have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk. .The plaintiff. .In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away. at the westerly end of the island. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences.On the 30th of September. the son of a mechanical engineer. or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite.Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case.The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not.The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. The power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge. . instituted by David Taylor.Hence. casis . he gave two more successive blasts. to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. After crossing the footbridge. It will be noted however. . An explosion followed. impassable for vehicles.Before he had gotten half way across. for the purpose of visiting one Murphy. by his father. .However. since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles. known as the Isla del Provisor. the defendant.Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet. he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side. he was.On December 12. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. of which each took one end. they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian. . The visit made on a Sunday afternoon. impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery. it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. They then opened one of the caps with a knife. negligence is clearly established. given the novelty of the apparition and the rapidity of the approach. . and their right to take them. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. .But in view of the known nature of horses. . was at the same time when he received the injuries complained of. who. one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds. . . Manuel looked for a hammer. the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or. plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan Bridge. spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. . DISPOSITION Appealed decision is reversed. . . The law considers what would be reckless. at San Fernando.The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side. deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. blameworthy. He was. Finding on inquiry that Mr. . . 1905. that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous. plaintiff. TAYLOR V MANILA RAILROAD . .torts & damages . when the boys proposed purring a match to the contents of the cap. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the city of Manila. causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Murphy. continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. . going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded.In so doing. with a boy named Manuel Claparols. a minor. and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop.As the automobile approached. FACTS .After watching the operation of the traveling crane used in handling the defendant's coal. the court thinks.The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. . more mature than the average boy of his age. then he is guilty of negligence. 15 years of age. in maneuvering his car in the manner above described. . . . . followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision. and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics. the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences. the boys picked up all they could find. the appeal ISSUE WON the defendant.When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger.The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant. . 1910 prof. A prudent man. his nearest relative. Jessie.In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done. After some discussion as to the ownership of caps. and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.The plaintiff himself was not free from fault. received a slight cut in the neck. instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down.The pony had not as yet exhibited fright. foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so. .He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge. placed in the position of the defendant. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

same rule which governs that of an adult. formally declared that it adhered "to the principles announced in the case of Railroad Co. making the company liable HELD 1. 1999 FACTS . admit of no other explanation. In the case at bar. after an exhaustive and critical analysis and review of may of the adjudged cases."ART.The owners shall be also be liable for the damages caused — "1. 1908. therefore. despite his denials on the witness stands. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that. and that the defendant. as did the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor. xxx xxx xxx "Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprises are equally liable for the damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred. if the child is actually injured. vs. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only. Petitioners Leonardo Kong. and 1908 of that Code. the Court said that it is of the opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff. not due to his wanton or willful acts. properly speaking. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault. not only for personal acts and omission. he can not recover. whereon things attractive to children are exposed. (3) that an invitation of license to cross the premises of another can not be predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been taken to interfere with such practice. and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstance of the case. he had been to sea as a cabin boy. upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902. and in a great variety of similar cases. and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward them must calculate upon this. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in severally state courts. they should expect that liberty to be taken. 657). and on his death or incapacity the mother. and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. . was able to earn P2. (4) that there is no difference between children and adults of an invitation or a license to enter upon another's premises. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child form entering premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are accustomed to roam about or to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter. In the case at bar. show clearly that he knew what he was about. Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar. Stout. "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault. and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion. on the other hand. (wherein the principal question was whether a railroad company was liable for an injury received by an infant while upon its premises. respectively. and take precautions accordingly. counsel for plaintiff relied on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last result in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases. it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts. became frightened and ran away.S. xxx xxx xxx "The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. one of which when carried away by the visitor.The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable. is liable for the damages caused by the minors who alive with them." . 9 years of age.We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated.As laid down in Railroad Co." Chief Justice Cooley."The father. such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. in view of the fact that the little girl. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. under the circumstances. By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence. at a place where the railroad company knew. "must calculate upon this. for which he may and should be held responsible. In these. the question involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an injury received by an infant of tender years. and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence. is clearly a breach of duty. Makati City.Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvel's Department Store. operations manager. which therefore was not." DISPOSITION The petition is DISMISSED. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity. by quasi—contracts." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever. or for purposed of amusement.The Defendant Company‘s defense that the caps were under the duty of independent contractors deserves scant consideration since these workers have been under the supervision of one of the company‘s foremen. and the cases based thereon. and take precautions accordingly. Marlow."ART. exploded and injured him. we also have to look at the proximate cause and the maturity of the plaintiff if it was his negligence that contributed to the principal occurrence of the tragedy. Obligations are created by law. and for kindling of explosive substance which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place. this has to be examined on a case-tocase basis. . ." and. such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years.).Plaintiff Taylor appears to have rested his case."ART. he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. However. (84 U. and there found explosive signal torpedoes left exposed by the railroad company's employees. Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager." ." .In support of his contention. 1903. .Just because the kids trespassed doesn‘t mean that the company is not liable for anything bad that might happen to them. a negligent omission. we are satisfied that plaintiff's action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting a match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff. such as a turntable left in such condition as to make it probable that children in playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer injury in playing with such machine. the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury. 1902.In the typical cases. by contracts. or upon which the public are expressively or impliedly permitted to enter to or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play. and where the child does not enter under such conditions the owner's failure to make reasonable precaution to guard the child against the injury from unknown or unseen dangers. and this is to be determined in such case by the circumstances of the case. . NO JARCO MARKETING CORP V CA (AGUILAR) DAVIDE." and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the A2010 . 1903. but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.As regards the maturity of the child. or for purposes of amusement. if such injury was."ART. the immediate cause of the explosion . the principles on which these cases turn are that "while railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it. If they leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to them." . more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age. voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan. must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and impulses. attributable to the negligence of the company). "attributable to the negligence of the defendant. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous. who was with him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap. To hold otherwise would be expose to all the children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or occupants of land upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to enter. both English and America. children who would likely to come. was his own act of putting a match to the contents of the cap. Stout ( 17 Wall. who from mere idle curiosity. the great weight of authority holds the owner of the premises liable. in the case of Powers vs. as described by the little girl who was present. WON the defendant‘s negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries. December 21. ." . 1089. enters upon the railroad company's premises.The owners of premises. plaintiff at the time of the accident was well— grown youth of 15.torts & damages .18 - prof. However. without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his express invitation or permission. (2) that no exception to this rule exists in favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated to attract them to the premises. vs. from idle curiosity. therefore. and supervisor. placed upon such premises by the owner. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only. at a place where the railroad company's premises. ISSUE 1. casis ." . . wherever they go. followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer. and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap. or had a good reason to suppose. and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with. said that: ―Children. as one of its determining factors. saying that (1) That the owner of land is not liable to trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by them. or where such infant found upon the premises a dangerous machine.

Disposition The instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED care. The management did nothing. . pinned by the gift-wrapping counter. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us.On the other hand.‖ when asked ―what did you do?‖ She died 14 days later. She suddenly felt a gust of wind and heard a loud thud. When. Subsequently. on that account. Zhieneth was guilty of contributory negligence because she tried to climb the counter. The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained. exempt from criminal liability. a child under nine years of age is. Further. conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence. a minor under 18 years of age.e. would do..000 for moral damages. It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not secured. it is just that the loss . In our jurisdiction. Criselda was able to ask people to help her and bring her daughter to the hospital. after appellant herein had pleaded guilty. but as he was under 18 years of age. If negligence. I did not come near the counter and the counter just fell on me. subject to the supervision of the Superintendent of Public Schools of the Province.CRISELDA too. after appellant had pleaded guilty. (Sangco) . a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment. Criselda never let go of her daughter except to sign the credit card slip. Accordingly. and he was committed to the care and custody of Atty. MAGTIBAY V TIANGCO 74 Phil 756 BOCOBO. is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasidelict and required discernment as a condition of liability. . ET AL. The counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong base and was used without incident for the past 15 years. Abaya. Initially. the civil action in the instant case was filed against defendant-appellant for damages in the sum of P2. . She was 6 years old. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH. 80 of the RPC. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. for the protection of the interest of another person. therefore. that degree of A2010 .Gonzales‘ testimony about what Zhieneth said to the doctor should be accepted because at the time she said it. a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in court. by analogy. not of punishment. and wake and funeral expenses. Gonzales and Guevarra.000 for attorney's fees and an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages. Abaya. unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment. casis No contributory negligence from Criselda .Jarco Mktg Corp. The time and distance were both significant. exonerated him from the crime charged HELD NO . Both Gonzales and Guevarra testified to the structural instability and shakiness of the counter which is in the shape of and inverted ―L. but reserved such right as the heirs of the deceased might have to recover damages in a civil action against said Tiangco. . or if happening wholly or partly through human agency. in view of Tiangco‘s good conduct recommended the dismissal of the case. The CFI dismissed the criminal case.000 for the death of Magtibay. the criminal case was dismissed. a former employee of Syvel‘s Dept Store who helped bring Zhieneth to the hospital. P300. JARCO MKTG. The Court of First Instance (CFI) Batangas found Tiangco guilty as charged. The CFI gave judgment for plaintiffs for P2. Smith. i. The testimony of the present employees (that Zhieneth climbed the counter so it fell) should instead be believed. therefore. one cannot exist with the other. should not be believed because he might have ill feelings towards petitioners. the sentence was suspended.The Aguilars’ side: While in the dept store. CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family. The testimony of two former employees. Sadly. Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2 nd flr or Syvel‘s Dept. Negligence is "the failure to observe. she was in so much pain and she answered right away. Yet. but simply that he would suffer no penalty.Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter.torts & damages . For if that was the truth. 2. whereby such other person suffers injury. Zhieneth was crying and screaming for help. No contributory negligence from Zhieneth .19 - prof. should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Under the circumstances thus described. So the Aguilars filed a complaint for damages wherein they sought the payment of P157. It was deliberately placed at a corner to avoid such accidents. February 28. an event happening without any human agency.The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v.‖ with a base smaller than the top.An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. the counter just fell on her. If property has been destroyed or other loss occasioned by a wrongful act. WON the incident is accident or attributable to negligence 2. negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man. ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist. It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and admissions.She was operated on immediately at the hospital. . later to the latter's hand." . no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. either criminal or civil. Liability of an infant for his torts is imposed as a mode. NEGLIGENCE. . Hence this appeal. They both had informed management (while they were still working there) that the counter should be nailed to the floor." . which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence. It is "a fortuitous circumstance. . and its top laden with formica. et al’s side: Criselda was negligent in taking care of her daughter for allowing her to roam freely. petitioners did. but merely put off the imposition of the corresponding penalty. The protruding part of the counter was at the costumer side. and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA.86 for actual damages. and is. but of compensation. RTC mfr – for the Aguilars. heard her tell the doctor that she ―nothing. to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life.522. she was just a foot away from her mother. did not wipe out his guilt. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care. Criselda momentarily let go of her daughter‘s hand to sign her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter. Thus. P20. at time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter. a child of such tender age and in extreme pain.The conclusive presumption favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. of whom plaintiffs-appellees are the lawful heirs. on the hospital bed.000 as damages. At this precise moment. This means she wasn‘t making it up. She looked behind her and saw her daughter on the floor. CA and CA mfr – for the Aguilars. The rule.RTC – for Jarco Marketing Corp. this did not mean that he was exonerated from the crime charged. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything. precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter. until Tiangco would reach his majority. . Store. event or happening. in order to give the delinquent minor a chance to be reformed.The suspension of the sentence under Art. an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens. ISSUE WON the suspension of the sentence under Art. et al.On May 9.80 of the Revised Penal Code.Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory.Defendant-appellant Tiangco. ISSUE 1.Petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. 1944 NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance Batangas FACTS . Shaped like an-inverted "L" the counter was heavy. thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. after he had observed good conduct. . neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. huge. Petitioners refused to pay. who was negligent? HELD 1. Nor did such dismissal of the criminal case obliterate his civil liability for damages. Gonzales. pleaded guilty to an information for homicide through reckless negligence in that he had recklessly driven an automobile and thereby caused the death of Magtibay. 1983. Gonzales testified that the gift wrapping counter was right beside the verification counter where Criselda was signing. the Aguilars demanded from the petitioners the reimbursement of hospital and medical bills. through their negligence or omission to secure or make stable the counter's base. and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal that it was not durable after all.After the burial of their daughter. then he is guilty of negligence. under our law. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age.

torts & damages should upon the estate of the wrongdoer rather than that of a guiltless person. . petition is based on Article 2176. Did the acts/omissions of Aquino cause the death of Ylarde? Yes.Ff day. put out his index finger and touch the wire.There is nothing in the record indicating any particular cause for the parting of the wire. and where. being head of academic school and not school of arts and trades. .25 p. but dissents in so far as the decision allows the recovery of the father of the sum of P1. . 7 Phil. but from the testimony of Demetrio Bingao.The mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of Jose (8 yrs old).But even supposing that contributory negligence could in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased. such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case.. Saturnino made a motion as if it touch it. the principal object is the recovery of damages for wrongful death.At 4 p. and some one cut the wire and disengaged the body.The wire was an ordinary number 6 triple braid weather proof wire.telling him that the wire might be charged. Aquino continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil.His reasoning: It is well settled in this jurisdiction that an action will lie to recover damages for death caused by the wrongful act.20 - prof. Aquino left the children to level the loose soil and borrowed a key from Banez. which has caused the death of a person by failure to exercise due care in the prosecution of its business. . . Atlantic. such as is commonly used by the defendant company for the purpose of conducting electricity for lighting. IN RULING THAT YLARDE WAS IMPRUDENT. has caused the death of another. Disposition judgment reversed YLARDE V AQUINO [citation] GANCAYCO. . Lower court dismissed and CA affirmed and said child Ylarde was negligent. Jose Salvador and Saturnino Endrina.Saturnino yielded to this admonition and stopped. . . .) . or other measures taken to guard the point of danger. .The liability of such a corporation for damages must be regarded as a part of the risks which it assumes when it undertakes to promote its own business.250 only as damages.stopped Saturnino. . organized primarily for profit. 57 PHIL 478 STREET. Consequently. .The indemnity allowed in criminal case is merely incidental to the main object sought. Teacher Banez started burying them. July 29. and the civil liability of a corporation.25 p.Alberto del Rosario. as in this case. one of the witnesses for the defense.indemnity to the heirs of the deceased is equivalent to P1. 1930 – 2pm: a wire used by the defendant on Dimas. who happened to be the son of an electrician. Work was unfinished. knew never to touch a broken electrical wire (as his dad told him so!). the question assumes a vastly different aspect. It should be P 2250.At the time that message was sent the wire had not yet parted. casis not subject to criminal prosecution for the act complained of. he stepped into a garage which was located nearby and asked Jose Soco to telephone the Malabon station of MERALCO that an electrical wire was burning at that place. who was somewhat ahead. Moreta.With respect to the amount of damages recoverable. 9 yrs old. . who was a few paces ahead of his classmates. . 821. One of the ends of the wire fell to the ground among some shrubbery close to the way.The wire was cased in the usual covering. .The engineer of the company says that it was customary for the company to make a special inspection of these wires at least once in six months. and just as it is entitled to earn adequate profits from its business. Aquino can be held liable. . He went to another place and left the kids. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT CONSIDER HIS AGE AND MATURITY..There should be a distinction between the civil liability of an ordinary person who. Luke's Hospital the child was pronounced dead.m. exclaiming "Ay! madre". 1932 FACTS ***This action was instituted by Julian del Rosario for the purpose of recovering damages from Meralco for the death of his son. which is the punishment of the guilty party. all members of the second grade in the public school. Aquino was a teacher. He ordered them to level the soil when a huge stone was at brink of falling. 3 days later he died.Based on Article 2180. .Aug 4. Work is too dangerous and it was not even in the lesson plan. . This is unacceptable. . not having been the determining cause of the accident. the defendant is a corporation. (Rakes vs.Citing Astudillo vs.l ISSUE WON Manila Electric is liable HELD YES Reasoning .000 .A crowd soon collected. resulting from a shock from a wire used by the defendant for the transmission of electricity.Whatever may be the reasons for the rule followed in criminal cases. (Manzanares vs. . by wrongful act.3 of the 4 kids jumped into the pit.As soon as Noguera took cognizance of the trouble. and received answer from the station to the effect that they would send an inspector. but this had been burned off for some distance from the point where the wire parted. DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed.Jose. it is clear that the end of the wire was on the ground shortly after 3 p. no doubt feeling that he was challenged in the matter.The end of the wire remained in contact with his body which fell near the post.Left by themselves. The work required adult laborers. Aquino told the kids not to touch the stone. .In a civil action.He immediately fell face downwards.Principal Soriano cannot be held liable. ―I have for some time been in the habit of touching wires‖. .000 as general damages for loss of service. but Alberto. in line with Amadora case and Art 2180 of Civil Code. IT WAS BUT NATURAL FOR THE CHILDREN TO PLAY AROUND. He required the children to remain in the pit after they finished digging. and in the meantime Alberto had been claimed as a victim. . A MINOR SHOULD NOT BE HELD TO THE SAME DEGREE OF CARE AS AN ADULT. . It is only the teacher who should answer for torts committed by their students.In criminal cases. . ISSUE WON Aquino and Soriano can be held liable for damages HELD . . 38 Phil. and that all of the company's inspectors were required in their daily rounds to keep a lookout for trouble of this kind. but Alberto. Gulf and Pacific Co.Aquino also said the digging was part of Work Education. somebody should have been dispatched to the scene of the trouble at once. . said. He ordered them to dig. . However..Soriano was principal. November 5. doesn‘t alter the case.He concurs that MERALCO is held liable for the death of Alberto. 2 were able to escape but student Ylarde sustained injuries.) . Manila Electric Company: Julian should recover the sum of P1.Soco transmitted the message at 2.Jose rejoined that he should into touch wires as they carry a current. for every tortuous act of violence or other pure tort. Besides. 1988 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . 359. The school was littered with concrete blocks. but more than an 1 ½ hours passed before anyone from MERALCO appeared on the scene. the neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went home.Jose Noguera saw that the wire was burning and its connections smoking. and that without reference to the question of moral guilt. m. A2010 . Soriano did not order the digging. .When notice was received at the Malabon station at 2. Upon being taken to St. I am of the opinion that those reasons do not obtain in fixing the amount of the damages recoverable in the present case.As the three neared the place where the wire was down.Alang St for the purpose of conducting electricity used in lighting the City of Manila and its suburbs. Parents filed suit against Aquino and Soriano. so it should be made adequately to compensate those who have suffered damage by its negligence. Aquino called 4 of the 18 to continue. SEPARATE OPINION ABAD SANTOS [concur in part and dissent in part] . .. m.m. Alberto. Aquino gathered 18 male pupils to help. the infant tort-feasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an adult. . Julian is entitled to recover P250 for expenses incurred in connection with the death and burial of the boy. The remaining Abaga jumped on the concrete block causing it to slide down. . He is liable for damages. DEL ROSARIO V MANILA ELECTRIC CO.

en seis papelitos de 20 gramos. whence the fire was quickly communicated to the highly inflammable material near-by. as amended HELD 1. . the defendant corporation was in the position of a bailee and that. As a general rule. and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames. and the result was that. presented a copy of a prescription obtained from Dr. the burden of proof was on the defendant to exculpate itself from responsibility by proving that the accident was not due to the fault of Quest. Phil. and after Quest had ceased to be manager and had gone back to the US.Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist of long standing and the owner of a drug store located at Calle Santo Cristo.Upon preliminary inspection of the engine. Buencamino. Manila. Another package was mixed with water for another horse. after the engine had been operating for a few moments. This was the cause of the flooding of the carburetor.It was observed that the carburetor was flooding. November 3. section 17. FISH AND ELECTRIC CO V PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORPORATION [citation] STREET. and is calculated to prejudice the accused.The boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run. The back fire may have been due either to the fact that the spark was too advanced or the fuel improperly mixed. with a view to ascertaining what proportion of the two elements would give best results in the engine. The value of the boat. before the accident occured.Proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors.Clorato potasa . at Pineda's drug store for filling.Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff in Manila and plaintiff was the registered owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline. Possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire.Para caballo. the defendant bases the contention that the action should be considered stale. the bailee is given a lien for his compensation. already saturated with gasoline. There was here. Quest remained outside of the engine compartment and occupied himself with making distillate. NATURE Appeal requiring a construction and an application. Binondo. took the three remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense. .Cranston decided to have the engine on the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner. and found that death was the result of poisoning. Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. The leak along the pipe line and the flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous situation. casis DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from affirmed.120 gramos . brought only the sum of P150.en seis papeles .What appellant is relying on is the maxim res inter alios acta. a veterinarian. WON the lower court erred in finding that the accused has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of an infraction of the Pharmacy Law. . The salvage from. with interest at 6 per centum per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint. This caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor. performed an autopsy on the horses. or engineer. Reasoning . Act No. In the course of the trial. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident. burst into flames. it should be noted. and this constitutes negligence.000. but was not used. the engine stopped. As a rule workmen who make repairs on a ship in its owner's yard. . chiefly by a mechanic whom Quest took with him to the boat.Sto. It would not have occured but for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. 1930 NATURE Appeal from decision of the CFI FACTS . but he said that.The trial judge seems to have proceeded on the idea that. 1918 prof. . but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. or to explain the conduct of a particular person. It is sufficient reply to say that the action was brought within the period limited by the statute of limitations and the situation is not one where the defense of laches can be properly invoked. . to which had been given the preparation. under the belief that he had purchased the potassium chlorate which he had asked for. As a consequence of such possession and special property. thereupon." Under the supervision of Pineda. he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. with costs. FACTS . which proved to be barium chlorate 2. WON the lower court erred in finding that the substance sold by the accused to Feliciano Santos was barium chlorate and not potassium chlorate 3. found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate. or other fuel. a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm. A temporary tank to contain the mixture was placed on deck above and at a short distance from the compartment covering the engine.torts & damages CULION ICE. are not bailees. Richardson. inasmuch as Quest had control of the Gwendoline during the experimental run. ISSUES 1. unless it manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the question at issue. for the first time. The new fuel line and that already in use between the gasoline tank and carburetor were so fixed that it was possible to change from the gasoline fuel to the mixed fuel.The temporary tank in which the mixture was prepared was apparently at too great an elevation from the carburetor. who had been directed by Cranston to place themselves under Quest's directions. NO Ratio On the trial of a criminal case where the question relates to the tendency of certain testimony to throw light upon a particular fact. The fuel mixture leaked from the tank and dripped sown into the engine compartment. Reasoning . The engine stopped a few times during the first part of the course. which the members of the crew were unable to subdue. ISSUE WON the loss of the boat is chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill of Quest HELD YES Ratio When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill. Manila. to switch to the new fuel supply. when sold. who agreed to do the job. The engine was tried with gasoline and the result was satisfactory. which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate." Santos.120. . or a mechanic who repairs a coach without taking it to his shop. until satisfaction of the judgment.850. with the understanding that payment should be made upon completion of the work. owing to the use of an improper mixture of fuel. Drs. the evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is . died shortly afterwards. Quest concluded that a new carburetor was needed and thus installed a Zenith carburetor. on the part of Quest. Motors manager. switched to the tube connecting with the new mixture. of the Bureau of Science. 597.) Dr. Quest had the assistance of the members of the crew of the Gwendoline. there is a certain discretion on the part of the trial judge which a court of errors will not interfere with.00 . as the court found. the hydrostatic pressure in the carburetor was greater than the delicate parts of the carburetor could sustain. The prescription read: "clorato de potasa . potassium chlorate is not. the two chemists also went to the drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate. . the wreck.The work was begun and conducted under the supervision of Quest. under their contract. was P10. and their rights and liabilities are determined by the general rules of law. so that when the fuel line was opened. Cristo . as a consequence. but whether Quest was free from blame. The two horses. He had a conference with Quest. having some sick horses. A moment later a back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. Peña and Darjuan. put two of the packages in water and gave the doses to two of his sick horses. WON the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the chemist Peña and Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium chlorate at the drug store of the accused. would have taken precautions to avoid. These ideas seem to be incompatible with the situation now under consideration. . the external parts of the carburetor.This action was instituted about two years after the accident had occured. (Barium chlorate. para caballo. This fact was called to Quest's attention. January 22. This tank was connected with the carburetor by a piece of tubing. of the penal provisions of the Pharmacy Law. the prescription was prepared and returned to Santos in the form of six papers marked. .CFI gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff to recover of the defendant the sum of P9. The true bailee acquires possession and what is usually spoken of as special property in the chattel bailed. and which on other occasions Santos had given to his horses with good results. and connection again had to be made with the gasoline line to get a new start. which a prudent mechanic. versed in repairs of this nature. but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. when the engine had gotten to running well. and that the gasoline. At the instance of Santos. Feliciano Santos.21 UNITED STATES V PINEDA 37 Phil 456 MALCOLM. when the back fire occurred.As the boat was coming in from this run. the flooding would disappear. The next problem was to introduce into the carburetor the baser fuel. Santos. was trickling freely from the lower part to the carburetor to the floor. is a poison. Upon these facts. After this had been done the mechanic. This arrangement enables the operator to start the engine on gasoline and then. "Botica Pineda . A2010 . consisting of a low grade of oil mixed with distillate. which was apparently not well fitted at the point where it was connected with the tank.

Thereafter. by means of Check No.Informed that the placement would yield less than the maturity value because of its pretermination. both payable to Eligia G. 2. Eustaquio. Rather considering the responsibility for the quality of drugs which the law imposes on druggists and the position of the word "fraudulent" in juxtaposition to "name. both authorized signatories for BPI. and from his desk. NO Ratio In view of the tremendous and imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons and medicines. which the woman holding herself out as Eligia G. that in some jurisdictions they are liable even for their mistake and in others have the burden placed upon them to establish that they were not negligent. civil status. An imperative duty is on the druggist to take precautions to prevent death or serious injury to anyone who relies on his absolute honesty and peculiar learning. 240005 dated the same day for P1. together with the papers consisting of the money . instead of the checks being delivered to her office at Philamlife. by Antonio Concepcion whom Cuaso knew to have opened. What did the Legislature intend to convey by this restrictive adjective? . 1981. respectively. and injury must be present . payable to "cash". Eustaquio had to hurriedly go to the dispatcher. Fernando encashed over the counter.215. .243. 1981. passed through the position analyst. if under A2010 . As finally proceeds. accident in good faith is possibly excluded.000. the checks went to the dispatcher for delivery. the woman holding herself out as Eligia G. and initial deposit of P10.On October 14. Fernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the pretermination and the latter authorizing Rosemarie Fernando to pick up the two checks. he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons which he sells. Fernando's signature in BPI's file. Such purported signature has been established to be forged although it has a "close similarity" to the real signature of Eligia G. Fernando. a woman who represented herself to be Eligia G. . . 1981. that the purchaser acted in reliance upon it. who would pick up the checks. before the two cashier's checks. is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. The purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent. following the processing route. Fernando. Eustaquio then told her that if it were her niece who was going to get the checks.19. Fernando. and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands. one for P1. a long-standing "valued client" of CBC. 126310-3. at the mercy of any unscrupulous vendor. Eustaquio conveyed the request for pretermination to the officer who before had handled Eligia G. Dispositive Judgment of the lower court. The caller wanted to preterminate the placement. and to fix his negligence. Cashier. as shown by the delivery receipt.‖ . proceeded to prepare the "purchase order slip" for the requested pretermination as required by office procedure. who did not interview the new client but affixed her initials on the application form after reviewing it. sex. to pick them up. that when he made it he knew that it was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion. which CBC forthwith sent to clearing and which BPI cleared on the same day. covering the preterminated placement.Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud it would be difficult. both of which letters were presumably handed to the dispatcher by Rosemarie Fernando.00 and the second for the balance. merely by phone again. an account upon the introduction of Valentin Co. it cannot be that the Philippine Legislature intended to use the word "fraudulent" in all its strictness. "her" date of birth. he changed the delivery instruction on the purchase order slip. 1981. If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts. But appellant has confused this maxim and this rule with certain exceptions thereto. Fernando applied at China Banking Corporation's Head Office for the opening of a current account. de Castro and Celestino Sampiton. that it was false. to convict any druggist of a violation of the law. it must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug called for. What Cuaso indicated in the application form.In the afternoon of October 9. The effort is not to convict the accused of a second offense. and that the checks be delivered to her office at Philamlife. Fernando. Nor is there an attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue and thus to prejudice defendant's case. How the misfortune occurs is unimportant. Fernando to be the Treasurer of Philippine American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife) since he was handling Philamlife's corporate money market account.Later in the same morning. who must blindly trust in the good faith and vigilance of the pharmacist. Although the checks represented the termination proceeds of Eligia G.000. Dealer Trainee in BPI's Money Market Department. 1981. Eustaquio knew the real Eligia G. without prejudice to any civil action which may be instituted. and to pay the costs. It would leave the innocent purchaser of drugs. nos. Eustaquio "made certain" that the caller was the real Eligia G.00. Dy. This view is borne out by the Spanish translation. Although not familiar with the voice of the real Eligia G.Two days after. 1992 FACTS . . were prepared. 1981. Thus. deception. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. But neither Eustaquio nor Bulan who originally handled Fernando's account.It was. withdrawals began on Current Account No. in fact. . We should not. who had a money market placement as evidenced by a promissory note with a maturity date of November 11. As it turned out. securities clerk.but not scienter. CBC's guaranty of prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement was then stamped on the two checks. Fernando". but Reginaldo Eustaquio.00. she would herself pick up the checks or send her niece. Penelope Bulan. In the Spanish "supuesto" is used. Bernardo Laderas. Rosemarie Fernando. casis market placement was to be preterminated and the promissory note (No. the application form shows the signature of "Eligia G. Manager and Administrative Assistant. she referred the application to the New Accounts Section for processing. nor anybody else at BPI. 1981 and a maturity value of P2. the caller of the previous Friday followed up with Eustaquio. if not impossible. and with her initials on the form signifying her approval. called BPI's Money Market Department. occupation ("business woman"). the papers. 240003 dated all the circumstances the fact of occurrence is attributable to the druggist as a legal fault. Her endorsement on the two checks was found to conform with the depositor's specimen signature. not just a roll-over of the placement. respectively. It would be idle mockery for the customer to make an examination of a compound of which he can know nothing. falsity.Turning to the law. Reasoning . her niece would have to being a written authorization from her to pick up the checks.000.. that he made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by the purchaser. Fernando by "verifying" that the details the caller gave about the placement tallied with the details in "the ledger/folder" of the account." It is the word "fraudulent" which has given the court trouble. defendant is a pharmacist. Jr.Later that afternoon. . told her "trading time" was over for the day. The two cashier's checks. and that the purchaser suffered injury. . but Eustaquio was left to attend to the pretermination process.16. in fact Rosemarie Fernando who got the two checks from the dispatcher. 26310-3: On October 16. tax account number. was compared or verified with Eligia G. sentencing the defendant to pay a fine of P100. . The nature of drugs is such that examination would not avail the purchaser any thing. A plea of accident and mistake cannot excuse for they cannot take place unless there be wanton and criminal carelessness and neglect. the same caller changed the delivery instructions. Fernando and Rosemarie Fernando. certain points therein as bearing on our present facts must be admitted.000.22 - prof. As a pharmacist.000. 021759 and 021760 for P1. thus. Such a construction with a literal following of well-known principles on the subject of fraud would strip the law of at least much of its force.On October 12. however." what is made unlawful is the giving of a false name to the drug asked for. NO Reasoning The proof demonstrates the contrary. The prosecution would have to prove to a reasonable degree of certainty that the druggist made a material representation. Fernando deposited the two checks in controversy with Current Account No. however. without good reason so devitalize the law. in BPI's Treasury Operations Department. verifier clerk and documentation clerk." The usual badges of fraud. negligence is intensified and fraudulent intent may even be established.800. therefore. on the pretermination of the placement. November 26. There is also no showing that Eligia G. 35623) to be preterminated. Rosemarie Fernando. was that the new client was introduced by Valentin Co.The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. nationality. who signed the two checks that very morning. The promissory note the caller wanted to preterminate was a roll-over of an earlier 50-day money market placement that had matured on September 24. 3. Thus.torts & damages inadmissible. This telephone conversation ended with the caller's statement that "definitely" it would be her niece. which we are permitted to consult to explain the English text. bothered to call up Fernando at her Philamlife office to verify the request for pretermination. which was a Friday. were sent to Gerlanda E.462. The vendor and the vendee do not stand at arms length as in ordinary transactions.Remembering particularly the care and skill which are expected of druggists.800. She was accompanied and introduced to Emily Sylianco Cuaso. Fernando's account. the same person impersonated both Eligia G.00 and P613. the dispatcher failed to get or to require the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the placement. Cash Supervisor. In the afternoon of October 13. earlier that year. BPI V CA 216 SCRA 51 GUTIERREZ. and suggested that she call again the following week. a person purporting to be Eligia G. writing thereon "Rosemarie Fernando release only with authority to pick up. we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence or mistake. and Check No. And finally it is provided that it shall be unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name.The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved. and this word is certainly not synonymous with "fraudulent. the caller insisted on the pretermination just the same and asked that two checks be issued for the proceeds. It has been said that there is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents. to tell him of the new delivery instructions for the checks. Fernando's placement. This final approval of the new current account is indicated on the application form by the initials of Regina G. . Consequently.

1981. 35623 with maturity value of P2. 1983. Under this premise petitioner BPI asserts that the presenting or collecting bank.607. To the extent that the degree of negligence is equated to the proximate cause of the loss.58 with interest thereon at 12% per annum from August 12. on October 19. she never received nor endorsed them and that her purported signature on the back of the checks was not hers but forged. By the very nature of their work the degree of responsibility. however. 40314 with maturity date of December 23. Fernando went to BPI for the roll-over of her placement. For obvious reasons.23 - prof.00. The exception to this rule is when the party relying in the forgery is "precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority.19) evidencing the placement which matured that day.Petitioner BPI's contention that CBC alone should bear the loss must fail. by means of Check No. . a hiatus. The Arbitration Committee. . NO . Fernado's money market placement with BPI. She disclaimed having preterminated her placement on October 12. CBC had no prior notice of the fraud perpetrated by BPI's employees on the pretermination of Eligia G. The Arbitration Committee. the real Eligia G. . belittled petitioner BPI's negligence compared to that of respondent CBC which it declared as graver and the proximate cause of the loss of the subject checks to the impostor who impersonated Eligia G. on October 22. 1981. but which BPI neglected to take. 240007 dated the same day for P370.In the present case.000. However. A2010 . . upon CBC‘s motion for reconsideration." Petitioner BPI anchors its argument on its stance that there was "a gap. a comparison of the signature of Eligia G." which the woman identifying herself as Eligia G. the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower courts declared that petitioner BPI's negligence was graver. casis of the infirmity or defect. In fact the records fail to show that respondent CBC had knowledge. No matter how many justifications both banks present to avoid responsibility.The Arbitration Committee in its decision analyzed the negligence of the employees of petitioner BPI involved in the processing of the pre-termination of Eligia G.The general rule under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is to the effect that a forged signature is "wholly inoperative". stamped at the back of the checks are the clear warranty: ALL PRIOR ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED.77) to evidence a roll-over of the placement. b) The officer who used to handle Eligia G. the underlying circumstances of the case show that the general rule on forgery is not applicable. Fernando is not a depositor of CBC. her signature was in BPI's file.The court of appeals affirmed the trial court‘s decision. this Court has emphasized that the collecting bank or last endorser generally suffers the loss because it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior endorsements considering that the act of presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that the party making the presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness of the endorsements. the banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. or knowledge of such facts‘ (Sec. . an interval between the issuance and delivery of said checks by petitioner BPI to the impostor and their actual payment of CBC to the impostor. the drawee bank would not have paid on the checks. they cannot erase the fact that they were both guilty in not exercising extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. Following the general rule. care and trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. payable to "cash" which the woman herself also encashed over the counter. by means of Check No.206. Fernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the pre-termination and the letter authorizing her niece to pick-up the checks. the collecting bank made an express guarantee on the validity of "all prior endorsements. BPI issued her a new promissory note (No. the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower court. which respondent CBC did. While the Arbitration Committee declared the negligence of respondent CBC graver.BPI further argues that the acts and omissions of respondent CBC are the cause "that set into motion the actual and continuous sequence of events that produced the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Petitioner BPI points out that the gap of one (1) day that elapsed from its issuance and delivery of the checks to the impostor is material on the issue of proximate cause. WON the drawer/drawee bank (in this case BPI) may claim reimbursement from the collecting bank which earlier paid the proceeds of the checks after the same checks were cleared HELD 1. had an unquestioned liability when it turned out that the payee's signature on the checks were forged. If the drawee-bank discovers that the signature of the payee was forged after it has paid the amount of the check to the holder thereof. At this stage. .torts & damages October 15.000.462. a vice-president of Philamlife. . Fernando. respondent CBC. the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the money market placement that was supposedly pre-terminated. Fernando's money market placement. She executed an affidavit stating that while she was the payee of the two checks in controversy. 2. returned the checks for reason "Beyond Clearing Time".On November 12. according to petitioner BPI. without any further showing that the CBC employees ‗had actual knowledge . No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear meaning of the warranty. Under this doctrine.100. the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. .BPI then filed a petition for review with the Regional Trial Court of Makati who dismissed said petition but modified the award by including a provision for attorney‘s fees in favor of CBC.Applying these principles. Fernando with that of the impostor Eligia G. . ISSUES 1. 1981. . 1981 left Current Account No. payable to "cash.000. there was yet no loss and the impostor could have decided to desist from completing the same plan and could have held to the checks without negotiating them.The PCHC Board of Directors.BPI contends that respondent CBC's clear warranty that "all prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsements guaranteed" stamped at the back of the checks was an unrestrictive clearing guaranty that all prior endorsements in the checks are genuine. 1981 for P48. With her surrender of the original of the promissory note (No. and on November 4.206. yet. Fernando. petitioner BPI's reliance on the doctrine of last clear chance to clear it from liability is not well-taken. In the event that the payee's signature is forged. where both parties were negligent and such negligence were not contemporaneous. and payment made "through or under such signature" is ineffectual or does not discharge the instrument. . the point that comes uppermost is whether the drawee bank was negligent in failing to discover the alteration or the forgery. 1981. However. BPI returned the two checks in controversy to CBC for the reason "Payee's endorsement forged". payable to "cash" which was received through clearing from PNB Pasay Branch. Fernando.607. could not have resulted in the discovery of the fraud.00.On November 11. .However.266. was requiring before the two checks in controversy were delivered. The gap of one (1) day between the issuance and delivery of the checks bearing the impostor's name as payee and the impostor's negotiating the said forged checks by opening an account and depositing the same with . Petitioner BPI insists that the doctrine of last clear chance should have been applied considering the circumstances of this case. c) Again no verification appears to have been made on Eligia G. .243. petitioner BPI maintains that considerations of relative negligence become totally irrelevant. payable to "cash. respondent CBC had no way to discover the fraud at all. The issue as to who between the parties should bear the loss in the payment of the forged checks necessities the determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties involved in the controversy in relation to the forged checks. of the fraud perpetrated by the impostor and the employees of BPI. 1981.The Arbitration Committee ruled in favor of BPI and ordered CBC to pay the former the amount of P1. by means of Check No." Thus.In presenting the checks for clearing and for payment. 240006 dated the same day for P1. Fernando's money market placement and in the issuance and delivery of the subject checks in this wise: a) The impostor could have been readily unmasked by a mere telephone call. we rule that the issue as to whose negligence is graver is relevant.00. however disagree in the evaluation of the degree of negligence of the banks.500.00. Fernando's affidavit. In this jurisdiction we recognize negligence of the party invoking forgery as an exception to the general rule. These incidents led to the filing of this case with the Arbitration Committee. which nobody in BPI bothered to make to Eligia G.500. it can recover the amount paid from the collecting bank. actual or implied.‖ . With these circumstances. there is no question that the banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees. 1981 and maturity value of P2. 1981 for P4. in turn. Negotiable Instruments Law) that their action in accepting their checks for deposit and allowing the withdrawals against the same ‗amounted to bad faith‘ cannot be considered as basis for holding CBC liable. . CBC. Fernando's account did not do anything about the account's pre-termination." which was received through clearing from Far East Bank. 1981. Fernando encashed over the counter. Without such warranty.The next issue hinges on whose negligence was the proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an impostor. Hence. The last withdrawal on November 4. supported by Eligia G. 56. 26310-3 with a balance of only P571. WON the collecting bank has absolute liability on a warranty of the validity of all prior endorsements stamped at the back of the checks 2. the defendant is liable for any damage arising out of the falsity of its representation. As the warranty has proven to be false and inaccurate.The records show that petitioner BPI as drawee bank and respondent CBC as representing or collecting bank were both negligent resulting in the encashment of the forged checks.Apropos the matter of forgery in endorsements. . 240001 dated November 3.In the present petition the payee's names in the checks were forged. the maturity date of Eligia G.58. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.61. the checks are "wholly inoperative" and of no effect. among others. however.Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. and d) Another step that could have foiled the fraud. NO . . Hence. Moreover. stated that ―these withdrawals. the Board of Directors of the PCHC reversed the Arbitration Committee's decision and dismissed the complaint of BPI while ordering it to pay CBC the sum of P1.

DISPOSITION Plaintiff not negligent. Due care on the part of CBC could have prevented any loss. in crossing the tracks to enter his premises. October 1. but there may be civil liability because of acts ordinarily punishable.16 A2010 . Bil-liingan. . unless they prove that there was no blame or negligence on their part. And while we do not apply the last clear chance doctrine as controlling in this case. are those who have them under their authority. in spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable condition of his deranged mind. inflicting a serious wound on her head from which she expired immediately. and 10 of article 8 does not include exemption from civil liability. if such person be insolvent. who worked for the defendant as a seaman of the M/S Pilar II. and 3. It is not unnatural or unexpected that after taking the risk of impersonating Eligia G.40 as compensation for the death of her son. we apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code to the effect that while respondent CBC may recover its losses. 1954 FACTS . because every person liable criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is also liable for reparation of damage and for indemnification of the harm done. .About the 4th of October. or power. Both banks were not able to overcome the presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. DISPOSITION Therefore. plaintiff Elena Amedo sought to collect from defendant Rio y Olabarrieta. 1. whereby he was declared exempt from criminal liability but was obliged to indemnify the heirs if the murdered woman. FACTS . charging the non-Christian Baggay. or minors shall answer with their own property. even though they be performed unwittingly. This finding. making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the street. and no facts.For this reason the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the court of Ilocos Sur.Article 18 of the same code says: The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. WRIGHT V MANILA ELECTRIC R. the horse stumbled. . without provocation suddenly attacked the woman Bil-liingan with a bolo. Province of Ilocos Sur. or over this age and under 15. notwithstanding. 2. awarded plaintiff P1. Calapini. 1909. although the law has declared their perpetrators exempt from criminal liability. under such circumstances. E. the rails were above-gruond.. other than the fact that Wright was intoxicated. are stated which warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. Inc. and fell. imbeciles. legal guardianship or power. such losses are subject to mitigation by the courts. legal guardian. This cause was instituted separately from the other. jr. To enter his premises from the street. & LIGHT CO. he cannot recover. There is therefore. the judgment appealed from being in accordance with law.000.At the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks. but this protection does not exclude liability for damage caused to those who may have the misfortune to suffer the consequences of his acts. dated February 15. 7. but defendant claims the plaintiff was also negligent in that he was so intoxicated. because of the violent death of the woman Bil-liingan. and the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground. affirmation thereof is proper. 1911 NATURE Appeal by the defendant from the judgment rendered on April 28. exempt from criminal liability can still be civilly liable HELD YES Ratio Civil liability accompanies criminal liability. Disposition The questioned Decision and Resolution are MODIFIED. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions described. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. Agueng. for the purpose of holding a song service called "buni" according to the Tinguian custom. still the CBC employees had ample opportunity to avoid the harm which befell both CBC and BPI. After trial and proof that the defendant was suffering from mental aberration. is to draw a conclusion which enters the realm of speculation and guesswork.215. with murder. whereupon the defendant's AMEDO V RIO [citation] CONCEPCION. 28 Phil 122 MORELAND. Quisamay. the persons who are civilly liable for acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile. for the reason that his fellows ought not to suffer for the disastrous results of his harmful acts more than is necessary.Article 17 of the Penal Code states: Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable. No facts to merit a higher award of damages to plaintiff. excepting that part which is exempted for their support in accordance with the civil law. the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel. .The Court cannot ignore the fact that the CBC employees closed their eyes to the suspicious circumstances of huge over-the-counter withdrawals made immediately after the account was opened. It was the gross negligence of the employees of both banks which resulted in the fraud and the subsequent loss. Should there be no person having them under his authority.‖ (If the former. we are not inclined to rule that petitioner BPI must solely bear the loss of P2. Under these circumstances.Trial court held that both parties were negligent. . and to conclude that. Abra. stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling. respondent CBC's negligence contributed equally to the success of the impostor in encashing the proceeds of the forged checks. the impostor would complete her deception by encashing the forged checks. prof.R.M. The opening of the account itself was accompanied by inexplicable acts clearly showing negligence. Filomeno Managuit.A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves aboveground.It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks. The main allegation of said original complaint was: . with costs against the appellant. .Defendant Manila Electric is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway . plaintiff drove home in a calesa and. if the latter. who has not acted with the exercise of judgment.One night. the sum of P2. casis ISSUE WON an insane person. to pay the costs in the case and to be confined in an institution for the insane until further order of the court. BPI shall be responsible for 60% while CBC shall share 40% of the loss of P2. No. 3.413.24 counsel appealed to this court. the said lunatics. for lesiones. 1950. and it is hereby affirmed. subject to the following: (1) In cases 1. in spite of his unfortunate condition. 2. September 1. and such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident US V BAGGAY 20 PHIL 142 TORRES.215. named Dioalan. which shall be enforced.413. in the sum of P1.Intoxication in itself is not negligence. May 24. several persons were assembled in the defendant's house in the township of Penarrubia. or a person under 9 years of age. ISSUE WON the negligence of plaintiff contributed to the ―principal occurrence‖ or ―only to his own injury.000. but that plaintiff‘s negligence was not as great as defendant‘s. might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition.Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the encashment of the forged checks by an impostor.torts & damages respondent CBC is not controlling. throwing the plaintiff from the vehicle and causing injuries . leaped forward. While it is true that petitioner BPI's negligence may have been the proximate cause of the loss. .This case was instituted on October 18. In her original complaint. Reasoning . They let the opportunity slip by when the ordinary prudence expected of bank employees would have sufficed to seize it. the trial court was correct in apportioning damages) HELD NO Ratio Intoxication in itself is not negligence.16.Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who.. the total amount of the two (2) forged checks.Plaintiff‘s residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendant‘s tracks run. 1914 NATURE An action to recover damages for injuries sustained in an accident FACTS . Reasoning . . a sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man did. Law and society are under obligation to protect him during his illness and so when he is declared to be liable with his property for reparation and indemnification. greater reason to rule that the proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an impostor was due to the negligence of petitioner BPI. Fernando with the connivance of BPI's employees. . and on his own mother. the non-Christian Baggay.038. the judge on April 28 rendered the judgment cited above. he is still entitled to the benefit of what is necessary for his decent maintenance. is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts. and with the same bolo he like wise inflicted various wounds on the women named Calabayan. when he. 1109. The conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts as found. plaintiff must cross defendant‘s tracks. 1910.

ordinarily. or worse. 1956 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the WCC FACTS . and circumstances under which the accident takes place ." (Wall vs. 1949. The hazardous nature of this act was not due specially to the nature of his employment. defendant driver. while the same was at a stop position.At any rate. (2) by drunkenness on the part of the laborer who had the accident. . Nueva Vizcaya. Grounds for compensation. ISSUE WON Amedo could claim compensation from employer Rio HELD NO . . or arisen from. . . the accident which produced this tragic result did not "arise out of" his employment. however. one mile and a half from the seashore of Arceli. 1949 at about 11:30 o'clock in the morning. in that it happened at the "time" when. . Point in question is whether the accident was committed under these 3 conditions . . MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS V WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION 99 PHIL 48 BENGZON. which."The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are descriptive of its character. Sec. jumped into the sea.Although the employer prohibited its employees to ride the haulage trucks.from these provisions three conditions are essential to hold an employer liable. WON Mamador has a right to compensation by Marinduque 2. also. and is indifferent. From the evidence presented.Notorious negligence means the same as gross negligence which implies "conscious indifferenece to consequences". to the danger of injury to person or property of others.". or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment. .25 - prof. to the danger of injury. NO . even if the case was against a third person.This contention cannot be sustained because what the widow waived was the offender's criminal proscution and not all civil action for damages. Defendant said that the plaintiff was merely a bystander. Cameron [1882] 6 Colo. Due to said injuries. not a truck helper being a brother-in-law law of the driver of said truck. p. These are: (1) the accident must arise out of the employment. his death was the consequence of his decision to jump into the water to retrieve said bill. 877.Plaintiff‘s basis for appeal is the Workmen‘s Compensation Act. Inchausti that criminal prosection of the "other person" does not affect the liability of the employer.. turned over and hit a coconut tree resulting in the death of Pedro Mamador and injury to the other laborers. while Filomeno Managuit was working. or the result of the nature of such employment. his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified. but it may be an evidence of negligence. convicted and was sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. Serrano also testified that. Injuries not covered.her amended complaint stated: ―That on May 27. — When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. it cannot be declared negligence because the proibition had nothing to do with the personal safety of the riders. Palawan.Petitioner also contends that the amicable settlement entered into by Mamador's widow and Macunat barred the widow's claim against the employer because she has already elected one of the remedies. that before leaving.Daniel Serrano. It couldn't be.It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea. has been defined as follows: A2010 . in turn. and as he picked up the bill from the floor something accidentally fell upon him and injured him.case provides for other jurisprudence which describe instances of gross negligence attributable to employee (see case). its violation does not constitute negligence per se. . plaintiff was injured and hospitalized. Nueva Vizcaya.By gross negligence is meant "such entire want of care as to raise a presumption that the person in fault is conscious of the probable consequences of carelessness. that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the parked truck in installing the early warning device. . Filomeno failed to exercise "even slight care and diligence.since the act done by Filomeno was dangerous. would have been exposed had he. 1968 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of IAC decision FACTS . while the words `in the course of' refer to the time. YES . see. Defendant's truck driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff. But. The blowing of his 2-peso bill may have grown out of. (2) it must happen in the course of the employment. or worse.) . plaintiff. which was anchored then about 1 1/2 miles from the seashore of Arceli Dumarang.A truck driven by Procopio Macunat. was not a suit for damages against third persons because the heirs did not intervene therein and they have not received the indemnity ordered by the court. belonging to Marinduque.. Sections 2 and 4 of which: Sec.Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence.it may be conceded that the death of Filomeno took place "in the course of" his employment. However. He has paid nothing. 2nd ed. WON there was notorious negligence by the deceased for having violated the employer‘s prohibition to ride haulage trucks LAYUGAN V IAC 167 SCRA 363 SARMIENTO. his left leg was amputated so he had to use crutches to walk. Dumarang. Palawan. .Defendant Godofredo Isidro admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident driven by Daniel Serrano.Petitioner alleges that the criminal case sentencing Macunat to indemnify the heirs of the deceased was a suit for damages against a third person.Under the circumstance. 4. his act being obviously innocent. .this is distinguishable from cases wherein the act done is not dangerous per se such as when an employee drops a cigarette on the pavement and picks it up. . likewise. It was the result of a risk peculiar to his work as a seaman or incidental to such work. he checked the truck. thereby having the effect of releasing the employer from liability. his employment.Deceased‘s wife now seeks compensation by Marinduque as the employer. he jumped into the water to retrieve a 2-peso bill belonging to him.Macunat was prosecuted. he would surely be entitled to compensation. . Disposition Award for compensation by WCC affirmed . and at the "place" where-according to the amended complaint-he was working. The truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving. . Daniel Serrano. 2. November 14. occupying almost half of the right lane towards Solano. ―When I was a few meters away. It was a risk to which any person on board the M/S Pilar II. such as a passenger thereof or an ordinary visitor. and (3) it must not be caused by the "notorious negligence" of the employee.she was allowed to file an amended complaint which was remanded to the trial court. to the latter. (3) by notorious negligence of the same.was the accident caused by Filomeno‘s ―notorious negligence‖? . he and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the National Highway.Plaintiff Pedro Layugan testified that while in Bagabag. it has been established clearly that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff was caused by defendant's driver. also. his two-peso bill was blown by the breeze into the sea and in his effort to retrieve the same from the waters he was drowned. he was drowned. I saw the truck which was loaded with round logs. the court already decided in Nava vs. because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. that as a result. if." that he displayed a "reckless disregard of the safety" of his person. however. as Filomeno had.torts & damages ―That on May 27. — Compensation shall not be allowed for injuries caused (1) by the voluntary intent of the employee to inflict such injury upon himself or another person.this however was dismissed due to lack of a cause of action which defendant filed stating that the allegation does not show that the death of plaintiff's son was due to an "accident arising out of and in the course of employment. that he could not have been but conscious of the probable consequences" of his carelessness and that he was "indifferent. at or about 11:30 o'clock in the morning while the said Filomeno Managuit was in the course of his employment. The Law Governing Labor Disputes in the Philippines by Francisco. right after the curve.The criminal case. . performing his duties as such ordinary seaman on defendant's M/S "Pilar II". his 2-peso bill merely fell from his pocket. his accident could be attributed to his gross negligence. So. . that the truck allegedly being repaired was parked. . said that he knew the responsibilities of a driver. however."notorious negligence" has been held to be tantamount to "gross negligence". I stepped on my foot brakes but it did not function HELD 1.‖ . while the deceased Filomeno Managuit was on board M/S "Pilar II" as such seaman. "pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury". place. ISSUE 1. . June 30. 275. casis . He bumped the truck being repaired by Pedro Layugan. and as a consequence of which. 2.

So. NO Note that for our purposes this was not raised as an issue in this case. she incurred hospital bills amounting to P93. who was inside the operating room with the patient. As a direct consequence of such accident Layugan sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot. Immediately thereafter. or conjecture. then he is guilty of negligence. As she held the hand of Erlinda Ramos.Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was a robust woman except for occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of a stone in her gall bladder she was as normal as any other woman. the Isuzu truck driven by Serrano. Calderon arrived at the operating room. Because the discomforts somehow interfered with her normal ways. 1985 at 9:00 A. ISSUES 1. December 29.In the case at bar. Herminda Cruz. Disposition Petition GRANTED with costs against private respondents. would be on June 17. the petitioner herein. of that fateful day. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient. she has been staying in their residence. under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. asked Dr. she sought professional advice. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. it is inapplicable where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury. Reasoning . and saw that the patient was still in trendelenburg position. Hosaka decided that she should undergo a ―cholecystectomy‖ operation after examining the documents presented to him. . . under the circumstances involved. Orlino Hozaka. mali yata ang pagkakapasok. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management and control of alleged wrongdoer.‖ She then saw people inside the operating room ―moving. another anesthesiologist. Gutierrez say. one of ..00 to P10. still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. she was given injections. And once the actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy. Mariano Gavino to prove that the damage sustained by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her airway by private respondents during the anesthesia phase. Therefore this only Obiter Dicta. She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladdershe underwent a series of examinations which included blood and urine tests which indicated she was fit for surgery. doing this and that.25. who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck. [and] preparing the patient for the operation‖.torts & damages with my many attempts. on June 10. Rogelio E. and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. particularly in the law of negligence: Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. private respondents primarily relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Reasoning [1] Negligence defined.This is a question of fact. On the other hand. Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal). was also there for moral support. Herminda introduced herself as Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center who was to provide moral support to the patient.Hours later at about 12:15 P. Ramos ―that something wrong was x x x happening‖. or where there‘s direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. She then heard Dr.‖ [2] In our jurisdiction. in turn. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case HELD 1 NO . and says that absent such proof of care.26 - prof. Hosaka approached her. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience.000.Petitioners filed a civil case for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against herein private respondents alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos. she saw the patient taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Gutierrez. At the operating room. The thing speaks for itself Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent.M. Ramos. casis the defendants in this case. it may be enlightening and helpful in the proper resolution of the issue of negligence to examine the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur. in the absence of an explanation by the defendant. I formulated it in an issue-type. 4) CA findings are contrary to those of the trial court. no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances show that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made. the other defendant. 3) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts. The patient‘s nailbed became bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position. and its relevant to the main issue on negligence: ―At this juncture. 1999 NATURE Petition For Certiorari FACTS . Plaintiff presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and Dr. assured Rogelio that he will get a good anesthesiologist. SC entertained review of the factual question.Plaintiff points to the negligence of the defendant driver while Isidro points to the driver of parked truck as negligent. 2. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do [2] Applying the definition and the test. . Herminda Cruz. Herminda was allowed to stay inside the operating room.M. ― Obiter [1] What is the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur? Two ways to put it: (a) This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant. After Dr. They agreed that their date at the operating table at the De Los Santos Medical Center. Calderon was then able to intubate the patient. 5) the said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. an anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy. . 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken. and the accident is A2010 . RAMOS V CA [citation] KAPUNAN. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when. 17). Erlinda Ramos stayed for about four months in the hospital..000. she then saw Dr. She thereafter noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr. Whether cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the road is immaterial taking into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed 3-4m from the back of the truck. and (b) According to Black‘s Law dictionary. whatever the source of the evidence.Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka were also asked by the hospital to explain what happened to the patient. it would.. . Dr. 1985. p.(Procedural) Ratio Findings of fact are entitled to great respect and will not ordinarily be disturbed by this Court unless it falls down under the exceptions provided by the Court to merit review of the facts. After praying. In this case it is inapplicable because it was established by clear and convincing evidence the negligence of the defendant driver. Hosaka. direct evidence is absent and not readily available. she saw this anesthesiologist trying to intubate the patient. evoke the presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man. it affords reasonable evidence. she focused her attention on what Dr.” .(Substantive) Ratio The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. After being discharged from the hospital. both parties presented evidence as to the possible cause of Erlinda‘s injury. She was admitted in the hospital and was with her sister-inlaw.M. Because of the remarks of Dra. and she told Rogelio E. But this case is an exception since: 1) the finding are grounded entirely on speculation. Hence. Although not a member of the hospital staff. with her husband Rogelio incurring a monthly expense ranging from P8. Hosaka is already here. WON defendant driver Serrano was negligent 2. still needing constant medical attention. it is clear that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence. Hosaka to look for a good anesthesiologist. I have (sic) found out later that the fluid pipe on the rear right was cut that's why the breaks did not function. The doctors explained that the patient had bronchospasm. she went out of the operating room. the Court is called upon to rule whether a surgeon. This is what the Court actually said in the case to prove its just obiter. She thereafter heard Dr. surmise. Herminda saw about two or three nurses and Dr.Herminda Cruz immediately rushed back. She was also diagnosed to be suffering from ―diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage‖.00. O lumalaki ang tiyan‖ (id. would do. . At almost 3:00 P. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. Dr. heard somebody say that ―Dr. But as far as we‘re concerned and relevant to our discussion in the outline. Calderon. Gutierrez was doing.542. Dr. The doctrine merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care.During the trial. She and her husband Rogelio met for the first time Dr. But despite this warning. and 6) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted on record. however. such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care. and the way we apply it in cases. ―ang hirap ma-intubate nito. She has been in a comatose condition. who was to administer anesthesia. to the effect that the cause of brain damage was Erlinda‘s allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent. to them. Perfecta Gutierrez. . who was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center. ―Res ipsa loquitur. Eduardo Jamora. that the accident arose from want of care. which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control. a pulmonologist.

We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. upon all these initial determination a case is made out for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. NO . must show a situation where it is applicable. only on 20 June 1995. since the Court of Appeals already issued a second Resolution. What is the cost for the damages HELD 1. in addition to proving injury or damage. since a copy of the decision of the appellate court was not sent to the counsel on record of petitioner.‖ No copy of the decision. the appellate court apparently mistook him for the counsel on record. Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care. . Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised. there can be no sufficient notice to speak of. taken with the surrounding circumstances. and must establish that the essential elements of the doctrine were present in a particular incident. . the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient. enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine. the appellate court still denied the motion to admit the motion for reconsideration of petitioners in its Resolution. Sillano filed on 7 August 1995 a motion to admit the motion for reconsideration contending that the period to file the appropriate pleading on the assailed decision had not yet commenced to run as the Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals had not yet served a copy thereof to the counsel on record. WON the Court of Appeals erred in finding that private respondents were not negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesthesia phase of the operation and. WON it should be dismissed for being filed later than allowable 15 day period for the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration 2. where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Moreover. we believe that the receipt of the former should be considered in determining the timeliness of the filing of the present petition. no copy of the decision of the appellate court was furnished to the counsel on record. res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge. which superseded the earlier resolution issued on 25 July 1995. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants. a copy of the decision of the appellate court was instead sent to and received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos on 9 June 1995 wherein he was mistakenly addressed as Atty. Meanwhile petitioners engaged the services of another counsel. Hence. Ligsay. ISSUES 1. Each case must be viewed in its own light and scrutinized in order to be within the res ipsa loquitur coverage. the Coronel Law Office. all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care.torts & damages . the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown: 1. and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable 3. Ligsay.27 - prof. we hold that a practical administration of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur. Upon these facts and under these circumstances the Court would be able to say. Hence. The next day.Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of the physicians. and denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner. the delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration cannot be taken against petitioner. mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. or make out a plaintiff‘s prima facie case. the petition before us was submitted on time. 2. . . whether the alleged negligence was the proximate cause of Erlinda‘s comatose condition. negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. was sent nor received by the Coronel Law Office. to replace Atty. Petitioner. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge. an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence. filed with the appellate court a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. When the doctrine is appropriate. as a matter of common knowledge and experience. Court of Appeals reversed. or to any and all anesthesia cases. if in the affirmative. then counsel on record of petitioners. all notices should be sent to the party‘s lawyer at his given address. Moreover. It is regarded as a mode of proof. as a matter of common knowledge and observation. referred the same to a legal counsel only on 20 June 1995. under usual and ordinary conditions. does not create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability. that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. . Sillano. . the appellate court denied the motion for extension of time in its Resolution dated 25 July 1995. and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. the liability of the physicians and the hospital in this case is not predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the desired results of an operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the diagnosis or treatment as in fact no operation or treatment was ever performed on Erlinda. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied. Instead. Based on this.Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means ―the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. However.Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. as a matter of common knowledge and observation. or four (4) days before the expiration of the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration.Nonetheless. Based on the other communications received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos. On the same day. casis . Thus. a plaintiff. not being a lawyer and unaware of the prescriptive period A2010 .It does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence.A careful review of the records reveals that the reason behind the delay in filing the motion for reconsideration is attributable to the fact that the decision of the Court of Appeals was not sent to then counsel on record of petitioners. As will hereinafter be explained. which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. Atty. Atty. the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. in holding that res ipsa loquitur is available to the present case we are not saying that the doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where injury occurs to a patient while under anesthesia. Atty. or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for. Rogelio Ramos. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results. It is simply a step in the process of such proof. however. or on 12 April 1996. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say. Atty. the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. Rogelio Ramos. Atty.The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that. it affords reasonable evidence.‖ The phrase ―res ipsa loquitur‖ is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury. The petition was filed on 9 May 1996.However. In the present case. it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. dated 29 March 1996. much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way. permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident. In order to have the benefit of the rule. dated 29 March 1996. and 3.It is elementary that when a party is represented by counsel. .In the above requisites. Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant. With a few exceptions. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone‘s negligence.In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable. may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence. the fundamental element is the ―control of the instrumentality‖ which caused the damage. The Court granted the motion for extension of time and gave petitioners additional thirty (30) days after the expiration of the fifteen-day (15) period counted from the receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals within which to submit the petition. and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. in the absence of explanation by the defendant. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular for filing a motion for reconsideration. notice to a litigant without notice to his counsel on record is no notice at all. In fact. .The decision of the Court of Appeals was received on 9 June 1995 by petitioner Rogelio Ramos who was mistakenly addressed as ―Atty. Still. YES . Ligsay. as such. The due date fell on 27 May 1996. Sillano on 11 April 1996. if negligence attended the management and care of the patient. Corollary thereto. primarily on the ground that the fifteen-day (15) period for filing a motion for reconsideration had already expired. 2. we shall also determine if the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the testimonies of the witnesses for the private respondents 4. by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him. Thus. Despite this explanation. Sillano filed before this Court a motion for extension of time to file the present petition for certiorari under Rule 45. . without the aid of expert testimony. well within the extended period given by the Court. that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant‘s want of care. before resort to the doctrine may be allowed. The motion for reconsideration was submitted on 4 July 1995. depending upon the circumstances of each case. creating an inference or presumption of negligence. . In other words. .A copy of the above resolution was received by Atty. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. and relieves a plaintiff of. Rogelio referred the decision of the appellate court to a new lawyer.

evidence of fellowship in most cases. and clinical pharmacology. the hiring. Thus. . these provisions neglect to take into account those situations. apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent physicians.In the first place. no prior consultations with. Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal). Because of this. while certain to occur. and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not. while the burden of proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs. the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient‘s condition. therefore. However. failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act. the control exercised. hire.Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of litigation. . . as in this case. In other words. These requirements are carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or by a review committee set up by the hospital who either accept or reject the application. YES . they presented Dr.In other words. moving or producing cause.Art. . internal medicine-allergy.In the instant case.‖ who are allegedly not hospital employees.28 - prof.An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced bronchospasm properly falls within the fields of anesthesia.We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital in this particular incident. the control test is determining. should be one which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved. . an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. She was likewise not properly informed of the possible difficulties she would face during the administration of anesthesia to Erlinda. technically employees. he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. The amount given as temperate damages. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient. Private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition. could not have been capable. Having failed to do this. On the basis of the foregoing transcript.temperate damages are appropriate. fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting ―consultant‖ staff.for the victim in such cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the compensatory damages previously awarded . respondent Dra.As it would not be equitable . though to a certain extent speculative. interns and residents. who advanced private respondents' theory that the oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic encephalopathy. Hosaka‘s negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority (as the ―captain‖ of the operative team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. be made with certainty. it does not escape us that respondent Dr. the amount of actual damages recoverable in suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum cost of proper care. is normally politely terminated. we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases. the amount of damages which should be awarded. should take into account the cost of proper care.Except as provided by law or by stipulation. nurses. . . . by evidence of exculpation. While ―consultants‖ are not. Accordingly. The measures cautioning prudence and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of the physician‘s centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. with the exception of the payment of wages. . in natural and continuous sequence. Furthermore. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. Given these considerations. In neglecting to offer such proof.Respondent Dr. This being the case. temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases. .Proximate cause has been defined as that which. . or pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda was done by her. the question now arises as to whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors for petitioner‘s condition. if they are to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused. once negligence is shown. guardian. In fact. If there was such extraneous interventions. he is normally required to attend clinico-pathological conferences. . generally. produces injury.In these cases.The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former‘s responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. interns and residents. . In the case at bar. he could not have been capable of properly enlightening the court about anesthesia practice and procedure and their complications. no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. .The CA commited a reversible error. that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage. 4. of explaining to the court the pharmacologic and toxic effects of the supposed culprit. casis employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct of their work within the hospital premises. . either as a visiting or attending consultant.After a physician is accepted. a clear indicia of her negligence. and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. Jamora. respondent hospital. 2199. Gutierrez was unaware of the physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists. In other words. private hospitals. presents problems in apportioning responsibility for negligence in medical malpractice cases. in which the pulmonologist himself admitted that he could not testify about the drug with medical authority. and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship. introduced into her system. visiting or attending. he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda‘s condition. The resulting anoxic encephalopathy belongs to the field of neurology. Thiopental Sodium. respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. and feedback from patients. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. if he could. Since Dr. However. it is clear that the appellate court erred in giving weight to Dr. Dr. Before this date. or a consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum standards acceptable to the hospital or its peer review committee. And because of the unique nature of such cases. was due to an unpredictable drug reaction to the short-acting barbiturate. A consultant remiss in his duties. Gutierrez‘ act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was. Jamora cannot be considered an authority in the field of anesthesiology simply because he is not an anesthesiologist. respondent Dra. therefore. 3. one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. . In addition to these. which. therefore. on the basis of the foregoing. Dr. an . and references. We find the theory of private respondents unacceptable. on 17 June 1985. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. The unique practice (among private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with attending and visiting ―consultants. Jamora is likewise not an allergologist and could not therefore properly advance expert opinion on allergic-mediated processes. a Fellow of the Philippine College of Physicians and Diplomate of the Philippine Specialty Board of Internal Medicine. and was in fact over three hours late for the latter‘s operation. Doctors who apply for ―consultant‖ slots. conduct bedside rounds for clerks. if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. the burden shifts to the respondents (parent. or proof of a similar nature. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlinda‘s condition. Towards this end. teacher or employer) who should prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.torts & damages diagnosis was not correct. for the privilege of being able to maintain a clinic in the hospital. and without which the result would not have occurred. res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished.and certainly not in the best interests of the administration of justice . no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. This is particularly true with respondent hospital. are required to submit proof of completion of residency. are difficult to predict. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda‘s cholecystectomy. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is. or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result.Upon these disquisitions we hold that private respondents are solidarily liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Gutierrez admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation itself. A2010 . Until the day of the operation. from the nature of the case.Dra. is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations. their educational qualifications.First of all. the physician‘s performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review committee on the basis of mortality and morbidity statistics. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain the matter.Private respondents repeatedly hammered the view that the cerebral anoxia which led to Erlinda‘s coma was due to bronchospasm mediated by her allergic response to the drug. Thus. and/or for the privilege of admitting patients into the hospital. . up to the time of trial. . moderate grand rounds and patient audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities. the difficulty is only more apparent than real. Jamora‘s testimony as an expert in the administration of Thiopental Sodium. The real question. Moreover. not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy. whenever it appears from the evidence in the case. as an expert would. where the resulting injury might be continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the injury. evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate). Jamora is a pulmonologist. It is the dominant. he is not a pharmacologist and. Respondent Dra. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. as such.

00 are likewise proper. which led to the different decision of the RTC and CA. as 2 versions arose from Dr. .00 each as exemplary damages and attorney‘s fees. . and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care. ISSUES Procedural WON the court can review questions of fact Substantive WON Dr. embedded on the ovarian cyst. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's private patient sometime before September 21. Batiquin‘s testimony. The CA reversed the decision. Consunji. since aside from the cesarean section. no motive to state any untruth was ever imputed against Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Consunji. there are exceptions. not the respondents. D. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower. are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim. Aside from Dr. Villegas submitted to Dr. 1988 Dr. As such. Villegas and successfully delivered the latter‘s baby. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish.Considering that we have assessed Dr. for anything less would be grossly inadequate. leaving her trustworthiness unimpaired. She then consulted Dr.000.While the petitioners claim that contradictions and falsities punctured Dr. dirt and pus behind the uterus.00 as temperate damages. First. altering their long term goals to take into account their life with a comatose patient. Well-settled is the rule that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony. Dr. . Consunji. Second. However.Mrs. For the foregoing reasons." . Batiquin's gloves after the operation nor blood smears on her hands upon removing her gloves. After examining her.It is also worth noting that the trial court paid heed to Dr. all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present..000. 2001 NATURE Appeal from CA affirming decision of RTC ordering defendant D. Kho to be a credible witness. the evidence which mentioned the piece of rubber are a Medical Certificate.000. an award of P2. the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore. The employer raised. Kho‘s testimony. casis . They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of professionals. it would be now much more in step with the interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their loved one in a facility which generally specializes in such care. Kho saw a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen. Kho's trustworthiness. A2010 . Batiquin. when suddenly. . however. . and solidarily against private respondents the following: 1) P1. Jose Juego‘s widow.The piece of rubber allegedly found was not presented in court. or when the appellate court misapprehended the facts Substantive . in the absence of an explanation by the defendant.On May 9. Kho threw it away as told by her to Defendant. Juego FACTS . 2) P2. needless to say. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney‘s fees valued at P100. . Salud Kho. The family‘s moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. all petitioners in this case. Having premised our award for compensatory damages on the amount provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation. They have fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner.29 - prof..Meanwhile.When Dr. Kho handled the piece of rubber.Finally.000. an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus. exemplary damages in the amount of P100. 1991. emotional and financial cost of the care of petitioner would be virtually impossible to quantify.000. 4) P100. will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of the patient‘s illness. Ma. Kho‘s testimony: 1) that it was sent to the Pathologist in Cebu as testified to in Court by Dr. Furthermore. Villegas submit to another surgery.500. Kho‘s testimony. In the morning of September 21. Also. a construction worker of D.000. knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil.At around 1:30 p. Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination. Kho's testimony.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives.M. the phrase relied upon by the trial court does not negate the fact that Dr. the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas' body.00 in moral damages would be appropriate.The focal point of the appeal is Dr. The trial court's following declaration shows that while it was critical of the lack of care with which Dr. Batiquin is liable HELD Procedural YES . an award of P1. The petitioners.M. Under the circumstances. Kho as a credible witness. Jose Juego. Kho‘s testimony and did not consider it with other portions of Dr. it affords reasonable evidence. Kho's testimony. as she asserted before the trial court. and. the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Furthermore. CONSUNJI V CA KAPUNAN. petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing care for a comatose patient who has remained in that condition for over a decade. by way of example. BATIQUIN V CA (Villegas) 258 SCRA 334 DAVIDE. thus only supporting out appraisal of Dr. a reading of the said testimony reveals no such infirmity and establishes Dr.This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant. In this light. a Progress Record. Kho and (2) that Dr.00 as actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8. filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against D.000. Batiquin. it stands to reason that such could only have been a by-product of the cesarean section performed by Dr. The failure of the Plaintiffs to reconcile these two different versions served only to weaken their claim against Defendant Batiquin. which. November 2. Villegas . regarded these documentary evidence as mere hearsay. April 20.M. The piece of rubber appeared to be a part of a rubber glove.00 as moral damages. Inc.000. among which are when the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court conflict.352.000. The CA was correct in saying that the trial court erred when it isolated the disputed portion of Dr. Dr. M.In the instant case. 1990. her positive testimony prevails over the negative testimony in favor of the petitioners. Kho's knowledge of the piece of rubber could not be based on other than first hand knowledge for. along with other physicians and nurses. the pains still kept recurring. Inc. a Nurse's Record. Dr Kho suggested that Mrs. Pasig City to his death.m. the actual physical. .00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable.In the instant case. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain medicines. Kho's credibility.After leaving the hospital. 3) P1. an Anesthesia Record. 1996 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS .500. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo were performing their work on board a steel platform with plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block. performed a caesarian operation on Mrs. Inc. Batiquin.000. does not occur unless through the intervention of negligence. Kho was frank throughout her turn on the witness stand. and a piece of rubber material on the right side of the uterus. She also gradually lost her appetite. "there being no showing that the person or persons who prepared them are deceased or unable to testify on the facts therein stated . . They. in this regard. and Dr. the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the platform came loose causing the whole platform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core of the building under construction.While the rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus. when the appealed decision is clearly contradicted by the evidence on record. and a Physician's Discharge Summary. The trial court. Maria. it was not prepared to doubt Dr. failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This was the cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs.The husband and the children. save his 2 companions who luckily jumped out for safety. to pay damages to plaintiff Maria J. so she consulted Dr. 5) the costs of the suit. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof DISPOSITION Decision affirmed .There was also doubts as to the whereabouts of the piece of rubber. and that she sent it to a laboratory and then to Cebu City for examination by a pathologist. Investigation disclosed that while victim Jose A. DISPOSITION the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners. July 5. Even the temperate damages herein awarded would be inadequate if petitioner‘s condition remains unchanged for the next ten years. Dr. But the trial court failed to recognized that these were mere denials or negative testimonies. that there was neither any tear on Dr. 1988.torts & damages .00 are hereby awarded. that the accident arose from want of care. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. There were inconsistencies within her own testimony.000. Villegas she found whitishyellow discharge inside. . Kho. Mrs.

ISSUE WON Manila Electric is guilty of negligence. the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. causing his death by electrocution.‖ .August 22. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. As explained earlier. the second requisite is also present. the claim before the ECC was filed. The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. M. on Rodriguez Lanuza St. or to establish any defense relating to the incident. The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Manila. It was installed there some two years ago before Peñaloza‘s house was constructed. YES Ratio As a rule of evidence.‖ Had the house owner followed the terms of the permit given him by the city for the construction of his ―media agua‖. but left the other end where it was. May 18. DISPOSITION The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to prove petitioner‘s negligence 2. FACTS . hid stepbrother. After trial. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.To hold the defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno.The lower court found upon the evidence that both the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent in handling their automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character and extent on the part of both as to prevent either from recovering. and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. During the construction of said house a similar incident took place. . . . with an awareness of its consequences. on the other hand. .Standing on said ―media agua‖. No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available. A reasonable presumption or inference of appellant‘s negligence arises. Disposition The appealed decision of the CA is reversed. . HELD NO .Due to a collision between the respective automobiles of Bernardo and Legaspi.The violation of the permit for the construction was not the direct cause of the accident. and complaint against the Company dismissed. because there is no insulation material in commercial use for such kind of wire (according to appellant. V REMONQUILLO 99 PHIL 117 MONTEMAYOR. provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent. and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.There was no insulation that could have rendered it safe. and to change the installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance. private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights. The owner of the house complained to defendant about the danger which the wire presented.The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence. Magno received from his son thru the window a 3‘x6‘ galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion. the Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED. Legaspi. There is no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when A2010 . He had training and experience for the job.Regulations of the City required that ―all wires be kept three feet from the building. ISSUES 1. .Where two automobiles. 2.The electric wire in question was an exposed.‖ The ―media agua‖ was just below the window of the third story. December 23. and it appears from the evidence and is found by the trial court that the drivers thereof were equally negligent and contributed equally to the . 1950: Efren Magno went to the house of Antonio Peñaloza. the widow‘s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. WON respondent is precluded from recovering damages under the Civil Code HELD 1. and defendant moved one end of the wire farther from the house by means of a brace. the distance from the wires to the edge of said ―media agua‖ would have been 3ft and 11 3/8 inches.It was the victim who was guilty of negligence Ratio the liability of electric companies for damages or personal injury is governed by the rules of negligence.torts & damages among other defenses. . No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee‘s deceased husband. casis Reasoning .his widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the company. going in opposite directions. the former filed an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by his car which he alleged were by reason of Legaspi's negligence in causing said collision. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. ISSUE WON the parties may recover damages HELD 1. 1956 NATURE Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. It is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge. thus. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence. He could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow.30 - prof. and this was not refuted). 1914 NATURE Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila dismissing the complaint on the merits filed in an action to recover damages for injuries FACTS . and in some measure by the too close proximity of the ―media agua‖ to the electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the ―media agua. Consunji. Petitioner’s Claim . thus.The company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said construction. Trial court rendered judgment in their favor. filed a cross-complaint alleging it was Bernardo's fault. whereupon payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects. The lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company parallel to the media agua and 2 ½ feet from it. the first requisite is present. Respondent’s Comment Owner was given final permit despite the excess of the ―media agua‖. Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived. Regrettably. the last requisite is also present. BERNARDO V LEGASPI 29 Phil 12 MORELAND. the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of appellant. . to repair a leaking ―media agua. thus. On appeal by D. It is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. NO . NO Ratio Claimants may invoke either the Workmen‘s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code. He also asks for damages. uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles pm the street and carrying a charge of 3600 volts. (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence. It merely contributed to it. The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen‘s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. petitioner does not cite any evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur. such supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and principal cause of the accident. nevertheless such companies are not insurers of the safety of the public. subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. collide on turning a street corner. On the contrary.Owner of the house exceeded the limit for the construction of the ―media agua‖ (17% more). with less tragic consequences.

. in his Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudenci. Despite his efforts." Having interposed it as a defense. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. says Cayo.. At that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J. She turned to run. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water.The girl was taken to the provincial hospital.31 - prof. under such circumstances. . .Plaintiff Gloria E.‖ . they found her face downward in the hot water. 2.Due to continuing pain in the neck. .The defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the street Gran Captain with the knowledge and consent of the authorities. public enemy .Verily. ISSUE WON the collapse of the ceiling was caused by force majeur HELD NO . it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. . the child died that same night. January 30. . and for the costs of both instances. on the evening when the religious procession was held. House. Mr. Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater. . casis ceiling collapsed. . There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. . Accident and mitigating circumstances. House for the amount of P1.Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater.When the mother and her companions reached the child. ISSUE WON the action should be dismissed due to the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs and her mother. there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. Ong. Atlantic. hail. however. Illinois. contributed to that most regrettable result. as for example. that the cause of death was other than the hot water. . USA in July 1982 for further treatment. to natural accidents. . . Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he isincompetent. plaintiff went to Illinois. attack by robbers. tempests. petitioner filed the petition in the SC. post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings. earthquake.. Corkburn. except as to the last mentioned special defense.The doctrines announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. . they.Definitions of force majeure as cited in Pons y Compañia vs. whole Body".While in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant. still rule. ea quae consilio humano neque provideri neque vitari potest. in a well considered English case. after examination of the evidence presented by the defendants. headache and dizziness. owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. . Escriche. and the accident BERNAL V HOUSE 54 PHIL 327 MALCOLM. said that were a captain uses all the known means to which prudent and experienced captains ordinarily have recourse. Bouvier: Any accident due to natural cause. GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V CHATTO 210 SCRA 18 DAVIDE JR.That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction. 1992 FACTS . but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages. an accident produced by any physical cause which is irresistible.torts & damages principal occurrence as determining causes thereof. That Mr.Even taking the finding that the defendant by its negligence helped to bring about the accident which resulted in the death of the child Purificacion Bernal. Jesus Lim Ong.The next day. and that the contributory causes were "Congestion of the Brain and visceras of the chest & abdomen. perils of the sea. by negligence. and that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence. the ceiling of its balcony collapsed.The building was constructed barely 4 years prior to the accident in question. Gulf and Pacific Co. or earthquake. directly exclusively without human intervention. that the collapse was due to construction defects. . neither can recover of the other for damages suffered. SEPARATE OPINION ROMUALDEZ [dissent] . but fell into the street gutter. they transferred to the UST hospital. .After the procession.etc. plaintiff. appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed. The term generally applies. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11.Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal went to Tacloban. Chatto. such as could not have been prevented by any kind of oversight. he is within the rule which gives immunity from the effects of such vis major. 1930 FACTS . he does all that can be reasonably required of him. considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all.000. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced.V.The trial court awarded actual or compensatory and moral damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. The contributory negligence of the child . . passed along a public street named Gran Capitan. and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the defendant. such as lightning. hurricane. especially as regards the ceiling. She stayed in the U. inundation. inundation. .Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness. She was treated at the Cook County Hospital in Chicago. there to endanger the lives of passers-by who were unfortunately enough to fall into it . Blackstone.. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. six (6) times. and her 15-year old daughter. 359). Ltd. does not operate as a bar to recovery.Its motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the respondent Court.Judgment appealed from should be affirmed. .The death of the child was the result of fault and negligence in permitting hot water to flow through the public streets. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises.This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that: Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured.The trial judge. June 16. 3rd Degree.S. the sudden illness or death of a person. ([1907].Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. What is significant is the finding of the trial court. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from was in part be reversed and in the court of origin another judgment was issued in favor of Fortunata Enverso and against J. an automobile appeared on which frightened the child. failed to sustain their theory of the case. La Compañia Maritima: 1. . 4. admitted that "he could not give any reason why the HELD NO .Shocked and hurt.The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban. and if.Respondent Court found the appeal later filed to be without merit. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect. but an architect who had not even passed the government's examination. public enemy. tempest. It was not shown that any of the causes denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. chief justice. the lightning stroke. broadly speaking. in his Commentaries on English Law: Inevitable accident or casualty. Lina Delza E. the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means. for about three (3) months during which time she had to return to the Cook County Hospital five (5) or. Leyte. Vis major est. . Leyte to attend the procession of Holy Friday. affirmed by the respondent Court. He nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. 3.: The event which we could neither foresee nor resist.It was certified that the cause of death was "Burns. . -The real reason why Mr. .There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother.The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance of her mother and her friends. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day. he is overpowered by storm or other natural agency. . 7 Phil. He is not an engineer.It is settled that: The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises. pains and care reasonably to have been expected. accompanied by two other persons.V. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. if any. such as those caused by lightning. A2010 .

. 'it was the old woman that bumped him. Quiñones. . > Jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. . 321. No. The appellant's rig was following another at a distance of two meters.G. while the respondent husband suffered cut lips.However. This was reported to the foreman. if any. SEPARATE OPINION WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent] . 1520) Disposition the appealed decision is affirmed with modification as to the civil liability of the petitioner which is hereby increased to P30. i. FACTS . The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. dated March 11. one of a group of 8 African-American laborers in the employment of defendant. 1989 [CITATION] NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the resolution of the Court of Appeals.On Dec 31. . > If the accident did not happen because the jeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the ACCIDENT MOUND. a rig driven by Genobiagon bumped an old woman who was crossing the street. but it had not been proven that Atlantic inspected the track or had any proper system of inspection. If it had remained on that inside lane. if at all. FACTS . 1979. ."The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence. The appellant continued to drive on.Trial court assessed that damages to plaintiff amount to PhP5. SC deducted PhP2. . ISSUE WON there was contributory negligence on the part of petitioner HELD YES . which was later amputated at the knee. in its answer. He ran after appellant when the latter refused to stop. .R.July 30. the company‘s officers and 3 of the workers testified that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all against walking by the side of cars.Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through negligence lies only in a criminal action against the official directly responsible and that the employer be held only subsidiarily liable. 44 O. Rakes. Costs against petitioner. it would not have hit the accident mound > That plaintiffs‘ jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the south of the ACCIDEN MOUND. In addition.. the amount fairly attributable to his own negligence. and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. October 22. CA-G. . She was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital where she died 3 hours later. an independent contractor which undertook the said construction work.Genobiagon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. 1959.000. . A2010 .Even assuming that the cause of the collapse was due to force majeure. PLDT V CA (SPS ESTEBAN) REGALADO. Disposition Judgment was denying the instant petition with costs against petitioner. Atlantic. but only in reduction of his damages.e. he could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. 1968 – Jeep of Esteban spouses ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench.The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident. although not as the primary cause. -The negligence of the injured person contributing to his injury but not being one of the determining causes of the principal accident. then plaintiff husband had not exercised the deligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. At that speed. he should not have been guilty of negligence. there were no side guards on the cars to keep the rails from slipping off." (People vs. . CA affirmed . 1980. The old woman started to cross when the first rig was approaching her. which the trial court denominated as gross. Mckenna.That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner. GENOBIAGON V CA (PEOPLE OF THE PHILS) 178 SCRA 422 GRIÑO-AQUINO.TC ruled in favor of Esteban spouses whereas the CA reversed the ruling.The plaintiff‘s witness alleged that a noticeable depression in the track had appeared after a typhoon. Overtaking the appellant. ISSUE WON the Esteban spouses can claim damages from PLDT HELD NO Ratio A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. leaving a permanent scar on her cheek. the track sagged. he must have exercised care. who fell at the middle of the road. RAKES V ATLANTIC [CITATION] [PONENTE] NATURE Action for damages FACTS . breaking his leg.The alleged contributory negligence of the victim. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure for one to be exempt from any liability because of it. March 29. . .32 - prof. since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence (People vs. he was found to have contributed in some degree to the injury inflicted. The old woman was unconscious. casis Orbeta. does not operate as a bar to recovery. > Plaintiffs‘ jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiff husband claimed.The plaintiff. Reasoning .000. The men were hauling the rails on 2 hand cars. legs and face. Also. was at work transporting iron rails from the harbor in Manila.Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms.Petitioner had walked along the side of the car despite a prohibition to do so by the foreman. some behind or at it sides and some pulling the cars in the front by a rope. September 29. Its original decision. denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible. At one point.500. Mangyao asked him why he bumped the old woman and his answer was.' The appellant went back to the place where the old woman was struck by his rig. is L. Barte and Company. does not exonerate the accused. the appellant's rig bumped the old woman. 1990 and September 3. as one of its determining factors. the tie broke. Disposition resolutions of respondent CA. As Rakes was walking along the car‘s side when the accident occurred. petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence.R.The accident was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. Each party is chargeable with damages in proportion to his fault. its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant.Genobiagon claims CA erred in not finding that the reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate cause of the accident which led to her death ISSUES WON contributory negligence can be used as defense by Genobiagon HELD NO . The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. the windshield of the jeep was shattered. but as appellant's vehicle was going so fast not only because of the steep down-grade of the road. 1957 NATURE Petition for review of the CA‘s decision affirming the conviction of the petitioner of the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence. at about 7:30 PM. promulgated on September 25. is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. but a by-stander Mangyao saw the incident and shouted at the appellant to stop. are hereby SET ASIDE.torts & damages is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been exercised. the car canted and the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff who was walking by the car‘s side. but also because he was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him. 1947). an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system.PLDT.

suffered by the private respondent RMC — petitioner bank's negligence or that of private respondent's? HELD . The upper part was called the depositor's stub and the . Because of this. she should have proceeded more cautiously by being more probing as to the true reason why the name of the account holder in the duplicate slip was left blank while that in the original was filled up. In all other respects. Yabut to Ms. Ms. Why is RMC insulating Ms. the appellate court's decision is AFFIRMED. there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by the private respondent. (b) fault or negligence of the defendant. Ratio Art. Mabayad. she would simply fill up the blank space later on. there being fault or negligence. while he ordered the investigation of the incident. assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. would do. is obliged to pay for the damage done. simply by faithfully observing their selfimposed validation procedure. common sense. thru its teller Ms. Azucena Mabayad. and inexcusable negligence in the appellant bank's supervision of its employees. 2176. Yabut.The foregoing notwithstanding. or bar a defense against liability sought by another.In the case at bench. was negligent in validating. at times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"). had two parts. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law.torts & damages . which. states that where both parties are negligent. banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care. In view of this.Going back to Yabut's modus operandi.33 - prof. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. Azucena Mabayad. wanton. her employer? . The award of attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by the petitioner. this was not how bank teller Mabayad proceeded thus resulting in huge losses to the private respondent. . casis determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident. But if his negligence was only contributory.Applying the above test. and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. particularly Romeo Lipana. . 1975 to July. thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company. private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. Irene Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate copy was only for her personal record. it is not disputed that each time Yabut would transact business with PBC's tellers. coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller.the negligence of the defendant alone was insufficient to cause the accident—it also required the negligence of the plaintiff. .There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff. except the award of P25. The rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of. . both original and duplicate. In the testimony of Mr. 40% of the damage awarded by the respondent appellate court. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter Reasoning . presented by Ms. in validating the deposit slips.It was in fact only when he testified in this case in February. March 14. 1976) that bank manager Bonifacio admittedly became aware of the practice of his teller Mabayad of validating blank deposit slips. as testified to by Ms. . Here. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip. 17 defines proximate cause as "that cause.Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Petitioners may recover from Ms. Bank of the Phil. plaintiff should not be afforded relief A2010 . the plaintiff may recover damages. Ms. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors. it cannot be denied that. who should have been charged with estafa or estafa through falsification of private document. Irene Yabut. had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client. thru its teller. only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the petitioners.00 attorney's fees. if the latter.979. 1983. The law considers what would be reckless. Romeo Bonifacio. in natural and continuous sequence. ISSUE What is the proximate cause of the loss.the case stems from a complaint filed by Rommel‘s Marketing Corporation (RMC) to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) the sum of P304. but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other. as issued in 1975. to wit: . Azucena Mabayad. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof.The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits should not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. She should not have been so naive in accepting hook. petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. 11 A "reasonable man of ordinary prudence" 12 would not have given credence to such explanation and would have insisted that the space left blank be filled up as a condition for validation. or when it is impossible to SEPARATE OPINION PADILLA [dissent] . unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. Unfortunately.000. despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the selfimposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips. Irene Yabut from liability when in fact she orchestrated the entire fraud on RMC. to the tune of P304. we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man. blameworthy. . or some other person for whose acts he must respond. and were instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. . indeed. the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE V CA (ROMMEL’S MARKETING CORP. original or duplicate. officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. this is gross. RMC's own employee. The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information — that of the name of the account holder — should have already put Ms. he cannot recover damages. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. Azucena Mabayad the amount they would pay the private respondent. policy and precedent. as advanced by the petitioner. Irene Yabut. Rather than readily validating the incomplete duplicate copy. yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank. line and sinker the too shallow excuse of Ms. shall be borne by private respondent RMC. Islands v. .) 269 SCRA 695 HERMOSISIMA JR. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury.Test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. . Such fault or negligence. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. notwithstanding the fact that one of the deposit slips was not completely accomplished. had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent. . could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. who had the last fair chance. the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary." In this case. This doctrine.Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity. Thus. then he is guilty of negligence.74. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. and without which the result would not have occurred. but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. Mabayad herself. Undoubtedly. it appears that the bank's teller. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent 23 under A2179 CC. he never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures.It seems that an innocent bank teller is being unduly burdened with what should fall on Ms.The proximate cause of the loss was the negligent act of the bank. . PBC's deposit slip. . the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care. produces the injury. to the effect that. 1997 NATURE Petition for review challenging the CA decision affirming the RTC decision in a civil case FACTS . or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. she would accomplish two (2) copies of the current account deposit slip. Mabayad. Disposition the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is modified by reducing the amount of actual damages private respondent is entitled to by 40%.74 representing various deposits it had made in its current account with the bank but which were not credited. or after the lapse of more than seven (7) years counted from the period when the funds in question were deposited in plaintiff's accounts (May. .LAST CLEAR CHANCE: under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to. absent the act of Ms. Mabayad on guard. . and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Private respondent shall have recourse against Ms. . . then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner. as insisted by the petitioners.In the case of banks. allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the petitioner bank. Had it done so. Court of Appeals.979.It was this negligence of Ms. in essence.

While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the tire were still visible. and superimposed RMC's account number. YES . v. private respondent should. The sudden blowing-up. We agree with the observation of the HERNANDEZ V COMMISSION ON AUDIT 179 SCRA 39 . NO Ratio A caso fortuito (fortuitous event) presents the following essential characteristics: 1. et al. whenever it appears that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which under the circumstances was incumbent upon it. therefore.‖ In the case at bar.Since Yabut deposited money in cash. it must be impossible to avoid 3.It should be noted that the teller validated the depositor's stub in the upper portion and the bank copy on the lower portion on both the original and duplicate copies of the deposit slips presented by Yabut. the bank was not remiss in its duty of sending monthly bank statements to private respondent RMC so that any error or discrepancy in the entries therein could be brought to the bank's attention at the earliest opportunity.34 - prof. In La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. is not contributory but the immediate and proximate cause of its injury. May 31. the date of the deposit. The obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor Reasoning . Plaintiff was thrown out of the vehicle and lost consciousness upon landing on the ground. the genuineness and due execution of the document become an issue in resolving whether or not the transaction had been fair and regular and whether the ordinary course of business had been followed by the bank. A2010 . but because it was purposely negligent as it admitted that it does not normally check bank statements given by banks. hence this appeal. WON the CFI erred in absolving the carrier from any liability upon a finding that the tire blow out is a fortuitous event 2. not the validation of the deposit slip by the teller as the deposit slip was made out by Yabut in her husband's name and to his account. Both parts were detachable from each other. The records show that this obligation was not met by the respondents." it is my considered view that the doctrine assumes that the negligence of the defendant was subsequent to the negligence of the plaintiff and the same must be the proximate cause of the injury. registered under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar. this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. . must be independent of the human will 2. have taken ordinary care of its concerns.It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage. . as what the law presumes.Thus. . a bank normally maintained a ledger which served as a repository of accounts to which debits and credits resulting from transactions with the bank were posted from books of original entry. ― not only are the rulings of the CA in Rodriguez v Red Line Trans. WON the accident was due to a fortuitous event HELD 1. and the amount of the deposit either in cash or in checks.In the case at bar. that ―a tire blow-out does not constitute negligence unless the tire was already old and should not have been used at all. It must have been a chance as would have enabled a reasonably prudent man in like position to have acted effectively to avoid the injury and the resulting damage to himself. . . injuries on his left arm. The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident. said act only served to cover-up the loss already caused by her to RMC. then the teller proceeded to verify whether the current account number matched with the current account name as written in the deposit slip. and by entering into the said contract. 2. . casis petitioner that a public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up. Paras. the manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent or servant of the carrier.City Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. the name of the depositor or current account holder. when there is a clear evidence of tampering with any of the material entries in a deposit slip. however. tampered with its account number. We held that. but actually owned by Fernando Banzon) when its right rear tire exploded causing it to turn turtle. and Camoro.The legal or proximate cause of RMC's loss was when Yabut. et al. it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation. Thus. Petitioner‘s MFR was denied. the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human will. or after the deposit slip was validated by the teller in favor of Yabut's husband.It was private respondent who had the last and clear chance to prevent any further misappropriation by Yabut had it only reviewed the status of its current accounts on the bank statements sent to it monthly or regularly. not binding on this Court but they were also based on considerations quite different from those that obtain in the case at bar. It must be impossible to foresee the even which constitutes the caso fortuito. Co. with regard to inspection and application of the necessary tests. The petitioner stated that there were 3 passengers in the front seat and 14 in the rear. No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. its employee. therefore.Relative to the contingency of mechanical defects. ISSUES 1. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles not to exceed safe and legal speed limits and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times. who filed their answer. not a last possible chance. Stated otherwise. the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability.‖ This conclusion is based on a misapprehension of overall facts. deposited the money of RMC in her husband's name and account number instead of that of RMC. He went to Danao city and upon arrival there he entered the City Hospital to attend to his injuries and asked his father-in-law to go to site of the accident to look for his watch but the watch was nowhere to be found. it was the criminal act of Yabut that directly caused damage to RMC. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire. that: ―The preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer. at least. The deposit slip was prepared and signed by the depositor or his representative. could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident. . Precisely. Banzon. there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. JUNTILLA V FONTANAR 136 SCRA 624 GUITERREZ JR. In short. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence. right thigh and on his back and also found this ―Omega‖ wrist watch was lost. et al. there must be a last and a clear chance. but with the account name purposely left blank by Yabut. alleging that the accident was beyond their control taking into account that the tire that exploded was newly bought and slightly used at the time it blew up. . The respondents then appealed to the CFI of Cebu. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner 4. we held in Necesito. . . detached the validated depositor's stub on the original deposit slip and allowed Yabut to retain the whole validated duplicate deposit slip that bore the same account number as the original deposit slip. Since a sizable amount of cash was entrusted to Yabut. The teller. 1985 NATURE Petition to review the decision of CFI of Cebu FACTS . Disposition Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm. to avoid the accident or injury. which reversed the judgment upon a finding that the accident in question was due to a fortuitous event. using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person. when Yabut wrote the name of RMC on the blank account name on the validated duplicate copy of the deposit slip. the rightful owner of such deposited funds. For the purposes of this doctrine.The CFI relied on the ruling of the CA in Rodriguez v Red Line Transportation Co. According to this theory. or if it can be foreseen. v De Jesus. the usual bank procedure then was for the teller to count whether the cash deposit tallied with the amount written down by the depositor in the deposit slip. it was only after the transaction was posted in the ledger that the teller proceeded to machine validate the deposit slip and then affix his signature or initial to serve as proof of the completed transaction. who indicated therein the current account number to which the deposit was to be credited. as far as regards the work of constructing the appliance.Petitioner then filed a civil case for breach of contract with damages before the City Court of Cebu against Fontanar. There is also evidence to show that the passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident.In the earlier days before the age of full computerization.Petitioner Roberto Juntilla was sitting a the front seat of a jeepney (driven by one Berfol Camoro. Decision of City Court is REINSTATED . .In the case at bar.torts & damages lower part was called the bank copy. The records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a ditch immediately after its right rear tire exploded. If it did.LAST CLEAR CHANCE: As for the doctrine of "last clear chance. When he came back to his senses. Its negligence. . with a due regard for all the circumstances.. her employer. Private respondent failed to examine these bank statements not because it was prevented by some cause in not doing so. on the assumption that it would serve no other purpose but for a personal record to complement the original validated depositor's stub.

And so. filed a request for relief from money accountability under Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code. He took a passenger jeep bound for his house in Bulacan. He is not an engineer. theft. Alvarez was subsequently charged with robbery and pleaded guilty." Having interposed it as a defense. through then Chairman Francisco S. affirmed by the respondent Court. 1982 Gloria E. NO . immediately followed in desperate pursuit. something that could not have been reasonably foreseen although it could have happened. Lina Delza E. that what happened was a fortuitous A2010 . or the provincial auditor. He is a graduate of architecture from the St.however. observing inter alia: In the instant case. Chatto. the loss of the P10. That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction. his successor sided with the petitioner. if only because his home in Marilao was much nearer than his office in Ternate.the petitioner. An officer who fails to comply with this requirement shall not be relieved of liability or allowed credit for any such loss in the settlement of his accounts. Ong. the real reason why Mr. Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater. To sustain that proposition is to introduce sacrilege in our jurisprudence.torts & damages CRUZ. the ignorance of Mr.On his decision to take the money home that afternoon instead of returning directly to Ternate. Tantuico. and without any mystic ability to peer into the future. He opted for the second. as the respondent Court impliedly held. post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings. Jesus Lim Ong is not an engineer. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and was one that could be expected of a reasonable and prudent person. ACCORDINGLY. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. He went to the main office in Manila to encash 2 checks covering the wages of the employees and the operating expenses of the Project. Credit for loss occurring in transit or due to casualty — Notice to Auditor. . So it was with the petitioner. Later. that the likelihood of robbery during the time in question was stronger in Ternate than in Marilao. the petition is GRANTED. Shocked and hurt. It does not appear he has passed the government examination for architects. spend the night there. after the initial shock. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. they transferred to the UST hospital. the loss of said cash thru robbery could have been aborted. Hernandez. plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation.In the petition at bar. denied the petitioner's request. NO . and her 15-year old daughter. of God. but the Court feels he should not be blamed for that. based on common sense and our own experiences. — When a loss of government funds or property occurs while the same is in transit or is caused by fire. They bought balcony tickets but even then were unable to find seats considering the number of people patronizing the movie. He avers he has done only what any reasonable man would have done and should not be held accountable for a fortuitous event over which he had no control. who was eventually convicted. the Commission on Audit.35 - prof.there was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial civil and structural engineers on the cause of the collapse of the theater's ceiling. . In fine. Its contention is that the petitioner should not have encashed the checks as the hour was already late and he knew he could not return to Ternate before nightfall.Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness. 1992 NATURE Petition for Review FACTS . especially on that busy highway. But the hold-upper who escaped is still at large and the stolen money he took with him has not been recovered. To Our mind. shall present his application for relief. with the available evidence in support thereof. Verily. That Mr. . Hernandez can be attributed to his negligence because had he brought the cash proceeds of the checks (replenishment fund) to the Beach Park in Ternate immediately after encashment for safekeeping in his office. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect. and within thirty days or such longer period as the Auditor. Brion. Disposition The petitioner is entitled to be relieved from accountability for the money forcibly taken from him. Hernandez was the officer-in-charge and special disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project of the Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite. or (2) take the money with him to his house in Marilao.175. 1989 NATURE A petition to reverse Commission on Audit‘s denial of relief FACTS . and leave for Ternate the following morning. according as a matter is within the original jurisdiction of the one or the other. ISSUE WON petitioner‘s acts are so tainted with negligence or recklessness as to justify the denial of the petitioner's request for relief from accountability for the stolen money HELD NO . What is significant is the finding of the trial court. agreeing that Hernandez had not committed any negligence or. there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident.In the afternoon of June 4. he says that the first course was more prudent as he saw it. Bulacan. the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. . as an act. 3 . and did. inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. which is the normal procedure in the handling of public funds. jr. but an architect who had not even passed the government's examination. he collected the cash value of the checks. or our intuition. The petitioner decided nevertheless to encash them because the Project employees would be waiting for their pay the following day. however. assuming he was guilty of contributory negligence. The petitioner had two choices: (1) return to Cavite that same afternoon and arrive there in the early evening. that the collapse was due to construction defects. or provincial auditor. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto suffered the following injuries: . June 16.Teodoro M. The Section 638. . had made up for it with his efforts to retrieve the money and his capture of one of the robbers.COA insists that the petitioner should not be relieved from his money accountability because it was his own negligence that led to the loss of the cash he had sought to take not to Ternate but to Marilao. 2. . For most of us. The memo concludes that in deciding to take the money with him to Marilao after imprudently withdrawing it from the main office. Ernesto G. November 6. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is. It was not shown that any of the causes denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. He caught up with Virgilio Alvarez and overcame him after a scuffle. or other casualty.The next day. event that could not have reasonably been foreseen. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day. ISSUES 1. Louie University in Baguio City.00 under the accountability of Mr. all we can rely on is a reasoned conjecture of what might happen. The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the accident in question. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11.Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. Hernandez claims that the respondent COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying him relief and in holding him negligent for the loss of the stolen money. may in the particular case allow.It is true that the petitioner miscalculated. Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater. casis theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. the processing of the checks was completed only at 3pm. . However. it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. WON the collapse was due to force majeure HELD 1. if you will. Ong about the cause of the collapse of the ceiling of their theater cannot be equated. It could not have collapsed without a cause. His answers to the leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said. the petitioner was assuming a risk from which he cannot now be excused after the loss of the money as a result of the robbery to which it was unreasonably exposed. Jesus Lim Ong. He estimated that the money would be available by 10am and that he would be back in Ternate by about 2pm of the same day. GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V CHATTO 210 SCRA 18 DAVIDE JR.This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said provisions. Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. thinking it the safer one.then Solicitor-General argued that Hernandez was negligent in the safekeeping of the stolen funds. incompetent. Mr. WON Jesus Lim Ong‘s investigation maybe given weight in the trial 2. Per Medico Legal Certificate (Exh. "C") issued by Dr. It was while the vehicle was along EDSA that two persons with knives boarded and forcibly took the money he was carrying.3 . admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed. invoking the foregoing facts. the officer accountable therefor or having custody thereof shall immediately notify the Auditor General.

thereby releasing a large amount of Article 1174. or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation. violence of robbers. when the warehouse was burned. Philippine Steam on the other hand relies on the following: Clause 14. pursuant to such demand. . the latter having no control whatsoever over the same.torts & damages especially as regards the ceiling. 31. the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened independently of the will of the appellant.Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured. . consequently. SERVANDO V PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO 117 SCRA 832 ESCOLIN. the obligor is exempt from liability for nonperformance. casis the same be withdrawn. Negros Occidental. morals or public policy. No amount of extraordinary diligence on the part of the carrier could have prevented the loss of the goods by fire which was of accidental origin. .Besides. Vol. Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with negligence.We sustain the validity of the above stipulation. defines 'caso fortuito' as 'an event that takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. in the morning of November 18. unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. In fact. . however. fire . complete and in good order. 4 . were inevitable. IV. This argument overlooks the pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs.NPC operated and maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River . The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736. the agreement contained in the above quoted Clause 14 is a mere iteration of the basic principle of law written in Article 1 1 7 4 of the Civil Code4 Thus. 'Such provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage. Except in cases expressly specified by the law. negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the dam's spillways. appellee Uy Bico had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse. 1962 Ed. shipwreck. Servando and Clara Uy Bico. or if it can be foreseen. until the consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of them". a 'caso fortuito' presents the following essential characteristics: (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence.When the water level in the Angat dam went beyond the allowable limit at the height of typhoon Kading NPC opened three of the dam‘s spillways to release the excess water in the dam. originally brought to the Court of Appeals. The storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent. appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed. (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. are contracts not entirely prohibited. Reyes. appellees Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board the appellant's vessel for carriage from Manila to Pulupandan. though foreseen. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been exercised. or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk.' . Clara had removed more than one-half of the rice consigned to her. 1982 NATURE This appeal.I concur.B. it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant. in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other. 1963. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. 3 where the Court held that while it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket . the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code. and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the defendant.despite the defendants' knowledge of the impending entry of typhoon "Kading.. Examples of this are destruction of houses. said warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown origin. FACTS .incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation. 7354 and 7428. Lawyer's Journal. ordering Philippine Steam to pay for damages. Moreover.The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by the defendants of water through the spillways of the Angst Dam (Hydroelectric Plant). . 1993 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court FACTS . morals. promulgated June 29. and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. It is what is known as a contract of 'adhesion'.In its dissertation of the phrase 'caso fortuito' the Enciclopedia Juridicada Espanola 5 says: "In a legal sense and. public policy..On the bases of the foregoing facts. where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss. the shipping company had no more control and responsibility over the goods after they were deposited in the customs warehouse by the arrastre and stevedoring operator. Disposition judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the instant petition with costs against petitioner.36 - prof. unexpected fire. Justice J. it must be impossible to avoid. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely.Appellees would contend that the above stipulation does not bind them because it was printed in fine letters on the back-of the bills of lading. 1979. May 21.On November 6. p. toys etc) as evidenced by the corresponding bills of lading issued by the appellant. ISSUE NATIONAL POWER CORP V CA (RAYO ET AL) DAVIDE JR. the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means. no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen. This however caused the inundation of the banks of the Angat river which caused persons and animals to drown and properties to be washed away." they failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam . Disposition judgment appealed from is hereby set aside. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure. and since the burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees. appellee Uy Bico was able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice Appellees' claims for the value of said goods were rejected by the appellant. . 49). must be independent of the human will. declaring appellant Philippine Steam Navigation liable for damages for the loss of the appellees' cargoes as a result of a fire which gutted the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in Pulupandan. and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation'. Court of Appeals. Jan. the defendants suddenly. and that they did not sign the same. dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters. WON the above stipulation validly limits the liability of the shipowner in this case HELD YES Ratio The parties may stipulate anything in the contract for so long as the stipulation is not contrary to law. Before the fire. the lower court rendered a decision. had reasonable opportunity to remove the goods. or which. the cargoes were discharged. considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. . . citing Mr. there is nothing therein that is contrary to law. colored papers. 462.It is settled that . Reasoning . . Under article 1738 of the Civil Code "the extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be operative even during the time the goods are stored in the warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination. Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the government. the consignees. also in relation to contracts.This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that .. The Partidas. It appears that appellant had not only notified appellees of the arrival of their shipment.From the time the goods in question were deposited in the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in the morning of their arrival up to two o' clock in the afternoon of the same day. (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito'. The stipulation which merely iterates the principle of caso fortuito is for all intents and purposes valid. Plaintiffs claim: .L.when the said water level went beyond the maximum allowable limit at the height of the typhoon. 1963. public enemies. Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan. 1951. A2010 . the loss is chargeable against the appellant. seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Cases Nos." In the case at bar. At about 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day. if he adheres. Civil Code.There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier .The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises. as the plane ticket in the case at bar. destroying appellees' cargoes. or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation. Amparo C. he gives his consent. p. but had demanded that SEPARATE OPINION AQUINO [concur] . Negros Occidental several cargoes (cavans of rice." (Tolentino. . he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. war. The latter could not have foreseen the event. . .

torts & damages
water which inundated the banks of the Angat River causing the death of members of the household of the plaintiffs, together with their animals Respondents comments: - NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant - NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of its employees - written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advising them to take the necessary Precautions - the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage to people and property - in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised, they could still not contain or control the flood that resulted - the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria. ISSUES 1. WON NPC was guilty of negligence 2. WON (applying the ruling of NAkpil & Sons v. CA) NPC is liable given that the inundation was caused by force majeure HELD 1. YES - A similar case entitled National Power Corporation, et al. vs, Court of Appeals, et al.," involving the very same incident subject of the instant petition. The court there declared that the proximate cause of the loss and damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein--who were similarly situated as the private respondents herein-was the negligence of the petitioners, - on the basis of its meticulous analysis and evaluation of the evidence a dduced by the parties in the cases subject of CA-G.R. CV Nos. 27290-93, public respondent found as conclusively established that indeed, the petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam," and that "the extent of the opening of the spillways, and the magnitude of the water released, are all but products of defendants-appellees headlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness."and that the 24 October 1978 'early warning notice" supposedly sent to the affected municipalities, the same notice involved in the case at bar, was insufficient. 2. YES - given that NPC is guilty of negligence. Juan F. Nakipil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals is still good law as far as the concurrent liability of an obligor in the case of force majeure is concerned. - In the Nakpil case it was held that "To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an 'act of God,' the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor, (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.

A2010

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prof. casis
damages, P300,000.00, as exemplary damages and P100,000.00, for and as attorney‘s fees; plus costs. - In its Answer, petitioner averred that subject school building had withstood several devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past, without its roofing or any portion thereof giving way; that it has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said school building, which houses school children, faculty members, and employees, is ―in tip-top condition‖; and furthermore, typhoon ―Saling‖ was ―an act of God and therefore beyond human control‖ such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages wrought thereby, absent any negligence on its part. - The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the ocular inspection made by the city engineer. Thus, this appeal. ISSUES WON the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the school building‘s roof ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon ―Saling‖, was, within legal contemplation, due to fortuitous event HELD YES - Petitioner cannot be held liable for the damages suffered by the private respondents. This conclusion finds support in Article 1174 of the Civil Code, which provides: “Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.” - The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which defines it as ―an event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen.‖iii[9] Escriche elaborates it as ―an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted.‖ Civilist Arturo M. Tolentino adds that ―[f]ortuitous events may be produced by two general causes: (1) by nature, such as earthquakes, storms, floods, epidemics, fires, etc. and (2) by the act of man, such as an armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental prohibitions, robbery, etc.‖iv - In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned.. An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences. When a person‘s negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event. When the effect is found to be partly the result of the participation of man – whether it be from active intervention, or neglect, or failure to act – the whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. - After a thorough study and evaluation of the evidence on record, this Court believes otherwise, notwithstanding the general rule that factual findings by the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive upon this Court. After a careful scrutiny of the records and the pleadings submitted by the parties, we find exception to this rule and hold that the lower courts misappreciated the evidence proffered. - There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of

- The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are, to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. (1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-1175). Disposition Petition dismissed.

SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE V CA PURISIMA; July 10, 1998
NATURE Petition for review seeking to set aside the Decision promulgated on July 31, 1996, and Resolution dated September 12, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in ―Juanita de Jesus vda. de Dimaano, et al. vs. Southeastern College, Inc.‖, which reduced the moral damages awarded below from P1,000,000.00 to P200,000.00. The Resolution under attack denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration. FACTS - Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay City, while petitioner owns a four-storey school building along the same College Road. On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the morning, a powerful typhoon ―Saling‖ hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of petitioner‘s building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents‘ house. After the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the destroyed buildings was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official, Engr. Jesus L. Reyna. Pertinent aspects of the latter‘s Reporti[5] dated October 18, 1989 stated, as follows: “5. One of the factors that may have led to this calamitous event is the formation of the buildings in the area and the general direction of the wind. Situated in the peripheral lot is an almost U-shaped formation of 4-storey building. Thus, with the strong winds having a westerly direction, the general formation of the buildings becomes a big funnel-like structure, the one situated along College Road, receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds. Hence, there are portions of the roofing, those located on both ends of the building, which remained intact after the storm. 6. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging of the roofings structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the said trusses to the roof beams. The 1/2” diameter steel bars embedded on the concrete roof beams which serve as truss anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the trusses. Still, there are other steel bars which were not even bent to the trusses, thus, those trusses are not anchored at all to the roof beams.” - It then recommended that ―to avoid any further loss and damage to lives, limbs and property of persons living in the vicinity,‖ the fourth floor of subject school building be declared as a ―structural hazard.‖ - In their Complaintii[6] before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, for damages based on culpa aquiliana, private respondents alleged that the damage to their house rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in others‘ houses. And so they sought to recover from petitioner P117,116.00, as actual damages, P1,000,000.00, as moral

torts & damages
foresight, diligence or care. In order to be exempt from liability arising from any adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have been no human participation amounting to a negligent act. In other words, the person seeking exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence. Negligence, as commonly understood, is conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. It may be the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,v[17] or the omission to do something which a prudent and reasonable man, guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do. From these premises, we proceed to determine whether petitioner was negligent, such that if it were not, the damage caused to private respondents‘ house could have been avoided? - At the outset, it bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence,vi[19] not merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact. Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of petitioner‘s school building after the typhoon. As the term imparts, an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing.vii[20] What is visual to the eye though, is not always reflective of the real cause behind. For instance, one who hears a gunshot and then sees a wounded person, cannot always definitely conclude that a third person shot the victim. It could have been self-inflicted or caused accidentally by a stray bullet. The relationship of cause and effect must be clearly shown. - In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of petitioner‘s school building. Private respondents did not even show that the plans, specifications and design of said school building were deficient and defective. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation from the approved plans and specifications. Nor did they conclusively establish that the construction of such building was basically flawed. - Moreover, the city building official, who has been in the city government service since 1974, admitted in open court that no complaint regarding any defect on the same structure has ever been lodged before his office prior to the institution of the case at bench. It is a matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common occurrences in this country. If subject school building‘s roofing was not firmly anchored to its trusses, obviously, it could not have withstood long years and several typhoons even stronger than ―Saling.‖ - In light of the foregoing, we find no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the judgment of the appellate court. We thus hold that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon ―Saling‖ was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents‘ house.

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- In a decision of the Spanish SC, cited by Manresa, the death of an employee who was bitten by a feline which his master had asked him to take to his establishment was by said tribunal declared to be ―a veritable accident of labor‖ which should come under the labor laws rather than under article 1905, CC. The present action, however, is not brought under labor laws in effect, but under Art.1905. Disposition Judgment AFFIRMED.

- This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal. Loreto Afialda was the caretaker of the carabaos of spouses Hisole. While tending the animals, he was ―gored by one of them and later died as consequence of his injuries.‖ The action was filed by the sister of Loreto, and contended that the mishap was due neither to Loreto‘s own fault nor to force majeure. - She uses Art.1905, CC (now Art.21835) as ground for the liability: ―The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. ―This liability shall cease only in case the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it.‖ - Spouses moved for dismissal for lack of cause of action, which the CFI granted. Hence, the appeal. ISSUE WON the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is caused to its caretaker (as opposed to a stranger) HELD 1. NO Ratio It was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. Reasoning - The lower court took the view that under the abovequoted provision of the CC, the owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable of fault under article 1902 only if he had been negligent or at the same code. - Claiming that the lower court was in error, plaintiff contends that art. 1905 does not distinguish between damage caused to a stranger and damage caused to the caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or not he has been negligent or at fault. - The distinction (between stranger and caretaker) is important. For the statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for ―any damages it may cause‖ and this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage. - In the present case, the animal was in the custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. - On the other hand, if action is to be based on Art. 1902, it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of the animal that caused the damage. But the complaint contains no allegation on those points.

ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY V CA (LUIS ET AL) 179 SCRA 5 PARAS; November 6, 1989
FACTS - 5- 6AM June 29, 1967 - strong typhoon "Gening" in Ilocos Norte brought floods and heavy rain. Isabel Lao Juan, (Nana Belen) went to her store, Five Sisters Emporium, to look after the merchandise to see if they were damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood, Juan suddenly screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. Her companions, two girls (sales girlls) attempted to help, but were afraid because they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Yabes, the son-in law, upon hearing the electrocution of his mother-in-law, passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current. The body was recovered about two meters from an electric post. - 4AM June 29, 1967- Engineer Juan, Power Plant Engineer of NPC at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. - 6-6:30AM June 29, 1967- he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection and saw grounded and disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. When he went to INELCO office, he could not see any INELCO lineman. - Engr. Juan attempted to resuscitate Nana Belen but his efforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was setting in. On the left palm of the deceased, there was a hollow wound. In the afternoon, the dangling wire was no longer there. - Dr. Castro examined the body and noted that the skin was grayish or cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor found an "electrically charged wound" or a first degree burn. About the base of the thumb on the left hand was a burned wound. The cause of' death was ,'circulatory shock electrocution" - In defense and exculpation, INELCO presented the testimonies of its officers and employees, which sought to prove that (1) on and even before June 29, 1967 the electric service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area did not suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life and property. (2) The service lines and devices had been newly-installed prior to the date in question. (3) Also, safety devices were installed to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others. (4) 12 linesmen are charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the areas respectively assigned to them. (5) They also presented own medical expert and said that cyanosis could not have been the noted 3 hours after the death because it is only manifest in live persons. (6) Lastly, the deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to INELCO because of the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latter with electric current

AFIALDA V HISOLE 85 Phil 67 REYES; November 29, 1949
NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI Iloilo FACTS

Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
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whenever the switch is on. The switch must have been left on, hence, causing the deceased's electrocution when she tried to open her gate that early morning of June 29, 1967 - CFI: awarded P25,000 moral damages; P45,000 attys fees - CA: P30,229.45 in actual damages (i.e., P12,000 for the victim's death and P18,229.45 for funeral expenses); P50,000 in compensatory damages, computed in accordance with the formula set in the Villa-Rey Transit case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of P15,000 as average annual income of the deceased; P10,000 in exemplary damages; P3,000 attorney's fees ISSUE WON the legal principle of "assumption of risk" bars private respondents from collecting damages from INELCO HELD NO Ratio The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by the salesgirls, the deceased went to the Five Star Emporium "to see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril, or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to INELCO‘s consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by INELCO‘s negligence Reasoning - INELCO can be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place. - In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City on the night of June 28 until the early hours of June 29, 1967, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not show that defendant did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor even manning its office. - INELCO was negligent in seeing that no harm is done to the general public"... considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be" The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the

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- It was shown in this case that Pesi Cola did not merely satisfy itself that Bonifacio possessed a driver‘s license. A background check was done and he was required to submit various clearances, previous experience, and medical records. He was also made to undergo both theoretical and practical driving tests prior to being hired as driver. In terms of the aspect of supervision, the petitioners raised no questions. Given this, the proof called for under Article 2180 to show diligence of a good father of a family has been met. Disposition Decision of the CA is affirmed.

defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission" Disposition CA decision, except for the slight modification that actual damages be increased to P48,229.45, is AFFIRMED.

RAMOS V PEPSI COLA 19 SCRA 289 1967
NATURE Appeal from a CA decision FACTS - The facts with regard the accident that Andres Bonifacio caused is not in the case. The Court limited its ruling on the decision of the CA to absolve defendant Pepsi Cola from liability under Article 2180 6 of the Civil Code. There was, however, a finding that Bonifacio was in fact negligent. - The petiton for appeal questioned the testimony of one Anasco with regard the process and procedures followed by Pepsi in the hiring and supervision of its drivers. The SC ruled that the issue brought before it with regard the credibility of Anasco is one of fact and not of law. It went on to stay that the CA is a better judge of the facts. ISSUE WON Pepsi Cola is liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability HELD NO - The Court ruled that based on the evidence and testimonies presented during the trial, Pepsi Cola exercised the due diligence of a good father in the hiring and supervision of its drivers. This being the case, the Company is relieved of any responsibility from the accident. Reasoning - In its ruling, the court citing its ruling on Bahia as follows: ― From this article (2180) two things are apparent: (1) that when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arise a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the employer or master either n the selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over him after the selection, or both, and (2) that they presumption is juris tantum ( so much or so little of law) and not juris et de jure (of law and from law), and consequently may be rebutted . - It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible, … Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. … The responsibility treated of this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
6

METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP V CA (CUSTODIA) 223 SCRA 521 REGALADO; June 21, 1993
FACTS - At about six o'clock in the morning of August 28, 1979, plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio boarded as a paying passenger a public utility jeepney, then driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his co-defendant Victorino Lamayo, bound for her work, where she then worked as a machine operator earning P16.25 a day. - While the jeepney was travelling at a fast clip along DBP Avenue, Bicutan, Taguig, another fast moving vehicle, a Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC) bus driven by defendant Godofredo C. Leonardo was negotiating Honeydew Road, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila bound for its terminal at Bicutan. - As both vehicles approached the intersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road they failed to slow down and slacken their speed; neither did they blow their horns to warn approaching vehicles. As a consequence, a collision between them occurred, the passenger jeepney ramming the left side portion of the MMTC bus. The collision impact caused plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio to hit the front windshield of the passenger jeepney and (she) was thrown out therefrom, falling onto the pavement unconscious with serious physical injuries. - She was brought to the Medical City Hospital where she regained consciousness only after one (1) week. Thereat, she was confined for twentyfour (24) days, and as a consequence, she was unable to work for three and one half months (31/2). - A complaint for damages was filed by herein private respondent, who being then a minor was assisted by her parents, against all of therein named defendants following their refusal to pay the expenses incurred by the former as a result of the collision. - Said defendants denied all the material allegations in the complaint and pointed an accusing finger at each other as being the party at fault. Further, herein petitioner MMTC, a government-owned corporation and one of the defendants in the court a quo, along with its driver, Godofredo Leonardo, contrarily averred in its answer with cross-claim and counterclaim that the MMTC bus was driven in a prudent and careful manner by driver Leonardo and that it was the passenger jeepney which was driven recklessly considering that it hit the left middle portion of the MMTC bus, and that it was defendant Lamayo, the owner of the jeepney and employer of driver Calebag, who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees and should thus be held solidarily liable for damages caused to the MMTC bus through the fault and negligence of its employees. - Defendant Victorino Lamayo alleged that the damages suffered by therein plaintiff should be borne by defendants MMTC and its driver, Godofredo Leonardo, because the latter's negligence was the sole and proximate cause

Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a family has been observed by petitioner is a matter of proof which under the circumstances in the case at bar has not been clearly established. as employer. of the Civil Code provisions on quasi-delicts as all the elements thereof are present. . When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties. prove that driver Leonardo had complied with all the hiring and clearance requirements and had undergone all trainings. the Complaint filed on May 30. the M/V Asia Philippines owned byTrans-Asia Shipping Lines. both of whom naturally and expectedly testified for MMTC.In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible. In any event. whether plaintiff or defendant. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen. 2. ISSUE WON a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by presciption HELD YES . Jr.. . we do not find the evidence presented by petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the diligence of a good father of a family. tests and examinations preparatory to actual employment.e. namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created. But. and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff . to hold the employer liable. 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period. petitioner MMTC must suffer the consequences of its own inaction and indifference. to hold sway. the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years.Due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. . 1976 when the maritime collision took place. may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. inasmuch as the witnesses' testimonies dwelt on mere generalities. it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place. which for an employer doctrinally translates into its observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees but which mandate. to wit: (1) damages suffered by the plaintiff. and not as a matter of right. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago.With the allegation and subsequent proof of negligence against the defendant driver and of an employer-employee relation between him and his co-defendant MMTC in this instance. we cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final. Article 2211 of the Civil Code provides that in quasi-delicts. there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent. and that accordingly. . from April 8. and (3) the connection of cause and effect between fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by plaintiff. . . .Finally. or even subject evidence for that matter. that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. it is paramount that the best and most complete evidence be formally entered. we believe that respondent court acted in the exercise of sound discretion when it affirmed the trial court's award. WON the oral testimonies of witnesses even without the presentation documentary evidence. The Kramers instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City. Sarabia. provided only that the same shall measure up to the quantum of evidence required by law. 1982. and that said positive testimonies spell out the rigid procedure for screening of job applicants and the supervision of its employees in the field 2. Employer is liable for torts committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned tasks. it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. the basis of the liability being the relationship of pater familias or on the employer's own negligence. (2) fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond. It is only then that the defendant.40 - prof. It is to be noted that petitioner was originally sued as employer of driver Leonardo under Article 2180. as its training officer. i. Once this is done. As a consequence of the collision. the action being based on a quasi-delict. the employer is likewise responsible for damages. . which consists of 3 elements. rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.It is procedurally required for each party in a case to prove his own affirmative assertion by the degree of evidence required by law. taking with it its fish catch. and that the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said date. . assuming the putative existence thereof.The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was due to the negligence of the employees of Trans-Asia. interest as a part of the damages may be awarded in the discretion of the court. that is.Under A1146 CC.torts & damages of the accident and that MMTC failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. It is not felt by the Court that there is enough evidence on record as would overturn the presumption of negligence. He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code. an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years.Article 2180 applicable only where there is an employer-employee relationship. the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. Philippine Veterans Administration. the plaintiff must show.The F/B Marjolea. especially since private respondent did not specifically pray therefor in her complaint.. WON petitioner exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees HELD 1. In making proof in its or his case. it is necessary first to establish the employment relationship. although it is not necessary that the employer be engaged in business or industry. through the testimonies of Milagros Garbo. and for failure to submit all evidence within its control. Trans-Asia filed a motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription. A2010 .The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of Article 2176 and 2177. 1989 FACTS . . ISSUES 1. as its transport supervisor. to use an oft-quoted phrase. to present all available evidence at its or his disposal in the manner which may be deemed necessary and beneficial to prove its or his position. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasidelict is committed. the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel. the . While there is no rule which requires that testimonial evidence. The diligence of a good father of a family required to be observed by employers to prevent damages under Article 2180 refers to due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees in order to protect the public. must be corroborated by documentary evidence. b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right.Their statements strike us as both presumptuous and in the nature of petitio principii. the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. object or documentary. the F/B Marjolea sank. in relation to Article 2180. who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting at the trial such amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable judgment.that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with special skill. . It is entirely within each of the parties discretion. this Court held: The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action. From the foregoing ruling. . couched in generalities and shorn of any supporting evidence to boost their verity. this Court ruled that in an action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks. without requiring the payment of interest thereon as an item of damages just because of delay in the determination thereof. Petitioner’s claim: . October 13. consonant with the theory of the case it or he seeks to advance and subject to such procedural strategy followed thereby. which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony. a fishing boat owned by Ernesto Kramer. was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila.Petitioner's attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence. Chairman.. and Marta Kramer. and Christian Bautista.In Espanol vs. For failure to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of employees.Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the company's procedure for screening job applicants and supervising its employees in the field. In Paulan vs. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. Inc. . The party. the case in undoubtedly based on a quasi-delict under Article 2180.that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29. casis KRAMER VS CA (TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES) 178 SCRA 289 GANCAYCO. training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve . is more often honored in the breach than in the observance.

It is contended that while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17. rendered a decision nullifying the RTC order. they are seeking.Mar 25. merely causing him physical injuries. Bataclan.The first instance is allowable and should be allowed if it will help in clarifying in a single proceeding the multifarious issues involved arising from a single transaction. petitioner maintains that the claim should have been filed at the latest on March 25. although arising out of another or different contract or transaction. While the bus was running very fast on a highway. which is the time when the cause of action arises. casis defendant may assert any defense which the third-party plaintiff has.torts & damages time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff. driven by Saylon. not for his death. the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. Disposition petition is GRANTED. may be brought into the case with leave of court.Juan Bataclan rode Bus No.1987. While these allegations in the proposed third-party complaint may cause delay in the disposition of the main suit. it cannot be outrightly asserted that it would not serve any purpose. . 1977 . The RTC judge was found to be in grave abuse of discretion and was ordered to admit the third-party complaint. It was followed by another resolution ordering the liquidation of GENBANK.Second and current proceeding (1987) – Yujuico filed a motion to admit Ammended/Supplemental Answer and a Third Party Complaint to impead the Central Bank and Aurellano as third-party defendants. This decision declared as null and void the liquidation of GENBANK. The complaint for damages was filed in court only on May 30. Thus. (Español vs. October 13. WON the cause of action under the third-party complaint prescribed HELD 1. shortly after midnight. and so damages were awarded. There is merit in private respondent's position that if held liable on the promissory note. "If through some event. subrogation or any other relief.March 25. 1977 – the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued a resolution forbidding GENBANK from doing business in the Phil. . the action has prescribed. and the passenger is burned to death. The decision of CA denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner are hereby reversed and set aside and declared null and void.The action for damages instituted by private respondent arising from the quasidelict or alleged "tortious interference" should be filed within four 4 years from the day the cause of action accrued. . was still alive. to transfer unto the third-party defendants liability on the note by reason of the illegal liquidation of GENBANK which was the basis for the assignment of the promissory note. including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it. . is connected with the plaintiffs claim. or (c) whether the third-party CAUSATION BATACLAN V MEDINA 102 PHIL 181 MONTEMAYOR. .. perhaps serious. Domingo D.It is from the date of the act or omission violative of the right of a party when the cause of action arises and it is from this date that the prescriptive period must be reckoned. Being founded on what was termed as "tortious interference. or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire. Both parties filed for motions of partial reconsideration. On the theory that the cause of action accrued on March 25. Ten men came to help. by means of the third-party complaint. it must be deemed to have been instituted on February 7. RTC Judge Mintu denied the third-party complaint but admitted the amended/supplemental answer. by lightning. it was the claim of third-party plaintiff for other damages in addition to any amount which he may be called upon to pay under the original complaint. Yujuico vs.First case: CA affirmed RTC decision in a special proceeding finding that the liquidation of GENBANK was made in bad faith. Private respondent issued a promissory note in favor of GENBANK. 1987.1986 when the decision in CA (first case)became final and executory. It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of 2 vessels the 4 year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. indemnity. 7 that by reason of the tortuous interference by the CB with the affairs of GENBANK. . October 22. 1980 when the Monetary Board ordered the GENBANK to desist from doing business in the Philippines while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17. say. . 2. the overturned bus is set on fire. 1976. private respondent relies on the "Doctrine of Relations" or "Relations Back Doctrine" to support his claim that the cause of action as against the proposed third-party defendant accrued only on December 12. . . WON there was ground to admit the third-party complaint 2. It was then that Yujuico filed the third party complaint to transfer liability for the default imputed against him by the petitioner to the proposed third-party7 defendants because of their tortious acts which prevented him from performing his obligations.Yujuico failed to comply with his obligation prompting Allied to file a complaint for the collection of a sum of money before the CFI Manila (now RTC). or may have against plaintiffs claim. but for the physical injuries suffered by him. and another judgment is hereby rendered sustaining the orders of the RTC denying the admission of the third party complaint ALLIED BANKING V CA (YUJUICO) 178 SCRA 526 GANCAYCO. burning the four passengers trapped inside. one of the front tires burst. On the other hand. Philippine Veterans Admistration) . . that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. The complaint alleged A third-party complaint is a procedural device whereby a "third-party" who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff. 1977. Hon.Respondent Yujuico. unexpected and extraordinary. The third party complaint is independent of. separate and distinct from the plaintiff‘s complaint. by the defendant. A2010 .While the third party complaint in this case may be admitted as above discussed.In the Memorandum of Agreement between Allied Banking Corp (Allied) and Amulfo Aurellano as liquidator of GENBANK. can be accommodated under tests (a) and (b) abovementioned.The judgment of the CA in its first decision is the substantive basis of private respondent's proposed third-party complaint. 30 of the Medina Transportation.41 - prof.CA. . private respondent herein. The third party complaint should not be admitted. a fierce fire started. The collision occurred on April 8. since the cause of action accrued on March 25. Disposition petition is dismissed. 1989 NATURE Petition seeking the reversal of the decision of CA in "Joselito Z.The tests to determine whether the claim for indemnity in a third-party claim is "in respect of plaintiff 's claim" are: (a) whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiff's claim is based. though he must have suffered physical injuries. If there was any confusion at all on the ground/s alleged in the third-party complaint. but rather.Petitioner claims that the cause of action alleged in the third-party complaint has already prescribed. including the receivable due from Yujuico. was beyond the 4 year prescriptive period. one might still contend that the proximate . who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a right for contribution. a ranking officer in General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) and a member of the family owning control of the said bank. 1 985. when a passenger bus overturns. The bus fell into a canal and turned turtle. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry. One of them carried a torch and when he approached the bus. Allied acquired all the assets and assumed the liabilityies of GENBANK. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners.The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus. which were both denied."1 and the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said decision. or whether the third-party's claim. and pins down a passenger. RTC Judge of Manila and Allied Banking Corp. ISSUES What is the proximate cause of death of the four passengers? HELD The proximate cause of death is the overturning of the bus. 1957 FACTS . that at the time the fire started. YES .see definition of proximate cause under A1 . obtained a loan from the said institution in the amount of 500K. The case was re-raffled where presiding Judge Panis reiterated the order made by Judge Mintu. Chairman. Four passengers could not get out. although the third-party defendant's liability arises out of another transaction. It appeared that gasoline began to leak from the overturned bus. YES . ISSUE 1. consequently. (b) whether the third-party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant. he was prevented from performing his obligation such that he should not be held liable thereon. agents or personnel of the other vessel.It may be that ordinarily. the fire that burned the bus. including Bataclan. Panis. the date when the Monetary Board ordered GENBANK to desist from doing business in the Philippines. FACTS . 1979 when the complaint in the case was filed. ." petitioner asserts that under the CC on quasi-delict" the action against third-party defendants should have been filed within four (4) years from the date the cause of action accrued. in respect of the plaintiffs claim. in a petition for certiorari questioning the denied motions. (Capayas v CFI Albay) The claim of third-party plaintiff. 1981.

On November 15.Both parties filed their separate MFRs. May 8." ." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom.The then IAC affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal. 1980. . made not only by the passengers. In fact. the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was. But in the present case and under the circumstances obtaining in the same. The only indication that the tank was full was when water began to leak. . Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm.A toxic gas leakage could only have happened by opening the tank‘s cover. the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.Petitioners in fussing over the lack of ventilation in the tanks backfired as their witnesses were no experts. . pero mukhang kinasuhan ni Sofia Fernando yung Davao City for negligence in a previous case dahil namatay yung asawa nya . 1980. granting the families of the deceased men P30k each in compensatory damages. January 7. Upon learning from the market master about the need to clean said tank.. casis victims would not have died.torts & damages cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. 2. and that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November. They find it illogical that the septic tank which had been around since the 50‘s would be the proximate cause of an accident which occurred only 20 years later. . if not for the overturning of the bus… then the leak and the fire wouldn‘t have happened) A2010 . the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected. the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier. by the driver and the conductor themselves. which was the 22nd day after the incident. which was won by Bascon. Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. they had to use a torch. WON Davao City is guilty of negligence 2. petitioners appealed to then IAC (now CA) which set aside the judgment and rendered a new one. there was nothing to supervise. . Neither did they present competent evidence to corroborate their testimonies and rebut the city government engineer Alindada‘s testimony that safety requirements for the tank had been complied with. A test for such a relationship is given in Taylor v Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. . NO . the CA rendered an amended decision granting Davao City‘s MFR.The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended . P20k each as moral damages and P10k for attorney‘s fees. He states that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence. . specially over a large area. this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on 'Its side but completely on its back. one must prove under Art 2179 of the NCC that the defendant‘s negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. The accident is thus of the victims‘ own doing—an ordinarily prudent person should be aware of the attended risks of cleaning out the tank. and without which the result would not have occurred. What is more. found that the men entered without clearance or consent of the market master. 1980. ISSUE WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death HELD YES. and all those people have remained unscathed which is ironically evidenced by the petitioner‘s witnesses. the coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus.42 - prof. market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property for the re-emptying of the septic tank of Agdao. especially since no other deaths or injuries related to the tank had ever occurred. and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available. before the date they were to work. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. without which there could have been no accident. and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help. Also. .The trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. The victims‘ failure to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident.Proximate cause is defined as that cause which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. but contributing to his own proper hurt. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury. 1981. Bertulano. the rescuers had to carry a light with them. we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus. Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City.The record is clear that .The Court also does not agree with petitioner‘s contention that warning signs of noxious gas should be placed around the area of the toilets and septic tank. As a result of which. Work on the tank was still forthcoming since the awarding to the winning bidder was yet to be made by the Committee on Awards—hence. can be smelt and detected -even from a distance. Public respondent lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation. They apparently did the re-emptying as the tank was nearly empty. produces the injury. This was especially true for the victim. the most handy and available. but most probably. between the event itself. In other words. they are not nuisances per se which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public. and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning).Appellant alleges that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed. *Di nakalagay sa case. Marcelo Javier was hacked by the Filomeno Urbano using a bolo. the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. 23. WON such negligence is the proximate cause of the deaths of the victims HELD 1.When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill. and even then no reports of casualties from gas poising emerged. Bertulano. However.Upon dismissal of the case by the TC. When admitted to the hospital. and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal FERNANDO V CA (City of Davao) 208 SCRA 714 MEDIALDEA.Although public respondent had been remiss in its duty to re-empty the tank annually (for almost 20 years). Dr. and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs. he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill required in what he attempts to do. As the CA observed. 1992 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . through its driver and its conductor. since he was an old hand to septic services and is expected to know the hazards of the job. As defined in Art 694 of the NCC. one of the bidders. Hence this petition. The autopsy showed that the victims died of asphyxia caused by lack of oxygen supply in the body. Their lungs had burst due to their intake of toxic sulfide gas produced from the waste matter in said tank. The lower courts held that Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. such negligence was not a continuing one. ISSUES 1.Bibiano Morta. Invitations to bid for cleaning out the tanks were issued. and those acts of the victim not entering into it. had they not opened the tank which they were not authorized to open in the first place. 1988 NATURE Petition to review the decision of the then IAC FACTS ON oct. They. Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition. The evidence merely confirms that the wound.In an information. Javier died in the hospital. To be entitled to damages. NO .Petitioner‘s contention that the market master should have been supervising the area of the tank is also untenable. On November 14. that Dr. and four other companions including an Alberto Fernando were found dead inside the septic tank. or at least. dismissing the case. According to the witnesses. the URBANO V IAC 157 SCRA 1 GUTIERREZ JR. upon investigation. which states that a distinction must be made between the accident and the injury. independent of it. -(I guess this case says. . the public toilet connected to it was used several times daily all those years. public respondent‘s failure to empty the tank had not caused any sanitary accidents despite its proximity to several homes and the public market as it was covered in lead and was air-tight.The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound.. gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. . Disposition amended decision of the CA is AFFIRMED . . The City Engineer‘s office. He was sentenced accordingly. this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled. it immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service.

There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck. Makati (not far from his home) . the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness. a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. and without which the result would not have occurred. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted." and that consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel b. 1980. casis and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street without headlights when he hit a dump truck owned by Phoenix Construction Inc. as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person. unrelated. for failure to take necessary precautions. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. however.In the case at bar. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition. somehow got infected with tetanus However. while under the influence of liquor. however. WON Phoenix has successfully proven that they exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver 7. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death. . severe trismus. he suffered the symptoms of tetanus. the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. MARCH 10. WON Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident. but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. awarded damages in favor of Dionisio IAC: in favor of Dionisio. However. or less. trismus is marked. 1980. Leonardo Dionisio (DIONISIO) was driving home (he lived in Bangkal. he died. The dump truck was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the street. and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent. As more muscles are involved. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant. died on the second day from the onset time. and headache are encountered occasionally. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection. efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. He had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Sts. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct. . its regular driver. only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. ranges from 2 to 56 days.43 - prof.Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom. In the vast majority. The medical findings. WON Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact with the dump truck 4. WON the driver‘s negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause. Carbonel (CARBONEL). but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw. without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Consequently. and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. (CARBONEL) VS. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time. over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. i. trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. WON the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked a. therefore.A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible. most muscles are involved to some degree. IAC (DIONISIO) 148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. A short incubation period indicates severe disease. In a small proportion of patients. it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. or back and difficulty swallowing. as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record. reduced the damages awarded ISSUES Factual issues: (court discussed this to administer substantial justice without remanding the case to the lower court – since both TC and IAC did not consider defenses set by petitioners) 1. that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening. WON Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the dump truck. This incident took place on October 23. Therefore. partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. rigidity becomes generalized. with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. distinct and foreign to the crime. successive. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause DISPOSITION :. minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency. 1983 Edition. Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. either immediately or by setting other events in motion. which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists. like lockjaw and muscle spasms. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause.Therefore. should hold Dionisio alone responsible for his accident 6. irritability. At Bangkal. which.e. 1004-1005. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. As the disease progresses. based on the ―last clear chance‖ doctrine. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. As in the case of the incubation period. 1980. natural. TC: in favor of Dionisio. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. the onset time should have been more than six days. . in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning. and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. generalized convulsive spasms. WON the amount of damages awarded should be modified HELD FACTUAL . dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present. the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time. or on November 14. Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Makati) from cocktails/dinner meeting with his boss where he had taken ―a shot or two‖ of liquor. medically speaking. INC. the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease. After 22 days. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION. in natural and continuous sequence. stiffness gives way to rigidity. Emphasis supplied) . As the progresses. a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. WON the court. A2010 . . therefore. pp. dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged. and an onset time of 72 hrs. Javier. 3.Doubts are present... the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms. an interval referred to as the onset time. lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. (PHOENIX). however. but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery. DIONISIO suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars. November 15. As a result of the collision. such condition was not the proximate cause.The incubation period of tetanus. Trismus is usually present.torts & damages ailment. The following day. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine. The infection was. . In fact." . DIONISIO claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.PROXIMATE CAUSE "that cause. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death."And more comprehensively. front or rear. 1987 NATURE Petition for review FACTS -About 1:30 am. if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct. Substantial Issues: 5. If. DIONISIO‘s claim: the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix PHOENIX + CARBONEL‘s claim: the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident. and efficient cause of the injury. with the permission of his employer PHOENIX. abdomen. produces the injury. which was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (DIONISIO‘s lane). WON private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful night 2.

it is difficult to see what role.000. has itself been rejected. in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result. the defendant will not escape responsibility. a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car. and not the result of reflective thought. usual and customary wind arising later will spread it beyond the defendant's own property. the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff. that one who leaves an obstruction on the road or a railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it. Clearly. -The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions. particularly since. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. at the crucial moment. x x x. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions. the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. He was not able to produce any curfew pass during the trial. only the balance of 800% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarily liable therefor to the former. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut. . NO. Costs against the petitioners. YES.44 - prof. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. PROSSER AND KEETON: "Cause and condition. because of failure to guard against it.00 as exemplary damages and P4. Dionisio's negligence. -Dionisio claimed that he was traveling at 30kph and had just crossed the intersection of General Santos and General Lacuna Streets and had started to accelerate when his headlights failed just before the collision took place. the defendant may be negligent. the certification did not specify any serial number or date or period of effectivity of the supposed curfew pass.500. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated. but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause. 7. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. x x x In all of these cases there is an intervening cause combining with the defendant's conduct to produce the result and in each case the defendant's negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk. the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident. 4. and therefore to take precautions to prevent that event. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent. "One shot or two" of hard liquor may affect different people differently. even though the car is negligently driven. 3. EVIDENCE PRESENTED: Patrolman Cuyno attested that Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken to Makati med + Dionisio admitted he had taken ―a shot or two‖ . and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created. But even in such cases. NO." "Foreseeable Intervening Causes. was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. rather than reflective. or to what extent.. Disposition. among other reasons. (It is important to determine if he had a curfew pass to shed light to the 2nd and 3rd factual issues) -Testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who had taken DIONISIO to Makati Med testified that none was found with Dionisio. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible. NO." that the "immediate and A2010 . if any. Ratio. and therefore to be anticipated. 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump track was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. except the award of P10. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. Besides. -BUT: an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous. 2. shall be home by private respondent Dionisio. YES. As to the other awards of damages. it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be home exclusively by the petitioners. He also asserts that Patrolman Cuyno‘s testimony was hearsay and did not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule since the facts he testified to were not acquired by him through official information and had not been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so. the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark. although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident. FROM PROF. as it could not. and hence of the defendant's negligence. Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate the usual weather of the vicinity. even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. casis defendant to protect the plaintiff against 'that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life. reactions from observers who happened to be around at that time. The person who leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of fire from some independent source. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition. Taking into account the comparative negligence ot DIONISIO and the petitioners. Testimony of Patrolman Cuyno attesting that people gathered at the scene of the accident told him that Dionisio‘s Car was MOVING FAST and that he DID NOT have its HEADLIGTS ON. this argument had no validity under our jurisdiction and even in the United States. substantial weight should have been ascribed to such testimony. NO. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether. to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it . sustain. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not under the official records exception to the hearsay rule but rather as part of the res gestae. these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off. . Although Dionisio offered a certification attesting that he did have a valid curfew pass. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned. SO ORDERED. the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages. but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited So far as it has any validity at all. is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix. 6. it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important." but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. Testimonial evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule consists of excited utterances made on the occasion of an occurrence or event sufficiently startling in nature so as to render inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the observer and hence made as a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event. Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk. one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward. the defendant is said not to be liable. or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances.not enough evidence to show how much liquor Dionisio had in fact taken and the effects of that upon his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. WHEREFORE. loss of expected income and moral damages private respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount. as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.' Thus. as is invariably the case the latter am the result of other active forces which have gone before.the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause.00 as attorney's fees and costs. even though it did not. the distinctions between" cause" and "condition" have already been "almost entirely discredited. it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety. when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly. none was found with Dionisio. and some new force intervenes. including all ordinary forces of nature such as usual wind or rain. YES. Phoenix‘s theory more credible than Dionisio‘s. The petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. When a spark ignites the gasoline. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and should have been considered by the trial court. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its track driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning. Private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory.torts & damages 1. The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others. nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE: The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule-that of contributory negligence. or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason Thus one who sets a fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary." proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts a. have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at which Dionisio was travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck. YES. or snow or frost or fog or even lightning. NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE ANYTHING. as it were. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the original risk. although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck PHOENIX‘s CLAIM: Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection (less than 200m away). SUBSTANTIAL 5. x x x [T]he standard of reasonable conduct may require the b. DIONISIO‘S CLAIM: he had his headlights on but that.

The payee then demanded a cash payment of the check‘s face value which REYES did if only to save his name. No. while driving the said vehicle.. Jr.‖ as provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code Thus. If indeed signs were placed thereat. none was ever presented to stress the point that sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed. casis -The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that petitioners‘ negligence was the proximate cause of the accident bars us from supplanting their findings and substituting these with our own. . It is evident from the records that they brought up for the first time in their Motion for Reconsideration. produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury complained of or some similar injury. WON exemplary damages and attorney‘s fees are recoverable HELD 1. Jr. cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of.PILIPINAS BANK‘S Current Account Bookkeeper made an error in depositing the amount: he thought it was for a certain FLORENCIO AMADOR. -In short. having violated a traffic regulation. sustained physical injuries. a court must be satisfied with proof of the following requisites: (1) an injury--whether physical.00 as exemplary damages. gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade. Provinces. 2005 NATURE Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS -On February 28. policy and precedent. petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr. the Complaint alleged that respondent‘s son Fulgencio Jr. -Fulgencio P. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. owner of ‘87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan. Art. -―The provisions of Article 2189 9 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same.43." Reasoning The proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the name of another depositor who had a similar first name. was driving at the speed of 60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he met the accident. filed a Complaint for damages against Quezon City and Engr. CA: modified amount to just P50T moral damages and P25T attorney‘s fees and costs of suit. P10. it was dishonored and the payee was advised to try it for next clearing. Jr. This speed was allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on ―city streets with light traffic.4T due Oct. yielded negative results. July 25. mental.000. which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. Dacara. . and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219.12. But if his negligence was only contributory.On Oct.45 - prof. Definition of Proximate Cause: "any cause which. rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St. 1994 NATURE .11. posted the deposit in the latter's account not noticing that the depositor's surname in the deposit slip was REYES. how then could it be explained that according to the report even of the policeman.torts & damages PILIPINAS BANK V CA (REYES) 234 SCRA 435 PUNO. as well as costs of suit. which however. would result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence. (2) a culpable act or omission factually established. P100T moral damages.For it to apply.The bank employee is deemed to have failed to exercise the degree of care required in the performance of his duties. 1988 at about 1:00 A. when his car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an adequate warning to motorists especially during the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive.21798 of NCC is applicable HELD NO . provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries.M. such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident. That was only when they noticed the error. JUNE 15.078. he requested PCIB Money Shop's manager to effect the withdrawal of P32T from his savings account and have it deposited with his current account with PILIPINAS BANK.000. it must be established that private respondent's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury.. -In the present case. upon a combined consideration of logic. or psychological-clearly sustained by the claimant. and due process. 2. No adequate reason has been given to overturn this factual conclusion. Ramir Tiamzon. common sense. streets. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. thus. which are amply substantiated by the evidence on record. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth. the Oct. QUEZON CITY V DACARA PANGANIBAN. CA agreed with the RTC‘s finding that petitioners‘ negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case. -Defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident but alleged that the subject diggings was provided with a mound of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it which was visible during the incident. To consider their belatedly raised arguments at this stage of the proceedings would trample on the basic principles of fair play. -As a result. 1988 which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara. he cannot recover damages. the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care. none was found at the scene of the accident. Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs. clearly point to petitioners‘ negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by respondent‘s car. Dispositive Petition denied. -Upon appeal. -To award moral damages. P10. or injuries suffered by. RTC: ordered petitioner to pay P200T compensatory damages. 8 .It was redeposited but was again dishonored. He. -It is too late in the day for them to raise this new issue. WON moral damages are recoverable 3.Furious. public buildings. 9 . and that the reason why Fulgencio Dacara. .000.10 check in favor of WINNER INDUSTRIAL was presented for payment.00 as moral damages. any person by reason of the defective condition of roads. Fulgencio Dacara. this Petition ISSUES 1. WON petitioner‘s negligence is the proximate cause of the incident 2. -RTC ruled in favor of Dacara..10. ordering the defendants to indemnify the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand pesos as actual/compensatory damages. in natural and continuous sequence. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision is tantamount to negligence which renders the City government liable -Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr.To cover the face value of the checks.. in amount of P21T due Oct. P5. the plaintiff may recover damages. however. Yes. . . -Hence. 1979 and for Vicente TUI in amount of P11. There can be no recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in physical injury. absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment by the lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked any basis for their conclusions. Quezon City. P25T attorney‘s fees. -These matters were. Since the ledger of Florencio REYES indicated that his account had only a balance of P4. but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (3) a wrongful act or omission of the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant. for and in behalf of his minor son. . Jr. 2179. -What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is a factual issue that this Court cannot pass upon.Petition for review of CA decision FACTS .12 check. fell into the diggings was precisely because of the latter‘s negligence and failure to exercise due care. not raised by petitioners at any time during the trial. justice. and other public works under their control or supervision. he immediately proceeded to the bank and urged an immediate verification of his account. should be presumed negligent pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code. A2010 . Dacara. both the trial and the appellate courts‘ findings. These are for WINNER INDUSTRIAL CORP. The same thing happened to the Oct. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. -Indemnification was sought from the city government. -Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for quasidelicts. bridges. -Indeed. -That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the accident was aptly discussed in the lower court‘s finding: ―Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February 28. -Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence.00 as attorney‘s fees and other costs of suit.FLORENCIO REYES issued two postdated checks. ISSUE WON Art.

Urbano then Art. This action was brought by Consolacion Gabeto. 4. exemplary damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with gross negligence.Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs. A2010 . and Fermin Gayetano. supposedly caused by the wrongful act of the defendant Agaton Araneta. distinct and foreign to the crime. wounded feelings. The award of moral damages must be solidly anchored on a definite showing that respondent actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings. The driver. after alighting. led the horse over to the curb. The horse was then pulled over to near the curb. The infection was. The negligence must amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property. stepped out into the street. Meanwhile one of the passengers. 3. in her own right as widow of Proceso Gayetano. -The facts of the case show a complete disregard by petitioners of any adverse consequence of their failure to install even a single warning device at the area under renovation. the said Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig. mental anguish. and lately. Conchita Gayetano. Urbano hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand . either immediately or or seen the call of Araneta. 1980 Javier died in the hospital. pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence. and Julio. -In Vda. upon which the box came down with a crash and frightened the horse to such an extent that he set out at full speed up the street. in natural and continuous sequence. moral shock. when the horse. temperate or compensatory damages. fright. Owing. and similar injury unjustly inflicted on a person. The evidence merely confirms that the wound.1980. Judge awarded damages to the widow to which decision Araneta appealed. as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record. mental anguish. in order to fix the bridle. The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. Dr. casis got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. somehow got infected with tetanus However. cited by plaintiffsappellants in their brief. Yes. and that they must have nevertheless been indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury to the person or property of others. When the driver of the carromata had turned his horse and started in the direction indicated. and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off. became disturbed and moved forward. Agaton Araneta. however. Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. therefore. Proceso Gayetano. respondent sufficiently proved before the courts a quo that petitioners‘ negligence was the proximate cause of the incident. the defendant. the bit came out of the horse's mouth. -Moral damages are not punitive in nature. to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it was made. replied to the effect that he had not heard URBANO V IAC (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES) 157 SCRA 1 GUTIERREZ. Rosita Gayetano. to wit. started to go away. social humiliation. v.‘s bare assertion of physical injury. fright. but the other. 1921 Street Facts: Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata near Plaza Gay. or similar injury. 1181). at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called this carromata first. The award of these damages is meant to be a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. and after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street to a point in front of the Mission Hospital. in doing which he pulled one of the wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed Julio Pagnaya over. -Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.46 - prof. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo. that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom 10 . On November 15. Reasoning: -The case involves the application of Article 410 of the Revised Penal Code. by one or the other — it makes no difference which — and Pagnaya tried to fix the bridle. in the City of Iloilo. -Gross negligence means such utter want of care as to raise a presumption that the persons at fault must have been conscious of the probable consequences of their carelessness. -Well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be awarded in the absence of proof of physical suffering. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral damages based on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code. 1980 . After going a few yards further the side of the carromata struck a police telephone box which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk. He has adduced adequate proof to justify his claim for the damages caused his car. and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died. for the purpose of recovering damages incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the death of the said Proceso Gayetano. the horse. we adopted the following definition of proximate cause: "x x x A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38. had unfortunately retained his seat. and it became necessary for the driver to get out. While he was thus engaged. GABETO V. -Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. and laying his hands on the reins. one Julio Pagnaya. -The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. and proceeded to fix the bridle. Disposition: Judgment is REVERSED. Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended x x x. with a view to going to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in the same City. -In the case before us. causing a swelling on said leg. feeling himself free from control. January 7. On November 14. Appellant’s claim: -there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death -the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed. Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. -Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case. which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment. and as guardian ad litem of the three children. serious anxiety.torts & damages -It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the appellate courts. Medina (102 Phil. and without which the result would not have occurred. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering. and that he had taken up the two passengers then in the carromata as the first who had offered employment. which he did. Thus. besmirched reputation. however. with the modification that the award of moral damages is deleted. et al. wounded feelings. they can be awarded only after claimants have shown their entitlement to moral. Basilio Ilano. At or about the same time Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Agaton Araneta. It is as follows: "x x x 'that cause. produces the injury. social humiliation. thereby establishing his right to actual or compensatory damages. besmirched reputation. -Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts. moral shock. being free from the control of the bit. it was Julio who jerked the rein. Dispositive The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. thereby causing the bit to come out of the horse's mouth. had alighted while the carromata was as yet alongside the sidewalk. which. ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death HELD: Yes. that no other evidence (such as a medical certificate or proof of medical expenses) was presented to prove Fulgencio Jr.' And more comprehensively. ARANETA 42 Phil 252. serious anxiety. de Bataclan. 1988 Nature : This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court Facts:When Filomeno Urbano found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed he went to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier admitted that he was the one responsible for what happened. the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. A quarrel between them ensued. Issue: WON the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof Held: NO. stopped the horse. in order that the vehicle might pass on. October 17.

died on the second day from the onset time. distinct and foreign to the crime. When Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about. like lockjaw and muscle spasms. If. The infection was. as its berthing space. ISSUE WON both the pilot and the master were negligent HELD YES. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. or in certain waters.126. Consequently. arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver. that his responsibility shall cease at the moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his order. xxx xxx xxx Par. — A Pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes control thereof until he leaves it anchored free from shoal. the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence or fault. pp. in maritime law. Kavankov filed his sea protest. he suffered the symptoms of tetanus. The master.When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots' Association. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. and licensed. the anchor did not take hold as expected. He can only be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided .In compulsory pilotage. the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.A pilot.Capt. is a person duly qualified. MASTER . 8. After 22 days.132.therefore.In case of compulsory pilotage. that a master of a ship may not know because the pilot is familiar with the port.' (at pp.J. 1998 NATURE Review on certiorari the CA decision affirming TC decision holding FESC and Gavino solidarily liable FACTS .Customs Administrative Order No. He is charged to perform his duties with extraordinary care because the safety of people and property on the vessel and on the dock are at stake. Cardenas.The SC started by saying that in a collision between a stationary object and a moving object. he died. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. . The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant.Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. 125) A2010 . Article III of Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. SEC. every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage. natural. . therefore. or shifting from one berth or another. Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. (People v. When the vessel was already about 2. British Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. He is an expert who‘s supposed to know the seabed. Remaquillo. . if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct. however. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death. 32. even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew members.the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time. supra) As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. etc. 11. Gavino submitted his report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the Philippine Ports Authority. PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE . each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. XXXIX. In such event. v. he ordered the engines half-astern. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped. as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. 03-85: SEC. with the master of the vessel. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. Gavino was found to be negligent. Victor Kavankov. and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.25. (99 Phil. the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease. The following day. to conduct a vessel into or out of ports. were dropped. it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause. however. 118). The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on board. casis he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize damage. The left anchor. Gavino ordered the engine stopped. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. Compulsory Pilotage Service. This incident took place on October 23. Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Provided. the respective duties and responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the master have been specified by the same regulation: SEC. FAR EAST SHIPPING CO V CA (PPA) 297 SCRA 30 REGALADO.The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of P1. The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. XLIV. 1980. successive. beside him. 15-65 issued twenty years earlier likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the responsibilities of pilots: Par. . with 2 shackles. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel. '(45 C. However. Abellana. As an expert he should‘ve been reacting quickly to any such happenings. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances. Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct. et al. flying under the flagship of the USSR. the onset time should have been more than six days. . Control of vessels and liability for damage. his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it.47 - prof. It then went on to determine who between the pilot and the master was negligent. there is a presumption of fault against the moving object (based on common sense and logic). 931-932). — Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor vessels under their control when requested to do so by the master of such vessels. . — For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat. unrelated. Provided. the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. the M/V PAVLODAR.000 feet from the pier. A commotion ensued between the crew members.The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section 8. 4. — On compulsory pilotage grounds.On June 20. any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said Master Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by competent authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage district. or on November 14. — The duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows: xxx xxx xxx f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely. The court found that his reaction time (4 minutes) to the anchor not holding ground and the vessel still going too fast was too slow. the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident. November 15. That his responsibility shall cease at the moment the master neglects or refuses to carry out his instructions. 1980. . . however may intervene or countermand the pilot if he deems there is danger to the vessel because of the incompetence of the pilot or if the pilot is drunk. such condition was not the proximate cause. -Therefore. The vessel sustained damage too." (at p. the pilot momentarily becomes the master of the vessel. "'A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible.Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge. Javier. as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf.After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold. which result in injury because of the prior defective condition. who was then on the pier apron noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. . and efficient cause of the injury. 185-186) -The court looked into the nature of tetanus to determine the cause -Medically speaking. 1980. PILOT . 1980.torts & damages by setting other events in motion. October 1. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port. owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC).

petitioners' negligence was the last. Based upon these facts. are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person.At about 2am. In fact. 2. Driver Lagunda admitted that three passengers rode on the running board of the bus when his vehicle was still at a distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus. it was driven on its middle portion thereof and so near the passenger bus coming from the opposite as to sideswipe a passenger on its running board. His widow. WON petitioners were guilty of negligence 2. He blindly trusted the pilot. . came about ten men.The master‘s negligence translates to unseaworthiness of the vessel. whereas the six by six truck was climbing up with no cargoes or passengers on board but for three helpers. DE BATACLAN VS. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party. whereas that of the other springs from a quasidelict. These men presumably approach the overturned bus. Salud Villanueva brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory.As a general rule. instead of being close to its right side of the road. person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them. Accordingly. concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's. and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87. so he could see and hear everything that the pilot was seeing and hearing. This is negligence on his part. or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor. and where the driver of the other vehicle was also guilty of contributory VDA. without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person. in point of time. Lagunda and Sabido throw all the blame on Mudales. Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva. it may appear that one of them was more culpable. even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury. Mendoza). No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Custodio was injured and died. although acting independently. ISSUES 1.48 - prof. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons. Gavino and FESC are solidarily liable. Despite the presence of a shallow canal on the right side of the road which he could pass over with ease.Based on Capt. Dispositive Judgment affirmed. while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus. What is more. Cavite. He was right beside the pilot during the docking. could not get out of the overturned bus. ET AL 17 SCRA 1088 CONCEPCION. the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided hitting Custodio.Shortly after midnight. owner Sabido and driver Lagunda (tsn. either is responsible for the whole injury. 1966 NATURE Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS In Barrio Halang. are. and. . and the other driven by Lagunda and owned by Prospero Sabido. Custodia. plus P100.That same day. the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case. . driven by its regular chauffeur. they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. The sideswiping of the deceased and his two fellow passengers took place on broad daylight at about 9:30 in the morning of June 9. the correctness of said findings is borne out by the very testimony of petitioner Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers riding on the running board of the bus while the same was still five or seven meters away from the truck driven by him. had violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio.000 plus P600 as attorney's fee. after they had clambered up to the road. It would appear that as the bus overturned. two trucks. gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank. although the liability of one arises from a breach of contract. Disposition Petition denied. in this sense. CA affirmed. it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. although acting independently of each other. for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the opposite direction. casis negligence. the negligence of the first two would not have produced this result without the negligence of petitioners' herein. on its way to Pasay City. Conrado Saylon. 308-309. which we cannot disturb in a petition for review by certiorari. such as the one at bar. by reason of which all of them were held solidarity liable. burning and all but consuming the bus. And Lagunda had time and opportunity to avoid the mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and cautious because the two trucks never collided with each other. . going in opposite directions met each other in a road curve. Calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood. a bus of the Medina Transportation. evidently fueled with petroleum. the distance between the two vehicles was such that he could have avoided sideswiping said passengers if his truck were not running at a great speed. the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were removed and duly identified that of Bataclan. — hereinafter referred to as the carrier — and its driver Mudales (none of whom has appealed). Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons. YES. testified that the 6 x 6 truck was running fast when it met the LTB Bus. Capt. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. Cavite. heard groans and moans from inside the bus. it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent. By simply swerving to the right side of the road. The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed of the truck and its location at the time of the accident are in the nature of findings of fact. whereas petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict. the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the Court of Appeals concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. After half an hour. Indeed.the CFI awarded P1. operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience. petitioners' truck had the last clear chance. left the town of Amadeo.Some of the passengers.torts & damages . CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS . of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner. A2010 .150. where several causes combine to produce injuries. WON petitioners should be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver HELD 1. including the 4 passengers trapped inside it. both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. LTB passengers had testified to the effect that the 6 x 6 cargo truck was running at a fast rate of speed. 1955 when the LTB bus with full load to passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and sliding downward a slope. widoy of Custodio. so that. Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent. As a result. . was sideswiped by the truck driven by Lagunda. Where the carrier bus and its driver were clearly guilty of contributory negligence for having allowed a passenger to ride on the running board of the bus. YES.the three passengers Bataclan. in combination. Kavankov‘s testimony. Lagunda did not avert the accident simply because to use his own language the canal "is not a passage of trucks. and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. the owners of the two vehicles are liable solidarily for the death of the passenger. To avoid any liability. a fierce fire started. There were about 18 passengers. August 31. . Makabuhay. and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury. moral. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened. and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. he never sensed the any danger even when the anchor didn‘t hold and they were approaching the dock too fast. in its execution. MEDINA 102 PHIL 181 MONTEMAYOR. and in turn means negligence on the part of FESC. . It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone. At any rate. . because that vehicle was running at a considerable speed despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve. and almost immediately. including the driver and conductor. one driven by Mudales and belonging to Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company. October 22. one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end. However. one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. It is sufficient that his negligence. the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan ISSUES SABIDO AND LAGUNDA V CUSTODIO. that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. is the proximate cause of the injury. . LTB bus passenger who was riding on the running board as truck was full of passengers. 1957 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Cavite FACTS .

she overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors. Rabbit‘s bus driven by Tomas delos Reyes and the jeepney driven by Tranquilino Manalo. 1759 ART.The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus. 2. ordered to pay jointly and severally with Rabbit the plaintiffs.Damages sought to be claimed in the 3 cases were for medical expenses.Manalo was eventually convicted and was imprisoned. BUT ONLY THE SPOUSES AND FILRITERS ARE LIABLE. . Rabbit was to be paid by the jeepney party for actual damages.On the other hand. IAC & CASIANO PASCUA. 1733 ART.Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden U-turn and encroached on the western lane of the highway. . and while in the hospital. as testified to by one of the passengers. I don’t know if the italicized phrases are pertinent. but for the physical injuries suffered by him. burial expenses. we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus. after the blow-out. neither were there oncoming vehicles except the bus. its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle. the fire that burned the bus. (jeepney driver)Manalo. crossing the Eastern lane and the (imaginary) center line and encroaching fully into the western lane where the collision took place as evidenced by the point of impact. as a result of which.According to the evidence.It was said that upon reaching a certain barrio. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. The case against delos Reyes was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. HELD 1. . through his agent. . moral damages and attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. . plaintiffs based their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict. Applied primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance. the bus was speeding. Rabbit Bus. 1763 11 . among which was Bus No.As against Rabbit and delos Reyes. . telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they were already old. from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging. . this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back. Reasoning Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and their goods.At the time and in the vicinity of the accident. DISPOSITION In view of the foregoing. the jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn. the bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the jeepney which resulted in the said deaths and injuries. after its wheel was removed. the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected. 1755 ART.Three cases were filed and in all 3 the spouses (owners of the jeepney) Mangune and Carreon. . -The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the greater portion of the western lane. the jeepney‘s right rear wheel detached which caused it to run in an unbalanced position. and that as a matter of fact. not only as a matter of justice. perhaps serious. If this be true. The chauffeur. but these were the only ones that contained ―but for‖. The weather condition of that day was fair. . that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help. not for his death. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES. and (3) the substantial factor test to conclude that delos Reyes was negligent. (1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passenger Caridad Pascua that the Mangune jeepney was "running fast" that his passengers cautioned driver Manalo to slow down but did not heed the warning (2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police Investigator Tacpal of the San Manuel (Tarlac) Police who found that the tracks of the jeepney ran on the Eastern shoulder (outside the concrete paved road) until it returned to the concrete road at a sharp angle. 753 of Rabbit . ISSUE: WON THE JEEPNEY OWNERS AND ITS DRIVER ARE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES AND DEATH SUFFERED BY THE PASSENGERS OF THE JEEPNEY HELD: YES. but that the driver did not follow his instructions. he had been telling the driver to change the said tires. Rabbit and (Rabbit‘s driver)delos Reyes were all impleaded as defendants.49 - prof.Rabbit filed a cross-claim for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. the fire that burned the bus. 1990 NATURE: CERTIORARI FACTS: . but rather.TC: found the couple and Manalo to be NEGLIGENT and held that there was a breach of the contract of carriage with their passengers. (2) the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence.000 and P800. thus making him liable. . for exemplary damages.11 2. must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus.IAC reversed this ruling in the sense that it found delos Reyes to be negligent. either immediately or by setting other events in motion.This case is for recovery of damages for the 3 jeepney passengers who died as a result of the collision between the Phil. loss of wages. which is the right of way of vehicles coming from the north. and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses. Neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. . ordered them to pay the damages. as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person. Note: This case was under the heading ―but for‖." (4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious Physical Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence by the CFI of Tarlac. ***As regards the damages. YES Ratio Tthe proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. and in the course of his visit. respectively. . WON there was negligence on the part of the defendant. spouses Mangune and Carreon filed a cross-claim for the repair of the jeepney and for its non-use during the period of repairs. with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are increased to P6. was still alive. and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning). including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it. this. but most probably. the rescuers had to carry a light with them. though he must have suffered physical injuries. made not only by the passengers. there were no vehicles following the jeepney. 189 SCRA 158 MEDIALDEA/August 30. casis .In the public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be pursued. . ART. REASONING: TC WAS CORRECT IN APPRECIATING THE FF FACTS CONCERNING MANALO‘S NEGLIGENCE. including that of the defense. that at the time the fire started. ET AL. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. (the insurer of the jeepney) was also impleaded as additional defendant in the civil case filed by the Pascuas. and his commitment to prison and service of his sentence (5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsa loquitar attesting to the circumstance that the collision occured on the right of way of the Phil. and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available. was hospitalized.Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their contractual liability. one of the passengers who. and so damages were awarded. (3) The observation of witness Police Corporal Cacalda also of the San Manuel Police that the path of the jeepney they found on the road \was shown by skid marks which he described as "scratches on the road caused by the iron of the jeep. Filriters was jointly and severally liable as it was the jeepney‘s insurer.. . or after stopping for a couple of minutes.A criminal complaint against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. invading and eventually stopping on the western lane of the road in such a manner that the jeepney's front faced the south (from where it came) and its rear faced the north (towards where it was going). . by the driver and the conductor themselves. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. NO. WON the the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus. . Ratio There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out. -Manalo stepped on the brake. as a result of the collision. Bataclan. the driver Saylon. Reasoning under the circumstances obtaining in the case.Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation. because of the injuries suffered by her.Other passengers of the jeepney sustained physical injuries.torts & damages 1. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. she was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina. but for the promotion of the safety of passengers on public utility buses. and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. Inc. for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney's fees. but rather. there was a distance of about 150 meters. INC v. it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers A2010 .

CA. 45 Phil. It was shown by the pictures that driver delos Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the right attempt to avoid hitting the Mangune's jeepney.. it to be one caused by a caso fortuito. page 5 of outline) . If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour. . But the SC was not convinced. that would make the carrier's liability personal. 2d). 94 Phil. Mar 10. defendants Mangune and Carreon offered to show thru their witness Natalio Navarro. (see previous digest) . assuming such calculation to be correct. 1987 Nature: Petition to review the decision of the IAC Facts: . was parked on the right hand side of the street (i.The IAC held that ―. casis toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding). et al.) -On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident. (Anuran. the jeepney left a skid mark of about 45 meters. . He switched his headlights on "bright" and saw a Ford dump truck about 21/2meters away from his car. Carbonel. . Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. . even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver (Viluan v. . as is invariably the case the latter (is) the result of other active forces which have gone before. etc. -In any event. the day before the collision. .ON CAUSE v CONDITION (under IV A 3c. .24 seconds. et al.if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked. in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result. a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. Delos Reyes could not have anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by Manalo. in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning. much less establish. and without headlights) or the negligence of the driver in parking the truck. et al. measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached up to the point of collision. . delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in 3.‖ -The speed of the bus was even calculated by the IAC. This notwithstanding the right rear wheel of the vehicle was detached while in transit. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. 75).. 104 Phil.Trial court ruled in favor of Dionisio. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible. et al. Paras.. Petitioners’comments . particularly since. on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction . 23. ("Phoenix"). We find defendant bus running at a fast speed when the accident occurred and did not even make the slightest effort to avoid the accident.it is the driver‘s negligence. Cebu Autobus Company. 657). Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss. v. he had little time to react to the situation. A2010 . Verily. . Jr.if the driver is to be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier. 892 citing Lasam. an alleged mechanic. Torts. an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a . not only because he was driving fast and did not even attempt to avoid the mishap but also because it was the bus which was the physical force which brought about the injury and death to the passengers of the jeepney. .Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. the last on Dec. 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code 2 or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event 3 (Lasam v. . That it was not successful in fully clearing the Mangune jeepney as its (Rabbit's) left front hit said jeepney must have been due to limitations of space and time.50 - prof. These arguments. . it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations.. . The bus driver's conduct is thus a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney. . There were no lights or any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck. he would run the greater risk of running smack in the Mangune jeepney either head on or broadside as the jeepney then was abruptly making a U-turn. efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained.Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less 50 kph at the time of the accident. is not a caso fortuito which would avoid the carriers liability for damages (Son v. 657.The dump truck." Professors Prosser and Keeton make this quite clear: ―Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. IAC affirmed the lower court‘s ruling. Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars. Said defendant did not even attempt to explain. v. contradictory to the explicit provision of A 2181 of the NCC.the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix Issue: WON the proximate cause of the accident was Dionisio‘s negligence (driving faster than he should have. Using this speed. however. . v. -SC: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon. the moment a passenger dies or is injured.As a result of the collision. April 29.To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from him.the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident. delos Reyes would have covered that distance in only 2. DISPOSITION: TC‘ S DECISION WAS REINSTATED and AFFIRMED BUT MODIFICATION THAT ONLY THE COUPLE AND THE FILRITERS GUARANTY ASSURANCE CORP. the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger. unless contradicted by other evidence: would have been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the jeepney was abrupt. the distinctions between" cause" and "condition" have already been "almost entirely discredited. its regular driver.Delos Reyes cannot be faulted for not having avoided the collision because as was shown. Held: . Smith. . . . that he periodically checks and maintains the jeepney of said defendants. 1966.e.at about 1:30 am on November 15 1975. ***On the sole liability of the Jeepney Owners (excluding Manalo) -the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger. .The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. . It was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street. which included the tightening of the bolts. Here. It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. there were no options available to him. 45 Phil. the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. . that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening. do not have any validity in this jurisdiction.That delos Reyes of the Rabbit bus could also have swerved to its left (eastern lane) to avoid bumping the Mangune jeepney which was then on the western lane: Under such a situation..Also. owned by and registered in the name of Phoenix Construction Inc. Necesito.petitioners' arguments are drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States.Even in the United States. INC WERE LIABLE. 16 SCRA 742). with the permission of his employer Phoenix. Jr. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned. (NOTE: this was the contention of petitioners which SC noted in is decision) Private respondent’s comments . ***With regard to the substantial factor test: . front or rear. and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733. is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro hac vice.Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed an intersection when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. .To escape liability. partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. facing the oncoming traffic. without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. AFFIRMED TOO THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BUT MODIFIED THE INDEMNITY FOR LOSS OF LIFE FROM 3K (AS PER A1746 TO A2206 NCC) TO 30K. . "[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for his failure to safely carry his passenger to his destination. As to the cause thereof no evidence was offered. . with modification on award of damages. the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable (Restatement.025 seconds. the defendant is said not to be liable. while under the influence of liquor.In culpa contractual. and in the event of contractual liability.torts & damages SC: -The principle about "the last clear" chance would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. Aside from the time element involved. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC v IAC (DIONISIO) 148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO. Buño et al. Smith.

" but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire. May 18. considering the latter's length of 6 feet.When the northbound Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge. . Plaintiffs say that the company failed to supervise their employees properly and was negligent in allowing locomotive to operate without smokestack protection for arresting sparks. 1956 NATURE Review by certiorari of a CA decision FACTS . applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. he turned around and a portion of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact with an electric wire of Manila Electric Company (the Company) strung 2. and forgetting where he was standing. the defendant will not escape responsibility. an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court. Reasoning We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence.The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. all passengers of the Ford Escort. he then switched on the headlights of the car. He may be at risk for fire. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck. . Galang appealed to IAC. he turned around swinging his arms with the motion of his body.the truck driver's negligence. In its consolidated decision of the civil cases. Disposition CA decision reversed. Before he could do so. ISSUE WON damage was caused by Rodrigueza‘s contributory negligence HELD . When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the media agua just below the third story window. IAC affirmed decision. company had no right to negligently destroy it. . They also say that the sparks were produced by an inferior fuel used by the company – Bataan coal. The Company appealed to the CA. But even in such cases. RODRIGUEZA V. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh. Dionisio's negligence. unrelated and efficient cause of the injury intervenes between such prior and remote cause and the injury. the truck driver must be held responsible. What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was only a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the truck driver‘s negligence A2010 . and some new force intervenes.5 ft parallel to the edge of the media agua. one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward. 1992 NATURE Appeal from decision of the IAC FACTS . far from being a "passive and static condition". . but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution. it was further asserted that these defendants did not allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said employee.The PROXIMATE AND ONLY CAUSE of the damage was the negligent act of the company. But unfortunately. evidently a remote cause. Rodrigueza didn‘t mind the warnings from the company. So.51 - prof.Efren Magno went to his stepbrother‘s 3-story house to fix a leaking ―media agua. The company could have removed the house through its power of eminent domain. and physical injuries to George Koh McKee. It is this CA decision the Company now seeks to appeal. . November 19. and attorney‘s fee. he could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. and driven by Ruben Galang. The collision would not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. His house‘s materials included nipa and cogon. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee. which appealed. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. .Manila Railroad‘s defense is not a bar to recovery by the other plaintiffs. . Jose Koh blew the horn of the car. holding the 6-ft iron sheet with both hands and at arms length. was an indispensable and efficient cause. Ratio A prior and remote cause (which furnishes the condition or gives rise to the occasion by which an injury was made possible) cannot be the basis of an action if a distinct.torts & damages "condition. swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down that street and for having so created this risk. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had had training and experience for the job. His house was there before the railroad company‘s property. but should not bear loss if the fire resulted from the company‘s negligence.Judge Capulong found Galang guilty of the criminal charge and ordered him to pay damages. Hence this petition. . The fire was communicated to four houses nearby. Trial judge decided against Manila Railroad.On 1 March 1977. and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created. two boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. casis Yes. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition. such condition was not the proximate cause. such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet. 1921 NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI FACTS Rodrigueza et al seek damages fr fire kindled by sparks fr a locomotive engine. although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident. it reversed the ruling of the trial court and ordered the defendants to pay damages. It merely provided the condition from which the cause arose (it set the stage for the cause of the injury to occur). . electrocuting him and killing him. on the said bridge. which affirmed the judgment. When a spark ignites the gasoline. evidently without looking." . . Complaint against company dismissed MCKEE v IAC.Two civil cases were filed on Jan 31. . it is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so.His widow and children filed a suit to recover damages from the company and the TC rendered judgment in their favor. MANILA ELECTRIC v REMOQUILLO 99 PHIL 117 MONTEMAYOR. So far as it has any validity at all. After grabbing hold of the sheet. Defense said Rodigueza‘s house stood partly within limits of land owned by company. and throwing all prudence and discretion to the winds. it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important.Judge Castaneda dismissed the 2 civil cases and awarded private respondents moral damages and exemplary damages. The decision is anchored principally on the findings that it was Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused the accident. this indicates contributory negligence on his part. All of these houses were of light construction. That Rodrigueza‘s house was near was an ANTECEDENT CONDITION but that can‘t be imputed to him as CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE because that condition was not created by himself and because his house remained by the toleration and consent of company and because even if the house was improperly there. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY STREET. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions. 1977. but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause. July 16. The appellate court further said that the law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants. in the selection and supervision of the latter. which was the opposite lane. successive. was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck owned by private respondents.In an MFR. ISSUE WON the Company‘s negligence in the installation and maintenance of its wires was the proximate cause of the death HELD No.There was no proof that Rodrigueza unlawfully intruded upon company‘s property. Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc. but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. He climbed up to the media agua which was just below the 3rd floor window and stood on it to receive a galvanized iron sheet through the said window. thereby causing his own electrocution.‖ (downspout). and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. his training and experience failed him. in the instant case. except that of Rodrigueza which was of strong materials. Petitioners appealed to IAC. the decision for the consolidated civil cases was reversed. the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark. TAYAG 211 SCRA 517 DAVIDE. it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause. as employers of Galang. his car collided with the truck.

Such was what happened in this case. Soler Street lay between that store and the institute. directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages.000. which were for the recovery of civil liability arising from a quasi-delict under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. HELD YES . and it may therefore be reasonably concluded that none was made. He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 km) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kph. together with the registrar. A2010 . June 4. no negligence can be imputed to Jose Koh.Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man. the same facts differently. casis spectacle of two judges appreciating. Dispositive Petition granted.The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. . attain justice with the least expense to the parties litigants. and an injury results. The second floor was unpartitioned. the negligent act of the truck driver. the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee.The Realistic Institute. who numbered about 180 at the time. which was the actual cause of the tragedy. as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person. . They were eventually consolidated for joint trial. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge. telling them not to be afraid because the Gil-Armi Building would not get burned as it is made of concrete. The records do not indicate any attempt on the part of the parties. The plaintiffs appealed to the CA. not juris et de jure. Proximate cause has been defined as: that cause. under what is known as the emergency rule. . What remains to be the most important consideration as to why the decision in the criminal case should not be considered in this appeal is the fact that private respondents were not parties therein. . On the separate civil and criminal actions .The CA declared that Teague was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. 1973 FACTS . thereby preventing the unseeming. or to use the fireescapes. semi-concrete edifice located at the comer of Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street. In such cases. the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here. conjectures and presumptions. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury.Moreover. plus interest at the legal rate from the date the complaint was filed. sister of plaintiffs. TEAGUE VS. produces the injury. The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril. aware of the plaintiff's peril. Four instructresses and six assistant instructresses of the institute were present and they. . unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. . Quiapo. "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger.Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals may be set aside when such findings are not supported by the evidence or when the trial court failed to consider the material facts which would have led to a conclusion different from what was stated in its judgment. and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger. whether acquittal or conviction. after the panic was over.torts & damages ISSUES WON respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolution are supported by evidence or are based on mere speculations. Assailed decision set aside while its original is REINSTATED.As employers of the truck driver. The panic. and the presence of each of the fire exits was indicated on the wall. They told the students not to rush out but just to go down the stairway two by two. clear congested dockets to simplify the work of the trial court. Jose Koh. if he. the private respondents are. perception and perhaps even prejudice.Section 1. IAC immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. was negligent. across the street. a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away from the institute. is only juris tantum. it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee - Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh. then he is guilty of negligence. the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof.Last clear chance: The doctrine is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant. subject to the modification that the indemnity for death is increased from P12. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. Neither did they attempt to prove it. including Lourdes Fernandez.The civil cases. owned and operated by Mercedes M. have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. and without which the result would not have occurred.The CFI of Manila found for the defendant and dismissed the case. would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action. had a total area of about 400 square meters. Manila.000.50 meters in width. a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident.The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. tried to calm down the students. . to consolidate criminal case with the civil cases. if at all negligent. each of which was provided with two fire-escape ladders. In the case of independent civil actions under the new Civil Code. was the initial act in the chain of events. thereby causing stampede. . was a vocational school for hair and beauty culture situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building. were found dead and several others injured on account of the stampede. . in natural and continuous sequence. This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in . a two-storey. however. The answers of the private respondents in the civil cases did not interpose this defense. guard against oppression and abuse. if no ludicrous. No part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. it cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.000. . were filed ahead of criminal case. arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent. Upon seeing the fire. and that the fire was anyway. might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. . On the basis of this presumed negligence. according to their respective orientation. some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter. however. and thereafter rendering conflicting decisions. or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril. . But. and although it had only one stairway. it had eight windows. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code. which seeks to avoid a multiplicity of suits. the result of the criminal case.The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. which. a panic ensued. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence. . of about 1. Teague. which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. would do. or in short. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. That presumption. is not guilty of negligence.52 - prof.Assuming. he was violating any traffic regulation. or vice-versa. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. could not be subdued and the students kept on rushing and pushing their way through the stairs. the injured person is entitled to recovery.00 to P50. which by a divided vote of 3 to 2 (a special division of five members having been constituted) rendered a judgment of reversal and sentenced the defendant to pay damages to the plaintiffs in the sum of P11. four students. unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might. should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care. would have easily sustained a consolidation.In the afternoon of October 24. or according to some authorities.Using the test. if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do . by exercising reasonable care and prudence. Rule 31 of the Rules of Court. FERNANDEZ 51 SCRA 181 MAKALINTAL. prevent delays.The respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the driver of the car. a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap. two boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car.Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent. notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. either immediately or by setting other events in motion. . 1955.

Fireproof partitions. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause. But the violation was a continuing one. La Union. was only a remote cause. 2. However. there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side. that being the proper side of the road for the machine. restaurants or panciterias. the principle of proximate cause applies to such violation.for instance as a school. But it was precisely such contingencies or events that the authors of the ordinance had in mind. instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down. NO. under such circumstances that the person responsible for A2010 . .To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective. HELD Yes. which.then the building is within the coverage of the ordinance. and it was the petitioner and not the owners who were responsible for such use. who should be liable for the violation 3. the defendant guided it toward his left. it would be more accurate to say that the overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. When he had gotten quite near. (2) fire at a neighboring place. such condition was not the proximate cause. but does have such relation to the use or purpose for which the building is devoted. CFI absolved defendant from liability Hence. Reasoning The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. [Citing MERALCO v Remoquillo] . 3. The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. 1. he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. which the Realistic Institute precisely was . he gave two more successive blasts. The violation of the ordinance. places of human detention. . instead of two of at least 1. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. and all public or quasipublic buildings having less than three stories. in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building. It is true that in this particular case there would have been no overcrowding in the single stairway if there had not been a fire in the neighborhood which caused the students to panic and rush headlong for the stairs in order to go down. it is argued.A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible. the appeal the first event should. shall be provided with at least two unobstructed stairways of not less than one meter and twenty centimeters in width and an inclination of not less than forty degrees from the perpendicular. in the manner in which it happened. it could be reasonably foreseen. but rather the use or the purpose for which a particular building. ISSUES 1. It is true that the petitioner's non-compliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of time. but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. in case of large buildings more than two stairways shall likewise be provided when required by the chief of the fire department. Fire!". who is a mere lessee. Ratio it is not ownership which determines the character of buildings subject to its requirements. in maneuvering his car in the manner above described. at San Fernando. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. 491. exits and stairways . but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing. In so doing. is utilized. He did this because he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed.        ISSUE WON the defendant. as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person. WON the failure to comply with the requirement of the ordinance was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez HELD 1. (3) shouts of "Fire!. and (6) injuries and death. 1918 NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of La Union FACTS . and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. Reasoning It was the use of the building for school purposes which brought the same within the coverage of the ordinance. Before he had gotten half way across. Ratio The violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident. since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the building. without reference to the prior negligence of the other part. plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan Bridge. As the automobile approached. casis On December 12. As a result of its injuries the horse died. This provision reads as follows: "Sec. the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile.torts & damages connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building. Indeed the requirement that such a building should have two (2) separate stairways instead of only one (1) has no relevance or reasonable relation to the fact of ownership." The alleged violation of the ordinance consisted is that the second storey of the building had only one stairway. unrelated. WON the ordinance devolved upon the owners of the building and therefore it is they and not the petitioner. Dispositive Decision appealed from is affirmed. panic and stampede were independent causes with no causal connection at all with the violation of the ordinance. 1912. for under normal conditions one stairway would be adequate for the occupants of the building.53            prof. if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct. and cannot be the basis of liability since there intervened a number of independent causes which produced the injury complained of. (4) panic in the Institute. although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a second stairway under construction. was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent. having one or more persons domiciled therein either temporarily or permanently. the final event in the chain immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. and the like. but if it is devoted to any one of the purposes mentioned in the ordinance . and he must in a moment have PICART V SMITH STREET. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet. said stairways shall be placed as far apart as possible. schools. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. the defendant. sanitarium. assembly halls. YES.2 meters each. WON Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila refers only to public buildings and hence did not apply to the Gil-Armi building which was of private ownership 2.The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death of Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance. Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents. clubs. successive. and efficient cause of the injury.According to the petitioner "the events of fire.  As the defendant started across the bridge. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge. either immediately or by settling other events in motion. such as hospitals. was guilty of negligence that would give rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done Ratio: The person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. NO. [Citing Bataclan v Medina] . As the defendant neared the bridge he saw the plaintiff and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary to evacuate the building. given the novelty of the apparition and the rapidity of the approach. as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. March 15. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result there from. was bound to happen under emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available.5 meters wide. even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion.All buildings and separate sections of buildings or buildings otherwise known as accessorias having less than three stories. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. reformatories. he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition." The weakness in the argument springs from a faulty juxtaposition of the events which formed a chain and resulted in the injury. Reasoning Thus the same may be privately owned. (5) stampede. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright.

WON the CA was correct in absolving the driver and owner of the truck (answered by WON CA correctly applied the doctrine of last clear chance) HELD: 1. 1987 NATURE PETITION for review of the decision of the IAC FACTS . which was denied at first. was parked askew (partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic) on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming traffic. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. owned and registered by Phoenix Construction Inc. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. The defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. stated broadly. Reasonable foresight of harm. a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident. the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril. a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. there was an appreciable risk that. Jur). notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC V IAC (DIONISIO) 148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. As against 3rd persons. causing the deaths of the passengers of the bus. This is the way the collision happened: The bus. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. or according to some authorities. Disposition: Petition GRANTED. A negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff.torts & damages  perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the same. Crossing the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal. Reasoning: The doctrine of last clear chance. The dump truck. is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant. the court thinks. if he. negligence is clearly established. is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Dispositive: Appealed decision is reversed. ISSUES: 1.54 - prof. would have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk. The bus driver also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane.Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck. and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or. March 10. driving his Volkswagen car. it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. In other words. The RTC awarded damages. or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril. the injured person is entitled to recovery. Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident. placed in the position of the defendant. while under the influence of liquor. he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. . and an injury results. to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. It will be noted however. in order to overtake a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver. He was.CFI: in favor of Dionisio . It does not apply in a case wherein a victim (who is an outsider to the cause of the accident) demands liability from the negligent parties. NO Ratio: The doctrine of last clear chance applies only between the negligent parties. and from this moment it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. Could a prudent man.130AM 15 November 1975 . which was ascending the inclined part of the road. not far from his home. was on his way home to Makati from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss where had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. but was granted on MFR. saying that the negligent acts of both drivers were the cause of the accident. A prudent man. then he is guilty of negligence. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant. Susulin shifted from 4th to 3rd gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus. But in view of the known nature of horses. followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision. its regular driver. negligent in the eye of the law. In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck. that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous. As the doctrine is usually stated. the two vehicles sideswiped each other at each other's left side. Stated in these terms. the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences. in the case under consideration. saying that the bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. The law considers what would be reckless. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by Carbonel. had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (Am. Not minding this circumstance due to his belief that the truck driver was merely joking. While the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing the hand tractor and the truck was approaching the bus.    BUSTAMANTE V CA (DEL PILAR AND MONTESIANO) 193 SCRA 603 MEDIALDEA. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm. thus their liability must be solidary. by exercising reasonable care and prudence. should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due case. Defendants Del Pilar and Montesiano ordered to pay damages with other defendants succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Makati. Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case.IAC: affirmed TC but modified amounts ISSUE (obiter) WON last clear chance doctrine should be applied therefore exculpating Phoenix from paying any damages HELD NO         . in our opinion. he was. February 6. deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. blameworthy. going very fast and the front wheels wiggling. As a result of the collision. seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge. absolving the defendants based on the doctrine of last clear chance. foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so. might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff‘s negligence. The heirs of the victims filed for damages. if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles.Leonardo Dionisio. driven by Susulin. When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger. aware of the plaintiff's peril. a negligent actor can‘t defend by saying that another had negligently failed to take action which would have avoided injury. The driver and owner of the truck appealed to the CA. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 21/2meters away from his car. casis opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident (Sangco). The plaintiff himself was not free from fault. 1991 NATURE: petition for certiorari to review decision of CA FACTS: a truck and a passenger bus sideswept each other. since the negligence of the defendant A2010 . or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars. was traversing an inclined road when the driver saw from 30 meters away an approaching truck (driven by Montesiano). . Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. without his headlights on and without a curfew pass.

74 to his secretary. petitioner Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling P304. she made her company believe that all the while the amounts she deposited were being credited to its account when. The theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent.Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man. Issue: Whether the proximate cause of the loss. To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. The amount was not credited to RMC‘s account but was instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas. Obiter . That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. -Irene Yabut would accomplish two copies of the deposit slip." In this case. if any. Ms.During this period. coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband. they were being deposited by her and credited by the petitioner bank in the account of Cotas. is to determine whose negligence-the plaintiff's or the defendant's-was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. . the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of. casis private respondent's.CA affirmed. attornet‘s fees and costs of suit. as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate. P304. Mabayad. states that where both parties are negligent. RMC demanded from petitioner bank the return of its money. Yabut and submitted to private respondent RMC together with the validated duplicate slips with the latter's name and account number. or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs.the bank's teller. plus damages. thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company. This doctrine. the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff.There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff.74. policy and precedent. would. . . loss of expected income and moral damages Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount Nature: Petition to review decision of CA A2010 HERMOSISIMA.From May 5.979.We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory. . to the tune of P304.979.Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. which found petitioner bank negligent and ordered the bank and Mabayad to pay RMC jointly and severally P304. would do. however. . but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other. officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. and without which the result would not have occurred. or bar a defense against liability sought by another. Ms.55 that of prof. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries. . in truth and in fact. Here.979. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. the task of a court. The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule-that of contributory negligence. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. .torts & damages . The law considers what would be reckless. it had never been the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these monthly statements of account reposing complete trust and confidence on petitioner bank.Furthermore. Disposition CA decision is modified by reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages. it filed a collection suit before RTC Pasig. represented by its President and General Manager Romeo Lipana. Azucena Mabayad. filed a complaint to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC). the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. on all occasions. and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone. Yabut. . suffered by the private respondent RMC is petitioner bank's negligence or PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE v CA (LIPANA) 269 SCRA 695 . Azucena Mabayad. (b) fault or negligence of the defendant. but as its demand went unheeded. if the latter. Held: It was the negligence of Ms. Proximate cause is "that cause. or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident. On the duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank. It turned out. validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip.RMC maintained two separate current accounts with the Pasig Branch of PBC in connection with its business of selling appliances. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. After validation. as advanced by the petitioner. blameworthy." The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions. were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Account No.Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC). in natural and continuous sequence. assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent. Smith. produces the injury. under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to. it is difficult to see what role. which. has itself been rejected. . ." that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179. The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number. in technical terms. and make it appear to be RMC's account number. yet it cannot be denied Facts: .74 representing various deposits RMC made in its current account with said bank. With the daily remittance records also prepared by Ms. now absorbed by the Philippine Commercial International Bank. 979. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity. Civil Code of the Philippines). or some other person for whose acts he must respond. at times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"). Smith but it is a matter for debate whether. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip. absent the act of Ms. Stated differently. or to what extent. PBC's teller. Azucena Mabayad. 1975 to July 16. an original and a duplicate. Under A2179. Irene Yabut. however.Upon discovery of the loss of its funds.Picart v. as it has been in A2179 CC . who had the last fair chance. it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. petitioner bank had been regularly furnishing private respondent with monthly statements showing its current accounts balances. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent. Unfortunately. . but modified the award of damages. then he is guilty of negligence. . 1976. To accept the petitioners' proposition must tend to weaken the very bonds of society. could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number written thereon.Phoenix and Carbonel also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. 1997 .Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic. . and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. was negligent in validating. that these deposits. in essence. The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. original or duplicate. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. Accordingly. which is that of her husband's. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society.72.Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. . petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. . even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. Bienvenido Cotas who likewise maintains an account with the same bank. common sense. for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC with PBC. March 14. is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account.

Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. GR No." 4. the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path. Calibo's companions who suffered injuries on account of the collision. the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED. Thus.Trial Court dismissed the complaint (and defendants' counterclaim) "for insufficiency of evidence. the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. however.' and although Zacarias saw the jeep from a distance of GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER AND HARDWARE V IAC (VDA. the jeep of the deceased Calibo was "zigzagging. therefore. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code Disposition CA decision modified. "the truck driver suddenly applied his brakes even as he knew that he was still within the lane of the jeep. since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. was extensively damaged. while the truck stopped on its wheels on the road." what is worse. refused to be so investigated or give statements to the police officers.it cannot be denied that private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account.. casis about 150 meters. But as we have already stated. . as it approached from the South Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Davao City at about 1:45 in the afternoon of July 4. He then turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened. the loss would not have occurred. or he could simply have braked to a full stop." and was "uncertain and even contradicted by the physical facts and the police investigators Dimaano and Esparcia. Its negligence. only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the petitioners. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault. Even if it be considered that there was some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias shortly before the collision. private respondent should. plywood. Mabayad was negligent in the performance of her duties as bank teller nonetheless. the instant case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the late Engineer Calibo who are residents of Tagbilaran City against the driver and owners of the cargo truck. was the 'driver's license of his co-driver Leonardo Baricuatro. and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. there must be a last and a clear chance.1979. Esparcia. on the latter's demand. it is claimed. 5. as the Appellate Court found. Agripino Roranes. 1979. .IAC reversed TC. while still at that distance of thirty meters from the truck. at least.torts & damages that the petitioner bank. particularly Romeo Lipana. . including its fender and hood. FACTS . . in that he had caused his truck to run some 25 centimeters to the left of the center of the road. It found Zacarias to be negligent on the basis of the following circumstances. This omission on the part of the private respondent does not change the fact that were it not for the wanton and reckless negligence of the petitioners' employee in validating the incomplete duplicate deposit slips presented by Ms. and the complaint against herein NATURE Petition for certiorari praying for a reversal of the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court which. had had a full view of each other's vehicle from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. Calibo had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident because he still had ample room in his own lane to steer clear of the truck. shall be borne by private respondent RMC. however guided his car toward the plaintiff without diminution of speed until he was only few feet away.000." 2) Zacarias had no license at the time. Ms. loaded with cement bags. Ratio The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a defense to accident liability. had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. Inc. that the fraud was committed in a span of more than one (1) year covering various deposits. Irene Yabut. they would have passed "along side each other safely. . demonstrates that the driver of the truck had applied the brakes and the jeep's driver had not. and the fact that indeed no criminal case was ever instituted in Court against Zacarias. as the Appellate Court would have it. for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. 1989 A2010 . Unlike Zacarias who readily submitted himself to investigation by the police. simply by faithfully observing their selfimposed validation procedure. Considering. was "not as clear and detailed as that of Zacarias. have taken care of its concerns. under the law. thru its teller. From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident. plus Roranes' waiver of the right to institute criminal proceedings against Zacarias. Engr. HELD NO. At about that time. Moments before its collission with the truck being operated by Zacarias. he "did not drive his truck back to his lane in order to avoid collision with the oncoming jeep .Engineer Orlando T. and Maximo Patos were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries. were "telling indications that they did not attribute the happening to defendant Zacarias' negligence or fault. In those circumstances." 3) the waiver of the right to file criminal charges against Zacarias should not be taken against "plaintiffs" Roranes and Patos who had the right. . ISSUES WON respondent court is correct in reversing the decision of trial court. GI sheets. At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge." The circumstances leading to the conclusion just mentioned: 1. The demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio.the doctrine of "last clear chance" assumes that the negligence of the defendant was subsequent to the negligence of the plaintiff and the same must be the proximate cause of the injury." had both vehicles stayed in their respective lanes.While it is true that had private respondent checked the monthly statements of account sent by the petitioner bank to RMC. And they have not seen fit to deny or impugn petitioners' imputation that they also admitted the truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away. the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck. had just crossed said bridge. the latter would have discovered the loss early on. his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance. Dispositive WHEREFORE.. May 18. driven by defendant Paul Zacarias y Infants. . Had it done so. PADILLA [dissent] . not merely rely on a supposed right to expect. The award of attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. the cargo track. The driver of the automobile. Zacarias was unhurt. the collision would never have occurred. such cannot be used by the petitioners to escape liability. but because it was purposely negligent as it admitted that it does not normally check bank statements given by banks. and none by the jeep. either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. This. . not a last possible chance. what he handed to Pfc.56 - prof. the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. to wit: 1) "the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied the lane of the jeep when the collision occurred. (Picart v Smith) Reasoning Both drivers. DE CALIBO and kids) . After the impact." 2. given in plaintiffs' behalf. with Calibo at the wheel." 3. common human experience dictates that the same would not have been possible without any form of collusion between Ms.70493 NARVASA. had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client. by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck. It must have been a chance as would have enabled a reasonably prudent man in like position to have acted effectively to avoid the injury and the resulting damage to himself. Yabut and bank teller Mabayad. ignored or ran counter to the established facts. the defendant was also negligent. to avoid the accident or injury. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC. -Picart v Smith: The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. Seeing an automobile ahead he improperly pulled his horse over to the railing on the right.On November 27. as what the law presumes. the left side of the truck was slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep. That there were skid marks left by the truck's tires at the scene. . It was private respondent who had the last and clear chance to prevent any further misappropriation by Yabut had it only reviewed the status of its current accounts on the bank statement sent to it monthly or regularly. to opt merely to bring a civil suit. jumped around and was killed by the passing car. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous. South Cotabato. and that the jeep had on impact fallen on its right side is indication that it was running at high speed. Since a sizable amount of cash was entrusted to Yabut. Roranes' testimony. Calibo. As a result of the impact. is not contributory but the immediate and proximate cause of its injury. except the award of P25. Private respondent failed to examine these bank statements not because it was prevented by some cause in not doing so. coming from the opposite direction of Davao City and bound for Glan. 40% of the damage awarded by the respondent appellate court.00 attorney's fees. . The private respondents have admitted that the truck was already at a full stop when the jeep plowed into it. Both vehicles were travelling at a speed of approximately thirty kilometers per hour.the bank was not remiss in its duty of sending monthly bank statements to private respondent RMC so that any error or discrepancy in the entries therein could be brought to the bank's attention at the earliest opportunity. In short. . .

At the time David Ico must have realized that the bus was not returning to its own lane. negligently bumped it from behind. and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered" .The above contention of petitioner is manifestly devoid of merit. While they were proceeding towards Malalam River. Ambrosio Ramirez. -PANTRANCO. Gancayco. Thus. Other victims settled with Bus Company.In this case. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane. 1958. Metro Manila. -Pantranco appealed the decision. it was the driver of the passenger jeepney who had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and was therefore negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm. and the balance of P350. 1966 NATURE: Petition for Review by certiorari of CA decision. (BF Homes) Paranaque. with exercise of due care. decided to venture in business and to raise the capital needed therefor. to recover consequently damages against the drivers and the owners of the trucks and also against the driver and the owners of the jeepney. Voting Cruz. the jeepney turned right and proceeded to MaIalam.Moreover.00 of which payable within one week.57 - prof.: November 1989 FACTS: At about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of June 12. But he parked his jeepney in such a way that ½ of its width (the left wheels) was on the asphalted pavement of the road and the other half. Vicente Mañosca. is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff . Although this presumption is only a disputable presumption which could be overcome by proof of diligence of a good father of a family. Ramirez has never been seen and has apparently remained in hiding.00. boarded a car and proceeded to Santiago. the jeepney had already crossed the intersection and was on its way to Malalam River -On the issue of its liability as an employer. INC v CAR BASCOS BAESA 179 SCRA 384 CORTES J.000.David Ico. At the time of the accident. For the doctrine to be applicable.torts & damages petitioners in Civil Case No. filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.00 to serve as his (Osmundo's) investment in the business. Contrary to the petitioner's contention. Osmundo S. Ambrosio Ramirez -TC ruled against PANTRANCO and ordered them to pay damages. which such violence that three of its passengers died. 4136** which provides that the driver of a vehicle entering a through highway or a stop intersection shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching in either direction on such through highway. Buño. 3283 of the Court of First Instance of Bohol. petitioner claims that it had observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. -petitioner claims that the original negligence of its driver was not the proximate cause of the accident and that the sole proximate cause was the supervening negligence of the jeepney driver David Ico in failing to avoid the accident . he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction. Canlas. HELD YES. by exercising reasonable care and prudence. Branch IV. conformably to the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code -When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee. . as a company driver is far from sufficient CANLAS V. Bascos and Fe O. CA Purisima. . 1981. driver of said jeepney stopped his vehicle in order to allow one of his passengers to alight. A motor truck speeding along.. and collided with it.Petitioner likewise insists that David Ico was negligent in failing to observe Section 43 (c). Ico for herself and for her minor children. Osmundo Canlas delivered to Vicente Mañosca the transfer certificates of title of the parcels of land involved.000. . It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. JJ. spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and their children. -The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant. a passenger jeepney was parked on the road to Taal. FACTS . An error of law was committed in releasing the jeepney from liability. on its regular route to Manila. PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS. have been aware of it .000.Maricar Baesa through her guardian Francisca O. Plaintiffs appealed to the CA insisting that the driver and the owners of the jeepney should also be made liable for damages. Appeal dismissed for lack of merit ISSUE: WON PANTRANCO is liable for damages. it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should. concur. Isabela. and Vicente Mañosca. even as 2 other passengers suffered injuries that required their confinement at the Provincial Hospital for many days. is DISMISSED. Marceline and Maricar. . aside from pointing to the late David Ico's alleged negligence as the proximate cause of the accident. the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case . died while the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell the said parcels of land to Vicente Mañosca. Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa. a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri. Batangas. it was already too late to swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent an accident. were aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at Malalam River. No pronouncement as to costs. In this instance. on the right shoulder of the said road. P500. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and seven other persons. A2010 . issued two postdated checks in favor of Osmundo Canlas in the ANURAN V BUÑO 17 SCRA 224 BENGZON. to celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa. there instantly arises a presumption that the employer has been negligent either in the selection of his employees or in the supervision over their acts. It must follow that the driver – and the owners – of the jeepney must answer for injuries to its passengers. After the accident the driver of the PANTRANCO Bus. the spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold Jim. River at a speed of about 20 kph. The cited law itself provides that it applies only to vehicles entering a through highway or a stop intersection. 2000 Nature Petition for Review on Certiorari Facts -Sometime in August. this Court believes that the evidence submitted by the defendant to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family iti the case of Ramirez. Griño-Aquino and Medialdea.Suits were instituted by the representatives of the dead and the injured. there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver. February 28. Obiter on Application of Principle of Last Clear Chance: The principle about the ―last clear chance‖ applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. DISPOSITION: Judgment modified. casis . It must be remembered that the obligation of the carrier to transport its passengers safely is such that the New Civil Code requires ―utmost diligence‖ from the carriers (Art. 1756). means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter. The former then executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing the latter to mortgage two parcels of land situated in San Dionisio. each lot with semi-concrete residential house in the name of the SPS Canlas. this legal presumption of negligence is confirmed by the CA‘s finding that jeepney driver in question was at fault in parking the vehicle improperly. Ilagan.This Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine "can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously. 1982. might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so. May 20. HELD: YES -Petitioner claims that under the circumstances of the case. 1755) who are ―presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. but it required the truck driver and the owners o make compensation. Upon reaching the highway. ISSUE WON the driver and owners of the jeepney should also be made liable. . The jeepney was extensively damaged. as his part of the transaction. This principle does not apply in this case. encroached on the jeepney's lane while negotiating a curve. From that time on up to the present. the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case.On January 12. Article III Chapter IV of Republic Act No. unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence‖ (Art. for and in consideration of P850. .The doctrine of the last clear chance simply. Isabela. both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the time of the accident the Pantranco bus was speeding towards Manila. -Petitioner's misplaced reliance on the aforesaid law is readily apparent in this case.Contrary to the petitioner's contention.CFI Batangas absolved the driver of the jeepney and its owners. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.

When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbank‘s tellers during withdrawals. The latter refused and a case for recovery of a sum of money was filed against them . Diaz with Allied Bank. the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter. (they could have presented the teller to whom the passbook was left. who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. the Court is of the ineluctible conclusion and finding that subject contract of mortgage is a complete nullity. petitioner Osmundo Canlas also wrote the office of Sheriff Maximo O.00.LC Diaz is a professional partnership engaged in accounting.nêt CONSOLIDATED BANK V CA (L.) GR No. For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking institutions. constituted by an impostor is void. the bank acted on their representations simply on the basis of the residence certificates bearing signatures which tended to match the signatures affixed on a previous deed of mortgage to a certain Atty. but they didn‘t) . is chargeable with the loss. despite several motions for extension of time for the filing thereof. The rules state that ―possession of this book shall raise the presumption of ownership and any payment or payments made by the bank upon the production of the said book and entry therein of the withdrawal shall have the same effect as if made to the depositor personally. Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.CA revered. the authorized representative of L. and on May 23. and request that steps be taken to annul and/or revoke the questioned mortgage. September 11. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so. When he came back.‖ Also. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. On 14 August 1991. The doctrine of last clear chance is applicable. or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident. and yet. Solidbank had the contractual obligation to return the passbook only to Calapre. Solidbank‘s tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative . Likewise. 1173 It could be said that the degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family in keeping with their responsibility to exercise the necessary care and prudence in dealing even on a registered or titled property. 1983. 1983 the herein petitioners instituted the present case for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. with the use of subject parcels of land as security. It is worthy to note that not even a single identification card was exhibited by the said impostors to show their true identity. It was also held that Solidbank did not have any participation in the custody and care of the passbook and as such.R. WON ASB must incur the resulting loss Yes. 25242 SET ASIDE. SolidBank‘s negligence in returning the passbook was the proximate cause. But such fact notwithstanding. The negligence of respondent bank was magnified by the fact that the previous deed of mortgage (which was used as the basis for checking the genuineness of the signatures of the supposed Canlas spouses) did not bear the tax account number of the spouses. the teller told him that somebody else got the passbook. and with the involvement of the same impostors who again introduced themselves as the Canlas spouses. 1982. LC Diaz demanded SolidBank the return of their money. the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even higher degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook. whose business is impressed with public interest. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the impostor. dated September 30. Solidbank was in possession of the passbook while it was processing the deposit. the bank did not require the impostors to submit additional proof of their true identity.00 and P460. The proximate cause was LC Diaz‘ negligence. CV No. Contreras and Asian Savings Bank refused to heed petitioner Canlas' stance and proceeded with the scheduled auction sale. Disposition WHEREFORE.1âwphi1.DIAZ AND CO.000. Calapre. Lower court a quo came out with a decision annulling subject deed of mortgage and disposing. Diaz. with the help of impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses. A2010 . covering the same parcels of land in question. . LC diaz. to deposit money in Solidbank.L. but it turned out that the check covering the bigger amount was not sufficiently funded.C. Evidently. 2003 NATURE Review of the decision of the CA FACTS . the trial court issued an Order restraining the respondent sheriff from issuing the corresponding Certificate of Sheriff's Sale. Stated differently. The teller could have called up LC Diaz since the amount being drawn was significant. the respondent bank must suffer the resulting loss. the Petition is GRANTED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals. The appellate court ruled that while L. or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss. Diaz to verify the withdrawal. 138569 CARPIO. by reason of which the bank would be denied the protective mantle of the land registration law. who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. he left the passbook with Solidbank.C. After completion of the transaction. Osmundo Canlas wrote a letter informing the respondent bank that the execution of subject mortgage over the two parcels of land in question was without their (Canlas spouses) authority. The Decision of Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case No.TC applied rules on savings account written on the passbook.An information for estafa was filed against one of their messengers (Ilagan) and one Roscoe Verdazola. respectively. Asian Savings Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals and CA reversed the lower court decision. Issue/s and Held WON CA erred in holding that the mortgage is valid Settled is the rule that a contract of mortgage must be constituted only by the absolute owner on the property mortgaged. casis . once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract. thru its cashier. It ruled that Solidbank‘s negligence was the proximate cause. instructed their messenger. Diaz had it called up L. Stated differently. the efforts exerted by the bank to verify the identity of the couple posing as Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas fell short of the responsibility of the bank to observe more than the diligence of a good father of a family.C. Diaz was also negligent in entrusting its deposits to its messenger and its messenger in leaving the passbook with the teller.In culpa contractual. Considering that it was established indubitably that the contract of mortgage sued upon was entered into and signed by impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. private respondent Vicente Mañosca was granted a loan by the respondent Asian Savings Bank (ASB) in the amount of P500.000. -Consequently. in CA-G. respondent Asian Savings Bank has to bear the loss sued upon.00 to a certain Attorney Manuel Magno. accorded only to purchasers or mortgagees for value and in good faith.‖ Solidbank could have averted the injury suffered by L.C. . which bank deposits the bank should guard against loss due to negligence or bad faith. 1993.00. Vicente Mañosca was declared in default.58 - prof. On September 29. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so. on February 3.For failure to file his answer. Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. No pronouncement as to costs. 1982. When the loan it extended was not paid. The next day. as well as the Community Tax Certificate of Angelina Canlas. Contreras. the bank is liable to its depositor. It applied the provision on the CC on quasi delicts and found that the requisite elements were present.torts & damages amounts of P40. Magno. Calapre then deposited in Solidbank. -On September 3. 1983 be cancelled or held in abeyance. The business of a bank is affected with public interest. 1983. . holding in trust the money of the depositors. respondent bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. Applying Art.C. ISSUES WON Solidbank was liable HELD . Vicente Mañosca was able to mortgage the same parcels of land for P100. a mortgage. -On January 15. 1983. They found that the teller made no inquiry upon the withdrawal of 300k. On January 18. .000. the doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other. Solidbank failed to discharge this burden. In essence.C.C. M-028 is hereby REINSTATED. Solidbank could not escape liability because of the doctrine of ―last clear chance. is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. In the case under consideration. SO ORDERED. they applied the rule that the holder of the passport is presumed the owner. from the evidence on hand it can be gleaned unerringly that respondent bank did not observe the requisite diligence in ascertaining or verifying the real identity of the couple who introduced themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant.The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other. it was learned that 300k was withdrawn from the account. their act was not the proximate cause of the loss. or culpa contractual.000.For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence. asking that the auction sale scheduled on February 3. But respondents Maximo C.

Respondents’ Comments The dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda.‖ She was discharged after nine days but was re-admitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva. is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution. YES.July 29. 2003 NATURE Petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision of the CA which affirmed with modification the judgment of the RTC of Iloilo City FACTS . The Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. and second.There is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house.torts & damages . once or twice weekly. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. KANAAN 72 Phil. the negligent acts of his opponent. although it may escape or be lost. the water run off . Its total loss was computed at P80. petitioner must be held liable. since they own the dog that bit her. Iran swerved to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its right. the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal. Reasoning The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident. . It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility. the Isuzu pick-up‘s right signal light flashed. .Seven months later. DISPOSITIVE Decision affirmed. J. it swerved to its left. 1989.R. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract. where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss. 1941 NATURE Petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA FACTS -The brothers Loreto and Jose Dingcong rented the house of Emilia Saenz (in Jose Ma. driven by petitioner Rogelio Engada. that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia. there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger. when retiring to bed. The Toyota Tamaraw jeepney ended up in the junk heap. he swerved to his left. That time.Theness developed hydrophobia. that it was a tame animal. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. Echevarria. pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. Ratio It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do so in safety. was a complication of rabies . and occupying room no. . Kanaan. notwithstanding STRICT LIABILITY VESTIL V IAC (UY) 179 SCRA 47 CRUZ. alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy. 1989 NATURE Petition to reinstate the decision of the Appellate Court. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation to L." The following day. 2183." the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. But what has been shown is the presence of an emergency and the proper application of the emergency rule. Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to avoid the pick-up. ENGADA V CA QUISUMBING. Thus. On board was Sheila Seyan. HELD DINGCONG vs. Diaz. WON petitioner‘s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident HELD 1. Among the hotel's guests is Francisco Echevarria. . as a result of the dog bites. occupies the ground floor of the hotel and established his "American Bazaar" dedicated to the purchase and sale of articles and merchandise. a symptom of rabies. casis Ratio The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. As for the alleged provocation. the Uys sued for damages. Petitioners’ Claim The Vestils are liable for the death of Theness. December 6. Petitioner‘s acts had put Iran in an emergency situation which forced him to act quickly. 1975.Obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage.On the strength of the foregoing testimony. . was a complication of rabies. Dispositive The appealed decision is AFFIRMED. DISPOSITION The Court approves the time. at about 1:30 in the afternoon. unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. No convincing proof was adduced by petitioner that Iran could have avoided a head-on collision. Basa Street of the City of Iloilo) and established the Central Hotel. When it was just a few meters away from the Tamaraw. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital. . pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. the registered owner of the Tamaraw. which was already on a head to head position going against Iran‘s Tamaraw jeepney immediately before the vehicles collided. carelessly left the faucet open that with only an ordinary basin without drainage. . modification only to damages A2010 . Reasoning ART. There was no clear chance to speak of. .59 - prof. G.We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case. IAC found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. and second.It does not matter that the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. This is a case of culpa contractual. the child died.000.On November 29. on the other hand. The Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pickup. Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for Iloilo City. ISSUE WON the Vestils are liable for the damage caused by the dog. paying P30 a month. 10 of said hotel. 1975: Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda. as a result of the dog bites.Theness developed hydrophobia.While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house. at the same time. would exonerate the defendant from liability. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants. encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and headed towards a head-on collision course with it.: June 20. where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead. L-47033 AVANCEÑA.Judge Jose R. which ultimately caused her death. 14. the pick-up collided with the Tamaraw. and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. The impact caused the head and chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its body. is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.000 in medical expenses. Seyan incurred P130. April 25. Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. on August 15. which ultimately caused her death.C. the father of Purita Vestil. which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate. For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of vehicles abandoning their lane. that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia. ISSUES 1. Iran swerved to the left only to avoid petitioner‘s pick-up. No. hitting the latter at its right front passenger side. a symptom of rabies. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. FACTS . The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause. the pipes of the hotel were under repair. the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. -Around 11pm of 19 September 1933.

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the pipes and spilled to the ground, wetting the articles and merchandise of the "American Bazaar," causing a loss which the CFI sets at P1,089.61. -The Kanaans (Halim, Nasri and Michael), representing the establishment "American Bazaar," thereafter filed this complaint for damages against Loreto Dingcong, Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria. -CFI held Francisco Echevarria liable, and acquitted Jose Dingcong. CA reversed and declared Jose Dingcong responsible, sentencing him to pay the plaintiffs damages. ISSUE WON Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria are liable for damages HELD YES. -Francisco Echevarria, the hotel guest, is liable for being the one who directly, by his negligence in leaving open the faucet, caused the water to spill to the ground and wet the articles and merchandise of the plaintiffs. -Jose Dingcong, being a co-renter and manager of the hotel, with complete possession of the house, must also be responsible for the damages caused. He failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent these damages, despite his power and authority to cause the repair of the pipes. Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed, with the costs against apellant.

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- Furthermore, it appears that the deceased had never notified the defendant corporation of his removal from San Francisco del Monte of Manila, and that the company did not know that he was living in Manila on the day of the accident; that the defendant company did not require its employees to work on Sunday, or furnish or require its agents to use bicycles. - These are additional reasons for holding that the accident was not due to and pursuance of the employment of the deceased. If the deceased saw fit to change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use a bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk, as the defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one; and if he made collections on Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of his employment, and his employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him. DISPOSITION The decision appealed from was affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.

defendant the equal protection of the law, and impairs the obligation of the contract between the defendant and Leopoldo Madlangbayan, and deprives the Courts of First Instance of their probate jurisdiction over the estate of deceased persons and nullifies Chapters XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII, and XXXIV of the Civil Code Procedure and related articles of the Civil Code. ISSUE WON the employer is liable to pay the employee‘s heirs. RULING NO. - As the deceased Leopoldo Madlangbayan was killed on November 16, 1930 and Act No. 3812 was not approved until December 8, 1930, it is apparent that the law which is applicable is Act No. 3428, section 23 of which reads as follows: When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident due to in the pursuance of the employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified. - The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in pursuance of his employment. - At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo Madlangbayan was not in the pursuance of his employment with the defendant corporation, but was on his way home after he had finished his work for the day and had left the territory where he was authorized to take collections for the defendant. - The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment", and as a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment, because such an accident does no arise out of and in the course of his employment. - The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in section 2 of Act No. 3428 was changed in Act No. 3812 to "arising out of and in the course of". Discussing this phrase, the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Mueller Construction Co. vs. Industrial Board, said: The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. By the use of these words it was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment, but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's employment of incidental to such employment, and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment. Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are excluded. - If the deceased had been killed while going from house to house in San Francisco del Monte in the pursuance of his employment, the plaintiffs would undoubtedly have the right, prima facie, to recover. - In the case at bar the deceased was going from work in his own conveyance.

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS V CA (GERONIMO) 227 SCRA 292 DAVIDE, JR.; October 18, 1993
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - Lydia Geronimo was engaged in the business of selling food and drinks to children in the Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen located in Dagupan. - August 12, 1989 - A group of parents complained that they found fibrous material in the bottles of Coke and Sprite that their children bought from Geronimo‘s store. Geronimo examined her stock of softdrinks and found that there were indeed fibrous materials in the unopened soda bottles. She brought the bottles to the Department of Health office in their region and was informed that the soda samples she sent were adulterated. - Because of this, Geronimo‘s sales plummeted with her regular sales of 10 cases day dwindling to about 2 or 3 cases. Her losses amounted to P200 to P300 a day which later on forced her to close down her business on December 12, 1989. - She demanded payment of damages from plaintiff Coca-Cola but the latter did not accede to her demands. - The trial court ruled in favor of Coca-Cola, stating that the complaint was based on a contract and not a quasi-delict because of pre-existing relation between the parties. Thus the complaint should have been filed within 6 months from the delivery of the thing sold. - The trial court however annulled the questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings in the civil case. According to the CA: ―the allegations in the complaint plainly show that it is an action for damages arising from respondent‘s act of recklessly and negligently manufacturing adulterated food items intended to be sol for public consumption.‖ It also noted that the availability of an action for breach of warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale of defective goods. Petitioners’ Claim: - Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and prescription. - Since the complaint is for breach of warranty (under A1561, CC), it should have been brought within 6 months from the delivery of the goods. Respondents’ Comments:

AFABLE V SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY 58 PHIL 14 VICKERS; March 6, 1933
NATURE Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila FACTS - Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company in the district of San Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of the City of Manila, and he was supposed to be residing in his district according to the records of the company. - One Sunday afternoon, Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding a bicycle was run over and fatally injured at the corner of O'Donnel and Zurbaran streets in the City of Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay. - It appears that Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora Alonso St. in Manila without notifying the company, and that at the time of his death he was returning home after making some collections in San Francisco del Monte. - According to the practice of the company, if collectors made collections on Sunday they were required to deliver the amount collected to the company the next morning. - The widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan brought an action to recover from the defendant corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act. No. 3812, P100 for burial expenses and P1,745.12 for compensation. - Plaintiffs' complaint was subsequently amended, and they sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3428 fifty per cent of P16.78 for 208 weeks of P1,745.12 plus P100 for burial expenses. - Defendant as special defenses alleged that Leopoldo Madlangbayan at the time that he sustained the injuries resulting in his death was violating an ordinance of the City of Manila which prohibits work on Sunday; and that Act No. 3428, as amended, is unconstitutional and void because it denies the

torts & damages
- Geronimo alleges that her complaint is one for damages which does not involve an administrative action. - Her cause of action is based on an injury to plaintiff‘s right which can be brought within 4 years (based on A1146, CC). ISSUE WON the complaint is founded on a quasi-delict and pursuant to A1146(12), CC, the action prescribes in 4 years HELD YES Reasoning - The vendee‘s remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in A1567. The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. - Under American law, the liabilities of the manufacturer or seller of injurycausing products may be based on negligence, breach of warranty, tort or other grounds. DISPOSITION The instant petition is denied for lack of merit.

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becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another‘s interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with; b) the invasion is substantial; c) the defendant‘s conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under the general negligence rules. - On the other hand, the elemts of tort interference are a) existence of a valid contract b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its existence c) interference of the third party is without legal justification or excuse - Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek Hua and DC Chuan, Tek Hua in fact had property rights over the leased stalls. The action of Trendsetter in asking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor was unlawful interference. - The SC handled the question of whether the interference may be justified considering that So acted solely for the purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. It stated that it is sufficient that the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives to conclude that So was not a malicious interferer. Nothing on the record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on the part of So. Hence the lack of malice precludes the award of damages. - The provision in the Civil Code with regard tortuous interference is Article 1314 which states that ― any third party who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party‖. The Court ratiocinated that the recovery of legal fees is in the concept of actual or compensatory damages as provided in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. In this casse, due to defendant‘s action of interference, plaintiff was forced to seek relief through the Court snd thereby incur expenses to protect his interests. The Court, however, found the award exorbitant. It was reduced to Pesos 100,000.00 Disposition – Petition denied. CA decision affirmed subject to the modified award of attorney‘s fees.

know the identity of a person to whom he causes damage. No such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damages suffered. DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed

SON PING BUN vs CA (Tek Hua) GR No. 120554 Quisumbing; September 21, 1999
NATURE Appeal on certiorari for review of CA decision FACTS - In 1963, Tek hua Trading, through its Managing Director So Pek Giok, entered into a lease agreement with D.C. Chuan covering four stalls in Binondo. The contracts were initially for one year but after expiry of the same, they continued on a month to month basis. In 1976, Tek Hua was dissolved with the original members forming a new corporation, Tek Hua Enterprises with Manuel Tiong as one of the incorporators. - So Ping Bun, on the death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok, occupied the same stalls under the business name, Trendsetter Marketing. - In 1989, the lessor, DC Chuan sent a letter to Tek Hua advising it of a 25% increase in rent effective September 1, 1989. A further rent increase of 30% effective January 1, 1990 was implemented. Enclosed in both letters were new lease contracts for signing. While the letters contained a statement that the leases will be terminated if the contracts were not signed, the same were not rescinded. - In 1991, Tiong wrote a letter to So Ping Bun asking him to vacate the four stalls as the same were going to be used by them. Instead of vacating the stalls, So was able to secure lease agreements from DC Chuan. - Tek Hua filed an injunction and an action for nullification of the contracts between Trendsetter and DC Chuan. The lower Court ruled in favor of Tek Hua. The CA, on appeal, upheld the trial court. Both the trial court and the CA awarded legal fees only. ISSUE - WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference of contract HELD- Yes. A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one party of the enjoyment of the other of his private property. In the case at bar, petitioner, Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent of the latter‘s property right. Reasoning- Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damges are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One

GILCHRIST v CUDDY 29 Phil 542 TRENT; February 18, 1915
NATURE Appeal from the decision of the CFI FACTS -Cuddy was the owner of the film ―Zigomar‖. Gilchrist was the owner of a theatre in Iloilo. They entered into a contract whereby Cuddy leased to Gilchrist the Zigomar‖ for exhibition in his theatre for a week for P125. - Cuddy returned the money already paid by Gilchrist days before the delivery date so that he can lease the film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and receive P350 for the film for the same period. - Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against Cuddy, Espejo and Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for damages against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy. ISSUE WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga is liable for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing at the time the identity of the parties HELD YES - Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with the contract and causing its breach. This liability arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. - Article 1902 of the Civil Code provides that a person who, by act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to pay for the damage done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of the tortfeasor that he must

GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN 171 SCRA 382 SARMIENTO; Mar 21, 1989
Nature: Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of CA Facts:

torts & damages
- on July 25, 1978, Florentina Guilatco, a court interpreter, accidentally fell into a manhole while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk at Perez Blvd. Her right leg was fractured, due to which she was hospitalized, operated on, and confined. - She averred that she suffered mental and physical pain, and that she has difficulty in locomotion. She has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter (at the time of filing of complaint) and thus lost income. She also lost weight, and she is no longer her former jovial self. Moreover, she has been unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities which she used to do prior to the incident. - Police confirmed existence of the manhole, which was partially covered by a concrete flower pot by leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long by 1 ½ feet wide or 42 cm wide by 75 cm long by 150 cm deep. - City Engineer of Dagupan Alfredo Tangco admitted that the manhole is owned by the National Government and the sidewalk on which they are found along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the National Government. He said that he supervises the maintenance of said manholes and sees to it that they are properly covered, and the job is specifically done by his subordinates. - Trial court ordered the city to pay Guilatco actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney‘s fees. CA reversed the lower court‘s ruling on the ground that no evidence was presented to prove that City of Dagupan had control or supervision over Perez Blvd. - City contends that Perez Blvd is a national road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city. Issue WON control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 CC. Held YES - The liability of private corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows: Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. - It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. - In this case, control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer. - The charter only lays down general rules regulating that liability of the city. On the other hand, article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from ―defective streets, public buildings and other public works.‖ On Damages awarded - Actual damages of P10000 reduced to proven expenses of P8053.65. The trial court should not have rounded off the amount. The court can not rely on ―speculation, conjecture or guess work as to the amount.

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Ratio Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. ***If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured, has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them separately, because tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual. Reasoning Defendants fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is a tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tortfeasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tortfeasors. The defendants might have been sued separately for the commission of the tort. They might have sued jointly and severally, as they were. It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act. **note: Ponente used examples of torts as held under common law** (In a case of assault and battery committed by various persons, under the common law, all are principals). So also is the person who counsels, aids, or assists in any way the commission of a wrong. Under the common law, he who aided, assisted or counseled, in any way the commission of a crime, was as much a principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual tort. - Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The person injured may sue all of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all, and altogether jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared with that of the others. - The courts during the trial may find that some of the alleged joint tortfeasors are liable and that others are not liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort. And this is true even though they are charged jointly and severally. However, in this case, the lower court, committed no error in rendering a joint and several judgment against the defendants. As recognized by Section 6 of Act 277 of the Philippine Commission: “Every author, editor, or proprietor * * * is chargeable with the publication of any words in any part * * * or number of each newspaper, as fully as if he were the author of the same. Disposition Judgment of the lower court modified. Ocampo, Kalaw, Palma, Arellano, Jose, Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit held jointly and severally liable for the sum of P25, 000 with interest at 6%. Santos absolved from any liability. ARELLANO, C.J. and MAPA, J. [concurring] - We concur, except with reference to the liability imposed upon Lichauco. The real owner and founder, Ocampo, explicitly stated that the other socalled founders subscribed and paid sums of money to aid the paper but as to Lichauco, he offered to contribute, but did not carry out his offer and in fact paid nothing. It is incomprehensible how one could claim the right or title to share the earnings or profits of a company when he had put no capital into it, neither is it comprehensible how one could share in the losses thereof, and still less incur liability for damages on account of some act of the said company, an unrestricted liability to the extent of all his property, as though he were a regular general partner when he was not such. TORRES [dissenting in part]

- Moral damages of P150000 is excessive and is reduced to P20000. Guilatco‘s handicap was not permanent and disabled her only during her treatment which lasted for one year. - Exemplary damages of P50000 reduced to P10000. - Award of P7420 as lost income for one year, plus P450 bonus remain the same - P3000 as attorney‘s fees remain the same Disposition Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set aside, decision of trial court reinstated with modification.

PERSONS LIABLE
WORCESTER v OCAMPO 22 PHIL 42 Johnson; Feb. 27, 1912
NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI FACTS - Plaintiff Dean Worcester, member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior of the Insular Government commenced an action against defendants Ocampo, Kalaw, Santos, Reyes, Aguilar, Liquete, Palma, Arellano, Jose, Lichauco, Barretto and Cansipit (owners, directors, writers, editors and administrators of a certain newspaper known as ―El Renacimiento‖ or ―Muling Pagsilang‖) for the purpose of recovering damages resulting from an alleged libelous publication. - The editorial ―Birds of Prey‖ was alleged to have incited the Filipino people into believing that plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt person, unworthy of the position which he held. The said editorial alluded to him as an eagle that surprises and devours, a vulture that gorges himself on dead and rotten meat, an owl that affects a petulant omniscience, and a vampire that sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless. - After hearing the evidence adduced during trial, the judge of the CFI rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, holding all the defendants (except for Reyes, Aguilar and Liquete who were found to be editors but in a subordinate position and found to have merely acted under the direction of their superiors) liable jointly and severally for sustained damages on account of petitioner‘s wounded feelings, mental suffering and injuries to his standing and reputation in the sum of P35,000 as well as P25,000 as punitive damages. - This judgment prompted defendants to appeal to the SC, claiming that the CFI committed several errors in rendering said judgment among which was that the lower court committed an error in rendering a judgment jointly and severally against the defendants. ISSUE WON the defendants, regardless of their participation in the commission of the actual tort, may be held jointly and severally liable as joint tortfeasors HELD YES.

seeing that he could not reach it without extra exertion. L-20392 MAKALINTAL. The car which the plaintiff intended to board was on the main line and bound in an opposite direction to that in which the defendant was going. is not responsible. casis WON Yu Khe Thai should be held solidarily liable as Bernardo‘s employer CHAPMAN V UNDERWOOD 27 Phil 374 MORELAND. Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the alleged negligent acts were committed by the driver. Ana and bound for Manila. within the meaning of Article 2184. 1968 FACTS . a competent driver. and Cansipit for they had neither direct nor indirect participation in the act that gave rise to the present suit for damages. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's son. While in this position he was struck from behind and run over by the defendant's (Underwood) automobile. the entrance being from the front or the rear platform.The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds. 1968 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CFI of Iloilo DISPOSITIVE Decision modified. 1914 NATURE Appeal from the judgment of trial court finding for the defendant FACTS . As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel. . after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom. . was a caretella owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. the same rule applies where the owner is present. where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. The test of his intelligence. He was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side. where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. The car was running at a reasonable speed. On the other side of the road. When the front of the "San Marcelino" car was almost in front of the defendant's automobile. that is. . On the other hand. went off the main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of the main track. jointly and severally with the director and manager. When he approached the carritela. He was with his family.it appears with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver. . Plaintiff attempted to board the front platform but. facing toward the rear platform. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai. he followed along behind it. December 18. as a genuine gift. Thereupon the defendant either kept straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to the right. but dissent as regards Palma. They were donors who merely contributed a sum of money.63 - prof. He was driving the latter‘s Cadillac along highway 54.The plaintiff-appellant. No negligence of having employed him maybe imputed to his master. Being told by his friend that the car was approaching. HELD No. .The defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle Peñafrancia in his automobile driven by his chauffeur. either civilly or criminally.A carretela was in front of the Cadillac.torts & damages . if any. They filed a suit for recovery of damages against Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai. CAEDO v. defendant's driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the plaintiff.After Ocampo had accepted the various amounts proffered. nor were they owners or proprietors of the newspaper. Arellano. . with occasional switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other)that is. absent a minimum level imposed by law. The act complained of must be continued in the presence or the owner for such a length of time that the owner by his acquiescence.Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home in Quezon City to the airport. in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. it is improper to deduce that the contributors formed a company of either a civil or commercial nature.No negligence can be imputed. Jose. injures a person or violates the criminal law. David. March 28. its press or other equipment. L-20392 MAKALINTAL. only eight meters away. Yu Khe Thai is free from liability FACTS . The CFI ruled in favor of the Caedos and held Bernardo and Yu solidarily liable. and waited for it to come abreast of him in order to board. a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another CAEDO V YU KHE THAI GR NO.Negligence on the employer‘s part. December 18. becomes himself responsible for such acts. Barretto. although present herein at5 the time the act was committed. and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts. and the Cadillac at approximately 48 to 56 kilometers. Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. . The road was wide and open. With them in the car were Mrs.in the case of Johnson vs. Therefore they can not incur. wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane. stopped beside the car. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. by a sudden act of negligence. . therefore.Bernardo is the driver of Yu Khe Thai. must be sought in the immediate setting..The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. the donors ceased to be the owners of and surrendered all right to the money donated and to the objects that were acquired therewith. Ana being immediately in front of him. DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is affirmed. he decided to overtake it even though he had already seen the car of the Caedos‘ approaching from the opposite lane. the driver does not fall within the list of persons in Art. unless the negligent act of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. . for the purpose of founding. HELD NO. desired to board a certain "San Marcelino" car coming from Sta. Reasoning Defendant's driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the plaintiff. is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. considering the condition of the road and the absence of traffic — the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour. .1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant would be responsible.I concur in regard to the defendants Ocampo and Kalaw. Ratio An owner who sits in his automobile or other vehicle.The judgment of the trial court was for defendant. . and issuing the said newspaper. Lichauco. as they were the only ones under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the street car. And as far as perception is concerned. and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance. A street car bound from Manila to Sta. Chapman. ISSUE WON Underwood is responsible for the negligence of his driver. going in the same direction. Bernardo did not see the carretela from afar. and somewhat hurriedly. A2010 . if the driver. This is the first clear indication of his ISSUES .The plaintiff needed only to watch for cars coming from his right. with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel. Julian Bautista. makes his driver‘s act his own. editing. the owner of the automobile. Just before reaching the scene of the accident the street car which was following took the switch (there was a single-track street-car line running along Calle Herran. YU KHE THAI GR No. . Ahead of the Cadillac.Bernardo had no record of any traffic violation. . The car was a closed one. he immediately. passed into the street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car.Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him. Caedo and three daughters. taking the owner from his Parañaque home to Wack Wack. . He had reason to rely on the skill of his driver.The Caedos were injured. There was no reason for Yu to be specially alert. Caedo was driving his Mercury car.

the mother. only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. and. WON defendant Rafael Bernardo is liable for the accident. J.The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is. as it must have been in the beam of his headlights for a considerable while. COURT OF APPEALS) REASONING The provision ―Teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody". to a great degree. plaintiff contends. (school‘s liability versus parental liability) which provides: "ART. In line with her reservation." . teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. the lower court erred in relieving the father from liability. In the circumstances. as already stated. No. was accused of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperiña and Amado Ticzon on March 31. son of Delfin Capuno. and is otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo. Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiña. Its rear bumper. was not with his son at the time of the accident. jointly and severally with his son Dante. Bernardo. 2. it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint. the accident occurred. During the trial. in case of his death or incapacity. L-10068-70 June 29. And so. It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the Balintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31. he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver The case involves an interpretation of Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. The test of his intelligence. As it was. The photographs taken at the scene show that the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the moment of impact. Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P2. on appeal. if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him. he attended the parade in honor of Dr. and they should have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary precautions. xxx xxx xxx Finally. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel. . ISSUE 1.The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. Bernardo. . and the risk should have been quite obvious. plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals but the case was certified to the Supreme Court on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of law. Dante Capuno was only fifteen (15) years old when he committed the crime. died as a consequence. confronted with the unexpected situation. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. as a consequence. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. And as far as perception is concerned. as he claimed later on at the trial. but was unsuccessful. Negligence on the part of the latter. necessarily subjective. judged the distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac would wait behind. Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness. that is. Sabina Exconde. decided to take a gamble — beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the carretela. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. And it was in connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it. And even if he did not notice the lights. No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master. WON his employer. 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna. RULING YES. veered to the left in order to pass. Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity. Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim. in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. This defense was sustained by the lower court and. It was a risky maneuver either way. employment of professional drivers by car owners who.959. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO G. with other students. It further appears that Delfin Capuno. if any. casis sat on his left side. the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. supervision and custody of the latter. as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperiña. with costs against the latter. . the children were under the direct control or supervision of an academic institution. he was a minor and was then living with his father. 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. and devoid of traffic that early morning. the civil liability of the father is evident. tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the right. within the meaning of Article 2184.torts & damages negligence. for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.12 RATIO Parents shall be liable for the tortious conduct of their minor children living with them although at the time of the tort. father of Dante. Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperiña. is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions. boarded a jeep and when the same started to run. YES. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant.Rafael Bernardo had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. ISSUE Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable. where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused. passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability. by -their very inadequacies.64 - prof. or else squeeze in between them in any case. caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose. a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one A2010 . could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institution of arts and trades as provided for by law.It was already too late to apply the brakes when Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him. he slackened his speed. .00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña.: FACTS Dante Capuno. nor the city school's supervisor. the former was not under the control. and so he had to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible. Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged and. There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident. have real need of drivers' services. must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident. NO. After trial. instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear. the carretela should anyway have been visible to him from afar if he had been careful. . one on each side. 12 The father. . (THIS IS A LANDMARK DOCTRINE. is solidarily liable with him. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. would be effectively proscribed. The carretela was provided with two lights. Caedo. the clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side was insufficient. 2. WHICH WAS LATER MODIFIED BY J CRUZ IN AMADORA VS. 1957 BAUTISTA ANGELO. On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane. paragraph 1 and 5. 1903. absent a minimum level imposed by law. The car was not running at an unreasonable speed. If YES. wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane. The road was wide and open. and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed. From this decision. If the causative factor was the driver's negligence. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. From the school Dante.In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction. are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them. HELD 1.R. defendant Yu Khe Thai. it is clear that neither the head of that school. He only came to know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher. SABINA EXCONDE vs. however.

2180 of the new Civil Code for damages. now appellant Agapito Fuellas. Revised Penal Code). as conceded by all commentators. 2 and 3. Padilla and Reyes. the sum of P2.959. And responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the action in the present case was instituted. 1954. Manuel Gutierrez. A2010 FUELLAS V. that the said court held the petitioner liable pursuant to par. this tribunal held: — It is true that under Art. Spanish Civil Code). They had a quarrel that lead to Pepito‘s injury. 101 of the Revised Penal Code. The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or control. Wherefore. Appellant. the mother. Facts: A passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality of Las Piñas. but deliberate intent. it would seem clear that where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher. but the SALEN V. And if there is no authority. arising from the criminal act committed by the latter. the latter. in case of his death or incapacity. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article 1903. any discussion as to the minor's criminal responsibility is of no moment. defendants failed to prove.000.. 1903 of the old Civil Code. Verily. BALCE . is obvious.R. In another case. the petition is dismissed. In an earlier case (Exconde vs. Spanish Civil Code). teachers.. gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Arts. But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability. They were classmates at St. I submit that the father should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent. Gumersindo was found guilty of homicide for having killed Carlos Salen. In reversing the decision. in case of his death or incapacity. his right arm was broken after Rico pushed him on the ground. Mary's High School. for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. and not the parent. June 29. were both 13 years old. a lad 18 years of age. and which he had every right to assume the school authorities would avoid. keeping them in their company. 2177). below 18 years of age who was living with him. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Art. Moreover. the void apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code. liable under Art. and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated. the father was not in the car. The automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez. In my opinion. educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means". This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them. this tribunal gave the following reasons for the rule: — The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and.. and was owned by Saturnino Cortez. Having proved that he entrusted his child to the custody of school authorities that were competent to exercise vigilance over him. Dansalan City. would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son. in case of his death or incapacity. a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile. educating them in proportion to their means". for the existence of deliberate intent in the commission of an act negatives the presence of fault or negligence in its commission. the father has rebutted the presumption of Art. last paragraph. the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of the evidence submitted therein by both parties. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority. prom. is obvious." To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses. or over 9 but under 15 years of age. and. 1903. is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault of negligence under the Penal Code (Art. et al. that according to the last article. etc. What substantial difference is there between them in so far as concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons. At the time of the collision. minor son of plaintiffs. so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and supervision over the pupil. the act of the minor must be one wherein "fault or negligence" is present. unless GUTIERREZ VS GUTIERREZ MALCOLM. 2180 of the Civil Code. Spanish Civil Code). 2 of Art. resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code. The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco. and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother. Issue: WON the father is liable civilly for the criminal act of his son? Held: Yes. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents. an insane. 2180 of the new Civil Code. 1957). on the other hand.. casis it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. on September 16. CADANO . no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. and that there being no fault or negligence on the part of petitioner-appellant's minor son. Salen and Salbanera vs. keeping them in their company. IN VIEW HEREOF. submits that the appellate Court erred in holding him liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act of his minor son. L-10132. 2176 of the same Code. If. Facts: Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas. 1903 and the burden of proof shifted to the claimant to show actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him liable. as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases. the above mentioned articles are not applicable. to recover damages in the amount of P10. Province of Rizal. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them. The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180. Spanish Civil Code). G. I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. independently of the criminal case. the mother. In that case. It is contended that in the decision of the Court of Appeals. and Mrs. the petitioner-appellant was ordered to pay damages for the deliberate injury caused by his son. the pertinent portion of which provides: "The father and. while. jointly and severally. last paragraph. No. the decision appealed from is affirmed Nature: Appeal from the Decision of the Trial Court making defendant therein. gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155. concur. for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them. holding the defendants jointly and severally liable with his minor son Dante for damages.L. 1931 Nature: an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the five defendants. JJ. 1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. therefore. J. there can be no responsibility. A. should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody. dissenting: I believe we should affirm the judgment relieving the father of liability.torts & damages The civil liability which the law impose upon the father. the words "arts and trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of establishments". also a minor. the mother. the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff.B. Jose Balce. J. for physical injuries suffered as a result of an automobile accident. Capuno. This defendants failed to prove. under 9 years of age. September 23. for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted. This is because a son who commits the act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12. subdivisions 1. the father of the minor who caused the injuries to Pepito Cadano. The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian and French Civil Codes. son of defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas. the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. and the costs of action. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case. while on the other hand. REYES. for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them.00 as damages. are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.. who acts without discernment.65 - prof. in connection with Art. This. Mr. 134 and 135. the defendant Balce was the father of a minor Gumersindo Balce. stating that the civil liability of the minor son of defendant arising from his criminal liability must be determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and not under Art. in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades" used in Art.

thus coming up with a potential gross income of P75. and the lack of care employed by the chauffeur. The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of the owner's business. with the inevitable result of a collision and an accident A2010 . he lost his head and so contributed by his negligence to the accident. He has no assets of his own as yet‖). Narcisso Gutierrez was a passenger of the bus. It was error on the part of the CA to have disturbed the determination of the RTC which it had previously affirmed. and the trend of his earnings over the span of his last few years. Yes. In its broader aspects. the owner of the truck. YES Ratio: The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and under the circumstances. YES Ratio: The reduction of the award of net unearned earnings had no basis. low powered vehicles. the judgment appealed from will be modified. seven in all. Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages against Luis and his father. RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA) 135 SCRA 242 ABAD SANTOS. Hill nothwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of his son. and who also died in the same event on the same date. LIBI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SPS GOTIONG) 214 SCRA 16 REGALADO. which affirmed in toto the RTC. The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts. ISSUES: 1. were accommodated therein. a businessman. Yes. Luna's social standing‘ [a statement which lacks complete basis]. the speed in operating the machine. (Note: father and son solidarily liable for damages.000 (P75. thus lowering the net annual unearned income to P45. Narcisso Gutierrez blames both the bus and the car while the truck blames the car and the car in turn blames the truck. In a MFR filed by the Dela Rosas. on approaching the bridge and the truck. prompting him to resort to threats against her. as a matter of equity. WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned income 2.66 - prof. with neither being willing to slow up and give the right of way to the other.‖ Also.) The Dela Rosas appealed in the CA. The reason for this conclusion reaches to the findings of the trial court concerning the position of the truck on the bridge. and attorney‘s fees of P50. Held: 1. the CA increased the annual personal expenses to P30.000 (no interest mentioned). saying that they had no cash money.Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the Julie refused. with legal interest from date of the decision. CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racing reduced the life expectancy. WON the award for atty‘s fees should have legal interest HELD: 1. namely. He had a fracture on his right leg.000. 1985 NATURE: Petition to review a decision of CA .000 as unearned net earnings of Luna. but since the son had attained majority.650. that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed. Luis is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine Courts. where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owner's family than the child driving it.000. RTC considered the age and health of the deceased. 1978 when Julie Ann broke up with Wendell after she found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. and living in Spain but only causally employed (―His compensation is hardly enough to support his family.torts & damages mother. would be liable for the damages caused by the minor.More than 2 years before their deaths. pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.000 gross income less P20. WON the father of Bonifacio (car) is liable. Abelardo Velasco. WON the owner of the truck is liable.‖ Disposition: resolution of CA SET ASIDE. and that the award for atty‘s fees should include legal interest. it was an error to increase the expenses without increasing the gross income. awarding P1. The writ of execution produced only a nominal amount. married. However. Reasoning: the RTC based its computation of the net unearned earnings on 2 factors: life expectancy of the deceased of another 30 years. the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent chauffeur. at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from which she died on January 14. and that. driving a Toyota car without a license) at a gokart practice area. In the meantime. whom he designates or permits to run it. all with legal interest. Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for lack of merit. 13 years old. jointly and severally. ―That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung. the CA modified this by factoring in the ―engagement of Luna in car racing.000 personal expenses). only slightly 2. together will several other members of the Gutierrez family. and Saturnino Cortez. There is nothing on record that supports the claim that the car racing was a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy.000 for loss of companionship. However. 2. P12.000. the SC came out with a resolution ordering the Dela Rosas. February 28. the liability of Atty. Hill became merely subsidiarily to that of his son. and an annual net income of P55. September 18. The instant petition is the one filed by Lunas. due to the escalating gasoline expenses. to pay the Lunas P450.1992 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court. Both parties filed separate petitions for review in the SC. In the United States. Issue: 1.respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who. was killed in a vehicular collision (between Luna.000. the father alone and not the minor or the mother. . driving a gokart. with 2 kids. then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents. .January. who maintains it for the general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children. where the court held that A2180 applied to Atty. In order to avoid him. The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son. this time reducing the unearned income to P450. which the CFI ruled in favor of the Lunas. FACTS . To this contention. Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December. RTC considered the various positions the deceased held at the time of his death.000. it is uniformly held that the head of a house. and the plaintiff will have judgment in his favor against the defendants Manuel Gutierrez. Malou Alfonso Disposition In consonance with the foregoing rulings. reinstating the earlier decision with slight modification regarding the award of atty‘s fees.000 compensatory damages. and the costs of both instances. The liability of Saturnino Cortez. The Dela Rosas now invoke that the father should also be held only subsidiarily. Based on these facts. FACTS: Roberto Luna.000 compensatory damages. the case is one of two drivers approaching a narrow bridge from opposite directions. for the sum of P5. the court is ―unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law because to do so will not serve the ends of justice. thus is void. P50. was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos.‖ thus lowering the life expectancy to only 10 years. ―It stands to reason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because of the ‗escalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. contending that the CA erred in reducing the award for unearned income. Pending the decision. the CA modified the decision. In coming out with the life expectancy.1979. casis larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled conveyances. Luis is already of age. and 15 years after the process of litigation is still not over). But. 1979 . and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis.) Obiter: The Dela Rosas invoke the ruling in Elcano v Hilll. and atty‘s fees of P50. it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase considering the manifold sources thereof‖ 2. (The atty‘s fees should accrue interest from the date of filing of the compliant. that of contract. Cebu City. and P50. the owner of an automobile. in the interest of justice (since the death took place in 1970. Also. It was conceded that the collision was caused by negligence pure and simple. Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend. and Luis dela Rosa.000. within 30 days. so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant. interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court. WRT to the gross income. while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi.000 for unearned net earnings. he has no property in the Phils or elsewhere. P12.000 for loss of his companionship (come on!!).

Quisumbing. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita's key is always in her bag. Decision set aside. Jr. Mercado. .The principle of parental liability is designated as vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed liability under the Anglo-American tort law. . . Jr. We. whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU). casis Reasoning. The trial Court agreed with the respondents and dismissed the complaint. COURT OF APPEALS AND QUISUMBING L-14342 LABRADOR. while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L. however. of the instruction and supervision of the child.' . owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. on the right cheek with a piece of razor.undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. incase of his death or incapacity. testified that her husband. Disposition – Petition granted. HENCE. they they can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damages. CFI dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of the evidence.000 are excessive. is the son of his co-plaintiffappellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L.CFI Cebu: Gotiongs filed civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter's vicarious liability under A2180 CC. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. Bundoc) 209 SCRA 518 Feliciano.both set of parents came up with versions of the story Gotiongs: > Wendell caused her death by shooting her and thereafter turning the gun on himself to commit suicide Libis: > an unknown third party. J. then aged ten. mother of Wendell. Quezon City. It should be emphasized. that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. a person is not only liable for torts committed by him also torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsibility. . that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not as the body was cleaned already in the funeral parlor . 1992 NATURE Appeal for review of CA decision FACTS . As a result. As stated. 1956. May 30. Adelberto Bundoc. The presumption under law is that when a child under their care commits a tortuous act the parents were negligent in the performance of these duties and responsibilities. Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing. the provision of Article 2180 would be applicable.On October 20. HELD . Cresencio Libi.The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him under Article 2176. Wendell. The SC however decided to hear the appeal based on substantial justice. controlling. the mother are responsible for the damages caused by the children who live in their company… The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. However. Article 2180 reads ― the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one‘s own acts or omissions. Thus. must have caused Wendell's death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification . The adopting parents had no actual or physical custody of Adelberto at the time of the incident as they were then in the US were they live. under this doctrine. ISSUES 1.The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not the indispensable party in the action as their son adopted by the spouses Rapisura on November 18. 1960 NATURE This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . The Court held that parental authority did not retroactively transfer to and vested in the adopting parents at the time the shooting incident occurred.Amelita Libi. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was. accordingly.Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing.IAC: CFI decision set aside and found Libis subsidiarily liable ISSUE WON A2180 CC is applicable in making Libi‘s liable for vicarious liability HELD YES Ratio The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists. . may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son. cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. A101 RPC SAYS SO > RULES: + for civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the legal authority and control or who live in the company of the parents: PRIMARY = premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex delicto by kids 9 or under or 9-15 but without discernment = premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with discernment or 15-21 (now 18) + liability effected against father or mother? BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUHTORITY OVER THE MINOR = youth welfare code = FC: responsibility of parents + for civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors: same rules in A2180 and A2182 Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio. To do so and hold them liable for the tortious act when be unfair and unconscionable. and disciplining of the child. quarrelled over a "pitogo". and in keeping said gun from his reach. Reasoning .torts & damages . to a large extent. father of Wendell . appellants are liable under A2180 CC. sufficient proof can be presented to overcome this presumption.BUT Liability is not subsidiary BUT primary > if the liability of the parents for crimes and QDs of their minor children is subsidiary. they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. Thus parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of the parents which include the instructing. 1982 via an adoption decree granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur. The adopting and natural parents of Jennifer filed a civil complaint for damages against the parents of Bundoc. because of his minority. 1982. On February 22. all of which facts were known to Wendell.A "pitogo".WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party to the tort action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. LIABILITY OF PARENTS A2010 .67 - prof. which figures prominently in this case. MERCADO v.A2180': The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by A2180 CC covers obligations wising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible… The father and.January 14. WON the moral damages fixed at P2. Therefore. HELD. shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Manuel Quisumbing. She admitted.1979 . the diligence would constitute a valid substantial defense. ISSUE . . however. THE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR FELONIES IS LIKEWISE PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY. He was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide but was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability ob the ground that he had acted without discernment. WON the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the of the father since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time) 2. Jr.Yes. Augusto wounded Manuel.The case contained procedural questions which were raised in the appeal.Julie and Wendell died from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm licensed under Cresencio Libi. Jr. FOR QDS OF THEIR MINOR KIDS AS CONTEMPLATED IN A2180 ID PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY > applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint tortfeasors) the parent is also solidarily liable with the child. But if the liability id direct and primary.

Brillantes from the complaint." contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher. the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty. Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc. the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter.Palisoc spouses as parents of their 16-year old son. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Daffon. plus the costs of this action in both instances.68 - prof. b. which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. it was duly incorporated. as to their pupils and students. academic and non-academic. Daffon. since this contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parents. since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant ." contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher. including recess time. Daffon were classmates.I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v. He never regained consciousness. .Defendants were: Antonio C. damages. (b) P3. the president thereof. said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. Further. they.There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the school." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's decision. in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. 1971 NATURE An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the CFI Manila. is that they stand. within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219. DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows: . Quibulue. The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. therefore. the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability. FACTS . YES. to a certain extent. in retaliation.. Reasoning . and 3. Brillantes. teachers or directors of PALISOC VS. Court of Appeals. YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute.000. HELD a.B.000. It is true that under the law abovequoted. but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution" . such that the control. Lastly.Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices.The trial court. casis arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody.. it is not without significance that . nor does paragraph 2 of said article. as erroneously held by the lower court. BRILLANTES 41 SCRA 548 TEEHANKEE. is as follows: ART. which authorizes the grant of moral damages.the deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's resentment. finally he died.. which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. . was shown to have existed. 2. it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school. concurring: -I would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils who are minors is not in accord with the plain text of the law. a fellow student of the deceased. . Civil Code. and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Civil Code. NO. including recess time.the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school.torts & damages 1. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived. must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority. and one afternoon. Palisoc became pale and fainted.00 for actual and compensatory expenses.At any rate.The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs. as in the case of the parents and of the guardians. but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. Valenton and Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12. A2010 . (c) P5. by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. MAKALINTAL.‖ ISSUE WON the school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors with Daffon. and the dicta in Mercado on which it relied. considering the size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions. dissenting: . such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. .00 for attorney's fee. gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face. instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged...The clause "so long as they remain in their custody" contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher. that while in the case of parents and guardians. in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180. apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy. Teodosio Valenton. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows. October 4. so long as they remain in their custody. and hence. the grant of moral damages is not justified. . J. absolving defendant Antonio C. Santiago M.L. (Art. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on . we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. in this wise: ―In the opinion of the Court. as well as the temper.finally. Jr. such that the control. direction and influence. together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. and Virgilio L. Dominador Palisoc. 2180. including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.000. 1. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher. which motivated the assault. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply.375. It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article.. at the laboratory room of the said Institute. (d) P10. at the time when the incident occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute. the article expressly so provides. . as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated. .. Sentencing the Daffon. Valenton and Quibulue.00 for loss of earning power and (e) P2." It is. their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age. Daffon. 2179. J. . respectively) Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students. at them. 2. At that time the classes were in recess. dismissing defendants' counterclaims. was occasioned by the fact that Manuel. should have been brought in as party defendant. NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of directors and the school) itself cannot be held similarly liable. so long as they remain in their custody.) After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals.00 for moral. but lately. it would have expressly so stated. Consequently. absolved from liability the three other defendantsofficials of the Manila Technical Institute.000. however. of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries. ." In the law of torts.2180) of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar.phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school. J. . so he was immediately taken to a hospital. and a student in automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute filed the action below for damages arising from the death of their son at the hands of a fellow student. . this article(art. REYES. the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents. . that "(I)t would seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody. I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results. upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made liable.At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship. direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. . Court of Appeals. defendant Virgilio L. had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo from Renato. as thus incorporated.the school had been incorporated since and therefore the school itself.

x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child. FACTS . 1988 July 29 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari AQUINO Facts: It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes. As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the school remised in the discharged of their duties. or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. They also claim that the "Lastly. ―There is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic and non-academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned. Teachers are liable for acts of their student except where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be answerable.torts & damages attitudes and often destructive activism of the students. the parents of the student at fault. Held: Yes. the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him. x x x ― The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises. private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone. The opinion of the majority states: "Here. since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident. another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez stated burying them all by himself. to hold their teachers and/or the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed by them. said private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away. casis civil liability in this case arose from a crime. At that time. defendant Daffon. Since it was a civil case. they were exonerated of liability. Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to be hospitalized and to undergo surgery. Deciding to help his colleague. the school was littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II. The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has outlived its purpose.it stands to reason that (1) the clause "so long as they remain in their custody" as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase "who live in their company" as used in reference to parents. However the court can suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed. While they were in the auditorium of their school. Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student under their control and supervision. These four pupils ---Reynaldo Alonso. (Note – the court view on increasing students activism likely causing violence resulting to injuries. aged ten to eleven. Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools. April 15.A group of students walking inside Araneta University were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias ―Teng‖. Alfredo went to the school to submit his ―Report in Physic‖. AMADORA VS CA RECOLLETOS) 160 SCRA 315 CRUZ. principal. are not involved. the school may be held to answer for the acts of its teacher or the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior. The answer is no since the provision speaks of ―teachers or heads‖ Dispositive WHEREFORE. also after classes. they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents). private respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging. for injuries caused by the student." PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY) 160 SCRA 785 PARAS. It seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship. The teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean.69 - prof. At this point. private respondent Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging.Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC .Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal. 1988 (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE- YLARDE vs. Basis of teacher‘s vicarious liability is." Note that for parental responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their company. private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category. The following day. April 25. hewas shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon. The court cannot make law. whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching‖.Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the provision only applies to vocational schools and not to academic institutions.. FACTS Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. The work was left unfinished. Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde. Guttierez. which they did not commit. Jr concurringly said many student x x x view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on behavior deportment and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected. What the petitioner wants to know is WON the school or the university itself is liable. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren. MTD was granted by the CA. 1988 NATURE Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order dismissing the complaint as against the respondent school and denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal. it can only apply the law with its imperfections.It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority. respondent school claims that a demand should have been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for damages against respondent school. Motion was denied due to insufficient justification to disturb ruling. ISSUE WON the Art 2180 CC13 applies to academic institutions HELD It is unnecessary to answer the issue. as such. . whether the semester has not ended. he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. . or has ended or has not yet begun. rendering teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control. academic or non-academic. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury. private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils. Then. ISSUE: WON Art 2180 is applicable. in or out of the school premises – J. Fransico Alcantara. Being their teacher-in-charge. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors.one other factor constrains me to dissent. this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. the teacher is physically present and in a position to prevent it.. . The term ―custody‖ signifies that the student is within the control and influence of the school authorities. but it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block. so long as they remain in their custody. However teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. ―x x x x The distinction no longer obtains at present. . dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep. Thus. GANCAYCO. A2010 . Before leaving. Such defense they had taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180." 13 . In any event.

therefore. but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit. Subsequently. (6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent. it is only the head of the school who can be held liable. As a result thereof. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. Abon for damages resulting from his acts. when he shot Napoleon Castro. -his parents filed a complaint against St. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult. (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling. J. We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence. when he shot Napoleon Castro. Reasoning: This is in line with the Court‘s ruling in Amadora vs. the ROTC Commandant. A "recess. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]. Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior. Francis HS. BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP. . Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school. at around 8:00 p. as contemplated in the law. three of the four kids. playfully jumped into the pit. Jimmy B. Alonso.: Feb. Bearing this in mind. Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF).m. knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. the latter "stands. Roberto C. (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging. "the phrase used in [Art. Such fault or negligence." Likewise. (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B. the teacher. Ratio: Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. so long as they remain in their custody. 1988 FACTS Jimmy Abon. the applicable provision of Article 2180 states: "Art. According to the CA. or the area within which the school activity is conducted. discretion. knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. Reasoning: ST." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher. represented by its principal. This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides: "Art. while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident. IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274 PADILLA. (2) absolving the other defendants. pinning him to the wall in a standing position. Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education. as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. casis HELD NO.70 - prof. so long as they remain in their custody. and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence. to pay private respondents. 25. (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person. including recess time. a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro. it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. Inc. it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde. ." HELD Only Aquino.. as party defendants. Likewise. a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977. xxx xxx xxx A2010 . and several teachers for damages incurred from the death . Quezon. petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 — 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school. Ylarde sustained injuries and died three (3) days later. (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task. the Trial Court rendered a decision. Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF). 2180 of the Civil Code. . impleading Jimmy B. capacity." or in the custody of BCF. (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's safety. Ratio: As regards the principal. 2180. ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde. Alcantara and Ylarde. b. the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages." as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school. supra. Jimmy B. His parents didn‘t allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home. to a certain extent. the concrete block caught him before he could get out. then a freshman student at St. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. Then. an obviously attractive nuisance. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. is liable. and (3) dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit. Ratio: Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano. Abon. Libertad D. both private respondents can be held liable for damages. However. This should not be the case. the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school. The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA. but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience. jointly and severally. In line with the case of Palisoc. Court of Appeals." contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises. The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age. petitioners in this case.. ISSUE WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code. in the parking space of BCF. Logically. there being fault or negligence. "Lastly.torts & damages A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left. Ylarde's parents. he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher. After hearing. 1991 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS -Ferdinand Castillo." Reasoning: a. and (5) left the children close to the excavation. 2176. is obliged to pay for the damage done. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. The time interval is safely within the "recess time" that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case. 17 a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat." On the other hand. as heirs of Napoleon Castro. Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation. DISPOSITION Granted. J. he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Illumin. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(Castillo/Cadiz) 194 SCRA 340 Paras. Abon. which was at about 8 o'clock in the evening.: October 5. without any warning at all. Abon. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. SALVOSA v.

They cannot escape liability simply because it wasn‘t an ―extra-curricular activity of the HS‖. 2 P. (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them. The plaintiff was confined in a hospital. contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it. xxx xxx xxx Lastly. Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties. Also. Security Agency. and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee. As such. In turn. yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA. the student abides by the school‘s academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations. teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming. 4. 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers. represented by his guardian. but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract. the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity. Inc. particularly par 4. since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices.Under Art. the defendant. J. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. student or apprentice of the school. a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBA‘s liability. The records also show that the 2 P. 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS . .On August 13. JR. Jr. the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondent‘s complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine. The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim. 1992 FACTS -Carlitos Bautista. Jr. 2180. while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil. along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge. J. and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180. Hence. who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant R. 4th. 7th paragraph. the petition is DENIED. the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. The school is obliged to provide the student with an education.In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBA‘s negligence in providing proper security measures. WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law. -PSBA sought to dismiss the case. Jimmy Solomon. hence. RL Security Agency and Solomon.. Hence this petition. Hence this petition. was in the campus premises thereof. -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment. 2180. Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident. time and place. PREMISES CONSIDERED. -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it. there was no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision. so long as they remain in their custody. . alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180. 2180. one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons. under Article 2180. Francis HS and the Illumin. Petitioners contend that the victim‘s parents failed to prove by evidence that they didn‘t give their son consent to join the picnic.The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman.. The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence of their liability. Francis and the principal). contending that it occurred due to petitioners‘ failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family. The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned. and as per doctor's opinion. shot the plaintiff on the abdomen. It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon. V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 FELICIANO. . From the evidence. In fact. during and after the attack of the victim. ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO. SOLIMAN. the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st.E. while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman. it should be noted that the victim‘s parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination. teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim.71 - prof. ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art. casis WHEREFORE. -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroad:‖… the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. -Both parties appealed to the CA.L. means and methods before. the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking. Costs against the petitioners.Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCC‘s motion to dismiss. for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1. acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. However. a contract is established between them. the questioned decision is SET ASIDE PSBA v CA (BENITEZ/BAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729 Padilla. a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks. RCC was not the employer of Solomon. WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180. 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses. without any provocation. NO . It further argued that Article 2180. no moral or exemplary damages under Art. of the Civil Code did not apply.torts & damages of their son. it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event. The CA erred in applying Art. At this stage. The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. If the CA‘s findings are to be upheld. alleging negligence. 1982. Also. resulting in a bilateral obligation. the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task.RCC filed a motion to dismiss. filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC. their students or apprentices. was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were from outside the school‘s academic community. Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following: xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper. 350 and 352 of the Civil Code 2. enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of PSBA. ISSUES 1. In the case at bar. Petitioner. . A2010 . On the issue of the liability of St. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extracontractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties‖ -Using the test in Cangco. At the outset. May 18. Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them. The employer of . in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD (1) NO. and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited. both are jointly and severally liable w/ the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the owner/manager (St. any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils. This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w/ Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers.: Feb. this appeal. -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family. a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC). employers will be forever exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties. recklessness and lack of security precautions. he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months. as well as those of Articles 349.E. -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC. but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible. Petitioner‘s MFR was denied. (2) NO. the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for one's own act or omission.

FC. recruits. CARPITANOS PARDO. . a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v. as here. and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial court's order.72 - prof. which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon.It was also pointed out in said case that: "In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. Mary‘s Academy.L.Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority. ST. Mary‘s Academy) WON St. upon the assumption that petitioner's cause of action was based. hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards. unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code. . finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them. Mary‘s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. In fact. The negligence of petitioner St.. MARY’S ACADEMY VS. 349. resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with. the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events. ISSUE (regarding liability of St. but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case. excluding petitioner St. 350. the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision.It is not the school. It held: When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment. In the case at bar. -TC: absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II. in the interest of justice. and therefore. and the students who are enrolled. 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos. Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition. there intervened the negligence of the minor‘s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority: xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors. Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva . WHEREFORE. The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or 'built-in' obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. the trial court had denied the school's motion to dismiss the complaint against it. -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities. Between the remote cause and the injury.In the case of PSBA v CA. allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC. xxx xxx xxx Art. a student of that Institute. Disposition. the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Security Agency Inc. the student covenants to abide A2010 . unbroken by intervening efficient causes.In the PSBA case. however. 352. on the other hand. there intervened the negligence of the minor‘s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. another student of the Institute. For the school to be liable. must be pinned on the minor‘s parents primarily. 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision .. Security Agency Inc. states." . Necessarily. 2. petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have. whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency.the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle. Brillantes. In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced. that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. YES . together with James Daniel II (then 15. even if there be a finding of negligence. . he being in fact an employee of the R. . by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. The negligence of petitioner St. and Vivencio Villanueva. while the school was the client of the latter. the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen. xxx xxx xxx Art. James Daniel II. or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded. 2180 of the Civil Code. there is established a contract between them. It is settled that where the security agency. This would be for the trial court to determine. there is. Dipolog City. but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. And. The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only.The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows: Art. acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation. No costs. the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment. casis Carpitanos sued the school. to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer. supra. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract. the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student. held parents and school liable -CA: school liable under A218 and 219.This case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings. -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva.[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants. Mary‘s Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos.In Palisoc v. petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident. student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges. and not to the clients of such agency. quoted above. -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva.L. the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon. The relations between teacher and pupil. and which was the proximate cause of the accident.torts & damages Solomon was the R. Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. however. was not a pupil. the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. At the same time. For its part. On the other hand. In the instant case. It was Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep. PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO. only on Art. the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc. Using the test of Cangco. the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon. however. February 6. driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep. SO ORDERED. . and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep. -Liability for the accident. Reasoning. . Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner. Certainly. and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the case. Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th paragraph of Article 2180. xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices. as yet. his parents. it must be shown that the ‗injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done. March 25.Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges. on the one hand. Mary‘s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. and could have been based. liable for damages HELD NO. There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC and Solomon. Ratio.Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. which contract results in obligations for both parties. It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached. Between the remote cause and the injury. the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC. Mary‘s Academy had no control. As PSBA. In other words.

who was biking towards the same direction as the bus. 2176. without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear. petitioner Philtranco. casis -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle.2180 uses the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) to mean "employer. Davide Facts: At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning. -Since the employer's liability is primary. in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. Inc.Hence. for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary. After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident. The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses. Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd. Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed. no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders. violation of traffic rules and regulations. the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41. about 6:00 o‘clock. Such fault or negligence.1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue!) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments: Art. . and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS. there being fault or negligence. Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus. Phil-American Forwarders.It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK. 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 217614 and 218015 of the Civil Code against petitioner Manilhig and his employer. 2180 NCC (Art. . abandonment of victim. 1999. its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Tomas. Inc. He was also only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality.200. is obliged to pay for the damage done.73 - prof. and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street.CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art. It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills. . xxxxxxxxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage . owned by PhilAm. the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former.. the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez.PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines. PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE. respectively. under the allegations of the complaint. -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles. Inc. So. which caused the death of the victim **Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. He was traveling counter-clockwise. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him. -The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn. In the process. direct. xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A.2180 CC. against Jose Benjamin Abad 15Art. like petitioner Philtranco. registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days. along the nat‘l highway at Sto. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital.. a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute.. CASTILEX V. in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer. This deprived the company of earnings of about P8. suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road. was run over by the said bus. parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez. recklessness. Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence. xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Inc. Petitioner’s Version -Manilhig. defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises.‖ . Romeo So Vasquez. Upon the other hand. . The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. -As the bus was pushed. -Civil Case No. PINEDA. 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A. -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Pampanga. including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired. Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides: Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. its manager BALINGIT and the driver. As to solidarity. VASQUEZ Dec. and joint and several or solidary with the driver. 1990. direct and solidary. 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine. Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur. June 17. (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. and denied MFR -Hence. The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan. -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street. * This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now. its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine. the victim. -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly. was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus. A2010 . Article 2194 expressly provides: the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Acuesta who. or to Belvic St. this appeal ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes. (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No.In the appeal. its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A. Jr. Dispositive Lower court‘s order of dismissal is AFFIRMED.600. GBW-794. (with regard to this issue) -Civil Case No. Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. On the same date and time. and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondents’ Version -In the early morning of March 24. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. owned by Phil Rabbit. But this was not alleged in their complaint. runs perpendicular to Gomez St. Inc. Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 2180.torts & damages FACTS . the victim Ramon A.Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pineda's employer. 21. 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS  (limited to that involved in the outline) 14Art.* ISSUE WON the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" used in Art. thereafter. and Luisa So Vasquez. warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog. -The Magsaysay Blvd. as a result thereof fell and.

who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver. . The phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task. His being at a place which. Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence.This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks. Such exception obtain in the present case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioner's vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager. He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning he‘s supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school. be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employer's vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and. Funtecha wanted to drive home. This rule is. Held: Castilez is absolved from any liability. It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. casis the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own. Instead. or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours. in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed. Where the employee's duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work. On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks. II. . however. The president of FCI is Agustin Masa. registered under the name of petitioner. way beyond the normal working hours. The Court of Appeals cannot. an employee is engaged in his employer's business in the operation of a motor vehicle. Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180. not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employee's action or inaction. then go back to the school. The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR. then go home in the school jeep. However. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner. while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task.torts & damages and Castilex Industrial Corporation. was known as a "haven for prostitutes. the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident. Hence. even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. . In the same action. Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. the plaintiff must show. neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Issue: WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle. Rather. After a dangerous curb. III. August 17. admittedly. title or designation but which. They perform functions which are beyond their office. Agustin has a son. the fourth paragraph should apply. he was driving a company-issued vehicle. He has a student license. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions. Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept. to hold the employer liable. surmises. For. using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position. however.. The SC does not agree. once this is done. Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights. pimps.It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home. Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD. spending more time at his actual duties. No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment. under which it can be found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home. 14 cda The employer may. He is also employed as a janitor. to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise. it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer's business or within the scope of his assigned task." had no connection to petitioner's business. presumably.Funtecha is a scholar of FCI. his overtime work had already been completed. Negligent acts of employees. The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances. and the fifth paragraph. A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable. who was presented as a hostile witness. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph. and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip. Allan lives with his dad. Operation of Employer's Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer. the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employer's motor vehicle. and seeing that the road was clear. whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry. Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians). therefore. Operation of Employer's Vehicle in Going to or from Work In the same vein. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included. Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan. are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task. 1992 NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS . the result varies with each state of facts. employees oftentimes wear different hats. ABAD. Allan. even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employer's vehicle. that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. as petitioner put it. or conjectures.m. Cebu Doctor's Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez. Funtecha also lives in the president‘s house free of charge while a student at FCI. even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. are still within the call of duty. an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. subject to exceptions such as when the A2010 . and drug pushers and addicts. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. and not a part of his services to his employer. Evidence that by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals. The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect. which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative. but rather. and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work. or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work. ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case. nevertheless. whether or not engaged in any business or industry. Allan let Funtecha drive.One night. it has been held that he has not resumed his employment. It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle: I. Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use. conclusion is grounded on speculations. traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee. the courts have frequently applied what has been called the "special errand" or "roving commission" rule. It was then about 2:00 a.74 - prof. whether or not engaged in any business or industry. As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact. and even finality at times. But it is necessary to establish the employeremployee relationship. an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle. to employers in general. testified that at the time of the incident. Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry. ABAD's working day had ended.

00 as moral damages. J/February 6. . the Metro Transit Organization. . has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. enroute to its destination. however. PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals. . Of course.Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides: "Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.000. NPC. A2010 NPC v CA (PHESCO INC. c) P50. or in the supervision over him.torts & damages . .No evidence. There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver. then drunk. entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan. The liability of the employer is. . includes any act done by an employee. a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. the LRTA.000. operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman. c) Attorney‘s fees of P20. was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who.It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD. Nicanor Navidad. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer. driver of the dump truck. instead of presenting evidence. There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep.A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action. the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him. filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin. . .00 as and for attorney‘s fees. In a "labor only" contract. one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw.On July 22. Prudent. . the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's business. NPC's liability is direct. The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitionerschool cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. August 14. Unfortunately. (Metro Transit).000.In this regard. primary and solidary.The petitioner.Marjorie Navidad (Nicanor‘s widow).00 as nominal damages.00.) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased. ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES . SC reversed. the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act. holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts: a) P44. .14 Oct 1993. along with their children. as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers.LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Moreover.Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI.520.The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin. b) Moral damages of P50.000. the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee.Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. .CA: exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and. 2003 .00. thus. including the latter's workers. Inc. d) P50. the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad. filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. about 730pm. delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. 1979. In exempting Prudent from liability. it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student driver's license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms. 2) Compensatory damages of P443.TC: dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit.00 as actual damages. Navidad was struck by the moving train. was coming in.000. if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it.The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability. . saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable. and Prudent for the death of her husband. we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in "labor only" contracting. In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees.000.TC: Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following: "a) 1) Actual damages of P44. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train. 1998 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari .At the exact moment that Navidad fell. a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City.75 397 SCRA 75 prof. the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. and e) P20.000. ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba. . Allan's job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day. DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed.In the provisions of the "Memorandum of Understanding" entered into by PHESCO and NPC.TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan.In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house. 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50. under Article 2180. Finding that a contractor was a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the "laboronly" contractor. b) P50. . even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. an LRT train. -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train. Even if somehow.The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latter's projects. Funtecha definitely was not. the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff. .While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks. and he was killed instantaneously. for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage. the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees.00. .00. Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG. However. The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw. having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately. in its answer. d) Costs of suit.830. it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Junelito Escartin. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act. FACTS . but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks). denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards. which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES . instead. . . primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver. . between the two. casis NATURE: APPEAL from CA’s DECISION . Rodolfo Roman. which reversed the trial court's judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages. -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals.CA denied petitioners‘ motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000. Hence.830." . It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman.

Article 219414 of the Civil Code can well apply." -The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply. In case of death of or injuries to passengers.A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury. Jr. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Pampanga. HELD: 1. In either case." "Article 1759. but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains.Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage . Christopher McKee and Araceli McKee. owned by private respondents.In case of such death or injury.Petition to review the resolution of the CA FACTS .The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier‘s employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers. . Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. . even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back.SC) The premise. the cargo truck. common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. .A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former‘s employees. which caused the latter to fall on the tracks. although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. "Article 1756. 2180. in case of his death or incapacity. The Ford Escort. . 1992 NATURE . however. There is no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.The Civil Code. the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman. all passengers of the Ford Escort. his car .. and physical injuries to George McKee. was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one‘s own acts or omissions. (But there wasn‘t any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Loadstar. The father and. casis negligence. one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana.NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA. a liability for tort may arise even under a contract. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car. 2194. was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. The foundation of LRTA‘s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. there being fault or negligence. Navidads Contention: . with a due regard for all the circumstances. and by simple proof of injury. using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. on the other hand. and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The boys were moving back and forth.PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions. governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers. JR. WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTA’s CLAIMS: -Escartin‘s assault upon Navidad. he must also be absolved from liability as Prudent is. and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier. thus. "This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees. . provides: "Article 1755. for the employer‘s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. where tort is that which breaches the contract. is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. Jaime Tayag and Rosalina Manalo. if the common carrier‘s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. in conjunction with Article 2180. July 16. so long as they remain in their custody. 1977. No costs. ______________ 12 Art. Before he could do so. Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence. DISPOSITION: CA‘S DECISION AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. and driven by Ruben Galang. a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck. is obliged to pay for the damage done. Lastly.torts & damages ISSUES: WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred. which was loaded with 200 cavans of rice weighing about 10. a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. the presumption would be that it has been at fault. swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck. applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. which LRTA and Roman. a factual matter that has not been shown. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. 2 boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation.Once such fault is established. . REASONING: . Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. A2010 . teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices.On January 8. unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent. 2176.Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier.Immediately before the collision. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh.76 - prof.In fine. Such fault or MCKEE V IAC (TAYAG & MANALO) 221 SCRA 517 Davide. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. 14 Art. the mother. . and was bound for Manila. Needless to say. in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers. according to the CA." "Article 1763. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. have failed to show. Kim McKee and Loida Bondoc. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. 2. an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved. when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasidelictual liability had no contract existed between the parties. Stated differently. 13 Art. both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy. When the northbound car was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge.13 of the Civil Code. YES. he then switched on the headlights of the car. was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent. . .000 kilos. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. NO. the contract can be said to have been breached by tort.

1916 NATURE Appeal from decision of the CFI FACTS .While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought or the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent. Either factor working independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions. WON Alexander Commercial is liable as Li‘s employer HELD 1. and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol. and bumped plaintiff's car.. Article 2180 reads as follows: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. the conduct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoroughful care. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li. That presumption.Civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were filed as a result of a vehicular accident. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving when she realized she had a flat tire. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh. and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. rather than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply his brakes. alleging that plaintiff was the one who was reckless or negligent. not juris et de jure. based on the principle of bonus pater familias. xxx xxx xxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.Please see first Mckee digest for details on the collision. exhaustion. -RTC found Li and Alexander solidarily liable. especially when he attempted to use his money for mathematical calculations. WON Li was grossly negligent in driving the company issued car 2. and then fell to the ground. etc. Inc.Witnesses testified that plaintiff‘s physical and mental condition before the accident was excellent.77 - prof. DISPOSITION Judgment of RTC reinstated. . The collision occurred in the lane of the truck. 1996 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. His leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture. . . She parked along the sidewalk of Aurora Blvd. in contravention of an ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act. Court of Appeals. She filed a claim for damages against defendant. WON Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence 3. Li would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were alert as every driver should be to those conditions. March 31. said company. . . The patient apparently was slightly deaf. ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Merritt. which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color. a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly. A2010 . Manalo and Tayag are. MERRITT v GOVERNMENT 34 Phil 311 TRENT. on the said bridge. the visibility of the street. YES . Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs.The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. . alcohol. unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. He could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. the provision for the unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car. Li's failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast" speed as testified by one of the witneses. It is the failure to observe that degree of care. which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.Ma. . He had to dissolve a partnership that he had with an engineer and give up a contract for the construction of a building. Neither did they attempt to prove it. drowsiness. He was one of the best contractors of wooden buildings. the managerial employee or company sales agent. under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. .Plaintiff was so severely injured. has not demonstrated. VALENZUELA v CA (LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL. Defendants counterclaimed for damages. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. with no parking lights or early warning device. which turned suddenly and unexpectedly to Taft Avenue without sounding any whistle or horn. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. is only juris tantum.Li‘s alibi was that he was driving at 55kph when he was suddenly confronted with a speeding car coming from the opposite direction. 3. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident. He instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle. As employers of the truck driver. but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. which was the opposite lane. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. alighted from the car. . that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. This latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor. INC. and the area was poorly lighted. was hit by the General Hospital ambulance.Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party.E. Physiological "fight or flight" mechanisms are at work. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. ISSUE 1.The Court rules that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was.Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises.Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant. . casis . whereby such other person suffers injury.Negligence. is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution. YES . She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li. with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of .In fine. Given a light rainfall. put on her emergency lights.torts & damages collided with the truck. and went to the rear to open the trunk. Alexander Commercial. which was destroyed. directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. to our satisfaction. provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs. the body.Li was. precaution. ISSUE WON the owners of the cargo truck (Tayag and Manalo) are liable for the resulting damages HELD YES . as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others. negligent in driving his company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer 2. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. inc. riding on a motorcycle. She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. in law. contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered.The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a car driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial.) 253 SCRA 303 KAPUNAN. however. As such. in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of furthering the company's image. therefore. the proximate cause of the collision. CA absolved Alexander. She was pulled out from under defendant's car. NO . an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger. February 7. since normally he would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela's car.

a government agency).The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent. It states that ―E. the rule is stated in 36 Cyc.000 per month. and among these persons. 2457 was enacted. Partida 7. would not prevent recovery for the whole time. by his own fault or negligence.‖ ISSUES WON the government is liable for the damages resulting from a tort committed by an agent or employee of the government HELD NO Ratio The State is only liable for the acts of its agents.78 - prof. except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. 1903. and whereas in the first article thereof. must be presumed to lie with the state.‖ . August 31. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts. in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of the property which they hold in sublease. limited the time to 2months and 21 days. 1902. the court held the following: . because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. are found. where the general principle is laid down that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence. without any fault on his part. because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of 6 months. . therefore.The Civil Code in chap 2. It follows therefrom that the state. . but not always. however. . ISSUE WON the government is liable for the damages HELD NO . .Act No. and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands. E. 915. on the contrary. is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office. foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof. . by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor. and the trial court so found. to which Mr. is P18.Insular Auditor dismissed the claim hence this appeal. which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees. 741. the award awarded for permanent injuries. and (b) the P2.Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent. regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or negligence. but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom it properly pertained to do the act performed. which is the original basis of this kind of objections. xx ―The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent. difficulties and losses. 1948 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the Insular Auditor FACTS . on that the person obligated. or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. As to the second.The obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or negligence is based. casis first. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision. takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. and to determine the amount of the damages. in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. No. since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments. Government.torts & damages . if any. subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.In the United States the rule is that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs.075. that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1. we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal an that of private persons interested in its operation. We find nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the ROSETE v AUDITOR GENERAL 81 Phil 453 FERIA. The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs. guardians and owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise. Dispositive Judgment appealed from reversed. 1903 of the Civil Code reads: ―Art. the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official. the record shows. Between these latter and the state. to defendant said Government at the same.Jose Panlilio ignited his lighter near a drum into which gasoline was being drained causing fire in the warehouse of Emergency Control Administration (ECA. . in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case. Reasoning . The court. doubtless because and only in this case. except when it acts through the agency of a special agent. however.The responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission.. . as held in the last paragraph of article 1903. This legal presumption gives way to proof. We. . The obligation imposed in the preceding article is enforceable not only for personal acts and omission but also for those persons for whom another is responsible. by virtue of such provisions of law.Art. case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations.As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court. . thereby giving rise to this claim for damages against Panlilio for his negligence and the officers of ECA for storing gasoline in said warehouse contrary to the provisions of ordinances of the City of Manila (ordinance requires a license for storing flammable substances. but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. which would be subversive of the public interest.In the case of Merritt v. which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. . no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a A2010 . or create any cause of action in his favor.666. responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. title 16. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. In this we think there was error. therefore.Although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers. thus: By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. which ECA didn‘t have). we are not called upon to determine. reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only 2 months and 21 days while the remainder of the 6 months was spent in his home. and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. book 4. find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff.000.741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5. acting in the exercise of his powers. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth. shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim.The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903 On the computation of damages The two items which constitute a part of the P14. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital. the following articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage. he executes the trust confided to him. as is evidenced by the same Law 3. officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903.Trial court held that the collision was due solely on the negligence of the chauffeur and awarded the plaintiff the sum of P14. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff. the fault or negligence.The fire destroyed the building owned by the petitioner. the state. called upon to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner. . because. Title 15.

thereby opening it up to the possibility that it may be held liable for the damages caused by its driver. the government is not responsible for damages caused through such negligence. in the sense in which these words are employed. which shall be organized immediately after the approval of this Act. 1976. and took a few steps. Therefore. These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital. is one who receives a definite and fixed order by the commission.There being no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to the ECA or its officers. No. The Angat dissenting opinion: Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines. who was not its special agent. required further medical treatment by a private practitioner. January 29.D. 327) authorizing the filing of claims against the government with the Insular Auditor. Burgos Avenue. for the proper conduct of its business. FACTS . Name and Domicile — A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration. DE LEON FONTANILLA V MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINSITRATION 194 SCRA 486 PARAS. . subsequently. upon the land benefited. which came into effect some 3 years after the perfection of the contract. it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent. the left upper arm. and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia. the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. including all communal and pump irrigation projects. the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders. the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. The decision of this Court in G.R. was done by a special agent. including the power to establish and maintain subsidiaries. ACCORDINGLY. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing. several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. 1. and his employment had lasted for five years.R. The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government. waiting for a jeep. 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED. . because the officers of the ECA did not act as special agents of the government within the above defined meaning of that wod in Article 1903 of the Civil Code in storing gasoline in the warehouse of ECA. . MENDOZA V. thus is governed by the Corporation Law. and in general. o NIA believes this bases this on:  PD 552 – amended some provisions of RA 3601 (the law which created the NIA)  The case of Angat River Irrigation System v.Teotico filed with CFI Manila. . Teotico. to say that it is liable for damages arising from tort committed by its employees. its mayor. .Genaro N. he hailed a jeep that came to a stop. maintenance and insurance. . .Although there is an act (Act No. He argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17. subsection (f): (f) . city engineer. to recover funds or portions thereof expended for the construction and/or rehabilitation of communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a special fund for irrigation development under section 2 hereof. DISSENTING: PADILLA: to say that NIA has opened itself to suit is one thing. he executes the trust confided to him. February 27. . but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions. 1991 NATURE Resolution FACTS The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare. an accountant. his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. as are directly or indirectly necessary. - - nature of its powers and functions does not show that it was intended to ―bring to the Government any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit‖. The state or a government agency performing governmental functions may be held liable for tort committed by its employees only when it acts through a special agent. DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is affirmed. After waiting 5 mins. . 552 provides that: (b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all irrigation systems constructed by or under its administration. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory. Section 2. subsection b of P.79 - prof. was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. impairing his vision. improving. who was not its special agent HELD YES Reasoning the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeep. It has its own assets and liabilities. rehabilitating. Besides. casis Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred liens first. Section 1 of Republic Act No. Due to the fall. . which liens shall have preference over all other liens except for taxes on the land. like the NIA. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid." Certainly. ISSUE WON the NIR is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. and then on the crops raised thereon. exercised a governmental function because the CITY OF MANILA V TEOTICA 22 SCRA 267 CONCEPCION. . is still another thing.‘ xx ― ‗That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent. Manila. such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a "government-function" corporation. incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above powers and objectives. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital. Section 2. such fees or administration charges as may be necessary to cover the cost of operation. Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh. and to transact such business. The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court. and appeal by private persons or entities from the latter‘s decision to the Supreme Court. Angat River Workers‘ Union Angat Case: Although the majority opinion declares that the Angat System. 1990 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. where his injuries were treated. 61045 dated December 1. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces. a strong dissenting opinion held that Angat River system is a government entity exercising proprietary functions. he fell inside a manhole on P. to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law. No. (Emphasis for emphasis). 1968 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals. . the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 26. NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. and such preferred liens shall not be removed until all fees or administration charges are paid or the property is levied upon and sold by the National Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency. DISPOSITION We conclude that the National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. and to recover the cost of construction within a reasonable period of time to the extent consistent with government policy. The employment contract of 1971 was executed when the Labor Code of the Philippines had not yet been promulgated.torts & damages ― ‘… The state is not responsible for the damage suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office… n relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a juridical person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. Burgos Avenue. and the latter responsible for all claims. after which he was taken home. it does not make any and all claims against the government allowable. 55963 and G. he had acquired the status of regular employee and could not be removed except for valid cause. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors. a complaint which was. 3601 provides: Sec. which is the irrigation of lands. A2010 . As blood flowed therefrom. foreign to the exercise of duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof. since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer. amended for damages against the City of Manila.

defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela. The Ace Advertising disbursed P5.June 15. concur. regardless of the object thereof. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence. . ―…were also privy to the unauthorized disbursement of the corporate moneys jointly with the appellant. or any other city officer. 1954 until full payment. 3rd party complaint dismissed -CA affirmed however dismissal of 3rd party complaint was reversed stating that Taylor's trip had been neither authorized nor ratified by the company -CA noted that based on the facts. and that these changes had been undertaken by the city from time to time whenever funds were available. The respondent. ISSUES WON City of Manila should be held liable for the damages suffered by Teotica. Upon order of the Provincial Commander. intended exclusively for the City of Manila. in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. in general. in connection with the maintenance of said road.The first issue raised by the Manila is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of RA 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading: The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor. is a special law. and as it was an unauthorized act of expenditure of corporate funds. cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same. Reasoning The assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made. therefore. city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. to authorize the trip which was for the company's benefit -Joya also filed a 3rd party complaint against the two Aranetas proving that they were involved in sending Taylor abroad -trial court rendered judgment ordering the respondent to pay the Ace Advertising "the sum of P5.B. ISSUES 1. because RA 409. in his answer. seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.After conducting a preliminary investigation. CC governs liability due to "defective streets. on account of Taylor's travel and studies -the Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the court of first instance of Manila against the respondent for recovery of the total sum disbursed to Taylor. the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed.00. to the damage of the firm of which he was an officer. casis passive. . No. to enforce the provisions of this chapter. demonstrate quite distinctly that the petitioner neglected to perform his duties properly.. Upon the contrary. and it was these three without whose acts the same could not have happened. 1975 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the CFI FACTS . and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review.4 refers to liability arising from negligence. Then. J. . he continued to receive his salaries in the form of vouchers ordered and signed by respondent Joya. JJ. is one of fact. with costs against the City of Manila. which were A2010 . again.20 with interest at the legal rate from August 23. .20. The existence of a contract between the parties. Palawan. . it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province. This plus the fact that he even approved thrice payroll checks for the payment of Taylor's salary. Sanchez. Municipal Board. J. Voting Reyes. authority or ratification. . Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon. Palawan.: May 24.Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter. Likewise. Makalintal. filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha. bridges.R.Defense pointed out that because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing.Plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". concerning the unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds for the latter. A year later or on April 9. city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted.This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.043. or any other law or ordinance. any person by reason of defective conditions of road. The others were signed by either the respondent. Hence. Dizon.Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch. in spite of his being a vice-president and director of the Ace Advertising. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road. the city government has changed the position and layout of catchbasins in the City by constructing them under the sidewalks with concrete cement covers and openings on the side of the gutter. cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of. Jikil Taha through his counsel made representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the seized property to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused. Even if P.043. denied the charge and claimed that the trip was nonetheless ratified by the company's board of directors. for which solidary liability should have been imposed upon all in the first place‖ ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict HELD: Yes . or from negligence of said Mayor.sec. When asked about the expenses of the trip. public buildings. streets. both petitioners knew and through their acts showed that they approved of the trip." in particular. in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan. the petitioner remained TORTS WITH INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION LIM v DE LEON G. wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander in Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch. on the ground that the same was the subject of a criminal offense. . or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions. for the first time. this appeal by the City of Manila. The petitioner signed three of these checks. that in order to prevent such thefts. he in particular not having testified or offered testimony to prove such claim. HELD YES.750. Castro. What said article requires is that the province. stealing of iron catchbasin covers was rampant. the Municipal Board. throughout the period of Taylor's stay abroad. and that in any event under the by-laws he had the discretion. that the Office of the City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers. the juridical situation was a simple quasi-delict by them committed upon the corporation.80 - prof. upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac.. what had happened was in truth and in fact a venture by them given their stamp of approval. or injuries suffered by. this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila. as general manager.Plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim pleaded with Orlando Maddela to return the motor launch but the latter refused. without costs. which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6.CFI Manila sustained the theory of the defendants and dismissed the amended complaint. Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon.L. WON defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime . constitutes no bar to the commission of a tort by one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative. explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party. ARANETA v JOYA 57 SCRA 59 CASTRO J. except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned. the determination of whether or not P. Ratio RA 409. respondent answered that these were not shouldered by the company and instead by other parties -while abroad. Bengzon. whereas the Civil Code is a general law. said Article 2189 is decisive thereon. a national highway. and other public works under their control or supervision. L-22554 MARTIN. 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him. under Article 2189 of the Civil Code. alleging that the trip was made without its knowledge. 1974 FACTS: -An employee of the Ace ADVERTISING Company was sent to the States to pursue studies in television.torts & damages city health officer.P. plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim. . Burgos Avenue were. or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides: Provinces. -The fact that he was occupying a contractual position at the Ace Advertising is of no moment.. Angeles and Fernando. Detachment Commander of Balabac. whereas Article 2189. under Republic Act 409. Zaldivar. .The petitioner's assertion that he signed the questioned payroll checks in good faith has not been substantiated. city treasurer and chief of police. At any rate. all told. or Vicente Araneta (company treasurer) who put up part of the bill connected with Taylor's trip and also handed him letters for delivery in the United States. August 29. 1962. as has been repeatedly held by this Court. applicable to the entire Philippines. Dispositive WHEREFORE.

should be considered. when the temptation is strongest to yield to the law of force rather than the force of law. not just to the lawyers who signed the motion.e.e. ISSUES 1. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Ratio: The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article.00 for attorney's fees. defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties. to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated. 30. but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs In filing the motion to set aside the resolution.030. exemplary damages may also be awarded.Aguinaldo and MSgt. Thus. Art. that for some period after their arrest. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Art. in addition. 2. only the facts alleged in the complaint. Its message is clear. And since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a warrant. said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants. 32. Hence. to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action. NO . jointly and severally with his subordinates. exemplary damages of at least P150K each or a total of P3M. elements of the TFM raided several places. it is difficult to justify the TC‘s dismissal for lack of cause of action the complaint against all the defendants. There can be no question that without the proper search warrant. The body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs.Defendant-appellees admitted that when Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim and impounded the motor launch he was not armed with a search warrant. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials. known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila. civilian or military. They needed no specific ABERCA V VER G. xxx "The indemnity shall include moral damages. Respondents’ contentions: A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants.torts & damages 2. casis necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power.81 - prof. Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages of P39.R. 3. who directly or indirectly obstructs. violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages. high or low. NO Ratio: Although the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. But in this case. they have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and seizure. Estelito Mendoza. he furnished copies thereof. [c] Art. 2. It cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint. and no others. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates. 2219. alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under Art. under the above principles. that he effected the seizure of the motor launch in the absence of and without the consent of Delfin Lim. responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one entered declaring the seizure illegal and ordering defendant-appellee Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon to pay to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim the sum of P3. WON defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful HELD 1. L-69866 YAP. or any private individual. house. the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. moral damages of at least P150K each or a total of P3M. the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiff. that during these raids. [d] So. through their counsel. that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel. as contended by respondents. except Maj. provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the RPC or other penal statute. employer and employee) relationship. it is not the actor alone (i. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. plus P1. if admitted hypothetically.Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: xxx "(6)Illegal search.00 moral damages. In addition. For this purpose.Any public officer or employee.Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their claim for damages on Articles 32 and 2219 of the New Civil Code which provide in part as follows: "ART. 32. Art. and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants. [b] The invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers. April 15. 3. a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. harass and punish them. the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. [b] By this provision. Reasoning: [a] The purpose Art. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. YES . 1988 NATURE: Petition for certiorari FACTS This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. And this must have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his comment on the motion. it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings. 29. 32. 32 of CC which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. 32 CC. as well as indirectly.000. 32 of CC. [d] Even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention. 32 governs. the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and acquires a larger dimension. xxx "(1)Acts and action referred to in Articles 21. 2. that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize.000. certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs. 34 and 36. owe obedience and allegiance at all times. no public official has the right to enter the premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. A2010 . papers. that military men who interrogated them employed threats. defeats.00 as actual damages. 26." Plaintiffs’ allegations: That complying with said order of Ver. it is . No." . and. then Sol-Gen. NO. employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants. tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them. WON a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages. NO. no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. xxx "(9)The rights to be secure in one's person. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. the decisive factor in this case is the language of Art. 28. Balaba. A superior have to answer for the transgressions of his subordinates against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. 27. 32 of CC makes the persons who are directly. WON trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to (dome of the) plaintiffs on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file MFR of the court's resolution granting the respondent's motion to dismiss HELD 1. the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party Reasoning: [a] The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress. and attorney's fees not less than P200K. 32 CC is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution." "ART.Pursuant to the foregoing provisions. [c] To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action. The complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which. P750.

CA PUNO. Again. he was acquitted in the CA. A2010 .. they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure.torts & damages authority to do that. Private respondent then filed a Civil Case against the petitioners for sums of money and damages. We impose a SIX PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9. So with the petitioner corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman. was tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law.The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for damages filed in the court below by petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of their constitutional rights and liberties. The other items returned were of inferior quality. and insignias. However. At the same time it rejects the automatic application of the principle of respondent superior or command responsibility that would hold a superior officer jointly and severally accountable for damages. cit. 32 of CC. was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines. Firstly. on the said amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment thereof. WON MHP Garments is liable Yes. moral damages can be awarded in the case at bench. He also ordered the return of the seized items which was not immediately MARCIA V CA (PAJE) 205 PHIL 147 RELOVA. he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. Petitioner corporation received information that private respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in October 1983. after a preliminary investigation. they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. Issue/s and Held WON the search and seizure was legal No. causing the latter‘s death and physical injuries to herein petitioners. serious anxiety. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure.He was convicted in the criminal case in the RTC. or members of the military or police force or private individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto. Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap . The evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private respondents' goods. Costs against petitioners. supplies. and two (2) other constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. There can be no doubt that petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights. De Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores of private respondents. Indeed.The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons.82 - prof. The specific date and time are not established in the evidence adduced by the parties. The search and seizure were clearly illegal. and wounded feelings due the tortious raid caused by petitioners. Probable cause for a search has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. an employee of petitioner corporation. C. And thirdly. The civil case was dismissed. 22 September 1994 Nature . After a preliminary investigation.. 1983 NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS . 1299 already directs all law enforcement agencies of the Republic of the Philippines. January 27. 1987 on the TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents. Private respondents' avowals of embarrassment and humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise were supported by their testimonies. returned despite demands." -Sometime in October 1983. De Guzman.Paje is a driver of a Victory Liner Bus . Disposition IN VIEW WHEREFORE. The respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents. in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%). concurring: . It affirmed the decision with modification MHP filed a petition for certiorari before the SC. They reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25. dresses. . It is consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered. Even then. petitioner corporation was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed. Ponce de Leon. WON an award for moral damages should be awarded Yes.00) for the unreturned twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts items and a TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest. There was no probable cause for the seizure. vs. De Guzman. upon proper application by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the Philippines for warrant of arrest and/or search warrant with a judge. The progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. be they public officers or employees. DISPOSITION: Petition granted. The wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the award of exemplary damages. violate or in any manner impede or impair the constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person. Larry de Guzman who did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. INC.Paje was charged with homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. In doing so. the raid was made on the stores of private respondents and the supposed illicit goods were seized. casis Instructions which the petitioners miserably failed to do. op. they should have filed a third-party complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief. In their Memorandum Agreement. Despite the sufficiency of time. the judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not abdicate his duty to properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of being held responsible for gross negligence and of being held under the cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with the tortfeasor.His bus collided with the jeep driven by Clemente Marcia. . and suits on display at respondents' stalls. the appealed decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Inc. Letter of Instruction No. SEPARATE OPINION: TEEHANKEE. The CA ruled that criminal negligence is wanting and that Paje was not even guilty of civil negligence. The trial court ruled for the private respondents. the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for unfair competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods. to apprehend immediately unauthorized manufacturers and distributors of Scout paraphernalia. and to impound the said paraphernalia to be used as evidence in court or other appropriate administrative body it orders the immediate and strict compliance with the MHP GARMENTS. The decision was appealed to the respondent court. and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. However. and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.J. in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms. Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs. A civil case was also instituted against him by herein petitioners for reckless imprudence and negligence in driving the passenger bus. The omission will not exculpate petitioners. The items were then turned over by Captain Peñafiel to petitioner corporation for safekeeping.Petition for Certiorari Facts -MHP Garments. they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. which was never done in this case. they seized the boy and girl scouts pants.. Without any warrant. It will also serve as a stern reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a virile reality and not a mere burst of rhetoric. badges. defeat. including moral and exemplary. the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents. . A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents. stand liable and may be sued in court for damages as provided in Art. unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned. not all the seized items were turned. they did not. The all encompassing protection extends against intrusions directly done both by government and indirectly by private entities. Private respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of business to recover their goods. Peñafiel.000. 1983. with his subordinates who committed such transgressions.The defendants presented the copy of said criminal case to the court handling the civil case against them. The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Secondly. Case remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings. . for the case was of pure accident." These facts and circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to justify their warrantless search and seizure. MHP received information that private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz. Mirasol Lugatiman.

fraud. 141 is SET ASIDE MADEJA V CARO ABAD SANTOS. The complaining witness is the widow of the deceased. however. 2004 NATURE Petition for review of CA Deci FACTS (Consti II Case) -Respondent Morales wrote an article for People‘s Journal Tonight based on the sworn statement in the police blotter and interview of Emelita Despuig where Despuig alleged that Arafiles raped her the month before then attempted to rape her the night she filed a complaint. -RTC: in favor of Arafiles -CA: in favor of Morales. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence. ISSUES 1. based on doctrine of fair comment ISSUE MVRS V ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL G." Obiter . 21 NCC): Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. under the circumstances of this case. -then mentioned doctrine: The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. and consistently with good faith and reasonable care. INC CARPIO MORALES. YES.83 - prof.R. Japzon for damages in the same court. 19. Dispositive Petition is GRANTED. frustrated and attempted homicide. 1983 NATURE Petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the defendant's motion to dismiss FACTS . -then discussed how to determine if a published work is libelous: In actions for damages for libel. respondent was present when Emelita executed her sworn-statement where she reported an abduction with rape and an abduction incident (where no rape occurred. . had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. Ratio Section 2. unless the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be non-existent in the final judgment."Art. The two enactments are quoted hereinbelow: "Sec. The presentation of the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint may have been in a sensational manner. to a point of suppression. the order dismissing Civil Case No.: December 21. . In the preparation of stories. al. -About a year following the published article. J. Japzon. Madeja sued Dr. J. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.The acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. and consistently with good faith and reasonable care. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. Otherwise stated. 2. they were not inflicted with malice. a civil action for damages. pendency or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom. Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. et. He should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him. for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. he was not able to do so. that the narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters. " . It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. March 25. the petition is hereby DENIED. it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. but we do not consider that the respondents.Petitioner also relies on Art 33 CC. Madeja.… an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action." Tolentino says: "While the State is the complainant in the criminal case. press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines. but it is not per se illegal. 33. the extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability DISPOSITIVE Decision affirmed A2010 . Carmen L.. provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. In cases of defamation. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. WON an independent civil action may be filed during the pendency of the criminal case ARAFILES v PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS. casis WON the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages HELD NO. The respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which invoked Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads: "Sec. . but was about to happen) – so respondent‘s article was not maliciously sensationalized. WHEREFORE. Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation.In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages. -then discussed the petitioner‘s allegation that the news item as a ―malicious sensationalization‖ failed: even though the police blotter only shows 1 count of abduction and rape." . .torts & damages ISSUES WON the acquittal in the criminal case would result to a dismissal in the civil case HELD YES . they should not be held to account. the injured individual is the one most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. Japzon is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith. the said article speaks only of defamation. In the preparation of stories. press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. SO ORDERED HELD 1. Eva A. being the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist. . may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy.Dr. The information states that: "The offended party Carmen L. 2003 NATURE Petition to review decision of CA . 135306 BELLOSILLO. 3. namely: 1.There are at least two things about Art. First discussed applicable provisions (A33.". Morales attempted to contact Arafiles but since the latter‘s office was still closed at that time (past 12mn – he works for NIAS-PAGASA).The criminal case still pending. Other civil actions arising from offenses. Reasoning. and physical injuries." 2. may be brought by the injured party. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. However. fraud and physical injuries. This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution. Hence. January 28. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. Arafiles filed action for damages based on the alleged ―grossly malicious and overly sensationalized‖ report by Morales which cast aspersions on his character. The succeeding paragraphs (in which petitioner and complainant Emelita were eventually identified) sufficiently convey to the readers. No. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Independent civil action. they should not be held to account. Disposition. A civil action for libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely independent of the institution. to a point of suppression. Ratio.

A2010 .PNB filed two civil actions to recover losses the bank suffered (Civil Case No. the former denying the motion. a civil action for damages. the two cases have been consolidated for a single decision. fraud. may be brought by the injured party. 88343). and physical injuries. hence.In disregard of the pertinent rules. 2. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ [dissent] . for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.JUSTICE JBL REYES: ―…in the case of an independent civil actions under the Civil Code. 1(d) does not apply.In the present case. Reasoning ART 33.The filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is fully warranted under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code. Salta indiscriminately granted certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed by PNB. .I dissent not because the newspaper article in question is libelous. cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam.which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of defamation. . I think Rule 107 Sec. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal case.Both RTC and CA found the article insulting and humiliating to Muslims. . (d) the plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe. the civil actions very clearly alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the cause of action averred in the complaints. . and upon securities not commensurate with the amount of the loans. ill-natured. RTC dismissed: plaintiffs failed to establish their cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified. . et. ―vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs xxx‖ can give rise to a cause of action for damages. or anger. fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. causing wounded feelings and mental anguish to believers of Islam. or only to recommend the granting of loans. . and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. or vexatious. Respondents scarcely can claim having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in damages. SALTA V DE VEYRA 202 Phil 527 DE CASTRO. CA reversed: it was "clear from the disputed article that the defamation was directed to all adherents of Islamic faith. such cause of action cannot be sustained.which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress. . depending on the amount of the loan applied for. . or to any of the individual complainants.‖ ISSUE 1. whether acquittal or conviction.The offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature. that they may be made the subject of a separate civil action because of the distinct separability of their respective juridical cause or basis of action. Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se. every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries. Civil Case No.To recover for this the plaintiff must show that: (a) conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of plaintiff. 79583. embarrassment.The article is not only an imputation of irreligious conduct but also a downright misrepresentation of the religious beliefs of Muslims. (c) causal connection between defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress. WON elements of libel exist 2. that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Phil but the entire Muslim world. to the effect that although it may not constitute a criminal offense.Two cases involving the same issue disposed of by two judges in a manner directly in opposition of each other. CC recognizes the possibility of such a civil action either pursuant to Art 26. a local federation of more than 70 Muslim religious orgs. Also. that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings. esp. .MVRS claimed it was merely an expression of belief/opinion and was published without malice. There is no direct reference or allusion to the federation or any of its members. and since no particular individual was identified in the disputed article. It is in the resolution of the motions to dismiss that Judges de Veyra and Purisima of the CFI of Manila took diametrically opposing views. The present case falls within the application of the relational harm principle of tort actions for defamation. SEPARATE OPINION VITUG [concur] . and.humiliating persons because of their religious beliefs. 4.Salta was an employee of the PNB assigned as Manager of the Malolos' branch. where the civil case may be filed separately and proceed independently of the criminal case. regardless of the result of the latter. NO. but because it constitutes an intentional tortious act causing mental distress to those whom private respondent IDCP represents. The cause of action is libel. were not entitled to damages. Ratio Action arising from an intentional tortuous act causing mental distress cannot be sustained in this case. which fraud is positively and easily identifiable in the manner and scheme aforementioned. and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious. HELD NO. would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action.That there was fraud committed by the defendant in granting the aforesaid loans which rendered him liable for his acts. NO. September 30. in manner characterized by negligence. . fraud and manifest partiality. that the greatest sin in Islam is to worship things or persons other than Allah. for such action is personal in nature. (b) conduct was extreme and outrageous. or to Art. Decision reversed. . Liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer. . it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character.Focal point of claim for damages: insult caused by the article that the Muslims worship the pig as their God which is absolutely contrary to their basic belief as Muslims that there is only one God.The purported damage caused by the published article falls under principle of relational harm . 1982 FACTS . the result of the criminal case. do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. In cases of defamation.The present controversy stems from a civil action for damages and not from a criminal complaint. as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm . The criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the main element of which is fraud. WON the cause of action should rise from an intentional tortuous act causing mental distress HELD 1. Reasoning Defamation means the offense of injuring a person's character. a specie of an offense committed by means of fraud. the article relates to the entire Muslim population and not just to the IDCP or to any of the individual respondents. par. For a uniform ruling that would authoritatively settle this regrettable conflict of opinion. This seems to be the spirit of the law when it decided to make these actions `entirely separate and distinct' from the criminal action. the latter granting it.Complaint alleged that what was published in BULGAR was insulting and damaging to the Muslims. Hence in these cases. and some individual Muslims filed in the RTC Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS. . casis . may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. 33 which provides that in case of defamation. it did not mention respondents as object of the article. and. (AmJur) Disposition Petition granted.‖ . Ratio The civil action permitted therein to be filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of the latter. regulations and policies of the respondent bank. . the accused would not be liable. With this the bank filed a criminal action against Salta.Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry. CARPIO [dissent] . but on the fact of defamation. one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited provision. .84 - prof. and filed Motions to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases." Acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle for the civil case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court makes a finding that even civilly. unlike other offenses not mentioned. anxiety. a civil complaint for damages. whether written or spoken.al.torts & damages FACTS . This finding of fact establishes that petitioners have inflicted on private respondents an intentional wrongful act . His duty was to grant loans. Based on the same acts for which the criminal action was filed.The ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHIL (IDCP). Torts with independent civil action: DEFAMATION An "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature.Salta was acquitted in the criminal case. ISSUE WON a decision of acquittal in a criminal case operates to dismiss a separate civil action filed on the basis of the same facts as alleged in the criminal case (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). This is clearly illustrated in the case of swindling.

entered into a contract with Nissho Co.85 - prof. Under Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law. that requirement is absolute and indispensable. 1974 against the Phil Rayon and Anacleto R. And even if these were not sight drafts. The liability for the remaining ten (10) drafts did not arise because the same were not presented for acceptance. Whether private respondent Chi is jointly and severally liable with Philippine Rayon for the obligation sought to be enforced 3a. or some note or memorandum thereof. To enable the Phil Rayon to take delivery of the machineries. They are. associations. The parties herein agree. 1(b) of the RPC.It is significant to note that under Article 31 [11] of the New Civil Code. It does not refer to the undertaking between either one or both of them on the one hand and the petitioner on the other with respect to the liability described under the trust receipt. -Since that violation of a trust receipt constitutes fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code. YES. two of these drafts were accepted by the Phil Rayon through its president. thereby necessitating acceptance. officers. were to be jointly and severally liable to the Prudential Bank should the Phil Rayon fail to pay the total amount or any portion of the drafts issued by Nissho and paid for by Prudential Bank. it is these corporations. the Prudential Bank indorsed the shipping documents to the Phil Rayon which accepted delivery of the same. While the acknowledgement of a surety before a notary public is required to make the same a public document. documents or instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa. -The clause "we jointly and severally agree and undertake" refers to the undertaking of the two (2) parties who are to sign it or to the liability existing between themselves. 3a. -Under Article 33 of the Civil Code. HELD: 1. it executed. drafts were drawn and issued by Nissho. Anacleto R. i. petitioner was acting well within its rights in filing an independent civil action to enforce the civil liability arising therefrom against Philippine Rayon. The Phil Rayon was able to take delivery of the textile machineries and installed the same at its factory site at 69 Obudan Street. 3. Chi became the sole guarantor. -Upon arrival of the machineries.. Estafa falls under fraud. par. however. Chi. -Reading Section 13 of PD No. On January 5. which. it would be unenforceable unless ratified. No. that the subject. G. Ltd. If he is a guarantor. of Japan for the importation of textile machineries under a five-year deferred payment plan. To effect payment for said machineries. no legal obstacle prevented it from enforcing the civil liability arising out of the trust. -And although it is true that the petitioner commenced a criminal action for the violation of the Trust Receipts Law. Elsewise stated. Contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into. Whether presentment for acceptance of the drafts was indispensable to make Philippine Rayon liable thereon. by the very terms and conditions thereof. Chi. PRUDENTIAL BANK V IAC (Philippine Rayon Mills & Anacleto Chi) 216 SCRA 257 DAVIDE. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. association or other juridical entities. Inc. etc. the failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods. pursuant to Section 7 of the NIL. -The obligation of the Phil Rayon arising from the letter of credit and the trust receipt remained unpaid and unliquidated.315. 1973.e. In short. is ineffective in this case because the space therein for the party whose property may not be exhausted was not filled up. However. nevertheless. WON the case should have been dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action as there was no prior exhaustion of Philippine Rayon's properties. Quezon City.. WON he may be considered a guarantor 3b. The lease was renewed on January 3. under Article 1358 of the Civil Code.torts & damages .384. the present action for the collection of the principal amount of P956. laches Lower Court’s Ruling Both the CFI and the IAC ruled that Philippine Rayon could be held liable for the two (2) drafts because only these appear to have been accepted by the latter after due presentment. a trust receipt which was signed by Anacleto R. represented by co-defendant Anacleto R. Against this letter of credit. -By his signing. Repeated formal demands for the payment of the said trust receipt yielded no result Hence. fraud and physical injuries. which is a promise to answer for the debt or default of another. or true intent of the solidary guaranty clause should be resolved against the petitioner since the trust receipt. partnership. together with the questioned solidary guaranty clause. when the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable. the Phil Rayon ceased business operation. SC’s own reading of the questioned solidary guaranty clause yields the conclusion that the obligation of Chi is only that of a guarantor. Whether Philippine Rayon is liable on the basis of the trust receipt. 74886 December 8. a contract of guaranty does not have to appear in a public document. the law merely requires that it.. -At the back of the trust receipt is a printed form to be accomplished by two sureties who. Reasoning Last sentence of the clause speaks of waiver of exhaustion. casis defamation. As indicated on their faces. it would be the petitioner — and not Philippine Rayon — which had to accept the same for the latter was not the drawee. JR. prescription. Defendant’s Defenses lack of cause of action. Chi. Private respondent Chi's signature in the dorsal portion of the trust receipt did not bind him solidarily with Philippine Rayon. provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. Inc. or that it be proved in a certain way. which affirmed in toto the decision of CFI Quezon City in a civil action instituted by the petitioner for the recovery of a sum of money representing the amount paid by it to the Nissho Company Ltd. -Any doubt as to the import." DISPOSITION The decision of Justice De Veyra is affirmed. by prior arrangement with the Prudential Bank. If not. receipt in a separate civil action. it is made clear that the civil action permitted therein to be filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of the latter.00. the penalty of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the directors.. Chi in his capacity as president of Phil Rayon. may be brought by the injured party in cases of . and the trial court explicitly ruled. of Japan for textile machinery imported by the Philippine Rayon Mills. 2. 1992 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of IAC. is a contract of adhesion which must be strictly construed against the party responsible for its preparation. ISSUES: 1. 2. NO.000. their liability is not divisible as between them. Otherwise. both courts concluded that acceptance of the drafts by Philippine Rayon was indispensable to make the latter liable thereon. Ltd.R. be in writing. FACTS -August 8. A2010 . With respect to a guaranty. NO. -Sometime in 1967. which were all paid by the Prudential Bank through its correspondent in Japan. while the others were not.95 was filed on October 3. payable on demand. 115: It is clear that if the violation or offense is committed by a corporation. all the textile machineries in the Phil Rayon's factory were sold to AIC Development Corporation for P300.000. Phil. YES. On December 29. the Bank of Tokyo. it can be enforced to its full extent against any one of them. Presentment for acceptance is necessary only in the cases expressly provided for in Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL).00. punishable under the provisions of Art. 3. 1962: Philippine Rayon Mills. documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appear in the trust receipt or to return said goods. Phil Rayon's factory was leased by Yupangco Cotton Mills for an annual rental of P200. which are made liable for the civil liability arising from the criminal offense. 1974. drafts are sight drafts which do not require presentment for acceptance. Rayon applied for and was granted a commercial letter of credit with the Prudential Bank and Trust Company in favor of Nissho. a civil action for damages. 1969. partnerships. employees or other officials or persons therein responsible for the offense. The attestation by witnesses and the acknowledgement before a notary public are not required by law to make a party liable on the instrument.

. may be brought by the injured party.Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Pampanga. NO.000. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. 1960. when they intervened in the criminal case against Jon Elordi. and the same would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence.The grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissal and which the Court found to be "well taken" were. It will save the parties unnecessary work. a civil action for damages.But appellants' intervention was subsequently disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's order to the effect. fraud.00 the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages. inasmuch as there resulted a judgment for the defendant. . without having made it they could file — as in fact they did — a separate civil action even during the pendency of the criminal case. . 1962 – Paje filed a motion to dismiss the civil action on the ground that his acquittal barred the said action but the motion was denied. also for damages. . Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on permissive joinder of parties explicitly allows it.This is the action which. 32. in turn. Civil Code). 838 but finally settled by them in their compromise.86 - prof. "the institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict. that is. as held in Paulan v.623. Navarro and Attorneys Jose W. CAPUNO V PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES MAKALINTAL. 31. shall run only from the date of the filing of the complaint.In filing the civil action as they did appellants correctly considered it as entirely independent of the criminal action. judgment was rendered wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him. and (2) that appellees had been released from appellants' claim for damages by virtue of the payment to the latter of the sum of P2. should also be paid. which sum. and consequently.The case arose from a vehicular collision. they no longer had any interest to protect in the criminal case since they had already claimed and received compensation for the death of their decedent. Section 2. Diokno and Augusto M. from which order the present appeal has been taken.The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that the fouryear period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. . it may be recalled. however. ART. As a matter of fact. Attorney's fees may even be allowed in appropriate cases. . supra. Disposition Petition granted.torts & damages 3b.Appellants originally sought to enforce their claim ex-delicto.November 9. Chi declared secondarily liable on the trust receipt. trouble and expense. the civil action for damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death. .623. -This is the equity rule relating to multifariousness. Prior thereto. of the Revised Rules of Court which requires the reservation of the right to institute a separate and independent civil action in the cases provided for in Articles 31." . or after the lapse of more than five years. . Cipriano Capuno. with respect to the latter. these. Sarabia. . Pampanga. Paje was later found guilty on November 7. .The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers. 33. A2010 . Section 6. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. . and (2) that on the part of the Estate of Buan its right to intervene in said case had been abated by the civil action. The information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims.The Court approved the compromise and accordingly dismissed the case. Abaroai: ―It is true that one of the plaintiffs in the present case reserved whatever right he may have had to bring a civil action. was dismissed by the Court a quo in its order of February 29. 34. Ilagan. and physical injuries. ISSUE WON the action had already prescribed. Marcia‘s heirs reserved their right to institute a separate civil action against Paje. This was obviously of no avail. As a result of the collision.00 by the Buan Estate under the Workmen's Compensation Act.Included in the complaint was a claim for indemnity in the sum of P2.An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against Paje. In cases of defamation. the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras.Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. without costs. . . for otherwise that action would have been premature and in any event would have been concluded by the subsequent judgment of acquittal in the criminal case. 1962 – Paje was acquitted by the appellate court.In view of the filing of the civil action the accused Jon Elordi moved to strike out the appearances of these private prosecutors in the criminal case. 1961 – Pending Paje‘s appeal. 1960. There was nothing procedurally objectionable in impleading private respondent Chi as a co-defendant in the civil case for the collection of a sum of money. .The parties in the civil case entered into a "Compromise and Settlement. The information therein. showing that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code. the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil action. 33. Petitioners’ Claim > The petitioners claim that the Lower Court erred in acquitting Paje and that his acquittal was a bar to the civil action. . he shall only be liable for those costs incurred after being judicially required to pay.623. Interest and damages. Quoting Chantangco vs. the said rule does not apply in the present case.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 1965 FACTS . in the CFI of Tarlac against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. It collided with a jeepney driven by Clemente Marcia in Lubao. July 31. No appeal was taken from either of the two orders. RULING YES. But the complaint here was filed only on September 26. In other words.At that time the criminal case was still pending.While the criminal case was pending. Excussion is not a condition sine qua non for the institution of an action against a guarantor. praying that the defendants be jointly and severally liable.And when they commenced the civil action on September 26. -In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the Estate of were represented by their respective counsel as private prosecutors: Attorney Ricardo Y. . . entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.As to whether or not Rule 111. 1958 the criminal case was still pending. Philippine Rayon Mills. upon appellees' motion. CORPUS V PAJE 28 SCRA 1062 CAPISTRANO. being accessories of the principal obligation. was sought to be recovered by the said Estate from appellees in Civil Case No. Grounds for the motion were (1) that as the Capuno heirs were concerned. and the plain inference from .December 29. saying that the collision was purely an accident. Chi's liability is limited to the principal obligation in the trust receipt plus all the accessories thereof including judicial costs. April 30. 1956 – Felardo Paje was driving a Victory Liner bus.December 23. Private respondent Anacleto R. -However. the window and children of Marcia instituted the separate civil action for damages arising from the accident against Paje and Victory Liner.There can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict. (1) that the action had already prescribed. It is based on trial convenience and is designed to permit the joinder of plaintiffs or defendants whenever there is a common question of law or fact. including the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2. pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code. and 2177 of the Civil Code affects the question of prescription. was amended precisely to include an allegation concerning damages suffered by the heirs of the victims of the accident for which Elordi was being prosecuted. declared liable on the 12 drafts in question and on the trust receipt.November 21. Inc. Such reservation was not then necessary. casis . which action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146. 1969 NATURE Direct appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal FACTS . under the provisions of the Penal Code. DISPOSTIION The order appealed from was affirmed. .00 previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's Compensation Act. herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi." For P290. 1958." . . -The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno and Ilagan was disallowed by the Court and that of Attorney Navarro was disallowed in an amending order. which read: ART. Marcia died while two other people were physically injured. .

widow of Dulay. (estafa) and physical injuries.‖ Respondents’ Comments: > At the pre-trial of the civil case. JAPZON was accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy.The criminal case still pending. filed an action for damages against Torzuela and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co. 16 .Corpus vs. Japzon for damages.Although in the case of Dyogi vs. — In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately. 2. Inc.. but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. it is evident that the terms 'physical injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code. Independent civil action. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed w/ deliberate intent (dolo). but in their generic sense.Art. that is. for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its technical sense. 1983 NATURE Petition seeking to set aside the order of the CFI dismissing the civil case against Japzon FACTS . an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. because the terms used with the latter are general terms.) . Buan. and physical injuries. which states that reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated. which the respondent judge granted on the basis of Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court16 ISSUE WON a civil action for damages may be instituted pending the resolution of a criminal case HELD YES . With this in mind. the defendants asked the court to rule on their special defense that plaintiffs' cause of action based upon a quasi-delict had prescribed considering that the complaint was brought four years and eleven months after the collision and that according to Article 1144 of the Civil Code an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years. (Civil Code. the Court ruled that the ―offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery. the order appealed from is affirmed. reckless imprudence. This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution. provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. A . A2010 . Torzuela shot and killed Atty. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. and not for homicide and physical injuries. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act. > that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 > that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary. 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Disposition Petition is granted. IAC.Homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reserved.In other words. Disposition PREMISES CONSIDERED. The lower court ruled that the action had already prescribed. Respondent: > that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties. . Of eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them merely concurred in the result. Japzon.. In cases of defamation. .DR. Torzuela's wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury. . Madeja sued Dr. > that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Art 2176 (the one filed by petitioners) cannot lie. or even death" **(end of obiter) . may be brought by the injured party. . 32. the order dismissing Civil Case No. is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the institution of an independent civil action. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense.torts & damages the foregoing is that a verdict of acquittal must carry with it exemption from civil responsibility. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. . alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. . Reasoning .Section 2. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. of an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages. which shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence. 141 is hereby set aside. . 33. 1995 FACTS . Madeja reserved her right to file a separate civil action for damages Sec. or attempted homicide.In the information. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting. may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. Napoleon Dulay had an altercation. fraud. that is. Thus. .' Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein. . Paje. > that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability. EVA A. the Court ruled that the action had indeed prescribed because the prescription period was pegged at 4 years (A1146. without special pronouncement as to costs. > that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed (Marcia v CA) Petitioner > the incident resulting in the death of Dulay was due to the concurring negligence of the defendants. and this recommendation must hove been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended.Maria Benita Dulay. since the civil liability under Art 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Art 365 of the RPC. the offended party Carmen L. or frustrated homicide. Carmen L. DULAY V CA (SAFEGUARD. if intentionally done. Dulay. 3.) Obiter .Sec. the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries.In any case the Code Commission recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in American Law. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. Yatco this Court held that the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 of the Civil Code includes homicide. would be punishable as a felony. not the result thereof. Thearticle mentions only the crimes of defamation.‖ . . as the Code Commission states. April 3. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31. 'fraud' and 'physical injuries. Rules of Court. not the crime of physical injuries.The Article in question uses the words 'defamation'.Benigno Torzuela.The defendant filed a motion to dismiss. alleging that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution..In People vs. SUPERGUARD) 243 SCRA 220 BIDIN. ISSUE WON the civil action against Paje can still prosper despite his acquittal HELD NO Ratio Criminal negligence. Other civil actions arising from offenses. frustrated and attempted homicide. a civil action for damages.With regard to the issue of prescription. fraud. the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury. 33.There are at least two things about Art. the civil liability is governed by Art 100 of the RPC. Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Art 2176 MADEJA V CARO 211 PHIL 469 ABAD SANTOS. December 21. casis . while the negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury. it is to be borne in mind that the charge against Felardo Paje was for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.." and Atty.87 - prof. so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines. namely: 1. Eva A." 2. citing Andamo v. (SUPERGUARD). (SAFEGUARD) and/or Superguard Security Corp. a security guard on duty at the "Big Bang sa Alabang. CC) and began to run on the day the quasi-delict was committed." (Rule 111.

As of August 1948. The balance sheet made mention of the Douglas C-54 plane. thus defeating the purpose of the informal meetings of CALI‘s principal creditors and depriving the plaintiff of the means of obtaining the plane. This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case.29. and attempted homicide (Madeja v. which is outside the jurisdiction of the Phils.. In cases of defamation. 1948. Santiago). 33. Sept 17. the independent civil-action which has been reserved may be brought by the offended party. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence 18 Rule 111.Unaware of Shell‘s assignment of credit. . working committee discussed methods of achieving objectives. Therefore. it would file insolvency proceedings. .. Institution of criminal and civil actions. 2. in this case. The offer was declined by Crawford. and Atty. 34. Fitzgerald could not have officially represented Shell because authority resides on Crawford.Sec. the Government.I.440. or its value. which were to preserve the assets of CALI and to study the way of making a fair division of all the assets among the creditors. 1948. Caro). not with reckless imprudence. the amount of such damages HELD 1. the accused in the case at bar. Shell‘s books showed a balance of P170. Inc‘s (CALI) operations.88 - prof. Alexander Sycip. without knowing the purpose for which it was called. CALI‖s President of Board of Directors.Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: "Sec 1. ISSUES 1. Ltd.In the cases provided for in Articles 32. or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. that Torzuela. it could not get much of its outstanding credit because of the preferred claims of other creditors. YES. . Inc.Aug 9. but the Court of Justice (SC) cannot countenance such attitude at all. and as an alternative. 1948 American Shell Oil Co filed a complaint against CALI in the Superior Court of the State of California. . An order of insolvency was issued by the court on the same day. of the P. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. USA.Since the start of Commercial Air Line. to the detriment and prejudice of other CALI creditors who were consequently deprived of their share in the distribution of said value 2.Plaintiff confined his action to the recovery of damages against Shell. Then followed a discussion on the payment of claims of creditors and the preferences claimed for the accounts due to employees. Alfonso Sycip. Alfredo Velayo was appointed Assignee in the proceedings. Defendant’s Comments > Assignment of credit in favor of American Shell was for valuable consideration and made in accordance with established commercial practices > It has no interest in the case instituted by American Shell.Oct 7. 1948 CALI filed a petition for voluntary insolvency. The other creditors disputed such contention of preference.Dec 22. . 1948 an amended complaint was filed to recover assigned credit of $85. but so far no definite agreement had been reached. .The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. it must be noted however. Shell‘s Credit Manager was in charge of collecting payment. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code.Velayo instituted case against Shell for the purpose of securing writ of injunction restraining Shell from prosecuting against CALI. a civil action for damages.58 in its favor for goods it sold and delivered to CALI. plus miscellaneous personal properties.I. and a writ of attachment was applied for and issued against a C-54 plane. CALI on Aug 12. Agcaoili of National Airports Corp. Shell had reasons to believe that the financial condition of Shell was far from being satisfactory. reserves his right to institute it separately. 33. as they are separate and distinct corporations. offered to Fitzgerald CALI‘s Douglas C-54 plane. . 1948. management of CALI informally convened its principal creditors in a luncheon. Mr.Those present in the meeting were of the unanimous opinion that it would be advantageous not to present suits against CALI but to strive for a fair prorata division of its assets. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code.First week of Sept 1948. 1948 approved the memorandum agreement of sale to PAL. . and noted that ―the Board had been trying to reach an agreement with creditors… to prevent insolvency proceedings. had to be decided by Stephen Crawford and later by Wildred Wooding . Secretary of the Board of Directors of CALI. YES. that Shell be ordered to pay damages double the value of the plane if the case in the US will defeat the procurement of CALI of its plane.. Ltd. casis . whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence.Although in the Marcia case. and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. Shell must answer for damages. assigning its credit amounting to $79. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court18 ISSUE WON civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action HELD YES . the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Shell).Shell‘s transfer of credit would have been justified only if Fitzgerald had declined to take part in the working committee and frankly and honestly informed the other creditors present that he had no authority to bind his principal and that the latter was to be left free to collect its credit from CALI by whatever means his principal deemed wise and were available to it. may be brought by the injured party. ." .‖ .081. taking advantage of its knowledge of the existence of CALI‘s airplane C-54 at California. However. frustrated. Carandang v. and if so. the Phil court would not be in a position to enforce its orders as against the American corporation Shell Oil Co. . and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. fraud. WON Shell Co. acted in bad faith and betrayed the confidence and trust of other creditors of CALI present in said meeting by affecting a hasty telegraphic transfer of its credit to the American corporation Shell Oil Company. and physical injuries. 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated.The telegraphic transfer made without knowledge and at the back of other creditors of CALI may be a shrewd and surprise move that enabled Shell to collect almost all if not the entire amount of its credit. it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence. . Any extensions of term of payment..It is evident that Shell. Alfredo Velayo. unless the offended party waives the civil action. 1956 NATURE Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila FACTS . a civil action based on Article 33 lies. explained the memorandum agreement executed by CALI with Phil Air Lines Inc on Aug 4.. The management of CALI announced that in case of non-agreement of the creditors.It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation.440. and much less from a foreign corporation to the detriment of Philippine Government and local business.162.torts & damages > that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Art 3317 and Section 3. 17 Fitzgerald.Section 37 of the Insolvency Law states INTENTIONAL TORTS VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS 100 PHIL 186 FELIX. October 31. Lower court dismissed the case. 33.. upon learning the precarious economic situation of CALI and that will all probability. . . 3.On the same day (Aug 9). Court denied petition because whether the conveyance of Shell‘s credit was fraudulent or not. No understanding was reached on the matter of preference of payment and it was then generally agreed that the matter be further studied by a working committee to be formed. But then. WON by reason of said betrayal of confidence and trust. When civil action may proceed independently . Inc. USA. Shell effected a telegraphic transfer of all its credit against CALI to the American Corporation Shell Oil Co. and the National Airports Corp. Atty. which was then in California. and damages under Articles 32. National Airports Corp learned of Shell‘s action in the US and hastened to file its own complaint with attachment against CALI in the CFI of Manila. This was followed on Aug 10 by a deed of assignment of credit amounting to $85. .Aug 12. its fuel needs were all supplied by Shell Company of the P. regarding the proposed sale to PAL of the aviation equipment of CALI.There was a general understanding among all creditors present on the desirability of consummating the sale in favor of PAL. Alexander Sycip were appointed to the working committee. is charged with homicide. however. Inc. Desmond Art. . > Fitzgerald was merely invited to the luncheon-meeting. Shell may be made to answer for the damages. and informed them that CALI was in a state of insolvency and had to stop operation. entirely disregarded all moral inhibitory tenets.29 and a supplemental attachment for a higher sum against the C-54 plane. . for the collection of assigned credit of $79. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.. Auditor of CALI. negotiation on the division of assets was left pending. When a criminal action is instituted. A2010 . shall proceed independently of the criminal action. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. Shell acted in bad faith. Mr. Fitzgerald of Shell.081.Aug 6. discussed the balance sheets of CALI. .. such information would have dissolved all attempts to come to an amicable conciliation and would have precipitated the filing of CALI‘s voluntary insolvency proceedings and nullified the intended transfer of Shell‘s credit to American Shell.

Al-Balawi. he brought her to the police station where her passport was taken and she was questioned about the Jakarta incident. after 2 weeks of detention. although this was practically the effect and result of the scheme.After a careful study of the pleadings. She was eventually allowed to return to Jeddah but barred from Jakarta flights.While Art 19 contains a mere declaration of principles. . 1950. and socializing with the male crew. The CA. . goods. temperate. as it is contented that what Shell really disposed of was its own credit and not CALI‘s property.. may be achieved in applying the provisions of the Civil Code. ISSUES 1.Facing conviction. A2010 . Saudia then filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO with the CA. she was again brought before the same court where the Saudi judge. .21 gives flesh to its provisions. she was terminated from the service by Saudia without being informed of the cause.The transfer of credit to its sister corporation in the US did not prejudice the Government. the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited. going to a disco. exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. one by one. such declaration is implemented by Article 21 of the Civil Code. Miniewy.There is no sensible reason for disturbing the finding that Shell is liable for exemplary damages. and fixed at P25. casis . or effects of the insolvent. WON Morada had a cause of action 2. Embassy to help her. It is not liable for exemplary damages because the provisions of the new Civil Code on the matter are not applicable to this case . The two were arrested and detained by Jakarta police. . Shell did not have any vested or acquired right to betray confidence of CALI or of its creditors. she was asked by her superiors to see Mr. denied Saudia‘s prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. Moreover. which states Art 21. compensatory damages a sum equivalent to the value of the plane at the time Shell assigned its credit to American Shell.According to the Civil Code. petitioner Saudia but she was denied assistance of any kind. October 8. they may be given retroactive effect.2 years later. She was brought before the court and was interrogated by a Saudi judge and let go. ―no vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the right of others.She aptly predicated her cause of action on Art. The amount of exemplary damages is thus modified. Shortly before her return to Manila. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V CA (MORADA) 297 SCRA 469 QUISUMBING. with much more reason that Shell should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of confidence.19 merely declares a principle of law. and another equal sum as exemplary damages. While there. . or having reason to believe that insolvency proceedings are about to be commenced. not caused any loss or injury to other creditors. to be received for the benefit of the insolvent estate. . When they met. as to the applicability of this provision. Art. however.Majority of the Court is of the opinion that the value of the C-54 plane might result too high.If Article 23 of Civil Code goes as far as to provide that ―Even if an act or event causing damage to another‘s property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant. in addition to the moral. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her. dancing and listening to music in violation of Islamic laws. she was asked to go to Jakarta to arrange for the release of the two men. They were put back in service while respondent Morada was transferred to Manila. Art 2252 of Civil Code provides by implication that when new provisions of the Code does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation. . just as she was about to board a plane home. act with justice. she complied but only after being assured by Saudia‘s Manila manager that the investigation was routinary and posed no danger to her. A few days later. Which law should govern (Phil. however. chattels. She later filed a case against them. in another resolution. The Indonesian authorities eventually deported the 2 men. liquidated or compensatory damages.There are doubts. the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. she was told that she had been forbidden to take flight. As it turned out.21 of the CC. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties.Code Commission on Article 21: (it) would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. She asked the Phil. July 30. she went to a disco with 2 of her fellow crew members Thamer and Allah (both surnamed Al-Gazzawi) and had breakfast in their hotel room. The same result. give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the two crew members for the attack on her person.A year and a half later. thus. Miniewy merely stood as the police put pressure on her to drop the case against the two men. 1957 Defendant-appellee’s contentions . Saudia filed a motion to dismiss raising the issues of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. YES . HELD . in Jeddah. however. Saudia then filed to the SC this instant petition.She then filed a complaint for damages against Saudia and Mr. she signed a document to appear before the court a week later. as well as the subsequent MFR.Plaintiff‘s right of action was based and prosecuted in the lower court under the provisions of the Insolvency Law and consequently he is stopped from pursuing another theory and is not entitled to damages under the provisions of the new Civil Code. ―the aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold no.Anent the argument that Civil Code provisions cannot be applicable as they came into effect only on Aug 30. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss by Saudia. As it turned out. She was saved by hotel security personnel who heard her cries for help. in contravention of Islamic tradition. during the pendency of this petition. he is chargeable therewith. She was told that it was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. . If any person. except the entities and groups controlled by Alfonso Sycip. We are convinced that there is reasonable basis for private respondent‘s assertion that although she was already working in Manila.It is not guilty of bad faith.torts & damages Sec 37. (It) is a prudent earnest of justice in the face of the impossibility of enumerating. sentenced her to 5 months imprisonment and 286 lashes. The CA issued a TRO prohibiting respondent judge from conducting any proceeding unless otherwise directed. however. the insolvent CALI. its country manager. The court found her guilty of adultery. . When the date of appearance came. Any person must.000. When Morada returned to Jeddah (the base of operations of petitioner). to her astonishment and shock. . When she did. Article 19 of the Civil Code provides Art 19.Plaintiff-appellant has no cause of action against it and is not the real party in interest . the Chief Legal Officer of Saudia. through the intercession of the Saudi govt. and that exemplary damages should not be left to speculation but properly determined by a certain and fixed amount. of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes. however. and that the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved. Reasoning . together with Thamer and Allah for what happened in Jakarta. for the benefit of CALI and its creditors. because its claims were fully paid. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch a later flight out of Jeddah. embezzles or disposes of ay money.The facts on which Court based its conclusion that Shell acted in bad faith are not and cannot be denied or contradicted by defendant. respondent CA rendered a decision that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Art.‖ Although Art. under the control of the latter‘s president Alfonso Sycip . all wrongs which cause damage.‖ Disposition Shell is liable to pay plaintiff. Because she was wrongfully convicted.‖. VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS RESOLUTION 100 PHIL 207 FELIX. may be modified. The amount of the award. according to Art 2254 of Civil Code. and liable to an action by the assignee for double the value of the property sought to be embezzled or disposed of. However. Law or Saudi Law) HELD 1. Allah left and Thamer attempted to rape her. She was later told to remain in Jeddah and her passport was again confiscated. During a stop-over in Jakarta. she was again asked to go to Jeddah to see Miniewy.Private respondent Milagros Morada was a flight attendant of Petitioner Company. As held in PNB v CA.19 and Art. . she sought help from her employer. .21 CC. before the assignment is made. 1998 NATURE Petition for certiorari to annul and set aside CA resolution and decision FACTS . having notice of the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency. She proceeded to Jakarta but she refused to cooperate. it having done nothing but to protect legitimately its own interest or credit against the bad faith of its debtor. clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court.89 - prof. a certain Khalid of Saudia brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. for it is left to the sound discretion of the Court.

as the situs of the alleged tort.Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias. there is no rigid test which can be applied. . the ―relationship‖ between the parties was centered here. Petitioner‘s purported act contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused additional humiliation. misery and suffering of private respondent. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. which should be appropriate to apply now. contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results. Every person must. Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler. and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.‖ Instead. if any. 21. P20. submitted a second laboratory crime report reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings. later amended to just estafa. . Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. therefore. This does not.one day after Tobias made the report. she had honestly believed that petitioner would.Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful. a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. and to leave the office keys. leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that: Art. an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. Reasoning . We find here an occasion to apply the ―State of the most significant relationship‖ rule.00 as moral damages. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages GLOBE MACKAY V CA 176 SCRA 778 CORTES. may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. casis wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Philippine Law Ratio Choice of law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right. . Thus. . For in our view. however. . there is basis for the claim that the over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Phils. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be conducted.Secretary of Labor.All of the 6 criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. the ―connecting factor‖ or ―point of contact‖ could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. ISSUE WON petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent HELD YES Ratio Art. . good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. ―act with justice. without being asked by RETELCO. and to observe honesty and good faith. residence. malicious. confidence and faith she reposed upon it.290 of' RPC (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence). in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. in the case at bar. . .CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.90 - prof. petitioner failed to protect her. 20. the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (A) the place where the injury occurred.Private respondent Restituto M.when Tobias returned to work after the forced leave. (C) the domicile. the place of celebration. ." Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides: Art. and. . . P200. give everyone his due.00 as exemplary damages. between the parties is centered. According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them to his immediate superior Eduardo T. signature. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another. Reasoning . These standards are the following: to act with justice. . and abusive acts of petitioners. which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law.As already discussed. Whereupon. act with justice.Article 20. had lodged according to the private respondent. The law.In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. . and ordered him to take a one week forced leave.000. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. a Filipina residing and working here. taking advantage of the trust. given the factual context of the case.Petitioner Hendry.the Manila police investigators cleared Tobias of participation in the anomalies. social standing and human rights of complainant. though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such.the Police Chief Document Examiner.Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies petitioners filed a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. shall indemnify the latter for the same. 1989 NATURE An appeal from the decision of CA FACTS .One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order. wilfully or negligently causes damage to another. she claimed.However. and costs. that in their exercise. . (D) the place where the relationship. to provide compensation or redress for the wrongs done. to leave his table drawers open. Disposition petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. the alleged conviction and imprisonment of Morada was wrongful.The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Tobias by ordering petitioners to pay him P80.Unemployed. such as the situs of the res. Hendry issued a memo suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him.000. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest. signatures.00 as actual damages. place of incorporation and place of business of the parties. Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company.19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting. or the place of wrongdoing. According to her. 2. Every person who contrary to law. detention and prosecution of private respondent under the guise of petitioner‘s authority as employer. claiming illness.000. . and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and reputation. provides that: Art. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case. August 25. petitioner Hendry. acting on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling.In the meantime. . . petitioner may have acted beyond its duties as employer. Civil case entitled ―Milagros Morada v Saudi Arabia Airlines‖ REMANDED to RTC A2010 . give her due and observe honesty and good faith. working with petitioner.In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability.00 as attorney's fees. for which petitioner could be liable as claimed. . Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect. the place of performance. Hendry who was then the Executive VP and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY. petitioners hired a private investigator who submitted a report finding Tobias guilty. This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent.19.There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that in ―handing over‖ or ―turning over‖ the person of private respondent to Jeddah officials. 19. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national. reinstated the labor arbiter's decision and dismissed the complaint. nationality. However. it is not without basis to identify the Phil." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). Tobias received a notice from petitioners that his employment has been terminated. including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.But while Art. in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties. (B) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred.Not satisfied with the police report. . to give everyone his due. . reputation. P30.torts & damages she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges. once duly proven. . did not testify during the hearings. In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship.Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts. oppressive. four of which were for estafa while the fifth was for of Art. A right. a resident foreign corporation engaged in international air carriage business here. . All told. Generally.000. it does not provide a remedy for its violation. As purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah. and observe honesty and good faith.GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person. . recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights. sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. . known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager.Nevertheless. the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. not to communicate with the office. after investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions. .

. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work. Baltao. the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. invoking the principle of damnum absque injuria.torts & damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law. He found that the signature on the check is not the signature of Eugenio S. . The presence of probable cause signifies.An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao". then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed.L. Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given Eugenio S. the act must be intentional.Petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right.From the records of the SEC. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. As part payment thereof. On the other hand. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction. There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21. or public policy. resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law. . coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases. was one "Eugenio S. upon verification with the drawee bank. the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners. shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate." ISSUE WON private respondent's cause of action is not one based on malicious prosecution but one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the CC HELD NO Ratio The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated. Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed. . Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores. Albenson made an extrajudicial demand upon private respondent Eugenio S. Disposition petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED. Baltao for Violation of BP 22. . Considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed. For this further damage suffered by Tobias. However. (2) which is exercised in bad faith. the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias. Disposition petition is GRANTED and the decision of the CA is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. depends on the circumstances of each case. . but the latter failed to do so and therefore. This principle finds no application in this case. the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. It is argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that private respondent could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed from his employment.the Court. What prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of BP 22 against private respondent was their failure to collect the amountdue on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent.L. the threat made by Hendry. Reasoning . Private respondent. Albenson was informed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry that E. petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 3) and it is done with intent to injure. the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY. If the dismissal is done abusively. Castro of Rizal reversed the AMONOY V GUTIERREZ 351 SCRA 731 PANGANIBAN. a son of plaintiff. The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty.Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him. good custom. respondent Baltao filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises. which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-appellants. stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. its employee. . 2001 FACTS . the Court finds that.Petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper. the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable.The threat unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. casis finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao. . Baltao. Woodworks. his son Eugenio Baltao III. whether willfully or negligently. FACTS . Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias.Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries. that the defendants may have been dealing with . was deemed to have waived his right. E. . However.Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S. contrary to petitioners' contention. finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke.Several other tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from work: Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail. . (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.L. and that is. anyone who. Woodworks." not of Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff used to be President. Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975.The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974. Thus." After obtaining the foregoing information. Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the circumstances. and Benjamin Mendiona. Inc. its owner. When presented for payment. petitioner acted in good faith and probable cause in filing the complaint before the provincial fiscal. and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal. Baltao to replace and/or make good the dishonored check. the absence of malice. immediately filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation. damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable." .00 and drawn against the account of E. the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity . which received the goods in payment of which the bouncing check was issued is owned by respondent. In filing said information. Woodworks. Jesse Yap. there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias. damnum absque injuria. public order. Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Albenson was advised that the signature appearing on the subject check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao. in the exercise of his legal right or duty.It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several actionable tortious acts. after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. claiming ignorance of the complaint against him. Considering that Guaranteed." Upon further inquiry. 2) but which is contrary to morals. Moreover. a single proprietorship business. the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code." . as a legal consequence.Lastly. . who manages a business establishment. however. The nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. causes damage to another.Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. with the very same business address as Guaranteed. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith. depends on the circumstances of each case. Albenson was given a check in the amount of P2. . "You Filipinos cannot be trusted. private respondent has a namesake. causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified. the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the account of "E. the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence.Finally. In its decision. January 11. moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages. the Court has already ruled that moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. Hendry added that. Baltao. .575. While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights. . The possibility is that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III. the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith. . Woodworks. ALBENSON V CA BIDIN. According to the principle of A2010 . 1993 NATURE Petition assailing the decision of respondent CA which modified the judgment of the RTC and ordered petitioner to pay private respondent moral damages and attorney's fees. In addition.91 - prof.L.

Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondents‘ house. and observe honesty and good faith. It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another x x x.695. . act with justice.In the mean time. this recourse.They failed to pay. . By then. As they were not able to pay. the Orders of 25 April 1986 and 6 May 1986 were issued for the demolition of structures in the said lots. He failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade . he sued UE for damages.torts & damages . their continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one‘s rights but also in the performance of one‘s duties. Jader later learned of the deficiency and he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examination. give everyone his due. 1993 Decision. On 6 February 1973. In its January 27. that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself on June 4. casis the bar examination. in the availment of one‘s rights.Amonoy was the counsel of therein Francisca Catolos. Rizal. is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. 19. .True. Consequently.Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. But the records show that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). Asuncion Pasamba died on 24 February 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passed away on 2 July 1969. and it disappears when it is abused.TC rendered judgment in favor of the Jader and ordered UE to pay Jader P35. Indubitably. 20. Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to them. The heirs sought the annulment of the auction sale. for without the latter.Considering that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in legal education. especially to the prejudice of others. Hence. 2000 FACTS . . a Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by respondents against petitioner before the RTC on December 15.00 as another round of attorney‘s fees.The Gutierrez spouses sought a restraining order from the Supreme Court. was issued by the Supreme Court on June 2. the former are useless. known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights. supposedly in accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court. including the house of the Gutierrez spouses. Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset. At the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there appeared however an annotation saying that it was a tentative list and that degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin . Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another. wilfully or negligently causes damage to another. his clients executed real estate mortgages on their lands and the house thereon. cannot be said to have acted in good faith. though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such.We reject this submission. recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise. Amonoy was ordered to return said properties to the rightful owners. He thereafter prepared himself for . His name also appeared in the invitation for the graduation as one of the candidates for graduation. For this reason. . . We agree with the CA that he unlawfully pursued the demolition of respondents‘ house well until the middle of 1987. and to observe honesty and good faith. contrary to law. on 21 January 1970 Amonoy filed for their foreclosure before the CFI of Pasig. He took a leave of absence without pay from his job and enrolled at the pre-bar review class. Every person must. more specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states: Art. his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right.645. Failing in that. Among the heirs of the latter was his daughter. 1986. February 17. . He maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC.CA Affirmed and added an award of P50. ISSUE WON Amonoy may properly invoke damnum absque injuria in this case since at the time of the demolition he had color of authority over said properties HELD NO Ratio Damnum absque injuria may not be invoked by a person who claims to exercise a right but does so in an abusive manner violative of Article 19 of the Civil Code. together with the absence of all information or belief of facts. one must Reasoning . which was also denied.Article 19. UE in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination. Thus. Over and above the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice x x x. 1986.000. A2010 . Amonoy was the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale.Because his attorney‘s fees thus secured by the two lots were not paid. particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams. he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition.000 as actual damages.UE denied liability arguing that it never led respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating students. Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case. may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration.UE elevated the case to this Court on a petition for review arguing that it has no liability to respondent Romeo A. . .92 - prof. the two (2) lots would be sold at public auction. Jader attended the graduation and brought his family with him. Jader. plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. Upon a judgment on merits later on.880. shall indemnify the latter for the same. therefore. Had he not insisted on completing the demolition. to give everyone his due. did not heed the TRO of this Court. 1989. 1986 under the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC.92.He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student . These standards are the following: to act with justice. the CFI on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which a notice to vacate was made on 26 August 1985. his actions were tainted with bad faith.Thus. it is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others. and P9.A commentator on this topic explains: ―The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears. Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda.He filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade but got a grade of five (5).Petitioner. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life.470. Art. Every person who. The case was dismissed by the CFI on 7 November 1977. But on 28 September 1972 judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days the P27. On Amonoy’s motion of 24 April 1986. and he who violates them violates the law. considering that the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by the latter arose out of his own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned the result of his removal exam. contending that the attorney‘s fees charged were unconscionable and that the agreed sum was only P11. however. Indeed. Verily. the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. Agnes Catolos.00 as value of the harvests. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another. He won the case for them and charged P27600 as attorney‘s fees. enjoining the demolition of respondents‘ house. The heirs opposed. . respondents‘ house had already been destroyed.00 . .‖ . it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students. Thereafter. based on the Certificate of Service of the Supreme Court process server. . when they act affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they deal in the general course of society will act in good faith. But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the above-mentioned Decision. the CA set aside the lower court‘s ruling and ordered petitioner to pay respondents P250. men must be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury – that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them. The CA also found.In civilized society. a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible‖ UE V JADER 325 SCRA 804 YNARES-SANTIAGO. P11. . which was granted by the same.UE had a contractual obligation to inform his students as to whether or not they have met all the requirements for the conferment of a degree.Jader was enrolled in the UE College of Law from 1984 up to 1988.00 for moral damages . ISSUE WON an educational institution may be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case HELD YES . even though the forms and technicalities of the law. respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the RTC. the said lots were foreclosed. but an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he received the TRO from this Court on June 4. the RTC dismissed respondents‘ suit.00 secured by the mortgage. that their fellowmen. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. his name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation with an annotation regarding his deficiencies. and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on 22 July 1981. A right. The law.600. On appeal. petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents‘ house on May 30. would render the transaction unconscientious. 1986.

or before the school year ended. but she did not comply with that order. It merely wanted to avoid a situation wherein its cash position would be compromised. . it . Reasoning . The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right. and prayed for atty‘s fees of 25% of the amt. casis was stipulated that an interest of 12% would be imposed. Petitioner cannot just give out its student‘s grades at any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar. the mere exercise of a right cannot be said to be an abuse of right. plus 25% for atty‘s fees and collection." and that "any letter or notice of termination received by you before this date has no sanction or authority by the Board of Directors of this Institution. with the exception of Fr.The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner's discontinuance from teaching was her own choice. She was ordered to report for work on July 5. That the school principal and Fr.Phelps Dodge appointed Barons Marketing as one of its dealers of electrical wires and cables. especially a profit-oriented one like Phelps. there must be no intention to injure another. ISSUE WON the defendants prevented the petitioner from reporting to the school and thus making them liable for damages HELD NO . GARCIANO V CA 212 SCRA 436 GRIÑO-AQUINO. Their acts were not contrary to law. Wiertz disagreed with the Board's decision to retain her. but Barons still did not pay. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. More importantly. Esteria F. has reacted acidly to the Board's deliberations for the reinstatement of Mrs. Thus. WON there was creditors‘ abuse of rights in this case 2. willful or negligent acts that are contrary to law. filed a complaint for recovery of the P3. Barons purchased on credit wires and cables worth P4. 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises only from unlawful. 1982. petitioner filed a complaint for damages in the Regional Trial Court.93 - prof. signed a letter notifying her that she was "reinstated to report and do your usual duties as Classroom Teacher . the members of the Board of Directors of the school. Ratio Liability for damages under Articles 19. Branch XI. they actually did nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming her post. even when the act is not illicit. and some members of the faculty of the school for discrimination and unjust and illegal dismissal. resigned their positions from the Board "for the reason that the ICI Faculty. effective July 5. 1982. Volenti non fit injuria. . February 9. 1982.B. Barons is bound to pay the said amounts.The petitioner was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year in the Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the Island of Camotes.the law prescribes a "primordial limitation on all rights" by setting certain standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate. When one of two innocent parties must suffer.1m. and (2) the difficulty of getting a substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one would accept the position without a written contract. even if true. and observe honesty and good faith. informing her of the decision of Fr. but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. ordering Barons to pay the debt and interest of 12% and awarding 25% as atty‘s fees.To constitute abuse of rights.Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the delayed relay of information to respondent.Phelps. there must be bad faith or intent to prejudice the plaintiff. . with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. to terminate her services as a member of the teaching staff because of: (1) the absence of any written contract of employment between her and the school due to her refusal to sign one.8m plus interest. Citing Tolentino: There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. Garciano. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL. he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it. It instead wrote Phelps requesting if it could pay the outstanding account in monthly installments of P500k plus 1% interest.On September 3. secretary. FACTS . bad faith on the part of Phelps was not proved. NO Ratio there is no abuse of rights when there is no bad faith nor intent to prejudice another. Joseph Wiertz. and approved by the President of the school's Board of Directors. that is. give everyone his due.the contract expressly provided for the imposition of the 12% interest plus 25% for attorney‘s fees and collection. the inclusion of Art. The RTC rendered decision in favor of Phelps. on July 7. Barons paid P300k (thereby leaving an unpaid account of P3. CA affirmed (with modification. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. Also. out of a membership of nine (9). Phelps was driven by legitimate reasons for rejecting Barons offer. 1992 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint for damages filed by the petitioner against the private respondents." .‖ 2. against Fr. concurred in by the president of the Parent-Teachers Association and the school faculty. WON Barons should be liable for interest and atty‘s fees HELD 1. . A2010 . which it in turn supplied to MERALCO. the president. 1982. As such dealer. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right.In this case. good customs or public policy. and must not be excessive or unduly harsh. making it harder for them to pay its own obligations. instead of responding to the request of Barons. when he acts with prudence and in good faith. Sotero Garciano (for she was still abroad). . morals.On July 9. 1982.torts & damages . the school's founder. Joseph Wiertz. and exemplary damages amounting to P100k. Petitioner‘s liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the course. . but disputed the amt claimed by Phelps. and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en masse. 1982. not an abuse thereof. It is plain to see that what we have here is a mere exercise of rights.8m). Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the petitioner through her husband. school about the matter and. xxx The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established. 1998 NATURE Petition for review decision of CA FACTS . ―Clearly. Emerito Labajo. She made inquiries from the BARONS MARKETING V CA (PHELPS DODGE PHILS) 286 SCRA 96 KAPUNAN. this (the request of Barons) would be inimical to the interests of any enterprise. It failed to act seasonably. graduate. In the sales invoice.Barons admitted the purchase of the wires and cables. as ordered by the school's Board of Directors. whatever loss she may have incurred in the form of lost earnings was self-inflicted. They did not "illegally dismiss" her for the Board's decision to retain her prevailed. Emerito O. Consequently.From Dec1986 to Aug1987. vice president. They were simply exercising their right of free speech or their right to dissent from the Board's decision. . YES Ratio the penal clause included in the contract should be complied with in the event of breach. Cebu. by way of penal clause. On Sept1987. While the respondents admittedly wanted her service terminated. she applied for an indefinite leave of absence because her daughter was taking her to Austria where her daughter was employed. 1982. the illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of exercising a right. 1982. good customs or public policy.19 in the CC: Every person must. act with justice. On January 13. therefore it is declared null and void. Labajo. did not make them liable to her for damages. Thus. The application was recommended for approval by the school principal. Reasoning . thereby questioning the integrity of the Board's decision". If mere fault or negligence in one‘s acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby. . Phelps sent several demands. Barons was given 60 days credit for its purchases of Phelp‘s products. she received the letter informing her that her services at the Immaculate Concepcion Institute had been terminated. and three members of the Board of Directors. Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. reducing atty‘s fees to 5%) Barons now assail the CA decision. Wiertz. Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable. August 10. alleging that Phelps should have been held guilty of ―creditor‘s abuse of rights‖. . Upon her return from Austria in the later part of June. or morals.On June 1. *note: Barons contends that Phelps abused its rights when it rejected Barons‘ offer to settle the debt in installments **right involved: right of a creditor to refuse partial fulfillment of a prestation due to him ISSUES 1. . and Barons should not be liable for atty‘s fees.

Under the contract and all other documents relating to the construction of the Veterans Hospital.November 28. .March 12. ISSUES 1.October 1989 – statement amounting to P8.00. BPI could have suspended MARASIGAN‘S card outright.MARASIGAN issued Far East Bank Check of P15.000. Consequently as early as 28 October 1989 thirty days from the non-payment of his billing dated 27 September 1989. September 25. Thus. BPI allowed him to use his card for several weeks. NO Ratio The agreement was for the immediate payment of the outstanding account. .There is no showing that the plaintiff received this letter before December 8. and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.000.00 as moral damages: P25.MARASIGAN filed a complaint for damages against petitioner before the RTC Makati . the real issue was the credit as to the architects of the building were.000.00 by way of attorney's fees. Ratio The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. atty‘s fees should be reduced to 10% Disposition CA decision modified WRT atty‘s fees but AFFIRMED in other respects A2010 . 1989.00 as moral damages. Nowhere is it stated in the terms and conditions of the application that there is a need of notice before suspension may be affected as private respondent claims. A check is not considered as cash especially when it is postdated sent to BPI.000.MARASIGAN oftentimes exceeded his credit limits but this was never taken against him by BPI and even his mode of paying his monthly bills in check was tolerated.December 12. casis .April 5. WON BPI abused its right to suspend the credit card 2. by Café Adriatico when the he entertained some guests. BPI could automatically suspend his credit card. hurt or harm which results from the injury. (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.torts & damages . the bill amounting to P735. and P10. As early as 28 October 1989. his membership will be permanently cancelled .000. 1989. there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the results of a violation of a legal duty. head of the collection department of defendant was formally informed of the postdated check about a week later. Neither did he make payment for his original billing/statement dated 27 October 1989. (2) which is exercised in bad faith.84 was not paid in due time. .December 8. 2989 .May 7. a co-employee who handles the account of the plaintiff. . the application contained the stipulation that the petitioner could automatically suspend a card whose billing has not been paid for more than thirty days.00 which would include his future bills.final demand by BPI requiring him to pay in full his overdue account. since 25% if P4.Good faith is presumed and the burden of proving bad faith is on the party alleging it. He was informed that bpi was demanding immediate payment of his outstanding account. Instead.By his own admission MARASIGAN made no payment within 30 days for his billing/statement dated 27 September 1989. One of his guests. damage is the loss. including stipulated fees and charges. In such cases.000. paid the bill by using her own credit card a Unibankard . Any CARD with outstanding balances unpaid after thirty (30) days from original billing/statement date shall automatically be suspended and those with accounts unpaid after sixty (60) days from said original billing/statement date shall automatically be cancelled without prejudice to BECC's right to suspend or cancel any CARD any time and for whatever reason. 1989 which was received on November 23.Atty. Ruiz and Herrera want to be recognized as architects of the building also citing Article 21 of the Civil Code as their base for he cause of action. . .84 on the condition that BPI will not suspend the effectivity of the card .987. 1998 FACTS . Mary Ellen Ringler. both shareholders of Allied Technilogists.00 as exemplary damages. 1989 despite assurance to the contrary by defendant's personnel-in-charge. WON MARASIGAN can recover moral damages arising from the cancellation of his credit card by BPI HELD 1.However. was requiring him to issue a check for P15. and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. 1990 – MARASIGAN demanded BPI compliance with his request in his first letter dated March 12. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria . and for an explanation within five (5) days from receipt thereof why his card was dishonored on December 8. It turned out that said retention was already released by the DND to the Company. Marasigan‘s credit card was dishonored. and was threatening to suspend his credit card. the named architect was only Panlilio. 1989 – MARASIGAN sent letter to the manager of FEBTC requesting the bank to stop the payment of the check .Enrique Ruiz and Jose Herrera. 1990 . Reasoning RUIZ V SECRETARY PAREDES. The Court then proceeded with the other cause of action which was deemed to be the controversy between Ruiz and Panlilio over the said 15%. otherwise the necessary court action shall be filed to hold defendant responsible for the humiliation and embarrassment suffered by him . He can not now pass the blame to the petitioner for not notifying him of the suspension of his card. . He was also told to refrain from further use of his credit card to avoid any inconvenience/embarrassment and that unless he settles his outstanding account with the defendant within 5 days from receipt of the letter. postdated December 15. BPI was therefore justified in suspending his credit card.Under the terms and conditions of the credit card. NO . 1989 . 1989 – MARASIGAN requested that he be sent the exact billing due him as of December 15.BPI served MARASIGAN a letter by ordinary mail informing him of the temporary suspension of the privileges of his credit card and the inclusion of his account number in their Caution List. the issuance of the postdated check was not effective payment. Inc. signed by MARASIGAN. an employee of the defendant who in turn gave to Jeng Angeles. MARASIGAN admitted having failed to pay his account because he was in Quezon attending to some professional and personal commitments. As quoted earlier. there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded.94 - prof.It was petitioner's failure to settle his obligation which caused the suspension of his credit card and subsequent dishonor at Café Adriatico. 1990 – MARASIGAN sent another letter reminding the manager of FEBTC that he had long rescinded and cancelled whatever arrangement he entered into with BPI and requesting for his correct billing.MARASIGAN was a complimentary member of BECC from February 1988 to February 1989 and was issued Credit Card with a credit limit of P3. less the improper charges and penalties. otherwise the plaintiff will file a case against them .TC: ruled for MARASIGAN finding that BPI abused its right in contravention of A19 CC ordering BPI to pay P 100. 2.As it turned out. the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. P 50. Reasoning . Thus.00. BPI did not capriciously and arbitrarily canceled the use of the card. 1990 within three (3) days from receipt. and P 20.MARASIGAN‘S own negligence was the proximate cause of his embarrassing and humiliating experience in not reading the letter of notice of cancellation. . . 1989 by Tess Lorenzo.000.00 as exemplary damages.00 and with a monthly billing every 27th of the month His membership was renewed for another year or until February 1990 and the credit limit was increased to P5. 1966 NATURE Appeal from an order of the Manila CFI FACTS . Ricardo J.1m is almost P2m.CA: AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION P50. The check remained in the custody of Jeng Angeles. within 5 days from receipt thereof or face court action and also to replace the postdated check with cash within the same period or face criminal suit for violation of Bouncing Check Law . Mr.Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right. 1990 . Thus. The award of damages by the CA is clearly unjustified. filed an action against the Secretary of National Defense and also against their own company (together with Pablo Panlilio who is also a shareholder of the company) in connection with the 15% retention fund withheld by the DND relating to the construction of the Veterans Hospital. any card with outstanding balances after thirty (30) days from original billing/statement shall automatically be suspended.000. to withhold the deposit of his postdated check and that said check be returned to him because he had already instructed his bank to stop the payment because BPI violated their agreement that when MARASIGAN issued the check to cover his account amounting to only P8. Reasoning .000.987.32. Roberto Maniquiz.December 16.000. Thus. Ratio To find the existence of an abuse of right A19 the following elements must be present (1) There is a legal right or duty. the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.March 21. this should be reduced to 10% for being manifestly exorbitant. BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION V CA (MARASIGAN) 296 SCRA 260 KAPUNAN.00 by way of attorney's fees.

December 17. Albenson filed a complaint against Eugenio S. 1993 NATURE Appeal from decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . which was used as basis of the action.While mere breach of contract is not an actionable wrong.L. their pleas for recognition as architects should have been heard by the lower court.Baltao filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation. As part payment. P2. ISSUE WON the lower court erred in dismissing the case HELD NO .L. 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. the prosecutor acted without probable cause.Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief." P15.And under the facts and circumstances obtaining.500 as attorney's fees. Woodworks. even if he is later on absolved.. . Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives. was bought. profession. the following three (3) elements must be present. . Hence. defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton. fraudulent or reckless. . A matrimonial bed.The amended complaint of appellants claimed that the non inclusion of their names as architects resulted in their professional prestige and standing being seriously impaired. Concededly. only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized. and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. ―Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. his son Eugenio Baltao III.Trial court granted Baltao‘s claim for actual or compensatory. together with Panlilio. . casis FACTS . . Prestige and recognition are bestowed on the deserving even if there is no judicial declaration. states. good customs. party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. one cannot sustain the contention that the failure or refusal to extend recognition was an act contrary to morals. The signature on the subject check belonged to Eugenio Baltao. Proof and motive that the institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages . Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S. Baltao and that E. friends and acquaintances.CA modified by reducing the moral damages and the attorney's fees awarded. in a reasonable mind. . In order that such a case can prosper. ISSUES WON Baltao should be awarded damages (based on malicious prosecution) HELD NO . he sent a telegram assuring Wassmer that nothing has changed and he will return soon. On the other hand no amount of declaration will help an incompetent person achieve prestige and recognition. January 11. ISSUE WON Velez is liable for the cost of wedding preparations spent by Wassmer HELD YES .95 - prof.‖ . they claim that even if the retention fund was in act released.Asst.An award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. its owner.In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith. no damages will be given . Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person. (2) That in bringing the action. 1954 as the big day. and one employee. Velez left a note for Wassmer saying that he has to postpone the wedding because his mother opposes it. is quite different. It is the abuse of right which can be a cause for moral and material damages. Bridal showers were given and gifts received. P25. TANJANCO V SANTOS REYES. job or occupation — and the same must be proved. Their wedding was set.Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed was one Eugenio S. Disposition Petition denied. On September 2. the article envisions a situation where a person has a legal right which was violated by another in a manner contrary to morals. fraudulent. neither may exemplary damages be awarded Disposition Petition granted. to wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor. December 24. moral and exemplary damages. Albenson was given a check drawn against the account of E.Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss — in business.This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry.000 as actual damages. reckless. attorney's fees and costs. CA decision reversed and set aside ALBENSON V CA (BALTAO) 217 SCRA 16 BIDIN. (3) The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice . Hence it presupposes losses or injuries which are suffered as a result of said violation. FACTS WASSMER V VELEZ 12 SCRA 648 BENGZON. Wassmer. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights. . delivered to Guaranteed Industries Inc. Thus. Woodworks was registered in the name Eugenio Baltao.Provincial Fiscal Mauro M.L. If this is so. Velez and Beatriz P. Baltao for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. . otherwise.Albenson made an extrajudicial demand but Balbao denied issuing the check.The record reveals that on August 23. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. good custom.The sole object of the appellants was to secure for themselves recognition that they were co-architects of the Veterans Hospital. moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. with accessories. . or on malicious prosecution. Woodworks.Francisco X. moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages. for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate . 1964 . The bride-to-be's trousseau. . 1966 NATURE Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals revoking an order of the CFI dismissing appellant's action for support and damages. To formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity. who manages E.Check was dishonored for the reason ―Account closed. that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. following their mutual promise of love.torts & damages . or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton . oppressive. Baltao for violation of BP 22. . it is damnum absque injuria.000 as moral and exemplary damages. . . Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner Judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2. or public policy.To constitute malicious prosecution. and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal. Article 21 of the Civil Code says that when the person willfully causes loss or injury contrary to good custom. trade. Article 21. he modified award of attorney‘s fees. and the costs.Where there is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton. or public policy. A2010 . But Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. . .Baltao filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against Albenson Enterprises. acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor. It appears that private respondent has a namesake.Albenson Enterprises Corp. which was subsequently issued. . or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages.‖ . so as to enhance their standing and prestige. the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. The pleadings in this case do not show damages were ever asked or alleged.But the next day. decided to get married and set September 4.Sued by Beatriz for damages. As to exemplary damages. the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.A party injured by the filing of a court case against him. he shall compensate the latter for damages.While the word ―injury‖ may also refer to honor or credit.Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code.. however. . property. Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao. there is no need or necessity for a judicial declaration.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.000. reckless [and] oppressive manner. Order appealed from is affirmed. or oppressive manner. good custom. if the proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated. may file a case for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights.

and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. sometime in 20 August 1987. in his Counterclaim. and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation. to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule: ART. or can not be proved. good customs. it connotes essentially the idea of deceit. casis of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint. as a result of such maltreatment. and finally.And in American Jurisprudence: On the other hand. . Due to her pregnant condition. and he has never maltreated her. but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport. there is no seduction. She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts. on the other hand.00 in moral and exemplary damages. the lower court. rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the private respondent. he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. that in consideration of his promise of marriage Araceli consented and acceded to Tanjanco‘s pleas for carnal knowledge.In his Answer with Counterclaim. Guilig. CFI dismissed the complaint. which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless. she was a virgin before she began living with him. inter alia. let us examine the complaint. which are calculated to have and do have that effect. . . (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances. The Court of Appeals. attorney's fees and costs. plus P10. had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit. who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality. She alleges in said complaint that: she is 22 years old. without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage. through machinations. which was in October of that year. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry. or a breach of a promise of marriage. The girl becomes pregnant. they therefore argued to get married after the end of the school semester. culture and traditions. applying Article 21 of the Civil Code.96 - prof. the facts stand out that for one whole year. (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner. and no other cause of action being alleged. that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof. he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent. inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act." They gave an example  "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". for had Araceli been deceived. the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer. persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury. and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit.It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy. the Commission has deemed it necessary. both being of adult age. The essential feature is seduction. the enticement. he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. As an Iranian Moslem. through his protestations of love and promises of marriage. even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury. from 1958 to 1959. and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. A promise of marriage either has not been made. promised to marry private respondent.After trial on the merits. Respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto the trial court's ruling.00 attorney's fees. traditions and culture. Regularly until December 1959. ―but the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. . BAKSH V CA 219 SCRA 115 DAVIDE JR. petitioner filed the instant petition. he is not conversant with such Filipino customs. before 20 August 1987. no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. and though the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage. plus P100. the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments. the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. (e) by reason of that deceitful promise. Araceli had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines. Bugallon. he maltreated and threatened to kill her. maintained intimate sexual relations with Tanjanco. The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent. in the interest of justice. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex. Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community. in an action by the woman. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. he did not maltreat her.In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages. persuasions and wiles. as a result of which she conceived a child. and which result A2010 . Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion. petitioner. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees. and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga. she sustained injuries. ISSUE WON CS erred in reversing the CFI decision HELD YES . as the girl is above eighteen years of age. (c) petitioner. no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire. without the assistance of counsel.Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals. she allowed herself to be deflowered by him. petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and. though the grievous moral wrong has been committed. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing. to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation. she would not have again yielded to his embraces.00 a month for her support and that of her baby.Bearing these principles in mind. traditions and culture. the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission where it stated. single. she and her parents would have such a right of action. filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code. (d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages. Disposition the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. with repeated acts of intercourse. have offended our sense of morality. Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female. petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City.000. Tanjanco succeeded in having carnal access to Araceli. a week before the filing of the complaint. there is no crime.torts & damages . moral shock. 23. under Article 21. she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes. Under the present laws. 1993 NATURE Appeal by certioriari to review and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . . entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of origin to proceed with the case. superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. reimbursement for actual expenses.The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers. during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain . . . and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover. February 19. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs. to pay her not less than P430. Hence. the latter courted and proposed to marry her. She became unable to support herself and her baby and duer to Tanjanco's refusal to marry her as promised. Dagupan City. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.. petitioner's attitude towards her started to change. he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. Unfazed by his second defeat. Over and above the partisan allegations. Insisting. that in law it is more than mere sexual intercourse. enticement. Inc. But under the proposed article. Therefore. she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. and social humiliation. besmirched reputation. a woman of adult age. deceit and false pretenses.Private respondent. To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because. wounded feelings. that he expressed and professed his undying love and affection for her who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings". he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment.000.Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos. artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant. is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments. much less for one year. Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage. private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens. Araceli Santos. he prayed for an award for miscellaneous expenses and moral damages. she suffered mental anguish.

proof that he had. Bunag. his controversial "common law wife" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita. he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four wives and concludes that on the basis thereof. During that time. that Amelita had no sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who is the father of the child yet to be born at the time of the filing of the complaint. they lived as husband and wife for 21 days. July 10.The Court found that Cirilo and Bunag Jr were sweethearts but for 2eeks before the alleged rape.97 - prof. where she worked as a waitress." Disposition Petition denied A2010 . P20K by way of temperate damage. respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise.A complaint fro breach of promise to marry was filed against Bunag Sr and Bunag Jr. and Art 2229 and 2234 CC.000 to P8. When she noticed they were going the wrong way. Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted. could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. Under Art 21 CC. . and the assailedjudgment and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED. The Court is of the opinion. support and damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez. any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. As relief. they proceeded to Bunag‘s grandmother‘s house. . pursuant to Art 21 in relation to par 3 and 10. P20K for exemplary damage. Reasoning . Bunag Jr came riding in a car with an unidentified man. It is essential. 21 is applicable to the case at bar HELD YES . that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress. attorney's fees plus costs.Bunag filed for the petition for review claiming that CA failed to consider vital exhibits and testimonies and error in the proper application of the law. CONSTANTINO V MENDEZ BIDIN. Disposition petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. Amelita Constantino alleges that she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant located at Sta.Cirilo appealed on the disculpation of Bunag Sr‘s liability. petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the livein relationship. the award for moral damages is allowed in cases specified and analogous to those provided in Art 2219 CC. Bunag brough her to his grandmother‘s house in Las Pinas where they liver together as husband and wife for 21 days. .After filing for the ML. That night. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent. that because of her pregnancy. . 1992 NATURE Petition for review from the decision of CA . only the fiscal made such dismissal of the criminal complaint. 1992 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . 1974. such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. in relation to Art 2219. BUNAG V CA (CIRILO) 211 SCRA 441 REGALADO. The RTC upon finding that she was forcibly abducted and raped Bunag Jr was ordered to pay for P80K for moral damages. Bunag then left and never returned. Moreover. and P10K for atty‘s fees. petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her. as a result of which Amelita got pregnant. that at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening.The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to which the latter agreed. par10. Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn child. Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married man. however. the petitioner‘s promising to marry Cirilo to evade criminal liability constitutes acts contrary to morals and good customs.A breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law. which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.torts & damages because of his Moslem upbringing. whenever Ivan is in Manila.000. Bunag Sr was absolved from liability. except where the plaintiff incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents therrof.Under the circumstances in the case at bar. and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. Finally. . the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Jr brought Zenaida Cirilo to a hotel where they had sex. that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of Davao City with a monthly income of P5. the said Code contains a provision.00. that they repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November. CA dismissed the petitions and affirmed judgment of RTC in toto. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which warrant and justify the award of moral and exemplary damages. Cirilo contends that she was abducted by Bunag Jr along with unidentified man and brought her to the motel where she was raped. Art 2219. no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act. casis . Jr. Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter. However. and so holds. that after the sexual contact. and Cirilo applied for their respective Marriage Licenses. but after leaving. she surrendered her virginity HELD NO Ratio Mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. that the day following their first meeting. Jr. In the instant case. This notwithstanding. apart from the right to recover for money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. While the Bunag‘s assigned several errors in the TC decision. moral and exemplary damages.Although TC granted damages on the basis of the forcible abduction and rape even after the criminal complaint‘s dismissal. Later that evening. that on the pretext of getting something. in reality. Article 21. Cirilo was ashamed when she went home and could not sleep and eat because of the deception done against her by Bunag. ISSUE WON Amelita can claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 3 & 21 4 of the Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage. May 14.Petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment. so much so that she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him.In her complaint. the trial court erred in ruling that he does not possess good moral character. Bunag Sr arrived and assured them that they would apply for the ML the next day. . On the day of the said rape. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. In the case. Manila.Conrado Bunag. . the payment of actual. that Amelita asked for time to think about Ivan's proposal.The court is constrained with the factual findings of the lower courts. Cirilo protested but Bunag threatened her that he would bump the car against the post if she made any noise.Bunag initially allowed her to go home but later refused to consent and stated that he would only let her go after they were married. that while dining. FACTS . good customs or public policy. they had a quarrel.She was then dragged by the 2 men in the hotel where Bunag Jr deflowered her against her will and consent. The Court a quo adopted her evidence. the extinction of the criminal liability does not extinguish civil liability unless there is a declaration of a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case may arise did not exist. Bunag Jr withdrew his application. ISSUE WON lower courts erred in granting damages for the breach of promise to marry HELD Ratio A breach of promise to marry is not actionable per se. Amelita was forced to leave her work as a waitress. Cirilo rode in the passenger‘s seat while Bunag Jr was driving. Bunag jr invited her for merienda to talk things over. . ISSUE WON Art. . Cruz. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. They never got to the restaurant where they were supposed to eat.In light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21. that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf ears. . that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals. .

and then issued 5 postdated checks in favor of Que. TC ruled in favor of Que. January 13. no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that the defendant not only deliberately. A2010 5 SCRA 200 1962 .Appellant. . 'Under the Spanish Law. The checks were dishonored. Nicolas kept the goods. 1997 NATURE Petition to reverse CA‘s Resolutions FACTS .A conceived. she could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual contact sometime in August. Hence. YES . he had not. Lolita disappeared from her brother‘s house where she was living. the accusation could not be held to have been false in the legal sense. Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage. an unmarried woman 24 years of age. One cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. Ratio. Plaintiff amended the complaint but the TC ruled such was not allowable as the original complaint averred no cause of action. is REINSTATED as above modified. Disposition decision of the respondent court dated March 12. Quimiguing. On april 14. ISSUE WON Que had instituted a malicious prosecution of the private respondent (WON the reversal made by IAC was correct) HELD NO . plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages. Concededly. Verily. PE V PE . independent of the right to support of the child. Repeated sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan. Court of Appeals. as a matter of fact. but through a clever strategy. The latter. If the charge. July 31. she claimed support of P120/mo.‖ This is furthered by Art. she had to stop studying. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter‘s family who allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of the family. 1984. She became pregnant and despite efforts and drugs (abortion pills?) supplied by defendant. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. He allegedly ordered that payment be stopped because the goods delivered to DRILON V CA (ADAZA) 270 SCRA 211 HERMOSISIMA JR. rape or other lascivious acts. Indeed. The wrong he had caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.Plaintiffs are parents. when Nicolas ordered strollers from Que. Also.Gen Renato DE VILLA.Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action as the complaint did not allege the child had been born—the motion was sustained. assisted by her parents. as under the American Law. 21. Instead. Hence.Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood. succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. Defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. . the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution (Manila Gas Corporation v. ISSUES 1. As stated in Art. 1989 NATURE Petition for review FACTS . brothers and sisters of Lolita PE.It is evident that the petitioner was not motivated by ill feeling but only by an anxiety to protect his his rights when he filed the criminal complaint for estafa with the fiscal's office. casis him by Que were defective and that Que allegedly refused to replace them. requested the DOJ (headed by Sec Franklin DRILON) to order the investigation of several individuals. was made with an honest belief in its truth and justice. Defendant. 1979. Its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damage. IAC reversed. under such circumstances. although married. Disposition the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside FACTS . 1970 NATURE Appeal on points of law from an order of the CFI FACTS . unborn child is given a provisional personality by law and therefore has a right to support from its progenitors. WON Quimiguing is entitled to damages HELD 1. QUE V IAC (NICOLAS) 169 SCRA 137 CRUZ. When the parents learned about this.The circumstances under which the defendant tried to win Lolita‘s affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who. The affair continued just the same. 100 SCRA 602) . He just stopped payment. there was no intent to accuse falsely. They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. Que on his part alleged that the said defective products were only returned after he filed an estafa case.torts & damages Reasoning . from Que‘s point of view. which Nicolas allegedly ignored. they prohibited defendant from going to their house. The case was dismissed for lack of merit. YES . particularly Icao (Art.Magtanggol Que is a dealer of canvass strollers while Antonio Nicolas orders from him. 2219 which provides compensation in cases of seduction. ―Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. a married man. When a complaint was laid and there was probable cause to believe that the person charged had committed the acts complained of.For a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damages caused. which were delivered. The two had an amicable business relation until 1975. Chief of Staff of the AFP. seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. the circumstances presented the possibility that Nicolas might cheat him. succeeded in having sex with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation and without her consent. through an ingenious scheme or trickery. The present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. Therefore. that he was a married man. the goods which were allegedly defective were not yet returned to Que before the filing of the estafa case. but not so much on the theory of probable cause as on the ground that. although false. Que filed an estafa case against Nicolas. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless.98 - prof. without Que knowing that there were defects in the goods he delivered. abduction. good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code. the complainant was fully protected. The lower court dismissed the action.Hence.Nicolas issued 5 checks which Que cannot encash. Reasoning -. in accordance with Nicolas‘ order to stop payment.Nicolas then filed a case against Que for malicious prosecution. March 20. frequently visited Lolita‘s house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. 854) 2. he has committed an injury to Lolita‘s family in a manner contrary to morals. 40) and may receive donations (Art. did not demand for its repair. sued her neighbor Icao with whom she had close and confidential relations. QUIMIGUING V ICAO 34 SCRA 132 REYES. this appeal by the plaintiffs ISSUE WON the defendant can be held liable under Article 21 HELD YES . thus the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error. and there were reasonable grounds on which such a belief could be founded. even if such child should be born after the death of the testator (Art. This decision is immediately executory. inspite of demands by the latter. 1957. is SET ASIDE and the amended decision of the trial court dated February 21. . A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolita‘s aparador. WON Quimiguing had a right to the support of the child 2. .To constitute malicious prosecution. 1974. 742). including private respondent ADAZA for their alleged participation in the failed Dec 1989 coup d’etat. the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs. although. the element of probable cause was not treated separately from that of malice. After making demands for payment.

Feeling aggrieved by the institution of these proceedings against him. Hendry‘s threat of more suits against Tobias. 2.RTC denied MD. the Secretary of Labor: reinstated the LA's decision which Tobias appealed to the Office of the President. 26. Reasoning . the prosecutor acted without probable cause. For this injury an action on the case lies.Nowhere in his complaint filed with the trial court did respondent Adaza allege that his action is one based on tort.CA also dismissed petition for certiorari and ordered RTC judge to proceed with the trial of civil case filed by ADAZA. complaints for estafa were filed against Tobias. .The results of the investigations said that the handwritings. . Information was filed before RTC QC. The filing of the cases despite the police reports exculpating Tobias.The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in the provisions of the NCC [Art 19. . . Disposition Petition is GRANTED. with no recommendation as to bail.000.Judging from the face of the complaint itself filed by Adaza. Manila Electric Co. 21.Petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. All of the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal and MRs of Globe were denied too. *Findings of bad faith (as per the TC): > After the dismissal of the 4 cases and denial of the MR by the Ministry of Justice. . ―the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith‖ [Ventura v. 2 cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office of the AFP to railroad Tobias‘ arrest and detention in the military stockade.Petitioners filed MD since there was no valid cause of action for this complaint for damages. without being asked by RETELCO. Reasoning .Hawpia CA. August 25. 5 for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and 1 for violation of A290 of the RPC (all of which were dismissed). . WON petitioners are liable for malicious prosecution A2010 . Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to take no further action on civil case except to DISMISS it.LA: dismissed the complaint. NONE of these requisites have been alleged. (Sec 3e of RA 3019) An examination of the records would show that this latest posture as to the nature of his cause of action is only being raised for the first time on appeal.During the pendency of the appeal with said office. ADAZA filed a complaint for damages and charged petitioners with engaging in a deliberate.This was then referred for preliminary inquiry to the Special Composite Team of Prosecutors who issued a subpoena to the said individuals after finding sufficient basis to continue the inquiry. that is by improper or sinister motive.Despite being cleared. it has been defined as―One begun in malice without probable cause to believe the charges can be sustained. and which terminates in favor of the person prosecuted. 32. (b) That in bringing the action.reversed. and GLOBE MACKAY V CA CORTES. Hendry. and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of -Tobias. (In Adaza‘s latest Comment. To do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice.Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal upon receiving the notice of his termination.00 as moral damages. The petitioners were of the honest conviction that there was probable cause to hold Adaza for trial. and the eventual dismissal of the cases.00 as actual damages. despite the negative results of the lie detector tests which Globe Mackay compelled him to undergo. . Asst.Unemployed. regularly." Globe Mackay hastily filed 6 criminal cases with the city Fiscal's Office of Manila. "Indeed. P20. NO Ratio In order for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper. he maintained that his claim before the trial court was merely a suit for damages based on tort and NOT a suit for malicious prosecution. . filed at least six criminal complaints against respondent. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force. .‖ . 35. with persistence. 33. .In Philippine jurisdiction.[ 2 SCRA 337]: the Court held that the right to file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an indebtedness. petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the latter's complaint for illegal dismissal. oppressive. 2217 and 2219 (8)]. Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). 20. and abusive acts of petitioners. all of which were dismissed. denied Globe‘s MR. for the mere purpose of vexation or injury.99 - prof. (c) Suffice it to state that the presence of probable cause signifies. HELD 1. thus rendering the complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.000. P200. YES Definition of Malicious Prosecution: . The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results. as a legal consequence.Yutuk V. after the termination of such prosecution. Such a change of theory cannot be allowed. 29. ..‖ Reasoning . > Despite the clearing Tobias of participation or involvement in the fraudulent transactions complained of. (b) It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. what appears clear from the records only is that respondent has been discharged on a writ of habeas corpus and granted bail.Both parties appealed. wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. civil suit. Bernabe. it has been defined as―An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution. the absence of malice. . .Although Globe claims that they must not be penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints against an employee who was their principal suspect in the commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of substantial sums of money. There was malicious intent manifested through the filing of the criminal cases as the case for illegal dismissal was pending. with one of the investigating fiscals. 38 SCRA 5871. commenting in one case that. but this was frustrated by a presidential decree transferring criminal cases involving civilians to the civil courts. The panel assigned to conduct prelim investigation found that there was probable cause to hold them for trial for the crime of REBELLION WITH MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER.This led Tobias to file a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful.Globe Mackay found out an anomaly that has been causing them to lose money. Evident likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this case against (c) That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice. suit. This is not considered the termination of the action contemplated under Philippine jurisdiction to warrant the institution of a malicious prosecution suit against those responsible for the filing of the information against him. MFR for Order of Denial was also denied. . called the action of malicious prosecution. to which Tobias was the number one suspect though he claimed he was the one who reported it.00 as exemplary damages. SC anchored its findings on TC‘s finding (re bad faith of Globe Mackay in filing the criminal complaints against Tobias). .torts & damages . casis .) ISSUES 1. Instituted with intention of injuring defendant and without probable cause. P30. . or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. malicious. and although the police investigation was "still under follow-up and a supplementary report will be submitted after all the evidence has been gathered.] .00 as attorney's fees.However.000. willful and malicious experimentation by filing against him a charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder when petitioners were fully aware of the non-existence of such crime in the statute books. signatures. NLRC. the plaintiff must prove these elements: (a) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal.In American jurisdiction. ISSUE WON there was malicious prosecution HELD YES . or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause. CA: affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Fiscal de Guia.[20 SCRA 536]: the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney's fees after making a finding that petitioner. 1989 NATURE Certiorari FACTS . the haphazard way this case was investigated is evident. (a) Insofar as Adaza‘s Criminal Case is concerned.000.RTC: rendered judgment in favor of Tobias by ordering petitioners to pay him P80. WON complaint was a suit for damages for malicious prosecution 2. and costs.

(2) P10. 1967.There is however. . . -Thereafter.Thus. pending investigation of the criminal complaint.00. CA.00 as moral damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF ALBENSON V CA (BALTAO) BIDIN. They wrote to him. 1965 to January. 1 SCRA 60]. Albenson acted in good faith and had probable cause in filing their complaint against Baltao.00 as exemplary damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. .On July 14. of which Eugeneio Baltao was president.100 - prof.There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21. CA. it registered a sudden increase in gas consumption. 1964. 176 SCRA 778 [1989]). may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. The law. 1993 NATURE Appeal from CA judgment modifying RTC‘s decision as regards amount to be paid FACTS . MANILA GAS CORPORATION V CA (ONGSIP) . He replied by denying and telling them to check the veracity of their claim. these three articles are all related to each other. in October. ." there can be no mistaking that defendants would not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass. does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. respondent Ongsip applied for gas service connection with petitioner Manila Gas Corporation. 1967. These standards are the following: to act with justice. 100 SCRA 602]. CA reversed and set aside. it is damnum absque injuria. 2) but which is contrary to morals. he would be deported. Investigating fiscal found probable cause and filed info with the RTC.Respondent Ongsip refused to give the money . . (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs.00 as moral damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. . The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith [Sison v. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated. 1972. .000. no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. (2) which is exercised in bad faith. known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights.Albenson did not abuse its rights. . Said check was signed by a Eugenio Baltao. All they wanted was to collect what is owed them. and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal. The presence of probable cause means the absence of malice. Ongsip inquired from Coronel why they were taking pictures but the latter simply gave him a calling card with instructions to go to his office. oppress. depends on the circumstances of each case. Although the requirements of each provision is different. good custom. therefore. ISSUE WON Baltao is entitled to damages HELD NO . though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such. it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. prompting petitioner to issue a 'meter order' with instructions to change the gas meter in respondent's residence.IT TURNS OUT that E. The trial court as well as the respondent appellate court mistakenly lumped these three articles together. and atty‘s fees (P100k). Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully".Without notifying or informing respondent Ongsip. (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. and cited the same as the bases for the award of damages.By the end of August. . drawn against the account of E. 1966. petitioner disconnected respondent's gas service for alleged failure and/or refusal to pay his gas consumptions from July. Mesa. secondly: the illegal closure of respondent Ongsip's gas service connection without court order and without notice of warning. Albenson filed case for violation of BP22. . ELW was owned by Baltao‘s son. and to observe honesty and good faith. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights. recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise.On February. It is now difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of these articles" (Tolentino. Concededly.000. resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law. the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly broadened. petitioner's employees went to Ongsip's place. Disposition Petition granted. or public policy. but he was informed afterwards of what had taken place by his houseboy. the filing of a suit by itself. the complaint was dismissed . an act which causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of damages. they changed the gas meter and installed new tube connections. Manila.000. firstly: the malicious. under any of these three provisions of law.An award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. Mapa Street.575 was given as payment.RTC granted actual (P133k). 1965.Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss.L. combined with articles 19 and 20. Baltao appealed to the Provincial Prosecutor. and. .The check bounced. and that is.ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores. and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. .On May 2. Baltao filed a complaint for damages against Albenson because the latter had unjustly filed a criminal case against him. Ratio To constitute malicious prosecution. Woodworks‘ business address was the same as Guaranteed Industries. . . 122 SCRA 576].On that same afternoon.Subsequently.ABUSE OF RIGHTS Article 19.torts & damages respondent Tobias.A burner gas was installed by petitioner's employees in respondent's kitchen at his residence. Sta. the trial court rendered its decision ordering defendant to pay plaintiff:(1) P50. respondent Ongsip requested petitioner to install additional appliances as well as additional gas service connections in his 46door Reyno Apartment: petitioner installed two 20-gallon capacity water storage heaters and two heavy-duty gas burners and replaced the original gas meter with a bigger 50-light capacity gas meter. casis MAKASIAR. .On July 27. sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. (3) P30. They believed Baltao was really the one who issued the check because it was his company who ordered and received the delivery. the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. "With this article (Article 21). He told the trial fiscal to move for dismissal. Baltao denied that it was his signature on the check. 1980 NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA (treated as a special civil action) FACTS .Albenson Enterprises delivered mild steel plates to 3267 V. the act must be intentional. moral (P1M) and exemplary damages (P200k). 1 Civil Code of the Philippines 72). The delivery was received by Guaranteed Industries. Private respondent was then taking a nap. public order.On May 20. However. a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.There was no malicious prosecution. The second and third elements are not present. There. a complaint for qualified theft was filed by petitioner against respondent Ongsip . Woodworks. .000. . he was informed about the existence of a by-pass valve or "jumper" in the gas connection and that unless he gave P3. no gas consumption was registered in the meter. Albenson extrajudicially demanded payment from Baltao. 1966. found no probable cause. He didn‘t tell them that his son was his namesake and that the latter operated a business in the same building. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another.After the criminal case was dismissed.There was no significant change in the meter reading despite additional installations.On August 17.L. oppressive and malevolent filing of the criminal complaint. Court of Appeals. petitioner's employees returned with a photographer who took pictures of the premises. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person. and on May and June 1966. Disposition CA‘s decision AFFIRMED.The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty. and cause damage to plaintiff. January 11. to give everyone his due. respondent Ongsip filed a complaint for moral and exemplary damages against petitioner Manila Gas Corporation based on two causes of action. a check in the amount of P2. A2010 . 1967. . To constitute malicious prosecution.The installations and connections were all done solely by petitioner's employees. who is his namesake. 3) and it is done with intent to injure. . but it was denied . or "negligently". The provincial prosecutor found out that something was amiss during the investigation and upon reinvestigation. . CA modified by awarding only half of original moral damages and atty‘s fees. a reading was made on the new meter and expectedly. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. . following the dismissal by the investigating fiscal of the complaint for qualified theft and the disconnection by petitioner of his gas service. October 30. David. . A right.

serious anxiety. exemplary or corrective damages may be imposed upon herein private respondent by way of example or correction for the public good. he was even willing to have his place excavated but petitioner would not dare take the consequences." . ..torts & damages ACTION. is predicated on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which states that "moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: . and actively engaged in social and civic affairs in Pilar. . As a result. . .CA affirmed the lower court‘s decision in toto. on the other hand. However. It was established before the court a quo that there was an existing feud between the families of both petitioner and private respondent and that private respondent slapped the petitioner without provocation in the presence of several persons. . holding private respondent liable to the former for moral damages as a result of the physical suffering. sought to vindicate its financial loss by filing the complaint for qualified theft against respondent Ongsip knowing it to be false. But the truth is that when Coronel and his men entered Plaintiff's compound and made changes therein. however.000. rape.000. 2219 of the same Code. hence. fright. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. this time with a photographer. "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. Capiz. indemnification had to be made.The first cause of action.Concededly. Coronel did not do. Necessarily. When Plaintiff woke up at four o'clock in the afternoon. April 26. (7) Libel. It stigmatized private respondent causing him emotional depression and social degradation. The fact that the complaint for qualified theft was dismissed by the Pasay City fiscal is no consolation. there is reason to believe that there was malicious intent in the filing of the complaint for qualified theft. liquidated or compensatory damages.00 as attorney's fees. As a consequence. PATRICIO V LEVISTE PADILLA. in addition. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Besides.As to moral damages. The amount of exemplary damages need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff is entitled to either moral. Article 2229 provides that "exemplary or corrective damages are imposed. 1979 NATURE Certiorari from CA‘s decision to grant P75k. even brutally. To prove his innocence. (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21.The award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which provides that "willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that.As correctly observed by the trial court in its decision—A significant fact brought about by the testimony of Coronel himself is the total absence of immediate accusation against Plaintiff right at the very moment when the bypass valve was allegedly discovered. .00 and P10. is sustained. moral shock and social humiliation caused by private respondent's act of hitting petitioner on the face in public. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries.The Court gives due consideration to respondent Ongsip's social and financial status as a businessman and the mental anguish he suffered as a result of the false imputation. or other lascivious acts. the profit motive being merely secondary.To constitute malicious prosecution. moral shock. (8) malicious prosecution. ." . .00. Pursuant to Art.The act of private respondent in hitting petitioner on the face is contrary to morals and good customs and caused the petitioner mental anguish. was appointed Director General of the 1976 Religious and Municipal Town Fiesta of Pilar. It was actually intended to vex and humiliate private respondent and to blacken his reputation not only as a businessman but also as a person. petitioner's own mechanical engineer. P25k and P5k to Espino for moral damages.00 as exemplary damages. (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. temperate.000. . abduction. We reduce the amount of moral damages to P15. and before petitioner could respond. The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to cause additional mental and moral suffering to private respondent. respondent Ongsip did not show any sign of fear or remorse and did not yield to the threatening demand of Coronel—this is the attitude of someone who knows how to take a firm stand where his principles and rights are concerned.Private respondent's contention that there was no bad faith on his part in slapping petitioner on the face and that the incident was merely accidental is not tenable. mental anguish. Disposition Decision of CA modified as regards the amount of damages. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith" .. the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. Plaintiff was sleeping. (10) of Art.000. Delfin Custodio. without provocation.000. Qualified theft is a serious offense indicating moral depravity in an individual. private respondent. The circumstance was familiar to that of catching a thief in flagrante delicto. In consequence thereof. besmirched reputation. to the moral. (5) P10.00 as exemplary damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION." A2010 . President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Pilar. (8) Malicious prosecution. Capiz and a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. 21 of the Civil Code in relation to par. to wit: "ART. 28. (4) P5. the court ruled in favor of herein petitioner (as complainant).. (6) Illegal search.Evidently. being similarly warranted by Article 2234 of the Civil Code as complemented by Article 2220.In addition to the award of moral damages. ISSUE WON Patricio is entitled to damages for the humiliation he experienced during the town fiesta HELD YES . .00 and P5.It bears noting that when he was informed as to the existence of a 'jumper' in his gas connection. Capiz.Petitioner's act in disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service without prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting to an independent tort. hit petitioner's face with his bloodied hand. tell him that there was thievery of gas. and 35. 34. this circumstance can be considered as a mitigating factor in ascertaining the amount of damages to which respondent Ongsip is entitled. This was the time when Plaintiff met Coronel. moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission." On the other hand. and (6) the costs of the suit. To be accused of such crime without basis is shocking and libelous. exemplary damages and atty‘s fees. 30 32. the award of moral and exemplary damages should be reduced to P25. moral shock. .Article 2217 of the Civil Code states that "moral damages include physical suffering.00 The award of P5. An award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. a commotion GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET INC V ESPINO GUERRERO.In the instant case. Under the circumstances. This. he approached petitioner in a hostile manner and asked the latter if he had seen his wounded hand.Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals . casis ensued and private respondent was brought by the policemen to the municipal building. who was in a state of drunkenness and standing near the same gate together with his companions. 26. December 28. petitioner together with two (2) policemen were posted near the gate of the public auditorium to check on the assigned watchers of the gate. 29. The damage had been done. . Private respondent Bienvenido Bacalocos. (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest.. Coronel and his men had already made the changes and had already gone. struck a bottle of beer on the table causing an injury on his hand which started to bleed. This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. Petitioner is a public utility corporation whose primary concern is service to the people. in failing to recover its lost revenue caused by the gas meter's incorrect recording. where he is residing. under the circumstances. this petition ISSUE WON the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of appeals is excessive HELD YES . While a benefit dance was on-going in connection with the celebration of the town fiesta. Though incapable of pecuniary computation. an ordained Catholic priest.Rafael Patricio. . .000. by way of example or correction for the public good. social humiliation. slander or any other form of defamation. . respectively. (9) Acts mentioned in article 309.101 - prof. .000. 2219.Respondent Ongsip's default in payment cannot be utilized by petitioner to defeat or nullify the claim for damages. . (3) Seduction. wounded feelings. Here was then the opportunity for Coronel to confront Plaintiff with the allegedly discovered 'by-pass valve' and bluntly. (4) Adultery or concubinage. wounded feelings and social humiliation." . 27. petitioner's financial capability must also be considered. petitioner Manila Gas Corporation. respectively. temperate or compensatory damages Disposition Decision in favor of Patricio. They returned however at five o'clock. At most. such damages are justly due. 1989 FACTS . and similar injury. . Right then and there Coronel should have told Plaintiff that he was using a by-pass valve and in effect stealing gas from Defendant. testified that the second gas meter was replaced as being defective because "some of its parts were worn out and that it was not properly registering. for which respondent Ongsip was awarded moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P50. Then. Patricio filed a complaint for Slander by Deed.000.00.

Class 1950. but the guard stopped him and said they were to go to the back of the supermarket. retired Minister. but he forgot about the file in his pocket. It is against morals. social humiliation.Responding to the complaint. . an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the occasion. It ruled that when petitioner sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry. deeply insulted. .. CA modified: moral damages = P5k. She paid the suppliers. good customs and public policy to humiliate. moral shock. . several persons were already there including the bride. member of the Knights of Columbus. Fandino reached over and took the P5 bill and said it was a fine. He was totally embarrassed. He was then brought to the front of the grocery. Washington. Yet.‖ Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmonte's . honorably discharged from the Philippine Army in 1946. according to the circumstances of each case (Art. Petitioners wilfully caused loss or injury to private respondent in a manner that was A2010 .He paid for the items in his wife‘s cart. Valmonte prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay actual.A few days after the incident. Department of Foreign Affairs at the Philippine Embassy. employed as an executive of Proctor & Gamble Phils. a Philippine government pensionado of the United States for six months. the guard stopped him and told him he hadn‘t paid for the file. Petitioner did not respond to the letter. CA awarded him damages. privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons (Article 26. Petitioner contends that the appellate court's conclusion that she publicly humiliated respondent does not conform to the evidence presented. or that her reputation was besmirched due to petitioner's wrongful act. personality. wounded feelings and serious anxiety. The appellate court held that Valmonte's claim for damages is not predicated on the fact that she was subjected to body search and interrogation by the police but rather petitioner's act of publicly accusing her of taking the missing jewelry. and the fashion designer. imposing upon him a fine. And one must act with justice.102 - prof. petitioner denied having uttered words or done any act to confront or single out Valmonte during the investigation and claimed that everything that transpired after the theft incident was purely a police matter in which she had no participation. a corporate manager incharge of motoring and warehousing therein. When she arrived at Suite 326-A. she was merely exercising her right and if damage results from a person exercising his legal right. the court found no sufficient evidence to justify the award of actual damages. The court said that Valmonte failed to show that she suffered serious anxiety. Valmonte noticed the people staring at her. Everyone must respect the dignity. and embarrassed. Fandino replied: ―That is all they say. give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith (Article 19. It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: ―Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched. New Civil Code).85 file. Upon entering the suite. the assessment of such damages. The bags and personal belongings of all the people inside the room were searched. nominal. The whole incident that befell respondent had arisen in such a manner that was created unwittingly by his own act of forgetting to pay for the file.Respondent Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto. During all the time Valmonte was being interrogated by the police officers. The hotel security was called in to help in the search.Hence. He apologized and said he had forgotten. threatening to call the police and in the presence and hearing of many people at the Supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation and embarrassment. In her complaint. petitioner kept on saying the words ―Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto. The court concluded that petitioner's verbal assault upon Valmonte was done with malice and in bad faith since it was made in the presence of many people without any solid proof except petitioner's suspicion.m.nakaw na naman ito. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception was to be held.While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral. He instead held it in his hand.Espino is a graduate Mechanical Engineer from U. ISSUE contrary to morals.‖ Espino said he was going to pay for it. private respondent's act of omission contributed to the occurrence of his injury or loss and such contributory negligence is a factor which may reduce the damages that private respondent may recover (Art. Disposition Petition denied. and went back to the suite.00 for she was publicly humiliated. but decided to file a case.‖ Valmonte's car which was parked at the hotel premises was also searched but the search yielded nothing. police officers arrived and interviewed all persons who had access to the suite and fingerprinted them including Valmonte. . the people whom we cause not paying for the goods say . the official photographers. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the court to adjudge Valmonte liable on her counterclaim. hearers or bystanders was not deliberately sought or called by management to witness private respondent's predicament. While his wife was shopping for groceries. gave the meal allowance to the band. that many people were present and they saw and heard the ensuing interrogation and altercation appears to be simply a matter of coincidence in a supermarket which is a public place and the crowd of onlookers. he and his wife ran into his aunt‘s maid. this petition. . liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated. . . 2216. It opined that Valmonte has clearly established that she was singled out by petitioner as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. There. Council No. However. it was not shown that she did so with malice and in bad faith. sufficiently rendered the petitioners liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code.The trial court rendered its Decision dismissing Valmonte's complaint for damages. 2004 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . Among those present was petitioner Carpio. Civil Code).Fandino read the report and remarked: ―Ano. shouting at him. . interrogated and trailed by a security guard throughout the evening. it is damnum absque injuria. Espino took out a P5 bill to pay for the P3. He was directed to get in line at the cashier to pay for the file. The Court does not believe that private respondent was intentionally paraded in order to humiliate or embarrass him because petitioner's business depended for its success and patronage the good will of the buying public which can only be preserved and promoted by good public relations. member of the Philippine Veterans Legion. .One morning in 1970. People started milling around and stared at Espino. petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost. ikaw ang kumuha. The Court of Appeals ruled differently. Later. . On their way out. Such unfounded accusation entitles Valmonte to an award of moral damages in the amount of P100. Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items needed for the wedding rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors. as well as attorney's fees. he didn‘t put it in the grocery cart because it might fall and get lost. Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were billeted.‖ Espino objected. September 9. While they were talking he stuck the file in his breast pocket. Because it was small. near the cashiers to a Mrs. a report was made. He thought about going back that night to throw stones at the supermarket.000. he and his wife and their two daughters went to shop at South Supermarket (owned by Grand Union) in Makati. It added that no proof was presented by Valmonte to show that petitioner acted maliciously and in bad