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Commanders employ forces within the three states (peacetime, conflict, and
war) of the theater strategic environment. Army commanders, particularly at the
operational level, operate with other services, government agencies, United
Nations (UN) agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary
organizations (PVOs), and multinational partners. These unified operations—joint,
multinational, and interagency efforts— require a thorough understanding of Army
capabilities as they contribute to the unified structure. Combatant commands and
theaters form the unified structure for this organizational environment. A combatant
command is one of the unified or specified commands established by the
President. A theater is the geographical area outside the continental United States
(CONUS) for which a commander of a unified command has been assigned
military responsibility. Combatant commanders conduct unified operations.
To discuss the US Army in theater operations at the operational level of war,
commanders must understand the theater strategic and operational environment.
To do that, they must understand the fundamentals that define that strategic
environment and how the application of those fundamentals affects Army
operations. Chapter 1 discusses planning and execution of major operations,
operational art, operations in war, and military operations other than war
(MOOTW). Chapter 2 describes the national and theater strategic environments
and provides a means to assess Army operations at the operational level.
Chapter 3 examines how the commander in chief (CINC) and the Army service
component commander (ASCC) apply operational art and design. Operational art
and design are the linkage between execution of tactical operations and campaign
plans to obtain strategic objectives in theater. These chapters provide the basis
necessary for understanding Army operations at the operational level.

Chapter 1
Decisive Victory
In peacetime, conflict, and war, the Army is the nation’s
predominant decisive land force. Whenever the Army is called upon,
it fights to win and operates to achieve decisive results at minimum
cost to life and treasure. Army forces (ARFOR) in combat seek to
impose their will on the enemy. In MOOTW, they seek to create, set,
or control conditions to achieve their purpose. The standard is to
achieve the military commander’s end state within the strategic end
state articulated by the National Command Authorities (NCA).


In today’s global-based, force-projection ever-increasing threats and instabilities. Still,
Army, planning and executing major the opportunities for peace, growth, and
operations to support a theater campaign is a stability are evident. Army capabilities to
formidable task. The theater strategic succeed in leveraging the environment
environment is uncertain and dynamic, with consistent with national policy and strategy is

Chapter 1

the key. Commanders at all levels must international agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and US
organize, resource, train, and employ their Government agencies. Also based on theater
forces to be the decisive force when and where strategies, these campaigns involve a series of
required. The Army operational-level integrated operations with strategic aims at
commander’s challenge is to shape the military international, national, and theater levels. The
environment and set the conditions for decisive intent is to establish and maintain the desired
results or victory—unqualified success in all military conditions while employing a wide
major operations, whether in peacetime, range of military and nonmilitary capabilities
conflict, or war. This chapter is synchronized to achieve theater strategic and operational
with Joint Pubs 1, 0-2, 3-0, 4-0, and 5-0; objectives.
multiservice publications (FMFM 1, NDP 1,
AFM 1); and Army FMs 100-1 and 100-5. Campaigns covering the full range of
military operations demand plans with sound
linkages between theater strategy, the
THEATER CAMPAIGN campaign plan, and major operations plans.
The theater campaign is the focus of army The theater campaign must include forward-
operations in war, conflict, or peacetime. It is deployed forces and force-projection forces
linked to a theater strategy. The campaign is a involved in peacetime engagement— for
series of related and integrated major example, the Partnership for Peace Program,
operations with strategic, operational, and multilateral training, meetings—all part of the
tactical complementary actions simultaneously CINC’s strategy.
and sequentially arranged to accomplish
national strategic, theater strategic, and THEATER STRATEGY, CAMPAIGN,
operational objectives within a given time and AND MAJOR
space. The campaign plan describes the OPERATIONS LINKAGES
conduct of air, land, sea, space, and special The vital linkage between national and
operations. If appropriate, it also includes theater strategic direction and the tactical
interagency operations, NGOs and PVOs, and employment of forces on the battlefield takes
multinational operations, often in relation to place in major operational-level planning. The
UN actions. To win rapidly and decisively, both theater strategy and campaign relate the ends,
combat and noncombat operations occur ways, and means of national strategy to the
simultaneously throughout the combatant outcomes, methods, and resources for
commander’s campaign space and the operational activities. Translating national,
operational-level commander’s battle space alliance, or coalition guidance, the theater
and against the enemy’s theater depths. commander devises theater strategic
In wartime, a broadly conceived theater objectives, concepts, and resource implications
campaign plan normally involves the for a broad range of activities in the theater,
employment of large unified and joint forces. A including provisions for both war and MOOTW.
single, unifying strategic concept of operations The theater strategy is the foundation for the
synchronizes the actions taken at each level of campaign plan and forms the framework for
war against the enemy’s depth. The intent is to the employment of forces.
concentrate strategically the decisive force, With the outbreak of crisis or, more
simultaneously destroying and disrupting key optimally, in anticipation of an outbreak, the
enemy capabilities and functions, and CINC modifies portions of his strategy and
exploiting the resultant strategic advantage
and initiative before the enemy can react. campaign and, when necessary, develops a new
Achieving the theater strategic objectives, campaign plan. His critical tasks are to identify
while striving to incur minimum casualties, is the military operations that will achieve the
the measure of success. desired military end state, thereby
contributing to conditions for achieving the
Other campaigns may also be broad in strategic end state. The military end state
scope but usually call for smaller forces and normally represents the conditions the CINC
may include UN forces as well as other wants the campaign to achieve and is reflected

FM 100-7

in his mission statement, concept, and intent. understandable statements of mission and
The NCA normally directs the military to intent before and during battle. In assigning
support other elements of national power to missions, commanders consider that nested
achieve a strategic end state that may be concepts contribute to the unified effort and
broader in scope than the necessary military dominance of the enemy.
end state. The intent of the CINC to meet the
necessary military end state must be nested Estimates
inside the broader intent of the NCA. Within Just as at the tactical level, the
the theater of war and theaters of operations, operational-level commander’s continuous
the CINC’s campaign plan supports the estimate assists commanders in choosing the
strategic intent, concepts, and objectives. best course of action (COA) and in making
Operational-level commanders set the adjustments to changing situations during
conditions for tactical plans and support the execution. Commanders first consider the
campaign with operational intents, concepts, enemy’s capabilities, his likely intent and COA,
and objectives. Commanders at the tactical and wargame friendly alternatives to get from
level ensure their intents, concepts, and the current friendly state to the desired
objectives are nested within those of the military end state. Once a commander selects a
operational-level commander. Regardless of COA, he articulates the operational concept—a
level, Army commanders consider the objective description of his vision for the operation. He
factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops-time also begins to formulate ways to support the
available (METT-T) in their battle space to CINC’s plan to keep the public informed of the
achieve dominance over the enemy and to campaign, thereby gaining its understanding
protect the force. and support. The result of the estimate is an
accurate assessment of the current enemy and
friendly situation, a refined understanding of
MAJOR OPERATIONS the mission, and a clear expression of
Commanders of major operations require a alternatives, which is the basis for the rest of
fundamental understanding of the principles of the plan.
planning. Operational and tactical planning Estimates never stop. Operational-level
share the same basic, self-evident commanders continually review the situation
requirements—a complete definition of the by—
mission, clarity of the commander’s intent,
thoroughness of estimates, and sound concepts •Visiting subordinates and getting their
of operations. At the operational level, the estimates
imperative is to remain capable of responding •Observing operations.
to continually changing conditions. These •Meeting with higher and adjacent
principles assist operational-level planners commanders.
•Receiving updated intelligence and
Mission information about support efforts.
To the Army operational-level commander, Commanders revise their concepts
a mission is more than expressing what the accordingly. During the execution of the plan,
unit must accomplish and for what purpose. In they may adjust the operation. Estimates
analyzing the mission, he considers his include changes in military and strategic
superiors’ intent and the battle space and conditions as a basis for future missions.
anticipates the missions that could logically Further consideration of estimates is
follow from the mission in the campaign plan. important for resource allocation changes,
Anticipating and staying ahead of change particularly in support operations.
requires the operational-level commander to
continuously reassess the stated mission in Commander’s Intent
light of changing strategic and operational After mission analysis, the operational-
conditions. Subordinates still require clear, level commander clearly describes the

Chapter 1

operation’s purpose, the desired end state, the

degree of acceptable risk, and the method of
unifying focus for all subordinate elements.
The operational-level commander’s intent
contains the intent statement of the next senior
commander in the chain of command. The
commander’s intent is meant to be a constant
reference point for subordinates to discipline
their efforts. It helps them focus on what they
have to do to achieve success, even under
changed conditions when plans and concepts
no longer apply. For major operations, a clear
statement of intent is essential to successful
integration and synchronization of effort,
including support operations throughout the
depth of the battle space.

Concept of Operations
The concept of operations describes how a
commander visualizes the major operation
unfolding. The concept is based on the selected
COA to accomplish the mission, expressing
what, where, and how the various subordinate
operations will affect the enemy. The concept
addresses the sequence and timing of events
most likely to produce the desired end state.
Support, in particular, can be a dominant
factor in the determination of the nature and
tempo of operations. Operational-level see the actions of each unit fitting together to
commanders answer these questions—what, accomplish the mission. They describe their
where, and how—in sufficient detail for the view of probable enemy actions and how they
staff and subordinate commanders to plan to defeat the enemy. The operational-level
understand what they are to do, how they are commander ensures that his concept is
to fight, and how they are to provide support for consistent with his intent, the intent of the
the fight. In the concept of operations, CINC, and the strategic purpose of the
subordinate commanders describe how they campaign.

The subordinate commanders’ application Every subordinate campaign or operation
of operational art begins with understanding plan (O-PLAN) requires an overarching
the theater strategic concept and guidance operational concept. The subordinate joint
about the military end state. As strategic force commander (JFC) is normally responsible
realities tend to constrain the strategic for the concept—an idea that is initially a
possibilities, the guidance also limits product of the higher commander’s intent,
mission analysis, personal estimate of the
operational-level possibilities. Directly stated, situation, and creative imagination and
strategic guidance allows the operational-level intuitive judgment. Initially, it exists only in
commander to proceed along clear lines in his mind. Yet, the operational concept must be
planning an operational concept to support a clearly articulated relative to the conditions in
desired military end state. which it will apply. No finite set of principles

FM 100-7

exists to help in formulating an operational These operations are key to determining the
concept, but history has validated the outcome of engagements, battles, and major
application of several key military notions or operations. Many other operations support
concepts. decisive operations. For example, two
Three commonly used concepts are center supporting ground battles, an interdiction
of gravity, lines of operations, and decisive operation, and a deception operation all could
points. Center of gravity usually relates to the support a separate, decisive ground battle
main enemy force or capability. The concept of during a single phase of a campaign.
center of gravity is useful as a tool to analyze Commanders at all levels provide focus by
enemy strengths and vulnerabilities. By designating the main effort and supporting
identifying and controlling decisive points, efforts, which help set priorities, determine
commanders gain a marked advantage over the risks, and unify the effort. The operational-
enemy and can influence the outcome of an level commander focuses by applying structure
action. A line of operation connecting a force to the theater of war and his area of
with its base of operations is useful for focusing responsibility (AOR). Structure is a product of
the effects of combat power toward a desired the strategic objectives, forces allocated for the
outcome. A commander who uses more than theater, a concept for their employment, the
one line of operation produces flexibility and factors of METT-T, and the presence of alliance
creates opportunities for success. By applying or coalition structures.
all three concepts, either separately or in Thinking more broadly and outside the
concert, the commander forms a concept to set structure, the commander synchronizes major
conditions for operations and battles with actions within his battle space. The
conclusive, and sometimes, decisive results.
Other useful theoretical concepts include operational-level operating systems—
culminating point, synergy, simultaneity and movement and maneuver, fires, protection,
depth, anticipation, leverage, tempo, direct battle command, intelligence, and combat
versus indirect approach, and termination. service support (CSS)— are logical ways for
commanders to describe systematically the
In developing the concept, operational- integration of functions that occurs in each
level commanders should consider alternatives phase of the campaign plan within a given
that lead to decisive operations and battles. battle space.

The Army operational-level commander He also realizes that the joint team shares
dominates land combat to provide decisive limited resources. The CINC’s vision for the
results for the CINC. He recommends force campaign provides direction for the allocation
projection into theaters; links strategy and of these limited resources. Most significantly,
campaigns to major operations and tactics the Army operational-level commander
through battle dynamics (described later in recognizes that theater success requires more
this chapter); integrates assigned and than the success of a single service component;
supporting joint capabilities effectively; and it requires unified success of the joint team, as
transitions smoothly from crisis back to directed by the CINC.
peacetime. The Army operational-level
commander also understands all aspects of the
CINC’s intent. More than merely FORCE PROJECTION AND
comprehending the Army or land force role in EARLY ENTRY
the joint operation, he understands the Power projection is the ability of the US to
planning considerations of the other service apply any combination of economic, diplomatic,
operational-level commanders and ensures a informational, or military instruments of
mutual understanding and contribution to the national power. An effective power-projection
accomplishment of all subordinate missions. capability serves to deter potential adversaries,

Chapter 1

conduct joint, multinational, and interagency

operations anywhere in the world from
CONUS or forward-deployed locations.
Ensuring the projection of lethal force
worldwide represents the operational-level
commander’s most critical and difficult task.
This task is essential because power projection
forms a central element of the US National
Security Strategy. This task is challenging
because it requires the operational-level
commander to deploy limited forces thousands
of miles and conduct a high-stakes, come-as-
you-are operation. The importance of the
anticipation, balance, and timing of offensive
operations represents three critical force-
projection considerations.
The operational-level commander improves
his ability to project decisive force through
anticipation. Predeployment and deployment
decisions are crucial. Made under conditions of
great uncertainty and friction, these decisions
influence the success of entry, combat, and
postconflict operations. Once made, the
decisions are most often irretrievable. The
operational-level commander improves these
early decisions by anticipating alert and
deployment. Anticipation also plays a key role
throughout the deployment. Time remains a
critical resource, while ambiguity and
uncertainty continue to cloud the environment.
Continuous force tracking, total asset
visibility, and continuous intelligence-
preparation-of-the-theater enable the
operational-level commander to anticipate
changes and maximize his freedom of action.
The most difficult predeployment decisions
in support of the campaign plan concern force
mix and balance. The operational-level
commander must resolve requirements for
quick, decisive victory with strategic
constraints and uncertainty. Initially, he must
seek a balance in joint capabilities instead of a
balanced ARFOR. He will want to deploy
credible, lethal forces early, but limited
strategic lift, undeveloped theater
infrastructure, and time constraints may
prevent him from doing so. Conversely, he may
require the maximum amount of combat power

FM 100-7

at the cost of logistical support. Either way, the TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 is the first document
CINC can seldom afford duplicate capabilities that codifies the elements of battle dynamics.
among elements of the joint team. Maritime air
and amphibious capabilities, naval gunfire, Battle Command
and fleet ballistic missiles represent lethal Battle command describes one dimension
force often available to support early entry of the linkage among strategy, operations, and
operations. These or other forward-presence tactics. Battle command is a commander’s
forces may protect the lodgment, deter enemy mental decision-making frame work. The
attack, or initiate limited offensive operations attributes of battle command—assigning
if conditions limit the early entry of fully missions, prioritizing and allocating resources,
balanced Army combat power. The operational- assessing and taking risks, guiding and
level commander must exploit forward- motivating the organization—contribute to
presence forces; split-based operations; and positive impact on commanders at critical
host nation, coalition, and joint assets to points in the battle or on the battlefield.
balance early entry capabilities. Commanders visualize current and future
states of friendly and enemy forces and then
Timing formulate concepts of operation to accomplish
the mission. The Army operational-level
The operational-level commander also commander faces unique responsibilities in
faces a critical decision as he plans the this area. Time constraints and requirements
transition to offensive operations. Early entry during force projection strain the process of
units may initially secure the lodgment as translating theater strategy and design into
additional forces arrive. However, American operational design and tactical objectives. The
operations doctrine and the situation will Army operational-level commander may
prevent long-term defensive operations. The proceed through the first iteration of the
operational-level commander must decide estimate process concurrently with the CINC
when he has sufficient combat capability to and subordinate Army commanders.
transition to offensive operations. He must also Consequently, the CINC may not fully develop
consider other joint capabilities that and communicate his strategy in military
complement Army force projection terms early enough to support parallel
characteristics. He must apply the CINC’s planning. The Army operational-level
intent and guidance to evaluate trade-offs commander must translate nonmilitary
between the time required to assemble theater end states into clear military objectives
overwhelming combat force and the benefits of to support the planning of his staff and
early offensive action against an enemy that is subordinate commands.
consolidating gains or preparing for offensive
action. The preferred model remains Operation Battle Space
Just Cause, which emphasized overwhelming Battle space characterizes another facet of
and paralyzing the enemy through decisive, the linkage among the levels of war. It
simultaneous strikes throughout the depth of represents the domain in which commanders
the battle space. This action resulted in conduct their operations at the tactical,
minimal losses and rapid strategic conclusion. operational, and theater strategic levels. The
Army operational-level commander’s battle
space forms a subset of the CINC’s and
BATTLE DYNAMICS contains the battle space of all subordinate
WITHIN THE THEATER commanders. Its physical volume expands or
Operational art links success in tactical contracts in relation to the Army operational-
engagements and battles with strategic aims. level commander’s ability to acquire and
The aspects of battle dynamics establish this engage the enemy. It includes the breadth,
relationship: battle command; battle space; depth, and height in which he positions and
depth and simultaneous attack; early entry, moves assets over time. It also reflects the
lethality, and survivability; and CSS. Although capabilities of the intelligence systems that
FM 100-5 describes each of these dynamics, support him and the deep operations

Chapter 1

capabilities of the units and systems that execution of the support provided. These
support his command. The Army operational- differences are a result of diplomatic, economic,
level commander’s battle space may extend social, and technological changes. Successful
beyond his operations area, and it may not be armies recognize and adapt to this change,
contiguous. It also extends back to CONUS, to harness it to their benefit, and are ultimately
include the deployment and logistical systems victorious.
that support Army operations in theater.
Rapid force projection from CONUS,
Depth and Simultaneous Attack extended lines of communication (LOCs), and
Depth and simultaneous attack reinforce potential forcible entry into logistically bare-
the linkage among strategy, operations, and based areas of operations (AOs) require Army
tactics. The operational-level commander development of a CSS system that is versatile,
supports the CINC’s aims by dominating the deployable, and expansible. The CSS system
opponent in his battle space through depth and must be as capable as the joint and
simultaneous attack. The operational-level multinational forces, to include the SOF, it
commander cannot maximize depth through supports. The CSS system must include both
unilateral action. To achieve it, he must link the deployed force and the sustainment base.
the levels of war by augmenting his intelligence Its purpose must be to maintain readiness and
and deep operations systems with joint sustain ARFOR in all operations across the
capabilities. The operational-level commander range of military operations and at all levels of
also joins the levels of war through war—strategic, operational and tactical. The
simultaneous attack. His efforts to achieve focus of the CSS system must continue to be
simultaneity concentrate the effects of soldiers and their weapons systems.
engagements, battles, and major operations in
the dimension of time. Resulting concurrent INTEGRATION OF JOINT
operations at all levels of war increase the CAPABILITIES
requirement for tightly integrated activities. The operational-level commander plays a
Application of depth and simultaneous attack critical role in integrating joint capabilities. He
blurs the boundaries among tactics, operations, understands all aspects of the CINC’s intent
and strategy. and recognizes the importance of unity of
Early Entry, Lethality, effort. These two abilities underpin the concept
and Survivability of integrated joint capabilities. The
operational-level commander integrates joint
Early entry forces are those operational capabilities during the land phase of joint
deploying forces required to support the CINC operations and as a service component
or other JFC concepts of operations in a commander reinforcing other members of the
precrisis or crisis situation. Early entry forces joint team.
must be able to deploy rapidly, enter the
operational area, and secure the lodgment. The operational-level commander is the
They must either immediately have a decisive primary coordinator and integrator of joint
effect or create conditions for the arrival of capabilities during decisive land operations.
substantial follow-on forces that can then The CINC seeks combinations of forces and
conduct decisive operations. Early entry forces actions to achieve concentration in various
must consist of lethal and survivable units dimensions throughout all phases of the
tailored to support or carry out the operational campaign. During the decisive phase of joint
intent of the JFC. operations, the operational-level commander
becomes the integrator of joint capabilities
Combat Service Support within his battle space. During this phase, the
The functions of CSS have not changed in CINC coordinates the availability of resources
many centuries. Logisticians have and will and integrates supporting joint force
continue to have similar requirements to arm, operations elsewhere in the theater. The
fuel, fix, move, and sustain soldiers and their operational-level commander synchronizes the
systems. The primary differences are in the actions of theater intelligence assets, naval

FM 100-7

gunfire and fleet ballistic missiles, air •Operations to reestablish precrisis

interdiction, close air support (CAS), joint readiness levels.
electronic warfare assets, SOF, and other joint
and national assets. He and his staff must Early decisions concerning mobilization
exploit the capabilities of these resources. and deployment establish conditions for critical
The operational-level commander also postconflict operations. Long-term solutions to
integrates joint operations indirectly through regional crises usually require more than the
the support of other services. He contributes to defeat of the enemy’s military. The operational-
the integration of operations in which the level commander develops plans for conflict
CINC assigns him support missions. The termination and postconflict operations early.
attack of enemy air defenses to support air He reviews them as branches and sequels to
operations and the attack of small enemy naval deployment and combat operations and plans
vessels in support of maritime operations for simultaneous combat. ARFOR assist the
during the Gulf War are two examples of this. JFC in supporting the host nation with
The operational-level commander also seeks operations to handle refugees, clear minefield
opportunities to integrate his capabilities into for immediate tactical purposes, control
the operations of the other members of the joint prisoners of war, provide humanitarian
force. He understands the planning assistance, and provide other forms of support.
considerations of air, maritime, and SOF and Nonmilitary considerations often require the
seeks opportunities to contribute to unity of initiation of these MOOTW before the
effort and the accomplishment of other service completion of combat operations.
missions. Once the conflict ends, forces may deploy to
their home stations or to another theater. The
TRANSITION TO PEACETIME OR WAR operational-level commander must plan for
this possibility. He must expect the NCA to
The operational-level commander alert his forces, as in precrisis operations. His
considers postconflict operations early in the forces must be versatile enough to transition
planning process. They fall in two broad rapidly from one regional conflict to another.
categories: Once forces return to their home stations, they
•Actions to restore order and normal social rapidly reestablish premobilization levels of
activities following armed conflict. readiness in anticipation of future operations.


The Army operational-level commander’s capabilities, and using versatile forces.
role in MOOTW is critical to achieving Transitions may have no clear division
strategic success. Like the decisive phase of between combat and peacetime activities, may
combat, most of these operations are land- lack definable timetables for transferring
based. Consequently, the Army operational- responsibilities, and may be conducted in a
level commander functions as the central fluid, increasingly diplomatic environment.
integrator of a joint and multinational team. JTF Andrew coordinated with many
He faces ambiguous threats, unpredictable federal, state, and private organizations. These
conflicts, ad hoc staffs, and force packages, as included the Federal Emergency Management
well as a multitude of nonmilitary participants. Agency, the Civil Air Patrol, the American Red
The operational-level commander prepares for Cross, the General Services Administration,
a mission of unknown duration and anticipates the Public Health Service, the Department of
changes in its nature and scope. To ensure Agriculture, the Salvation Army, the Boy
success, he applies operational art executed Scouts of America, and many religious relief
within the framework of battle dynamics. He organizations. The commander of JTF Andrew
achieves his desired end state by carefully determined that victory would be achieved
planning, integrating complementary when the local schools reopened. This had a

Chapter 1

significant focusing effect on the efforts of DOD planning considerations because of the nature
and non-DOD participants and answered the of MOOTW. Areas that require special
question, “How do I know when I am done?” planning considerations include interagency
cooperation, parallel and continuous planning,
This disaster-relief effort demonstrated intelligence, and constraints and restraints
the versatility of the US armed forces. The placed on the operation.
training for war that developed initiative,
ingenuity, and flexibility in the conduct of Gaining cooperation among the multitude
operations served the nation well in a of participants is a formidable task. The
noncombat situation. The alert of the 10th operational-level commander unifies the
Mountain Division for Somalia less than six efforts of all participants operating within his
weeks after sending more than 6,000 soldiers battle space by attempting to reach agreement
and their equipment to south Florida further on common goals and objectives. Consensus on
highlights their versatility. goals and objectives requires an understanding
of the roles, missions, and capabilities of each
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS participating member. Additionally, both
national and international representatives of
Military decision making and planning the media will likely cover the operation.
processes also apply to MOOTW. The Facilitating their mission keeps the service
operational-level commander faces unique member, the local populace, and the

FM 100-7

international community apprised of the the parallel planning and estimate processes
situation and may contribute to the ongoing in each functional area.
achievement of national aims and objectives. The operational-level commander obtains
Parallel planning is essential. Ideally, this clear, strategic guidance on constraints and
begins with the NCA decision to commit restraints early in the planning phase. He
military forces. The uncertainty surrounding determines his authority and capability to
the mission requires commanders to enforce local laws and assesses restraints on
simultaneously begin planning at all levels. weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence.
Parallel planning provides planners with the Excessive force could impede the attainment of
ability to influence task organizations, mission operational goals and hamper the efforts to
statements, and force caps and obtain access to maintain legitimacy and obtain international
critical strategic intelligence early in the acceptance. Disciplined forces, measured
planning process. The operational-level responses, and patience are essential to
successful outcomes.
commander must participate in the
development of end states, conditions, and
measures of effectiveness (MOEs). He must INTEGRATION OF COMPLEMENTARY
understand the diplomatic, economic, and CAPABILITIES
social objectives of the operation before The operational-level commander
determining the military end state and integrates and synchronizes complementary
sequencing operations to achieve it. Clarity of capabilities within his battle space.
mission and desired end state is critical. Establishing cooperation among many
participants is demanding; integrating their
Intelligence is the key to force protection. capabilities is even more so. The simultaneous
The Army operational-level commander application of complementary strengths,
acquires and disseminates information on the concurrently conducted at all levels, provides
country, the people, and the diplomatic, the necessary leverage to achieve the desired
economic, and military situations. Key items of end state. The key to developing this leverage
information are shared with members of is the ability to establish unity of military and
participating civilian organizations, who in civilian efforts. Without a formal interagency
turn can be vital sources of intelligence. command structure, commanders ensure unity
Continuous access to strategic intelligence and of effort through leadership. They must
reliable low-level sources is paramount to demonstrate the logic and soundness of their
situational awareness. The viability of the solutions and the competence of their
rules of engagement (ROE) are assessed execution. Robust liaison is critical in this role.
continuously with the current mission, friendly Providing assistance to other participants
force capability, threat conditions, and promotes integration of their unique
environment within which operations are capabilities. Operational-level commanders
conducted. ROE protect the force and also enhance their integration efforts by—
provide a framework within which hostile acts
are controlled. •Collocating their headquarters with local
and regional governments.
The Army operational-level commander •Establishing a civil-military operations
must conduct a continuous estimate process. centers.
He operates in a dynamic environment. •Aligning military and diplomatic
Changes in strategic objectives, operational boundaries.
constraints, or the nature of the threat are
three examples that may invalidate the initial By planning, implementing, and
mission analysis. Operations, intelligence, continuously updating a complementary joint
deployment, engineer, and logistics estimates and interagency concept, operational-level
are constantly updated as new information commanders integrate diplomatic, military,
becomes available. The commander’s and economic power across all dimensions of
continuous estimate process serves to integrate the environment.

Chapter 1

The operational-level commander plans transitioning from warfighting to other
MOOTW anticipating the requirement to operations. Rapid changes in the strategic
transition to another, similar operation or even situation may force sequential commitment
war. The experiences of the 10th Mountain from one theater to another; while changes
Division (Light Infantry) during 1992 and 1993 within the same theater may require a
set the precedent. MOOTW require flexible transition from one type of operation to
leaders with versatile forces. The operational- another. Activities such as nation assistance,
level commander must be able to address a humanitarian support, and disaster-relief
wide array of missions against a multitude of operations may continue when higher levels of
diverse threats. His versatile force must be violence arise. Commitments to MOOTW may
capable of fighting and winning our nation’s precede combat, follow combat, or flow readily
wars, yet it must be fully capable of back and forth between the two.

Throughout history, military operations Multinational operations require close
have been conducted with armed forces of cooperation among all forces. Capabilities will
several nations in pursuit of common often differ substantially among national
objectives. The changing world environment forces, but higher considerations of national
dictates that future operations will most likely prestige will often be as important to the final
require multinational involvement. success as the contributions to the overall
An operation conducted by forces of two or effort. Seemingly small decisions, such as
more nations is termed a multinational national composition of the main effort, may
operation. An operation conducted by forces of have significant consequences for the outcome
two or more nations in a formal arrangement is of the operation. Members should be consulted
called and alliance operation. An operation on their recommendations for COA
where the military action is temporary or development, ROE, and assignment of
informal is called a coalition operation. missions.
Campaigns and major operations may be To assure unity of effort, all plans require
conducted within the context of an alliance, detailed coordination with essential supporting
coalition, or other international arrangement. plans for liaison and the provision of mutual
Such operations, whether or not they involve support. Host nation support and the
combat, are planned through both capabilities of coalition partners in particular
international and US channels. In practice, may dictate the tempo of the attack and its
each coalition operation is unique. Planning form. The commander must focus on lateral
and conduct of the operations vary with the coordination across national and interagency
international situation and the composition of boundaries, in particular the effective sharing
the forces. Alliance or coalition members may of information. Though unity of command
not have identical strategic perspectives, but promotes unified effort, American commanders
there should be sufficient harmony of interests should be prepared to operate within the
to ensure a common purpose for the campaign. alliance or coalition under command of other
The need to maintain consensus within the than a senior US commander.
alliance or coalition is paramounted to preserve a
unified effort.

Chapter 2
The Theater
The Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes criteria for a
unified theater based on National Security Strategy, National
Military Strategy, geography, and history. The President approves
the UCP, which sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant
commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force
structure; delineates the general geographical AOR for geographic
combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for
functional combatant commanders. A key consideration is strategic
objectives. National strategic direction and evolution of geopolitical
circumstances shape the theater’s geographic boundaries.
Theater commanders provide strategic direction and operational
focus to subordinate commanders. They develop a theater strategy
and campaign plan, organize their theaters, and establish command
relationships for effective unified (joint and multinational)
operations. Through this process, theater commanders plan and
conduct unified operations that ensure a united effort within the
The military instrument of national security policy requires
synchronization with the diplomatic, informational, and economic
efforts. Circumstances determine the extent of the synchronization
required. The national synchronization effort is referred to as unified
action; the theater level is referred to as unified operations.
Interagency operations are another consideration for Army
commanders in the theater.
The US Constitution requires civilian control (the NCA) of US
military forces. Consequently, subsequent legislation has molded
today’s defense establishment and produced the concept of the
unified theater. Unity of command requires that one responsible
commander focus resources toward obtaining defined objectives and
strategic end states. Across the range of military operations, unity of
command gives a single, unified commander responsibility for all
military operations within a designated theater strategic
environment (see Figure 2-1). Command lines within the unified
theater are established to designate one responsible commander.

Section I
The Strategic Hierarchy
The first round of the first battle is a strategic-level decision.
GEN William W. Hartzog
Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command

To accomplish unity of effort within the unified theater, the CINC devises
a theater strategy for that geographic portion of the globe. This military
strategy is a combination of the art and science of employing armed forces or

Chapter 2

the potential threat posed by the presence and capabilities of that force to
secure national security objectives through the application of force. The CINC
derives his military strategy for a geographic region from a hierarchy of
guidance and manifests it in the unified theater campaign plan and theater
contingency plans.
The theater strategic environment is shaped by the special conditions,
circumstances, and influences in the theater that affect the employment of
military forces and the decisions of the chain of command. The theater
strategic direction is expressed through hierarchical levels of strategy.
National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and theater strategy
all provide the basis for each theater’s strategic direction. These strategies
integrate national security and military objectives (ends), national security
policies and military concepts (ways), and national resources and military
forces (means) to achieve national security objectives. The Army’s planning
and conduct of major operations or MOOTW is the operational-level link
between the tactical level force’s actions and the strategic hierarchy
discussed above. This operational-level link is discussed later in this chapter
and in the Chapter 3 discussion of operational art and design.
The National Security Act (NSA) of 1947, as amended, created the
Department of Defense and the positions of Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The National Security Act of 1947, and
subsequent implementing memorandums, authorized the formation of
unified and specified combatant commands. Commanders of these combatant
commands are called CINCs.

FM 100-7


The NCA establish the National Security freedom, human rights, and democratic
Strategy and appropriate strategic end states. institutions flourish.
The National Security Strategy announces US The 1995 National Military Strategy
interests and objectives. This strategy is the art describes two fundamental strategic military
and science of developing, applying, and objectives derived from the National Security
coordinating the instruments of national Strategy.
power—diplomatic, economic, military, and
informational—to achieve objectives that •Promote stability through regional
contribute to national security. National values cooperation and constructive interaction.
and principles form the foundation of US •Thwart aggression through credible
interests and objectives. The Army’s keystone deterrence and robust warfighting
doctrine (FM 100 5) reflects these values as the capabilities.
American view of war. US interests and
objectives outlined in the 1994 version of To achieve these strategic objectives, US
National Security Strategy include— military forces must perform three tasks:
•Enhancing our security. The survival of the •One, remain constructively engaged in
US as a free and independent nation, with peacetime.
its basic values intact and its institutions •Two, attempt to prevent the eruption of
and people secure. conflict.
•Promoting prosperity at home. A healthy •Three, should conflict prevention fail, fight
and growing US economy to ensure and win our nation’s wars.
opportunity for individual prosperity and
resources for national endeavors at home The overlapping and interrelated strategic
and abroad. concepts that allow the military to execute
these three tasks are overseas presence and
• Promoting democracy. Healthy, cooperative, power projection. Figure 2-2 depicts the
and diplomatically vigorous relations with relationships between the strategic concepts of
allies and friendly nations. A stable and overseas presence and power projection and the
secure world where political and economic national military objectives.

Chapter 2


The Goldwater Nichols DOD The National Military Strategy and
Reorganization Act of 1986 requires the defense policy provide strategic guidance for
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to the employment of military forces. The Joint
help the NCA in providing strategic direction Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides
for the armed services. The National Military planning guidance to the CINCs and chiefs of
Strategy and the Joint Strategic Planning the services to accomplish their missions based
System (JSPS) are the methods the CJCS uses on current military capabilities.
for providing that assistance.

The CINC translates the national level includes the mission analysis and the
strategic directives into a theater strategy. assessment of the operational-level
This strategy is the basis for developing a environment discussed in Section VI of this
campaign plan and leads to operations plans chapter. At the theater strategic level, the
for execution. Joint or multinational forces CINC develops his theater strategy by first
implement these plans in theater to achieve identifying specified and implied missions and
theater strategic objectives that, in turn, tasks for his theater. He derives these from
achieve national objectives. many sources, including the national security
The CINC’s strategy has several and military strategies, policies, directives, the
components. First, it expresses his vision and JSCP, the UCP, Joint Pub 0-2, and other
intent (military objectives). –the theater ends directives and agreements.
to which operations are conducted. Next, it While identifying theater missions, the
provides integrated strategic concepts, COAs, CINC analyzes his theater strategic
and guidance—the theater ways designed to environment. Using the strategic estimate,
secure national objectives, using the theater’s which includes the factors of METT-T, he
wide-ranging military capabilities. Finally, it considers the potential instabilities or threats,
gives the service and functional component the limitations, and the nature of anticipated
commanders guidance for planning and operations. Assessment factors include the
employing nuclear, conventional, and SOF integration of capabilities by diplomatic,
theater means. informational, and economic instruments of
The plan’s process allocates the theater national power provided to the military. In
means. Forces are allocated based on theater addition, the CINC must consider
missions as they compete with requirements in international security agreements. This
other theaters. Means are expected to fall short analysis leads to formulation of a strategic
of what would ideally be available. The theater estimate that defines the strategic situation in
campaign plan sequences unified activities the theater. Thus, the estimate produces broad,
over time and space to compensate for these strategic concepts of what must be done in
shortcomings. theater. Then, the CINC integrates these
concepts into the theater strategy.
METT-T analysis is a traditional The CINC’s staff and subordinates, to
assessment method for tactical-level leaders. include his service and functional component
Under deliberate planning circumstances, commanders, contribute to the development of
tactical-level commanders and staffs should the theater strategy. The functional component
use the Army’s deliberate decision making commander is the commander in charge of a
procedures in FM 101-5. As part of the Joint service or functional component command,
Operations Planning and Execution System which consists of all individuals, units,
(JOPES) procedures, strategic and operational- detachments, organizations, and installations
level leaders use more formal methods, such as under the command assigned to the unified
strategic estimates or commander’s estimates, CINC. The development of the multiple theater
as they analyze military and diplomatic strategic concepts leads to a specific strategic
situations (see Joint Pubs 5-03.1 and 5-00.2). COA for implementation in the theater
At the strategic level, METT-T analysis campaign. Once the CINC selects the desired
focuses on conditions, circumstances, and course, his staff and subordinate joint
influences of the theater strategic commands use the theater strategy to develop
environment. At the operational level, it and integrate OPLANs, including campaigns.

FM 100-7

Section II
The Chain of Command
The Goldwater Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 prescribes the
chain of command. The NCA exercises authority and control of the armed
forces through the chain of command with two distinct branches. The first
branch runs from the President to the SECDEF to the combatant
commanders for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The second
branch runs from the NCA to the secretaries of the military departments to
the chiefs of the service forces for execution of service functions.
Commanders of combatant commands are responsible to the NCA for the
preparedness of their commands and execution and accomplishment of
assigned missions. The secretaries of the military departments are
responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces. The
authority exercised by the military departments is subject by law to the
authority provided to the combatant commanders.
The DOD Reorganization Act placed the CJCS within the chain of
command to communicate the directions of the NCA. Though he does not
exercise military command over any combatant forces, all communications
between the NCA and combatant commanders pass through the CJCS.
Figure 2-3 displays the chain of command.


This portion of the chain of command action is passed to combatant commanders.
begins with the President and SECDEF, who The President, with the advice of the SECDEF
make up the NCA. They alone have the and CJCS, establishes combatant commands
constitutional authority to direct US armed and appoints combatant commanders under
the authority of the National Security Act of
forces into military action. Once the NCA 1947. The JSCP apportions forces for each
makes the decision, authorization for military combatant command for planning.


While the CJCS does not exercise The CJCS coordinates all communications
command over military forces, the SECDEF on matters of joint interest addressed to the
may assign oversight responsibilities to the CINCs by other authority. The CJCS acts as
CJCS to assist in controlling and coordinating the spokesperson for the CINCs, especially on
the combatant commanders. The CJCS the operational requirements of their
functions within the chain of command by commands. The CJCS monitors the geographic
conveying to the CINCs the orders of the regions of the world not assigned to a
President and SECDEF. combatant command.

A combatant commander is a commander statutory authority (combatant command) to
of a unified or specified command. A combatant organize and task all services under his control
commander is called the CINC. A combatant to accomplish military missions. Combatant
commander is the only military leader with commanders are key links in the chain of

Chapter 2


The chain of command for the military combatant commands. The secretaries fulfill
departments runs from the NCA to the their responsibilities for forces apportioned to
secretaries of the military departments. The combatant commands by exercising
secretaries exercise authority, direction, and administrative control (ADCON) through the
control through the service chiefs of their forces service component commanders assigned to the
not assigned to combatant commands. This combatant commands. ADCON is subject to the
chain of command includes all military forces command authority of the combatant
within the respective service. This branch of commander.
the chain of command is separate and distinct
from the branch that exists within a combatant The ASCC, using ADCON authority, is
command. responsible for preparing, maintaining,
training, equipping, administering, and
The secretaries of the military supporting ARFOR assigned to the unified and
departments are responsible for the specified commands. The emphasis of the
administration and support of their forces, to service branch of the chain of command is
include those assigned or attached to administrative (legal, personnel, finance) and

FM 100-7

logistical support to respective service forces. forces. Figure 2-3 illustrates this branch of the
Training during peacetime, in preparation for chain of command.
war, and before commitment of forces is also a
key element and task for the ASCC. Within the parameters set by the CINC’s
organization of the theater and the command
The CINC provides the channel for relationships he establishes, the ASCC
strategic and operational guidance in theater organizes the ARFOR to best accomplish the
and ensures the US unity of command. The assigned missions. The CINC has the authority
service administrative and support channel to direct certain Army organizational options
provides administrative, training, and logistics but normally leaves internal Army
support, ensuring that the CINC receives organization and command relationships to the
organized, equipped, and trained US military ASCC.

Command is central to all military actions. COCOM and is the authority to perform the
Unity of command is central to unity of effort. functions of command over subordinate forces.
The authority vested in a commander must be The CINC may delegate OPCON to his
commensurate with the responsibility subordinates. OPCON is the most authority
assigned. Commanders in the chain of with which subordinates can direct all aspects
command exercise authority as prescribed by of military operations and joint training needed
law or a superior commander. Commanders of to accomplish any assigned mission. A
US military forces use various levels of commander with OPCON may control forces
authority, which are described as command from one or more services. OPCON does not
relationships and other authorities. Within the normally include the authority to direct
seven levels of authority, four are command logistics, administration, discipline, internal
relationships—combatant command organization, or unit training. The service
(COCOM), operational control (OPCON), component commander retains his service
tactical control (TACON), and support. The responsibility and authority for forces under
other three are coordinating authority, OPCON of another command. Commanders
ADCON, and direct liaison authorized must be aware of the US and North Atlantic
(DIRLAUTH). Treaty Organization (NATO) terms of OPCON
and not interchange the two. The NATO term
COMBATANT COMMAND OPCON more closely resembles the US
COCOM is the command authority definition of TACON.
authorized by Title 10, US Code, Section 164,
or as directed by the President in the UCP to TACTICAL CONTROL
combatant command commanders (unified or The CINC uses TACON to limit the
specified). COCOM provides full authority to authority to direct the tactical use of combat
organize and employ commands and forces as forces. TACON is authority normally limited to
the combatant commander considers necessary the detailed and specified local direction of
to accomplish assigned missions. This movement and maneuver of the tactical force to
authority enables the CINC to organize and accomplish an assigned task. TACON does not
employ his commands and forces, assign tasks, provide organizational authority or
designate objectives, and give authoritative administrative and support responsibilities.
direction over all aspects of military The service component continues to exercise
operations, joint training, and logistics these authorities.
necessary to accomplish the assigned missions.
The CINC normally exercises COCOM through
his service component commanders. COCOM is SUPPORT
not transferable.
The CINC identifies support relationships
for one force to aid, assist, protect, or
OPERATIONAL CONTROL logistically support another force. The
Commanders at or below the combatant supporting force gives the needed support to
commander exercise OPCON as their the supported force. Establishing supported
command authority. OPCON is inherent in and supporting relationships between

Chapter 2

components is a useful option to accomplish supporting action, and other instructions

needed tasks. This concept applies equally to necessary for coordination and efficiency. The
all dimensions of the joint force organized by supporting commander is responsible for
the CINC. ascertaining the needs of the supported
Each subordinate element of the joint force commander. The supporting commander must
can support or be supported by other elements. fulfill those needs from within the existing
Normally an establishing directive is issued to capabilities, priorities, and requirements of
specify the purpose of the support relationship, other assigned tasks. The categories of support
the effect desired, and the scope of the action to are general, mutual, direct, and close.
be taken. Joint Pub 0-2 states, “Unless limited
by the establishing directive, the commander of General Support
the supported force will have the authority to
exercise general direction of the supporting General support provides designated
effort.” The execution of general direction support to an entire supported force and not to
includes the designation and prioritization of any particular subdivision. General support is
targets or objectives, timing and duration of the the most centralized support relationship. For

FM 100-7

combat units, this relationship provides the Other authorities granted outside the
most flexibility for influencing the battle command relations delineeated above are
during conduct of operations and is used when coordinating authority, ADCON, and
the enemy situation is unclear. It is more DIRLAUTH.
commonly used in the defense than the offense.
Coordinating Authority
Mutual Support Coordinating authority is a consultation
relationship between commanders, but not an
Mutual support describes actions that authority to exercise control. The CINC and
units provide one another against an enemy other subordinate commanders designate
because of their assigned tasks, their positions coordinating authority to assist during
relative to one another and to the enemy, and planning and preparation for actual
their inherent capabilities. operations. The CINC specifies coordinating
authority to foster effective coordination;
Direct Support however, coordinating authority does not
Direct support provides designated compel any agreements.
support to a specific force and authorizes the Administrative Control
supported force to seek this support directly.
The supporting force provides support on a ADCON is the direction or exercise of
priority basis to the supported force. Also, the authority necessary to fulfill military
supporting force may provide support to other department statutory responsibilities for
forces when it does not jeopardize the mission administration and support. ADCON may be
or put the supported force at risk. The delegated to and exercised by service
authority to accomplish support of other than commanders at any echelon at or below the
directly supported forces rests with the higher service component command. The secretaries
tactical or operational commander but also of military departments are responsible for the
may be delegated. An example of this support is administration and support of their forces
when the elements of a general support assigned or attached to unified commands. The
artillery brigade assigned a direct support secretaries fulfill this responsibility by
mission are diverted temporarily to support a exercising ADCON through the service
force other than the designated force. component commander of the unified
command. ADCON is subject to the command
authority of the combatant commander.
Close Support
The fourth alternative, close support, is Direct Liaison Authorized
that action of the supporting force against DIRLAUTH is the authority granted by a
targets or objectives that are sufficiently near commander at any level to a subordinate
the supported force as to require detailed commander to coordinate an action directly
integration or coordination of the supporting with a command or agency within or outside
action with the fire, movement, or other actions the command. DIRLAUTH is a coordination
of the supported force. relationship, not a command relationship.

Section III
Joint Force Commands
The NCA, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS, establishes
combatant commands (unified and specified) on a regional or functional basis.
Regionally oriented unified commands are called theater combatant
commands. The CINC, using the COCOM options, establishes the theater
command structure. He may establish subordinate JFCs (subunified
commands and JTFs). These subordinate JFCs may be established on a
regional or functional basis.

Chapter 2

With the advice and assistance of the commands operate globally across all
CJCS, the NCA establishes combatant geographic regions. The UCP provides
commands (unified and specified) to perform missions, geographical areas, and forces
military missions and prescribes the force assigned to unified commands. The UCP is
structure of such commands. Commanders of normally reviewed biennially during an odd
combatant commands are responsible to the year. Suggested changes are submitted for
NCA for the preparedness of their commands consideration. Those that receive support are
to execute assigned missions and for the subsequently implemented.
accomplishment of the military missions
assigned to them. Regionally Oriented (Theater)
Unified Commands
SPECIFIED COMMANDS Unified commands with regional
A specified command is a command that responsibilities are the US Atlantic Command
has broad, continuing missions. The NCA, with (ACOM), the US Southern Command
advice and assistance of the CJCS, establishes (SOUTHCOM), the US European Command
a specified command. A specified command is (EUCOM), the US Central Command
composed normally of forces from a single (CENTCOM), and the US Pacific Command
military department. Still, it may include units (PACOM). Each regional combatant command
and staffs from other services. Currently, no has a specific geographic AOR or theater that
specified commands exist. includes the land, sea, and airspace in the
strategic region. UCP-designated AORs
UNIFIED COMMANDS provide military focus and a basis for
Unified commands are those combatant coordination worldwide.
commands with significant forces from two or A theater combatant commander has the
more services. Unified commands may be flexibility to organize and employ forces
functionally or regionally oriented. wherever required to accomplish his assigned
responsibilities in coordination with other
Functionally Oriented (Global) supporting combatant commanders. Effective
Unified Commands use of the nation’s military power requires
Functionally oriented unified commands close integration of the separate services. Unity
are the US Space Command (SPACECOM), the of effort is required for effectiveness and
US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), efficiency. Centralized direction provides for
the US Special Operations Command unified action by forces. Decentralized
(SOCOM), and the US Strategic Command execution is essential because 2of the enormity
(STRATCOM). Functionally oriented unified of the command and control (C ) span.


The theater combatant commander, The CINC organizes his forces, assigns
referred to as the CINC, is a strategic-level tasks, designates objectives, provides
commander of a unified command, who authoritative direction, and employs his forces.
provides strategic direction and operational He designs and executes theater campaigns
and unified operations, supports the operations
focus to his subordinate commands. CINCs of other theater CINCs, and continually
serve as the vital link between national assesses the environment, anticipating the
military strategy and theater strategy. They need for theater operations where his forces
provide the strategic and operational direction may play a supporting or supported role.
required for major unified and joint land, air, A CINC is assigned a myriad of
and maritime operations. The CINC is not responsibilities to fulfill his unique command
simply a planner and allocator of resources; he role. Joint Pub 0-2 discusses the CINC’s
has a broad range of responsibilities responsibilities at length. It specifies that the
established by public law and described in joint CINC is responsible for maintaining the
publications. security of his command and protecting the

FM 100-7

interests of the US, its possessions, and its areas that the theater commander organizes.
bases against direct and indirect hostile They further subdivide these areas among
threats. The CINC ensures that his command their forces. The SECDEF directs the Secretary
is prepared to carry out missions assigned by of the Army to assign ARFOR to the CINCs.
the NCA. The CINC assigns responsibilities Operating within national budget constraints,
and missions to his component forces and the NCA cannot satisfy all of the CINC’s
maintains unity of command. requirements. Therefore, during deliberate
The CINC executes his strategic planning planning, CINCs identify their force shortfalls.
responsibilities for developing a theater The CJCS, through the military department
strategy and theater campaigns (war plans to chiefs, identifies forces to fill these shortfalls.
achieve national strategic objectives). He uses The JSCP apportions forces to each CINC for
operational art and theater design while planning purposes. This apportionment may
performing the following critical tasks: not equal the current forces assigned. The NCA
assigns additional forces when a CINC is
•Prepares the estimates (strategic and required to implement a specific plan requiring
commander’s) of the situation. more forces than assigned or apportioned for
•Establishes a theater strategic end state. planning.
•Determines strategic center of gravity. The CINC, by exercising COCOM
authority, performs the following legal
•States his strategic vision and intent in his functions of command over assigned forces:
strategic concept of operations.
•Determines forces required to achieve the
•Organizes the theater. military end state, organizes available
•Identifies subordinate commands and forces, allocates resources, and commands
determining specific forces required to forces.
execute campaign plans. •Employs commands and forces.
•Establishes command relationships and
delegating authority. •Assigns tasks.
•States readiness shortfalls and developing •Designates objectives.
programs to correct those shortfalls. •Exercises authoritative direction over all
•Concentrates his forces and supplies aspects of military operations, signal
strategically. support, logistics, and joint training to
•Conducts strategic maneuver to destroy, accomplish missions assigned to his
dislocate, or neutralize the strategic center command.
of gravity. Combatant commanders alone exercise
•Seeks strategic advantage and the COCOM authority by establishing command
initiative. relationships with subordinates, delegating
appropriate authorities, and assigning
•Directs the development of theater responsibilities to their subordinates (see
contingency plans and concept plans leading Figure 2-4). The CINC strives for centralized
to the conduct of operations in war or direction and decentralized planning and
MOOTW. execution. The CINC has the following six
•Achieves a theater strategic end state. options, including combining options, through
which he may exercise COCOM authority
The CINC’s campaign plan provides a (Joint Pub 0-2):
common frame of reference within which •Service component command.
operations of land, air, maritime, special
operations, and space forces, as well as •Functional component command.
interagency, multinational, or UN forces, are •Subordinate unified command.
unified, integrated, and harmonized. Joint
campaign doctrine is found in Joint Pubs 3-0, •Joint task force.
5-0, 5-00.1.
•Single-service force.
The services provide forces to operate
within a subordinate JFC in the operational •Direct command.

Chapter 2

A service component command consists of responsibility as the theater becomes more
those individuals, units, detachments, complex, and it may become necessary to
organizations, and installations of a single establish an intermediate headquarters, based
military service assigned to the unified on the complexity of the operational
command. Except for the CINC and members environment. This alternative is discussed
of his joint staff, the senior officer of the service further in Section VI of this chapter.
component assigned to a unified command and
qualified for command by the regulations of
that service is designated the service
component commander. His assignment is FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT
subject to the concurrence of the CINC. The COMMMAND
service component commander is responsible Based on his mission analysis, the CINC
for all command aspects of his force, to include may form a functional component composed of
logistics within the unified command. like functional forces from more than one
The ASCC serves as the principal advisor service. Functional component commands may
to the CINC for supporting and employing be established for MOOTW or war to perform
ARFOR in theater and ARFOR outside the particular operational missions that may be of
theater tasked to support theater operations. short duration or may extend over time and
The ASCC may delegate part of this involve forces from two or more services. The

FM 100-7

functional component commanders are as Command (ALCOM), US Forces Japan (USFJ),

follows: and US Forces Korea (USFK).
•Joint force land component commander The ASCC of subunified commands
(JFLCC). operates in the chain of command within the
subordinate unified command. The ASCC of
• Joint force air component commander the subunified command normally
(JFACC). communicates directly with the unified
command ASCC on matters that relate
•Joint force maritime component commander specifically to that service and informs the
(JFMCC). subunified commander as that commander
•Joint force special operations component directs.
commander (JFSOCC).
Each focuses on operational responsibilities, The SECDEF, a combatant commander, a
leaving logistical support to the respective service subunified commander, a functional
component commander. See Figure 2-5. Functional component commander, or an existing
component commanders may serve simultaneously commander of a joint task force (CJTF) may
as service component commanders. For example, establish a JTF. A JTF is established normally
an Army JFLCC could direct Marine forces and on a geographical area or functional basis to
serve as the ASCC commander. execute missions with specific limited
objectives that do not require centralized
SUBORDINATE UNIFIED control of joint logistics. A JTF is composed of
COMMAND elements of two or more services and exists
until mission completion.
Unified commanders, with approval from
the NCA, may establish subordinate unified The CJTF exercises OPCON over forces
commands (also called subunified commands). assigned to the JTF. The unified command’s
CINCs establish subunified commands to ASCC places an ARFOR under OPCON of the
conduct operations on a continuing basis CJTF for the conduct of operations and retains
according to the criteria that established the responsibility to provide service-specific
unified command. support to the ARFOR. The JTF established in
the Persian Gulf in 1988 to protect shipping
The CINC may exercise COCOM through a and the JTF established in Panama in 1989 to
subunified commander for operations on a conduct Operation Just Cause illustrate this
continuing basis. The subunified commander type of organization.
exercises functions, authority, and
responsibilities similar to those of a unified
exercises OPCON of assigned commands and COMMAND
forces within the assigned AOR or functional Normally, the Army will not be involved in
area. The CINC PACOM, for example, has this COCOM option due to its operational
three subordinate unified commands: Alaskan interdependence with the other services. Still,

Chapter 2

on occasion, such as the support to Charleston, mission require urgency and the forces must
SC, by FORSCOM units in the aftermath of remain immediately responsive to the CINC.
Hurricane Hugo, the Army may conduct a single- Direct command of specific SOF is a prime
service operation. example of this COCOM option. Such forces
could be composed of forces from one or more
DIRECT COMMAND services. This option would likely be employed
The CINC can retain direct command of for short, sensitive, and small-scale operations.
specific operational forces. The direct command Special operations often fall under this
option is used when the circumstances of the organizational option.

Section IV
Multinational Commands
Operations in a multinational environment have both similarities and
differences to normal joint operations. This section highlights some of the
differences found in a multinational environment. It details the differences
between alliance and coalition operations. It discusses the need for mutual
understanding and respect, for capitalizing on inherent operational strengths
of a particular nation, and for obtaining unity of effort.

Multinational operations can be established to facilitate exchange of
categorized in one of two major groups: intelligence and operational information,
coalitions and alliances. Coalitions and ensure coordination of operations among
alliances must create a structure that meets coalition forces, and provide a forum for
the needs, diplomatic realities, constraints, resolving routine issues among staff sections.
and objectives of the participating nations. During Operation Desert Storm, the coalition
Since no single command structure fits the coordination,
communications, and integration
needs of all alliances and coalitions, several center (C IC) was established to effect
different models could evolve. command relationships. Figure 2-6 depicts a
parallel command.
COALITIONS As a coalition matures, the members may
Coalitions normally form as a rapid choose to centralize their efforts through
response to unforeseen crises and are ad hoc establishing a lead nation command structure.
arrangements between two or more nations for A lead nation command is one of the less
common action. During the early stages of such common command structures in an ad hoc
a contingency, nations rely upon their military coalition. A coalition of this makeup sees all
command systems to control the activities of coalition members subordinating their forces to
their forces. Therefore, the initial coalition a single partner, usually, the nation providing
arrangement will most likely involve a parallel the preponderance of forces and resources.
command structure. Still, subordinate national commands
Under a parallel command, no single maintain national integrity. The lead nation
multinational army commander is designated. command establishes integrated staff sections,
Usually, member nations retain control of their with the composition determined by the
national forces. Coalition decisions are made coalition leadership. Figure 2-7 provides a
through a coordinated effort among the model for a lead nation command structure in a
participants. A coordination center can be coalition.

FM 100-7

Typically, alliances are formed because of •Appropriate plans have been developed and
formal agreements among two or more nations exercised among participants.
for broad, long-term objectives. Alliances are •A developed theater of operations exists,
characterized by years of cooperation among
nations. In alliances— some equipment interoperability exists, and
command relationships have been firmly
•Agreed-upon objectives exist. established.
•Standard operating procedures have been

Chapter 2

Cooperation among members of an A lead nation command in an alliance may

alliance, such as NATO, is advantageous, since be characterized by a staff that is integrated to
mutually developed procedures for making and the degree necessary to ensure cooperation
executing decisions exist. Often, when among multinational or national subordinate
members of such an alliance cooperate in Army formations. Usually, alliances are
operations outside of their alliance sphere, organized under an integrated command
such as in naval operations in the Persian Gulf, structure that provides unity of command in a
procedures worked out within the alliance are multinational setting. The key ingredients in
adapted quickly. an integrated alliance command are that a
single commander will be designated, that his
staff will be composed of representatives from
As in a coalition, a lead nation command all member nations, and that subordinate
structure may exist in a developing alliance commands and staffs will be integrated to the
when all member nations place their forces lowest echelon necessary to accomplish the
under the control of one nation. This means missions. Figure 2-8 represents a typical
that the lead nation’s procedures and doctrine multinational army force organized under an
form the basis for planning for and integrated command structure in an alliance.
coordinating the conduct of operations. Though If multinational formations exist below the
this type of arrangement is unusual in a formal multinational army component headquarters,
alliance, such a command structure may have the alliance membership will determine the
advantages under certain treaty circumstances command of those subordinate organizations.
existing with Latin America, Southwest Asia, Multinational army force headquarters staffs
or Japan that may evolve into alliance will be integrated. Accordingly, heavy reliance
arrangements. will be placed on liaison between forces.


International agreements should set forth commanders and procedures that ensure unity
the degree of authority for multinational of effort. Ideally, the coalition/alliance will

FM 100-7

designate a single military commander to OPCON. For example, within these limits, a
direct the combined efforts of the participating foreign UN commander cannot—
forces. The US contingent of a multinational •Change the mission or deploy US forces
command may be a unified command, a outside the AOR agreed to by the NCA.
specified command, a subordinate unified
command, a functional component command, a •Separate units.
JTF, or a force of a single service. •Redirect logistics and supplies.
A common understanding of C •Administer discipline.
relationships facilitates the required unity of
effort. The US chain of command, from the •Promote individuals.
President to the lowest US commander in the •Change the internal organization of the US
field, remains inviolate. US forces in a units.
multinational force will continue to recognize
their COCOM relationship to a US unified or Other national forces will likely remain aligned
specified commander. Subject to NCA prior to their national command authority.
approval, a multinational force commander International agreements will specify
may exercise appropriate and negotiated when and how the transfer of authority from
OPCON over US units in specific operations national command to multinational command
authorized by a legitimizing authority such as takes place. At lower echelons, command
the UN Security Council. relationships will be identical to US joint
relationships (OPCON, TACON, support,
The multinational force commander and coordinating authority) or at least similar
the US theater CINC providing the US forces to (OPCOM, tactical command [TACOM]).
the multinational force must coordinate and Definitions of these terms differ slightly
agree to the command relationships. This between US and NATO. Commanders of
agreement must be in 2
consonance with the operating forces must clarify how each is
NCA criteria for C within multinational applied. FM 100-8 describes the doctrine for
operations, which may establish limits of multinational army operations.
Section V
Theater Organizations
A theater is an assigned geographic area outside CONUS and under the
command of a regional combatant commander (unified command) (Joint
Pub 0-2). Under the UCP, a theater or AOR is viewed from the strategic
context, the level of international military cooperation required, or the degree
of dedicated US military resources necessary in the theater. These
perspectives influence how the Army conducts operations in each theater.

Military strategists often describe continental and maritime theaters are
theaters as maritime, continental, or littoral, different, both demand the synchronized
based on their dominant geographic and efforts of all services, both within and between
strategic characteristics. This description theaters. Littoral theaters combine aspects of
influences the predominant type of military both continental and maritime theaters.
forces used, the strategic missions assigned,
and the strategic and operational objectives CONTINENTAL THEATERS
pursued in the theater.
Continental theaters are established to
Continental theaters primarily involve control the land and associated airspace vital to
control of land and associated airspace. the sustenance of a nation or nations or to destroy
Maritime theaters focus on ensuring control of an opponent’s means to exercise such control.
the seas and associated airspace. While EUCOM, CENTCOM, and SOUTHCOM are

Chapter 2

continental theaters. Military action in •Limited operations with limited objectives

continental theaters may vary in purpose and such as peacekeeping or nation assistance.
scope from participation in the internal defense of
another nation against subversion, lawlessness, LITTORAL THEATERS
and insurgency to major operations and
campaigns to destroy enemy land forces. The Operations in a littoral region require
focus of continental campaigns is on the integration and synchronization of naval, air,
combination and sequencing of air, space, land, and land forces. World political changes and
sea, and SOF operations. affordability have reduced US access to land
bases in forward areas near the most likely
MARITIME THEATERS crisis regions. This has increased the
importance of military operations that can
Maritime theaters are established both for capitalize on sea bases and land lodgments
the forward defense of the nation and for that, once synchronized, project land and air
strategic access to US resource needs, friends, combat power deep into the region. Littoral
and potential adversaries. ACOM and PACOM theaters are not as predominant as the other
are maritime theaters. The focus of maritime two theaters but have been seen in previous
campaigns is very similar to that of continental campaigns along peninsulas or coastlines.
campaigns. Campaigns in maritime theaters
may be composed of one or more of the The deployment of US forces to Southwest
following types of operations: Asia during Operation Desert Shield in 1990 was
•Fleet operations to seize or maintain accomplished for the most part by sealift.
unobstructed access to ocean areas by However, maritime support and the maritime
destroying or blocking enemy forces. interdiction operations required synchronization
forces operating within the CENTCOM
•Joint operations to control key land areas. continental theater, thus forming a littoral region.

When considering the requirements of the ECONOMY-OF-FORCE THEATER
many active theaters, national planners An economy-of-force theater receives a lesser
establish the priorities by providing planning level of forces and resources than the theater of
guidance, allocating forces, and apportioning focus because the associated risk and potential
limited resources. Theaters are described as for conflict are lower. SOUTHCOM during the
theaters of focus, economy-of-force theaters, or early 1980s illustrates this type of theater. Forces
deferred theaters. This description corresponds and resource requests are filled after those of the
to the relative prioritization of resources for the theater of focus. Those that cannot be filled are
specific theaters. then identified and tagged for filling when the
economy-of-force theater is upgraded to a theater
of focus.
A theater of focus is the theater of main DEFERRED THEATER
military effort because it has the highest risk A deferred theater receives the least priority
level and potential for conflict. NCA and CJCS for assigned forces and resources, based on its
provide guidance, forces, and resources associated risk level and potential for conflict.
accordingly. CENTCOM was the theater of CENTCOM during the early 1980s was an
focus during Operations Desert Shield/Storm. example of a deferred theater. Forces and
resources are identified and tagged for deployment
but not deployed other than during exercises.


Theater combatant commanders develop commander considers his theater structure
a theater strategy and then organize the and command relationships. The Army,
theater. Considerations for multinational besides operating as part of a joint force, must
operations should always be prominent as the be prepared to conduct multinational

FM 100-7
operations with land, air, and naval forces of In war, the CINC may use many of the
structures identified above or others as
other nations, as well as interagency required to subdivide the theater. When the
operations. While unity of command may not NCA authorizes combat operations, the theater
be possible in multinational operations, unity commander, with NCA and CJCS approval,
of effort is essential. delineates a theater of war.
Each CINC may assign associated areas Theater of War
within his theater to subordinate A theater of war is defined as the air, land,
commanders. CINCs may designate joint sea, and space area which is or may become
areas or zones during war and MOOTW, while directly involved in the operations of war.
theaters of war and operations are designated Operations within a theater of war are
only in time of war. Combat zones (CZs) and invariably joint and usually multinational. The
communications zones (COMMZs) may be theater of war should be operationally self-
established as needed. The CZ is an area sufficient, with a sustaining base adequate to
required by forces to conduct combat support contemplated operations. The theater
operations. The COMMZ contains LOCs and of war should encompass only that part of the
those theater organizations and other areas or countries to be involved in the war.
agencies required to support forces in the While part of the theater is in a state of war, it
field. The CINC organizes his theater to may be possible that all nations within the
enable him to synchronize his unified theater are not at war. See Figure 2-9.
operations or integrate single-service, joint, Theater of Operation
special, and supporting operations with allied
and interagency activities and NGOs and If the CINC determines that he should
PVOs. subdivide his theater of war to contend with

Chapter 2

Joint Operations Area

more than one major threat, he may designate JOAs are geographic areas the CINC
subordinate theaters or AOs for each major creates to conduct specific military missions
threat. Still, the theater commander must and their supporting activities. JOAs are
ensure that such divisions do not violate the usually established for short-term operations.
principle of unity of effort. The theaters of JOAs are particularly useful when operations
operation refer to that portion of an area of war are to be conducted on the boundaries between
necessary for military operations and for the theaters. The JOA commander’s authority is
administration of such operations for extended limited to that required to accomplish specific
periods. The theater of operations commander tasks. US operations in Panama during
often has responsibilities similar to the theater Operation Just Cause in 1989 offer an example
CINC, but not of the same scope. During World of a JOA.
War II, the Atlantic, European, Mediterranean,
and Russian theater of strategic direction was Joint Zone
divided into four similar subordinate theaters of A joint zone is a term for an area
operation. These theaters of operation were established to permit friendly surface, air, and
integrated geographically and focused upon subsurface forces to operate simultaneously.
enemy Axis forces. ARFOR transit but do not normally operate in
The range of military operations also may a JZ.
require designating several geographic
subareas of responsibility such as a joint Joint Special Operations Area
operations area (JOA) or joint zone (JZ), a joint JSOAs are restricted areas of land, sea, and
special operations area (JSOA), or a joint rear airspace that the CINC assigns to a JFSOCC to
area (JRA). A subordinate theater also could be conduct special operations. JSOAs may be
used in a larger theater for decentralizing the established for short or long duration special
effort to a subunified commander. Subareas of operations efforts, normally when they are
responsibility are portions of a theater CINC’s independent of conventional operations. If
AOR and are delegated usually for a long term conventional operations in the JSOA are
and often over large areas. See Figure 2-10. required, coordination with forces operating

FM 100-7

within the JSOA must be effected prior to stockage areas, movement control points,
initiation of operations. The CINC may logistics headquarters and units, the rear
delineate a JSOA to facilitate simultaneous portion of the intratheater communications
conventional and special operations in the zone, airfields and air bases, transitioning land
same general operating area. The capture of forces, theater missile defense forces, the
the hijacking terrorists of the Achilles Lauro in theater rear headquarters, and strategic
the Mediterranean in 1987 was in a JSOA. reserves. See Figure 2-11.
Joint Rear Area Subordinate Areas of Operations
In war, as in peacetime and conflict, the Subordinate army commanders organize
CINC may designate a JRA. The JRA is their assigned AOs for tactical operations. This
designated to facilitate protection and organization is based on terrain orientation,
operation of installations and forces that security orientation, or a threat orientation.
provide logistics and/or support to combat Subordinate army commanders establish
operations. The joint rear area coordinator necessary control measures to delineate
(JRAC) is the officer given responsibility for the responsibilities for zones of action or sectors of
overall security of the JRA and for furnishing a defense to coordinate fires and direct
secure environment to facilitate sustainment, maneuver. These measures may include lateral
host nation support (HNS), infrastructure boundaries, axes, objectives, phase lines, and
development, and movements of the joint force. special areas, for example, airspace control
area or air defense area. If the enemy situation
The size of the JRA may vary considerably is known, a threat orientation is more
and is highly dependent on the size of the appropriate. Accordingly, the subordinate
theater, logistics support requirements, the army commanders would organize their AOs to
threat, or the scope of the joint operation. The accommodate all of the air, land, and sea forces
JRA is usually to the rear of the theater or CZ, necessary to impose their tactical battle space
but it is not necessarily contiguous to the CZ. to defeat the enemy. For example, the main
With split-based operations, much of the JRA battle area (MBA) is the portion of the
could be in CONUS. A JRA can also be adapted battlefield in which the decisive battle is fought
to a modern, high-intensity, nonlinear to defeat the enemy. Only those control
battlefield. A JRA may be segmented and measures necessary for operations against the
contain isolated pockets of relatively secure enemy should be imposed upon subordinate
support areas that collectively make up a JRA. commanders, minimizing the use of lateral
boundaries except where necessary to separate
Combat Zone, Communications Zone, friendly forces or provide flank and rear
and Theater Base security against an enemy situation.
The CINC may additionally organize his
theater of war into a CZ, a COMMZ, and a OPTIONS FOR CONDUCT
theater base. The CZ is that area required by OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
combat forces to conduct operations. CINCs OTHER THAN WAR
may further subdivide the CZ into forward and
rear combat zones. They are normally forward The theater of war does not normally
of the Army rear boundary. encompass the CINC’s entire theater. In the
remainder of his theater, the CINC may be
The COMMZ contains those theater conducting MOOTW. CINCs designate a
organizations, LOCs, and other agencies in the theater structure that achieves strategic and
JRA required to support forces in the field. theater focus in both MOOTW and war. This
Usually, the COMMZ is in the rear portion of structure allows synchronization and
the theater of operations, reaching back to the integration of all instruments of power within
CONUS base or perhaps to another combatant the theater. At times, this synchronization
commander’s AOR. The theater CINC may requirement may extend to UN operations.
establish these areas for long-term, continuing If hostilities are imminent, the CINC may
requirements or for short durations to meet a designate an area of conflict— an area of land,
specific situation. sea, and air designated for the conduct of hostile
The theater base is a sizable portion of the MOOTW. However, if an MOOTW is required
JRA. It has logistics facilities such as ports of that does not include response to hostilities,
debarkation, marshaling areas, logistics such as a natural disaster or humanitarian

Chapter 2

Figure 2-11. Combat Zone and Communications Zone Organization

assistance, the CINC may establish an area of responsibility such as a JOA, JSOA, AO, or
assistance within his theater. The area of COMMZ or JRA. Establishment of these
conflict or area of assistance may be further subareas is to provide the same functions and
subdivided into several geographic subareas of control measures as required for conducting
wartime operations. See Figure 2-10.

Section VI
The Army in Theater
This section discusses the three tasks of the operational-level commander
and how they influence theater organization, the environment, and the
echelons of command within the Army. It discusses the ASCC and the Army
commander as a subordinate JFC. Senior army leaders, using an operational-
level perspective, task-organize the Army to maximize its capabilities in the
theater. The Army’s theater organization provides the means to execute the
designs of operational art while facilitating joint operations.


The ASCC supports the theater combatant trains, and equips these land forces to
CINC by conducting Army operations to accomplish all assigned missions.
support or attain the CINC’s established z
objectives. The Army contributes forces to Unified C results in assigning forces for
perform combat, logistics, and support employment, apportioning forces for planning,
activities in theater. The Army organizes, and allocating them for execution to combatant

FM 100-7

commanders. In support of the CINC, the his subordinate commanders and staffs are
ASCC organizes the assigned forces to trained, agile, and versatile to meet this
accomplish the three operational-level tasks of requirement. The CINC looks to his ASCC for
the senior army commander: the nomination and selection of specifically
•Establishing the link among joint, Army-apportioned or assigned units for
multinational, interagency, NGO, PVO, or assignment to subordinate joint commands.
UN operations. The Army conducts liaison with joint,
•Executing functions to support continuous multinational, NGO, PVO, and interagency
operations by subordinate army forces. organizations in theater. This liaison includes
lateral liaison with other services, as well as
•Planning and executing operations to higher and lower liaison with the appropriate
support the joint campaign when designated joint or multinational force staff and any
as an operational commander by the CINC. subordinate joint or multinational
organizations as required. The ASCC must
Other subordinate army commanders may understand the capabilities that the other
perform the tasks; still, they remain the services bring to the theater. Such
responsibility of the ASCC. understanding enhances the opportunity for
synergy within the joint force.
ESTABLISH JOINT, MULTINATIONAL, Similar to the exchange of liaison teams is
NGO, PVO, AND the requirement of ARFOR to augment a joint
INTERAGENCY LINKAGE force staff or receive augmentation from joint
The first task of the senior army commander forces when the Army forms the core of a joint
in theater is to establish linkages to joint, staff headquarters. The ASCC must interface
multinational, and interagency organizations. with joint information and control systems
These linkages include— such as intelligence and communications.
•Receiving joint, multinational, and These systems require specific hardware that
interagency or UN direction. may be unique to the joint force headquarters
and may require special Army efforts for
•Advising the CINC on Army capabilities. effective joint coordination.
•Establishing liaison with joint, Army intelligence elements closely
multinational, and interagency coordinate with joint, multinational, and
organizations and NGOs and PVOs. interagency organizations to establish the
•Augmenting the joint, multinational, and mutual supporting intelligence structure
interagency staff as required. required to support the joint commander’s
operations. The intelligence structure should
•Linking with specific joint, multinational, assign collection capabilities consistent with
NGO, PVO, and interagency systems. available assets, conduct timely all-source
•Coordinating intelligence collection, analysis, and provide rapid dissemination of
analysis, and dissemination. available intelligence information.
The commander’s guidance includes the
subordinate commander’s missions and tasks CONDUCT SUPPORT
that are expected to contribute to the higher OPERATIONS
echelon’s plan. The guidance should include The second task of the ASCC in theater is
the assignment of forces and sequencing of to execute his Title 10 responsibility by
subordinates’ assigned mission and tasks. The supporting operations. At theater level, the
guidance will include any delegated authority, preponderance of operational considerations
other information pertinent to the situation, are logistical but may include significant
and any changes that modify subordinate engineer efforts, depending upon existing
missions and tasks. infrastructure. In the force-projection mode,
The ASCC of the unified or subunified decisions made early will be highly significant
command or the ARFOR commander of the as the time for combat operations approaches.
JTF advises the CINC or CJTF, respectively, Decisions such as the sequencing of arriving
on employment of US Army organizations and forces and equipment will often not be
their capabilities. The ASCC must ensure that reversible.

Chapter 2

The answers to such questions as what is who ensures Army support requirements are
needed first—construction engineers or met. These support requirements, which
infantrymen, tanks or trucks—may sow the include logistics, personnel services, and
seeds of success or failure. The commander and health services, are service-specific and flow
his staff should analyze these kinds of through the service chain of command. Support
questions, being careful not to eliminate any functions at the operational level are addressed
option before the need for such a decision is in FM 100-16, FM 100-10, and FM 63-4.
These analyses require a full assessment CONDUCT OPERATIONS
of the factors of METT-T and an understanding The third task of the ASCC in theater is to
of where and how risks are taken. Army conduct operations. When designated by the
commanders retain responsibilities to support CINC as an operational-level commander, the
Army units through the service chain of senior army commander, in this role, serves in
command, regardless of the joint and the chain of command, planning and executing
multinational arrangements. The ground major operations that support the joint
transportation system, common classes of campaign. He designates, sustains, and shifts
supply, and construction of the infrastructure the main effort of subordinate ground forces to
are examples of the Army’s contribution to the support the joint or multinational plan. His
overall theater effort. understanding of operational art (see
Each joint or multinational organization Chapter 3) is essential to his performance of
with Army forces has an ARFOR commander this role.


Each unified and subordinate unified training, normal logistics functions, and
command has an Army service component Army intelligence matters.
command. The CINC’s Army service •Informing the CINC of joint nonstrategic
component command consists of the ASCC and
all those elements under his command. The nuclear support required by the Army.
ASCC is responsible for— •Ensuring signal interoperability.
•Recommending to the CINC or subunified •Providing logistical and administrative
commander the proper employment of Army support to the ARFOR participating in a
component forces. JTF.
•Accomplishing assigned operational
missions. SUPPORT
•Selecting and nominating specific units of The Army service chain expects the ASCC
the Army for assignment to theater forces. to monitor and support all ARFOR in its
•Conducting joint training, including geographic area. The ASCC, exercising
training other service components as ADCON, may communicate through the Army
Chief of Staff to the Secretary of the Army for
directed. service-specific matters. The ASCC is
•Informing the CINC of Army logistics responsible for command logistical support
support effects on operational capabilities. unless a higher command directs otherwise.
•Supporting operational and exercise plans Sometimes, the CINC may direct the
as requested. ASCC to provide common items to other
services within his AOR. Additionally, the
•Developing Army program and budget ASCC may support allied or coalition forces.
requests for the CINC. Army commanders in joint organizations use
•Informing the CINC of program and budget the channel from the ASCC to the Department
decisions that may affect planning and of the Army for service-specific requirements.
operations. This channel forms a hierarchy for Army
support in theater but does not imply a
•Conducting Army-specific functions such as superior-subordinate relationship. Army
internal administration and discipline, elements within subordinate joint

FM 100-7

organizations perform functions similar to the headquarters. The organizational

design of a
ASCC. An illustration of this concept is the headquarters to support C tasks of the Army
organization of the service channel in PACOM service component command, the JTF, the
with a notional JTF (Figure 2-12). operational-level headquarters (numbered
In Figure 2-12, the ARFOR within the army), and corps must be versatile, agile,
notional JTF coordinate logistics through US flexible, and modular in structure. Such a
Army, Japan (USAR-J). USAR-J is the Army design provides the Army service component
service component command of USFJ, a command2 the flexibility to establish the
subunified command. USAR-J is responsible required C capability, using assigned assets or
for coordinating support services through US preestablished functional and modular
Army, Pacific (USARPAC). Within PACOM, a augmentation packages from other component
unified command, USARPAC is the Army forces or other Army assets.
service component command and coordinates The ASCC must determine the degree of
directly with the Department of the Army. The participation within the AOR required by
purpose of the service channel is the efficient ARFOR. That participation can range from
use of Army resources within a theater. The Army contributions to a JTF, to total
JTF establishing authority’s Army service involvement of the Army component in theater,
component command is responsible for to reinforcements from CONUS or other
providing logistical and administrative support theaters. The assessment of the operational
to ARFOR participating in a JTF. environment will determine how the Army
organizes within the AOR.
COMMAND AND CONTROL The first option is for2 the ASCC to provide
During conditions of peacetime, each an operational-level C capability. The Army
regional CINC has an Army service component contribution to a subunified command is an
command through which he normally exercises example of this option. This subunified
COCOM of ARFOR assigned by the NCA to the command’s ASCC has responsibilities within
CINC. In conflict and war, the CINC may the designated AO similar to those of the
transfer OPCON to the designated unified commands ASCC. The deployment of

Chapter 2

Army units to operate within a JTF requires multinational forces in the theater of
the ASCC to establish an ARFOR operational- operations.
level headquarters to command and control The DCG for Operations would serve as the
those units. This headquarters may require senior operator responsible for battle command
augmentation from the ARFOR not assigned to of all maneuver forces, conducting major
the CINC or from other services. Another operations, battles, and engagements. In this
alternative is to augment the JTF arrangement, the ASCC would continue his
headquarters. The complexity of the service responsibilities and establish required
environment and the degree of Army linkages among joint, multinational,
participation determines the option selected. interagency, NGO, PVO, or UN. This option
A second option is the formation and reduces the span of control required of the
commander. As with the first option,
deployment of an operational-level complexity of the environment determines the
headquarters (for example, a numbered army) selection of this organizational alternative.
to control the conduct of operations. The ASCC
makes this decision in consultation with the These options provide an orderly means for
CINC. This presupposes a highly complex the Army to accomplish the operational-level
operational environment with the involvement responsibilities in theater. The options also
of multiple ARFOR (usually more than one provide a means to evolve the Army theater
Army corps). The ASCC remains the senior structure as the complexity of the theater
army commander within the unified command evolves.
and may or may not be physically located Another set of circumstances in which the
within the AO. If the ASCC is not located in the Army could be divided into separate elements
AO and does not deploy, he may constitute and2 is when the CINC requires a sense of urgency
deploy a requisite headquarters to perform C and direct responsiveness of an Army force to
for the ASCC’s Title 10 support responsibilities him. Under such exceptional circumstances,
therein. This requisite headquarters would be the theater organization may have two or more
in addition to the operational-level independent ARFOR operating directly under
headquarters conducting operations. the theater CINC. These separate ARFOR
would focus on specific missions, as determined
The first two options require coordination by the CINC and ASCC. The ASCC continues
with the ClNC. The third option is internal to to focus on the task of supporting the
the ASCC and concerns the organization of the operations of all ARFOR within the theater.
Army operational-level component. The ASCC However, commanders of the ARFOR under
may determine a need to consolidate functions COCOM (working directly for the CINC) focus
under a deputy commanding general primarily on operations and the establishment
responsible for operations and a deputy and maintenance of joint and multinational
commanding general responsible for support linkages. Thus, the three tasks of the
and logistics. The DCG for Support would serve operational-level commander would be
as the senior logistician responsible for battle conducted by both Army commanders. The
command of all logistics and support forces and structure of the ASCC is adaptable enough to
coordination of all logistics support. If meet the three crucial tasks in any theater
designated as the executive agent, the DCG for situation. The ASCC’s responsibility is to
Support would also be responsible for advise the CINC of a structure that meets the
coordinating logistics support for joint and/or dictates of operational design.

Both the ASCC and numbered army commanders would be responsible for
establishing linkages with joint, multinational, government, nongovernment,
private voluntary, and interagency organizations. However, the ASCC would focus
on support operations, and the numbered army commander would focus on the
conduct of operations and the requirements of a joint force land component, if
designated by the CINC.

FM 100-7


The CINC may designate an ARFOR when delegating this responsibility, must
commander as a subordinate JFC. The ensure his subordinate commander is aware
designation may be as a subunified and understands the CINC’s intent and
commander, a JFLCC, or a CJTF. Based on the concept of operations. This delegation allows
ASCC structure, the Army JFC must the ASCC, as the JFLCC, to focus on
reexamine his responsibilities and capabilities conducting operations.
to perform the three tasks of the operational-
level commander. Establishing a joint As a subunified or CJTF, the ARFOR
headquarters under these circumstances will commander would normally expect to focus on
be a unique extension of the joint linkage task. the conduct of joint operations. Support of the
As a JFLCC, the ARFOR commander ARFOR under control of the subunified
retains the responsibility, through the service command or JTF will flow through the CINC’s
branch of the chain of command, to support ASCC. Depending on the method in which the
subordinate Army forces. Because of the CINC employs the Army component, the ASCC
complexity of the two tasks—operations and may appoint a single subordinate commander
support—the ASCC may delegate the authority responsible for executing typical logistics and
for performing the support task to a administrative functions. Chapter 6 has details
subordinate Army headquarters. The ASCC, on Army component operations.

The requirement to assess the assessment and correspond to the three
environment in which operations are to be elements in the strategic assessment. Within
conducted exists at the strategic, operational, these three tasks, eight components further
and tactical levels. The factors of METT-T define the operational METT-T assessment.
provide a structure for the conduct of those Figure 2-13 is a model for the conduct of the
analyses. In preparing and conducting major operational-level assessment.
operations to support joint campaigns, the
examine the operational environment, using INTERAGENCY LINKAGE
the factors of METT-T and a regional analysis.
The results of that examination serve as a (CIRCUMSTANCES)
means for assessing relative strengths and Four components make up an assessment
weaknesses of the theater and are used to of joint, multinational, and interagency
guide and temper actions. linkages.
The ARFOR commander and the CJTF Interoperability
view the operational-level environment in
much the same manner as the CINC views the Interoperability is the ability of forces to
larger theater strategic environment. Both provide a capability or service, to accept
commanders consider the factors peculiar to services from other forces or agencies, and to
the area in which they will operate. The use those capabilities and services to operate
environment is determined by the effectively together. The presence of
circumstances, influences, and conditions that government agencies is an aspect of operations
affect the employment of military force and the in a joint environment. The degree of required
decisions of the operational levels of command. Army interoperability with these agencies will
The assessment of the strategic be determined by the circumstances of the
environment is based upon the circumstances, operational environment.
conditions, and influences of the theater. The
operational environment within that theater is Alliances and Agreements
assessed in a similar manner. The Alliances and agreements are the formal
commander’s three operational-level tasks means that guide multinational operations.
provide the structure for the METT-T The degree of formality is a dynamic state

Chapter 2

determined by mutual needs. Where need modification by allies/coalition leaders, which

exists, the degree of formality increases with may have a subsequent impact on the
time. This same principle applies to operational objective. The time available is also
interagency operations. These arrangements a factor that must be addressed when
are initiated when a requirement for more considering the objective.
formal arrangements exists.
Where arrangements are yet unformed or OPERATIONS (CONDITIONS)
in early development, operations may be based The components of the operations task are
on very informal agreements by the threat and the geography, topography, and
representatives of the Army and the agency. climatology.
Initially, participants may have only general
principles from public law, presidential Threat
instructions, and agency policy or doctrine to The threat is based on the ability of an
guide their actions. As time permits and enemy or potential enemy to limit, neutralize,
requirements demand, the arrangements are or destroy the effectiveness of a current or
formalized in memorandums of understanding projected mission, organization, or equipment
that outline specific responsibilities. item. The threat may be indirect by having the
Forward Presence potential to adversely impact on US interests
or the attainment of US objectives. The world
US forces, in modest numbers, are forward remains extremely dangerous. Many nations
deployed to sustain alliance commitments and can acquire technologically advanced, highly
to contribute to regional stability. Forward lethal weapons that could threaten US and
presence is accomplished also through the allied forces. For example, third-dimension
periodic deployment of CONUS-based forces platforms, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles,
for participation in training exercises, nation armed helicopters, and weapons-carrying
assistance activities, or counterdrug unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), combined
operations. Pre-positioning of forces and with accurate guidance and mass casualty
sustainment to include Army pre-positioned warheads, present a significant threat to a
afloat (APA) contribute to mobility and warfighting CINC’s assets.
flexibility of US forces. This supports the force-
projection military strategy and provides for Instabilities
rapid response to a crisis or reinforcement and A variety of factors challenges the stability
sustainment of forward-presence forces. of various countries and regions. These
instabilities can lead to increased levels of
Objective competition, regional conflicts, and civil war.
The operational-level commander derives Additionally, regional factions, some
the objective from the theater campaign plan possessing forces and equipment equivalent to
developed from the theater military strategy. the US, may seek to expand their influence by
That plan and strategy is subject to coercion or direct force. These regional

FM 100-7

challenges will often involve an adversary concluded between nations. The coalition
whose system of beliefs interprets differently participants establish similar support
such fundamental ideas as right or wrong, the arrangements at the theater strategic level. An
value of human life, and the concept of victory additional concern, especially in alliances, is to
and defeat. determine the type of support that the US
forces, when directed, may have to provide to
Geography, Topography, and Climatology the alliance partners or host nation.
The geography describes the land, sea, air,
and the distribution of plant and animal life, RANGE OF OPTIONS
including man and his industries. The As the commander examines the
topography describes the configuration of a operational environment, he begins to make
surface, including its relief and the position of judgments about the operational impact on his
its natural and man-made features. three tasks. These judgments are the
Climatology describes the prevailing weather subjective and objective measurements of the
conditions of a region. components of each task as they affect the
employment of the Army force. They
SUPPORT OPERATIONS correspond to a range of options that describes
the commander’s ability to accomplish the
(INFLUENCES) three tasks in the operational environment.
Two components of the support task are Figure 2-13 lists the three tasks, the
the infrastructure and foreign nation support. operational environment components, and the
broad values that describe the range over
Infrastructure which these tasks and components may be
Infrastructure is a term that applies to all
fixed and permanent installations, fabrications The commander assesses the operational
(road, rail, communications networks, water environment and assigns a cumulative
networks, air networks, or utility systems), or assessment describing it as austere, restrictive,
facilities for the support and control of military or developed. This perspective permits the
forces. comprehensive analysis of the operational
environment through the examination of each
Foreign Nation Support task and the environmental components that
align with each task of the operational
Foreign nation support includes all civil or commander. This analysis helps identify the
military assistance provided by a nation to areas that require more or less effort. The
foreign forces within its territory during analysis also influences the commander’s
peacetime, conflict, or war. Foreign nation skillful synchronization of the operational
support is based upon agreements mutually functions.

Chapter 3
Theater Strategic and
Operational-Level Perspective
A major concept essential to understanding Army theater
operations at the operational level is operational art and design. Key
elements of operational art and design apply across the range of
military operations. Commanders must understand these elements
when they plan and conduct Army operations in theater. This
chapter discusses the Army operational-level commander's
employment of ways and means to obtain ends established by theater
strategy and campaign plans.
No particular echelon of command functions solely at the
operational level. Command echelons may vary with the nature of the
campaign or major operation, strategic and military objectives,
organizational structure, or size of the joint force. The intended
purpose—not the level of command—is the primary determinant of
whether a force functions at the operational level.

FM 100-5 describes operational art as KEY CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONAL
"... the skillful employment of military forces ART AND DESIGN
to attain strategic and/or operational
objectives in a theater of operations through The theater strategic and operational
the design, organization, integration, and concepts that explain operational art and
conduct of theater strategies, campaigns, design include center of gravity, decisive points,
lines of operation, culminating point, indirect
major operations, and battles. Operational approach, positional advantage and strategic
art translates theater strategy and design concentration of forces, and deception. The
into operational design which links and CINC and his principal subordinates should
integrates the tactical battles and agree on what design features are most
engagements that, when fought and won, important to accomplishing the mission. The
achieve the strategic aim." CINC establishes the first use and priority of
these concepts. Subordinates’ use and priority
Operational art links tactical events to is a subset of the CINC’s. For example, the
strategic objectives. Using operational art, the CINC selects the strategic center of gravity,
CINC envisions the theater strategic and and subordinates select decisive points on the
operational design. To achieve theater path to attacking the center of gravity.
strategic design and objectives, the CINC
arranges unified operations, joint operations, Center of Gravity
major operations, and tactical-level battles. The essence of operational art is
Operational art at the operational level uses concentrating friendly military forces and
major operations in support of joint campaigns resources against the enemy’s main sources of
to sequence these events over time and space. strength (strategic center of gravity) in a
Senior army commanders and their staffs manner that provides the JFC with the
practicing operational art may operate in a strategic and operational advantage and the
joint and possibly combined arena. They initiative. The destruction, dislocation, or
sequence Army operations to achieve theater neutralization of the enemy center of gravity
strategic and operational objectives. should prove decisive in achieving strategic

FM 100-7

objectives. Similarly, the JFC must identify the exploiting his weaknesses, and effectively
theater friendly center of gravity and protect it. concentrating our own combat power. An area
The enemy center of gravity exists at all that must not be overlooked is using, and even
levels of war. A center of gravity is the driving, emerging technologies to access the
foundation of capability—what von Clausewitz tactical situation on the ground.
called "the hub of all power and movement, on
which everything depends....the point at which Lines of Operation
all our energies should be directed." (On Lines of operation define the directional
War, 1976) The center of gravity maybe seen in orientation of a force in relation to the enemy.
more complex components or abstract terms, They connect the force with its base of
such as the enemy’s alliance, solidarity, or operations—from which it receives
national will and in2 actual examples such as reinforcements and resupply-–and its forward
strategic reserves, C , logistics, industrial base, units—where it operates against the enemy.
and so forth. The center of gravity is most This concept is linked to the interior or exterior
useful at the operational level of war as an (or combination) directional orientation of a
analytical tool to focus the effort against the force in relation to the enemy. Lines of
enemy’s strength. operation are used to focus combat power
In MOOTW such as disaster relief and effects toward a desired end.
humanitarian assistance the enemy’s center of Culminating Point
gravity is the threat of hunger or the elements
of the environment. The uniqueness of these The culminating point is the point in time
operations requires the commander and his and space at which the offensive becomes
staff to understand the military’s role in overextended, and offensive combat power no
relation to the total efforts of national power longer sufficiently exceeds that of the defender
being used to resolve the situation. The to allow continuation of the offense. While this
military’s role supports the other elements of point may not be precisely determined, the
national power. commander and his staff should consider it in
the design concept.
Decisive Points A defensive culminating point is that point
Decisive points provide commanders with a at which the defender’s capability is reduced to
significant advantage. They are the keys to such a degree that continued pursuit could
defeating or protecting the center of gravity. result in the defender’s defeat in detail. If the
Normally, there are more decisive points in a defender’s aim is to transition to the attack,
theater than there are resources to attack then the culminating point is where the
them. The commander designates the most defender must revert to a holding action and
critical points and objectives as a means of await reinforcement. If the defender’s aim is to
gaining freedom of maneuver to gain and retain terrain, then the culminating point is
maintain momentum. By correctly identifying where the defender must withdraw, delay, and
and then attacking (or protecting) decisive so forth.
points, the commander is able to defeat the
enemy’s center of gravity. Decisive points serve Indirect Approach
as trigger points for friendly force actions that An indirect approach is a scheme that
sustain the initiative. The AO will have more attacks the enemy center of gravity from
decisive points than available resources to unexpected directions or at unexpected times.
commit against them. The commander and his The indirect approach seeks enemy
staff must conduct a risk analysis to prioritize vulnerabilities and avoids enemy strengths. The
the friendly force efforts. application of techniques to win the information
A stand-alone, individual information war war is one area that leads itself to the indirect
action can be decisive. Winning the approach. When possible, JFCs attack enemy
information battle before the war can be even centers of gravity directly. Where direct attack
more decisive than winning it during means attacking into an opponent’s strength,
hostilities. Winning the information war before JFCs should seek an indirect approach.
the war may preclude combat operations. The Examples
include attacks of flanks, rear areas, or
ability to get inside an adversary’s decision- C capabilities. Vulnerabilities are boundaries or
making cycle (his operational ability to react) is seams between forces, the relative weaknesses of
critical to attacking his centers of gravity, unprotected flanks or rear areas, or unhardened

Chapter 3

command, control,
communications, and responsibility to link strategic aims with
intelligence (C I) facilities. tactical execution varies in military operations.
The theater commander and subordinate
Positional Advantage and operational-level commanders may control
Strategic Concentration of Forces large military formations over great geographic
Strategic realities indicate that force ratios distances while sequencing tactical military
may not favor friendly forces across the operations in pursuit of strategic or operational
theater. Therefore, the JFC determines where objectives. Conversely, operational-level
to strategically concentrate force and in what commanders may control relatively small
areas to accept risk. Clearly, this aspect ties in military formations conducting specific, short-
with the center of gravity, indirect approach, term operations for the same purpose. Senior
positional advantage, and deception. Joint army commanders practice operational art
forces seek to obtain positional advantage across the range of military operations.
relative to enemy forces. Such advantage Whatever the environment (peacetime,
includes control of territory—air, land, sea, conflict, or war), the operational-level
subsea, and space—from which to better commander links theater strategy and
operate and attack. Having positional campaigns to tactical execution by effectively
advantage includes denying this territory and sequencing operations over time.
freedom of movement to the enemy. Attaining
this advantage involves combat operations. Objective
Deception The objective is the central element of
operational design because it establishes the
Deception manipulates enemy perceptions condition necessary to achieve the strategic
about friendly force intentions, positions, and aim. While the CINC initially keys on national
timing. Deception has strategic, operational, or alliance strategic objectives, he also
and tactical aspects, and its planning is as supplements them with theater strategic and
complex and detailed as the overall plan. operational objectives. To ensure clarity of
Deception relies heavily on intelligence strategic and operational intent when
information, which helps commanders identify conducting subordinate campaigns, JFCs may
appropriate targets, develop a credible story, identify and carefully describe operational
and determine the effectiveness of the effort. objectives from the CINC’s specified and
implied tasks.
KEY ELEMENTS OF THEATER Sequence of Operations and
The key elements of theater and The sequence of operations and use of
operational design reinforce the concepts of resources are closely related elements of
operational art and design. The elements theater and operational design. The
consist of the— operational-level commander links theater
•Objective. strategy and campaigns to tactical execution by
•Sequence of operations and use of resources. effectively sequencing major operations and
battles over time. As described in FM 100-5,
•Phases. tempo and battle command contribute
•Branches and sequels. significantly to the effective sequencing of
•Sequential and simultaneous warfare.
The JFC visualizes the sequence of
•Logistics. operations necessary to achieve the desired
conditions of the strategic end state. Without
The senior army commander’s effective use this linkage, operations are apt to become a
of operational art and design elements series of disjointed events less likely to achieve
translates theater strategy and the campaign the desired theater objectives. The
into operational and, ultimately, tactical visualization includes identifying the enemy
action. No specific level of command is center of gravity and culminating points and
concerned solely with operational art and protecting the friendly center of gravity. This
design. The level of command that has the process is useful when determining phases of a

FM 100-7

Branches and Sequels

campaign, applying resources against these Besides phases, the JFC visualizes
phases, and enabling the JFC to envision requirements over the full range of operations
requirements for branches or sequels. for branches to preserve freedom of action.
Branches are contingency plans for changing
disposition, orientation, or direction of
Phases movement and for accepting or declining
battle. Sequels are actions taken after an event
Generally, the campaign is divided into or battle and are based on possible outcomes—
phases that focus on major changes in the victory, defeat, or stalemate.
nature of the total effort, such as defensive to Sequels, for example, might reflect a
offensive, decisive maritime action, and potential transition from the strategic defense
decisive continental action. Some campaigns to a counteroffensive, to a withdrawal, or to an
are naturally progressive in their phasing occupation. The visualization of branches and
(establish sea control, gain a lodgment, initiate sequels is not simply a thought process of
a major continental campaign), while others events. This visualization is a parallel planning
are more complex. The latter may be the case process that provides the command a valuable
when the opponent has initiated hostilities and resource-time.
the theater commander must transition from
an initial defense, to seizure of the initiative, Sequential and Simultaneous
and eventually to offensive operations to
achieve the strategic goal. The main effort is to Warfare
attack the centers of gravity simultaneously In considering phasing, the JFC addresses
throughout the depth of the battle space. Often the problem of deployment to ensure that
that effort is phased. forces arrive at times and places that support
the campaign. Because of limited resources,
Each phase in the campaign should lay the geographic considerations, and our system for
groundwork for its successor until a final organizing the force, the US may go to war in
decisive effort can be joined. A phase may sequential phases.
orient on a physical objective or on establishing At the strategic level, sequential actions
a certain advantageous condition. The include mobilization, deployment, and
description of each phase should identify the sustainment of the sequential employment of
strategic tasks to be accomplished, together forces. Because the US is strategically insular,
with the ultimate purpose—the why—of the plans are driven to exterior LOCs, and, with
strategic tasks. The description should include limited resources, the campaign is phased to
a narrative of the theater commander’s achieve strategic ends.
strategic concept of how and when these
strategic tasks are to be accomplished. It At the operational-level, sequencing may
should also include an estimate of force be seen more in terms of employment.
requirements, as well as major supporting Additionally, sustainment is a critical
operations necessary for the effort. consideration in sequencing campaigns. The
campaign establishes requirements for the
These concepts and force estimates should procurement and apportionment of national
be continually refined up to the time the resources from CONUS-sustaining bases.
operation order implementing that phase is Forward bases must be established, LOCs
required. Prior to terminating the phase or must be opened and maintained, intermediate
meeting the necessary conditions for moving to bases of operations must be established to
the next phase, planning will have begun and support new phases, and priorities for services
the refinement process to facilitate the and support must be established by phase.
transition will continue. Logistics considerations, then, become key to
sequencing the campaign plan.
The phasing and sequencing of operations Notwithstanding the generally sequential
should not be slow or methodical. However, as nature of campaign phases, some phases are
soon as conditions permit, the JFC strives to conducted simultaneously—particularly in
overwhelm the enemy throughout the depth of depth. Deployment may continue well after
the battle space. He conducts simultaneous employment begins. Sustainment is conducted
attacks throughout the depth to paralyze the throughout. Redeployment may begin during
enemy and force an early capitulation. posthostility operations. Defense and offense

Chapter 3

operations are always interrelated. Also, logistics interface in the theater. The
sequential operations may be conducted in a combatant commander provides strategic
single operation, for example, the raid into guidance and priorities for operations, while
Libya. the service component commanders identify
operational requirements to the national
Logistics industrial logistics base.
Logistics is one of the combat functions Deployment and integration of forces and
that helps commanders build, sustain, and logistics in the theater are based on the
project combat power. It is also a major combatant commander’s theater strategic
operating system at each level of war. Combat design in his campaign plan. Centralized
operations and logistics increasingly merge at management and distribution of supplies and
higher levels of war. Neither can be conceived materiel at the strategic level facilitate
without consideration of the other. decentralized execution of logistics at the
Strategic and operational logistics support operational and tactical levels. Further
wars, campaigns, and major operations; discussion of operational art and its
tactical logistics supports battles and corresponding components can be found in
engagements. Strategic and operational FM100-5.

The resources provided to the operational the Army operational-level commander uses
commander are the means. The authoritative resources to attain a particular operational
direction that governs the conduct of objective. The Army commander articulates
operations are the ways. these limiting factors in the form of restrictions
and constraints.
MEANS Restrictions
The means allocated to the operational
commander influence the selection of the Restrictions prohibit the operational-level
operational objectives. Tangible resources commander from performing specific actions or
include military forces and supplies made categories of actions. The laws and treaties of
available to the commander. These may the US embody some restrictions such as those
include other nonmilitary assets such as US on the treatment of noncombatants imposed by
civilian agencies or HNS and direct the Geneva Conventions. Others will be unique
augmentation, for example, civilian reserve air, to the circumstances and locale of the
land, or maritime fleet transportation assets. particular conflict. Some restrictions may
prohibit the use of certain weapons, preclude
Intangible resources include the operations in certain geographical areas, or
commander’s authority over forces not under limit certain tactical methods such as the
his direct command; authority over certain mining of harbors. Such restrictions may
nonmilitary aspects of theater operations, for influence the achievement of operational-level
example, refugees; and public and diplomatic objectives.
support of military operations.
WAYS Constraints shape operational
The allocation of resources provides alternatives. In contrast to restrictions,
capabilities and constraints on the conduct of constraints denote actions that the commander
operations. The concept for operations emerges must take or methods he must employ. Limits
from these capabilities and constraints. The of advance and control measures in general are
concept is tempered by contingency plans examples of constraints. The imperative to
(branches) that include deception. The minimize casualties also may shape
authoritative guidance for the operational alternatives.
concept is the ways of the operation. Methods may include objectives unrelated
The nature of the strategic direction may to operational military aims but which have
require that the use of military force be limited inherent strategic significance. For example,
such as by ROE. Limiting factors dictate how the JFC may require the Army commander to

FM 100-7

employ combined forces even though their use tactically insignifican. The retention of
would make operations more complex from the Verdun in 1916 constituted such a constraint
Army perspective. Frequently, constraints on French operations, though it resulted in no
require retaining or protecting areas deemed military gain and cost nearly a million lives.
diplomatically or psychologically important but

The Army may act as a service component, operational-level commander may translate
functional component, subunified command, or these conditions into a single military objective
JTF subordinate to the JFC during the conduct or phased military objectives expressed in
of operational-level activities. The ASCC, or major operations that support joint campaigns.
ARFOR commander, acting in one or more of The Army commander participates in the
these roles at the operational level, plans and joint concurrent (parallel) planning process to
conducts subordinate campaigns, major help the JFC translate strategic direction and
operations, and operations to attain theater aims into a clearly defined and achievable end
strategic and/or operational objectives to state and objective. Usually, the more intense
support the joint force mission. the conflict and the more predominant the
The JFC translates strategic guidance to military factors, the easier it is to translate
operational terms in the form of an OPLAN or strategic direction into operational-level
operations order (OPORD). This OPLAN/ objectives. When the nonmilitary elements of
OPORD includes a clear mission and specific national power dominate, the full use of military
tasks to which the traditional military capability may be limited. Joint Pub 3-O states
decision-making cycle is applied. The JFC that adaptive planning provides a range of
provides a clear definition of the conditions options encompassing all the elements of
that constitute the strategic and military end national power (diplomatic, economic,
states. The conditions for the end states must informational, and military). The selection of
exist before planning and execution of military military operational-level objectives tends to be
operations can be effective. The Army more complex in MOOTW.


Planning and Execution

The two chapters in this part discuss the planning considerations for Army
operations and the operating systems at the operational level in theaters.
Chapter 4 presents planning considerations for Army participants at the
operational level in theaters in the joint operations of subordinate joint campaigns.
Chapter 5 discusses operational art requiring the synchronization of the six
operational-level operating systems.

Chapter 4
Planning Framework
While the planning process is essentially the same at most levels
of command, subordinate planning at the operational level demands
a broader perspective over the whole range of military operations.
Joint Pubs 3-0 and 5-00.1 describe the conditions under which
subunified and JTF commanders write campaign plans to support
the theater campaign plan. Functional and service components of
the joint force conduct subordinate and supporting operations—not
independent campaigns.
Operational-level Army planners use major operations as tools to
synchronize ends, ways, and means to support the joint operations of
a subordinate joint campaign. These major operations sequence
tactical battles or activities to attain theater strategic and
supporting operational-level objectives and guidance from the
unified theater campaign. Theater strategic planners use unified
operations to synchronize the ends, ways, and means of the theater
combatant commander’s theater strategic purposes.

Though commanders traditionally apply The subordinate JFC, in his campaign
campaigns to conflict and war, they can also plan, considers an orderly schedule of theater
design them to accomplish theater strategic strategic decisions and directions and the
objectives in peacetime. A subordinate joint supporting operational focus of the theater
campaign plan serves as the key employment campaign plan. He then provides a series of
plan to be implemented in subordinate related joint operations within the joint
operating areas such as a theater of operation campaign. The plan comprises subordinate
or other JOA. This plan is the basis for forces and designates command relationships,
planning among the staff and various subordinate tasks, and objectives.
subordinate service component commands. The subordinate plan ensures
This campaign plan provides the synchronization and integration of joint and
subordinate commander’s vision and intent. It single-service forces but can integrate, when
does this through broad, operational concepts delegated, specific (special operations) and
for operations and sustainment throughout the other supporting forces. The subordinate JFC
time frame necessary to achieve the theater might consider relationships, also delegated,
commander’s assigned strategic concept and with multinational, interagency, international,
objectives. and UN forces. However, normally the theater

FM 100-7

commander first integrates these types of planning and execution. The intelligence staff
forces into his unified operations to achieve must provide commanders routine, direct, and
unity of effort in the theater. Integrating these habitual links into the intelligence system.
forces to achieve designated objectives, either These links provide an early focus on the
directly or indirectly, contributes to obtaining commander’s tactical and operational
the CINC’s strategic objectives. intelligence needs. When a regional crisis
occurs, the intelligence system focuses on
Theater-level or subordinate campaign pushing intelligence and tailored products to
planning is a dynamic and continuous process the users and prepares for the unit to pull
that occurs in peacetime, conflict, or war. It needed intelligence.
guides the development of supporting
operations or campaign plans and facilitates When a crisis develops, the CJCS issues a
the implementation of national strategic warning order. The supported CINC,
direction, priorities, and resources allocations. subordinate force commanders, and supporting
commanders adjust their plans as time permits
Deliberate planning is designed as a cyclic and the probability of conducting operations
process during peacetime conditions. increases. The supported commander develops
Deliberate planning allows the opportunity to COAs and recommends a specific COA to the
develop and refine plans (OPLANs, concept NCA. The NCA selects a COA and the CJCS
plans [CONPLANs], and concept summaries) issues an alert order. During the execution
to be used in wartime. Crisis action planning planning phase, the supported CINC and his
(CAP) procedures provide for the transition staff prepare the campaign plan and an
from peacetime to hostilities or war. Deliberate OPORD, normally by modifying an existing
planning supports CAP by anticipating OPLAN, to initiate the first phase of the
potential crises and developing the contingency theater campaign. Execution begins with the
plans that facilitate the rapid development and NCA decision, via the CJCS execute order, to
selection of a COA and execution planning execute the campaign plan and continues until
during a crisis. The deliberate theater and the campaign reaches an end state favorable to
supporting plans are based on evolving the US and its allies.
assumptions and/or an intelligence buildup.
The intelligence buildup is continuous ORIGINATING AUTHORITIES
throughout the range of military operations. Campaign planning can be directed by the
Intelligence readiness begins in peacetime, NCA, assigned in the JSCP, undertaken by the
before any crisis. The commander establishes theater commander, or undertaken to support
intelligence requirements that direct the sequential requirements of subordinate
peacetime intelligence operations supporting JFCs. Existing OPLANs or CONPLANs may
contingency planning. Two specific elements— provide the basis for development of campaign
staying out front in intelligence planning and plans.
understanding how to get intelligence
support— are key components to contingency The campaign plan is the basis for action
planning. As contingency plans are activated, within a hierarchy of decision making and
the commander focuses intelligence and guidance. That guidance links national
targeting to support specific mission decision security strategy and policy directives to
and planning requirements. In addition, the tactical-level battles and engagements. Both
commander begins planning for the crossover levels of campaign plans ensure the linkage of
point in intelligence when initial reliance on those battles and engagements toward the
higher echelon intelligence is augmented by accomplishment of the desired strategic end
tactical intelligence and electronic warfare state. See Figure 4-1.
(IEW) assets within the AO. Upon approval by the NCA of a proposed
Intelligence readiness means that military option with alternatives, the CJCS
intelligence organizations must develop broad designates the supported and supporting
knowledge of priority contingency areas, combatant commanders and issues further
update those data bases daily, and be prepared planning guidance. The supported CINC has
to surge in support of emerging missions. primary responsibility for all aspects of theater
Commanders and J2s must direct the campaign plan development. The supported
intelligence effort daily to ensure data bases CINC develops his strategic estimate and
are available if alerted to support contingency intent, then prepares the recommended

Chapter 4

strategic concept as the preferred COA, which, effectively with supporting CINCs. The CJCS
upon approval, becomes the basis of his outlines to all involved CINCs the degree of
campaign plan. coordination and cooperation required.
When the CJCS approves the campaign Unless limited by the establishing
plan, the supported CINC provides a copy of directive, the supported commander exercises
the plan to supporting CINCs and subordinates general direction over the supporting effort.
for their use as a basis for developing their General direction includes—
supporting plans. In practice, the process is •The designation of targets or objectives.
sequential only in meeting formal approval •Timing.
dates. All parties conduct concurrent planning
throughout the process, via working papers, • Duration of the supporting action.
informal and formal drafts, liaison efforts, and •Other instructions as necessary for
action officer and commanders’ conferences. coordination and efficiency with the unity of
The supported CINC ensures that his effort between supported and supporting
theater organizational staffs can coordinate efforts and plans.

FM 100-7

The supported commander should consider logistics, and C is used over time to attain
the accepted operational and tactical practices national or theater strategic objectives.
of the services of the supporting forces. The key to designing the theater campaign
The supporting commander is responsible plan is understanding the desired strategic end
for ascertaining the needs of the supported state, determining the military end state,
force. He fulfills those, needs with existing identifying the enemy’s strategic center of
capabilities and in keeping with the priorities gravity, and—having achieved the strategic
and requirements of other assigned tasks. advantage by strategic concentrations and
Normally, the supporting commander is subsequent strategic maneuver—attacking the
permitted to prescribe the operations, tactics, center of gravity to achieve the end state.
methods, communications, and procedures the Though theater and subordinate campaigns
supporting force employs. have different levels of scope, purpose, and
perspective, they share common fundamentals.
Occasionally, the NCA or CINC requires •They describe the situation affecting the
more rapid translation of strategic aims into conduct of military operations.
direct, tactical execution, with an abbreviated
operational-level link. This typically occurs •They describe the strategic end state and
during specific incidents or sensitive situations conditions that constitute that end state.
requiring NCA control. These direct actions of •They orient on the enemy’s strategic center
special operations are usually of short
duration, requiring nearly simultaneous of gravity and/or successive decisive points
operations. The 1986 US raid on Libya is an at all levels of war and levels of depth.
example. As conventional operations become •They provide an orderly schedule of theater
longer in duration or more complex in strategic or operational decisions—the
execution, they are likely to require an commander’s vision and intent.
expanded operational-level link between the
strategic aim and tactical execution. •They provide concepts of operations and
sustainment to achieve national or theater
strategic objectives within a theater
CAMPAIGN DESIGN organization—the basis for all other
The theater strategic environment planning.
significantly affects campaign design at the •They describe the series of related unified or
theater strategic or operational levels. Alliance joint operations and major operations that
and coalition requirements are obviously key lead to the campaign end state, to include
factors to consider. The availability and objectives and conditions necessary to begin
capabilities of forward-presence forces—to
include allied and international forces, each subsequent sequence of operations.
interagency organizations, and NGOs and •They phase the levels of campaigns to
PVOs—influence force apportionment clearly define or focus sequential activities.
decisions. Mobilization, deployment, Phases often correspond to changes in the
sustainment, and force-generation capabilities purposes of unified or joint major
influence the type and timing of operations. operations.
ROE may impose limitations, constraints, or
restraints. •They identify the strategic center of gravity
and/or key decisive points during the
Campaign plans are designed to conduct a campaign. Key decisions are often based on
series of related military operations to achieve attainment of conditions identified as
strategic objectives in a given time and space.
Theater campaigns achieve national strategic necessary to begin phases or shift
objectives, whereas subordinate campaigns operations. Other key decisions involve
achieve the CINC’s theater strategic objectives. shifting priorities and resources.
Campaign plans are the theater strategic and •They provide the CINC’s or subordinate’s
operational extensions of the CINC’s theater design for synchronizing efforts.
strategy. They translate theater strategic or
operational concepts into theater or •They describe the terms of priority of effort
subordinate campaign plans for military action and resources by phase or subsequent
by specifying how intelligence, operations, operation. This aspect includes a description

Chapter 4

of the supporting capabilities and their •Assigns objectives and tasks.

intended affect on operations. •Synchronizes joint, single-service,
•They provide the organization of the unified supporting, and special operations forces
or joint force and designate command with allied, UN, NGO, PVO, and
relationships between the theater CINC interagency or international efforts.
and his subordinates. A theater campaign plan includes the
•They identify specific objectives and assign ClNC’s strategic vision of the unified
tasks and concepts for each subordinate operations sequence necessary to attain the
that are sufficient to serve as the basis for national strategic objectives assigned by higher
subordinate planning. authority. It orients on the enemy’s strategic
center of gravity; achieves unity of effort with
•They synchronize and integrate joint, the armed forces allocated by the nation;
single-service, supporting, and special clearly describes the strategic end state; and
operations forces in conjunction with serves as the basis for subordinate planning.
multinational and UN forces; international Two of the most important aspects of this plan
and interagency organizations; and NGOs are the synchronization of forces in operations
and PVOs into a cohesive and synergistic and the concept for their sustainment.
whole that is unified in nature. Integration and Synchronization
Campaign planning is the primary means of Forces and Operations
by which the CINC provides for strategic unity The campaign plan integrates and
of effort and through which he guides the synchronizes unified, joint, and multinational/
planning of unified and joint operations within coalition operations by serving as the unifying
his theater and its subordinate operating focus for the conduct of operations. The CINC
areas. coordinates from among the total US, allied, or
Theater Campaign Plan interagency and international capabilities and
applies or focuses those necessary to prosecute
Through the theater campaign plan, the the campaign. He orchestrates this application
CINC— of force so that a variety of supporting
•Defines theater strategic objectives. capabilities is complementary and
reinforcing—all oriented on achieving
•Describes a strategic concept of operations campaign objectives.
and sustainment.
•Sequences unified operations. Concept for Sustainment
•Allocates subordinate forces. The campaign plan integrates and
synchronizes unified, joint, and multinational
•Establishes command relationships and logistics and support operations. It ensures
delegates authority. that logistics and support planning are

FM 100-7

centralized, comprehensive, and continuous. strategic direction affecting the theater

Although implementation and execution of campaign plan process.
logistics functions and support are normally a
national and, specifically, a service Joint Strategic Planning System
responsibility, the CINC coordinates from The JSPS is the primary formal means by
among the total US, allied, or interagency or which the CJCS, in consultation with other
international capabilities and applies or members of the JCS and CINCs, assists the
focuses those necessary to prosecute the NCA in providing national strategic direction.
campaign. Logistics and support The JSPS is used to assess the strategic
considerations are vital to the successful security and specific theater environments,
execution of the campaign plan. evaluate the threat, and propose the national
military objectives , strategic concepts and
Supporting Campaign Plans guidance, and force capabilities to support the
Theater combatant commanders and their achievement of national security objectives. It
staffs prepare campaign plans. In addition, provides strategic rationale for the initiation of
principal subordinate JFCs prepare joint operations planning.
subordinate or supporting campaign plans as
required against multiple strategic threats. Joint Operation Planning and
These include subunified and JTF commanders Execution System
and their staffs. Campaign planning occurs within the
The theater commander may decentralize established deliberate or execution processes of
the joint force by establishing theaters of JOPES. Campaign logic, sequence, and
operation or JOAs for subordinate JFCs who fundamentals go into the OPLAN format
directly command the warfighting service within JOPES. JOPES provides procedures to
forces. Subunified or JTF commanders, when translate strategic direction into a plan of
assigned a strategic mission, prepare operations. A CINC can use JOPES to develop
subordinate campaign plans that support the and select appropriate COAs. This COA
higher CINC’s concept and contribute to the development process can be also applied to
unified effort in the theater. campaign plan development.
A JTF is established usually for different
levels of command to achieve specific objectives Theater-Level Planning
of limited scope. The JTF mission may be of At the theater level, within JOPES
sufficient scope to achieve a strategic objective. guidelines, the CINC employs a theater design
In such a case, under direction of the theater process to develop the theater campaign plan.
CINC or, in certain circumstances, under This design process —
direction of the NCA (through the CJCS), the •Begins with receipt of current national
commander of the JTF may be responsible for strategic direction.
establishing a subordinate campaign plan.
•Follows with evaluation of the theater
DECISION MAKING strategy and strategic estimate.
Strategic decision making that affects •Continues with specified planning
campaign planning occurs at three levels: considerations of operational art and a
national security level, national military level, series of related sequential planning
and theater level. actions.
National Security-Level Planning •Leads back to the national strategic
At the national security level, the NCA guidance and end state to ensure that it can
uses the national security system to design be successfully employed.
national security objectives and guidance Subordinate JFCs receive guidance
reflecting a strategic end state. through the JOPES-related, theater-level
campaign planning process. They formulate
National Military-Level Planning supporting plans based on the theater CINC's
At the national military level, the CJCS strategic guidance and intent. While campaign
uses sequential planning systems, such as planning is a responsibility of the theater
JSPS and JOPES, to provide further national CINC and subordinate JFCs, it has a specific

Chapter 4

relationship to JSPS and JOPES. These •Command relationships.

systems provide a process for the theater
commander to receive strategic guidance from •Theater organization.
and provide input to the NCA and CJCS, as •Requirements for supporting plans.
well as a methodology for developing the
campaign plan. The final link in the process is a
determination of plan feasibility and requests
Theater campaign planning (Figure 4-2) for change or augmentation. Planning may be
portrays an orderly series of related actions self-regenerating, depending on changing
and operations that occur in the campaign conditions of the above actions or events.
design considerations within JOPES. The
broad process begins when the CINC receives Derived Mission
current strategic guidance and then
systematically considers— Specified and implied strategic tasks are
determined from specific NCA guidance; from
•Derived mission. national or alliance documents, such as the
•Revised theater strategy and estimate. JSCP, the UCP, or Joint Pub 0-2; or from CINC
initiatives. The national military objectives
•Commander’s estimate. form the basis of the campaign’s mission
•Commander’s concept. statement. Using these guides, the CINC
derives his theater campaign mission—a
•Objectives, tasks, and concepts for strategic mission that accomplishes the
subordinates. purpose of national strategic direction.

FM 100-7

Initially, the mission may be a general strategic estimate, is a continuous process from
statement of the theater strategic objectives which strategic concepts are formulated and
and their purposes, but it may later be refined COAs are derived to become the basis of the
after specific tasks and phases have been theater campaign plan. In practice, the
developed and delineated as a result of the commander’s views, as expressed in the
commander’s estimate. The mission evolves. commander’s estimate during deliberate or
From the derived mission, the CINC CAP, contribute to NCA deliberations in
determines what is to be done, what resources forming strategic guidance. As a minimum, the
are available, and what obstacles or actions commander’s estimate will include—
may prevent mission accomplishment. The •The mission, situation, and COAs.
CINC states this derived mission in succinct •Considerations that affect the COAs.
terms that are understandable to superiors and
subordinates alike. The CINC provides •Enemy capabilities.
guidance to subordinate commanders through •Analysis of enemy capabilities.
his application of operational art and the
description of his strategic intent. •Comparison of own COAs.
The commander’s intent is a concise •Recommended COA.
expression of the purpose of the unit’s
activities, the desired results, and how For each COA, the estimate should
operations progress toward that end. In his address-
intent, the commander clarifies the why •Combat forces required; for example,
element of the mission statement for his airborne brigade, tank battalion. Identify
subordinates. This helps them pursue the types of units.
desired strategic end state without further
orders, even when operations do not unfold as •The force provider.
planned. •The destination.
Revised Theater Strategy •Required delivery dates.
and Estimate •A coordinated deployment estimate.
The national and multinational strategic •An employment estimate.
guidance the CINC receives from higher
authority, whether explicit or implicit, drives •Strategic lift requirements, if appropriate.
the campaign planning process. Guidance is Concepts of Operation
expressed through national security strategy
and national military strategy relative to the The CINC’s strategic concepts of operation
deliberate or crisis-action attainment of and sustainment in the theater campaign plan
strategic objectives and guidance. During CAP, are linked closely and derived from his
assumptions change and plans are adjusted. strategic intent. They accomplish the following:
The theater campaign plan must be •Describe the strategic end state and
flexible. It must be able to accomplish its requirements and conditions that constitute
designed purpose and adapt to changing that end state.
assumptions, guidance, or situations affecting •Design the theater strategic concept,
the desired outcome. The plan should be objectives, and tasks and supporting
subjected to continued, detailed review and operational direction, objectives, tasks, and
revised as required so that it does not become
outdated, is not overcome by critical events, or concepts for subordinates to carry out their
does not become unworkable. Major campaigns or operations.
components of the CINC’s strategic estimate •Organize joint, single-service, supporting,
are strategic direction, the theater strategic and special operation forces, in conjunction
situation, strategic concepts, specific COAs, with multinational or UN forces,
and decisions. Joint Pub 5-00.1 describes these interagency organizations and NGOs and
in detail. PVOs into a cohesive, unified force designed
Commander’s Estimate to plan and execute subordinate campaigns
The CINC’s study of the situation, coupled and operations.
with his review of existing theater strategy and •Retain strategic reserves.

Chapter 4
Command Relationships and
•Establish command relationships. The CINC organizes the subordinate
operating areas within the theater and
•Integrate the nations’s mobilization, establishes the command relationships for
deployment, and sustainment efforts into these areas to support the campaign.
the CINC’s employment and logistics Organizations and relationships are based on
concepts. the campaign design, complexity of the
campaign, and degree of control required.
•Concentrate forces and materiel resources Within the campaign planning process, the
strategically so that the right force is CINC determines the organization and
available at the designated times and places command relationships before assigning tasks
to conduct decisive, winning operations. to subordinates.
•Seek to gain the strategic advantage over To establish command relationships the
the enemy that affords an opportunity to CINC must determine the types of subordinate
take the strategic initiative through commands and the degree of authority to be
offensive operations. delegated to each. This further clarifies the
intent of the CINC and contributes to
•Defeat or destroy the enemy’s strategic decentralized execution and unity of effort. The
center of gravity to achieve the strategic end CINC selects the types of subordinate
state. commands from the six doctrinal options, for
example, service components, subordinate joint
commands, and so forth. The options for
In his strategic concept, the commander delegating authority emanate from COCOM
describes how he visualizes subordinates and range from OPCON to support.
conducting campaigns, major operations, and
the decisive battle, focusing on the employment Requirements for Supporting Plans
of his force as a whole. This description The CINC considers a total resource
includes conditions to be achieved, sequence of support concept that is integrated both
events, and expected enemy reactions to vertically and horizontally into supporting
friendly forces as the battle progresses. Above plans for theater and subordinate campaigns or
all, the commander should specify the desired operations. The CINC and subordinate JFCs
military end state– the results he expects the and their staffs develop these plans based on
battle to achieve, including effects on the unified support that can be provided from
enemy and the desired posture of friendly national-level assets, supporting CINCs,
forces after the fight. The commander should services, alliance or coalition partners, other
describe how this posture will facilitate government agencies, NGOs and PVOs,
transition to future operations or postconflict international agencies, UN agencies, and host
operations. nations. Supporting plans may—
•Address tasks and support requirements
Objectives and Subordinate Tasks during mobilization, predeployment,
The theater strategic and supporting deployment, entry, operations, postconflict
operational objectives assigned to subordinates operations, redeployment, and
are critical elements of the theater strategic demobilization.
design of the theater campaign. These •Address requirements for diplomatic,
objectives establish the conditions necessary to
reach the desired end state and achieve the informational, and economic coordination
national strategic objectives. The CINC focuses and support.
on national military or alliance strategic •Detail support during the various phases of
objectives to select his theater strategic and the theater campaign.
supporting operational objectives. Subordinate
JFCs, in turn, are assigned specific theater Supporting commanders synchronize their
strategic and supporting operational objectives plans with the theater campaign plan. They
for subordinate campaigns. The CINC carefully time-sequence mobilization to support
defines the objectives to ensure clarity of deployment, deployment with execution,
theater strategic and operational intent and to execution with sustainment, and vice versa.
identify specific tasks required to achieve those They identify resources and necessary liaison
objectives. early—as the plan is being developed.

FM 100-7

Supporting plans provide for liaison from the determine foreign counterpart organizations
supporting CINC to the supported CINC, who with which the Army may need to establish
has control over all support in the theater. linkages.
Coordination is required with allies, The capacity of the nation to expand its
coalition forces, and host nations on industrial base may ultimately have a
intratheater movements. Plans to effect constraining effect on the campaign plan. The
intratheater movement should provide the CINC must compare the expected consumption
CINC maximum control of the movement and rates with the projected availability of critical
concentration of forces and materiel, which will supplies to ensure that the campaign plan is
permit rapid response to changing situations logistically feasible. To manage projected
as the campaign develops. shortages, the CINC may plan to restrict or
The CINC identifies intelligence support control the use of critical assets. The CINC may
requirements for the campaign through the recommend that DOD implement industrial
development or revalidation of a supporting production and repair surge for specific
intelligence plan. This plan identifies shortfall systems.
requirements for national-level support from
DOD intelligence agencies and military Defense Intelligence Agency. The DIA is
services. responsible for coordinating national-level
support to the unified efforts of the CINC. DIA is
Supporting and subordinate commanders also responsible for deploying national
and supporting US departments and agencies intelligence support teams to the theater to
use the CINC’s strategic concepts of operation facilitate the flow of quality intelligence to the
and tasks for subordinates as the basis for CINC. When actual operations commence,
determining the necessary support for each increased strategic intelligence support may be
phase of the campaign plan. Supporting and provided by a DOD joint intelligence center (JIC)
subordinate commanders respond to the to furnish an integrated defense intelligence
identified tasks by preparing supporting plans position to the CINC.
and by submitting them for approval to the
supported CINC. Defense Information System Agency. The
Defense Information System Agency (DISA) is
responsible to the CINC for the employment of
National Agencies and communication resources at designated defense
Industrial Resources communication system (DCS) entry stations
National-1evel intelligence organizations and gateways to terminate long-haul trunks
are essential to campaign planning and and circuits from the JOA. DISA ensures that
execution because of the need for access to the required entry station, gateways, and
different data bases, reconnaissance and switching centers have appropriate equipment
surveillance capabilities, and finished and cryptographic devices to assure worldwide
intelligence. During the development of the interoperability of the CINC’s command,4
theater campaign plan, the CINC should control, communications, and computers (C )
identify intelligence and mapping support assets.
requirements and request support from the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Defense Department of State. DOS involvement
Mapping Agency (DMA), and other national- extends from policy formulation at the highest
level intelligence agencies. Such other federal level to mission execution at the host nation
agencies include the Central Intelligence and country team levels. At the country team
Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency level, the US ambassador is responsible for
(NSA), and the intelligence staffs of the directing, coordinating, and supervising all US
Department of State (DOS) and military Government elements, except those under the
services. command of an established US theater
The list of agencies with which the Army commander.
may find it necessary to establish linkage At the theater level, the CINC may use his
varies based on the mission. FM 100-19 diplomatic advisor to coordinate with US
discusses MOOTW conducted to support US ambassadors and their country teams to plan
civil authorities and identifies the US agencies and conduct campaigns. Throughout the range
that must be considered. These agencies can of military operations, the ambassador

Chapter 4

remains an important player in the conduct of projects (OP) worldwide. These functions and
unified operations. The role of establishing and capabilities may be provided to the Army
maintaining interagency linkage to this component command through the logistics
representative of the President is vital for support element (LSE).
accomplishing the strategic objectives.
Logistics Support Element. LSE is a flexible,
United States Information Agency. The deployable multifunctional unit. It commands
United States Information Agency (USIA) is and controls forward elements of the strategic
responsible for supporting US foreign policy base. These forward elements are composed
objectives by informing the public in other primarily of DOD civilians and contractors.
nations about US programs and policies. The The LSE is structured to link the industrial
USIA can advise the CINC on the implications base with the operational-level units and,
of foreign opinion on the execution of present through the logistics assistance
and future campaigns. representatives, with tactical logistics. The
and ASCC require a tailorable logistics
Defense Logistics Agency. The Defense C element for forward elements of the national
Logistics Agency (DLA) is the CINC’s link to base. The LSE supports these needs by using a
the national industrial base. DLA provides flexible combination of military, DOD civilian,
supplies to the military services and supports and contractor personnel that allows it to alter
their acquisition of weapons and other its mission and size based on METT-T. The
materiel. Support begins with joint planning objective of the LSE is to sustain readiness by
among the services for weapons systems’ parts, operating as far forward as feasible,
extends through production, and concludes minimizing the evacuation of critical
with the disposal of materiel that is obsolete, reparable from the theater of operations and
worn out, or no longer needed. DLA provides thus reducing the flow of replacement materiel.
supply support, contract administration
services, and technical and logistics services to Military Resources
all military services. CJCS considers theater strategies and
plans when prioritizing and apportioning
US Army Materiel Command. The US Army forces and resources among the combatant
Materiel Command (USAMC) operates the commanders. National strategic planning for
Army’s national logistics system through its mobilization, predeployment, deployment,
major subordinate commands and separated entry operations, postconflict operations,
reporting activities (SRAs) to fulfill the Army’s redeployment, and demobilization is based on
need for logistics support. USAMC— the planned employment and sustainment of
•Performs assigned materiel functions and forces by the various combatant CINCs.
related functions for research, development, The strategic concept of operations of the
test, and evaluation (RDTE). theater campaign plan imposes requirements
•Provides acquisition, logistics support, and on mobilization timing and generation of
technical assistance for materiel systems. necessary force capabilities. Campaign
planners and mobilization planners must
•Performs other materiel acquisition coordinate and integrate closely. Strategic
management functions. deployment planning focuses on intertheater
•Provides the Army’s national logistics movement of forces and sustainment of the
system-level maintenance support for items theater for intratheater deployment,
concentration, and employment to support the
of materiel used by the Army. theater campaign plan. The CINC’s priorities
•Serves as the DOD single manager for are the basis for either movement.
conventional ammunition. The NCA may direct the use of strategic
•Provides management of operational forces or reserves to support the CINC’s
policies, programs, objectives, and resources employment concept. The CINC considers that
associated with its worldwide Logistics these forces may be apportioned to generate
Assistance Program. decisive combat power and provide protection
and security for deploying theater forces or be
Additionally, USAMC accounts for and used against external threats that could affect
manages Army Reserve and operational the outcome of the campaign.

FM 100-7

Additionally, national-level assets may an ARFOR headquarters that provides requisite

support the CINC's employment concept for support to ARFOR within the JTF and requests
conducting operations security (OPSEC), additional support from the controlling unified or
deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), subunified command ASCC. Based on the
SOF, civil affairs (CA) operations, and other supporting plans developed by the controlling
operations as unique operations within unified unified, subunified, or JTF command, the
operations. ARFOR headquarters develop its logistical plan.
Each service is responsible for providing In the event that national mobilization of
personnel, administrative, and logistical forces accompanies campaign plan execution,
support to its forces. The ASCC, in conjunction special plans and management may be
with his subordinate senior army commanders required to ensure available supplies to meet
assigned to the unified or subunified command, campaign priorities. In addition, as these
develops supporting plans to provide and mobilized forces deploy, planners develop
maintain adequate logistical support to Army theater distribution plans to eliminate
service forces and other forces as directed bottlenecks at arrival and intratheater
throughout all phases of the campaign. movement points. The CINC coordinates and
effects support agreements with the host
As a rule, the JTF does not have an ASCC. nation and allies for logistics, facilities
However, the CINC may designate the ASCC as acquisition, transportation, and other
the subunified commander or CJTF. The JTF has operations support.

A major operation is the ARFOR’s major operations also support the unified
coordinated execution of land operations of a operations of the theater campaign when
joint operation that is part of a particular phase subordinate missions require a phased, related
of a subordinate’s or CINC's campaign. A major series of joint operations to achieve theater
operation sequences Army activities, battles, strategic objectives. Major operations that
and engagements to attain operational-level support joint campaigns occur under certain
objectives. Senior army commanders, as circumstances.
subordinates to a subordinate JFC, and their
senior staff officers execute operational art •First, a CINC assigns theater strategic
through the design and conduct of major objectives and provides strategic guidance
operations, including contingency operations. and operational focus to an immediate
Often the ASCC/ARFOR is the supported subordinate.
commander planning and executing a major •Second, the CINC may establish multiple
operation. Then, the execution of the operation’s operating areas within a theater. Under
general direction is exercised by the ASCC/ both sets of circumstances, the strategic
ARFOR. This impacts in particular on the
planning of deep operations; deep fires; importance of the objectives, the guidance,
interdiction; Army airspace command and and the complexity of the joint operations
2 2
control (A C ); and reconnaissance, intelligence require the development of joint, single-
surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) service, supporting, and special operations
within the senior army commander’s AO. forces that complement both the
Sometimes, the ARFOR commander is a subordinates’ joint campaign and the
supporting commander who plans and executes CINC's theater campaign.
major operations of the campaign. For
example, the ARFOR may be the supporting
commander to the JFACC and the supported OPERATIONAL-LEVEL PLANNING
commander for the JFC's overall air Operational-level plans can include
interdiction effort. subordinate campaign plans and plans for
Operational-level planners develop major major operations. These plans support the
operations to support the series of related joint theater strategic objectives by linking those
operations of the joint campaign plan. These objectives to tactical-level operations.

Chapter 4

Subordinate Campaign Plans

The combatant commander may opt to the other service components and also provides
divide the theater of war into theaters of logistical support for all ARFOR assigned to
operations. When directed, principal the theater and to other services as required.
subordinate JFCs develop subordinate The ASCC plans and conducts major
campaign plans or OPLANs that accomplish or operations as directed by the CINC. In those
contribute to the accomplishment of theater instances where the CINC elects not to use the
strategic objectives. These plans support and ASCC to plan and execute major operations,
extend the theater CINC’s concept of the ASCC, while providing logistical support
operations in a sequence or set of joint for the Army forces, also recommends to the
operations composed of integrated major CINC the proper Army force composition and
operations and battles. These plans support employment as part of the operational-level
the theater campaign plan by achieving specific commander’s delineated requirements.
strategic objectives or by establishing
conditions for further operations that lead to Sustainment or
the specified end state. Reinforcement Plans
The principal CINC reviews subordinate The capability to sustain the campaign
campaign plans, along with the necessary from beginning to end sets the tempo of
supporting plans, to ensure they are valid, operations. Sustainment or reinforcement
synchronized, and support the concept and planning—part of logistics-preparation-of-the-
objective of the theater campaign plan. theater (LPT) process—identifies and provides
Appendix B provides an example of a the available supplies, equipment, materiel,
subordinate campaign plan. replacement personnel, and HNS
infrastructure to sustain the involved forces
Major Operations Plans according to the CINC’s concept of operations.
ARFOR with employment roles that LPT plans, developed by logisticians at all
support JFCs develop major operations plans echelons, must include provisions for
to support the theater or subordinate campaign infrastructure development and defense and be
plans. Plans are objective-driven and, when consistent with the strategic aims and CINC’s
applied collectively to the joint force, provide intent. FM 100-16 describes the LPT process in
the integrated and mutually supported effort to detail.
generate and concentrate combat power at the
operational level of war. Appendixes C, D, and MULTINATIONAL
E provide examples of major operations plans OPERATIONAL-LEVEL PLANNING
for peacetime, conflict, and war, respectively.
Achieving unity of effort in multinational
operations is critical for success. Multinational
SERVICE-COMPONENT-LEVEL operations planners ensure success by
PLANNING determining how US campaigns integrate with
The ASCC’s planning responsibilities are alliance or coalition forces and how intelligence
contingent on the Army’s role in supporting and logistics resources are shared.
theater-level unified operations. These Understanding the personalities and
responsibilities can range from planning, to sensitivities of the senior commanders and the
participating in joint operations with other national character of each of the allied armies
components, to participating in major is the key to successful leadership in
operations, to planning only for the service multinational army operations. In addition,
support of Army forces of the subordinate joint understanding their capabilities, personal and
commands. professional habits, and training background is
Major Operations Plans Commanders must establish effective
The ASCC’s responsibilities for planning working relationships among themselves. They
and conducting major operations depend on must establish rapport, mutual respect, and
how the combatant commander exercises his unity of effort; use liaison officers; develop
COCOM options. If the combatant commander standardization agreements; and overcome
elects to exercise COCOM through the ASCC language barriers. History has shown that it is
by delegating OPCON to him, then the ASCC possible for military leaders having a wide
conducts major operations in conjunction with divergence of cultural backgrounds to cooperate

FM 100-7

effectively while conducting multinational planning of multinational or coalition forces.

military operations. Subordinate commands, such as service and
Military capabilities of nations differ based functional component commands, subunified
on doctrine, training, and equipment. Even in commands, and JTFs, prepare the necessary
the US Army, differences exist among supporting plans for the conduct of joint
commands concerning interpretation and operations that support multinational
execution of doctrine. Some doctrines may objectives.
emphasize offensive operations; others
defensive. Some nations prepare for highly Logistics Support
mobile, mechanized operations, while others
concern themselves with insurgent or other Traditionally, the responsibility for
forms of warfare. logistics support to national component forces
remained with the responsible authorities of
The multinational commander must the nations concerned. In a multinational
recognize the relative strengths and differences environment, logistics support must be the
of the multinational force cultures. Decisions collective responsibility of the nations involved.
on employment must include the capabilities of The logistical objective in a multinational
the multinational force. They must be made in environment is to achieve the greatest degree
consultation with the military leadership of of logistical standardization that is realistically
those forces. achievable, given operational constraints,
The multinational commander must diplomatic and legal demands, and the existing
carefully balance the allocation of capabilities. capabilities of the multinational participants.
Subordinate commanders may have a tendency Logistical standardization is affected by such
to request control of forces that provide factors as compatibility and interoperability of
capabilities not organic to that nation’s forces. equipment, interchangeability of combat
The guiding principle is not to hold assets that supplies, and commonality of procedures. Also,
are needed by others, while at the same time planners must develop methods to prevent
not diluting the concentration of critical competition for resources, particularly
capabilities. infrastructure and LOCs, that could adversely
affect operations.
Relationship to Campaigns Planners should consider options for
Campaigns may be conducted within the contracting, acquiring HNS, obtaining support
context of an alliance, coalition, or other from other national forces, and integrating
international arrangement. Planning is such support within the multinational force.
accomplished through US, multinational, or These options can furnish critical support and
international channels. Coordinated planning resources that are not available through
on such matters as operations, logistics normal organizational means. Planners should
(including infrastructure), intelligence, understand and consider rationalization,
deception, electronic warfare [EW], standardization, and interoperability (RSI)
communications (including infrastructure), during planning.
ROE, and diplomatic ends is essential for unity
of effort. The preparation of supporting plans Intelligence
addressing coordination and liaison, HNS, and
the provision of mutual support are examples Multinational commands include national
of essential tasks that the theater CINC must and alliance intelligence systems. In keeping
accomplish. with the NCA guidance the CINC receives,
intelligence information should be integrated
and shared with the multinational command. If
Employment possible, the multinational command and other
During multinational operations, the involved national forces must agree on these
multinational chain of command performs procedures well in advance of commencement
detailed employment planning, to include of the campaign. Supporting plans should
employment of national and international address such matters as information-sharing,
agencies. These multinational plans may serve complementary intelligence operations, and
as the basis for the US campaign plan and liaison. These plans also should address
supporting plans, or the US campaign plan interaction with the multinational intelligence
might provide the basis for employment center (when established).

Chapter 4

Information Operations
The Army applies information war/ •Frequency management.
operations technology to support the CINC to
enhance his battle command, improve •Communications security (COMSEC) key
battlefield agility, and make split-based management/distribution.
operations possible. Effective use of
information operations can prevent the •Interfaces from theater systems to
initiation of hostilities by imposing the sustaining base.
perception that taking hostile actions against •Integration of signal support assets in theater
the US or its allies would not be in the best among joint and multinational forces.
interest of the potential adversary. Space-
based systems offer an unrestricted The joint signal support architecture
environment to affect these operations. provides vertical and horizontal integration for
Commanders must be able to access the army battlefield operating systems, as well as
global grid of worldwide information resources the interfaces that provide interoperability
at any time and at any location in the world. with joint and multinational forces’ systems
The Army often takes the lead among service and the sustaining base. The key to future
components for the entire joint and success is a seamless communications
multinational theater signal support architecture that ties the many distributed
infrastructure. Essential planning communications and automation elements into4
considerations must include- an integrated, interoperable, and cohesive C
•Wide area network planning/management. network.

Interagency operations facilitate the The CINC is the central point for planning
implementation of all elements of national and implementing theater and regional
power. Interagency operations are critical to strategies that require interagency
achieving the strategic end state, especially in coordination. The CINC may establish an
MOOTW. The Army often operates in an advisory committee to link his theater strategy
interagency environment alongside other to national policy goals and the objectives of
institutions of the US Government. This occurs DOS and concerned ambassadors. The CINC
when the military is the prime strategic option, establishes a joint headquarters to conduct
as it is in war, but also when other instruments interagency coordination and planning.
of national power are the preferred option and Military personnel may coordinate with other
the military assists with forces. US Government agencies while operating
directly under an ambassador’s authority,
Army forces must be prepared to conduct a while working for a security assistance
variety of operations that integrate organization or while assigned to a regional
warfighting and MOOTW with a variety of CINC.
government agencies, other services, and forces
of other nations. These operations could Coordination among DOD and other US
include stability operations, NEO, Government agencies may occur in a country
counterterrorism, security, or arms control and team or within a unified command. Military
verification. personnel working in interagency
organizations must ensure that the
Interagency operations facilitate unity and ambassador and CINC know and approve all
consistency of effort, maximize use of national programs. Legitimizing authorities determine
resources, and reinforce primacy of the specific command relationships for each
diplomatic element. DOD and CJCS coordinate operation. The command arrangement must
interagency operations at the strategic level. clearly establish responsibility for the planning
This coordination establishes the framework and execution of each phase of the operation.
for coordination by commanders at the
operational and tactical levels. In some cases— Besides extensive US Government agency
such as peacekeeping—DOS is the lead agency coordination, commanders also must fully
and DOD provides support. In others—such as integrate operations into local efforts when
peace enforcement—DOD is the lead agency. appropriate. Such integration requires close

FM 100-7

coordination with local government agencies As relationships among interagency

and bureaus; local military, paramilitary, or participants mature, increased effectiveness
police forces, and multinational partners. A can result. Interagency operations do not
structure such as a mixed military working necessarily lend themselves to the joint
group comprised of senior officials of the geographic subarea of responsibility previously
military and other agencies may assist such an discussed. Overlapping operational and
effort and include belligerent parties as interagency boundaries can be a source of
appropriate. confusion.

Chapter 5
The Army commander executes major operations to support joint
campaigns. He practices operational art requiring the synchronization of
the six operational-level operating systems. (Minor differences exist
between TRADOC Pam 11-9 and the Universal Joint Task List.)
•Operational movement and maneuver.
•Operational fires.
•Operational protection.
•Operational battle command. (FM 100-5 defines battle command
and its impacts.
•Operational intelligence.
•Operational logistics. (TRADOC Pam 11-9 calls this “support.”
Joint Pub 4-0 expands the definition of logistics to incorporate
health services, engineer services, and current supply,
maintenance, and distribution services.)
This functional approach is by no means the only way to look at
the roles and responsibilities of the Army operational-level
commander. The operational-level commander must successfully
accomplish several complex operations that may not be easy to
analyze. He should consider the operational-level operating systems
as aids to identifying tasks that must be accomplished at the
operational level. These systems provide a structure for the
discussion in Part Three. They are a catalog of battlefield and
support activities that place functions into logical—not procedural—

Operational movement and maneuver is supporting CINCs' plans. His senior
the disposition of forces to create a decisive commanders consider mobility requirements
impact on the conduct of a campaign or major from initial planning, or prehostilities, through
operation. The commander achieves this mission accomplishment, or accomplishment of
decisive impact either by securing the posthostility activities.
operational advantages of position before
battle or by exploiting tactical success to The CINC's theater strategic concept is the
achieve operational results. Simply put, framework the senior army commander uses to
operational movement and maneuver involves develop his supporting plan. The essence of the
positioning the needed Army forces and Army commander’s plan is the distribution of
resources at the critical time and place. his available force to support the CINC's
strategic concept. Operational movement and
The theater CINC designs, organizes, and maneuver produces decisive impact on the
conducts campaigns. He sets the tempo and campaign or major operation. All other
direction for the conduct of operations. He operational-level operating systems seek to
centralizes mobility planning, to include maximize the effect of movement and

FM 100-7

Ground Combat Operations

maneuver. They are synchronized to produce a Ground combat operations require
series of operational maneuvers that provide coordinated movement and effective
subordinate commanders with the necessary concentration of combat power against the
leverage to gain, retain, or sustain the enemy in spite of enemy interdiction efforts.
initiative. Air defense, air and ground transportation,
At the operational-level, the scope and reconnaissance and security, service support,
and traffic control are among the chief concerns
complexity of movement and maneuver usually as these large movements occur. Ground
involve joint and multinational operations. combat operations have the best chance of
Still, scale alone does not make movement or success when they are synchronized with air
maneuver operational. Rather, operational superiority and air interdiction operations.
movement and maneuver creates operational Senior army commanders direct the movement
advantage; this can be achieved at various of subordinate forces, ensuring that by the end
echelons. of a distinct phase of the major operation,
forces are positioned in a way that enables
OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT rapid transition to subsequent phases.
Operational movement is the regrouping,
deploying, shifting, or moving of service, joint, OPERATIONAL MANEUVER
or multinational operational formations to and Maneuver is the means by which combat
within the theater from less threatened or less power is concentrated at the critical point to
promising areas to more decisive positions. achieve the surprise, shock, momentum, and
From the Army commander’s perspective, dominance that enable smaller forces to defeat
movement involves forces deployed into his larger ones. Operational maneuver is the
area by the CINC and forces under his control means by which the commander sets the terms
that he moves within his AOR. of battle, declines battle, or acts to take
Strategic Deployment advantage of tactical actions. Throughout a
combat operations area, attack, defense, and
Strategic deployment, specifically the time- retrograde operations often take place
phased arrival of forces in the theater, may be simultaneously as each combatant attempts to
among the most challenging problems at the mass, economize locally, and maneuver against
operational-level. An error in determining the his opponent.
proper sequencing of forces may be difficult, if
not possible, to correct. The Army operational- Maneuver Operations
level commander must ensure the correct mix Prior to the conduct of offensive, defensive,
of combat and support forces are sequenced to or retrograde operations, senior army
arrive in the theater to support the CINC's commanders, in conjunction with the JFC,
concept. He does this by influencing the posture their operational forces to influence the
development of the time-phased force enemy. As the army commander postures his
deployment list (TPFDL) to ensure Army units forces, he visualizes the depth of the campaign.
and sustainment are sequenced into his Although initial deployment is important,
operational area to support the planned army commanders posture for initial and
sequence of operations. Forces required for port subsequent operations, based upon their
opening, reception, and onward movement visualization of the operational end state.
must be sequenced early in the TPFDL to flow
into the AO once the lodgment area is Offensive Operations
established. The offensive is the decisive form of war
The senior army commander is responsible and must be exercised in a coherent and
for moving forces allocated by the CINC from cohesive manner. The key to success in an
ports of debarkation to specific locations within offensive operation is to defeat, destroy, or
the Army’s objective area. This responsibility neutralize the enemy force. Offensive
includes the actual relocation or movement of operations seek—
operational forces by any means or mode of •To secure decisive terrain.
transportation. Prior to deploying the forces •To deprive the enemy of resources.
into combat formation, the senior army
commander directs movement from positions •To gain information.
within the operational area to a forward •To deceive, divert, and hold the enemy in
staging area or position. position.

Chapter 5

Retrograde Operations
•To disrupt the enemy’s attack. Retrograde operations are movements to
the rear or away from the enemy. They gain
•To set up the conditions for future time, preserve forces, avoid combat under
operations. undesirable conditions, or draw the enemy into
an unfavorable position. Control of the airspace
The goal is to mass effects, and not necessarily is the key to their success. The underlying
our forces, as we pursue offensive operations. reasons for retrograde operations are to
At the operational level, offensive operations improve an operational situation or prevent a
may be directed against an element of the field worse one from occurring.
force-the mass of enemy forces, the boundary
between two of its major combat formations, a Peacetime Stationing
vital C center, a logistical base, or LOCs. It also Requirements
could be more abstract—the cohesion among The CINC addresses peacetime stationing
allied forces, for example, or the mental and requirements in light of his potential
psychological balance of a key enemy warfighting needs and availability of forward-
commander. Operational-level commanders deployed forces. The ASCC controls trained
execute offensive maneuver simultaneously and ready Army forces based overseas for
through operational envelopments, turning CINC employment. Those forces are backed by
movements, infiltrations, penetrations, and rapid reinforcement by Army forces from the
frontal attacks—all of which must be integrated US or from other theaters. An evident
with air operations throughout the depth of their mobilization capability and a demonstrated
battle space to ensure the best chance for success. determination to respond effectively to crises
can have significant deterrent value.
Defensive Operations
Army leaders conduct defensive operations MOBILITY AND
to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, COUNTERMOBILITY
concentrate forces elsewhere, control key Operational mobility is linked closely to the
terrain, wear down enemy forces as a prelude concept of movement and maneuver.
to offensive operations, or retain operational Operational movement and maneuver include
objectives. The defender must counter the the functions of providing mobility for
attacker’s initiative. At the operational-level, operational forces and countering the mobility
the defender may disrupt the enemy attack of enemy operational forces.
with spoiling, special deception, psychological, Facilitating maneuver of major formations
and interdiction operations. A successful without delays includes counteracting the
defense has reactive and offensive air and effects of operationally significant obstacles. It
ground elements working closely together to also includes enhancing operational movement
deprive the enemy of the initiative. by preparing and improving facilities and
Army forces may either conduct a mobile routes critical to major operations.
defense that focuses on the destruction of the Operational counter-mobility delays or
attacking force or an area defense that focuses otherwise hinders the movement of enemy
on the retention of terrain. The mobile defense operational formations, to include selecting
orients on the destruction of the enemy force by and emplacing systems of obstacles for
employing a combination of fire, maneuver, operational effect.
offense, defense, and delay to defeat its attack.
The area defense absorbs the enemy into an Terrain, both natural and man-made,
interlocked series of positions from which the significantly influences operational mobility.
army commander destroys the enemy largely Terrain consists of coastal plains, mountain
by fires. ranges, forests, jungles, deserts, rivers, river
deltas, built-up areas, railroad embankments,
Senior army commanders normally hold pipelines, and so forth. Terrain affects the
operational reserves in depth to seize the ability to sustain forces, often dictating the
operational initiative during a defensive capacity of LOCs. This effect, in turn, can limit
operation. These reserves may include the size and composition of supported forces. In
dedicated forces, designated operating forces, war, the operational-level commander
generated forces from reconstitution, or considers the effect of terrain features upon
incoming newly arrived forces. ground movement and the ability of air power

FM 100-7

to influence that movement by detecting operational-level commander are linked to an

ground forces and subsequently delaying, understanding of battle space. The commander
disrupting, and destroying the forces. In seeks to preserve freedom of operational
peacetime, the army commander may consider movement by countering the effects of natural
how these features affect accomplishment of or man-made, operationally significant
missions supporting peacekeeping or obstacles. He must be prepared to counter
humanitarian operations. enemy movements by delaying, channeling, or
The commander must consider the effects blocking operational formations. The
of weather and be cognizant of its effects in the commander achieves this through the use of
theater. Key terrain considerations for the countermobility.

The term operational fires refers to a weapons of mass destruction (WMD), fires
commander’s application of nonlethal and could become the predominant operational
lethal firepower to achieve a decisive impact on instrument.
the conduct of a campaign or major operation.
Operational fires are a separate element of the A synchronized, systematic, and persistent
commander’s concept of operations (addressed plan of attack among air and land and, when
separately from maneuver) but must be closely applicable, sea and space commanders is
integrated and synchronized with the essential. Air superiority enables the ARFOR
commander’s concept of maneuver. to execute operations without interference
Operational fires are joint, and potentially from enemy air forces and maintains tactical
multinational, activities and are a vital flexibility. Air component missions that
component of any operational plan. contribute most directly to land operations are
counterair, close air support (CAS), air
Operational maneuver and operational interdiction, special operations, airlift, and
fires may occur simultaneously within a surveillance and reconnaissance. An example
commander’s battle space but may have very is air interdiction operations flown against an
different objectives. In general terms, enemy heavy division maneuvering to
operational fires are not fire support, and counterattack friendly forces during friendly
operational maneuver is not necessarily offensive operations. The land forces contribute
dependent on operational fires. However, to air operations by fire—suppression of enemy
operational maneuver can be affected by such air defenses (SEAD), land-based air defense,
fires and can exploit opportunities created or ground defense of air bases—and by maneuver
developed by the JFC's operational firepower through attack helicopter operations or seizure
(Joint Pub 3-09). Operational fires are of air bases and air defense sites by ground
normally furnished by assets other than those forces.
required for the routine support of tactical
maneuver. However, as the range of assets THEATER AIR CONTROL
used to support tactical maneuver increases, SYSTEM
those same assets will play a more significant
role in the delivery of operational fires. The The supported CINC must effectively
Army has significant capabilities for employ the air capabilities provided by the
contributing to the joint, deep fight or planning assigned or supporting service or functional
and conducting its own deep operations, when component forces within his AOR. Each
necessary, using operational maneuver and/or component within the unified command
organic operational fires. structure may conduct a variety of air
operations in the CINC's AOR. Additionally,
Operational fires include targeting and supporting CINCs may also fly missions to
attacking land and sea targets whose support the supported CINC's objectives. The
destruction or neutralization would have a supported CINC must integrate assigned and
significant impact on a campaign or major supporting forces into his theaterwide air
operation. Operational fires include the operations and ensure component direct
allocation of joint and multinational air, land, support air operations are coordinated
2 2
with his
sea, and space means. In a war involving theaterwide operations. The A C process

Chapter 5

integrates the maneuver of Army aviation into component commander (ACC) is responsible for
the overall scheme of maneuver. Users of Army providing fixed-wing tactical air support to
airspace achieve operational influence through United States Army (USA) forces.
the synchronization of air maneuver, using all Circumstances may require that the US Navy
battlefield operating systems focused (USN) or US Marine Corps (USMC) provide all
throughout the depth of the AO. All Army or part of the tactical air support for the
airspace users fire and maneuver within the ARFOR. Under such circumstances, the Naval
third dimension
2 2
of the ground commander’s component commander is responsible for
AO. The A C process is used to synchronize providing the tactical air support.
these Army assets in the area above the ground FM 100-103-1 describes multiservice tactics,
commander’s AO. techniques and procedures for integrating
To ensure this integration, the CINC may airspace C in
a CZ. Figure 5-1 describes a
choose to establish a functional component— notional C structure for integration and
the JFACC. This responsibility is normally coordination of joint fires.
assigned to the service that has the The theater air control system (TACS) is
preponderance of air assets and the best not a formal system in itself but the actual sum
capability to command and control joint air of various component air-ground systems. The
operations. Responsibilities of the JFACC are TACS includes the organizations, personnel,
described in Joint Pubs 3-01.2 and 3-56.1. If equipment, procedures, and techniques
the JFACC is not established, the air comprising the Army Air-Ground System

FM 100-7

(AAGS) and the Air Force component possible to shift the focus and concentration of
commander’s (AFCC's) TACS-related fires rapidly over the width and depth of the
responsibilities and missions. The AAGS is the operational commander’s battle space. EW,
system necessary for providing the land PSYOP, special reconnaissance, and SOF must
component commander or ARFOR with the be synchronized with operational fires in war, or
means for receiving, processing, and they may be used by themselves in MOOTW.
forwarding the requests of subordinate
commands for air support missions and for the
rapid dissemination of information and PLANNING
intelligence produced by air means. In the past, theater air forces have
TACS provides the same type of system for provided operational fires; however, the
the AFCC. A similar system exists within the increasing range and accuracy of projectile,
USN and provides
the USN-USMC naval rocket, and missile systems, combined with
aviation C system for naval aviation. maneuver and attack capabilities from attack
FM 31-12 contains 2
a detailed discussion of the helicopters and light forces, now provide the
USN-USMC C system and the additional Army commander with his own organic
agencies included therein. Although operational-fires capability. The ability of each
components and agencies of the TACS belong to service to engage targets at operational depths
different services and sometimes to different demonstrates the inherent joint and
nations, they function as a single entity- in potentially combined nature of operational
planning, coordinating, and integrating air fires.
support operations with ground operations. The senior army commander, in supporting
The AAGS begins at the highest echelon in the CINC's campaign plan, plans operational
the theater and extends through all echelons fires within his AO. His major role is to
down to maneuver battalions. This system is synchronize ground and air operational fires in
used for coordinating and integrating tactical his AO to achieve operational and tactical
air support with ARFOR ground operations. objectives. The army commander applies
The AAGS is composed of operations,2 fire operational fires in depth to achieve
support, air defense, Army airspace C , and operational objectives quickly with minimum
liaison elements. Each Army component of the casualties.
system is designed to operate with an element
of the US Air Force (USAF) TACS but is also The army commander plans operational
compatible with both USN and USMC air fires from the top down (the operational
control systems. Figure 5-2 illustrates the commander establishes objectives and
components of a typical TACS and the locations designates and integrates targets, then passes
of the liaison elements within the AFCC. them to the subordinate joint or allied units for
execution). The Army commander executes
those fires with organic and allocated assets
OTHER SYSTEMS and by nominating targets that he cannot
Technology is improving extended-range strike with these assets to the JTCB. He uses
acquisition and attack systems such as the the targeting process to shape the battle space
multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), the and synchronize fire support, interdiction, and
Army tactical missile system (ATACMS), and maneuver. He does this using 3
the decide,
the Apache attack helicopter. These systems detect, deliver, and assess (D A) methodology
allow the Army to extend battle space and play and participating in the JFC's joint targeting
a larger role in decisive deep operations. process.
Senior army commanders must orchestrate The D A methodology enables commanders
available Army, joint, and multinational lethal to respond rapidly with synchronized
delivery systems to disrupt, delay, destroy, or operations to events vital to establishing
degrade enemy operational forces or critical favorable conditions 3
for mission
functions and facilities. They must ensure that accomplishment. The D A methodology is a
systems designed to impair, disrupt, or delay the process that helps a commander’s structured
performance of enemy operational forces, attack of critical targets and creates a
functions, and facilities are coordinated with favorable battle tempo for friendly forces,
fires. The extended range and flexibility of attack particularly at decisive points and times during
helicopters and fire support systems make it the operation.

Figure 5-2. Theater Air Control System
FM 100-7

This methodology requires extensive Tactical objectives are supported by the

lateral and horizontal coordination, which the ability of operational fires to disrupt, delay, or
staff does, based on the commander’s intent. In limit enemy capabilities that would impact
planning operational fires, both ground and air immediately on the current battle. Tactical
component commanders consider the effects objectives support the attack of committed
that all fires, especially scatterable mines and enemy formations throughout their depth. This
cluster-type munitions, may have on future support helps the commander seize and retain
ground operations. FMs 101-5 and 6-20-10 the initiative, alter the tempo of operations,
discuss the targeting process in detail. and set the conditions for decisive close combat.
Commanders concentrate the effects of Support of both operational and tactical
their fires rather than massing the weapons objectives through operational fires is based on
themselves. Extended-range acquisition and the ability of operational fires to hold all critical
attack systems allow the commander to reduce enemy functions at risk throughout the depth
the vulnerability of his forces by dispersing the of the battle space. Operational fires neither
friendly forces and massing effects on the leave the enemy a place to hide nor time to rest,
enemy. However, fires alone are unlikely to critically limiting his freedom of action. As
achieve completely operational objectives. such, operational fires hasten the physical
Integrated properly with operational destruction of the enemy force and the
maneuver, fires can help achieve a decisive disintegration of cohesive operations and
impact on the operation. demoralize the enemy’s will to fight. In
MOOTW, the availability of operational fires to
the commander acts as a deterrent to
GENERAL TASKS escalation of conflict and, when necessary,
provides him additional means to accomplish
Operational fires help the Army the mission and protect the force.
commander accomplish his mission and protect Also, the enemy may possess a sophisticated
the force. Operational fires achieve both operational fires capability. The Army
operational and tactical objectives while commander must consider enemy capabilities
holding enemy critical functions at risk and establish measures to protect the force.
throughout the depth of the battle space. Operational fires may be used to disrupt enemy
Operational fires are more than deep fires. capabilities before they can be used against
They achieve operational objectives by friendly forces. Examples include theater missile
extending the battlefield in both space and defense, counterreconnaissance, surveillance and
time. Targets critical to the success of friendly target acquisition, counterfire, and joint
operations exist throughout the depth of the suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD).
battlefield. Current and emerging capabilities Operational fires focus largely on one or more of
permit their acquisition and attack at three general tasks: facilitating maneuver,
increasing ranges and with faster response isolating the battlefield, or destroying critical
times. Operational fires expose or attack enemy functions and facilities.
enemy centers of gravity. Attack of key
operational targets helps to set the conditions Facilitating Maneuver
for operational maneuver. Disrupting,
delaying, or limiting critical enemy functions Operational fires can facilitate maneuver in
helps the commander dictate the terms for the depth by suppressing the enemy’s deep-strike
close fight. Operational fires may hold or deny systems, disrupting the enemy’s operational
terrain in support of both operational and maneuver and tempo, and creating exploitable
tactical objectives. gaps in tactical defenses. Interdiction and

Chapter 5

maneuver are inseparable operations against a coordination line (FSCL) within boundaries
common enemy. Interdiction directs, disrupts, and in consultation with superior, subordinate,
delays, or destroys the enemy’s surface military supporting, and affected commanders.
potential before it can be used effectively against
friendly forces (Joint Pub 1-02). Effective Isolating the Battlefield
interdiction and maneuver are complementary
operations designed to achieve the JFC's Isolating the battlefield is another major
campaign objectives. Together they present the task of operational fires. Operational-level
greatest dilemma to the enemy. The synergy commanders isolate the battlefield by
achieved by integrating and synchronizing interdicting enemy military potential before it
interdiction and maneuver assists commanders can be used effectively against friendly forces.
in optimizing leverage at the operational level. Commanders usually combine this isolation
with other operations in a simultaneous attack
When the campaign calls for ground designed to use superior combat power to
operations to be decisive operations or defeat achieve quick, decisive outcomes.
mechanisms, planning for the interdiction
operations and target prioritization must be While interdiction destroys enemy forces,
based on the ground commander’s concept of its primary contribution to the operation is
operations. Just as air commanders (Naval and curtailing the enemy’s freedom of movement
Air Force) know and understand the and information flow and influencing the
capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of enemy’s battle tempo by diverting, delaying,
opposing air forces, ground force commanders and disrupting enemy forces. Interdiction can
must know and understand the capabilities, slow the action of enemy reserves and obstruct
strengths, and weaknesses of opposing ground the redeployment or movement of forces.
forces. Interdiction of the logistical support
Proper interdiction planning requires both system disrupts enemy operations by choking
off the enemy’s combat power. Friendly ground
air and ground expertise. The interdiction and and air forces must exploit the enemy’s reduced
maneuver planning responsibilities of the freedom to maneuver and synchronize this
operational-level commander fall into two reduction with other operations to achieve the
areas: influencing joint air interdiction desired tempo of operations.
operations and ensuring that ARFOR and
JFLCC target nominations are struck Destroying Critical Enemy
according to available assets. To ensure Functions and Facilities
integration of interdiction and maneuver, the
Army operational-level commander must— Operational-level commanders may use
operational fires to destroy critical enemy
•Define Army interdiction objectives and functions and facilities. Critical targets may
priorities and provide them to the JFACC. 2
include high-value C systems, mobility assets
•Establish allocation of CAS effort between such as fixed and mobile bridging, air defense
subordinate Army forces and the operational sites, and enemy long-range delivery systems
headquarters. such as surface-to-surface missiles, theater
ballistic and cruise missiles, airfields, and
•Ensure the deep operations coordination cell aircraft.
(DOCC) determines high-payoff and high- The objective in such cases is the deliberate
value targets. elimination or substantial degradation of
•Ensure that consolidated target, nominations critical enemy operational capabilities, for
reflect ARFOR priorities. example, attaining air superiority by
destroying enemy air operations and air
•Recognize that Army targets do not defense capabilities. Operational fires do not
automatically get higher priority. necessarily depend on other concurrent
•Facilitate notification to subordinate unit operations for success; however, they may be
commanders when the JFC determines that employed with other systems and maneuver in
the circumstances have changed and therefore a simultaneous attack of enemy operational
alter asset allocation priorities. capabilities. Operational fires are particularly
attractive in a theater where lack of resources
•If designated as an appropriate ground forces may preclude major ground offensive
commander, establish a fire support operations.

FM 100-7

The senior army commander ensures unity provides the BCE and collocates it either
of effort and purpose by organizing fires in his ashore or afloat with the ACC's air operations
operational battle space. He is a major planner center (AOC) or theater equivalent. The BCE
of operational fires and a major allocator of fire expedites the exchange of information through
support resources. He closely coordinates joint face-to-face coordination with elements of the
and multinational assets. He allocates or AOC established by the ACC. The AOC is the
controls resources and designates missions to operational facility in which the ACC
subordinates. They attach forces, establish centralizes the planning, direction, and
support relationships, or control usage; specify controlling functions over all tactical air
the degree of risk; and retain systems control. (TACAIR) resources.
A primary consideration for the Army
commander is the allocation of scarce The BCE's basic mission is to facilitate the
operational fires resources, especially air synchronization of air support for Army
assets. operations. The BCE is responsible to the
ASCC/ARFOR commander and coordinates
COORDINATION with and receives objectives, guidance, and
The senior army commander and his staff priorities from his operations officer (G3).
play a major part in coordinating joint and Specific missions include processing land
multinational assets. Under the guidance of forces’ requests for TACAIR support,
the JFC, land, air, and maritime components monitoring and interpreting the land battle
execute major operations designed to attain situation for the AOC, providing the necessary
strategic objectives. The JFC synchronizes interface for the exchange of current
operational-level fires as part of the joint intelligence and operational data, and
planning process. This process entails coordinating air defense and airspace control
component coordination and cooperation in the matters.
employment of all fires.
Historically, the BCE has worked with
Deep Operations Coordination Cell the Air Force in this coordination role, but with
the changes in world environment and joint
The DOCC is a proposed fire support element doctrine, the Army BCE can expect to work in
at the operational-level headquarters that contingency operations with USMC and
plans, coordinates, and executes employment maritime air component commanders.
of operational fires. Chapter 7 discusses the Planners must identify and resolve problems
DOCC in detail. J-SEAD is an example of this that result from these less-practiced and less-
refined linkages. If the BCE collocates with an
type of coordination and cooperation. AOC, it is organized into sections
corresponding to the AOC's. Figure 5-3
Battlefield Coordination Element illustrates the organization of the BCE and its
The Army DOCC effects coordination interface with tactical air control. For more
with other services through the battlefield information on the BCE, consult FM 100-103,
coordination element (BCE). The ASCC FM 100-15, and 71-100 series FMs.

Operational protection conserves the maneuver by making soldiers, systems, and
fighting potential of a force so that it can be operational formations difficult to detect,
applied at the decisive time and place, strike, and destroy. Operational protection
Operational protection includes actions taken pertains to forces everywhere in the theater of
to counter the enemy’s firepower and war or operations. Operational protection
includes, but is not limited to-
•Providing operational air defense.
1. To accomplish this mission, the 3d US Army formed
a deep operations targeting cell during Operations •Conducting deception.
Desert Shield and Desert Storm. •Protecting operational forces and means.

Chapter 5

• Employing OPSEC. assets. Enemy air operations may include

tactical ballistic missile (TBM), air-to-surface
•Providing security for forces and means. missile (ASM), and cruise missile (CM) attacks,
The full spectrum of enemy air threat includes
•Conducting rear operations, which includes UAVs, rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, and
combatting terrorism. airborne and air assault operations. The
current approach to theater missile and air
•Conducting risk assessments. defense places emphasis on leveraging the
synergy of joint capabilities to the maximum
•Planning for possible response or use of WMD. extent possible to counter the threat. Each joint
force component addresses the target sets that
PROVIDING OPERATIONAL they are best equipped to engage and destroy.
All members of the combined arms team The first target set is ballistic missiles.
perform air defense operations; however, Ballistic missiles can be strategic, operational,
ground-based air defense artillery (ADA) units or tactical. They may also have guided
execute the bulk of the force protection mission. munitions. Because of detection difficulties and
Army ADA provides protection to forces and inadequate kill potential, manned aircraft are
selected geopolitical assets from aerial attack, inappropriate platforms to counter TBMs in
missle attack, and surveillance. Significant the terminal phase. The TBM target set is best
considerations for employment of ADA in engaged by ground-based systems as
theater operations include its role in joint and demonstrated by Patriot ADA during
multinational counterair operations, theater Operation Desert Storm. Manned aircraft are
missle defense, the threat, available assets, best suited by design for air-to-air
and organizations. engagements of other manned fixed-wing
Air Threats
A second target set committed against
The entire spectrum of threat air theater assets is cruise missiles, UAVs, and
operations can be flown with theater-level fighter/bomber aircraft that evade the defense

FM 100-7

counterair operations of the joint air forces. •To detect, warn of, and report theater
Ground-based air defense systems are best missile launch.
equipped to engage these targets. UAVs and
helicopter platforms typically operate at •To coordinate a multifaceted response to a
altitudes where fixed wing air-to-air combat is theater missile attack.
not employed. These targets are destroyed •To integrate TMD with other combat
through ground-based systems, thereby operations.
contributing to protection of forces and
geopolitical assets and denying the enemy TMD has four operational elements—
surveillance of friendly force activities. passive defense, active defense, attack
operations, and command, control,
The contribution of all services to theater communications,
computers, and intelligence
missile and air defense offensive and defensive (C 1). The Army contributes to all four. Passive
tactics engages all applicable target sets. These measures reduce the vulnerability of critical
offensive and defensive tactics cover all aspects forces and assets to theater missile attack.
of active and passive defense measures Active defenses engage missiles and enemy
throughout the theater. aircraft armed with air-to-surface missiles in
flight. Attack operations are conducted4 to
prevent the launch of theater missiles. C I is
Joint and Multinational required to coordinate and integrate the
Counterair Operations defense against the theater missile capability.
Joint and multinational counterair The senior Army air defense command in
operations are conducted to attain and theater executes a key portion of the TMD
maintain a desired degree of air superiority by concept. Air defense forces are task-organized
destroying or neutralizing enemy forces. Joint to defend in a TMD task force. The TMD task
and multinational counterair operations force protects a mix of force organizations and
include both offensive and defensive measures geopolitical assets that represent a high
taken against enemy air threats. Offensive priority for protection by the TMD. It is
counterair (OCA) operations destroy, disrupt, composed of two overlapping tiers. The upper
or limit enemy air threats as close to their tier is defended by theater high-altitude air
source as possible, whereas defensive defense (THAAD). The lower tier is defended
counterair (DCA) operations are conducted by the Patriot. Through TMD, both OCA and
primarily to counteract enemy air offensive DCA actions are taken against theater
actions to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of missiles. Simultaneous with the active defense
hostile air attacks. operations to destroy inbound theater missiles
Air defense forces conduct DCA operations are the attack operations to facilitate
using both active and passive measures. Active counterfires using the flight data of the threat
DCA operations use ADA; EW; Army aviation; TBM to locate the launch point. This is an
and chemical (smoke), combined arms, and air operational action that can extend air defense
elements to disrupt or destroy airborne enemy activities far beyond the corps deep battle area.
aircraft, missiles, and other aerial vehicles that For additional details on TMD, refer to
pose attack and surveillance threats. Passive FM 44-100.
DCA measures such as cover, concealment,
signature reduction, smoke operations, and CONDUCTING DECEPTION
deception frustrate enemy targeting efforts and The conduct of deception contributes
minimize the effects of enemy attacks. greatly to the protection and survivability of
Theater Missile Defense operational forces. Operational deception
consists of those operations that purposely
FM 44-100 states that the objectives of mislead enemy decision makers by distorting,
theater missile defense (TMD) are— concealing, and falsifying friendly intentions,
•To reduce the probability of and to minimize capabilities, and dispositions. Deception
the effects of damage caused by a theater includes protecting the commander’s own
ballistic missile attack. intentions, disseminating misinformation to
deceive the enemy about those intentions,
•To detect and target theater missile obscuring areas of the theater, and
platforms. determining the effect of the deception.

Chapter 5

The ultimate goal of deception is to mislead planning and conducting major operations. He
the opposing military commander, prompting does so by employing signal security (SIGSEC)
him to plan and conduct his activities in a and concealment techniques and avoiding
manner that unwittingly serves the friendly operational patterns.
force’s objectives. Deception operations are The operational-level commander protects
planned and executed at the operational level emitters and information transmitted through
of war and synchronized with strategic 2
friendly C communications-electronic systems
objectives. They can support theater objectives from enemy exploitation. He also hides
by deterring the escalation of conflict, operational forces and facilities from enemy
destroying the enemy’s warfighting means, observation and surveillance sensors. He
gaining and maintaining the initiative, and ensures units vary activities and ways of
shaping the enemy’s scheme of maneuver. conducting operations to avoid predictable
The operational-level commander patterns that are vulnerable to enemy
participates in the deception process at two interception.
levels. He may plan and execute deception
operations within his mission purview, or he PROVIDING SECURITY OF
may be asked to provide planning and
operational-level support for deception FORCES AND MEANS
activities planned and executed by By identifying and reducing friendly
subordinate, adjacent, or higher command vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or
echelons. Deception operations at the surprise, the operational-level commander
operational level must complement or reinforce enhances the force's freedom of action.
the theater deception plan effort. The Enhancement consists of measures to protect
operational-level commander reconciles the force from surprise, observation, detection,
operational and tactical deception plans to interference, espionage, and sabotage. It
ensure they complement but do not contradict includes protecting and securing the flanks of
the strategic (theater) plan. operational formations, critical installations,
facilities, and systems.
The operational-level commander OPERATIONS
safeguards his operational force by reducing The operational-level commander is
the effects of enemy operational-level actions responsible for rear operations subject to
(movement, radio electronic combat, and so applicable host nation laws and agreements.
forth). He does this by preparing operationally Rear operations include those activities that
significant fortifications, removing allow freedom of maneuver in the COMMZ,
operationally significant hazards, and continuity of sustainment, and uninterrupted
protecting the use of the electromagnetic battle command. The combatant CINC is
spectrum. ultimately responsible for all rear operations in
The operational commander provides the theater of operations. He normally assigns
protective construction hardening for subordinate commanders the responsibility for
operational 2
forces and key facilities, for operations in a JRA according to mission
example, C , logistics, and rear area positions. requirements, force capabilities, the strategic
However, even hardened facilities are environment, and the threat. The CINC may
vulnerable to a determined attack. The assign the overall mission of rear operations to
operational commander eliminates hazards one commander—the JRAC. The JRAC must
that may adversely affect the execution of his ensure integration of all rear operations
plan. Additionally, he ensures that actions are missions and forces and synchronization with
taken to ensure friendly, effective use of the the CINC campaign plan.
electromagnetic spectrum, despite the enemy’s The potential magnitude of the threat to
use of EW. the theater base and COMMZ dictates that US
forces be trained to cope with threat forces
EMPLOYING OPERATIONS when and where they attempt to interrupt
SECURITY COMMZ operations. The operational-level
The operational-level commander attempts commander uses every appropriate active and
to hide friendly force indicators associated with passive measure for defense against detection

FM 100-7

from the air, attack from the ground, and The potential employment of WMD can have
compromise of friendly defense systems. an enormous impact on the conduct of all
Successful rear security operations are operations. These strategic, operational,
critical in the rear area since it contains the psychological, and political impacts affect
LOCs, establishments for supply and campaign designs. The sheer killing and
evacuation, and agencies required for destructive power of these weapons create an
immediate support and maintenance of field illusionary battlefield effect. Further, the
forces. The key tasks of successful rear security proliferation of WMD dramatically alters the
operations are— nature of regional conflict.
•Coordinating base/base cluster defense As these weapons proliferate, the
plans. likelihood of their use against friendly forces or
in response to an enemy’s first use increases.
•Collecting, integrating, analyzing, and The effects of these weapons on a campaign or
disseminating timely and accurate major operation—either through use or the
intelligence. threat of use—can cause large-scale shifts in
•Patrolling aggressively in coordination with tactical objectives, phases, and/or COAs. Thus,
planning for the possibility of their use against
the host nation, to intercept and defeat friendly forces is critical to campaign design.
small threat forces before they close on their Commanders must be aware of the political as
objective. well as public sensitivities to the use of WMD
•Deploying forces sufficient to counter the and be prepared to respond to the possibilities
enemy intrusion. of postuse public relations problems.
From the combatant commander’s
CONDUCTING RISK perspective, a swift end to a conflict will
ASSESSMENTS partially negate the escalator potential of
these weapons. A combination of conventional
Also integral to force protection is the offensive and defensive measures can help
conduct of risk assessments. Risk assessments deter or reduce the likelihood of an enemy’s use
identify hazards and examine the resulting of these weapons. Offensive preventive
risks associated with the mission. Special risk measures may include raids, surgical air
considerations must be made where the threat strikes, and operations designed to locate and
of WMD exists. Risk assessment is dynamic. As neutralize the threat of such weapons.
circumstances change and the command’s Commanders implement the defensive nuclear,
experience level increases, risk assessments biological, chemical (NBC) principles of
confirm and reconfirm critical information that avoidance, protection, and decontamination.
affects decisions. They also plan for effective air and ballistic
missile defense with different systems. US
PLANNING FOR POSSIBLE military policy attempts to deter enemy use of
RESPONSE OR USE OF WMD through a defense posture that allows
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION US forces to survive, fight, and win under
conditions produced by these weapons.
US policy concerning nuclear warfare is to
deter it, and, if deterrence fails, to terminate Commanders must assess an enemy’s
the conflict at the lowest possible level of willingness to employ these weapons and the
violence consistent with national and allied conditions that would prompt him to do so.
policy objectives. This policy does not preclude However, commanders should never assume
US first use of nuclear munitions. Nuclear rationality in the mind of the enemy. A
weapons may only be used following the virtually defeated enemy may resort to
specific directives of the President. unrestricted warfare by any means at hand.
Since the Army no longer has an organic Army forces may support use of WMD with
nuclear capability, it must rely on other SEAD or with the reconnaissance and selection
services for delivery of nonstrategic nuclear of targets. More importantly, however, Army
weapons to support its operational warfare officers must participate-in drafting and
requirements. Nuclear weapons should be executing campaign plans that envision
integrated with other fire support systems to friendly use of WMD. The campaign plan must
achieve the greatest operational advantage. identify the requirement for strikes with WMD

Chapter 5

that support campaigns and major operations. WMD against other coalition members will
Additionally, Army planners should identify increase as US forces demonstrate the ability
appropriate WMD targets and ensure to defend effectively against their effects.
integration of WMD into the campaign plan Commanders should consider that possibility
and/or major operation plan. in all strategic, operational, and tactical
The Mass Destruction
Environment Nuclear Weapons
When WMD are used, extensive As a force that now lacks organic nuclear
destruction and mass casualties can result. capability, the Army must rely on Air Force
Only cohesive, disciplined, physically fit, and and Navy nuclear capabilities to deter regional
well-trained units can function in this threats from using WMD and, should it be
environment. But long-term operations in this necessary, to respond to regional use of these
environment degrade even the best individual weapons. The integration of nuclear weapons
and unit performance as a result of wearing and long-range ballistic missile systems
protective equipment. Commanders must train expands the scope of regional conflict. Ballistic
and equip soldiers and civilians alike to endure missiles significantly reduce reaction times
these conditions. By being better prepared and create complex planning and decision
than the enemy for continuous operations criteria. The ability of some nations to employ
under conditions produced by WMD, US forces nuclear weapons at extended ranges, using
can maintain an advantage over the enemy ballistic or cruise missiles and high-speed
that deters him from using these weapons. aircraft, will significantly enhance their
effectiveness as instruments of terror. With the
Force protection is an imperative in this ability comes the possibility of conflict
environment. Units can survive the use of escalation beyond the boundaries of the region.
WMD by anticipating their employment.
Commanders can protect their forces in a Using intelligence estimates, planners
variety of ways. These include training, advise the commander of the enemy’s
OPSEC, dispersion of forces, and proper use of capability to employ nuclear weapons and
terrain for shielding against effects. under what conditions he is most likely to do so.
A significant intelligence task is locating these
In an NBC environment, battle command weapons and assessing the probability of their
becomes more difficult. Command posts and employment. Accordingly, the integration of
headquarters at all levels are likely targets. national, joint, and multinational intelligence
Control is difficult even within the smallest means is vital to this effort.
unit. Personnel in protective clothing are slow
to respond to rapid changes in mission. The The immediate effects of a nuclear
employment of these weapons greatly alters detonation are blast, thermal radiation, initial
the tempo of combat. So, commanders must nuclear radiation, and electromagnetic pulse
never assume that they are immune to attack (EMP). These effects can cause significant
but consider ways of decreasing their risk. personnel and materiel losses. Secondary
effects include urban devastation, fires, and
Contamination avoidance is essential for radiological contamination. The EMP from a
successful operation when faced with an NBC nuclear detonation can affect unshielded
threat. Avoiding contamination allows units to 3
electronic equipment and degrade C I systems.
maintain tactical momentum and preserves Residual radiation can also have long-term
combat power by keeping soldiers out of effects on personnel, equipment, facilities,
increased NBC protective postures. It also terrain, and water sources. Therefore, ensuring
removes or lessens the need for that friendly force dispositions do not provide
decontamination. Detailed information on lucrative targets for nuclear weapons is
NBC contamination avoidance is found in important.
FM 3-3.
Multinational operations become more Biological Weapons
risky with the threat of NBC use. Countries While the US has renounced the use of
that cannot protect themselves against these biological weapons, many nations have not.
weapons may become the primary target of an The availability of biological weapons to
enemy whose aim is to disintegrate the possible enemies requires that commanders
coalition. The likelihood that an enemy will use prepare for operations in a biological

FM 100-7

environment. Defensive measures are Chemical weapons produce immediate and

necessary to mitigate the effects of a biological delayed effects that can hamper operations
attack. Both military and civilian populations through the contamination of equipment,
require information and psychological and supplies, and critical terrain features.
medical preparation. Commanders can reduce the effects of chemical
employment by applying the fundamentals of
Chemical Weapons contamination avoidance, protection, and
All current and future operations have the decontamination. Chemical reconnaissance
potential to occur in a chemical environment. and decontamination are two planning
US policy does not condone or authorize first imperatives for all future missions; training is
use of chemical weapons. However, the key. Detailed information on providing
preparedness to operate in this environment NBC protection to the force, as well as risk
negates many possible advantages for an analysis and assessment, is found in FM 3-4.
enemy to employ these weapons. This
preparedness is itself a deterrent.


Initially described in FM 100-5, anticipating requirements, and using
operational battle command is the exercise of initiative. The senior army commander
authority and direction by a commander to translates these principles, the CINC's
accomplish operational objectives. The control strategic direction, and the operational-level
mechanisms support the exercise of battle objectives into a clear statement of intent.
command. The commander’s vision and his The concept of battle space was developed
stated intent guide the organization toward the to help the commander visualize and organize
accomplishment of their mission or assigned the projection of combat power to gain physical
tasks. Battle command focuses efforts, dominance over the enemy. Battle space is the
establishes limits, and provides structure to three-dimensional physical environment—that
operational functions. Battle command is not constrained by boundaries—in which
supports the organization in the conduct of commanders visualize conducting combat
current operations while planning and operations over time. Commanders use the
preparing for future operations. concept of battle space to help determine how
the terrain and all available combat power can
THE COMMANDERS be used to dominate the enemy and protect the
RESPONSIBILITIES force. Eventually, this vision becomes the
battlefield framework from which the
Visualizing the battlefield is a continuing commander’s intent and concept of operation
requirement for commanders. Battle command are derived. Understanding of this concept
at the operational level includes the collection contributes to the synchronization of full-
and protection of information, the assessment dimensional operations.
of that information, the selection of appropriate
actions, and the establishment of direction for Understanding also allows commanders to
the leaders of subordinate operational forces. synchronize combat power against the enemy
In exercising battle command, the operational- and keep the enemy from extending his battle
level commander considers those assets space to its greatest range. This helps
available from higher headquarters as well as commanders determine how they might task-
from other service components and allies. He organize and position their units. By
then organizes his command and delegates understanding how to visualize operations to
responsibilities. disrupt the enemy in depth, commanders can
synchronize operations to disrupt the enemy in
Operational-level battle command requires depth to throw him off balance, to attack his
longer lead times, involves a greater span of functions, and to set the conditions for decisive
control, and is inherently joint and often victory. Synchronization, sequencing, and
multinational. It includes tactical-level phasing of the battle within the battle space is
principles such as issuing mission orders, critical to success. New technology in

Chapter 5

Structuring to Focus Effort

digitization has provided opportunities for Structure is critical for implementing the
improved battlefield situational awareness and commander’s vision. At the operational level,
increased weapons systems lethality. the complexity and scope of the mission
Digitization efforts include ground maneuver contribute to uncertainty. Leaders cannot
battle space as well as the airspace above the always draw upon experience or previous
theater. Digitization increases operational solutions to problems that may be entirely
tempo and protects friendly forces. Battle space different. An important component is
is discussed in detail in FM 100-5 and establishing the rules and defining the limits.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5. ROE, control measures, degree of risk, success
The senior army commander maintains criteria, report formats, and other tools
clear unity of command during changes of contribute to the function of establishing
operational phases. This unity includes structure. Many of these matters are standard
relationships with joint and multinational procedures in smaller units. However, at
organizations. Significant changes in command echelons above corps (EAC), the inherent joint
relationships require phasing plans to avoid and multinational nature of operations, along
confusion. Any major organizational changes with the peculiarities of each theater, compel
require a review of the existing battle the senior army commander to specify certain
command process. elements.
Structuring focuses effort. Structure is a
THE COMMANDER'S VISION characteristic of the control function of
leadership. The senior army commander
A senior army commander performs four applies structure when he assigns missions
functions to implement his vision and achieve and communicates his vision. Structure is
proper operational battle command. First, he accomplished formally through orders and
decides upon and communicates his intent and directives and informally in communicating
provides direction so that others can with subordinate commanders.
understand and respond. Next, he establishes
the structure to focus effort. Then, he plans and Planning and Organizing
organizes the activities necessary to get
results. Finally, he motivates, influences, and Operational planning begins with the
supervises the force to develop and sustain the assignment of a mission or with the
organizational purpose required to accomplish commander’s recognition of a requirement; it
the mission. continues until the mission is accomplished,
The staff uses the commander’s intent to
Communicating the develop and coordinate the supporting
Commander’s Intent operation plan. Once the commander develops
the plan, he organizes his command and
The commander’s intent is a concise designates command relationships to
expression of the commander’s expected accomplish the mission.
outcome of an operation. The commander’s
intent funnels an organization’s collective An operational-level commander keeps his
activities to achieve the commander’s desired eye on long-range objectives throughout any
outcome. The commander’s intent is the central operation. He views tactical outcomes and task
goal and stand-alone reference that enables accomplishments from the perspective of how
subordinates to gain the required flexibility in they contribute to the major operation. While
planning and executing. It is the standard tactical setbacks might cause adjustments to
reference point from which all present and the operation, they should not unduly divert
future subordinates’ actions evolve. attention away from the operational objective.
Commanders and leaders—guided by their In the plan development process, the
commander’s intent—who can make decisions commander and his staff interact continuously
can better ensure the success of the force as a during the commander’s analysis, the restated
whole when conditions are vague and confusing mission, guidance to the staff, estimates, and
and communication is limited or impossible. development of COAs. This interaction
The design of commander’s intent is not to continues through the commander’s decision to
restrain but to empower subordinates by giving publish an order. Continuous feedback and
them freedom of action to accomplish a coordination ensures that the staff and
mission. commander focus on the objective.


Motivating and Influencing the Force

At the operational level, leadership and The senior army commander must be able
command is no longer simply a direct influence to sustain the appropriate command climate—
process. It also includes a well-formed ability to a climate that fosters free communication—in
exercise indirect, organizational leadership. order to generate the motivation to maintain
Success depends on creating and maintaining cohesive teams. Free communication permits
cohesive teams, units, and organizations, using the senior commander to assess how well his
both direct and indirect modes of leadership. vision is understood. It also assists him in
FM 22-103 discusses these modes of influencing every level of his command.

Operational intelligence is that intelligence assess operational-level information applicable
required for the planning and conduct of major to nonhostile situations that could require
operations within a theater of operations. At military support. MI efforts focus normally on
the operational level of war, the joint and potentially hostile threats. This intelligence
multinational intelligence system does not leads to the identification and location of high-
concentrate just on the collection, payoff targets that, if successfully attacked,
identification, location, and analysis of the help achieve the assigned operational-level
center of gravity and operational objectives. It objective.
also must focus its production effort downward During hostilities, the focus of the
and concentrate efforts on warfighting priority operational-level intelligence effort is to
intelligence requirements (PIR). analyze the enemy’s operational capabilities
•Basic (or finished) intelligence. and estimate his intent. Many elements of
•Strategic indications and warnings. analysis that underwrite war or conflict
tactical intelligence apply at the operational
•Tactical warnings. level, for example, enemy order-of-battle,
•Current intelligence reporting. enemy capabilities, WMD, doctrinal norms,
and characteristics of the AOR.
(IPB) on an operational or theater basis. Commanders and their intelligence and
chemical officers should evaluate these
•Targeting intelligence. elements and other products and reports in a
•Battle damage assessment (BDA) and broad context. They should also establish Army
force collection requirements and allocate
poststrike assessment. organic and supporting collection assets.
•Collection requirements management A key role for the Army service component
(synchronization of intelligence product is to expedite access to and facilitate
reports). dissemination of theater and national-level
The operational-level intelligence intelligence through the JIC. Intelligence at
organizations also provide unique the operational-level requires information
counterintelligence (CI), signals intelligence broader than that normally associated with the
SIGINT, imagery intelligence (IMINT), tactical echelons. Political, economic, and social
measurement and signatures intelligence factors affect the enemy decision-making
(MASINT), technical intelligence (TECHINT), process and the corresponding friendly
human intelligence (HUMINT), security collection plan.
countermeasures services, and force protection.
These capabilities are found within the units of the PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE
operational-level military intelligence (MI) REQUIREMENTS
organization. An example of a typical theater MI Intelligence at the operational level must
structure is discussed in detail in Appendix A. project well into the future. The senior army
commander drives the intelligence effort by
COLLECTION articulating PIR and information requirements
Military leaders normally rely on DOD or needed in his decision-making process. For
other government agencies to monitor and intelligence to be timely, this commander must

Chapter 5

plan and control the intelligence effort with the capabilities and vulnerabilities. This
same level of interest and personal understanding focuses on hostile situations but
involvement he devotes to other functions. In includes information applicable in nation
particular, he must assure that his intelligence assistance, disaster relief, and other nonhostile
system distributes products and intelligence situations.
information that meet the needs of his staff and
the requirements of his subordinate POTENTIAL THREAT
commanders. CAPABILITIES
INTEGRATION Potential threat operational doctrine and
force capabilities across the range of military
Intelligence is vital to the design of a operations remain the largest part of military
successful operation. The senior army collection requirements. As collectors probe,
commander must integrate intelligence with the critical focus must be on the nature of the
all the other operational-level functions. enemy’s battle command structure.
Tactical commanders must react quickly to Collectors must seek the identity and
unanticipated shifts in the flow of battle with personal characteristics of opposing
forces reserved for that purpose. Operational- operational commanders, their relationships
level commanders, however, must determine with their superiors and subordinates, and the
their lines of operations and lines of support effects of these relationships on the
much further in advance. Deployment of mechanisms through which the enemy makes
intelligence collection personnel as part of the operational decisions. Questions that may be
force establishing a forward presence in a asked include—
contingency area contributes to this capability.
Commanders should consider both permanent •What freedom of action does the opposing
stationing and periodic deployment of CONUS- commander have?
based resources. •How aggressively is he likely to exercise it?
SYNCHRONIZATION •What degree of compliance can he expect
from his subordinates?
Synchronization is the arrangement of
operations and battlefield activities in time, •How effective is his battle command system?
space, resources, and purpose to produce Such questions are more critical at the
maximum relative combat power at a decisive operational-level than at the tactical level,
point. It focuses the vast arsenal of intelligence particularly for those military forces in which
resources available from national to division initiative is reserved at relatively high levels of
levels to accomplish the desired result— command. A vital operational-level intelligence
synchronized intelligence operations at each task is to discover who commands and how he
level that satisfy and deliver PIR to theater and exercises command in a given situation.
combat commanders.
Synchronization ensures IEW operations COMMANDER’S REQUIREMENTS
are linked to the commander’s requirements
and respond in time to influence decisions and The senior army commander requires a
operations. In the synchronization process, the risk assessment concerning friendly
intelligence officer takes the commander's PIR susceptibilities and vulnerabilities an enemy
and backward plans to orchestrate the may exploit. This assessment is part of
collection and production efforts with the predictive products that support the
operation and deliver intelligence when commander’s battle planning. Intelligence
required. Intelligence synchronization is a agencies also must obtain information
continuous process that ensures the concerning the nature and characteristics of
intelligence system answers the commander’s the AOR, to include significant hazards. The
intelligence requirements in time to influence commander needs to know the enemy’s total
his decisions. capability, the area’s basic physical features,
climatological characteristics, and topography.
Information should include significant
VULNERABILITIES military, technical, scientific, diplomatic,
Operational-level commanders must economic, industrial, geographic, demographic,
clearly understand both enemy and friendly topographic, hydrographic, climatic, cultural,

FM 100-7

and psychological features of the area. This Operational-level commanders must
information contributes to hostile and nonhostile always consider security when working with
military preparations. sensitive intelligence information, especially in
the multinational operational environment.
Operational-level commanders normally have
PROBLEMS access to natiional strategic intelligence means.
The operational-level intelligence Often, these systems can provide valuable
collection process has some unique insights into probable enemy intentions. By
characteristics. No analytical method or their very nature, these national collection
mechanism completely eliminates the means are among the most sensitive of
problems of uncertainly, volume, and security. intelligence assets, especially those sources
most likely to reveal probable enemy
Uncertainty intentions. Commanders must therefore
carefully balance their desire to act on
The products of intelligence at this level are information derived from these sources, with
sometimes imperfect guides to action; therefore, the realization that such action could risk
senior army commanders may be required to take exposing the source and compromising the
risks. Commanders can mitigate these risks by national defense capability. The operational-
clearly articulating the PIR and information level commander must make the decision on
requirements they need for their decision making. the information to be shared. In nonhostile
The senior intelligence officer mitigates risk by situations, revealing information gained from
ensuring that facts are distinguished clearly from national assets could compromise US defense
assumptions and not by constraining intelligence capabilities. In multinational operations, the
estimates by preconceived expectations of problem is compounded by questions
preferences. concerning allied internal security.
Another concern is the sheer volume of DISSEMINATION
intelligence that can overwhelm the commander
and his staff. The senior intelligence officer must
manage this volume and clearly separate the key Senior commanders require free and timely
intelligence reports the commander and his staff exchange of intelligence to make decisions with
need from the background intelligence- supporting confidence. Intelligence is timely if it allows the
analysis. A coordinated push mechanism that commander to act at the appropriate time. The
alerts senior army commanders of significant dissemination means and the form employed
changes in the situation must be complemented by affect the timeliness of the dissemination of
intelligence. The timely dissemination of
a pull mechanism that keeps theater, usable and pertinent intelligence is the most
departmental, and national activities focused on important intelligence problem that must be
support to military operations. solved on the battlefield.

Operational logistics consists of logistical next contingency area, restoring the Army's
and other support activities required to total capability, and demobilizing resources.
support the force during campaigns and major
operations within a theater of operations. A force-projection army requires a logistics
Using the LPT process, logisticians at all system that anticipates requirments and
echelons determine the logistics requirements makes use of all available resources,
to support the CINC's campaign plan. Logistics improvising when required. The Army logistics
system relies on local resources, when possible,
plays a dominant role in maintaining force whether they are those of host nations or those
readiness for operations, mobilizing critical contracted or purchased. The system
human and materiel resources, moving the recognizes constraints of time and limits of
force to its intended AO, sustaining the force strategic transportation systems and
throughout the duration of operations, compensates by pre-positioning materiel,
redeploying the force to its peacetime base or either afloat or ashore, in or near likely future

Chapter 5

AOs. It makes use of all resources available, to make up the organizational structure found at
include DA and those of other government this level.
agencies, as well as contractor personnel. Operational-level logistics support may be
complemented by the deployment of USAMC's
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT LSE. The LSE, largely a table of distribution
0F THE FORCE and allowances (TDA) activity, performs any
Operational support of the force extends logistics function not normally performed by
from the theater of operations logistics bases to table of organization and equipment (TOE)
the forward CSS units and facilities. Early in units. It is a self-contained organization that
an operation, logistics planning and may be staffed with any combination of civilian
management cells within the ASCC structure and military personnel required to perform
are used to ensure rapid establishment of specialized tasks. Civilians may be DA or DOD,
battle command of logistics and to determine or they may be contractors who agree to deploy
future support requirements. to support highly sophisticated equipment.
Military personnel are battle-rostered from
As the theater matures, a requirement for other duty assignments or brought in to fulfill
separate, more formal logistical battle special requirements of the LSE. The LSE's
command organizations may exist. Based on unique skills include depot maintenance, oil
the CINC's campaign plan and the operations analysis, calibration of test equipment,
to be conducted, the ASCC determines the ammunition surveillance, release of pre-
nature and scope of the logistical force positioned strategic stocks, materiel fielding,
structure. See FM 100-16 for a detailed technology insertion, and BDA.
description of the logistics function at the
operational level of war. The primary focus of the operational
logistician is on—
Logisticians concentrate on providing
capabilities, not organizations, to fulfill •Reception.
whatever support requirements exist. •Position of facilities.
Logisticians use logistics support bases to
fulfill support requirements as far forward as •Materiel management.
possible. They tailor logistics forces so that the •Movement control.
required capability, and nothing more, is
deployed and employed. Although local •Distribution management.
resources are used, logisticians rely on a •Reconstitution and regeneration.
CONUS-based support source through
communications and reliable transportation •Redeployment.
and distribution systems. As the CINC develops his strategic concept
The theater of operations logistics base, in of operation, he concurrently develops a
performing its theater of operations logistics concept of support in coordination with his
functions, links strategic sustainment to service component commanders. They and
tactical CSS. At the operational level of their staffs consider a myriad of logistics
activity, the familiar distinction between factors that affect the ability of the operational
operations and logistics begins to blur. forces to conduct operations. Among the most
Logistics is synonymous with operations and conspicuous, tangible resources are equipment
becomes a significant undertaking of the ASCC and other materials of war. When resources are
and his staff. Commanders conducting limited, the CINC/ARFOR must prioritize the
operations across the range of military allocation of materiel among his commands,
operations must concern themselves with giving the preponderance of support to forces
operational support. making the main effort and sometimes shifting
Operational logistics is the link between priorities as the campaign unfolds.
the strategic and tactical levels. It At the campaign- and major-operation-
encompasses support required to sustain joint planning levels, logistics is a dominant factor
and multinational campaigns, other military in determining the nature and tempo of
activities, US forces, and forces of friendly operations. Sound logistics planning and
countries or groups within an AO. Military analysis are factors that allow for rapid
units, augmented by DOD civilians, contractor changes to operations plans. Logistics cannot
personnel, and available host nation resources, win a war, but its absence or inadequacy can

FM 100-7

cause defeat. Operational-level activities are required adjustments as the crisis response is
characterized by— refined and the situation evolves. Forces must
•High consumption of military materiel. be tailorable to meet force-projection
requirements that restrict the deployment of
•A great diversity of equipment types. entire CSS organizations. A split-based
•Expansion of the battle area, resulting from logistics concept complements this capability.
the employment of sophisticated weapons, Units must compensate for partial
communications, and sensors by both sides. organizations deployed in tailored packages
and for operating losses through the formation
•Extended lines of operation. of provisional units. These units must be able
•Constrained resources. to surge support at critical times and locations.
The concept of modularity must be built into
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT unit design to facilitate this process.
Senior army commanders must effectively
apply the five CSS characteristics: Improvisation helps units meet CSS needs
anticipation, integration, continuity, with available resources and may call for
responsiveness, and improvisation in planning nonstandard solutions. Improvisation permits
and conducting the tactical CSS functions of solutions to anticipated and real problems
manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving the where no solution has been identified
force, and sustaining soldiers and their previously.
Anticipation ensures CSS operations are
agile and characterized by the demonstration An operational perspective on logistics
of initiative. Requirements must be accurately requires the translation of the five CSS
projected to provide resources at the necessary characteristics into tactical-level applications
time and place. The synchronization of logistics as described by the CSS functions of manning,
with operations is also a part of anticipation. arming, fueling, fixing, moving the force, and
This synchronization requires a versatile and sustaining soldiers and their systems.
mobile organization structure that maintains
an operational perspective. Manning
The manning function provides for unit
Integration and individual replacements. In addition, it
Integration recognizes that CSS is integral provides for personnel readiness management
to the conduct of operations and the two are and casualty management.
mutually supportive. It ensures the agility and
versatility of an operation by providing the Arming
maximum operational freedom. The arming function replenishes arms,
Standardization and interoperability munitions, and equipment in an environment
agreements contribute to integration in the characterized by high consumption rates, the
joint and multinational environment. demands of which are controlled by throughput
distribution and the establishment of
Continuity controlled supply rates.
Continuity provides for the continued flow
of CSS that is essential to successful Fueling
operations. It exploits operational lulls to The fueling function ensures the
restore logistics capabilities depleted during availability of fuels and packaged POL
past operations. Alternative approaches are products for a highly mobile force with the
sought to avoid total reliance on any single potential for high consumption rates
source. demanding a dependable fueling system.
Responsiveness Fixing
Responsiveness provides for rapid reaction The fixing function provides for preserving
during a crisis. The CSS challenge is to make availability of equipment. This function is

Chapter 5

performed as far forward as possible and in contracting support are critical to the
minimum time. Expedited means of recovery, performance of this function.
repair, and return are characteristic of the
function. Sustaining Soldiers and Their Systems
This function has five elements: personnel
Moving the Force service support, health service support, field
services, quality of life, and general supply
This function involves transportation support. Public affairs (PA), religious support,
operations of units and materiel. often, this and legal support operations are elements of
personnel service support. These areas are
function may be done on short notice for large described in Appendix A of this manual, in
forces involved in major shifts of direction. FM 100-10, in FM 100-16, and in branch-
Total asset visibility, in-transit visibility, and specific manuals.


Army Component Operations

This part includes three chapters that discuss Army service component
operations during force projection, operations in war, and MOOTW.

Chapter 6
Force Projection
Codified in the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 1994 and
further developed by the SECDEF, the US military strategy is built
upon the central components of engagement and enlargement.. .“to
enhance our security by maintaining a strong defense capability and
promoting cooperative security measures; work to open foreign
markets and spur global economic growth; and promote democracy
The Army represents a portion of the potential military power of
the nation. That power translates directly to influence the
international system. The US uses military power to compel an
adversary to accede to US will. That potential power deters
opponents from taking actions hostile to US interests. Peaceful
employment of military forces reassures our allies, demonstrates our
capabilities, promotes stability, and contributes to our ability to
influence international outcomes.

A crisis is an incident or situation involving forces are most vulnerable to significant
either an internal or external threat to the US, casualties. Conversely, as closure times extend,
its territories, citizens, military forces, and the duration of a crisis extends, increasing the
possessions or vital interests. A crisis develops risk of casualties.
rapidly and creates a condition of such
diplomatic, economic, or military importance A crisis can occur in peacetime, conflict,
that commitment of US forces and resources is and war. In peacetime, a crisis can be
contemplated to achieve national objectives. precipitated by a natural disaster or civil
disturbance, resulting in a threat to civil
During deliberate planning or CAP, authority. In war, the threat focus can be
commanders prescribe, in TPFDD format, who, directed at the sovereignty of a nation. The
what, when, and where forces will be deployed. extent to which the Army is prepared to
Based on these initiatives and a unit’s ability to respond to a crisis can significantly influence
accurately identify its movement the eventual outcome.
requirements, USTRANSCOM then identifies
how the unit will move to meet National Adaptive planning is required to ensure
Military Strategy objectives. favorable outcomes. At the theater level, the
CINC is responsible for developing a range of
With the knowledge that extended force response options. These response options are
closure times may directly increase the domestic not limited to the military instrument of
and coalition support risks for a particular national power but include economic,
crisis, commanders rigorously discipline their diplomatic, and informational alternatives. The
strategic lift requirements to that needed for the requirement for interagency cooperation and
operation. During the deployment process, US multinational considerations is evident.

Chapter 6

Deterrence is preferable to war. Effective Sometimes, deterrent actions do not prevent

deterrence can prevent escalation of a crisis. the continued escalation of a crisis. The CINC
Deterrent action can resolve a crisis on favorable requires an Army capability to rapidly project
terms. When the opportunity exists, the use of a combat-ready forces. The goal of these forces is to
deterrent action, such as a show of force, can send deter conflict or, should deterrence fail, to win
a clear signal of US resolve to intervene should the quickly, decisively, and with minimum casualties.
threat of unfavorable crisis resolution continue. This Army requirement demands a deployable,
lethal, versatile, expansible, and sustainable force.

A contingency is the employment of contingency operations can occur in the
military forces in response to a crisis caused by environments of peacetime, conflict, and war.
natural disaster, terrorists, subversives, or A contingency may be a unique, stand-
required military operations. Due to the alone event in response to a natural disaster or
uncertainty of the situation, contingencies a man-made event or change in the direction
require rapid planning, response, and (branch) of an evolving campaign or major
development of special procedures to ensure operation. Within a campaign or major
the safety and readiness of personnel, operation, a branch is a contingency plan for
installations, and equipment. Like crises, the deviation of operations from the planned

line. It is a result of chance or uncertain events •Quick resolution (win early with minimal
that are identified as crisis triggers. casualties).
Senior army commanders assess their •Major impact of national and international
operations. During this assessment, they news coverage.
anticipate the probability of an occurrence of a
particular contingency, and they develop plans •Effective instant communications with
(OPLAN or CONPLAN) to respond to that attendant interest by the NCA and senior
contingency. If a crisis occurs, the commander service leadership in any operation.
updates the OPLAN or CONPLAN and
converts it into an OPORD for execution. The •Effective theater air and missile defenses to
characteristics of a contingency operation provide force protection and ensure the
include crisis situations, NCA involvement security of lodgment areas and protection of
with US national interests at stake, and US and multinational forces and interests.
operations that require a rapid military
response. •Under the national strategy, the
requirement for possible redeployment with
UNIQUE REQUIREMENTS subsequent employment in another theater.
Army commanders must understand and
address additional requirements that are RESPONSIBILITIES
unique to contingencies. Rapid deployment, The Army has a major responsibility to
crisis action, and time-sensitivity make execute a variety of contingency operations.
contingency operations unique. Contingency This responsibility requires the commander
operations are usually joint undertakings and his staff to exercise operational art in
conducted within the framework of the UCP. applying joint and Army doctrine in a highly
Once forces are deployed, the execution of charged, time-sensitive environment. This
specific missions remains similar to normal ability is of particular importance to the ASCC
military operations in the peacetime, conflict, in theater.
or war environments. Successful contingency
operations, as in all military operations, While the tactical combat operation may be
require detailed planning and aggressive, somewhat limited in duration, scope, and
synchronized execution. intensity, the ASCC, in conjunction with the
CINC and the other component commanders,
IMPORTANT sequences military operations that are not
CHARACTERISTICS necessarily combat operations to achieve the
desired end state. This sequencing includes
Some particularly important characteristics close coordination with DOS to ensure that
of this type of operation include— military operations support diplomatic
•Early response. objectives after completion of tactical combat
•Rapid projection of military power.
The ASCC in theater has the following
•Forcible-entry capability. responsibilities relating to contingency operations:
•Forces tailored to the situation. •Training and sustaining the force to conduct
•Unambiguous command relationships. operations required by the CINC.
•Thorough coordination among all forces •Installing, operating, and maintaining
(joint and multinational) and interagency signal capabilities that are interoperable
organizations. with joint, multinational, and/or
•Timely, detailed intelligence. interagency systems. To ensure
interoperability, the ASCC may have to
•Lethality for early entry forces—hold enemy provide signal capabilities to the allies
forces at risk, protect the force, deter. within the multinational force.
•Strict OPSEC. •Exercising OPCON of assigned and
•Sensitivity to the diplomatic implications of attached forces and exercising operational
the military operation. direction of supporting forces.

Chapter 6

•Coordinating with other component required tasks, the NCA, CJCS, and CINC
commanders to ensure effective and choose an appropriate command structure.
efficient conduct of operations. They may select any of the six COCOM options
•Monitoring the operational situation and (discussed previously in Chapter 2) for the
organization of forces. Having selected the
passing information to the CJTF (JFC). command structure, they select a commander.
•Planning and conducting operations In this chapter, the JTF option is used for
according to JFC guidance and detailed illustrative purposes. The CINC and ASCC
plans. determine the composition of the ARFOR of the
JTF. Several options exist for the Army
•Ensuring administrative and logistics structure in a JTF. The commander of the
support as required and as directed by the ARFOR OPCON to the JTF determines the
JFC. best option based upon an assessment of the
•Establishing liaison with the JFC and other operational environment.
joint organizations, multinational
organizations, NGOs and PVOs, or Single Army Headquarters
government agencies. to a Joint Task Force
•Coordinating with supporting commanders The commander of ARFOR, in conjunction
to redeploy the force effectively to home with the JFC, may organize them under a
stations or to another theater. single Army headquarters responsible for the
three Army tasks: joint, multinational, NGO
•Planning and coordinating with supporting and PVO, and interagency linkage; operations;
organizations to reconstitute effectively the and internal support. He selects this option
force. This may require the use of when the mission is simple, limited ARFOR are
operational project stocks. involved, and/or the threat is relatively small.
(See Figure 6- 1). The three tasks include joint
•Coordinating effective support of the media and multinational coordination. In this
and use of PA assets. example, we have omitted the multinational
•Ensuring the units comply with federal, coordination requirement because we assume
state, and local (to include host nation) that the JTF is composed of US forces.
environmental and pollution abatement This single Army headquarters may be a
requirements. corps headquarters or smaller echelon of
command. While the corps and division, as
organizations, may be able to accomplish these
ORGANIZATIONAL OPTIONS missions, they are not currently staffed or
The NCA tasks a combatant commander trained to assume these and other operational-
with the responsibilities in a particular crisis level missions. Therefore, both would require
as outlined in Chapter 2. Based upon the substantial additional training, personnel, and

FM 100-7

C resources to be effective. Once the corps is •Transportation and distribution of Class I,
designated as the ARFOR to a JTF, the corps III, V, and VIII supplies.
commander is subordinated to the CJTF or the •Real estate and contract support.
establishing headquarters and must look to
him for guidance, strategic direction, and •Theater topography support.
missions for the force. In turn, the CJTF
exercises OPCON or TACON of assigned or •General engineering and real property
attached forces. This includes the maintenance activities (RPMA).
responsibility to train the joint force if the JTF
was developed during a deliberate planning The corps/division would assume this
process to support existing OPLANs. Although support responsibility as the Army executive
the ARFOR of the JTF is responsible for agency under agreements and memorandums
operations and the direct support of his forces, of understanding previously established
the ASCC retains responsibility to provide between services.
overall support to all ARFOR, to include the External augmentation of staff sections, to
forces in the JTF. As the ARFOR to the JTF, include equipment, is2 required to properly
the corps and division staffs require training perform the ARFOR C tasks. Augmentation is
on— required for—
•JOPES. •Operational planning and control.
•Management of TPFDD. •Establishment of a JOPES cell.
•Operational-level functions. •Diplomatic military planning activities.
•Theater movement control. •Signal support.
As the ARFOR, the corps or division maybe •Intelligence support.
tasked to assume specific operational-level
Army responsibilities within its AO. Under •Liaison teams.
such circumstances, the corps or division would
not only be responsible for all Army units but •PA support.
could also be responsible for providing support •Historical data collection of lessons learned.
to all services for—
•Mortuary affairs. The ARFOR’s intelligence connection to
theater and national assets must be deployed
•Casualty operations. early into a theater. The deployable
•Postal operations. intelligence support element (DISE)
accomplishes this. The DISE is a small,
•Finance. scalable, deployable element. It is the initial
•Signal support. forward intelligence team of split-based
operations. The DISE is tailored tactically from
•Environmental protection and cleanup. MI units according to the factors of METT-T,
•NBC decontamination. lift, and pre-positioned assets.
•Rear area protection. The mission of the DISE is to provide the
deployed commander accurate, detailed,
•Base security. continuous, and timely intelligence to support

Chapter 6

the rapid entry of US forces across the range of procedures for releasing information regarding
military operations. Its communications ongoing operations. The ARFOR’s public
processing and downlink assets are linked to a affairs officer (PAO) should manage all media
national and theater intelligence support base and public requests for information. The JFC/
located in CONUS or outside the AO. The two ARFOR must develop procedures and
types of tailorable DISE configurations are guidelines that provide releasable information
mini-DISE (manpack) and DISE (vehicular). to the media within security, accuracy,
Together these DISE configurations provide propriety, privacy, and safety considerations of
the commander a robust intelligence capability the ongoing operation.
to support deploying forces. The DISE provides
split-based communications, broadcast
intelligence, and intelligence processing. Two or More Army Forces
to a Joint Task Force
Additionally, the ARFOR must plan and
operate effectively with the media. The impact The JFC may desire direct control of
of the media on the conduct of operations is several separate Army ground operations. He
substantially greater today than in any establishes, with the advice of the ASCC in
previous time. The capability of the news theater, two or more separate ARFOR
media to transmit ongoing operations activities headquarters that are directly subordinate to
to news networks globally cannot be the JTF (see Figure 6-2). Each of these
discounted. This new technology requires the separate Army headquarters would maintain
JFC/ARFOR to establish points of contact and the three Army tasks of joint, multinational,

FM 100-7

and, perhaps, interagency coordination; The performance of the three tasks is a

operations; and internal support. The JFC constant requirement within the operational-
might use this particular option when— level environment. Under these circumstances,
multiple commanders could share the tasks.
•The operation is relatively simple. The ASCC would retain traditional
•Several large Army organizations are responsibilities as discussed previously. The
involved. responsibility for the conduct of operations at
the operational-level could then be taken on by
•Two or more lines of operation exist. the ARFOR commander within the task force,
assuming that the operation is of sufficient size
•The threat is located in two or more different and scope to require an operational and not
geographic areas. solely tactical perspective. The requirement for
joint, multinational, and, perhaps, interagency
•The situation allows the JFC to focus on linkage would become a task that must be
several dispersed ground operations performed by both commanders.
without diffusing his joint responsibilities. This alignment of the responsibilities,
though not expected to be a normal structuring,
Separate Support and shows the flexibility of the design to meet a
Army Forces Headquarters wide range of potential operational conditions.
The Army might organize under this option
As the situation grows more complex, the when—
JFC and the ASCC may organize ARFOR to •The operation is extremely complex.
resemble a miniature theater organization. In
this organization, one headquarters would •More than one Army combat force
focus on operations, while a separate headquarters exists.
headquarters would focus on support
responsibilities (see Figure 6-3). These •The Army has a significant support
circumstances align with the chain of command responsibility to other services/
discussed in Chapter 2. multinational forces.

Chapter 6

•Two or more lines of support exist. multinational, and interagency coordination;

•Additional theater support organizations operations; and support. Under these
circumstances, the multinational and
make a forward support element too large to interagency coordination task could require a
control effectively without dedicated significant resource increase. He may consider
command effort. delegating some of the authority for his Army
•The JTF requires a significant support effort tasks to subordinate commanders.
that exceeds normal corps support This JFC may build his joint organization
capabilities. from an existing Army organization—a corps
headquarters or a numbered army. Today’s
Army Commander as a Joint Force corps will most likely find itself conducting
Functional Component Commander force-projection operations as part of a tailored
The JFC may organize forces functionally joint force and may be assigned the role of
serving as a JTF headquarters. The unit can be
under a single headquarters. As a norm, the designated as the JTF headquarters at any
service commander with the predominant time during either the deliberate planning
number of forces is tasked to provide the process or during CAP if the nature of the
controlling headquarters. The JFLCC may mission so warrants. The Army JFC may
build his organization from an existing organize his subordinate Army units based
structure and augment it with joint staff billets upon the three options presented in
for needed expertise. The Army force Figures 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3.
commander, as the functional component
commander, would retain his responsibilities Once the corps is designated as a JTF, the
for joint, multinational, and interagency corps commander, as the CJTF, is
linkage operations and internal support of subordinated to the combatant commander (or
ARFOR. See Figure 6-4. In those cases where the establishing headquarters) and must look
the Army force commander is not designated as to him for guidance, strategic direction, and
the functional component commander, he still missions for the force. In turn, the CJTF
retains responsibility for internal support. exercises OPCON or TACON of assigned or
attached forces. This includes the
Army Commander as the Commander responsibility to train the joint force if the JTF
of a Joint Task Force was developed during a deliberate planning
process to support existing OPLANs.
When the contingency is predominately a
land operation, the CINC may designate an The CJTF must determine what
Army commander as the JFC. This JFC has augmentation requirements are needed for the
considerable requirements placed upon him in task at hand and coordinate support through
addition to his three Army tasks of joint, the establishing headquarters. Augmentation
FM 100-7

of the corps staff is essential in transitioning corps, as a JTF, can conduct either tactical- or
the corps to a JTF structure. Augmentation can operational-level planning and missions. The
be organized using a modular concept to mission, not the size of the force, determines
address the various staff entities such as— the level at which the JTF functions. Once fully
•Command and staff (joint staff and special engaged at one level, the corps cannot be
staff). expected to assume the additional functions
and command responsibilities that correspond
•Headquarters support and sustainment (life to the other. Still, the corps commander must
support functions). fully understand both tactical- and
•Signal support. operational-level environments to ensure a
•Security support for the JTF headquarters. supportive relationship exists between his
plans and operations and those of subordinate
•Augmentation in technical areas such as and higher headquarters.
CA, PSYOP, and so on (Joint Pub 5-00.2). The commander thinks not only in terms of
Although augmentation must be tailored military resources but also considers those
for the specific situation and is different for interagency, diplomatic, economic, and other
every mission, some augmentation is almost resources that may be available and
always required in— appropriate for the task at hand. The CJTF
must understand the strategic and regional
•Intelligence collection. environments, to include US policies, treaty
•Joint planning procedures. commitments, status of forces agreements
•Logistics planning. (SOFA), coalition parties’ interests, and so on.
These influences affect campaign and
•Signal support, especially Army Global operational planning and the establishment of
Command and Control System (AGCCS) ROE for the force.
access. The Army JFC must have the additional
•Medical planning. flexibility to assume the joint coordination role
and may choose to augment organic support
Augmentation in these areas assists in units with additional divisional, corps, or
ensuring linkage between the JTF staff and the operational-level support organizations. As
combatant command joint staff, especially such, subordinate Army combat force
concerning access to information and commanders would concentrate on operations
capabilities available at the combatant while the JFC conducts a large portion of the
command level. joint, multinational, and interagency
The corps cannot function simultaneously coordination and operations support tasks
at both the tactical and operational levels. The (internal and external). See Figure 6-5.

Chapter 6

The Army JFC could retain these coordination support personnel at a ground location (see
and support tasks when the operation is largely an Figure 6-6). The CJTF and staff—
Army ground operation, the other services play a
support role to the Army, or the Army JFC has Plan operations of the JTF in accordance
sufficient resources in his organization to with operational direction from the
accomplish these additional missions. establishing authority.
Establishing Authority Direct, control, and coordinate operations of
assigned forces.
The authority who establishes the JTF
designates the JFC, assigns the missions, Coordinate planning activities of
prescribes the broad concept of operations, subordinate forces.
allocates the forces, and defines the command
relationships. Generally, the establishing Under supervision of the joint staff,
authority designates the JFC from within his own establish, when required, joint boards and
headquarters or from the preponderant service agencies to plan, control, and coordinate the
within the joint force. The establishing authority use of joint assets in specific functional
may direct formation of a joint staff from his own areas, for example, the JTCB.
staff, or he may direct the JFC to form the JTF
staff from his own resources and augment it as Coordinate with other joint and
necessary from other service or component multinational forces, the UN, other
headquarters within the designated JTF. government agencies not assigned, and
NGOs and PVOs.
Headquarters Functions •Coordinate with other national forces anchor
The Army JFC organizes the JTF foreign governments when required by the
headquarters to accomplish assigned establishing authority.
missions. This headquarters may vary from a
small group aboard a ship to a large staff and •Coordinate signal support.

FM 100-7

Planning. During the deliberate planning •A joint meteorological forecasting unit

process, the CINC may designate the ASCC as (JMFU) to provide weather support.
a JTF or ARFOR planning agent. The ASCC
director of plans coordinates the planning As a matter of principle, training remains a
effort. The Army staff planners develop JTF national responsibility. To ensure the units are
and ARFOR plans in each functional area,
using Joint Pubs 5-00.1 and 5-00.2 as guides. able to execute their assigned missions and be
Each Army staff planner coordinates as operationally ready, the leaders must know
required with functional area counterparts in and understand the capabilities and
the joint community. Planners should limitations of the other nations’ units. The
understand and consider RSI during planning. enhanced mutual understanding of the
When agencies outside the Army must capabilities and limitations is to minimize the
contribute to the planning effort, the Army differences and optimize effectiveness. To that
force’s director of operations, or G3, requests end, all command levels must conduct training,
support from the appropriate agency. This which should include the JFC’s ideas and
planning process develops the base OPLANs desired outcomes. These concepts, specified by
and CONPLANs modified for execution during content (basic tasks), scope (condition), and
contingencies. objectives (standard), are an essential basis for
effective training. Training should be
During CAP, the director of plans directs coordinated and integrated where feasible.
the planning effort until he receives an Coordination is required among respective
execution order. After he receives the execution participants to ensure mutual understanding
order, the G3 completes execution planning and compliance. Although the J3 must monitor
and conducts operations. The G3 (plans) begins and evaluate the training status of all units,
future planning, normally focusing on the next the actual evaluation of the training status and
major operation or phase. The JOPES operational readiness of the respective units
publications (Joint Pub 5-03 series) provide remains a national responsibility. The
planning policies, procedures, formats, and standards and criteria used for evaluation
guidance for joint operations. should be published and understood by all
Operations and Training. When designated as
the joint force headquarters, the ASCC deputy
chief of staff for operations (DCSOPS) Special Operations. At the theater level a
organizes the J3 section, receives special operations theater support element
augmentation from other services, establishes (SOTSE) performs special operations staff
the JOC, and initiates CAP. The J3 assists in functions at the Army service component
planning, coordinating, and executing JTF command headquarters. At corps level, a
operations. The J3 normally organizes a battle special operations coordination element
staff with representatives of all the (SOCOORD) serves as a functional staff
directorates within a JOC in order to provide element of the G3. The SOCOORD is the
consolidated oversight. When the joint staff mechanism by which a corps plans for and
does not have a J5 (plans), the J3 performs obtains SOF support. As such, it has staff
long-range or future planning. However, the J3 responsibility for SF and ranger integration in
has a plans cell to conduct near-term planning each of the battle operating systems’ functional
of branches to the current operation. Besides areas and serves as a focal point for SF and
the JOC, the J3 also may supervise— ranger support to the corps staff.
•A JTCB to coordinate targeting guidance The SOCOORD develops SOF target
and objectives and to develop the joint nominations and mission requirements for the
target list. corps to forward to the JFC. These
•A joint rescue coordination center (JRCC), developments result in mission taskings from
although the CJTF may task a subordinate the JTCB to the JFSOCC, who assigns
service force commander to perform this missions to appropriate SOF units. Service
function. distinctions of SOF are transparent. The
nature of the requirement and the total force
•A joint information warfare staff composed capability determines whether Army special
of component representatives and operations forces (ARSOF) or another element
representatives of the J2 and J6. of SOF is tasked to meet a given requirement.

Chapter 6

Communications. When designated as the joint resources, identifying and integrating

force headquarters, the ASCC’s theater signal additional intelligence resources such as the
officer organizes a J6 staff, receives JIC, and applying national intelligence
augmentation from other services, and capabilities. He works with subordinate service
establishes a joint communications control G2s (S2s) to develop complementary
center (JCCC) as required. Joint Pub 6-0 intelligence operations that support the CJTF’s
discusses the responsibilities and functions of requirements.
the J6. A key function among these The JTF JIC is the primary J2 organization
responsibilities is network management. The4 supporting the JFC and the ARFOR. The JIC
JCCC exercises staff supervision over C facilitates efficient access to the entire DOD
control centers belonging to deployed intelligence system. The composition and focus
components and subordinate commands, Joint of each JIC varies according to the
Pub 6-05.1 describes the JCCC and its commander’s needs, but each is capable of
functions. performing indications and warnings (I&W)
Alternate communications means are and collecting, managing, and disseminating
essential. During planning, the primary means current intelligence. Through the JIC,
is the Worldwide Military Command and ARFORs coordinate support from the Air
Control System (WWMCCS). (Once fielded, the Force, Navy, and Marine Corps and national,
Global Command and Control System (GCCS) interagency, and multinational sources.
replaces WWMCCS.) Communications In addition to its other functions (I&W,
networks include the four major networks of situation development, target development,
the DCS: BDA, IPB, and force protection intelligence
•Defense Switched Network (DSN). development), the JIC coordinates the
•Secure Voice System (SVS). acquisition of national intelligence between the
JTF and the CINC’s staff. The CINC posts
•Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN— special intelligence teams to the AOR. These
the future defense message system). teams are OPCON to the JFC and under staff
•Defense Data Network (DDN). supervision of the JTF J2. They may include
DIA, the US Army Intelligence and Security
Initially, tactical satellites (TACSAT) may be Command, or the National Security Agency.
the only means of secure communication with Staff weather augmentation, as required, is
operational forces, under staff supervision of the JTF J2. The JTF
The Army JFC establishes alternate J2, through the JIC, establishes and supervises
communication means as soon as possible. The required functional intelligence organizations
JTF, ASCC, and ARFOR headquarters that may include a—
establish communications during Phase I of •Joint interrogation facility (JIF).
contingency operations. Organic signal •Joint captured materiel exploitation center
organizations provide signal support and
identify and forward shortfalls to the JCCC for (JCMEC).
resolution. The JCCC requests JCS-controlled •Joint documents exploitation center
contingency communications assets as (JDEC).
•Joint imagery processing center (JIPC).
Intelligence. When tasked as a joint force The JTF J2 requests a cryptologic support
headquarters, the ARFOR G2 organizes a JTF
J2 section, incorporating other service group (CSG) and an associated mobile
augmentation and establishing a JIC from cryptological support facility (MCSF) or
organic assets. The other services may equivalent SIGINT communications package
augment the JIC as required. The JTF J2 is from the CINC. The CSG works from within
responsible for determining the requirements the JIC.
and direction of the intelligence effort to Successful IEW support during force-
support the CJTF’s objectives. He assists the projection operations relies on continuous
CJTF in ensuring that intelligence objectives peacetime information collection and
are correct, understood, prioritized, intelligence production. Peacetime IEW
synchronized, and acted upon. The J2 is also operations support contingency planning and
responsible for employing joint intelligence develop baseline knowledge of threats and

FM 100-7

environments. These operations engage and the JTF engineer is designated a special
challenge the intelligence battlefield operating staff officer and assigned these duties).
system to respond effectively to commanders’
contingency planning intelligence •A joint civil-military engineering board
requirements. During peacetime operations, (JCMEB) to provide overall direction for
commanders closely examine MI force civil-military construction efforts and
structures, operations, and training, which development of a civil engineering support
ultimately leads to a combat-ready IEW force plan (again, the JTF engineer may manage
capable of successfully supporting force- this activity).
projection operations.
•A joint medical regulating office (JMRO) to
IEW operations planners must anticipate, coordinate the movement of patients in and
identify, consider, and evaluate potential out of the assigned AOR.
threats to the force as a whole throughout •A joint military blood program office
force-projection operations. For smooth
transition to hostilities, intelligence staffs (JMBPO) to coordinate the distribution of
must coordinate collection and whole blood within the AOR.
communications plans before the crisis occurs. •A joint central graves registration office
MI units continually update their contingency (JCGRO) to handle mortuary affairs
plans to reflect the evolving situation, (normally tasked to the ARFOR).
especially during crisis situations.
Immediately before deployment, intelligence Logistical considerations permeate the
activities update or top off deploying forces planning effort. These considerations are
with the most recent intelligence on the AO. MI essential conditions and objectives in each
units continuously update technical data bases phase of a plan or operation. The proper type of
and situation graphics. service support units must deploy early for port
opening, reception, staging, and onward
Logistics. The J4 (logistics) plans, coordinates, movement of incoming units; to support
and supervises supply, maintenance, initially arriving forces; and to prepare
transportation, general engineering, health lodgment for rapid force buildup. The CINC
services, and other related logistics activities. must decide whether to establish an in-theater
Each service component of the combatant COMMZ. In most force-projection contingency
command is responsible for the logistics operations such a capability is not present. A
support of its respective forces, except when the COMMZ is required if the operational
CJTF designates a single-service responsibility environment assessment identifies a
for a particular logistics function. The CJTF requirement to stockpile support and logistics
establishes logistics priorities for the force, in theater.
assigns terrain and facilities for use as support Logistics planners should anticipate
bases, and designates and maintains LOCs. circumstances that could threaten logistics
support capabilities. The plan should provide
The J4 supervises the activities of any for alternative COAs as external and internal
logistics-related coordinating centers and circumstances threaten the support capability.
boards that may be required. These may As circumstances warrant, the Army and JFC
include— plan for operational replenishment to protect
•A joint movement center (JMC) that or regenerate combat power that has been
coordinates strategic movement with dissipated in the conduct of operations. See
USTRANSCOM and ensures effective use of Joint Pub 4-0 and FM 100-16 for a detailed
transportation assets. discussion of theater logistics doctrine.
•A subarea petroleum office (SAPO) formed Influencing Factors
around elements from the combatant Whatever the organizational option
command’s joint petroleum office (JPO) to chosen, the Army commander must have the
augment the JTF in managing petroleum- capability to fulfill the tasks assigned him by
related logistics. the Army and the JFC. If assigned both the
joint coordination and external support tasks,
•A joint facilities utilization board (JFUB) to in addition to his operations tasks, the ARFOR
manage real estate requirements (unless commander must coordinate directly with the

Chapter 6

required joint agencies and those Army functions. As AR FOR are designated to
logistics organizations that are part of the participate in force-projection contingency
force-projection contingency operation. operations, the commander must consider that
The resources and capabilities of Army resource availability, media impact, US public
units correspond to their design and the will, the geopolitical structure/support, and the
missions they perform. Units designed for dynamics of the contingency environment may
tactical operations do not have an operational restrict his selection of optimal organizational
capability as an inherent part of that tactical structures. The commander selects lesser design
design. The three operational tasks are options because of restraints, constraints, and
predicated upon a unit design that provides the the evolving nature of the operational
capability to perform the operational functions environment.
described herein. Echelons at, division level and Logistics units are particularly suitable for
below have a tactical design and no inherent modular design so that entire units are not
capability to perform the operational-level required to perform specified functions.
functions discussed in Chapter 5. Logistics units are also suitable for performing
At corps level, more flexibility exists and split-based operations, where only essential
augmentation can be used to correct specific cells are deployed while the base organization
design shortcomings for conducting operations performs its function in CONUS or from a
at the operational level. The ASCC and forward-presence location elsewhere. Split-
numbered army are designed specifically for based operations are feasible only when
operational-level operations. The corps, communications and automation are assured.
however, when engaged in tactical operations, As circumstances evolve, final design of the
cannot perform simultaneously at both the Army force must reflect the tactical and
tactical and operational levels. Though the corps operational requirements. Where an
commander must maintain an operational operational requirement exists, the CJTF must
perspective, full-scale tactical operations allocate ARFOR from the appropriate echelon
preclude the performance of operational to perform those functions.

Contingency operations are undertaken in force has closed. At minimum, commanders
response to a crisis. That crisis can occur in and staffs must consider the—
isolation, as would be the expected case in •Coordination of sequencing and phasing of
MOOTW. But a crisis also can occur during the forces (combat, CS, and CSS).
conduct of a major operation during hostilities.
Viewing the contingency operation as a series •Requirement and time frame to establish
of stages serves to sequence operations. When and build up the theater base.
the contingency occurs during the conduct of a •Protection of forces, to include rear area
major operation, the stages assist in both operations (rear area rapid reaction force).
resolving the crisis and in returning the
contingency forces back into the ongoing •Preparation time for deployment,
operation as rapidly as possible. operational readiness—types of units and
The eight stages of a force projection— their readiness, and so forth.
mobilization, predeployment activities, •CINC’s critical items list in the TPFDD flow.
deployment, entry, decisive operations,
postconflict/postcrisis operations, •Requirement and level of in-theater stocks.
redeployment, and demobilization— provide the •Host nation capability and availability.
general structure for a contingency operation
and can be adjusted to fit the needs of a Any particular contingency may not
particular contingency (FM 100-5). Execution include all of the general stages. For example,
of these stages may not be distinct. a contingency operation may be the first phase
Predeployment activities and deployment, for of an evolving major operation. Redeployment
example, might be so closely followed by forced of all forces may not begin until the end of the
entry and initial operations as to be indistinct. subsequent phases of the major operation, of
Operations might begin well before the entire which the contingency was a single phase.

FM 100-7
Mobilization is the process that permits the inherent dynamics of the contingency
augmentation of the active force. The Army environment, considerable effort may be
Mobilization and Operations Planning and involved in gaining clarity on the military end
Execution System (AMOPES) is the guide for state. The military end state may include those
planning and participating in the JOPES. The diplomatic considerations that inevitably
five levels of mobilization are selective accompany contingencies over which the Army
mobilization, Presidential selected reserve call- commander may have little direct control.
up, partial mobilization, full mobilization, and
total mobilization. These options need not be The CINC assigns the ways and means for
executed sequentially and are part of the mission accomplishment. His ASCC advises
graduated mobilization response. Units him on Army requirements to employ effective
mobilize through five phases: planning, alert, and efficient Army means. The NCA and the
home station, mobilization station, and port of CINC assign the ways, in the form of
embarkation. FM 100-17 discusses constraints and restrictions, to the ARFOR
mobilization in detail. commander. For example, the CINC may direct
the seizure of objectives with psychological,
rather than military, significance and may
STAGE II establish specific ROE. Once the ARFOR
PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES commander clearly understands the ends,
This is a critical stage of a contingency ways, and means for the contingency, he begins
force-projection operation for which units the planning process in earnest or adjusts
throughout the total force train. The ASCC exiting plans.
recommends to the CINC the size and
composition of the ARFOR required to support Based on the CINC’s concept of operations,
the mission, including forces that support the ASCC reviews all existing OPLANs and
assembly and deployment of the force. CONPLANs for suitability. He updates and
Additionally, the ASCC identifies the lift adjusts these plans to develop an OPORD.
requirements to move the ARFOR and Existing CONPLANs and lessons learned from
requirements for reception and onward the joint and Army repositories (Joint
movement upon arrival in the theater of Universal Lessons Learned System [JULLS]
operations. The ASCC’s recommendation is and the Center for Army Lessons Learned
based on the assessment of the operational [CALL]) should be the starting point when
environment. That assessment is revised to conducting crisis planning. If no suitable plan
reflect the dynamics of the operational exists, the Army commander OPCON to the
environment. JTF develops OPORDs, using the time-
sensitive or CAP procedures outlined in Joint
The JTF ARFOR commander maintains Pub 5-03.1.
the Army’s operational-level perspective
within the JTF for the contingency. The The ARFOR commander develops his
attainment of strategic or operational contingency OPORDs based on the maximum
objectives requires sequencing of Army capability the enemy can generate. In a crisis
military operations. In force-projection caused by a natural disaster, the enemy
contingency operations, ARFOR commanders becomes the threat to human life and safety
must keep this operational perspective, even if and the potential for damage to the
they conduct separate tactical operations environment. The AR FOR commander
directly for the JFC. The overall attainment of conducts parallel, but more detailed, execution
the strategic objective may require military planning with the JFC and normally issues a
operations not limited to combat missions. supporting Army OPORD with detailed
These sequenced military operations require instructions to subordinates. The concurrent
an operational-level perspective over time. planning occurs at all Army echelons involved
The JFC’s primary Army advisor for this in the contingency.
perspective is the ARFOR commander assigned The ARFOR commander issues immediate
to the JTF. This commander provides warning orders to all subordinate units.
operational-level perspective to the JFC during Because of the time-sensitive nature of
planning, deployment, employment, and contingency operations and the crisis-action
redeployment. During planning, the ARFOR system, information must get to the
commander must receive a clear definition of appropriate unit as rapidly as it becomes
the desired end state from the JFC. Because of available. Subordinate units must recognize

Chapter 6

that they may not receive complete OPORDs

from their higher headquarters until late.
Subordinate OPLANs based upon earlier
warning orders must be flexible enough to
adapt to the evolving contingency operations.
Therefore, horizontal and vertical coordination
must occur between staffs so that plans can be
made concurrently. Liberal use of warning
orders should be used so subordinate
commanders can begin work.
Certain planning considerations are
critical during this stage. Anticipatory logistics
requires appropriate commanders to project
support requirements and synchronize support
actions with tactical organizations. This action
is necessary to ensure combat power can be
sustained or reconstituted as required. The
ARFOR commander identifies potential
consequences to ensure that the JFC makes
knowledgeable decisions on lift prioritization.
Finally, as with all operations, OPSEC must
not be sacrificed, despite the urgency of the
crisis situation.
An important task facing the ARFOR
commander is the organization of his staff and
the Army augmentation of the JFC’s staff to
support the planning and execution of the
contingency operation. The makeup of the JTF
staff should reflect the composition of the
operational forces. If the JFC’s mission is
largely an Army mission, Army personnel
should predominate the staff. The Army
contribution to the JTF may include light,
armored, or special operations forces.
The Army augmentation package given to
the JTF staff should reflect the proportional
balance of the JTF force package. If the joint
staff is not sufficiently and appropriately
augmented, the ARFOR commander must
spend more effort advising the JFC on the
capabilities and limitations of the Army force.
Therefore, ARFOR likely to conduct
contingency operations should have designated
augmentation cells (discussed earlier in this
chapter) that automatically push forward to
support JTFs. See Figure 6-7.

The initial response force is the product of
a combination of many factors. It reflects the
mission of the JTF and the Army’s
corresponding tasks, along with the lift that
has been made available to conduct the
necessary strategic and operational movement.

FM 100-7

Other factors include the capabilities of the protection of the lodgment area. TBM, CM,
host nation to support ARFOR on either a long- ASM, and UAV threats could seriously disrupt
or short-term basis. Finally, the contributions or compromise the security of lodgment
of alliance or coalition forces shape the initial operations. Based on the threat and
response by ARFOR. The supported CINC’s availability of joint and/or multinational ADA
decision on the composition of this force systems, early entry forces tailor the ADA force
requires the ASCC to project future events. The packages that are deployed initially. An ADA
Army force commander seeks to maintain task force is deployed to protect selected
versatility, a flexible force mix, and the ability enclaves. This stage ends with the
to generate superior combat power, establishment of a secure airhead and/or
sustainability, and the necessary internal lift beachhead. See Figure 6-8.
ENTRY OPERATIONS A rapid buildup of force capability is the
The execution stage—entry operations— focus of this stage. This buildup includes
encompasses the occupation of the initial establishing a forward-operating base, closing
lodgments in the operations area. In this stage the remainder of the force, expanding the
the capability for force is generated. Initially, lodegment, linking up with other joint forces,
that capability does not go far beyond self- and establishing multinational and
sustainment. The ARFOR commander interagency linkages. Decisive combat power is
sequences his resources into the operations
area to create the conditions for decisive
operations. This sequencing includes joint
mobility of operational forces that seek to gain
a positional advantage early.
Two alternative approaches exist to
establishing positional advantage. The first is a
long-term approach that focuses on building
the force capability over time. Once sufficient
capability is available, the ARFOR commander
tries to resolve the cause of the crisis. In the
second approach, rapid crisis resolution is
sought through the positioning of initially
deploying forces into the critical location. By
rapidly positioning forces with the requisite
capability, the crisis may be resolved earlier.
However, the Army might have to conduct
forcible entry operations. This approach has a
high payoff. Risk is the price for such potential.
The ARFOR commander coordinates the
movement of intertheater or intratheater
forces into the operations area. Opposed-entry
combat activities may take place during this
stage. The ARFOR commander deploys
operations and support forces2 into the
contingency area and establishes C to provide
initial lodgments. While the focus during this
phase is the deployment of forces, operations
may be required to secure simultaneous entry
zones that ensure force protection into the
contingency area.
An effective air defense should be
established in the lodgment area as rapidly as
possible. Air defense is critical for the

Chapter 6

positioned to resolve the crisis rapidly by

synchronizing and simultaneously engaging
enemy forces throughout the depth and space
of the operational area.
Force protection becomes increasingly
important during the operations stage.
Reconnaissance assets are focused to provide
the ARFOR commander with an accurate
picture of the enemy force actions and
intentions. OPSEC ensures the protection of
the force in part by preventing the enemy
reconnaissance from gaining similar
information on friendly forces. Deception
operations complement OPSEC by painting a
false picture of the friendly force’s intentions.
Effective air defense and TMD remain a
priority during this phase of the operation.
In MOOTW, decisive operations contain
similarities and differences from the principles
that guide operations in war. The principles of
objective, unity of effort, legitimacy,
perseverance, restraint, and security guide
actions in MOOTW. Figure 6-9 describes areas
for consideration during conduct of operations.

During the previous stage, the ARFOR
commander completes the Army contribution
toward attaining those operational objectives
to resolve the crisis that instigated the
contingency operation. Postconflict operations
secure the strategic objectives. Planning for
postconflict operations must be an integral part
of the overall Army plan, which is revised
continually as the conclusion of hostilities
approaches. The objective of this planning is to
transition operations with minimum confusion
to either the host nation, an international body,
or DOS. The Army contribution to postconflict
operations may include—
•Controlling prisoners.
•Handling refugees.
•Arranging for civilian contractors to clear
minefield and conduct demining
•Destroying explosive ordnance.
•Conducting civil affairs.
Simultaneously, units prepare for future
operations by consolidating, reconstituting,
and training. These future operations can

FM 100-7

range from the resumption of hostilities to

redeployment. See Figure 6-10.

During this stage, the force prepares for
future operations. The force may be redeployed to
its home station, to a staging base, or to another
theater for subsequent operations. In addition, the
ARFOR commander reconstitutes his force,
within his capabilities, to ensure flexibility for
future operations. (See Figure 6-11).
Reconstitution of the force requires an
extensive reallocation of resources and skills. The
LSE may play a major role during reconstitution
operations. The LSE must be able to receive,
identify, and determine disposition; maintain
accountability; store, prepare for shipment, and
arrange for movement of Class I, II, III (package),
IV, V, VI, VII, and IX items to the port or a theater
stockage location. Some of these functions can be
performed by augmenting LSE personnel with
TOE units or contractor personnel. Items
requiring repair may be repaired by the LSE or a
contractor within the theater or sent out of the
theater to a repair facility. The theater materiel
management center identifies the items requiring
redistribution instructions.

Chapter 6


Demobilization is the process by which demobilization station/center actions, and
units, individuals, and materiel transfer from home station/horne-of-record actions. As with
active to reserve status. Demobization is mobilization, demobilization is discussed in
accomplished in five phases: planning actions, detail in FM 100-17.
area of operations actions, transit actions,

Chapter 7
Army Operations in War
The NCA may exhaust its options to achieve vital national
interests with the diplomatic, economic, and informational elements
of national power. Such would require the NCA to use the military
element of national power as a primary instrument for protecting
national interests.
When the military element becomes the predominant element for the
execution of policy in a particular theater, the Army may enter the third state
of the range of military operations—war. This chapter discusses modern
warfare and the transition to war from peacetime or conflict. The chapter
closes with a short look at the termination of war.

War is a state of hostile, armed combat. War conducting training and operations during war
is characterized by the sustained use of armed and MOOTW comply with all federal, state,
force between nations or organized groups and local (to include host nation)
within a nation. War involves regular and environmental and pollution abatement
irregular forces in operations to achieve vital requirements and standards. Environmental
national security objectives. War may be pollution standards cover solid waste
limited or general in the resources employed management and control of pollutants in the
and the risks of survival at stake. air and water and on terrain. Other legal
Modern warfare may be nonlinear, thereby requirements cover resources such as
making air operations increasingly vital to the endangered species and wetlands. Other
effectiveness of ground operations. The environmental areas that must be addressed
commander may, by choice or by lack of concern noise, terrain damage, ecological
maneuver forces, place his force in dispersed, areas, and historical/archeological sites. Still,
noncontiguous areas from which he can operate the environment should be treated as a
to destroy enemy forces. Nonlinear operations resource, not a constraint.
require commanders to seize the initiative The CINC structures the army in theater to
through offensive action, to force the pace of transition to war, to receive reinforcements, to
battle, and to retain the flexibility to bring conduct major operations, and to terminate
overwhelming force to destroy the enemy at a war on favorable terms. The CINC fixes area
time and place where he is most vulnerable. and organizational responsibilities for the
The long-term aim is to regain the initiative Army in consonance with the theater strategy,
and flexibility needed to quickly destroy the the threat, available forces, and existing or
enemy force. At the operational-level, this prospective alliances. These responsibilities
involves an appreciable amount of risk but evolve significantly during the transition from
offers an opportunity for high-payoff success. peacetime to wartime.
The Army organizes in war to fight effectively Unity of Effort
both linear and nonlinear operations.
At the operational level, Army operations
in war are always part of unified and joint
TRANSITION TO WAR operations and often part of multinational
During peacetime, the Army trains to deter operations. Therefore, the Army commander
war and, if necessary, to fight the nation’s wars. must have a unified, joint, and multinational
The ASCC must ensure that during realistic view of operations. Army cooperation with the
training for war his subordinate units consider other components is necessary to produce unity
the effect of training on the environment and of effort. Military operations are more than just
the effect of the environment on training. combat operations and do not necessarily end
Federal laws require that Army activities with the cessation of hostilities. Some of the

Chapter 7

military operations that occur during and after to reinforce the theater. The ASCC evolves and
combat operations include— expands to cope with the increased tempo of
•Processing and return of enemy prisoners of operational and support missions. The Army
war (EPW). may introduce additional operational-level
headquarters to assist the CINC in controlling
•Return of displaced civilians. the increased number of tactical organizations.
•Transfer of responsibilities to peacekeeping Depending on the analysis of METT-T and
forces. the extent of global conflict, the CINC may
•Restoration of basic life support services. organize several theaters of operation within
the theater of war. This has not been done since
•Battlefield policing. World War II. The CINC may form JTFs for
Units conduct these operations until specific missions in theater, as was done during
acceptable peacetime conditions are achieved Operation Desert Storm. Each of these will
and the force is redeployed. most likely include ARFOR. In theater, more
than one Army commander may have
The Range of Military operational-level responsibilities. These
Operations operational-level Army commanders sequence
operations over space and time to attain
All states of the range of military operational or strategic objectives. The
operations may exist within the theater of war. principles outlined in Chapter 3 for the design
Peacetime activities may characterize a portion and execution of operational art apply to these
of the theater, while other areas may commanders.
experience conflict. Thus, the principles and
operations that apply to peacetime and conflict
discussed in previous chapters may apply to RETURN TO PEACETIME
the theater of war. The primary focus of the The desired end state of war is the rapid
war environment, however, remains on combat return to peacetime on terms favorable to the
operations and those activities that ensure US and its allies. This end state includes
success. setting the conditions to prevent future war or
conflict. Postwar or military consolidation
Organizational Changes operations may be necessary to ensure that the
When the Army in theater transitions to theater transitions to peacetime and remains
war, significant changes occur in Army there for the foreseeable future. Diplomatic
organizations. Such changes require a rapid and economic considerations may predominate
expansion of the Army in order to introduce during this process, with military operations
large numbers of maneuver and support forces supporting these elements of national power.


The ASCC’s primary mission is to move forces into the theater of war via strategic
contribute to the success of the joint or lift. Based upon operational requirements, the
multinational commander’s major operation. ASCC influences this process through JOPES,
The ASCC must envision the long-range AMOPES, and TPFDD. He ensures that the
strategic objective in formulating his initial proper types of Army personnel and materiel
plans for positioning forces. Army service flow into the theater to conduct and support
component functions during war include major operations. The CINC sequences this
movement and2 maneuver, fires, protection, flow to ensure that it supports the concept of
deception, C , joint information systems operations for current and future missions.
interface, IEW, and support. Within the AO, movement and maneuver must
be well-coordinated, integrated, and
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER synchronized to maximize the combat power
The CINC requests forces stationed in available to the theater commander. This
CONUS or from other theaters. coordination and synchronization is conducted
USTRANSCOM has overall responsibility to on an area basis through maneuver control,

FM 100-7
Plans Offensive and
Defensive Operations
movement control, and battlefield circulation The ARFOR commander at the operational
control. level plans offensive operations in war to
secure or retain the initiative, to exploit or
Theater Commander pursue the enemy, and to prevent the enemy
The CINC may designate the ASCC as a from regrouping and regaining the combat
senior support headquarters without initiative. He also plans defensive operations to
responsibilities for conducting combat gain time or space to conduct decisive offensive
operations. This becomes highly probable as actions. Even in the defense, the ARFOR
the requirements for support increase and the commander seizes opportunities and plans for
CINC becomes more involved in directing offensive maneuver, counterattack, and deep
Army combat operations. operations whenever possible.
Army Service Plans Large-Scale Operations
Component Commander The ARFOR commander at the operational
The reception, preparation, and flow of level plans large-scale maneuver of assigned
ARFOR in the theater is a primary function of forces to support the theater campaign, with a
the ASCC. The ASCC sets clear movement view to the theater CINC’s ultimate objectives.
priorities within the context of the current The CINC sequences and/or integrates major
major operation and in preparation for future operations by assigning zones or sectors,
major operations. The ASCC uses the senior boundaries, objectives, priorities, resources,
movement control agency (MCA) to provide the and phases. He integrates within his battle
movements program, which allocates space resources such as space-based systems
transportation support based on these and information warfare assets. Planning
priorities to support reception and onward responsibilities center on analyzing the
movement activities. Execution of the program assigned mission, visualizing major combat
provides for the movement of units, supplies, operations and logistical requirements, and
and equipment from support areas forward to disseminating plans and directives. The plans
the deployed forces and ultimately retrograde generally project future operations and provide
of materiel from these forces. details on mission accomplishment as directed
The ASCC concentrates forces and creates by the CINC.
economy of force through the use of
intratheater movement. Through intratheater Directs Maneuver
movement, the ASCC develops positional of Subordinate Forces
advantage in relation to the enemy to support The Army operational-level commander
the campaign. The ASCC carefully weighs the directs the maneuver of subordinate forces to
risks of concentration against the protection of support the theater campaign plan. This
forces, installations, and the infrastructure on direction is tied to the overall concept of
which future operations depend. operations and the estimate of the situation at
The ASCC visualizes maneuver in the key decision points during the operation. The
operational sense. His visualization is from the primary emphasis of operational maneuver is
perspective of the entire theater army, not just on the concentration of combat power through
one or several of its elements. Divisions, the exercise of large land formations on broad
separate brigades, or regiments are the level of fronts.
resolution of’ his perspective. An early decision Synchronization of operational movement,
is imperative. Once initial corps and division fires, and support produces a series of
positions are selected, the ASCC will find it operational maneuvers that provide the Army
difficult to change the initial set. operational-level commander and subordinate
commanders with the necessary leverage to
Army Operational-Level shape the battle space to gain, retain, and
Commander sustain the initiative. The ARFOR commander
Planning offensive and defensive synchronizes attacks on the enemy throughout
operations and maneuvers to achieve the the battlefield to counter known or anticipated
CINC’s campaign plan is a primary function of enemy efforts, to exploit success, and to hasten
the ARFOR operational-level commander. In the total collapse of enemy forces.
addition, he plans large-scale operations Tactical execution focuses on destruction of
and directs maneuver of subordinate forces. the enemy throughout his battle space through

Chapter 7

Tactical Firepower
use of depth and simultaneity. The Army The primary purpose of tactical firepower
operational-level commander, while sensitive is to directly and immediately support tactical
to these immediate engagements, cannot allow operations of the joint force against
himself to be preoccupied with the close appropriate tactical decisive points. Therefore,
operations and be distracted from the larger maneuver commanders exercise control over
perspective. He reallocates forces, reprioritizes tactical firepower that supports their
efforts, and conducts a continuous estimate maneuver operations. Tactical firepower
throughout the battle space to react to current includes the coordinated and collective use of
and future decisive points. target acquisition data, indirect-fire weapons,
The Army operational-level commander armed aircraft (both fixed- and rotary-wing),
initiates changes designed to facilitate the and other means against enemy elements in
execution of current operations, with due contact or imminent contact. Included are
consideration to the impact on future artillery, mortars, other nonline-of-sight fires,
operations. He directs the movement of naval gunfire, CAS, attack aviation assets, and
subordinate forces to ensure that after a electronic attack. Tactical firepower also could
distinct phase of the operation they are include the means for surface-to-air and air-to-
positioned in a manner that will enable rapid air engagements.
transition to subsequent phases. Interdiction operations conducted by all
Normally, deciding the specific form of elements of the joint force can also be designed
maneuver to be used against tactical or to achieve or support tactical objectives. Some
operational objectives is left to the judgment interdiction missions may therefore be
and discretion of subordinate tactical considered as tactical. All interdiction missions
commanders. Directing a tactical form of affecting the land battle require coordination
maneuver at the operational level reduces the between several levels of command, both
flexibility of subordinates, narrows options, within and across service lines (see Figure 5-2).
and may unnecessarily restrict subordinate
commanders in developing optimum COAs. Operational Firepower
To defeat the enemy’s center of gravity, the Operational firepower achieves a decisive
commander can synchronize maneuver, fires, impact on a subordinate campaign or major
and operations simultaneously in depth operation. Operational firepower is joint and
against enemy forces at all levels. This multinational. It is a separate element of the
synchronization is one of the most dynamic subordinate JFC’s concept of operations
concepts available to a commander. Maneuver (addressed separately from operational
and fires should not be considered separate maneuver) but must be closely integrated and
operations against a common enemy, but synchronized with his concept for maneuver. In
rather complementary operations designed to that regard, operational firepower is integrated
achieve the commander’s objectives. The normally with operational land maneuver for
commander phases the operation against the synergistic effect, staying power, and more
enemy’s decisive points at successive depths. rapid achievement of strategic aims.
This phasing helps him determine the most Operational firepower is not fire support, and
advantageous simultaneous employment of operational maneuver is not necessarily
forces and firepower for decisive engagement to dependent upon operational firepower. Still,
achieve the end state. operational maneuver can be affected by such
fires and can exploit opportunities created or
FIRES developed by the JFC’s operational firepower.
JFCs use a variety of firepower means to Today, all services contribute capabilities
divert, disrupt, delay, damage, or destroy the that can be used for operational firepower. To
enemy’s air, surface, and subsurface military synchronize operations, the JFC may task one
potential. This paragraph discusses how the component to provide fires to support another
JFC thinks about applying joint fires to component’s operations. Still, as service means
support his concept of operations. for operational firepower may be used for
tactical firepower, the JFC should preserve
The Firepower Model that tactical capability as he develops his
Joint firepower can be classified as tactical, concept of fires.
operational, or strategic, based on its intended Operational firepower includes targeting
effect. and attacking land and sea targets whose

FM 100-7

destruction or neutralization will have a major Systems capable of providing strategic

impact on a subordinate campaign or major firepower are generally those also capable of
operation. Operational firepower includes the providing operational firepower. The intended
allocation of joint and multinational air, land, effect or outcome qualifies a system, weapon, or
sea (surface and subsurface), and space means. operation as either strategic or operational.
In a war involving WMD, fires could be an Nuclear munitions, because of the escalation
operational instrument at decisive points that they signal, are normally categorized as
leads to the enemy’s strategic center of gravity. strategic firepower—whether they are
Operational firepower can be designed to delivered by aircraft, missile, or other means—
achieve a single, operationally significant and are closely controlled through a system the
objective that could have a decisive impact on theater commander establishes.
the campaign and major operation.
Operational firepower may include the Army Interface
interdiction of a major enemy force or forces to The Army operational-level commander is
set the conditions for subsequent, decisive the critical link for coordination of joint support
operations. for Army operations and Army support for joint
Operational firepower is planned top down. operations. The Army operational-level
The operational commander establishes commander has a key role in ensuring that
objectives, identifies targets, and then passes ground and air operations, as devised by the
them to subordinate joint or multinational JFC, complement and reinforce each other. The
units for execution. Subordinate nominations Army operational-level commander begins
contribute to this top-down approach. coordination with the JFC and ACC early in
Operational firepower focuses largely on one or the operational planning process. During the
more of the following: operational planning process, the Army
operational-level commander, in coordination
•Destruction of critical functions, facilities, with his subordinate commanders and staff,
and forces having operational significance. identifies Army requirements for air support
(reconnaissance, CAS, air interdiction, and
•Isolation of a specific battle within the battle airlift). He also participates in the targeting
space. process by nominating targets for Army and
•Facilitation of maneuver to operational Air Force engagement.
depths. Interdiction
Systems capable of providing operational Interdiction contributes substantially to
firepower generally include land- and sea- operational firepower, although it also can
based airpower and surface-to-surface, long- have tactical and strategic effects. Interdiction
range missiles. diverts, disrupts, delays, or destroys the
The ASCC has various means with which enemy’s surface or subsurface military
to execute operational firepower. He may mass potential before it can be used effectively
fires, concentrate long-range missile fires, against friendly forces. Although interdiction
employ attack helicopters, or coordinate the can have tactical effects, it generally applies
use of air forces with Army resources. forward of or beyond units in contact or
Application of operational firepower is a imminent contact. Its effects must be
primary means for concentrating combat synchronized in time, space, and purpose with
other supporting or supported operations of the
power. joint force. Interdiction-capable forces include,
but are not limited to—
Strategic Firepower
•Fighter or attack aircraft and bombers.
Strategic firepower is intended to achieve a
major impact at the strategic level and thus an •Ships and submarines.
impact on the course of the theater campaign or •Conventional airborne, air assault, or other
war as a whole. Strategic firepower includes ground maneuver forces.
selection and assignment of strategic targets to •SOF.
attack capable forces. Strategic firepower also
makes the forces and resources available for •Surface-to-surface, subsurface-to-surface, and
attacking those targets according to the theater air-to-surface missiles, rockets, munitions,
strategy and campaign plan. and mines.

Chapter 7

•Artillery and naval gunfire. Guard’s corps by destroying artil1ery, armor,

•Attack helicopters. and soft-skinned vehicles not later than D+7).
•EW systems. Interdiction operations, whether by land,
air, or naval forces, complement overall
•Antisatellite weapons. maneuver to destroy the enemy’s center of
•Space-based satellite systems or sensors. gravity. The ARFOR commander may choose to
use interdiction as a principal means to achieve
Synchronizing interdiction and maneuver the intended objective (with his subordinate
is critical to the successful execution of the forces supporting the component leading the
campaign or major operation. Interdiction and interdiction effort). For example, actual or
maneuver should not be considered separate threatened maneuver can force an enemy to
operations against a common enemy, but abandon or reveal covered positions or attempt
rather complementary operations designed to rapid resupply. These reactions provide
achieve the JFC’s campaign objectives. excellent and vulnerable targets for
Moreover, interdiction could be a maneuver interdiction.
itself to gain positional advantage over an
enemy. Targeting
Potential responses to synchronized Targeting by the ARFOR staff follows the
maneuver and interdiction can create an same targeting process used at subordinate
agonizing dilemma for the enemy. If the enemy echelons. This process is detailed in
attempts to counter the friendly maneuver, FM 6-20-10. The targeting process is an
enemy forces can be exposed to unacceptable important part of the military decision-making
losses from interdiction; if the enemy employs process described by FM 101-5.
measures to reduce such interdiction losses, At the operational level, the focus of the
enemy forces may not be able to counter the targeting effort is more on planning and
maneuver. The synergy achieved by coordination, rather than on execution of
integrating and synchronizing interdiction and operational firepower. Typically, when the
maneuver assists commanders in gaining the ARFOR staff identifies high-payoff operational
greatest leverage against the enemy at the targets, it will coordinate with subordinate
operational level. units for acquisition and attack by systems
The ARFOR operates within the theater allocated or organic to the corps. There will be
operational battle space that the JFC some critical targets that subordinate units are
establishes for the conduct of all operations. not capable of acquiring or engaging. The
Strategic, political, and internal boundaries critical nature of these targets—and the
are examples of the further subdivision of the requirement to coordinate and synchronize the
battle space that must be considered by the employment of several joint acquisitions/
operational commander. The JFC establishes attacks as quickly as possible—requires the
operational boundaries to facilitate the ARFOR commander to establish a staff section
synchronization of maneuver and interdiction. to support the associated targeting effort. This
Synchronization of efforts within these section is the DOCC.
boundaries is of particular importance. The DOCC is organized with appropriate
According to Joint Pub 3-0, the operational joint service, multinational arms, and coalition
land commander is the supported commander force representatives. The primary functions of
for air interdiction in his AO, and he therefore the DOCC are situational awareness, planning
specifies the target priority, effects, and timing and coordination, targeting, and control of
of interdiction operations therein. While this designated operational firepower. A
may mean specifying individual targets or description of the DOCC functions is shown in
target sets and the desired effects to be Figure 7-1. The primary mission of the DOCC
achieved in attacking them, the often preferred is to provide centralized coordination and
method is for the land commander to specify management of ARFOR deep operations. The
the operational-level effects he intends the DOCC ensures effective and efficient
interdiction to achieve, the target priorities to employment of critical assets and facilitates
achieve those effects, and the date/time by synchronization of joint operations. The
which the effects are required (for example, primary functions of the DOCC apply across
eliminate the counterattack capability of X the range of military operations.

FM 100-7

Fire Control Measures fluidity and flexibility of successful joint

JFCs employ various fire support operations.
coordination measures to facilitate effective Fire Support
joint operations. Many maneuver control
measures have fire coordination implications. Coordination Line
Specific joint fire support coordination The ARFOR may establish an FSCL within
measures and the procedures associated with the AO to support his concept of operation. The
those measures also assist in preserving the ARFOR must coordinate the FSCL’s location

Chapter 7

with the appropriate ACC and other However, if he cannot effect coordination, the
supporting elements. If an FSCL is supporting commander controlling the attack
established, its purpose is to allow the ARFOR, must follow the ARFOR commander’s guidance
its subordinates, and supporting units, such as for attacking targets in this area. Thus, the
Air Force, to swiftly attack targets of ARFOR commander need not directly control
opportunity beyond the FSCL. Such attacks by the overall interdiction effort (air, ground) but,
Army assets must be coordinated with all other as the supported commander, he exercises
affected commanders in sufficient time to allow general direction over interdiction and other
necessary action to avoid friendly casualties. activities of supporting commanders in his AO.
This coordination includes informing and/or
consulting with affected commanders (that is, Besides the FSCL, other fire support
supporting air components). The inability to coordination measures may be used to
effect this coordination will not preclude the facilitate or restrict operational firepower.
attack of targets beyond the FSCL; however, These include restrictive fire areas (RFAs) and
failure to coordinate this type of attack no-fire areas (NFAs) to protect friendly
increases the risk of friendly casualties and elements on either side of the FSCL. If ROE
could waste limited resources through permit, commanders should consider the use of
duplicate attacks. If the land force commander free-fire areas (FFAs) to expedite fires or the
desires to shoot or maneuver beyond his lateral jettisoning of ordinance in specific areas.
boundaries, he must first coordinate with the Whether attacking or defending, the
appropriate commander. The interface within ARFOR commander usually designates an
the DOCC among the various fire support initial FSCL and plans for a subsequent series
representatives provides an excellent means of of on-order FSCLs. Execution of on-order
initially coordinating the attack of targets in FSCLs must be transmitted in sufficient time
the area. to allow higher, lower, adjacent, and
supporting headquarters time to effect
The FSCL must complement the ARFOR necessary changes.
commander’s concept for deep operations and
optimize the synergy between operational
maneuver and operational firepower. To Warfighting Airspace
achieve this synergy, supported and supporting Warfighting airspace is the airspace
commanders must have clearly defined directly above the ground commander’s AO
responsibilities, selective targeting, and that provides for freedom of maneuver for those
coordinated operations. As the supported forces operating in the third dimension.
commander, the ARFOR provides necessary Commanders in the field use various means to
guidance (restrictions, constraints) for all gain freedom of maneuver in this area,
operations in the area beyond the FSCL and especially in the conduct of deep operations.
within the designated ARFOR AO. The ARFOR Warfighting airspace uses the coordinating
commander does not necessarily have to altitude to define this area. The coordinating
control the supporting operations or joint altitude is an airspace permissive control
service activities in this area. Still, supporting measure designed to coordinate airspace
commanders must follow the AR FOR between high performance fixed-wing and
commander’s intent and guidance for activities rotary-wing aircraft. The JFC has already
in this area. Control of interdiction provides a designated the AO. The warfighting airspace
functional example. presents a three-dimensional view of the
battlefield. In the warfighting airspace, the
Interdiction occurs both short of and ground commander retains freedom of
beyond the FSCL. Attack of planned maneuver without overly restricting any of the
interdiction targets on either side requires no other users of airspace.
further coordination, assuming the attack is
proceeding as planned. Deviation from the plan
requires coordination with affected Coordination
commanders. Attack of interdiction targets of To coordinate operational-level fires, the
opportunity short of the FSCL requires DOCC interacts with multiple Army, Air Force,
coordination with the affected commanders. and sometimes Naval aviation organizations.
Before attacking targets of opportunity beyond The DOCC works very closely with the
the FSCL, supporting commanders should command’s MI organization and the echelons
coordinate with the ARFOR commander. above corps (EAC) analysis and control

FM 100-7

element (ACE). They are the DOCC’s main Its organization reflects theater force
source of targeting data. composition, strategic objectives, geography,
and the threat. The JTCB includes
To ensure that targeting data is developed representatives of the land component
into target lists, the manning of the section commander, air component commander, naval
must include MI officers. The DOCC works component commander, special operations
with the command’s subordinate unit’s fire component commander, AOC, and marine, air,
support element (FSE) to deconflict targets and and electronic planning cells. Input from the
targeting information, to task corps for joint staff element is used also to prepare the
operational fires support, and to forward air JTL.
support requests to the AOC. The DOCC also
provides the corps with target feedback, The JTCB normally meets daily to ensure
especially BDA received through the BCE. that JFC targeting and EW guidance is
Assignment of artillery, WMD target analysts, disseminated, to monitor the effectiveness of
and maneuver arms (especially aviation) lethal and nonlethal targeting efforts, to
officers to the coordination section is crucial to coordinate and deconflict joint force operations,
its effective coordination with the tactical-level to validate fire support coordination measures,
headquarters. and to approve new target nominations for
inclusion in the JTL. JTCB results are
The Army DOCC effects coordination with provided to the supporting forces. Joint
the US Air Force through the BCE located at Pubs 3-0 and 3-09 discuss the purpose and
the Air Force AOC, the ground liaison officers functions of JTCBs. Joint Pub 3-05.5 contains
at the wings, and the Army liaison officer discussion of SOF mission tasking as part of
aboard the airborne battlefield command and the JTCB process.
control center (ABCCC). Similar functions are
performed within the Navy Tactical Air 3
Control System (NTACS) by its tactical air Joint C CM Cell
control center. These assets receive The JFC usually organizes a joint C CM
information from and provide feedback directly cell to coordinate EW targeting information,
to the DOCC. An automated targeting support provide EW targeting guidance and priorities,
system to transmit targeting priorities, prepare or refine JTLs, and compile a list of
targeting lists with supporting intelligence crucial friendly assets that must be3 protected
data, and targeting damage assessments are from joint EW operations. The C CM cell is
essential to this coordination. normally chaired by the J3 or his
representative and has representatives of the
Joint Interface J2, J6, operational fires coordination section,
and other staff elements and service
The DOCC provides the Army members to components as appropriate.
the JTCB and the joint command, control, and 3
communications countermeasures (C CM) cell. The ASCC establishes a C CM plan, in
coordination with the CINC’s plan, 3
to attack
high-value targets. The EAC C CM plan,
Joint Targeting developed from the ASCC’s intent, focuses on
Coordination Board subordinate unit operations and complements
The CINC or JFC may establish a joint joint operations with other component
targeting coordination board to direct the commands within the theater.
theater targeting process, to include special
operations targeting. The board consists of
members of the joint staff and representatives PROTECTION
of each subordinate command. The JTCB Operational fires organic to the joint force
ensures the effective employment of all are key in protecting the rear area from ground
theater-level deep surveillance and attack threats. A vital mission of Army ADA is to
resources, including SOF. It coordinates protect the force and critical theater assets
targeting information, provides targeting from aerial attack, missile attack, and
guidance and priorities, prepares or refines surveillance during warfighting operations.
joint target lists (JTLs), and deconflicts lethal The priorities may shift to protecting major
and nonlethal assets. The JTCB is usually concentrations of combat forces and
chaired by the J3 or his representative. supplementing protection of maneuver forces.

Chapter 7

Protection of LOCs remains critical as they coordination with the host nation for additional
extend to support maneuvering forces. security assistance or other rear operations
Army commanders are often responsible support. HNS agreements, SOFA, or other
for the security and protection of facilities and legal instruments guide the US and host nation
units that support joint or multinational relationship. The US commander in the
commanders conducting close and deep COMMZ directs and coordinates rear
operations. Additionally, Army commanders operations, using a single command
may be tasked to provide security for air bases headquarters. At this echelon, support is the
located within their AO. ARFOR commanders principal operation. Several US organizations
must continuously employ risk-management work with the host nation to execute each rear
approaches to effectively preclude operation function.
unacceptable risks to personnel and property, Separate US functional commands and
including protecting forces preparing for or en agencies control the movement of US assets in
route to combat. the COMMZ and coordinate these movements
Risk management is the recognition that with host nation and US area commanders.
decision making occurs under conditions of The army organization with responsibility for
uncertainty. Decisions must remain consistent rear operations is usually responsible for
with the commander’s stated intent and offer a coordinating terrain management and security
good expectation of success. The risk-taking with host nation agencies in its AO.
skill requires competency as a prerequisite. •Rear Area Operations Center. A rear area
Risks from WMD must be continually assessed operations center (RAOC) is a subordinate
to ensure force protection and deterrence and CP within the ARFOR’s CP. The RAOC is
should be addressed in plan synchronization responsible for collecting rear area
and force resourcing. Trained and disciplined information, managing terrain, controlling
organizations lessen risk. area damage, determining the impact of
Rear Operations weather, and synchronizing the rear area
Rear operations include those activities battle plan to facilitate responses to enemy
that allow freedom of maneuver, continuity of threats in the rear area. FMs 100-15, 90-12,
support, and uninterrupted C . In linear battle and 90-23 detail these rear operations
terms, these actions occur behind forces activities.
engaged in active combat. The rear operations •ARFOR Support. The ARFOR designates a
procedures discussed herein focus on support organization (corps support
operations during war. Similar actions could be command [COSCOM]) to execute the
required in MOOTW. Joint Pubs 3-10 and
3-10.1 and FMs 90-23 and 90-12 provide support function and assist in movement
additional coverage of rear operations. Rear and terrain management. In contingency
operations has four functions: sustainment, operations, ARFOR may hand off these rear
movement, terrain management, and security. operations responsibilities as the lodgment
An Army commander may execute these rear or AO expands. EAC organizations assume
operations functions in a COMMZ/JRA or CZ. these responsibilities, thereby allowing the
corps to focus on tactical operations.
Communications Zone/
Joint Rear Area Combat Zone
A JFC normally establishes a theater base In a CZ, the ARFOR commander usually
communications zone (JRA) and the CZ within owns all the terrain on which his forces conduct
the territory of a sovereign host nation. Unlike operations and is responsible for synchronizing
the CZ, most host nations whose sovereignty all rear operations. This discussion
remains viable maintain some level of control characterizes rear operations at corps and
in a COMMZ. below in contingency situations with no
The host nation may retain overall developed COMMZ and environments with no
responsibility for security, movement, and viable HNS.
terrain management. In such cases,
commanders of US forces in the COMMZ own Chain of Command
only the bases they physically occupy. They are Command and control of rear operations is
responsible for the security of bases and the key to success across the width and depth

FM 100-7

of the battle space. To ensure overall security of administration of the US support effort, and
the rear area, commanders
2 2
at all levels must overall security of all US forces and resources
understand C , C responsibilities, and present in or transiting the COMMZ.
C elements. Each unit in the rear area,
regardless of its support function, shouId be Army Service
able to defend itself. Ideally, threats to the rear Component Commander
should be engaged and defeated before they can
affect rear operations. When they must be The ASCC would likely delegate the
fought in the rear, a system of incremental responsibility for rear operations planning to
responses must be able to eliminate the threat his deputy chief of staff for operations. At
as quickly as possible. theater, operational-level planning is
conducted to sequence future rear operations,
The chain of command for rear operations coordinate HNS, and synchronize the four rear
is embodied in area commands for security, operations functions (support, movement,
area damage control (ADC), and terrain terrain management, and security). The ASCC
management functions. Any unit in the uses a decentralized control system of area
COMMZ uses this channel to report commanders for rear operations covering large
information of intelligence value and to request areas of the theater COMMZ. The area
engineer, chemical, explosive ordnance commander usually designates his deputy
disposal (EOD), military police (MP), and host commander as the rear operations officer who,
nation assistance. in turn, often executes this responsibility
The COMMZ tactical chain of command for through the security, plans, and operations
rear operations flows from the theater CINC to (SPO) officer.
the ASCC, to rear operations centers (ROCs), to
base clusters, and to bases. This chain of Rear Operations Centers.
command is used to coordinate protection of The ROC (as depicted in Figure 7-2)
units and facilities within geographical areas of collects information and plans and coordinates
the COMMZ. security, ADC, and terrain management. The
ROC is composed of functional sections that
Commander in Chief work closely with their area command
The CINC is responsible for rear structure. The ROC sections coordinate with
operations. He normally designates a JRAC, host nation liaison elements in addition to
often the ASCC. The ASCC as the JRAC would NBC, EOD, MP, engineer, and other technical
then assume US responsibility for coordinating organizations.
rear operations in the COMMZ, which includes The ROC maintains multiple
coordination with the host nation. The JRAC is communications channels using switched
responsible to his US superiors for the telephone services and combat net radios
development and maintenance of US (CNRs) with higher and adjacent headquarters
installations, control of US movements, and units. The ROC conducts vulnerability and

Chapter 7

threat assessments within its AO. It then plans security and damage control support, to
and coordinates protection of designated include fire support and ADA support. It then
critical facilities and resources. It also advises ensures the completed defense plans are
MCAs of security issues, area surveillance brought to the ROC for record and integration
responsibilities, response (combat) operations, with the total protection concept.
positioning of units, and ADC. The ROC reacts
to incidents most of the time but also looks to Host Nation
short-term planning. It has an FSE and mobile The host nation, when capable, retains
base defense coordination teams (BDCTs) to responsibility for security and ADC of all areas
assist in detailed rear area defense planning. outside US bases. Despite the status of HNS,
The ROC’s most important contribution to US commanders are always responsible for the
COMMZ/JRA security is the establishment and defense of their base. They take measures to
coordination of base defense plans. The ROC avoid detection by reducing the base signature,
coordinates base siting with the technical chain most notably through OPSEC, and the use of
of command and then organizes these bases camouflage and concealment. US commanders
into base clusters to provide mutual support. take protective measures to withstand enemy
The rear operations commander, with ROC attacks and employ measures to speed recovery
recommendation, designates base and base and return to full mission capability should an
cluster commanders to coordinate defensive attack occur. Measures include the
plans. Sometimes the ROC identifies single emplacement of protective obstacles,
bases that are isolated, such as a specialized fortification of critical facilities, and
fixed facility, or clearly independent, such as installation of NBC defense systems.
an air base, and treats them as separate base US commanders also plan graduated levels
clusters. of response to enemy attack to defeat Level I
threats and to delay and disrupt Level II and
Base Cluster Commander III threat forces until outside assistance
The base cluster commander arrives. See Table 7-1. If the host nation has
communicates with all bases in his cluster limited capabilities to fulfill its rear operations
through a base defense operations center responsibilities, or the AOR is hostile, the JFC
(BDOC). Each base and base cluster is or ASCC may designate US assets to execute
responsible for preparing its own defense these functions. The commander could require
plans. The ROC sends a BDCT to the base additional US engineer forces for ADC and
cluster commander’s base cluster operations other sustainment engineering tasks. He might
center (BCOC) to assist in consolidating provide more CSS and CS organizations for
individual base defense plans into a supply, movement, and terrain management.
coordinated base cluster defense plan. Assets Without HNS, the ASCC may assume
for forming the BDOC and BCOC are gathered responsibility for overall security of the
from available base or cluster assets. See Joint COMMZ/JRA, addressing all three levels of
Pub 3-10.1 for a detailed discussion of base threat. All US commanders would concern
defense. The BDCT reviews and assists in themselves with greater security roles beyond
coordinating all needed US and host nation their normal self-defense responsibility.

FM 100-7

Units in the COMMZ are especially the three levels of response and typical threats
vulnerable to enemy attack because of their that can trigger the response.
focus on support and limited combat
capabilities. Combat units located in the
COMMZ are usually newly arrived or DECEPTION
regenerated and thus have limited combat In war, the Army commander integrates
potential. The ASCC must coordinate Army deception plans with joint force
responses to all three levels of threat to prevent deception plans to ensure unity of effort. The
disruption of support activities, interdiction of better the enemy is deceived, the more
LOCs, demoralization of forces, and diversion protection is provided to the friendly force.
of combat forces. Deception operations must be closely
In the COMMZ, US response forces handle coordinated with the JFC’s deception staff
Level II and III threats. Response forces are element (DSE) and support the JFC’s deception
generally tactical combat forces (TCFs) and/or plan. The Army commander attaches
host nation forces, depending upon the viability representatives to the DSE to participate in
of the host nation and established host nation deception planning. At the operational level of
agreements. In the COMMZ/JRA, security war, the Army commander uses deception as
operations are economy-of-force operations. US one of his major force multipliers. This is
MPs provide security support to all Army particularly important when the relative
operations through execution of their strength differential between opposing forces
battlefield mission of area security. MPs are favors the enemy. In war, the Army
normally designated as the rear operations commander finds deception particularly
response force to defeat Level II threats. The attractive as a means to influence the decisions
ASCC normally designates a TCF to defeat of an opposing commander.
level III threats. The ASCC may designate a Deception requires planners to view the
TCF from any of the following: friendly force from the perspective of its
opponent. That perspective and a notion of how
•Tactical units passing through the rear area that opposing commander believes the friendly
to the forward-deployed force. force will act are key to the deception strategy.
•Units assigned or reconstituted in the rear The purpose of the deception operation is to
area. The ASCC may already have units cause the enemy to act in a way prejudicial to
his best interests. A deception plan seeks to
assigned rear security operations (an MP exploit the expectations of the opposing
brigade task force augmented according to commander by offering confirming evidence of
the factors of METT-T). those expectations. The resultant enemy action
•Tactical units of other service components or must be to his disadvantage as the actual
allies within the theater army under friendly force plan unfolds. While deception can
OPCON of the senior army commander. have a high payoff, it is difficult to execute
•Tactical units from forward-deployed The Army operational-level commander
elements. blends his deception plans into the concept of
•A task-organized force from assets operation. The deception plan is a viable COA
that was considered but not selected. At the
disembarking in the theater. operational level of war, the commander forms
The theater commander’s campaign would a deception cell that includes functional
require significant change should the threat in representation from the entire staff. This cell
the rear area grow to a level that required requires considerable resources to be an
diverting combat units. The German Army effective element of the major operation.
experienced this situation during World War II The commander may execute the deception
on the eastern front. German rear area COA as a branch of the major operation. This
commanders— confronted with large numbers execution requires the positioning of forces and
of partisan forces—bypassed enemy units and the allocation of materiel. If required, the Army
inserted conventional and special operations operational-level commander may execute the
forces, disrupting their operations. This threat deception branch of the concept of operation if
ultimately required over 25 German divisions his selected COA is compromised. The
dedicated to rear area security. Table 7-1 lists deception operation must be a viable COA. To

Chapter 7

be successful, it must cause the enemy to fires, intelligence, force protection, C , and
confirm its preconceived ideas of friendly force allocated support. Primary emphasis at the
actions. numbered army level is on planning for future
Command relationships in war may evolve Exercising Control
during the transition to war to be substantially Through Planning
different from those exercised during
peacetime or conflict. This evolution is the The Army operational-level commander
result of several factors, to include additional actively participates in developing the
ways and means available to the CINC to subordinate JFC’s theater of operations
prosecute the war effort. campaign plans. He interfaces with the
commanders of the other services and directs
Developing the the preparation of the Army’s major operations
Chain of Command to support the plan. He issues planning
guidance, weighs various COAs, and develops
During the transition from peacetime to and coordinates a concept of operations. The
wartime, a theater undergoes a process of Army operational-level commander ensures
development. As the theater expands, the that his concept is aligned with that of his
purpose of combat operations grows in superior commander. He coordinates vertically
complexity and the size and scope of combat with senior and subordinate commands and
and support force structures increases. This horizontally with adjacent and supporting
may result in organization of the theater into commands and activities. With representatives
theaters of war or theaters of operation as from the other services, the Army commander
discussed in Chapter 2. incorporates sea and airpower in the concept
early in the planning process. This power
Intermediate Army includes fire support, reconnaissance, sealift,
Headquarters air defense, and airlift.
The requirement to establish an Planning in wartime at the operational
intermediate Army headquarters between the level is continuous and more complex than in
ASCC and the corps depends on other environments for the following reasons:
characteristics of the theater environment
based on METT-T and the reasons identified in •The synchronization of functions in large
Section III of Chapter 2. The number of areas over greater periods of time
subordinate headquarters that a higher introduces additional variables.
headquarters can control depends on a number
of factors; mission, experience, training, •The presence of an enemy with possibly
communications abilities, and logistics are a equal or greater capabilities, pursuing
few. The span of control will be as broad or actions independently, causes continuous
narrow as the situation dictates. updating of planning efforts.
Numbered Army •The planning process remains relatively the
The ASCC, with the concurrence of the same, while the requirement for joint
CINC, establishes a numbered army, planning increases dramatically at nearly
designates a numbered army commander, and all echelons.
provides him with the directive or order that •The Army operational-level commander
forms his command. This directive specifies the must plan for a large number of branches
rationale for establishing the numbered army,
the objectives it should meet, and the forces and sequels to help simplify decisions in a
involved. Numbered armies plan and direct time-sensitive war environment.
major operations. Operations at this level
involve the deployment, movement and Establishing Command
maneuver, and fires of land combat power over
extended terrain and the integration of all Relationships
Army and other service support into the In the directive that creates the Army oper-
operation. Subordinate tactical commanders ational-level echelon, the theater commander
determine the specific tactics in maneuver, establishes command relationships. These

FM 100-7

relationships are responsive to the needs of the Army MI is commander-driven,
theater of operation commander and are synchronized, disseminated, split-based, and
unique to the environment in which the eche- tactically tailored.
lon is created. This operational-level echelon
may be a numbered army, a designated corps, Commander-Driven
or any other Army organization that meets the The commander drives the intelligence
needs of the JFC. The Army component designs effort. He focuses the intelligence system by
the operational-level echelon to maximize clearly designating his PIR, targeting
unity of effort, to allow flexibility in employing requirements, and priorities. He ensures that
subordinate echelons, and to effect a rapid the intelligence efforts are employed fully and
response to changes in friendly and enemy sit- synchronized with maneuver and fire support.
uations. As the theater expands, the CINC He demands that the intelligence battlefield
may— operating systems provide needed
•Separate the Army’s operations and support intelligence in the correct form.
•Designate the ASCC as a support The G2/S2 synchronizes intelligence
headquarters with OPCON of Army support collection, analysis, and dissemination with
organizations. operations to ensure the commander receives
the intelligence he needs, in the form he can
•Maintain control of major maneuver forces, use it, in time to influence the decision-making
or put maneuver forces under OPCON of process. Intelligence synchronization is a
subordinate joint commanders. continuous process that keeps IEW operations
tied to the commander’s critical decisions and
concept of operations.
Broadcast dissemination of intelligence is
The JFC’s staff maintains joint the simultaneous broadcast of near real-time
communications interfaces through the JCCC. intelligence from collectors and processors at
The ASCC’s communications staff participates all echelons. It permits commanders at all
in theater joint and multinational echelons to simultaneously receive the same
communications network planning and intelligence, thereby, providing a common
management through its interface with the picture of the battlefield. It allows commanders
JCCC. In cases where the ASCC provides the to skip echelons and pull intelligence directly
bulk of the joint force headquarters staffing, from the echelon broadcasting it.
the ASCC may be required to operate an
integrated JCCC/ASCC communications Split-Based
management center. Key duties center on Split-based intelligence operations provide
network management of voice, data, and video deploying tactical commanders with high-
systems signal interoperability. Frequency and resolution intelligence until their organic
COMSEC management are also key duties. intelligence collection assets are employed.
Joint Pub 6-05.1 provides a detailed These operations augment organic intelligence
description of JCCC organization and production and employ collection and analysis
elements from all echelons—national to
tactical—to support bases from which they can
operate against the target area.
WARFARE Tactically Tailored
IEW is the commander’s key to victory on a In force-projection operations, the
battlefield and to success in MOOTW. commander tailors IEW support for each
Intelligence enables commanders to focus, contingency, based on the mission and
leverage, and protect the combat power and availability of resources. He must decide which
resources at their disposal to win decisively on key intelligence personnel and equipment to
the modern battlefield and succeed in deploy early and when to phase in his
endeavors short of war. remaining MI assets. The ASCC serves as the

Chapter 7

intelligence integration headquarters for the as the ASCC link to coordinate, synchronize,
Army operational-level commander. The ASCC and deconflict intelligence support, intelligence
must have timely intelligence on the enemy, asset management, deep targeting priorities,
weather, and terrain; the conditions of the and SOF operations conducted by subordinate
AOR; the civil population; and related units.
environmental factors. The collection of
information and the production and Direction and Coordination
dissemination of intelligence are continuing The CINC provides overall direction and
processes during peacetime as well as during coordination of the intelligence effort of
war. assigned forces. Through the ACE, the ASCC
maintains the means of executing his
Sources intelligence function. However, the theater
The ASCC processes and refines commander may establish an intelligence
intelligence information from many sources to organization to perform theater intelligence
the degree of resolution necessary to support functions. When established, this organization
theater army operations. Sources include the also provides the ASCC with the intelligence
Army, the US command’s JIC, DIA, CIA, NSA, information required to supplement the
other services, allied forces intelligence component’s organic intelligence capability. In
agencies, and other federal intelligence war, Army operational-level commanders
investigative and law enforcement agencies. concentrate on several specific areas of
These sources produce intelligence information intelligence to facilitate military combat
on the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and operations. These include—
probable COAs of the armed forces of foreign •Identifying enemy capabilities and likely
nations and other forces they may sponsor. The COAs that could affect future major
ASCC accomplishes his intelligence mission operations.
through the ACE.
•Targeting specific enemy commanders and
The intelligence support elements (ISE) of echelons for deception.
the MI organization provide 24-hour liaison
with the US Army; with joint, multinational, •Determining the best way to protect friendly
and allied military organizations; with vulnerabilities and exploit enemy
intelligence services; and with US corps. These weaknesses.
liaison elements assist supported •Updating the PIR.
organizations in identifying IEW
requirements, establishing priorities, and •Using all sources of intelligence efficiently
interfacing directly with the operational-level by integrating collection assets to produce
MI organization. The ISEs serve as extensions operationally useful products.
of the ACE and are collocated with the
supported organization. These elements Operational Protection
provide a mechanism for US and allied The commander uses the entire
commands to request information on the intelligence system to support force protection.
enemy. The intelligence system is active and proactive,
The ISEs facilitate the production and identifying, locating, and targeting an enemy’s
exchange of intelligence, as well as the ability to target and affect friendly forces. Force
coordination for EW support, to include civil protection intelligence products—
broadcast jamming. ISEs also work with unit •Identify and counter enemy intelligence
intelligence officers and assist with intelligence collection capabilities.
input to operational planning, situation arid •Assess friendly vulnerabilities from the
target development, and IPB. These support
elements are located at such distances from the enemy’s perspective.
ACE that they operate independently. They •Identify the enemy’s perception of friendly
respond to the needs of their counterpart centers of gravity and how he will attack
agencies and commands at least as often as them or influence them.
they respond to the needs of the ACE.
•Identify risks to the force.
Operational-level MI organizations
support operational planning at ASCC level. •Identify potential countermeasures to deny
This planning provides predictive intelligence enemy access to friendly critical areas.

FM 100-7

•Contribute to threat avoidance once the risk each). The CINC assigns the Army’s portion of
is identified. the sustainment base.
•Enable the commander to plan for both Engineer Support
passive and active OPSEC, deception, and The ASCC supplies engineer support to
other security measures. provide the facilities needed in the COMMZ to
With this intelligence, the commander receive, stage, move, and support combat
decides which countermeasures he must use to forces. The ASCC must ensure that his LOCs
shield his intentions, present false images to remain open. He must either establish or
the enemy commander, and protect his force. maintain his supporting base and provide
engineer support to other services. Engineers
Counterintelligence in the theater give priority to general
engineering and survivability functions.
CI operations counteract foreign
intelligence and terrorist threats to the Replacement Training
friendly force. Their specialty is support to The ASCC provides the means to train
force protection. replacements. Normally, he establishes a
Rear Area Operations training center that is the focal point for
regeneration. The center trains replacements
IEW contributes to the rear battle by and assigns them individually or as crews,
helping to identify, analyze, wargame, and squads, and platoons. Resource constraints
provide early warning of potential threats to may require the commander to delay the
the friendly rear area. IEW also contributes by training of replacements.
identifying terrain that supports friendly rear
area operations. Responsiveness and Suitability
The ASCC ensures that support is suitable
SUPPORT and responsive to the priorities of the CINC
and to subordinate commands. At this level,
In war, the CINC may designate the ASCC ASCC resource management (prioritizing,
to have a predominately support focus. In this stockpiling, and so forth) has a long-range
role, the ASCC has a number of logistics and perspective. The ASCC forms a logistics
support responsibilities. The ASCC may also operations cell to orchestrate elements of the
have support responsibilities for other US and support process. This element ensures that
allied forces as a result of established current priorities, intentions, and operations
agreements or as assigned by the ClNC. The support the requirements of the ARFOR in
ASCC provides primary support within the theater. This organization balances the needs
theater through subordinate groups, brigades, for current operations against the needs for
and commands specifically organized and future operations and advises the ASCC
allocated to accomplish the theater support accordingly.
mission. The ASCC maintains organizational
flexibility by tailoring the type and number of Reception, Staging, and
support units to the mission requirements and Onward Movement
by planning for the expansion of the support The ASCC is normally responsible for
capability. Some specific support requirements reception and onward movement of Army
the ASCC commander executes are base forces. As the ASCC conducts reception
development; engineer support; replacement operations, he receives forces at aerial ports
training; support; reception, staging, and and seaports and equips, fuels, fixes, arms,
onward movement; and reconstitution. moves, decontaminates, if required, and
protects these forces as they pass through the
Base Development support base to their tactical assembly area.
The ASCC role in base development is key Operational-level army logistics commanders,
in the operational support capability because it support elements, and advance parties for
focuses on long-term support. The ASCC is incoming units must ensure that augmentation
responsible for a portion of the joint forces are equipped rapidly and deployed to
sustainment base (LOCs, ports, bases, designated marshaling areas. Incoming forces
airfields, and units responsible for operating are required to perform many of their support

Chapter 7

functions, receiving only minimum-essential undertaken, the ASCC must understand the
services and support from the ASCC. Reception effects those operations may have on
operations may begin before hostilities start established support operations. Reconstitution
and continue until hostilities cease. Reception may adversely affect both support and
operations and support operations are similar reception operations.
and occur concurrently.
A reconstitution planning cell is located in
Reconstitution the ASCC operations section. Assignment of this
The ASCC plans and conducts operational- task to the G3 (operations) section reveals that
and tactical-level reconstitution operations. reconstitution is first and foremost an
FM 100-9 defines reconstitution as operational decision. This cell plans for the
"extraordinary actions taken by commanders reconstitution operations in preparation for
to restore combat-attrited units to a desired future operations. The ASCC employs the cell as
level of combat effectiveness commensurate part of the reconstitution assessment and
with mission requirements and availability of evaluation team (AET) that performs liaison
resources." The ASCC is concerned primarily functions and assists the ASCC in implementing
with the regeneration option of detailed reconstitution efforts. The reconstitution2
reconstitution—the rebuilding of a unit planning cell may be employed as part of the C
through the large-scale replacement of of the reconstitution task force.
personnel, equipment, 2
and supplies; the The ASCC synchronizes reconstitution
establishment of C ; and the conduct of with all other functions within the theater.
mission-essential training for the newly rebuilt Properly planned and executed reconstitution
unit. The ASCC must ensure time and actions do not detract from combat efforts but
resources are allotted to conduct reconstitution enhance them. In the offense, well-executed
operations. The ASCC draws from the CONUS reconstitution efforts maintain the momentum
base, using intertheater and intratheater of the attack by prolonging the unit’s arrival at
assets based upon the mission of the JFC. its culminating point. In the defense,
Reconstitution is normally done in preparation reconstitution preserves combat power
for future operations in the operational potential and allows the operational-level
sequence. If regeneration of a unit is commander greater freedom of action.

Upon successful termination of combat consolidation of friendly and available enemy
operations, the deployed forces transition to a mine field reports is critical to this mission.
period of postconflict operations prior to Additionally, the ASCC must be prepared to
redeployment. This transition may occur even provide health service support (HSS),
if residual combat operations are occurring in emergency restoration of utilities, support to
other parts of the theater of operations. social needs of the indigenous population, and
Anticipation and early planning for postconflict other humanitarian activities as required.
operations eases the transition process. The
JFC must determine the conditions to which The US historical perspective upon the
the operations area is to be returned. successful termination of past conflicts has
According to the CINC’s directives, the been rapid redeployment and demobilization.
ASCC must oversee the orderly transition of Redeployment and demobilization should occur
authority to appropriate US, international, at a pace that does not disrupt the ability of the
interagency, or host nation agencies. The ASCC to execute continuing missions. The
ASCC and subordinate commanders successful termination of war activities leads to
emphasize those activities that reduce transition to the state of peacetime. Still, the
postconflict or postcrisis turmoil and help possibility always exists that resumption of
stabilize the situation. Commanders must also hostilities may occur. Thus, units must rapidly
address the decontamination, disposal, and convert to a wartime posture and be prepared
destruction of war materiel; the removal and to conduct wartime operations. During this
destruction of unexploded ordnance; and the period, force protection is vital in order to
responsibility for demining operations. The prevent undue harm to US forces.

Chapter 8
Military Operations Other Than War
This chapter discusses Army MOOTW—operations in two states
of the range of military operations: peacetime and conflict. Peacetime
is a state in which diplomatic, economic, informational, and military
powers of the nation are employed to achieve national objectives.
Since peacetime is the preferred state of affairs (as opposed to conflict
or war), how well the Army and other services accomplish their
missions in peacetime is vital to US national interests.
Conflict is a unique environment in which the ARFOR
commander works closely with diplomatic leaders to control
hostilities, with the goal of returning to peacetime conditions. In
conflict, the military, as an element of national power, takes on a
more prominent role than in peacetime. The Army participates in
conflict as a component of a joint organization that is usually an
element of a multinational structure. Other US Government
agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and international organizations (IOs) often
Army warfighting doctrine is based on well- measure of a unit’s ability to counter an
established principles of war. MOOTW are expected threat and execute a mission. A force
based on similar principles that guide the must have the capability to accomplish a
force’s actions. The principles of war apply for military mission by virtue of its training,
those actions that involve our forces in combat. equipment, and structure.
For MOOTW that do not require direct combat, The force composition for MOOTW must be
the principles are objective, unity of effort, proportionate to the stated goals of the
legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security. sponsoring authority and provide sufficient
FMs 100-5 and 100-23 describe these principles capability to complete the mission and protect
and their application. These principles are not the force. The perception that the force
immutable, but serve as guides for action. employed exceeds the limits of its mandate
Commanders must balance these principles lessens legitimacy with the international
against the specific missions and nature of the community, the US public, and the indigenous
operation. population. Capability and acceptability are
In planning for military operations in not constants but vary based upon the threat,
peacetime and conflict, commanders must tailor the intensity of operations, the missions to be
a force that is suitable for the mission. performed, and changing international
Suitability is the measure of a force’s capability perceptions.
against possible threats and the diplomatic The composition of the force should reflect
acceptability of the chosen force. Acceptability is the commander’s consideration of the military
based on the force’s appropriateness, given end state, METT-T, mission-specific training
diplomatic considerations, and qualities that requirements, strategic lift, pre-positioned
are consistent with accomplishment of national assets, joint and multinational military
interests and objectives. The commander’s forces, reserve component forces, nonmilitary
acceptability of the force includes the US agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and host nations
perceptions of the indigenous population, forces. The nature of MOOTW is such that CS
the international community, and the and CSS units may have an equal if not greater
American public. Force capability is the role than combat units.

The Army’s responsibilities in peacetime During peacetime, senior army commanders
are as important as its traditional combat roles. are always postured to present a deterrent to

Chapter 8

internal or external threats to US national programs, security assistance programs, and

interests. They do this by conducting routine multinational training exercises. Like
peacetime operations and nonhostile activities. conventional forces, SOF are a deterrent. In
multinational operations, SOF involvement
UNIFIED COMMANDERS with allies worldwide contributes to deterrence
and provides a low-visibility means of
At the direction of national leaders, CINCs extending US influence.
may use ARFOR to perform noncombat
missions that support diplomatic initiatives. Due to extensive unconventional warfare
Army leaders then carry out these activities as (UW) training, SOF are well-suited to conduct
part of the overall unified command plan. various peacetime operations and provide
These activities may include job training various types of support. SOF should be
exercises, peace support operations, nation considered the force of choice for peacetime
assistance activities, disaster relief and missions. General-purpose forces may also be
humanitarian assistance, security assistance, called for their particular specialties or when
shows of force, and support for counterdrug the scope of operations is so vast that
operations. conventional forces are required.
The commander of a unified command,
such as PACOM and ACOM, may control and ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT
coordinate military support to domestic COMMANDER
emergencies in the states of Alaska and Hawaii The operational-level functions discussed
and territories and possessions of the US. here are used as a starting point to discuss the
CINCs must continuously assess their regions ASCC in peacetime. Some systems, such as
to identify the strategic situation and operational fires, may not have extensive
situations requiring military forces for peacetime applications. Still, the operational-
noncombat missions. Armed forces may be level commander and his staff need to analyze
tasked with direct responsibility, or they may each function and its corresponding
conduct operations that support other US subfunctions, augmenting or deleting as
Government agencies. necessary to ensure the proper integration and
synchronization of all peacetime operations
The Army’s role in peacetime is to support
the regional CINC’s efforts to prevent unstable Movement and Maneuver
situations from developing into the loss of local The CINC may use armored, light, or
control or open conflict. Senior army special operations Army forces and their
commanders may do this by conducting routine corresponding CS or CSS structures available
activities that maintain the potential of within the region. Some situations require
ARFOR to conduct major operations. This deployment of additional units via strategic
potential may serve as a deterrent, or it can lift. The MCA provides for the orderly flow of
enhance the capability to react in emergencies. these forces and resources. The ASCC receives
Army component forces may turn this potential and prepares incoming units for operations.
into actual mission execution to actively control Since peacetime operations are normally
a situation. As ASCCs or other senior army conducted in a permissive environment, CS or
commanders respond to the regional CINC, CSS units may be the predominant elements
they may be required to conduct peacetime and deploy early to prepare to support the
operations in one region while simultaneously arrival of other units.
conducting conflict and/or war operations in
others. The CINC may assign operating forces a
JOA, but he generally uses few boundaries or
other special control measures. Normally, the
SPECIAL OPERATIONS ASCC, a subordinate Army commander, or a
FORCES COMMANDERS JFC employs these forces to execute a specific
In peacetime, SOF help attain peacetime MOOTW mission. Each operation is discrete in
military objectives and may promote regional response to a specific situation, though it may
stability by advising, training, and assisting be sequenced with past and future operations.
allies. SOF peacetime activities could be the Execution focuses on near-term operations.
conduct of US humanitarian assistance Peacetime operations often require special

FM 100-7

engineer, legal, CA, PSYOP, and PA self-defense and deterrent posture. These rules
considerations. Once the operating force deal with terrorist and other threats.
completes its mission, it redeploys to its home
station or continues peacetime activities in Maintaining
theater with little requirement for Discipline and Order
consolidation operations or other transition
efforts. Good order and discipline are instrumental
for conserving military potential. The ASCC
Protection establishes a command climate conducive to
this end. He ensures the maintenance of proper
Protecting forces and resources from a wide liaison with DOD police organizations as well
range of threats is an important responsibility as with local or host nation, allied, and
for all senior commanders. In force-projection interagency police agencies. Within Army
contingency operations, the threat of the use of organizations, the ASCC facilitates Army MP
WMD must be continually tracked to preclude and Criminal Investigation Command
unacceptable risk to the force. Options for elements investigating offenses. In addition,
protection from these weapons encompass the the ASCC enforces the policies of the senior
politico-military range and include diplomatic army commanders. The ASCC may provide
defusing and deterrence through NBC prisoner confinement facilities for those who
readiness, active and passive defense, air violate good order and discipline.
defense, and WMD reduction. The ASCC
directs measures in peacetime to conserve Providing Limited
military potential so that it can be applied at a
decisive place and time. Deception Measures
Protecting the force depends on current, Peacetime operations usually require little
accurate intelligence for I&W of possible deception beyond normal OPSEC. OPSEC, or
obstacles or threats. Protection includes the information measures the ASCC uses,
conducting antiterrorism measures, must be consistent with established guidelines
maintaining discipline and order, and and may require interagency coordination.
providing limited deception measures. As part
of protecting the force, the ASCC issues the Fires
peacetime ROE established by the regional A major challenge for any force taking part
commander in coordination with JCS, the host in peacetime operations is to be organized to
nation, and the ambassador. Through an accomplish the goals of the sponsoring
operational risk assessment, the ASCC ensures authority and provide sufficient capability to
the conservation and safety of the force. protect the force. The committed ARFOR must
Providing air defense of the force and selected be sufficiently lethal and survivable to protect
geopolitical assets has a deterrent value. It also itself, deter possible aggression, and
has an advantage that it is seen as a accomplish its mission. This specialized force
nonescalatory measure. must be capable of performing both hostile and
nonhostile actions simultaneously throughout
Conducting Antiterrorism its AO. The ASCC must always have available
Measures and continuously plan for the employment of a
Terrorist acts overseas are a constant joint or multinational force suite of fire support
threat to US armed forces, civilians, and systems. A credible operational fires capability
facilities. The ASCC presumes civil authorities deters aggression and increases the options
and host governments will implement available to the commander to accomplish his
counterterrorism procedures to protect people mission and protect the force.
within their territory. The CINC ensures Fire support units provide more than lethal
coordination of all local antiterrorist policies and nonlethal fires during MOOTW. Fire
and measures for protecting DOD facilities, support coordinators and operational-level
equipment, personnel, and family members planners must establish liaison early to start
abroad. The ASCC may assist in implementing planning and coordinating targeting functions
specific antiterrorist actions called for by (operational IPB, high-payoff target selection,
terrorist threat conditions (THREATCONs) target acquisition and attack system selection/
discussed later in this chapter. The theater tasking, and BDA planning) should fires be
commander’s peacetime ROE provide a flexible needed. The organization and equipment of fire

Chapter 8

support units can augment the C I collection must first support the increased security
and other capabilities of the joint or requirements for both position defense and
multinational force. movement. Second, planners must recognize
Doctrine for fires and the basic tasks of fire the restrictions and constraints of ROE on the
application of force. Planners must then
support do not change during MOOTW. Still, consider indirect and nonlethal fires, in
the MOOTW environment presents unique addition to direct fire systems, when they
challenges that affect tactics, techniques, and write ROE. ROE should address appropriate
procedures for fires and require the meticulous responses to various expected threat actions
attention of planners. Planners must consider and force protection. The diversity of available
the characteristics of the MOOTW threat and fire support systems, including those of
their impact on both operational fires and fire coalition forces, requires that ROE include
support. weapon system and munition selection as well.
The MOOTW AO typically presents threats At all echelons of command, ROE significantly
that do not conform to linear operations. impact all aspects of fire planning, target
Threats are diverse and may manifest acquisition, and attack. Finally, the nonspecific
themselves anywhere at any time, making nature of MOOTW threats requires continuous
them difficult to predict. Threat personnel and planning. Consideration must be given to
activities may be indistinguishable from mutual support between adjacent units or
friendly until hostilities are initiated. The bases and even AOs.
prevalent threat in MOOTW is from hostile The fleeting nature of the threat requires
terrorist, guerilla, or partisan activities. near real-time target acquisition and sensor-to-
Additionally, environmental factors (weather, shooter links. Target acquisition systems must
disease) pose a serious threat. In some be capable of distinguishing between friendly
scenarios, they will be the prevalent threat. and threat activity. This capability increases
Normally, MOOTW threats do not involve a the importance of HUMINT and IMINT
sophisticated military force unless hostilities sources, which provide real time eyes on targets
have escalated to the realm of conflict or the such as patrols, police, SOF, UAV/RPV
threat is capable of rapidly massing and (remotely piloted vehicle), and J-STARS (joint
dispersing military or paramilitary force to surveillance target and attack radar system).
achieve its objectives. MOOTW threat Ground surveillance, countermortar, and
activities include hit and run harassing tactics counterbattery radars are equally important
such as attacks and raids, mining and booby and have special employment considerations in
traps, sabotage, deception, and psychological the MOOTW environment. Electronic
warfare designed to embarrass and demoralize intelligence (ELINT) systems may provide
friendly governments and forces. valuable situation development information,
External support from other nations for the but the need to verify target descriptions limits
indigenous MOOTW threat and adaptation of ELINT responsiveness and utility as a target
friendly operations to the local geography acquisition system for triggering target attack.
compound the problem. External support of the These considerations highlight the need for
threat extends the problem to the international close coordination among joint, multinational,
diplomatic arena, usually increasing the and coalition force operations; intelligence; and
restrictions and constraints on military fires representatives at the ASCC
options. The extremes in geography require headquarters. Although these considerations
organizations to prepare for and adapt to are not all-inclusive, they may appear to focus
variations in terrain and vegetation and the fire support at lower echelons rather than
impact of seasonal weather changes. operational fires. Still, the MOOTW
All of these aspects of the MOOTW threat environment forces the ASCC/ARFOR to plan
impact planning and execution of operational meticulously, coordinate, and execute
fires. The range of threats in an MOOTW application of force.
environment impact both operational fires and To expedite fire support coordination, fire
fire support. First, all friendly forces are planning, and clearance of fires, special
vulnerable. No rear area enjoys relative arrangements are required with the host
security. This vulnerability requires nation military, allied nations, joint services,
establishment of integrated base defenses with and national and local civilian authorities.
a mutually supporting fires capability. Fires These arrangements include determining

FM 100-7

communication requirements, identifying direction of the unified commander’s

liaison personnel, and establishing diplomatic-military staff element, may
procedures—all focused on the interoperability integrate ARFOR to support the ambassador.
of the multinational force effort to support Military commanders must work closely with
peacekeeping objectives. the ambassador and his country team to assure
Within NATO and the ABCA (American, effective exchange of information and
British, Canadian, Australian) quadripartite coordination. Sometimes, the military
working group, special agreements exist which commander may be a part of the country team
facilitate fire support operations. These are and directly advise the ambassador.
NATO standardization agreements
(STANAGs) and quadripartite standardization The Commander in Chief
agreements (QSTAGs). Many countries that The CINC may use forward-deployed Army
the US may support have no bilateral fire units in theater when the NCA directs. In such
support agreements. Action may be required, a case, command relationships change little
based on the situation, to establish from routine peacetime activities. The ASCC
agreements. Support in these efforts may be controls ARFOR operations and recommends
arranged through the appropriate DOS and coordinates the use of contingency forces
agencies and country
teams. This increase in and mobilization of reserve forces from outside
centralized C of fires is needed for civil- the theater. In such a case, the CINC may use
military cooperation, developing and adhering existing command relationships, or, if the
to ROE, establishing appropriate procedures mission requires forces of multiple services, he
for clearance of fires, and establishing an may establish a JTF. The ASCC may advise the
appropriate joint/multinational force staff CINC to integrate reserve component forces
structure to plan, coordinate, and, when either in a training status or brought to active
necessary, control operational fires. duty for an extended period to assist in
executing operations.
Command and Control
Peacetime operations contribute to Intelligence
stability and conflict prevention in order to The ASCC needs high-quality, timely
complement diplomatic initiatives. The ASCC intelligence to conduct peacetime operations.
may conduct a wide range of peacetime The ACE serves as the clearinghouse for all-
operations that directly or indirectly stabilize a source intelligence. The ACE maintains lists of
situation or contribute to the general welfare. I&W that the ASCC uses to anticipate
Contingency force-projection operations peacetime operations. The ACE produces
develop through CAP (see Chapter 6). These intelligence information and disseminates it to
actions may evolve into longer-term commanders and staff agencies for use. This
commitments such as regional peacekeeping intelligence effort must address diplomatic and
operations. Other peacetime operations may economic information as well as information
begin as long-term commitments that may related to potential natural disasters. Based on
require deliberate planning. Examples include these indicators and CINC guidance, the ASCC
overt PSYOP programs, nation assistance, and focuses the collection and processing of
security assistance. information on specific peacetime operations.
Command relationships in peacetime are Intelligence provides a basis for all US
normally based on the in-place theater plans and operations in MOOTW. The nature
structure that conducts routine peacetime of MOOTW is one of heavy involvement with
activities. These peacetime relationships the host nation populace, government, and
require special sensitivity to and coordination military. Due to this heavy involvement with
with nonmilitary organizations. As a result, the host nation, most activities in MOOTW are
operational-level command relationships and HUMINT-intensive. HUMINT operations
unity of command may be clouded. provide valuable intelligence, as well as I&W
on threat activities and operations. HUMINT
The Ambassador provides timely information on threat
The ambassador is responsible for the capabilities and intentions. HUMINT collects
direction, coordination, and supervision of all information by interrogation, observation,
US Government interagency activities within a elicitation of personnel, and exploitation of
particular country. The ASCC’s staff, under the documents and material. HUMINT is also the

Chapter 8

most effective intelligence discipline available Area studies provide host nation weather
to the threat. Consequently, counter-HUMINT and geographical information, as well as basic
operations are the key to the success of any intelligence (seaports, airports, transportation
activity in MOOTW. Counter-HUMINT systems, water storage, POL storage, building
operations are used to degrade or neutralize materials availability) helpful in preparing for
threat espionage, sabotage, and subversion natural disasters and other contingency-type
capabilities. operations. Forward presence, both through
Close liaison with a variety of US and host permanent stationing and periodic deployment
nation military and civil organizations is of CONUS-based HUMINT resources, is
critical to the success of any MOOTW activity. essential to this effort.
This liaison is imperative for coordination, The theater-level MI organization
intelligence collecting, and information continuously develops and refines indicator
sharing. CI personnel are uniquely suited to lists. These lists allow the ASCC to monitor
this task. As a minimum, CI personnel must diplomatic, military, and economic conditions
coordinate with members of the US country in the area. Army intelligence sources provide
team, US MI units, US MP units, CA units, the necessary information and intelligence to
PSYOP units, HN regional and urban area identify and predict potential threats. All-
coordination centers, HN intelligence and source intelligence analysis provides the ASCC
security forces, and HN military, paramilitary, with the necessary information to protect his
and police. forces, noncombatants, and resources. It also
allows him to prepare for future operations
Battle Space while minimizing the probability of surprise
In MOOTW, commanders seek to counter from a potential threat.
the threat’s effects in a given battle space. The
threats in MOOTW will vary between each Logistics
MOOTW activity. Battle space is a physical The ASCC is responsible for developing
volume that expands or contracts in relation to and providing the elements of sustainment for
the ability to influence and counter the threat. ARFOR within a region and for other services,
A higher commander does not assign battle based on executive agent responsibilities for
space, which extends beyond the limits of the common servicing. Unless directed by national
commander’s AO. Battle space is based on the authority, NGOs and PVOs will provide their
premise that the commander’s thinking respective support. Strategic logistics support
expands to develop a vision for countering the is projected from CONUS and other OCONUS
threat before any mental constraints are sites, using all national resources, including
emplaced, such as boundaries, legal mandates, USAMC, DLA, other services, and commercial
or terms of reference (TOR). sources. The ASCC provides logistics,
Battle space includes all friendly assets direction, and prioritization. The ASCC staff
available to counter the threat. In MOOTW, monitors all support activities to ensure
pure combat power is only a small portion of smooth, daily sustainment of the force. The
the true battle space. Other assets may include ASCC seeks to conserve Army resources
the diplomatic efforts of embassy officials, whenever possible by using contractors, the
liaisons with host nation governments and host nation, or other viable sources of support.
military agencies, as well as the efforts of In peacetime, the CONUS support base
NGOs, PVOs, and IOs. continues to project logistics support from
national resources. The ASCC monitors the
Unity of effort is essential to operations support of the soldier as well.
within a given battle space. Ownership of
assets is less important than application of The Army personnel system and training
their effects toward countering the threat. An base provide a supply of qualified soldiers into
understanding of battle space allows forward-deployed/forward-presence theaters or
commanders to keep their options open, to units that may deploy into any region. The
synchronize all friendly assets, and counter the following agencies provide daily support to
threat. As the commander considers the soldiers and their family members:
mission, as well as any perceived mission creep, •Defense Finance and Accounting Service.
he can visualize his battle space throughout •Legal Services Agency.
the operation and how the battle space may
change as he moves to counter the threat. •Chaplaincy Service Support Agency.

FM 100-7

•Community and Family Support Center.

•Other Army staff field operating agencies.
The ASCC may coordinate augmentation of
this support through other services or allies.
Combat health support (CHS) of soldiers
includes all services performed, provided, or
arranged by the Army Medical Department to
promote, conserve, or restore the mental or
physical well-being of personnel in the Army
and, as directed, in other services, agencies,
and organizations. The surgeon general has
overall worldwide responsibility for Army
health care. Senior army commanders and
service components must ensure their soldiers
and their soldiers’ family members receive
these services effectively. In theater, the CHS
system provides care in Echelons I through IV,
ultimately leading to treatment in the US.
Senior commanders ensure that the Army
health care system provides preventive
measures, progressive treatment,
hospitalization, and evacuation of service
members and their families. In developed
theaters the support structure is available to
support peacetime operations. This structure
includes host nation, contract, and interservice
support agreements. Forces conducting
peacetime operations integrate their
operations into this structure.
When operating forces require support not
present in theater or operate in an austere
theater, the ASCC plans and coordinates
support arrangements either unilaterally or
with joint support agencies. Army commanders
develop tailored support packages to provide
essential support for the ARFOR. This could
include functional and area army commands to
provide large-scale or long-term support. These
considerations provide operational-level
commanders with general synchronization
requirements applicable to most peacetime
Training for war is the Army’s top priority.
The ASCC provides the direction, purpose, and
necessary motivation to his subordinates to
successfully accomplish the training mission.
The ASCC outlines his intent and then ensures
that his subordinates focus on mission-
essential task lists (METLs). Most missions
during peacetime can be accomplished by a
disciplined force proficient in METL tasks.
Subordinate METLs must support the CINC’s
theater strategy.

Chapter 8

The ASCC goes beyond these fundamental defense policy of strategic deterrence. Training
training considerations. Since much of the for leaders may be much broader than the
operational-level EAC support structure subordinate METL indicate to ensure the
resides in the reserve components, the ASCC leader flexibility required for conducting both
must be involved with active and reserve warfighting and MOOTW missions. Peacetime
component training as well as with joint operations take advantage of the established
requirements and potentially multinational support structure and capabilities of the
training. Training during peacetime must support and service support elements that
prepare ARFOR for missions across the range sustain the routine peacetime activities.
of military operations and support the national

ASCC peacetime operations include, but nations in response to a crisis requiring a surge
are not limited to, security assistance, nation of military support.
assistance, search and rescue, CA, NEO,
peacekeeping, shows of force, support to NATION ASSISTANCE
counterdrug operations, and humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief. Nation assistance programs promote
stability and orderly progress, thus
contributing to the prevention of conflict. If
SECURITY ASSISTANCE internal conflict has begun, the goal of nation
The Army conducts security assistance assistance is to aid in removing its root causes.
operations to provide military articles, Nation assistance becomes a primary means of
training, and defense-related services bringing the conflict to a successful resolution
authorized by statute law. Security assistance according to the internal defense and
is a key element of US foreign policy, with DOS development strategy. Nation assistance
as the lead agent supported by DOD. These consists of general missions such as assisting
operations are strictly controlled by the with development-related infrastructure
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which deals projects, training health care workers, and
with international military education and improving the professionalism of national
training (IMET), or the Arms Export Control military forces. Nation assistance missions can
Act of 1976, which deals with foreign military generate useful good will toward the US and
sales. The US Government provides security assist friendly governments.
assistance on a credit or cash basis to the host
nation. Senior army commanders must be SEARCH AND RESCUE
careful not to commit the US Government to
providing any assistance that could be Search and rescue operations are
construed as security assistance without sophisticated actions requiring precise
following the statutory requirements. execution. They may be clandestine or overt.
They may include the rescue of US or foreign
The in-country security assistance office nationals or items critical to US national
(SAO) is the military focal point for security. Rescue operations require timely
formulating, planning, and executing these intelligence and detailed planning. They
programs. Theater CINCs make significant usually involve highly trained special units but
contributions, to include supervision, support, may be supported by general-purpose forces.
selection, and command of SAOs. The ASCC Search and rescue operations may be required
contributes to developing assistance in peacetime as well as in conflict and war.
requirements. CONUS-based units are usually
called on to provide security assistance
training teams. Still, in-theater or OCONUS- NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION
based units could also provide the training. NEOs are normally conducted to evacuate
Training provides the most lasting military US civilian noncombatants and nonessential
contribution for security assistance efforts. US military personnel from locations in a
Security assistance officials, in rare foreign (host) nation to a safe haven, preferably
circumstances, may direct the Army to transfer the US. An NEO is normally conducted to
military hardware or materiel to foreign evacuate US citizens whose lives are in danger

FM 100-7

from a hostile environment or natural disaster. These operations can influence other
NEOs may also include the selective governments or politico-military organizations
evacuation of citizens of the host nation and to respect US interests and international law.
third-country nationals. These operations can take the form of aircraft
NEOs involve swift, temporary occupancy and ship visits, multinational training
of an objective, perhaps using temporarily exercises, forward deployment of military
disabling technologies to minimize casualties forces, and introduction or buildup of military
and end with planned withdrawals. They may forces in a region. The appearance of a credible,
include the use of force. Under ideal trained military force underscores national
circumstances, little or no opposition to the policy interests and commitment, improves
operation exists. Still, commanders must host-nation military readiness and morale, and
anticipate and plan for possible hostilities. If provides an insight into US values.
military forces are employed in an NEO, they
usually comprise units from more than one
service. The regional CINC, on being ordered to COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS
support an NEO, designates a JFC to exercise Support to counterdrug operations
overall control of the operations involved in the complies with the national drug control
NEO. strategy, complements the efforts of law
Evacuation operations differ from other enforcement agencies, and supports foreign
military operations, since direction of the governments. At the level of national strategy,
operation may remain with the American the NCA places increasing importance on the
ambassador at the time of the evacuation. role of DOD in controlling the flow of drugs
Further, the order to evacuate is a diplomatic— across US borders. The objective of military
rather than a military—decision, with counterdrug efforts is to reduce the flow of
extensive ramifications. FM 90-29 provides illegal drugs into the US. Military support is
details on NEO operations. therefore a balanced effort to attack the flow of
illegal drugs at the source, while in transit, and
during distribution in the US. Military
PEACEKEEPING counterdrug activities may also be used to
Military peacekeeping operations support support insurgences and counterinsurgencies
diplomatic efforts to achieve or maintain peace and to combat terrorism.
in areas of potential or actual conflict. The
single, most important requirement of a
peacekeeping operation is consent to the HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND
operation by all the parties to the dispute. Such DISASTER RELIEF
consent represents an explicit agreement, Humanitarian assistance and disaster
permitting the introduction of a neutral third relief operations are unique peacetime
party. operations because they could be conducted
The US may participate in peacekeeping within CONUS. Recent examples in the US
operations under the sponsorship of the UN or have included assistance rendered in the
other IOs, such as the Organization of northwest states to contain forest fires and
American States, or in cooperation with other relief operations following Hurricanes Hugo in
countries. The UN has been the most frequent 1989 and Andrew in 1992. These operations fall
sponsor of peacekeeping operations. within the category of support to domestic civil
Peacekeeping often involves ambiguous authorities. Examples of in-theater operations
situations that require the peacekeeping force include famine relief efforts in Somalia and
to deal with extreme tension and violence hurricane relief operations in Hawaii following
without becoming a participant. Based on the Hurricane Iniki.
peacekeeping mandate and the stationing
agreement, specific TOR, follow-on command Humanitarian assistance and disaster
directives, and ROE are established. relief operations provide emergency relief to
victims of natural or man-made disasters.
These operations may include refugee
SHOWS OF FORCE assistance, food preparation and distribution
Shows of force lend credibility to the programs, medical treatment and care, damage
nation’s promises and commitments, increase assessment and control, forensic identification,
its regional influence, and demonstrate resolve. maintenance of law and order, reestablishment

Chapter 8

of communications networks, and sanitation/ are suited to both short-term and longer-term
water facilities. involvement. To be effective in short-term
ARFOR are committed to these operations operations, these programs require continuous
when localities become overwhelmed by the preparation, regional expertise, and consistent
extent of the situation and can no longer coordination between civil and military
provide basic human needs and protection. The authorities. This preparation is best achieved
ability to respond on short notice with a wide through peacetime involvement in the theater.
array of capabilities is a unique attribute of the
Army. The length of commitment is normally Psychological Operations
limited to the time that communities and other ARFOR PSYOP forces execute PSYOP to
government and private agencies can handle support the unified commander and US
continued operations by themselves. When national interests. Throughout the range of
properly executed, military participation in military operations, PSYOP is a vital force
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief employed to optimize the influence of US
operations has long-term positive effects. national policy on foreign target audiences,
Overseas, such participation demonstrates whether neutral, hostile, or friendly. In
good will and engenders mutual respect. At MOOTW, PSYOP provides the commander
home, it provides soldiers the opportunity to with the capability to project the purpose and
demonstrate their skills while helping their mission of US forces and to influence target
fellow citizens. audience behavior to support the commander’s
CIVIL AFFAIRS AND PSYOP is a force multiplier, providing
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS long-range, mid- to long-term support of the
unified commander’s intent. While classified as
Although not a peacetime operation, CA SOF, PSYOP is a general force multiplier. This
and PSYOP are critical operations that aid support exists at all levels of command and
commanders in accomplishing their peacetime operations—from strategic to tactical. PSYOP
objectives. Commanders at all levels must units are regionally focused and maintain
understand the depth and capabilities of CA extensive historical research and expertise on
and psychological support found throughout the sociological, economical, and religious
any given command. Commanders must practices and on the languages of a given AO.
understand the CA and PSYOP ability to ARFOR PSYOP support US Army, Navy,
support US and allied armed forces. Marine Corps, Air Force, and allied forces.
Except for PSYOP-unique equipment and
Civil Affairs military occupational specialties (MOS), the
ARFOR execute CA programs to support unit of attachment sustains PSYOP elements.
the unified commander. During peacetime, CA For PSYOP to achieve maximum effectiveness,
support is often provided as an ancillary planners must include it in the planning
benefit to deployments for training. CA units process early.

Operations conducted in peacetime are The theater CINC organizes his AOR for
designed to preclude the onset of conflict. Due orderly and rapid transition from a peacetime
to factors that may not be controlled, conflict posture to different levels of hostility. This
may evolve. Because the transition to conflict process is sequential and sufficiently flexible to
may occur in a gradual or abrupt manner, the respond to any situation. The transition
ARFOR commander must prepare for either process must be responsive enough to
eventuality. The operational METT-T diplomatic initiatives to be halted or reversed
assessment provides the mental process for the once it has begun. The CINC must be sensitive
continuing reevaluation of the operational to the fact that a prolonged state of heightened
environment. That reevaluation aids the readiness for combat without action may drain
identification of needed Army capabilities in resources and adversely affect morale.
the event of conflict. Such identification assists
national-level decision makers in determining The ASCC translates mission orders from
mobilization requirements. the CINC into plans and military operations. If

FM 100-7

mobilization is required, AMOPES—the Army confrontation; though sometimes, combat

system that supports JOPES—provides a operations may not occur. Army leaders may
disciplined planning procedure for conducting conduct operations very similar to operations
Army mobilization, deployment, planning, and during war but execute them with both
execution (see also FM 100-17). The ASCC and restraints and constraints placed on the use of
appropriate Army commanders review the firepower and maneuver.
mobilization requirements established in
and OPLANs to meet Factors
the situation. C relationships are likely to Senior army commanders must keep four
change as levels of hostility and military factors in mind when considering operations in
involvement increase. conflict: coordination, balance, planning for
Commanders participate in joint and uncertainty, and identification of risk.
multinational planning efforts and coordinate
and prepare ARFOR for deployment and Coordination
employment. Finally, commanders contribute Coordination is critical to establishing the
ARFOR ready to meet joint and multinational basis for the operations being conducted. The
operational requirements and to establish a Army must cooperate with other government
logistical base to support fielded Army units. agencies, services, and nations to deal
effectively with the diplomatically sensitive
RESPONSIBILITIES situations present in conflict.
The theater CINC, with concurrence from Commanders must balance the combat
the NCA, determines when all or part of his posture and readiness of their soldiers against
AOR is in a state of conflict. Conflict is a state the volatile environment in which they
of hostile opposition among organized parties function. A balance must also be struck
or groups within a nation, or between or among between diplomatic goals and the scale,
nations, and usually involves irregular forces intensity, and nature of Army operations
to achieve limited diplomatic or military supporting those goals.
objectives. Conflict is often protracted, and
irregular forces often dominate. Planning for Uncertainty
Military actions may be confined to Commanders must build flexibility into
geographic areas. When US Army units are their plans and operations. Conflict situations
directly engaged in conflict, they can expect are full of uncertainty as presented by both the
guidelines on weaponry and the degree of force threat and the diplomatic conditions that limit
authorized. Diplomatic leaders will likely limit Army options.
objectives to those achievable with short,
focused, and direct application of military Identification of Risk
force. Even though limited in scope, these short Commanders must seek to increase their
applications of force may be part of a campaign options while limiting the enemy’s options.
or major operation phased over an extended Successful commanders do not run out of
period. The NCA or the CINC may further limit options. Risks and gambles are part of option
the conduct of military operations to a specific decisions. The decision to take risks is weighed
geographic area. against the mission, probability of success,
The Army’s Role available intelligence, and as many other
factors as are available to the commander in
The Army’s role in conflict is to assist a JFC his decision cycle.
in gaining control, deterring escalation, and
restoring order. Conflict operations are ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT
challenging because they require a measured
application of military force sufficient to FUNCTIONS IN CONFLICT
accomplish the designated objectives. Operations during conflict present a
Typically, conflict occurs in diplomatically— challenge to Army leadership. The military, as
charged situations within specific legal one of four elements of national power, may not
boundaries. ARFOR operate in a hostile dominate events but may adapt its operations
environment with a high probability of physical to fit those of other lead agencies. In coalition

Chapter 8

and interagency operations, the ASCC must over time and space. Chapter 6 addresses some
achieve unity of effort through cooperation, considerations for forcible entry. Among the
liaison, negotiation, and compromise. Where key considerations is the element of force mix.
practicable, agreements should be formalized Combat forces are key to seizing the lodgment
in writing as TOR, memorandums of area, but support forces become immediately
understanding (MOUs), or similar critical thereafter. Strategic planners and force
instruments. Tasks required of the ARFOR will commanders must ensure that logistics forces
vary relative to the success of returning the and sustainment resources are deployed in
area in conflict to a state of peace. ARFOR must theater as soon as possible to enable combat
be flexible enough to meet a wide range of forces to conduct continuous operations.
operational requirements. The conflict
environment will challenge the versatility of Reception and Onward
the force. Movement
Movement and Maneuver The mission of reception and onward
Movement and maneuver in conflict are movement is to integrate rapidly arriving
characterized by planning that reflects the forces and supplies into the theater without
restrictions and constraints placed on military disrupting the operation’s tempo. This mission
operations. These restrictions and constraints must be balanced against support to current
form a set of requirements and prohibitions operations, as both are logistically intensive.
imposed by the NCA. They usually have a Accordingly, the ASCC must carefully plan and
diplomatic basis that outweighs militarily execute reception and onward movement to
preferred alternatives. The NCA articulates maintain the proper balance to support
these restrictions and constraints in different arriving forces and the operation’s tempo.
manners. Early base development efforts are key
considerations for the Army commander. Units
ROE are the translation of circumstances and facilities for the reception of forces are
and limitations for the initiation and conduct of critical, especially in the initial phase and in an
engagements with hostile forces. Personnel undeveloped theater.
ceiling caps restrict the level of forces that can
become involved in a conflict within prescribed Disposition of Forces
geographical boundaries. Designated AOs The final consideration for maneuver
define restrictions on the commander’s battle during conflict is the disposition of forces.
space. These factors combine to influence the Deployment of forces into their initial positions
movement of forces into the AO. After that is critical. This positioning must support both
movement, maneuver is influenced by these current and subsequent operations as
same factors. envisioned by the Army commanders. ARFOR
Army Force may operate from noncontiguous bases that
In conflict, the Army force needed is a key require the Army commander to develop lines
of operation and support with a minimum
consideration. Often the presence of amount of protection. To be able to rapidly
overwhelming force in the conflict area mass his forces and prevent the enemy from
discourages enemy actions. Senior army gaining the initiative, the commander must
commanders must forthrightly articulate the have a finely tuned intelligence capability, a
resources required to achieve quick and detailed understanding of the physical
decisive victory with minimum casualties. disposition of friendly forces, and a high degree
Based upon the diplomatic situation and other of operational-level mobility.
competing priorities, the Army commander
may have to achieve his goals with
considerably fewer resources than he desires. Fires
The sequencing of major operations in this Operational-level fires during conflict
environment requires patience and a clear revolve around two key considerations: ROE
understanding of the diplomatic realities that and coordination of joint fires. The types of fires
apply to the particular conflict. permitted are likely to be limited, and the fires
used will require a higher level of precision and
Forcible Entry greater reliance on temporary disabling
Conditions may require a forcible entry. techniques and technology. Collateral damage
This capability requires the staging of forces is less tolerable in conflict. Failure to control

FM 100-7

and limit collateral damage can endanger the soldiers are not placed in an undue risk
long-term effects supporting stability. situation. Strong command and levels of
The Army may find itself in a supported discipline and training lessen those risks.
role in the area of operational fires. For Training in peacetime must be realistic and
instance, the precision and depth of the fires equate to requirements for fighting in war.
required may dictate a predominant Air Force •The fourth component is avoiding
role. To achieve his operational objectives and
complement the JFC’s plan, the Army fratricide— the unintentional killing or
commander selects targets for Army resources wounding of friendly personnel by fire.
to attack and nominates targets for other Commanders must maintain situational
resources to attack. The joint coordination awareness of the enemy and their
process is critical to ensuring that resources personnel. This situational awareness,
are not wasted and that fires create a along with strong command presence,
synergistic effect. disciplined operations, and anticipation of
The Army operational-level commander future operations helps limit probability
must have an organic staff capability to plan and occurrences of fratricide.
and coordinate operational-level fires. This
staff element is the DOCC. His staff must also Commanders implement the
have the capability to augment the joint staff THREATCON system. Table 8-1 briefly
for planning and coordinating joint operational describes THREATCONs Normal, Alpha,
fires. Because of potential restraints and Bravo, Charlie, and Delta. The implementation
constraints caused by concerns over collateral decision is based upon—
damages, other systems may take on a role of •The threat assessment.
greater utility. Other systems’ fires are
designed to impair, disrupt, or delay the •Personnel and facility criticality and
performance of enemy operational forces, vulnerabilities.
functions, and facilities.2 PSYOP, SOF, EW •Resource availability.
(jamming), and other C countermeasures are
all disabling fire options. •Operations and morale impacts.
•Damage control considerations.
Protection of the force requires heightened •International relations.
awareness as conditions move toward direct •Possible terrorist retaliatory responses.
confrontation. As the likelihood of
confrontation increases, so does the The commander must recognize that
vulnerability of the force, unless additional information on the threat is difficult to obtain
protection measures are implemented. prior to an incident. Army Regulation 525-13
Protection conserves the fighting potential of a discusses the combatting terrorism program in
force and is every soldier’s responsibility. detail. The identification of friendly force
Protection has four components. vulnerabilities and geopolitical assets are key
•The first component includes OPSEC and steps in protection. Essential facilities must be
deception operations. Successful execution identified. Communications must be protected
from interference and interception. While the
of this component prevents the enemy from basic principles for deception hold true during
locating and causing harm to friendly forces. conflict, they are often more difficult to apply.
•The second component supports keeping OPSEC is significantly harder to sustain in
soldiers healthy and maintaining their an open society where national survival is not
fighting morale. It includes protecting their at stake. Deception is more difficult to achieve
equipment and supplies and taking care of when the operational-level objectives have
their basic needs. more diplomatic content than military
significance. The Army commander must
•The third component is safety. It is a ensure that his deception plans support the
principal element and must be an integral unified command’s plans and are not
part of all military operations. Soldiers compromised by information leaks. The
conducting military operations are placed at environment of conflict often appears peaceful,
risk; still, commanders must ensure that requiring commanders to remain vigilant to

Chapter 8

guard against complacency. Terrorism is most transition to a state of conflict footing. Conflict
effective when the threat is not highly visible planners may have to consider combined
and surprise is likely to be achieved. relationships. The level 2
of international
integration will affect C . The unified command
Command and Control 2
structure2 serves as the C structure to build
During conflict, the ASCC contributes to upon. C may emanate straight from the
the CINC’s theater strategy of limiting national level if operations include actions of
hostilities. These efforts often involve direct direct strategic importance.
use of military power to complement
diplomatic As operations in theater transition to2
initiatives. The principal C problem is how to conflict, in-theater forces and existing C
integrate US military actions with lead relationships may be adequate to accomplish
agencies of our own or foreign governments. the mission. ARFOR from CONUS or other
The Army has a variety of operations to select theaters could increase the complexity, scope,
from in supporting conflict2 situations, all of and level of forces executing operations beyond
which have some common C considerations. the capabilities of the normal theater
Structure structure. This would thereby require
augmentation or restructuring. In austere
Military leaders conduct conflict operations theaters, an Army force may have to arrive in
without a declaration of war. The absence of theater prepared to support itself and execute
this declaration restricts the structuring of the operations unassisted. Later, the theater
theater for operations. In MOOTW, the CINC ASCC may control all operations, or the CINC
does not establish a theater of war or theaters could task the ASCC to support operations
of operation unless it is a major conflict. while he directly controls the execution of
Normally, he establishes smaller areas, such as operations through a separate operational
a JOA, for conducting operations. Diplomatic chain of command.
considerations predominate over purely 2
military requirements and constrain C . The
senior military leader has a greater level of Planning
freedom than in peacetime but must coordinate Army operational-level commanders are
closely with nonmilitary agencies. Whatever active participants in the development of all
the geographic organization,
the ASCC must conflict plans. They may participate in
establish clear C structures for conducting deliberate planning (JOPES, Volume VI) to
operations in conflict. prepare for anticipated or potential actions.
Unanticipated or rapidly developing situations
Command Relationships may require operational-level commanders to
Command relationships and structure conduct CAP. Planning for conflict, especially
usually begin with existing peacetime at the operational level, is a continuous
arrangements that require a degree of process. Rapidly changing diplomatic

FM 100-7

conditions may change the desired objective, closely with the host government to develop
composition, and sequencing of conflict and improve the intelligence capabilities of all
operations. Planners must prepare multiple security forces. During counterinsurgency
branches and sequels to enhance their ability operations, intelligence provides the basis for
to provide timely support. Senior army all US and host nation plans. Prior to
commanders require a flexible force structure commitment, US military forces provide
to enable their organization to achieve the specific intelligence requirements to the US
desired strategic end. national intelligence community. This ensures
that national-level collection focuses on force
Intelligence requirements. Cooperative or multinational MI
Early establishment of an ACE is critical activities at the operational level are integral
for successful operations. ACE operations to effective intelligence collection and
should commence within the theater of production. Army intelligence units provide
operations before hostilities. Intelligence technical expertise, management, and advice to
communications established between the develop host nation intelligence capabilities.
theater intelligence center and the national They help establish objectives and, where
systems provide the critical intelligence that desirable and feasible, develop common
US military forces require immediately upon procedures.
arrival and until tactical intelligence flow is The Army can provide tactical intelligence
established. support in conflict situations. ARFOR can
Operational intelligence must support the contribute experience and expertise to
targeting effort of operational fires and/or establish and manage all-source intelligence
set the stage for operational-level maneuver. operations and enhance overall management of
Success requires sound IPB. In conflict, IPB the intelligence effort. This management of
may follow the process used for a conventional intelligence information includes data on
battlefield or a modified process that focuses on internal unrest, on external support for
nonmilitary information. Civilian trends are insurgencies, and on host nation military
often as important as operational information. capabilities, including intelligence and
Weather analysis remains an important part of counterintelligence.
IPB. Doctrinal templates for guerrillas, The threat of sabotage, terrorism, and
surrogates, and narcotics traffickers do not subversion requires MI staffs to focus their
exist. counterintelligence collection efforts. These
Intelligence personnel need different efforts require close coordination with host
collection techniques and background nation police and legal officials. In countries
information, which may require continuous where cooperative or multinational intelligence
updating. The process must react to the systems already exist, newly arrived Army
dynamics of the specific situation it supports, tactical units normally work with the area
as well as to the worldwide situation. itelligence elements on a mutual support
Intelligence agencies must exploit the full basis. When the situation forces Army units to
range of both US and host nation intelligence move frequently, they should not assume
and counterintelligence production responsibility for long-term, area-oriented
capabilities. This includes the collection and intelligence programs. Still, they may
analysis of SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT, contribute significantly to short-term collection
which are particularly valuable in determining and production efforts. All Army personnel
hostile intentions. during conflict provide information which,
when tied into the data-gathering system, can
The ASCC provides theater-specific produce useful intelligence.
intelligence integration for the Army
operational-level commander. The Army Logistics
commander develops his picture of the In conflict, the ASCC tailors logistics to
operational area, based upon the threat he provide basic requirements in an austere
faces and the information gathered by the situation. He stages logistics and uses
intelligence system. Intelligence should be the intermediate support bases, leading to full base
basis for all action. development if necessary. He does this with the
During foreign internal defense operations, use of HNS. Early deployment of the LSE from
the Army’s intelligence organization works USAMC ensures a positive link from the

Chapter 8

deploying units to the national logistics system organizations. These logistics responsibilities
and may be required to fill gaps in the TOE include—
logistics infrastructure or projected selected •Patient evacuation and medical regulation.
elements of the national/industrial base into2
theater. The LSE could provide an initial C •Hospitalization.
structure to orchestrate USAMC resources and •Health service Iogistics/blood management.
the logistics efforts of contractors and HNS. •Preventive medicine, dental, veterinary,
The degree of development of the host nation’s
infrastructure has a significant influence upon medical laboratory, and combat stress
the Army commander’s long-range logistics control services.
operations. In an austere environment, •Area medical support.
logistics operations can take precedence over •Command, control, and communications
near-term combat operations. 3
(C ).
The Army commander takes a long-range Logistics operations may become the
view of the conflict situation and plans his primary Army weapon in conflict. Critical
logistics for the anticipated duration of combat logistical skills supplied by the Army may
operations, plus a transition period. He is allow the host nation to focus on combat
responsible for providing HSS to ARFOR and, requirements in the particular conflict, with
as directed, to other services, agencies, and little or no US Army participation.

In conflict, the ASCC executes a variety of a terrorist act. Antiterrorism includes those
operations that contribute to the achievement of defensive measures that reduce the
theater-strategic goals. These may include the vulnerability of individuals and property. The
continuation and expansion of the full range of extent of these defensive measures varies
previously discussed operations begun in based on assessment of the local threat. These
peacetime, as well as attacks, raids, UW, measures include—
support of insurgences and •Being personally aware and knowledgeable
counterinsurgencies, peacemaking, security of personal protection techniques.
assistance surges, and operations to combat
terrorism. Sometimes operations are in •Implementing crime and physical security
response to a crisis or other rapidly developing programs to harden the target.
situation. At other times operations may call for
long-term planning and sequenced execution to •Making installations and personnel less
support theater goals. Chapter 4 provides Army appealing as terrorist targets.
planning and deployment considerations for
crisis situations. FM 100-17 addresses Army Counterterrorism
planning and deployment considerations across Counterterrorism includes the full range of
the range of military operations. offensive measures to prevent, deter, and
respond to terrorism. These measures are
TERRORISM normally carried out by SOF under the
Terrorism is the calculated use of violence direction of the NCA. Local measures include
or the threat of violence to inculcate fear. only those actions taken to terminate an
Terrorism is intended to coerce or intimidate incident or apprehend individuals responsible
governments or societies pursuing goals that for terrorist acts. Other countermeasures—
are generally diplomatic, religious, or preemption, intervention, or retaliation with
ideological. Combatting terrorism consists of specialized forces operating under the direction
defensive (antiterrorism) and offensive of the NCA—have the characteristics of attacks
(counterterrorism) actions. or raids.
The Army commander may conduct actions
Antiterrorism before, during, or after a terrorist incident.
Antiterrorism includes all measures that Although DOS has the lead in combatting
installations, units, and individuals take to OCONUS terrorism, the Army commander and
reduce the probability of their falling victim to his staff must understand the threat and its

FM 100-7

tactics, as well as current US policies, when and diplomatic development, while UW

dealing with terrorists. The Army may be the emphasizes military actions.
lead or a supporting force in an effort to combat
terrorism during a specific operation. INSURGENCY AND
ATTACKS AND RAIDS Insurgency and counterinsurgency are two
Attacks and raids can support rescue or aspects of the same process. However, they
recovery operations to destroy or seize differ in execution. Insurgents assume that
equipment or facilities that demonstrably appropriate change within the existing system
threaten national collective security interests. is not possible or likely. Insurgency therefore
They can also support counterdrug operations focuses on radical change in diplomatic control
by destroying narcotics production or and requires extensive use of covert
transshipment facilities (if authorized by the instruments and methods. Counterinsurgency
NCA) or by supporting a host government’s uses principally overt methods and assumes
actions in this regard. The principles of combat appropriate change within the existing system
operations directly apply. is possible and likely. The US supports selected
Attacks by ground, air, and naval forces insurgences that oppose oppressive regimes
damage or destroy high-value targets or which work against US interests. Since
demonstrate the capability to do so. Raids are support for insurgences is often covert, many
usually small-scale operations involving swift operations connected with them are special
penetration of hostile territory to secure activities. Because of their extensive UW
information, seize an objective, or destroy training, SOF are well-suited to provide such
targets. Attacks and raids end with a support.
withdrawal. Successful attacks and raids can Conventional forces may be called on when
create situations that permit seizing and the situation requires their functional
maintaining the diplomatic initiative. To be specialties. Their tasks may include support
successful, they require the proper focus of and advice. The CINC may direct the ASCC to
planning, organization, training, and provide equipment, training, and services to
equipment. Attacks and raids may involve insurgent forces. In the following types of
conventional forces and SOF. The JFC usually operations, ARFOR can assist insurgents:
plays a larger role than the Army operational- •Recruiting, organizing, training, and
level commander in planning and executing equipping forces to perform unconventional
these types of operations.
or guerrilla warfare.
UW is a series of military and paramilitary •Institutional and infrastructure
operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy- development.
controlled, or diplomatically sensitive territory.
UW includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla •Intelligence-gathering.
warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, •Surreptitious insertion.
sabotage, and other operations of a low
visibility, covert, or clandestine nature. US •Linkups.
military support to UW operations can include •Evasion and escape of combatants.
the use of both conventional forces and SOF.
UW is usually a long-term effort. •Subversion.
Techniques and tactics for certain UW •Sabotage.
operations are similar to those employed in •Resupply.
support of insurgences. However, support for
insurgency differs from that for UW. The US uses its military resources to
Insurgency accomplishes strategic goals provide support to a host nation’s
directly, whereas UW typically supports counterinsurgency operations in the context of
conventional operations. The difference affects foreign internal defense (FID). FID is the
the operational and strategic design of the participation by civilian and military agencies
operation. For example, operations in support in any of the action programs another
of insurgences give priority to infrastructure government takes to free its society from

Chapter 8

subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The The long-range goals of a PE operation are
US ambassador, through his country team, two-fold. The first goal is to contain the conflict
provides the focal point for interagency to prevent the destabilization of adjacent areas.
coordination and supervision of FID. The second goal is the agreement to a
Military support to FID is provided negotiated settlement by the parties to the
through the unified CINC. Military resources conflict. This settlement must resolve the basis
provide materiel, advisors, trainers, and for the conflict and establish the foundation for
security assistance forces to support the host the transition to peacekeeping operations and
nation government’s counterinsurgency peacetime operations. The diplomatic
operations through SAOs. ARFOR operations complexities of operations to restore order
that support a host nation conducting a require that available force be sufficient but its
counterinsurgency may include, but are not use be applied with discretion. The operation
limited to, intelligence-gathering, joint and also requires that the forces be appropriate to
combined exercises, civil-military operations, the environment.
humanitarian or civic assistance, logistical The senior army commander must
support operations, populace and resource understand the constraints and diplomatic
control operations, drug-interdiction sensitivities of this environment and recognize
operations, and tactical operations. that local law and customs often influence his
actions. PE operations require 2
PEACE ENFORCEMENT mission analysis, clear C relationships,
effective communications facilities, joint and
(OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER) multinational force liaison, and effective public
When in the national interest to stop a diplomacy and PSYOP.
violent conflict and force a return to diplomatic
methods, the US conducts peace enforcement SECURITY ASSISTANCE
(PE) operations with its military forces. The US SURGES
typically undertakes PE operations at the
request of appropriate national authorities in a The US accelerates security assistance
foreign state or to protect US citizens as part of when a friendly or allied nation faces imminent
an international multilateral or unilateral threat. In these surges, operations usually
operation. The PE force does not represent a focus on logistical support. Geography, the
wholly disinterested power or such a drastic magnitude of the logistics effort, and time
commitment would not be made. However, the limitations determine airlift and sealift
interests of the country or countries that requirements. US support to Israel during the
provide forces for these operations are served 1973 Arab-Israeli War illustrates this kind of
best by a cessation of violence and a negotiated operation. The Yom Kippur War demonstrates
settlement. the importance of airlift in the initial stages of
conflict and the follow-on strength of sealift.
Conflict within a given area eventually The CINC may direct the senior army
affects adjacent areas. These effects are seldom commander to provide equipment from his
desirable and can include refugee movements, command as part of security assistance surges.
arms marketing, proliferation of weapons, and The senior army commander may also provide
environmental contamination. A further some of the logistical support (port operation
potential exists for the expansion of the conflict and line haul units) needed to transfer surge
beyond its original boundaries. equipment to the friendly nation.

The successful termination of conflict operations and prepare the way for the use of
operations leads to a return to peacetime. The diplomatic, informational, and economic
unsuccessful termination of conflict endangers elements of power in a peacetime environment.
US interests or threatens a possible transition As the level of hostility lessens, the ASCC
to war. In either case, the ASCC must be changes the composition of his force. He
prepared for these outcomes. The ASCC plans replaces those combat arms forces—essential
consolidation operations to terminate combat during combat operations—with CS and CSS

FM 100-7

forces as hostilities subside. Finally, he and reconstitution of forces, which facilitates a

positions nation-assistance forces to complete return to peacetime activities. As a part of
the transition to peacetime operations. postoperation reporting, the commander
develops lessons learned for incorporation into
The ASCC plans an orderly redeployment training during peacetime activities.
of forces. This redeployment includes recovery

Appendix A

Army Service Component Command

Responsibilities and Organization
This appendix focuses on the functions, responsibilities, and
capabilities of those operational-level organizations formerly known as
echelons above corps. It addresses the dynamic nature of the theater
strategic and operational requirements in the states of peacetime,
conflict, and war. It contains requirements for establishing and
designing a theater. It describes responsibilities, functions, and
organizations required to conduct major operations and provide
logistical support. It pinpoints the functional, operational, and support
responsibilities of the Army service component commander (formerly
known as the theater army commander) in the theater.
The Army service component serves as the senior Army echelon in
a theater and is the Army service component command of a unified
command. It includes the service component commander and all Army
personnel, organizations, units, and installations that have been
assigned to the unified command. The Army’s operational-level
organizations assist and augment tactical (corps and division)

During periods of peacetime deployments The total capabilities the ASCC provides
and training where Army forces pass through may not be initially required in theater for the
the area or operate within a CINC’s AOR, but early stages of a force-projection operation.
are not assigned to that CINC, the ASCC Rather, the ASCC structure represents
coordinates with the ASCC of the appropriate capabilities that would be task-organized into
CINC to ensure those forces are supported. a selected force based upon the mission,
However, except as the NCA directs, all forces assessment of the operational environment,
operating within the geographic area assigned constraints, restraints, and the commander’s
to a combatant command shall be assigned or risk assessment. Each theater is unique. The
attached to and under the command of that functional requirements of a theater
combatant commander. The architecture of the organization remain somewhat constant. The
Army in a theater is flexible enough to meet the variable is the level of capability required.
needs of combatant commanders. The ASCC The ASCC tailors units to provide the specific
has a number of capabilities and options for capabilities the CINC requires and echelons
organization and provides the capabilities that
support a force-projection concept—from an those capabilities as required into the
austere to a fully developed theater. theater.

Historically, echelons of command at the headquarters—the field army—to control
operational level of war (EAC) have gone multiple corps. The World War II structure
through an evolutionary process. During the expanded this, using army groups and field
Civil War, the Army began evolving toward armies between the theater and corps
larger, Army-level units with a single commanders. These Army groups were formed
commander directing large forces dispersed in to control two to five field armies. In turn, the
multiple locations. Then, during World War I, field army could control a like number of corps.
the theater commander used an intermediate Essentially, an army group could control a
maximum of 25 corps.

FM 100-7

With the structuring of the Army around a When a corps or division is fully engaged at
four-corps base, the requirement for the army the tactical level, it cannot be expected to
group and field army was eliminated. However, assume responsibility for the additional
the functions performed by the army group and functions and command responsibilities that
field army were not eliminated, resulting in correspond to the operational level. It has
those functions (Title 10) being performed by a neither the personnel nor materiel resources to
forward-deployed theater army and its perform both responsibilities. Chapter 6
requisite subordinate organizations discusses these additional requirements in
performing specific functions. Additionally, the detail. Under the force-projection concept, a
requirement for a multiple corps operation tactical-level unit may conduct operational-
required the capability to constitute at least an level operations. In principle, these operations
headquarters (a numbered should be performed by an echelon not directly
army) for C of the operations. responsible for commanding tactical
operations. The tactical force commander must
Should multinational forces be added to a be free to concentrate resources on the tactical
conflict, as we anticipate to be the case, larger mission. Whereas, the operational-level
formations are possible. The issue then commander must be free to concentrate
becomes one of span of control for the theater resources on the performance of the three
CINC. Modern forces have a significant operational-level tasks—joint, multinational,
mobility advantage over their World War II and interagency linkage; conduct of Army
counterparts, where the US Army last formed operations; and support of Army operations.
army groups. That mobility advantage permits
smaller formations to operate over larger AOs. The Army contributes operational-level
Army echelons reflect the unified command organizations to support joint and
structure, increased span of control multinational operations. Operational-level
capabilities, and improved weapons units fight and support, as well as make up a
technology. Corps serve as the Army support base. Operational-level forces may be
centerpiece for structure and are normally the part of a forward presence that serves as a
building blocks upon which the Army symbol of US national resolve. Other forces
organizes. The ASCC, formerly called the remain in the US to provide rapid force
theater army commander, carries out the projection to forward-deployed units or to
Title 10 responsibilities within the theater. execute contingency operations. Whatever the
case, Army leaders need to be familiar with
Subordinate JFCs may control multiple US those Army operational-level forces that
Army corps without an intermediate Army contribute capabilities to joint and
headquarters. Then, the ASCC carries out the multinational operations. US Army levels of
Title 10 responsibilities in lieu of the theater command include—
army. However, the ASCC may choose to •Army service component command.
organize a numbered army as an intermediate
headquarters between the corps and the JFC to •Numbered army.
command and control operations when •Corps.
required by METT-T. Army organizations are
structured to enable them to perform the •Division.
missions to which they are assigned. At corps •Brigade, regiment, or group.
and below, those missions are primarily
tactical. Corps and below units must be •Battalion or squadron.
augmented to perform at the operational level. •Company, battery, or troop.
Still, units that normally operate at the tactical
level may not have the operational perspective These echelons of command provide a means for
necessary to skillfully link tactical operations commanders to achieve operational- and tactical-
to strategic objectives. level objectives. Each of these echelons has its
own set of capabilities and considerations.

The Chief of Staff of the Army, with the unified commands to meet theater
CJCS and unified command authorities, requirements.
configures the Army service component to the

Appendix A

In peacetime, the CINC normally exercises CINC also could designate the ASCC as the
COCOM through the ASCC. The ASCC must CJTF. The ASCC would focus on all three
have a strategic and operational perspective operational-level tasks. The CJTF may choose
while executing his responsibilities. He serves to organize his command by service element,
as the principal advisor to the CINC for functional component, subordinate JTF, or any
supporting and employing ARFOR in theater. combination of these. The ASCC, if not the
The ASCC participates in mid- and long-range GJTF, would continue to focus on sustainment
planning to support the CINC's theater and support of all ARFOR assigned or attached
strategy and campaign plan, conducts major to the theater.
operations that support the CINC's campaign
plan, and provides sustainment and support of The CINC may choose to exercise COCOM
all ARFOR assigned or attached to the theater. directly over specific forces. The ASCC would
The ASCC may exercise OPCON of selected place ARFOR under the direct OPCON of the
forces. He may command forces executing CINC for the conduct of operations. The ASCC
combat operations or MOOTW. would continue to focus on sustainment and
support of all ARFOR assigned or attached to
The ASCC performs three strategic and the theater. If the CINC chooses to exercise
operational-level tasks— COCOM through functional component
•Establish linkages and coordinate with the commanders, three scenarios are possible.
joint force head quarters and other service •The functional component commander
component commanders. might also be the ASCC. The ASCC would
•Conduct operations. conduct major combat operations and
•Conduct support operations to sustain the support operations for the theater.
ARFOR assigned to the theater. •The functional component commander
The ASCC’s strategic task in peacetime is might also be an Army commander—but not
to carry out the strategic logistics tasks and the ASCC. In this scenario, the ASCC could
priorities for the CINC. The ASCC’s establish a numbered army, and the
operational role in peacetime is to plan and numbered army commander could be the
conduct operations and exercises to execute the functional component commander. The
CINC’s theater strategy and plans. The ASCC ASCC would place ARFOR under OPCON of
is responsible for sustaining all forces in the numbered army commander for the
theater and maintaining the capability to conduct of operations. Within the functional
expand to accommodate ARFOR required for organization, the numbered army
theater operations plans. For a complete commander would perform the three
discussion of service component operational-level tasks. However, the ASCC
responsibilities, see Joint Pub 0-2, Chapter 3. would continue to focus on sustainment and
support of all ARFOR assigned or attached
CONFLICT AND WAR to the theater.
As the theater transitions to conflict or •The functions component commander
war, the CINC may choose one of several
options to exercise COCOM. Each of these might also be a commander from another
options has different impacts on the service such as the Marine Corps. In this
employment of ARFOR. The CINC may choose scenario, the ASCC would place ARFOR
to continue to exercise COCOM through the under rider OPCON of the functional component
ASCC. The ASCC would conduct major commander for the conduct of operations.
operations and continue to provide Within the functional organization, the
sustainment and support of all ARFOR ARFOR commander would perform the
assigned or attached to the theater. The CINC three operational-level tasks. The ASCC
may assign the ASCC support-related tasks would continue to focus on sustainment and
solely or a combination of both support
.. and support of all ARFOR assigned or attached
operational tasks. to the theater.
The CINC may choose to exercise COCOM
through a JTF for a limited duration mission. As the theater transitions to conflict or
The ASCC would place ARFOR under OPCON war, the probability increases that the CINC
of the CJTF for the conduct of operations. The will separate the ASCC’s operational

responsibilities from its support role. The the ASCC concentrates on conducting support
CINC may designate another commander to operations.
focus on conducting combat operations, while


The ASCC provides to the CINC a2 ARFOR to the right place at the right time to
collection of capabilities, functions, and C enable the CINC to strategically concentrate
elements to accomplish the mission. With the forces and logistics to generate decisive combat
initial deployment of forces, the ASCC, based power. Figure A-1 illustrates the capabilities
on METT-T, tailors his organization to provide and functions the ASCC provides.
the required support to conduct major
operations, battles, and engagements. The The ASCC becomes intimately involved
ASCC’s support function has a major impact on with decisions concerning competing demands
the design and conduct of campaigns and major for limited resources. He assists the theater
operations. The ASCC must get the right CINC in the development of support priorities,

Appendix A

particularly those affecting other services. To transit visibility, real-time communications,

support the force-projection concept and in and pre-positioned materiel (on land and
addition to projecting forces and support, the afloat), along with improved strategic lift
ASCC must also coordinate the projection of capability, ensures sustainment of the
additional required support from CONUS, projected force. FM 100-16 describes these
another theater, or an intermediate support concepts in detail.
base, using air lines of communication (ALOCs)
and sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Because of the changing nature of the force
Figure A-2 illustrates this situation. size, necessary time frame, and resource
constraints, units must be capable of providing
In contingency operations, upon entry into mission-essential support before the arrival of
the AO, US forces may be either opposed or doctrinal logistics units or when deployment of
unopposed. Each type entails a different mix of logistics units would exceed what is required to
forces and capabilities. The existence of little or support the force’s mission. Mission- and
no in-theater support base may require that a capability-oriented modular elements are
large logistics organization, with augmentation designed to support combat-essential
from strategic and operational-level logistics requirements through sequencing capabilities
organizations, accompany the deploying into the AO. The capability projection of
tactical unit. The synchronization of2 the logistics support must focus on two critical
deployment of CSS units, supplies, and C with areas: essential requirements and the strategic
the increase in combat capabilities is critical. end state. Decisions made early in the process
affect the end result. If a developed support
Theater logistics support requires a infrastructure is absent or eliminated in an
seamless logistics profile, from strategic area, an ASCC headquarters could serve as the
logistics—DLA, USAMC, and General Services nucleus for a theater base development
logistics field units. The process. One example of a possible ASCC
historical C and support structure provided in headquarters organization is shown in
a mature theater may not be in place. Units Figure A-3. For other examples refer to
must rely on a logistics system that operates on FM 101-5.
the basis of projecting and supporting force
capability instead of supporting units and The ASCC headquarters conducts planning
echelons. Implementation of concepts, such as and coordinates major operations and support
split-based operations, total asset visibility, in- through flexible combinations of area and

FM 100-7

functionally oriented organizations. The ASCC is responsible for managing the

Headquarters management involves managing Army’s support base in a developed theater.
the organization and administration of the Besides managing the Army’s support base, the
headquarters, including— unified commander may designate the ASCC
•Coordinating and supervising movement, as the JRAC responsible for surface security of
the entire JRA, organization and operation of
internal arrangement, space allocation, and the theater support base, and conduct of rear
administrative support. operations for all land component services
•Supervising agencies that service the (Joint Pub 3-10.1).
command, such as the American Red Cross;
civilian safety personnel; morale, welfare, SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
and recreation personnel. A developed theater consists of forward-
•Recommending manpower allocation, deployed resources and forces with some level
especially in the use of personnel authorized of installation and HNS. In war, this theater
in large numbers to the headquarters. support base, or JRAC, would be located in the
intratheater COMMZ or in a dispersal area.
•Allocating shelter in the headquarters area The ASCC operates within the theater’s
for troops, in coordination with the G3 for developed infrastructure and CINC's strategic
area organizations and the G4 for provision priorities to receive forces and resources
of shelter. through seaports of debarkation (SPOD) and
aerial ports of debarkation (APOD). The ASCC
•Providing control and standardization of establishes the logistics infrastructure for the
procedures within the headquarters. All theater of operations and assists in
staff officers are responsible for proper establishing and adjusting theater LOCs. The
administrative activities within their own ASCC receives, equips, marshals, stages, and
staff sections. moves units forward to the tactical assembly

Appendix A
Logistics Command and Control
areas for employment. The ASCC continues to The ASCC must provide total support to all
support and reconstitute these deployed ARFOR in theater. If the ASCC chooses to
ARFOR. Upon termination of conflict, the focus
on operations and streamline his span of
ASCC continues to provide support to the C , he may establish a deputy commander for
ARFOR to allow redeployment and support and make him responsible for
reconstitution of the force. The theater oversight of the total support mission. Or, he
organization with a COMMZ is depicted in may choose to retain control of the support
Figure A-4. function and orchestrate it through his deputy
chief of staff for support or appropriate
Multifunctional Logistics coordinating staff office—that is, DCSPER,
Support deputy chief of staff for logistics (DCSLOG), or
deputy chief of staff for resource management
The CINC, with advice from the ASCC, (DCSRM).
may organize logistical support in his AOR To orchestrate the many supply and service2
with single, subordinate commanders missions, the ASCC establishes a logistics C
responsible for large geographic areas. headquarters in the COMMZ. It provides
Normally, the ASCC places these 2
areas under reception and operation staging to units
the command of a logistics C headquarters. located in or passing through the COMMZ.
The ASCC may further divide the support This reception and operation staging includes
areas into smaller areas assigned to a logistics personnel and administration support, direct
task-organized support element. The ASCC support (DS) maintenance, and supply, field
establishes as many logistics headquarters and services, and local transportation provision.
logistics task organization elements as needed 2
to efficiently support his force in theater. The logistics C headquarters provides
Figure A-5 illustrates this area command backup logistical support to corps or other
structure. subordinate units and performs general

FM 100-7

support (GS) maintenance to support the Joint UXOs. It is responsible for channeling this
Theater Logistics System (JTLS) under work information out of the theater and back down to
load direction of its materiel management each detachment.
center (MMC). The logistics headquarters
coordinates area functions, such as traffic Additionally,
the ASCC, through the
circulation and population control, with host logistics C headquarters, plans and executes
nation agencies and MPs and coordinates rear security operations in the COMMZ. The
property maintenance activities with the ASCC may task the logistics headquarters to
engineers. This headquarters provides an provide out-of-sector support.
Figure A-6
organization for centralized control of all Army shows a typical logistics C organization that
EOD efforts in the theater. This provision the2 ASCC could design to provide the logistics
allows the ordnance organization commander, C functions (less provision for Class VIII and
with direction from the ASCC’s staff, to quickly classified maps). The attached organizations
focus EOD assets to critical locations or are METT-T dependent.
operations. FM 9-15 covers EOD structure and
operations. Area Support
Working with the deputy chief of staff for The ASCC tailors LSE organization to
engineers (DCSENG), the ordnance provide area support based on its subordinate
organization plans and coordinates organizations, unit missions, and services
counterunexploded ordnance operations. required by the forces within the specific AOR.
Either in the corps or in logistical bases, EOD The most common situation requires an
units can be quickly reassigned to meet any element to command and control a mix of DS
battlefield requirement. When EOD and GS units, though emphasis is on DS to the
detachments are not readily available, the units in or passing through its servicing area.
ASCC may direct engineer units to conduct Functions normally provided on an area
counterunexploded ordnance operations. basis include maintenance, supply and
Additionally, unit level organizations must services, and petroleum supply. Strategic
train to identify unexploded ordnance (UXO) logistics organizations (DLA, USAMC), as
and perform self-extraction from submunitions determined by memorandum of agreement
and scatterable mines on the battlefield. The2 (MOA) or MOU with appropriate commands,
ordnance unit (EOD) within the logistics C also provide support on an area basis.
headquarters acts as the information flow Additionally, medical units provide HSS
on an
manager for technical intelligence dealing with area basis but maintain a separate C element.

Appendix A

The C element may also coordinate and •Civil affairs.
execute rear2 security operations. An area •Aviation support.
support C organization is shown in
Figure A-7. •Intelligence structures.
Specific Functions •Petroleum functions.
The ASCC must provide special functions •Ammunition supply and storage.
to provide GS in both the COMMZ and CZ. A •Movement control
deputy commander for operations, a deputy •Materiel management
commander for logistics, or someone reporting
directly to the ASCC may provide the functions
to the command. If the theater matures for a Signal
long-standing mission with forward-deployed The ASCC, through his G6, provides
troops, then functional commands, based on information system support to all US Army
METT-T, could be established for the areas elements within the theater. The ASCC signal
of— function requires an integrated communication
•Signal. network within the COMMZ, out-of-theater
access, and interface with the CZ systems.
•Personnel service support. During the planning phase of any operation,
•Public affairs and news media. planners must consider initial deployment
through a fully mature theater, sustained
•Finance. operations, contingency plans, phased
•Engineer. reduction of signal support as units redeploy,
and signal support requirements supporting
•Transportation. posthostility activities.
•Combat health service support. The ASCC tailors the organizational-level
•Air defense. signal 4organization to meet his requirements
for C support. This support includes
•Special operations support. communication, automation, visual

FM 100-7

information, printing and publications, and operations and is achieved using means such as
records management. Specific signal military or commercial satellite
capabilities employed from initial entry into communications, high frequency radios, or
the theater to a mature theater are dependent commercial fiber optic links. Interoperable
upon the operational environment of the gateways provide the means to interface
particular theater. The CINC acquires DCS between tactical and strategic systems via DCS
access primarily through TACSAT, DSN, and entry points. These gateways also provide
MILNET/DISNET trunks. The CINC takes connectivity with joint and allied forces. The
maximum advantage of the host nation net effect is to allow forces to deploy worldwide
communication infrastructure. FM 11-45 without sacrificing their ability to exchange
discusses the operations of operational-level securely and reliably information in theater
signal organizations and details the and with CONUS-base information resources.
information mission area (IMA) support See Figure A-9.
provided by the various organizations. If
required, the ASCC may 2
establish an Personnel Service Support
operational-level signal C organization as The ASCC, through the deputy chief of
depicted in Figure A-8. staff for personnel (DCAPER), is responsible for
To support the force-projection army, all GS personnel operations. The theater
operational-level information services mesh DCSPER manages critical personnel systems
seamlessly with those of the sustaining base, and synchronizes personnel network
which may be located within CONUS or operations throughout the theater.
another theater. This connectivity and reach- operational-level personnel C organization
back capability allows for split-based must be flexible and able to adjust to specific

Appendix A

FM 100-7

theater support requirements. The ASCC may and replacement activities, and manages
initially deploy elements to perform the essential personnel services. When established,
personnel management function. This element the element draws personnel from personnel
would be comprised of key sections from
each operations and replacement, postal, and2
functional personnel area and a C section. personnel service areas within the personnel C
Additional elements deploy in follow-on organization. HQDA, US Total Army Personnel
echelons according to conditions dictated by Command (USTAPERSCOM), DCSPER,
METT-T. Further adjustments take place provides a civilian
support cell, which does not
through changes in subordinate unit number include the C elements.
and type. The operational-level personnel
Operational-level major personnel organization uses the theater communications
functions are strength accounting, replacement network to transmit reports and statistics in
operations, postal operations, casualty theater and to CONUS. It must have access to
operations, personnel information systems, voice and digital communications capabilities
and personnel readiness. FM 12-6 provides with USTAPERSCOM to exchange information
detailed discussions of operational-level and data on personnel strengths, casualty
personnel functions. An operational-level operations, and replacement operations. The
personnel organization is illustrated at information exchange priority between these
Figure A-10. organizations demands direct, real-time
When established, the operational-level electronic communication, both voice and
personnel functional command organization is digital. The personnel community must also
under the staff supervision of the theater maintain close coordination with medical,
DCSPER. In fulfilling its responsibilities to mortuary affairs, provost marshal, and other
synchronize the tactical functions of manning communities that provide replacements (such
and the personnel services the personnel as hospital or straggler returnees) or casualty
organization exercises C and provides information. The total theater personnel
technical guidance on personnel management community, comprised of personnel units and
to the subordinate personnel organizations. personnel staff elements, including the theater
DCSPER and the G1-S1 staffs, is responsible
The personnel organization can task- for the support of personnel operations. Its
organize a functional area staff element. This primary mission at the operational level is to
element sustains personnel readiness, directs sustain theater personnel strength and
theaterwide personnel systems, synchronizes manage theater personnel support systems. As
personnel network operations, directs GS postal such, it enhances soldier combat capability

Appendix A

through a full range of sustainment activities to success as the actual execution of the
and thereby increases combat power. The operation. Leaders must recognize that the
theater personnel community must perform global visibility of today’s media is bridging the
the following functions: gap between the strategic and tactical levels, so
•Report total Army theater strength to Army that a tactical victory can be an operational or
PERSCOM and HQDA. strategic loss and vice versa. The media’s
ability to provide detailed, graphic, and live
•Integrate all personnel support activities coverage of events from anywhere in the world
within the theater. has made military operations into spectator
•Establish general theater-unique personnel events watched in real time by the American
policies and manage services to soldiers, public, allies, and adversaries. This allows
media personalities, politicians, pundits,
civilians, and joint or allied personnel. critics, and academics to become active
•Assist the ASCC in evaluating and participants in the debate about the way the
influencing the theater command climate. operation is being executed.
•Direct morale, welfare, and recreation Also, the American people have a right to
activities; alcohol and drug abuse know about Army operations. More
prevention and control; equal opportunity; importantly, the Army has a vital interest in
and safety programs. ensuring an expedited flow of complete,
accurate, and timely information about Army
•Prepare the personnel estimate. operations. Doing so fulfills the Army’s
•Recommend theater replacement priorities obligation to keep the American people
to the DCSPER HQDA. informed. It also helps to establish the
conditions that lead to confidence in America’s
•Prepare personnel service support plans and Army and its conduct of operations in
orders to support the theater campaign plan peacetime, conflict, and war. When soldiers,
and its branches and sequels and ensure their families, the nation’s political leaders,
subordinate plans support the commander’s and the general public perceive that the Army
desired end state. is conducting operations competently,
•Direct GS activities within the postal and professionally, and ethically, the morale,
esprit, and effectiveness of the Army force is
replacement management systems. enhanced. This is critical to successful mission
•Track the force, project replacement needs, accomplishment.
and ensure subordinate unit personnel The key to achieving an expedited flow of
plans support branches and sequels of the complete, accurate, and timely information
campaign plan. about Army operations is the integration of PA
•Prepare to function as the J1, if designated estimates and recommendations into the
by the theater CINC and augmented by planning and decision-making process. PA
additional joint personnel. elements must assess internal and external
information needs and expectations and
Whether committed to MOOTW or war, analyze what is being published by the media.
personnel service support organizations are They must develop strategies that support
tailored to satisfy the operational requirement open and independent reporting. They must
of the theater independently or with allied ensure that their strategies are synchronized
forces. To ensure unity of effort, joint personnel with the PA guidance of higher headquarters.
services require formal agreements, MOUs, They need to carefully coordinate their effort
and exchanges of liaison officers. with related information communication
functions, such as combat camera, as well as
Public Affairs and News Media CA and PSYOP. PA success comes from open,
A key factor that must be considered at the honest, proactive information communication.
strategic, operational, and tactical levels is the PA personnel serve as the interface between
presence of national and international media the military and the media. They work to
representatives and the effects of global communicate the Army perspective and to
visibility on the planning and execution of ensure that reporting is fair and balanced.
operations. Leaders must understand that the They try to educate media representatives on
perception of an operation can be as important the military and the operation, and they

FM 100-7

prepare military personnel to interact with the The ASCC provides finance support to the
media. Although the commander and the PAO force through his operational-level finance unit
are the organization’s official spokespersons, commander, who also serves as the staff
all soldiers are potential spokespersons. The finance officer. Separately, the DCSRM
media often perceive junior soldiers as provides the operational-level resource
especially candid, honest, insightful, credible. management support to the ASCC. The
PA personnel play a key role in facilitating operational-level finance function is to sustain
media-soldier interaction. Army, joint, and multinational operations by
Besides serving as the interface between providing timely commercial vendor and
the military and the media, PA supports the contractor payments, various pay and
commander’s program to ensure that the disbursing services, and essential accounting.
information needs of soldiers and their families Military pay, travel, and disbursing are
are met. PA personnel develop a strategy based missions that impact morale support and, as
upon the critical information soldiers and their such, provide an additional combat multiplier.2
families need to understand the operation and If established, the operational-level finance C
the mission and the information they need to organization provides finance support to all
maintain their morale and esprit. This strategy joint and multinational commands, as ordered,
identifies the product requirements for and provides policy and technical guidance to
communicating information within the theater finance units. FM 14-7 covers finance
and between the theater and home station. It activities. A possible operational-level finance
synchronizes commercial contract services and function is shown in Figure A-11.
Army production capabilities to most The finance function includes centralized
effectively and efficiently provide those theater support missions such as currency
products. funding, commercial accounts, foreign national

Appendix A

pay, and appropriated and nonappropriated operation. Following coordination by the CINC
fund accounting. When designated by DOD, it or CJTF with the Assistant Secretary of the
also provides currency funding support to other Army for Financial Management (ASA-FM),
US and allied organizations in the theater. The the ASCC may approve the transfer of
operational-level finance command— accounting functions to a designated finance
•Establishes theater financial policy to support activity (DFSA) in CONUS. The
ensure consistent application of DOD finance element continues to ensure that
finance and accounting policy. necessary documentation and data are
provided to the DFSA to accomplish the
•Coordinates finance support requirements accounting function. The ASCC establishes the
within the theater. amounts of monthly cash payments made to
•Recommends allocations of finance units in individual soldiers. Finance support teams
theater. (FSTs) pay soldiers when and where their
commanders desire. FSTs are able to make
•Reviews theater operations plans and contract payments, commercial vendor
prepare annexes to ensure proper support of payments, and combat payments and process
operations. pay inquiries.
•Coordinates HNS for finance and Engineer
accounting requirements. The ASCC tailors the engineer structure to
•Supports NEO. the theater requirements with the staff advice
•Performs/coordinates logistical, operational, from his DCSENG. The operational-level

and administrative actions for assigned engineer commander provides C and a central
organizational framework for the engineer
finance units. effort. Engineer forces outside corps focus on
•Ensures operational readiness of assigned reinforcing and augmenting corps engineer
finance units. efforts, developing the theater support base,
and maintaining an infrastructure for
Finance units provide the full range of sustainment. This focus involves—
finance and accounting services to all soldiers
and units in the theater. These units formulate •Planning.
command financial policy, establish finance •Ensuring operational mobility.
procedures, and provide finance support for the •Coordinating all theater engineer assets.
AOR within the theater, to include—
•Providing direction of construction, real
•Preparing and paying commercial vouchers. property maintenance activities, LOC
•Cashing negotiable instruments. sustainment, rear area damage control,
•Preparing and paying foreign national engineer logistics management, and base
payrolls. development.
•Funding tactical exchange facilities and The ASCC tailors the engineer structure to
other his theater requirements. Engineers must be
nonappropriated fund closely tied into current and future operations.
instrumentalities (NAFIs). Engineer units provide versatility to the
•Preparing and paying travel vouchers. operational commander. All engineer units
•Accounting for pay to EPWs and civilian (combat, construction, or topographic) focus on
operations in the CZ. In addition, they support
internees. the theater by providing general engineering
•Providing currencies for local procurement support at the operational level. The engineer’s
payments, foreign national payrolls, operational-level topography unit and a variety
imprest funds, combat payments, day of specialized engineer teams support or
laborer payments, intelligence and augment engineer forces throughout the
counterintelligence operations, and claims. theater. Combat heavy engineers weight the
main effort and provide sea, air, and land
During operations, the level of formal operational and strategic mobility.
A typical
accounting services that finance elements operational-level engineer C organization is
perform in the theater depends on the shown in Figure A-12. FM 5-116 discusses the
intensity, duration, and location of the operational-level engineer function.

FM 100-7

Theater construction management often operations that involve inland waterways, rail,
spans multiservice requirements. The CINC motor, and air and terminal services, to include
may direct the establishment of a regional water, beach, air, motor transport, and rail.
contingency engineering manager (RCEM) to The operational-level transportation units
control all theater-level engineering. The move personnel, mail, and materiel, except
operational-level engineer commander can bulk fuel, from point of arrival in theater to the
perform this role if the CINC designates the CZ. The operational-level transportation units
ASCC as the RCEM and the ASCC designates must coordinate with the MCA and interact
the operational-level engineer commander as with joint and allied transportation managers.
his agent. To support force-projection The transportation function requires flexible
requirements for early deploying engineer organizations that the ASCC configures to
units, an engineer element may deploy by meet theater needs. FM 55-1 discusses the
sections to meet highly variable work loads and operational-level transportation function. A
situations. The US Army Corps of Engineers typical operational-level transportation
(USACE) may establish field offices that organization is shown in Figure A-13.
specialize in contract construction, real
property management, and host nation Combat Health Support
construction support. In the theater, CHS encompasses ten
functional areas to meet the needs of the
Transportation service member. These functional areas are—
The ASCC provides theaterwide •Patient evacuation and medical regulation.
transportation support. This operational-level
transportation function includes mode •Hospitalization.

Appendix A

•Health service logistics/blood management. Since all CHS units4 in the COMMZ are
•Dental services. under the senior CHS C I organization, units
without organic CHS receive CHS on an area
•Combat stress control services. basis. This is the most efficient and economical
•Preventive medicine services. way to provide support to all COMMZ units.
The senior CHS unit commander located
•Veterinary services. within the geographical boundaries of a major
•Area medical support unit normally provides CHS staff advice to the4
4 unit commander. The senior CHS C I
•C I. commander and ASCC develop standing
•Medical laboratory services. operating procedures to govern the
4 relationship between each unit commander
The senior command surgeon and CHS C I2 and the senior CHS unit commander in his
organization in theater provide centralized C area. CHS units are not subordinate to the
of all Army medical department (AMEDD) logistics area support units but do provide CHS
units assigned to the ASCC and located in the
COMMZ. The operational-level4 army medical on an area basis.
force structure under the CHS C 1 organization 4
provides support to both forward-deployed and2 The senior CHS C I organization provides
nonforward-deployed ARFOR. This C advice on CHS matters to adjacent and
organization provides the capability and subordinate commanders. When directed by
flexibility to shift assets to support additional the ASCC, the CHS commander may provide
numbered army or corps buildups, to reallocate CHS to other US and allied forces. FM 8-10
medical assets to accommodate patient work discusses the operational-level
CHS function. A
loads, and to reconstitute tactical-level CHS typical CHS C I functional structure is
units. displayed in Figure A-14.

FM 100-7

Air Defense
The Army air defense function is required All air defense operations are joint.
for each theater. Air defense organizations FM 44-100 discusses the operational-level
provide the Army’s contribution to theater air Army air defense function. The relationships of
and missile defense in joint and multinational air defense in a theater are shown in
operations. The air defense commander Figure A-15.
ensures that— The senior Army air defense commander is
•Army air defense is integrated into joint and the operational-level ADA commander and the
multinational counterair and TMD Army ADA coordinator (ADCOORD) to the
operations and plans. ASCC and JFACC (see Figure A-16). The
senior Army air defense commander provides
•Theater force projection, protection, and the majority of Army rear area (theater air
sustainment requirements are achieved. defense) DCA and active missile defense forces.
•The air defense mission is to— He is the theater ADA integrator, which
ensures that Army air defense elements
•Execute and coordinate integrated theater provide optimum force and geopolitical asset
air and missile defense operations protection throughout the theater. He
throughout the theater of operations. integrates corps air defense brigade
requirements during counterair planning and
•Provide theater air and missile defense assists in developing Army OCA and DCA
expertise for campaign planning to the joint input to the air campaign plan.
land, sea, and air component commanders. The operational-level air defense unit
•Recommend air and missile defense commander performs the following functions:
priorities for protection of the force and •Plans theater air and missile defense force
geopolitical assets, to include force projection and sustainment operations.
allocation. •Integrates the air defense communications
•Execute active and passive air and missile systems with the AADC and operational-
defense measures to deny enemy level ADA brigades, corps, AOC (BCE),
surveillance. control and reporting center (CRC), and
•Centralize command (less engagement AWACS (airborne warning and control
control) of all operational-level air defense system).
organizations through all phases of force •Coordinates the theater air and missile
projection in peacetime, conflict, or war. defense linkages with the ACC, NCC, and

Appendix A

allied ADA forces. These linkages include level SOF. These SOF normally fight as joint
interface with intelligence sources, OCA, entities. The ASCC, in his service component
TMD attack operations, space operations, role, must sustain ARSOF in theater. The
logistics, and so forth. ASCC, in coordination with the US Army
Special Operations Command (USASOC),
•Trains and evaluates all Army ADA identifies the support organization to serve as
organizations assigned to operational-level the link between ARSOF in theater, Army and
air defense C according to FM 25-100. other service support resources, and the
CONUS-based USASOC. This support
•Transitions all Army ADA organizations structure is responsible for planning,
assigned to the theater from peacetime, to coordinating, and monitoring the reception,
conflict, to war. onward movement, basing, and sustainment of
•Recommends priorities for allocation of ARSOF in a theater of operations. Note that
logistics requirements (manning, arming, CA and PSYOP units not assigned to the SOC/
JSOTF (joint special operations task force)
fixing/maintaining, moving, fueling, and receive sustainment from the conventional
sustainment of the soldier) for all ADA force unit of assignment or attachment.
organizations within the theater.
•Identifies and recommends pre-positioning The SOF support element does not
of war reserve materiel stocks related to air normally support and sustain ARSOF since it
defense missions. has no dedicated support infrastructure that
duplicates the capabilities of other ASCC
functions. The ARSOF support element
Special Operations Support mission is ARSOF sustainment, not the
Each regional CINC establishes a conduct of special operations and therefore
subordinate unified special operations does not layer itself as a warfighting
command (SOC) to exercise OPCON of theater- headquarters between operating forces and

FM 100-7

•Agricultural assistance.
•Property control.
•Public communications and transportation.
•Public works and utilities.
•Civil information.
•Dislocated civilian control.
•Arts, monuments, archives, and cultural
FM 41-10 describes CA doctrine. The CA
function is illustrated in Figure A-17.

Aviation Support
Operational-level army aviation support,
normally an aviation brigade, provides C and
air movement support for the ASCC. SOF rely
heavily on this brigade for in-theater support.
The brigade has the capability to conduct joint
or multinational air maneuver to support
theater campaigns and major operations.
Aviation support provides combat capabilities
to assist in COMMZ rear security operations.

other higher commands. FM 100-25 discusses

ARSOF in detail.
Civil Affairs
The senior CA unit in a theater is normally
regionally aligned to the ASCC. A CA
organization commands attached CA units and
provides staff support to an SOC, other
component services, and the joint theater staff,
as required. The CA organization has organic
language team and government economic
public facilities in special function teams that
coordinate the following CA functions:
•Civil defense.
•Civilian labor.
•Legal services.
•Public administration, education, finance,
health, safety, and welfare.
•Civilian supply.
•Economics and food aid.

Appendix A

The ASCC tailors the aviation support to execution needs of the commander at that
provide maximum flexibility for his particular echelon. Each echelon also supports the
theater. However, support normally has a intelligence needs of commanders at other
limited organic maintenance capability. echelons.
In instances where the ASCC does not have
an assigned aviation unit, he may choose to Organizational Tailoring. The IEW organiza-
establish that capability using resources and tion at the operational level is a deployable,
assets available in theater. Once mobilized, scalable MI organization designed specifi-
Army National Guard maintenance units can cally to support the theater or major region in
be used to provide the required maintenance which it operates. It can conduct split-based
capability that would not otherwise be operations in force-projection missions by
available. FM 1-111 provides detailed doctrine early deployment with a force of small, highly
for the operational-level army aviation technical elements. The DISE is a flexible,
function. Figure A-18 illustrates the scalable support package that acts as a con-
operational-level army aviation function. duit for theater and national intelligence. Its
size and capability can be expanded as the
Intelligence Structures scope of operations expands. The operational-
level Ml organization serves as a C head-
The intelligence battlefield operating quarters for subordinate and attached MI
system architecture provides specific elements. The operational-level analysis and
intelligence and communications structures at control element (ACE) is the principal orga-
each echelon, from the national level through nization for producing all-source intelligence.
the tactical level. These structures include It controls, manages, tasks, processes, ana-
intelligence organizations, systems, and lyzes, synthesizes, and disseminates intelli-
procedures for collecting, analyzing, gence. The ACE supports OPSEC and
processing, and delivering intelligence to deception, sensor cueing, target develop-
warfighters. ment, situation development, and force pro-
The intelligence function is a seamless, jection. It also coordinates with and provides
unified system that anticipates and satisfies connectivity to national, joint, allied, and
the intelligence needs of commanders. multinational intelligence sources.
Commanders drive intelligence and ensure its The operational-level MI organization
proper employment by clearly articulating supports unified, joint, allied, and
intent, decisively designating PIR, and boldly multinational commands; other US Army
prioritizing the types of targets they want operational-level commands within the
engaged. Commanders exploiting the full theater; and CONUS major Army commands
potential of the intelligence system realize the (MACOMs). Operational-level MI
total effect of this combat multiplier. organizations are under the command of the
The intelligence system simultaneously US Army Intelligence and Security Command
supports multiple commanders at multiple (INSCOM) and are under OPCON of the
echelons. Each echelon has organic intelligence respective theater commander during
capabilities and staffs to meet the planning and peacetime. During conflict, they revert to the

FM 100-7

command of the ASCC. FM 34-37 discusses the located in CONUS or outside the AO. This link
operational-level MI organization in detail. provides commanders access to multisource
Figure A-19 shows an operational-level MI corps, theater, and national intelligence assets
organization. and data bases. The intelligence support base
The Army technical control and analysis is normally a division, corps, or operational-
element (TCAE) serves as the single focal point level ACE.
between the NSA and forward-deployed The mission of the DISE is to provide the
operational- and tactical-level forces for deployed commander accurate, detailed,
providing technical support to SIGINT continuous, and timely intelligence during the
operations. Collocated with the NSA, the TCAE rapid introduction of US forces across the
is positioned uniquely to provide tailored range of military operations. It is tailored
products to support operational- and tactical- tactically from MI units according to the factors
level MI units operating worldwide. It also of METT-T, lift, and pre-positioned assets. The
serves as the Trojan system and network two types of tailorable DISE configurations are
manager for all Army Trojan system users. mini-DISE (manpack) and DISE (vehicular).
The DISE is a new and integral part of the Basic tactics and techniques call for the
concept for MI support to force-projection DISE to deploy with the initial assault forces.
operations. It is a tactically tailored The DISE works closely with the organic
organization that brings together intelligence element of the supported unit. This
communications capabilities, automated unit could be anything from an airborne
intelligence fusion systems, and broadcast battalion S2 to the G2 of a MEF, depending on
downlinks in a small package able to deploy the operation. The DISE works with the
with the early entry forces of a force-projection supported force during both planning and
operation. It is not a specific piece of equipment execution of operations to ensure corps,
or a particular configuration of equipment. The theater, and national intelligence is
DISE is a flexible organization able to support synchronized with the ground commander’s
any type of ground force whether from army, scheme of maneuver and intent. The
joint, or allied/coalition forces. Through split- supporting ACE stays abreast of changes in the
based operations, the DISE provides tactical friendly situation through close coordination
a link from their forward-based with the DISE. Together, they ensure assets
C element to an intelligence support base stay focused on the needs of the commander

Appendix A

and allow the commander and his staff to pull •Operational intelligence products such as
intelligence based on actual need. graphic templates, annotated imagery, and
Depending on the size of the deployed force, tailored weather forecasts.
the DISE may be the only intelligence asset •Ground component intelligence support to
actually deployed in country receiving
processed intelligence from its supporting ACE the JICs.
located outside the AO. In large-scale •Reinforcement to corps intelligence
deployments, the DISE is deployed with the operations in the form of a corps military
forward-deployed assault element until the intelligence support element (CMISE). The
main or tactical CP arrives with the complete
processing capability of the all-source analysis CMISE and operational-level MI
system (ASAS) and the ACE. In that case, after organization in each theater create smart
the main CP arrives and is functioning, the bridges between echelons to ensure a truly
DISE could move forward to support the seamless system of intelligence systems
tactical CP, remain in the rear area, or move focused on supporting the warfighter.
wherever its capability is required, based on
METT-T. Petroleum
Intelligence Tasks. MI accomplishes its The ASCC must provide centralized
mission through six primary tasks. These tasks distribution of bulk petroleum products for all
generate intelligence products tailored to the US forces in theater. The ASCC establishes an
mission for warfighters and other consumers. operational-level army petroleum organization
The products derived assist the combat to receive petroleum products in theater and
commander in focusing and leveraging his distribute them throughout the COMMZ and
combat power. The six tasks can be thought of rear of the CZ. If the theater uses pipeline
as the METL for intelligence. As such, in a systems for bulk distribution, other
broad sense, these tasks should serve as a transportation assets distribute the products
framework for training (see TRADOC from the pipeline terminal to the user. The
Pam 11-9). The six intelligence tasks provide operational-level petroleum organization
information to aid a commander in decision interfaces with the MMC for product
making and include— distribution and coordinates with host nations
•Providing I&W. for additional product and distribution
support. FM 10-67 details the operational-level
•Performing IPB. petroleum function. Figure A-21.
•Developing the situation.
Ammunition Supply
•Supporting target development and and Storage
The ASCC is responsible for in-theater
•Developing force protection intelligence. receipt, accountability, management, and
•Performing BDA. establishment of storage sites; coordination of
distribution between storage sites and between
The operational-level MI organization storage sites and forward transfer points; and
focuses on providing multidiscipline IEW direct issue to using units from storage sites on
support to the JTF, ASCC, and ARFOR (see an area support basis. This responsibility will
Figure A-20). Army operational-level MI most likely be a joint service/multinational
organizations provide— forces mission in the theater of operation.
•Deployable, scalable, high-frequency, The operational-level ammunition
intercept, direction-finding, and jamming organization interfaces with the MMC for
support (Trackwolf, AN/TLQ-17A Sandcrab, Class V distribution, coordination with joint
Army High-Frequency Electronic Warfare service and multinational force support, and
System [AHFEWS], and single-source requirements determination. The ASCC's
processor [SIGINT]). responsibility continues throughout the
•Overt HUMINT collection, interrogation, conduct of operations in the theater, with
document exploitation, and CI support. emphasis directed to the critical Class V
functions of retrograde, management of
•Battlefield technical intelligence. captured and recovered ammunition, and

Appendix A

recovery and redeployment of stocks following commands and controls transportation

mission completion. battalions and movement control teams. The
Support is provided within theater from a MCA may be designated as the validation
sequentially deployed ammunition logistics authority for Army theater airlift requests.
support structure initially consisting of This organization often coordinates with allied
ammunition accountability detachments (port) and host nation MCAs and coordinates and
and modular, platoon-sized container handling validates theater airlift for Army units.
and noncontainer ammunition units. As the FM 55-10 discusses MCA activities in detail.
theater matures and the number2 of modular Figure A-22 illustrates an operational-level
units increase, a conventional C structure is Army MCA.
templated over these modular units, creating
company-sized units for large volume/area Materiel Management
mission capability. Specialized ammunition The operational-level MMC manages the
surveillance and quality assurance support theater’s supply and maintenance operations.
throughout the ammunition system from the Management involves balancing maintenance
CONUS base to the forward ammunition efforts and ensuring visibility of critical item
support units is provided by quality assurance shortages. The MMC centrally manages the
specialist ammunition surveillance (QASAS) supply and 2maintenance activities of the area
teams of trained Department of the Army (DA) logistics C organizations, coordinates with
civilians. subordinate organizations in the CZ, and
serves as the primary interface with the
Movement Control CONUS-sustaining base. The MMC is
The operational-level Army MCA is connected electronically with the MCA,
responsible for coordinating and administering appropriate supply and service organizations,
transportation policy, managing strategic and and the COSCOM MMC to coordinate
operational-level movement responsibilities, distribution of GS supply and maintenance
and managing theaterwide transportation requirements. It may coordinate with joint or
assets. The MCA prepares movement and port multinational agencies. FM 100-16 discusses
clearance plans, conducts liaison with higher MMC operations. An operational-level Army
and lower movement control elements, and MMC is depicted in Figure A-23.

M 100-7

In peacetime, the ASCC must conduct the The CINC may exercise COCOM through a
three operational-level tasks while subunified commander for operations on a
continuously supporting all ARFOR in theater. continuing basis. The subunified commander
As the situation changes from peacetime to exercises functions, authority, and
conflict or war, the theater may develop in responsibilities similar to those of a unified
complexity and scope, requiring the expansion command CINC, except for COCOM. The
of combat, combat support (CS) and CSS forces. subunified commander exercises OPCON of
On transition to conflict or war, the CINC may assigned commands and forces within the
choose one of six options to exercise COCOM. assigned AOR or functional area. ASCCs of
Refer to Chapter 2 for detailed discussion of subunified commands operate in the chain of
each option. Each of these options has different command within the subunified command.
impacts on the employment of the ARFOR in They normally communicate directly with the
theater. unified command ASCC on specific Army

Appendix A

matters and inform the subunified commander COCOM in these situations through the ASCC.
as required. The CINC establishes a numbered army in
The CINC may choose to continue to coordination with the ASCC. He does this
exercise COCOM through the ASCC or a JFC. usually when the span of control becomes too
If the requirement to conduct major operations great for the theater army commander or JFC.
becomes severely complex, the ASCC, with the He may also establish a numbered army when
CINC's approval, might choose to create a forces are widely dispersed geographically.
numbered army to direct the major operation. Establishment may occur when operations
If he does establish the numbered army, the require more than one large formation
ASCC would continue to focus on sustainment composed of multiple corps to execute distinct,
and support of all ARFOR assigned or attached simultaneous campaigns or focus on different
to the theater. Figure A-24 shows the functions major threats. This situation would likely
provided by a numbered army organization. include the division of a theater of war into
separate theaters of operation.
The CINC may choose to exercise COCOM
through a JTF. The ASCC would establish the The CINC may establish a numbered army
ARFOR (numbered army, corps, division, and when a political situation requires a US
so forth) and place it under OPCON of the operational headquarters as a counterpart to
CJTF for the conduct of operations. As the an allied headquarters or to ensure satisfactory
senior army command in a JTF, the numbered distribution of multinational responsibilities.
army could serve as the ARFOR, the JFLCC Intermediate headquarters of this nature exist
headquarters, or the nucleus around which a within combined organizations such as a
subordinate JTF could be built. The numbered NATO army group. If the CINC chooses to
army commander would conduct the three exercise COCOM through functional
operational-level tasks within the JTF. The component commanders, three different
ASCC would continue to focus on sustainment scenarios are possible.
and support of all ARFOR assigned or attached •The functional component commander
to the theater. might also be the ASCC. In such a case, the
The CINC may choose to exercise COCOM numbered army would be employed in a
directly over specific forces. The roles of the similar manner as COCOM through the
numbered army in these situations are similar ASCC.
to those in the JTF discussion. Generally, the
CINC does not employ ARFOR in a single- •The functional component commander
service operation. The CINC usually exercises might also be an Army commander—but not

FM 100-7

the ASCC. In this scenario, the numbered an operational (as opposed to support)
army commander could be the functional headquarters designed to control from two to
component commander. The ASCC would five corps. Its commander must have an
place ARFOR under OPCON of the operational-level perspective. The
numbered army commander for the conduct administrative and support activities of the
of operations. The ASCC would continue to numbered army are much less than those of the
focus on sustainment and support of all ASCC. As a result, the numbered army staff is
ARFOR assigned or attached to the theater. austere. The staff focuses on situation
assessment, estimate formulation, planning,
•The functional component commander and functional area coordination. The
might also be from another service. In this numbered army probably would make
scenario, the numbered army is not likely to extensive use of liaison representatives to
be deployed because of the size of the units, enhance its effectiveness. In conducting
and operations would not require an operations, the numbered army may direct
additional level of control. assigned or attached forces to gain and control
terrain, populations, and resources. These
Structure operations often involve directing deployment
The ASCC would normally form a and fires, as well as directing movement and
numbered army from existing assets and maneuver of large formations over great
structure it to meet specific operations distances. Figure A-25 illustrates a typical
requirements. The numbered army is primarily numbered army headquarters.

Appendix A

The numbered army rarely executes be a subordinate headquarters. In the event
support operations. It provides requirements that a numbered army executes support
and priorities to the ASCC, which provides operations, the numbered army commander
logistical support. The headquarters itself could establish a rear CP to control logistical
receives support from a nearby area support support assets as well as coordinate rear
organization in the COMMZ. Assigned ARFOR security operations.
are normally self-sufficient and rely on the
normal theater functional command support In addition to the headquarters element,
network or contingency support arrangement. the numbered army consists of a signal unit, an
The ASCC could allocate support forces to the Army aviation element, an MP company, an
numbered army if independent operations are intelligence support element, and a variable
required. This could occur if the numbered number of maneuver elements. The numbered
army executes a deep operational maneuver or army is a flexible organization that is task-
deploys to a geographically separate area. The organized to accomplish assigned missions.
ASCC would provide a tailored support The Army will not likely configure any two
package—an Army support element (ASE)— numbered armies with the same types3 of units.
for the duration of the requirement. The signal unit provides dedicated C interface
with other systems 2in theater. The aviation
The numbered army usually operates from element provides C aircraft and intratheater
a main and an alternate CP. These mobility for the headquarters. The MP element
headquarters may be located in the COMMZ or provides CP security. The intelligence element
CZ. The main CP controls current operations, supports the commander’s ASI needs.
collates information, integrates all-source
intelligence (ASI), and coordinates logistical The ASCC may allocate SOF to provide
support. The main CP also develops plans for HUMINT, PSYOP, or CA capabilities. In rare
future operations. circumstances, SOF units could execute long-
range reconnaissance or strike missions.
The numbered army commander Engineer support would likely be provided on
designates an alternate CP to ensure an area basis or, in an unusual situation, be
continuity of operations. The alternate CP may attached to the ASE.


Other MACOMs influence operational- USACE operates civil works divisions and
level army units. The US Army Information resident offices within theater to design and
Systems Command commands the operational- execute major construction projects during
level signal organization during peacetime and peacetime. The Military Traffic Management
conflict. The US Army Intelligence and Command (MTMC) serves as the
Security Command commands the operational- USTRANSCOM executive agent for moving
level MI organization at theater level during and sustaining unit equipment by surface from
peacetime and conflict. The Criminal CONUS into theater for all services. USAMC is
Investigations Command commands the the Army’s provider of Army-unique logistical
criminal investigation division (CID) support. USAMC may establish elements of the
organization and subordinate detachments LSE in the theater to enhance communications
during peacetime, conflict, and war. CID
elements conduct sensitive investigations, between the Army in theater and CONUS-
support logistics security operations, manage based, USAMC-supporting organizations, as
criminal and terrorist-related intelligence, and well as USAMC operations in theater.
conduct criminal investigations.


The vast majority of special operations in support Army operations. It is therefore
a theater of operations are joint special appropriate to briefly discuss the inherently
operations. Since the SOC evaluates the SOF joint SOF organizations available to support
support requirements in terms of the total SOF theater operations.
capability, SOF from other services may

FM 100-7
Special operations require centralized,
To perform his four basic duties, the
responsive, and unambiguous C , which is JFSOCC organizes the special operations units
achieved through a joint operational to—
headquarters exercising OPCON of SOF. Since •Perform deliberate and time-sensitive
special operations are conducted continuously planning.
(peacetime, conflict, and war), a permanent
structure is necessary. To provide the •Conduct special operations as directed.
necessary unity of command, each theater •Organize assigned and attached forces.
combatant commander has elected to establish
a subordinate unified command for SOF (see •Coordinate special operations with
Figure A-26). conventional operations.
These commands—the theater SOCs—are •Participate in the joint targeting process.
the principal joint headquarters through which •Obtain special operations intelligence
the theater CINCs exercise COCOM or support.
OPCON of SOF within their theaters. The •Establish and maintain effective liaison.
commander of the SOC (COMSOC) is also the
permanent theater JFSOCC since the SOC has •Plan and conduct joint and multinational
a functional basis. His duties include those of a special operations training exercises.
subunified commander (joint SOF) and a •Allocate SOF resources and establish SOF
functional component commander (SOF sustainment priorities.
component of a joint operation). These basic
duties, as described in Joint Pubs 0-2 and 3-0, •Coordinate and monitor sustainment of
are subject to modification by the theater SOF.
CINC. They include— •Coordinate and monitor establishment and
•Exercising OPCON over forces assigned or sustainment of SOF operational project
attached. stocks.
•Conducting continuing operations. •Exercise technical control over SOF
•Advising the proper employment of SOF. communications.
•Coordinating special operations planning, •Identify and articulate theater SOF
conduct, and support. requirements to the theater CINC for
transmission to USCINCSOC.

Appendix A

The COMSOC is the JFSOCC for the coordinating and deconflicting special
theater combatant commander. He commands operations aviation and conventional air
the SOC and is the principal special operations operations. (SOC includes Air Force and Army
advisor in theater. As COMSOC, he reports platforms.) The JSOACC is normally the
directly to the theater combatant commander commander of the special operations aviation
and exercises OPCON of theater SOF. He may (SOA) component providing the preponderance
form subordinate headquarters as required. of SOA forces, or the one most capable of
This may include the formation of a JSOTF. conducting, commanding, and controlling
JSOTFs may remain OPCON to COMSOC or special operations missions. Depending upon
be placed OPCON to other subordinate the mission, the JFC may assign OPCON or
commanders (normally a JFC) to perform TACON of conventional air assets to the
missions of limited scope or duration. JFSOCC, who may exercise the authority
Figure A-27 illustrates a theater with a joint through the JSOACC.
special operations aviation component
COMSOC must be familiar with the day-to- TASK FORCE
day issues working within the theater The NCA, theater CINC, or COMSOC may
combatant command. The COMSOC may also form a JSOTF. JSOTFs may be small and
serve as a special staff officer. In this situation, temporary or large and enduring, depending
he may appoint a deputy to represent him upon the national or theater objective. They
permanently on the staff. A typical SOC is based may be formed from theater SOF, theater SOF
upon standard joint staff functions. Ideally, augmented by or augmenting headquarters
each theater should have adequate, experienced assigned or attached for a specific mission, or
SOF personnel to staff the SOC. If the JFSOCC SOF external to the theater. They may be
lacks the manpower to fill these positions, he formed around an existing service force
must coordinate for external support or extend structure. For example, to accomplish a series
his resources to cover all required functions (for of related DA missions, the COMSOC may
example, a combined J3/5). designate a Naval special warfare task group

Organization of SOF subordinate to the
JFSOCC—ARSOF, Air Force special
operations forces (AFSOF), and Navy special
operations forces (NAVSOF)—differ,
depending upon the situation, theater of
employment, and requirements of applicable
OPLANs and CONPLANs. Below the SOC,
organization normally takes place along
service or functional lines but also may take
the form of independent JSOTFs tasked to
complete specific missions (see Figure A-27).
The COMSOC may choose to organize
subordinate forces along functional lines.
Functional components may be used in lieu of
or in combination with service components.
One of the most commonly used special
operations functional organizations is the
JSOACC. The JSOACC is the subordinate
commander within a SOC or JSOTF
responsible for planning and executing joint
special operations aviation missions and for

FM 100-7

(NSWTG) as the nucleus of a JSOTF •Analyzing target audiences in the objective

headquarters. The NSWTG would require area.
ARSOF and AFSOF augmentation to function
effectively in this situation. The JSOTF is •Advising the commander or mission director
normally dissolved after its mission is of possible PSYOP COAs.
completed. •Developing and conducting PSYOP to
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS support military operations.
FUNCTION •Countering hostile propaganda.
The operational-level PSYOP organization •Supporting commander’s information and
plans and conducts authorized PSYOP awareness programs.
activities and implements worldwide support
of all nonmobilization contingencies during •Supporting, planning, or conducting
crises and open hostilities short of declared deception operations.
war. This organization also develops, •Providing target audience intelligence,
coordinates, and executes peacetime PSYOP regional and language expertise, and a
activities. In addition, should war be declared,
the operational-level PSYOP organization means for disseminating information and
assists in planning and executing strategic and products that describe the intent of military
operational PSYOP for the theater CINC. operations.
Figure A-28 depicts the operational-level •Supporting commander’s handling of EPW
PSYOP function. and civilian internees.
In MOOTW and conflict, the active
component PSYOP organization deploys to the
theater to provide a planning cell and assume THEATER CHEMICAL FORCE
the duties of the senior PSYOP headquarters. FUNCTION
This mission is continued until US Army Chemical forces perform combat functions
Reserve (USAR) units are mobilized and the in wartime and offer a variety of mission
appropriate reserve component PSYOP capabilities in MOOTW. The focus at the
organization arrives and assumes those duties. functional level allows task organizations of
As these units arrive, they are placed under the correct mix of forces to accomplish the
OPCON of the senior PSYOP headquarters and mission. Chemical mission areas fall into the
assigned to their predetermined subordinate following categories:
commands. OPCON is normally retained at the •NBC defense.
senior PSYOP headquarters with TACON
being passed to the appropriate unit. Examples •Smoke and obscurants.
of PSYOP support to conventional operations
include— •Temporarily disabling techniques and
• Assessing the psychological impact of
military operations. •Flame.

Appendix A

Chemical units are indispensable to nuclear hazard surveying, detection,

operations. They offer a range of capabilities identification, monitoring, and personnel and
necessary to a versatile force. They can support equipment decontamination.
operations as individuals, teams, or units. A
mix of different units (decontamination units, Smoke units, both mechanized and
NBC reconnaissance elements, smoke units, motorized, provide large-area smoke and
and biological identification/detection [BIDS] obscurant support. Additional capabilities
units) is often necessary to achieve the proper include providing local security, vector control,
balance of capabilities—force protection and limited water transfer, spray, storage, limited
mission accomplishment. Forces deployed in personnel showers, and limited firefighting.
countries with WMD or chemical industrial Chemical units can provide training and
complexes require support from both NBC consultation in—
battle staffs and units.
•Use of defoliants.
A chemical C organization can provide
battle command for a variety of supporting •Employment of riot control agents.
units. It can provide training support and
technological and consultative operations for •Use of smoke and obscurants.
nuclear accident- and incident-response
operations and chemical accident- and •Construction and employment of flame field
incident-response operations that involve NBC expedient devices and commercial chemical
material, flammable and combustible threats.
substances, and industrial chemical hazards.
NBC reconnaissance units are equipped to •Collection, packaging, storage, disposal, and
conduct surveys and determine the type and cleanup of hazardous materials and wastes.
extent of toxic contamination with mobile, real-
time analysis. NBC reconnaissance and FMs 3-100 and 3-101 provide details on
decontamination units perform chemical and missions and mission requirements.


Appendix B
Subordinate Campaign Plan Model

Copy No.
Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Date/Time Group of Signature

CAMPAIGN PLAN: (Number or code name)

References: Maps, charts, time zones (zulu), and other relevant documents
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. Briefly describe the command organization
(composition and relationships) for the campaign/subordinate campaign.
Include detailed information in the command relationships annex (see also
paragraph 5a).
1. Situation. Briefly describe the politico-military situation that the plan
addresses (see commander’s estimate).
a. Theater Guidance. Provide a summary of directives, letters of
instruction, memorandums, or theater war plans that apply to the plan,
including a theater campaign plan received from the theater
(1) Relate the theater commander’s strategic intent to operational
requirements in the theater of operation or joint operations area,
including its subregional space and multinational elements.
(2) List the theater commander’s strategic and operational objectives
and tasks assigned to the subordinate command.
(3) List actions that are prohibited or required by higher authority
(ROE and so forth).
(4) Include predeployment (C-Day) actions as necessary.
b. Enemy Forces. Provide a summary of pertinent intelligence data,
including information on the following:
(1) Composition, location, disposition, movements, and strengths of
major enemy forces that can influence action in the theater of
operations or joint operations area.
1.Joint Pub 5-O describes how campaign logic and principles fit into OPLAN format and the JOPES
process. Joint Pub 5-03-series further explains the process, including models of planning,
messages, estimates, and OPLANs/CONPLANs.


Appendix B


(2) Operational concept (if known), to include the enemy’s perception of

friendly vulnerabilities and the enemy’s intentions regarding those
(3) Major operational objectives.
(4) Commander’s idiosyncrasies and doctrinal patterns.
(5) Operational and sustainment capabilities.
(6) Vulnerabilities related to the enemy’s center of gravity.
NOTE: Assumed information should be identified as such.
Reference may be made to the intelligence annex for
detailed information.
c. Friendly Forces. State information on friendly forces not assigned that
may directly affect the command.
(1) Mission of higher, adjacent, and supporting US commands.
(2) Mission of higher, adjacent, and supporting allied or other coalition
(3) Protection of own operational center of gravity or other critical
d. Assumptions. State assumptions applicable to the plan as a whole.
Include both specified and implied assumptions.
e. Legal Considerations. State laws or agreements binding on the plan.
f. Public Affairs Considerations. Identify impact of global visibility,
public interest, and media presence on the plan.
2. Mission. Integrate the operational objectives and tasks of the command and
their purposes and relationships to achieve the theater strategic objectives
(who, what, when, where, and why).
3. Joint Operations.
a. Operational Concept. Integrate the fundamentals of the campaign
into a who, what, where, and how statement of operational intent.
Restate the assigned operational concept for each phase of the theater
strategic concept. Include the phased sustainment of major forces in the
command. Include other concepts such as deception and psychological
warfare during the subordinate campaign. State how the joint
operations are a part of the CINC’s unified operations. Include all
aspects of operational design. State how operational advantage is to be
(1) Subordinate organization.
(2) Operational objectives.
(3) Maneuver (operational).
(4) Fires (operational).
(5) Phases of campaign, major operation, or battle.
(6) Timing.


FM 100-7


b. Phase 1.
(1) Operational or tactical concept. Include operational or tactical
objectives, scheme of maneuver, and timing for this phase.
(2) Forces required by function or capability. Consider Army, Navy, Air
Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and special operations and
space forces.
(3) Tasks of subordinate commands and adjacent components.
(4) Reserve forces location and composition. State “be prepared”
(5) Fires. Include general missions and guidance to subordinates and
components. Ensure that fires are complementary.
(6) Mobility. Consider transportation; ports; lines of communication;
transit and overflight rights; reinforcement, reception, and onward
movement; and host nation support arrangements.
(7) Annexes. Reference all annexes relating to each phase of the
concept of operation. Such references show how activities such as
deception, psychological operations, nuclear operations, special
operations, rules of engagement, airspace management,
interdiction operations, mine warfare operations, and so forth,
relate to the overall concept.
(8) Deployment. State briefly how deployments of units, replacements,
and supplies into the theater affect the sequencing of operations.
Include the details of such deployments in paragraph 4 and/or a
logistics annex.
c. Phases II through IV. Cite information as stated in each subsequent
phase. Provide a separate phase for each step in the subordinate
campaign, at the end of which a major reorganization of forces may be
required and another significant action initiated.
d. Coordinating Instructions. If desired, place instructions here that
apply to two or more phases or multiple elements of the command. The
execution checklist may be placed in an annex.
4. Logistics. Give a brief, broad statement of the sustainment concept for the
campaign, with information and instructions applicable to the campaign by
phase. The concentration of logistics in phases must be concurrent with
operational phases. This information may be issued separately and referenced
here. At a minimum, this paragraph should address the following:
a. Assumptions (including coalition requirements).
b. Supply aspects.
c. Maintenance and modifications.
d. Medical service.
e. Transportation.
f. Base development.
g. Personnel service support.


Appendix B


h. Foreign military assistance.

i. Administrative management.
j. Lines of communication.
k. Reconstitution of forces.
l. Joint and multinational responsibilities.
m. Sustainment priorities and resources.
n. Interservice responsibilities.
o. Host nation considerations.
5. Command and Signal.
a. Command.
(1) Command relationships. State generally the command
relationships for portions of the campaign or the entire campaign.
Indicate any shifts of command contemplated during the campaign,
indicating the time of the expected shift. These changes should be
consistent with the operational phasing in paragraph 3. Give the
location of the commander, command posts, and succession to
(2) Delegation of authority.
b. Signal.
(1) Communications. Plans of communications may refer to a standard plan or
be attached in an annex. Include the time zone to be used; rendezvous,
recognition, and identification instructions; code; liaison instructions; and axis
of signal communications as appropriate.
(2) Electronics. Plans of electronic systems may refer to a standard plan or be
attached in an annex. Include electronic policy and other information as

ANNEXES: As required (see Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and theater
campaign plan)


Appendix C
Major Operations Plan Model

Copy No .
Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Date/Time Group of Signature

MAJOR OPERATION PLAN: (Number or code name)

References: Maps, charts, and other documents
the organization of the Army in theater to support the CINC’s long-range
strategy and campaign plan, specifically identifying the command conducting
the operation. In a plan for a major operation composed of several phases, put
the task organization in a separate annex (Annex A) that also outlines
command relationships and their changes, if any, as the operation progresses
from one phase to the next. Include task organizations for Army component
support to contingencies in the annexes referring to the plans for those
operations. The structure of Annex A deals with the following factors:
a. Civil-Political Relationships. Embassies, country teams, non-DOD
US Government agencies (CIA, Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA],
Agency for International Development [AID]).
b. Multinational Force Relationships. Host nations, allies, forces from
regional/treaty organizations.
c. Joint Relationships. DOD agencies (DIA, National Security Agency),
unified and specified commands (subunified commands and JTFs when
appropriate), other services in uniservice roles.
d. Relationships with Other Army Commands. HQDA, USAMC, US
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), other CONUS
MACOMs, and their stovepipe organizations in the theater and army
components of other unified commands.
e. Army in Theater Relationships. The structure that reflects unity of
command within the ASCC or ARFOR.
(1) Army components of subunified commands and JTFs.
(2) Functional commands.
1.This OPLAN format conforms to the format delineated in Joint Pub 5-03.2, as amended by CJCS
Instruction 3122.03 JOPES, Volumes I and II (draft) and FM 101-5, Command and Control for
Commanders and Staffs (final draft), August 1993.


Appendix C


(3) Area commands.

(4) Major combat and combat support organizations directly under
ASCC command in peacetime.
(5) Army organizations providing operational-level support to the BCE
and ACEs.
(6) ARSOF, especially the theater army special operations support
1. Situation. Thoroughly describe the operational environment as well as
appropriate aspects of the strategic environment in which the major operation
will be conducted. Include tactical information for the early phases of the
operation. Refer to command and staff estimates, country studies, or OPLANs.
Designate the trigger event that signals execution of the OPORD.
a. Intelligence. Use this subparagraph to refer to a separate intelligence
annex (Annex B) or the intelligence estimate. The two main components
should include the following:
(1) A summary of information concerning the area of operations, which
consists of—
(a) A strategic overview of the area, to include its climate, politics,
geography, topography, demography, economics, and social/
cultural factors.
(b) Specific, localized information about conditions affecting the
early phases of the operation, especially if a forced entry is
anticipated. Include weather, key terrain, observation, cover
and concealment, obstacles, avenues of approach, drop zones,
landing zones, and beach and hydrographic data.
(2) A description of the enemy, which consists of—
(a) Strategic and operational factors such as the political roots and
objectives of enemy activity, personalities, outside support,
sanctuaries, logistics capabilities, levels of training and combat
experience, morale, strategic and operational centers of gravity,
and vulnerabilities to PSYOP.
(b) Factors of immediate concern during the early phases of the
operation such as locations, strengths, weapons systems,
tactical capabilities, reserves, mobility.
(c) Information about the military strengths of nations not allied or
affiliated with US forces. Include order-of-battle information,
numbers of major weapons systems, personalities of leaders,
levels of training, or combat experience and affiliation with
major hostile powers.
b. Friendly Forces. Provide information on friendly forces that may affect
the execution of the plan being put forth. These effects may impact
directly on the command or on the organizations subordinate to that
(1) Task organizations/command relationships. State the mission and
applicable parts of the concept of operation of the joint or


FM 100-7


multinational command to which the ARFOR is subordinate. They

will normally be as stated in the theater campaign plan. Provide
sufficient detail so that key individuals know and understand the
higher, joint, or multinational commander’s intent, the end state
desired at the conclusion of the campaign, and how their actions
mesh to attain joint or multinational goals.
(2) Higher headquarters. Include the mission, concept, and intent of
the unified/joint theater CINC. His charter is to further US
interests in the theater and should be stated so that the ASCC/
ARFOR, his staff, and subordinates know and understand the part
they play in achieving the CINC’s strategic aim.
(3) HQDA. Describe the missions, concepts, and intents of HQDA as
they pertain to the theater. In peacetime, the ASCC is a MACOM
responding to CINC direction as well as to HQDA for Title 10
responsibilities. Include references to Army regulations or other
service authorities.
(4) Other service components. Highlight the roles of the Navy, Air
Force, and Marine Corps components of the unified command.
(5) Joint, unified, and specified commands and DOD agencies.
Highlight the roles of other commands that affect the operations in
this theater.
(6) Multinational forces. Highlight the organization, capabilities, and
activities of friendly nations in the theater, with emphasis on their
military forces. State their roles and missions in support of the
CINC’s objectives to further US policies.
(7) Special operations forces. Describe the activities of SOF in the
region that affect the operation.
(8) US Coast Guard. Describe the role of the Coast Guard in the
theater, especially its counternarcotics role.
(9) Department of State. Highlight the contributions of US embassies
and country teams in the theater as they affect and interface with
elements of the ASCC/ARFOR.
(10) Other non-DOD US agencies. Describe the activities of US
Government agencies not included in country teams, such as DEA
and AID, as they affect Army operations.
c. Attachments and Detachments. Highlight critical elements of the
Task Organization/Command Relationship section (Annex A).
d. Assumptions. Provide a summary of the conditions and situations that
must exist when the OPLAN becomes an OPORD. They include
predictions and presumptions concerning the following:
(1) Conditions within host countries and other nations in the region.
(2) Consistency of US policy for the region such as the application of the
War Powers Act.
(3) Involvement by hostile powers, both from outside and within the
region, in the internal affairs of nations in the theater.


Appendix C


(4) Effects of US actions in the theater on relations with nations outside

the theater.
(5) Adequacy of interagency support.
(6) Bilateral and multilateral consensus on the degree or extent of
common threats, for example, the narcotics trade, and required
(7) Availability of resources.
(8) Warning times.
(9) Times and locations of anticipated hostile actions.
(10) Anticipated political situations in the host nation and neighboring
(11) The timing of political decisions in friendly nations.
(12) The timing of the release of the use of special weapons.
2. Mission. Provide a clear, concise statement of the tasks to be achieved in all
phases of the major operation. Include the commander’s visualization of the
end state to be achieved. Examples are restoration of an international
boundary, defeat of enemy armed forces, or clearing of hostile armed forces
from a given geographical area. If for an MOOTW, provide a clear statement of
the long-range, continuing aim of the theater army. Summarize tasks assigned
by the CINC, tasks directed by HQDA, and tasks derived from the
commander’s analysis of the environment and his understanding of his
superiors’ intent. Unlike the single-paragraph narrative common to the
mission statement for a wartime operation, the MOOTW mission statement is
usually a list of tasks. These tasks may include the following:
a. Plan and organize for transition to war.
b. Support and sustain ARFOR and other designated forces.
c. Protect the force, its personnel, and family members.
d. Train ARFOR to maintain readiness.
e. Participate in security assistance efforts.
f. Conduct Army intelligence activities in conjunction with joint and
multinational intelligence efforts.
g. Plan for, rehearse, and participate in contingency operations and
responses to crises. Plans for such operations may be included as
annexes and generally conform to the format for an OPORD for an
ARFOR in a conflict situation. Such peacetime operations include the
(1) Security assistance.
(2) Nation assistance.
(3) Search and rescue.
(4) Humanitarian assistance.
(5) CA.
(6) NEO.


FM 100-7


(7) Peacekeeping.
(8) Show of force.
3. Execution.
a. Commander’s Intent. Provide a statement, in general terms, of the
commander’s visualization (from start to finish) of the mission
accomplishment by his command. This subparagraph links the mission
to the concept of operations. It binds all subordinate activities to the
overall objective.
b. Concept of Operations. Describe the commander’s visualization of
how the mission will be accomplished, to include his intent for the
employment of the command as a whole. At the operational level, divide
the concept into phases; the commander will specify the end state for
each phase so that subordinates know his intent for each phase. The
trigger event for the transition between phases is the achievement of
some intermediate goal. This knowledge will permit subordinates to
plan branches within their own plans. The subordinate commanders are
empowered to demonstrate initiative in supporting the achievement of
the commander’s stated end state. The commander and his subordinates
can also execute sequels within and at the conclusion of phases,
depending on the outcome of battles and engagements. Include an
operations overlay (Annex C) and the deception plan (Annex D) in the
(1) Phase I. The first operational phase of a contingency is usually the
detailed preparation of the command to execute the operation. In a
highly charged, time-sensitive environment characterized by
political maneuvers from a diplomatic posture, the commander
prepares his concept by—
(a) Organizing his staff to conduct the proposed operation and
integrating those augmentation cells from other components
and agencies and subordinate Army units.
(b) Establishing liaison with the host nation, with the unified
command responsible for the target area, with other unified and
specified commands (especially those involved in deployment),
with SOF already in the target area, and with appropriate US
Government agencies.
(c) Negotiating status of forces agreements, constraints (Annex E),
and ROE (Annex F) for the proposed operation with the host
nation, in coordination with DOS and appropriate embassies
and country teams.
(d) Establishing or preparing to establish intermediate staging
bases in the target region and directing the repositioning of
supplies and equipment.
(e) Conducting necessary operations to support political and
diplomatic initiatives or to rehearse for the planned major


Appendix C


(f) Ordering his subordinate organizations to prepare to execute the

major operation.
(g) Stating the commander’s concept to attain the end state for this
phase by the command as a whole.
(h) Setting forth the commander’s scheme of operational maneuver,
including close battle, deep battle, and rear operations when
(i) Describing how operational fires will be employed. Include a
phased fire support annex (Annex G) to show complex
arrangements for fire support, including priorities of fires and
targeting. Augment the annex with appendixes for air support,
chemical support, field artillery support, naval gunfire support,
and nuclear fires.
(j) Including air defense (Annex H), electronic warfare (Annex I),
engineer support (Annex J), and PSYOP (Annex K), rear
operations (Annex L), protection of forces and means
(Annex M), provost marshal functions (Annex N), public affairs
(Annex O), and space operations (Annex P).
(k) Using the subsequent subparagraphs to direct tasks for
subordinate units not already covered in the concept for this
(l) Stating the initial location and tasks for the reserve. Propose the
employment of the reserve in taking advantage of branches and
(m) Providing coordinating instructions applicable to two or more
subordinate elements. If reinforcements from outside the
theater will impact on operations, include that impact here.
Also include instructions for linkups with SOF or ground units
involved in the deep battle.
(2) Phase II. The second operational phase is the execution of the
operation itself. It can be composed of several phases (deployment,
force entry, force buildup and combat operations, decisive combat
operations and achievement of end state). In this phase, the
(a) States his concept in detail to attain the phase’s end state by the
command as a whole. In his narration of the step-by-step
execution of the phase, he specifies exactly which subordinate
and supporting units will accomplish each operational or
tactical task.
(b) Sets forth the scheme of maneuver, as well as the deployment
scheme, to attain initial objectives. Where appropriate, the
scheme should include
the forcible insertion of combat elements
and necessary C elements and their accompanying support.
1. Changes in the form of maneuver.
2. Changes in the nature of the operation.


FM 100-7


3. Major regrouping of forces.

4. Significant changes in enemy capabilities.
(c) Prescribes the employment of fires necessary to attain initial
objectives according to the fire support Annex (Annex G). The
annex includes targeting priorities and priorities of fire and
may be augmented by appendixes for air support, field artillery
support, and naval gunfire support. In this subparagraph or its
annex, also include joint interfaces such as the joint targeting
board (JTB) and the BCE.
(d) Includes provisions for air defense (Annex H), electronic warfare
(Annex I), engineer support (Annex J), PSYOP (Annex K), rear
operations (Annex L), protection of forces and means
(Annex M), provost marshall functions (Annex N), public affairs
(Annex O), and space operations (Annex P).
(e) In subparagraphs subsequent to (d) above, includes direct tasks
for subordinate units not already covered in the phase concept.
(f) If appropriate, states the location and tasks for the reserve. This
subparagraph proposes the employment of the reserve in taking
advantage of branches and sequels.
(g) Includes coordinating instructions that apply to two or more
subordinate elements. Also includes link-up procedures
between the force and forces already in the operation, if
(3) Phase III. The third operational phase is the consolidation of the
results of a successful end state for this phase. It does not contain
the detail of the preceding phases. In this phase, the commander
includes instructions for the—
(a) Redeployment of combat forces to their original locations.
(b) Deployment of CA, MP, engineer, medical, or other types of units
necessary to restore peacetime stability to the target region in
case a continuing US military presence is required.
(c) Modification of the residual force’s relations with US
Government agencies and the host nation to aid in the
transition to peacetime stability.
c. Tasks for Major Subordinate Commands. Set forth tasks that
encompass two or more phases of the major operation in a subparagraph
for each major subordinate command.
d. Coordinating Instructions. Provide instructions appropriate to two or
more phases of the operation. Coordinating instructions may include—
2 2
(1) Airspace management procedures. Include the formation of an A C
cell and its relation with the theater airspace control authority.
(2) Operational fires planning guidance. Refer to a separate annex
(Annex G).
(3) Force-protection guidance. Refer to a separate annex (Annex M).
Include the mission-oriented protection posture (MOPP) levels.


Appendix C


(4) Times, events, or situations that signal the transition between

(5) Constraints (Annex E). Operations in situations short of general
war are usually constrained significantly by factors other than
military ones. Describe such limitations on military actions in an
annex detailing the provisions of treaties, agreements, and
conventions governing the political, humanitarian, and
informational limits on the military effort.
(6) Rules of engagement (Annex F). In addition to constraints imposed
by international agreements, certain self-imposed ROE govern the
use of military forces and certain weapons effects during the major
(7) Times, events, or situations that signal the transition between
(8) Resource management guidance.
(9) Training guidance. Refer to a separate annex (Annex Q).
(10) Operational planning guidance.
(11) Space operations planning guidance (Annex P).
(12) Public affairs operations (Annex O).
4. Support. Provide operational support instructions that are of primary
interest to the elements being supported. An ARFOR without its own inherent
logistical organization will refer to the administrative/logistical plan of the
ASCC for detailed procedures on how operational-level support elements and
other subordinate elements may receive support from operational-level
support organizations. In this paragraph or in a support annex (Annex R), the
ARFOR commander describes those support matters necessary to accomplish
the combat mission of his force. He must ensure that support plan phases
coincide with OPLAN phases.
a. Even without an integral support organization, the ARFOR commander
may choose to include the following subjects in his plan’s support
paragraph or annex.
(1) Priorities of supply and maintenance.
(2) Submission of materiel status reports.
(3) Controlled supply rate for Class V.
(4) Prescribed nuclear load.
(5) Chemical munitions allocations.
(6) Designations of LOCs.
(7) Labor policies (use of EPW, civilian labor).
(8) Medical evacuation policies.
(9) Personnel strength reports.
(10) Replacement policies and priorities.
(11) Reconstitution.



(12) Reception and onward movement of reinforcements.

(13) NEO.
(14) CA.
(15) Host nation considerations.
(16) Public affairs.
b. If a support organization is placed under command of an ARFOR,
include the detailed information normally found in the ASCC plan.
c. Identify support, such as labor, transportation, and facilities from host
nations and friendly third countries. Set forth in detail the procedures
for making use of these resources.
d. Include procedures for ASCC support of contingency forces from CONUS
or other theaters.
e. Highlight routine daily force sustainment, to include the operation of
installations and military communities.
5. Command and Signal.
a. Command. Provide information concerning command post locations,
succession of command, and liaison requirements.
b. Signal. In this subparagraph or its supporting annex (Annex S),
describe communications procedures and priorities such as radio
silence, CEOI, codes, and interface with joint or multinational
communications nets.


A - Task Organization/Command Relationships. This annex is presented in
phases. For each phase, list commands directly subordinate to the
headquarters issuing the OPLAN as major headings. Indent, under the title of
each direct subordinate command, the direct subordinates of that command in
the order prescribed in FM 101-5, Appendix G. In a numbered army, include
corps and maneuver organizations smaller than corps directly under army
control, army field artillery air defense units, and other EAC organizations.
Additionally, this annex—
•Describes the relationships of the headquarters issuing the order with its
higher headquarters/authority and its special relationships with non-DOD
US Government agencies (embassies, country teams, DEA, CIA).
•Describes relationships with host nations and with forces from regional/
treaty organizations, to include their integration into the overall force
•Unambiguously sets forth the relationships discussed in FM 100-7. The
commander issuing this order may be the JFC whose existing army
headquarters is the nucleus of the headquarters of the JTF. The


Appendix C


commander may be the commander of ARFOR as discussed in Chapters 2

and 6 of FM 100-7, with the responsibility for the operational and tactical
employment of ground forces. The commander may be the CJTF’s Army
component commander, with command less OPCON of ARFOR. Separate
headquarters may be designated to perform each of the three functions, or
a single headquarters may perform two, or even all three, functions: JTF
headquarters, ARFOR headquarters, and Army component headquarters.
B - Intelligence. This annex includes the following information:
•Analysis of the AO. Climate, geography, political matters, aspects of
economics, and social/cultural affairs affecting the operation.
••Strategic factors.
••Operational/tactical factors.
•Enemy situation. Strengths, vulnerabilities, capabilities, dispositions,
••Strategic factors.
••Operational/tactical factors.
•Essential elements of information.
•IPB, to include acquisition tasks.
•Intelligence administration. Handling of prisoners of war, documents,
materiel, and intelligence reports.
•Joint/multinational intelligence links. Interface with the ASCC's ACE to
provide for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information by
allies, US strategic means, and joint sources.
C - Operations Overlay. A graphic representation of the concept of operations.
D - Deception. This annex includes a description of the deception objective, the
deception story, resources available, excerpts of higher headquarters deception
plans, and the active and passive deception measures to be taken by
subordinate organizations.
E - Constraints. This annex contains those political, humanitarian, economic,
and social/cultural limitations on the application of military power during the
operation. It references US laws and treaties, conventions, and international
agreements. This annex includes restrictions on the use of certain weapons,
limitations on tactical methods, or entry into certain areas. It may prescribe
the seizure and retention of certain objectives for political and psychological
reasons or the mandatory use of allied or multinational forces in certain
situations. This annex includes policies of nations in or near the target area
that may inhibit military actions.
F - Rules of Engagement. This annex contains those guidelines to subordinate
and supporting organizations regarding the rules for the control of forces and
their weapons systems. The security of the force and its personnel is balanced
against the need to prevent the employment of undue or excessive military


FM 100-7


G - Fire Support. This annex describes the concept for synchronizing

operational fires with operational movement and maneuver. It includes
priorities of fires, targeting considerations, and control measures. Its phases
coincide with those of the OPLAN. It is augmented by appendixes.
•Air Support. This appendix outlines the major roles and tasks to be carried
out by air elements, priorities of allocations for CAS and battlefield air
interdiction, specific control arrangements, and procedures for the
operational SEAD.
•Field Artillery. This appendix describes the organization for combat,
missions for field artillery formations providing operational fires, and
timing of attachments and detachments or changes in artillery unit
•Naval Gunfire. This appendix describes the concept for employment of
naval gunfire, allocation of observers or spotters, allocations or missions of
ships, and limitations and control measures peculiar to naval gunfire.
•Chemical Support. This appendix includes the concept of employment for
chemical weapons and the prescribed chemical load.
•Nuclear Support. This appendix includes the concept of employment for
nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), to include coordinating
instructions for nominating NSNW targets, controls, and constraints;
preclusion data for collateral damage and troop safety; arrangements for
the initiation of nuclear operations; and procedures for integrating
conventional weapons with NSNW.
H - Air Defense. This annex includes the joint or multinational air defense
organization, organic and supporting air defense capabilities, ROE, weapons
control procedures, and enemy air capabilities.
I - Electronic Warfare. This annex includes the EW mission, enemy EW
capabilities, defensive and offensive EW measures, and coordination with
other parts of the OPLAN (deception, communications, PSYOP, operational
J - Engineer. This annex includes priorities of engineer work to mobility,
countermobility, and survival tasks. It also includes planning and execution of
operational obstacles and barriers, engineer organization for combat, and
engineer tasks for subordinate organizations.
K - Psychological Operations. This annex refers to the intelligence annex,
designates PSYOP targets, and describes the PSYOP plan, to include its
integration into higher headquarters plans and deception plan operations or
related tasks for subordinate units.
L - Rear Operations. This annex contains instructions for the protection of the
designated rear area in the host country and neighboring friendly countries
from all levels of threats. It designates a joint/multinational rear area
coordinator, usually the ASCC, and outlines provisions for the defense of bases,
base clusters, and other facilities, using assigned and attached units, host
country resources, and, if necessary, tactical combat forces.


Appendix C


M - Protection. This annex contains instructions for the protection of bases,

installations, military personnel, family members, and other US nationals in
the theater from terrorism, natural disasters, and other dangers.
N - Provost Marshal. This annex prioritizes the four MP battlefield missions
for employed MP forces: area security, battlefield circulation control, EPW
operations, and law enforcement. It should correlate with Annex M
(Protection) and Annex F (Rules of Engagement).
O - Public Affairs. This annex contains guidance for facilitating the media
effort to cover the operation and for supporting the information needs of the
soldiers and their families.
P - Space Operations. This annex describes planned and available space
support to the OPLAN. It explains how to obtain and coordinate space support,
in addition to listing operational constraints and shortfalls.
Q - Training. This annex contains guidance for the multinational, joint, and
service training of individuals and units assigned or attached to the theater
R - Support. This annex spells out in detail the necessary support for
subordinate formations to accomplish their missions. The information is keyed
to the phases of the OPORD when appropriate. The annex prescribes priorities
of supply and maintenance, requirements for submission of reports, and
sources of support (units in the force itself, the host nation, or the Army
component of the unified command in the region). This annex is organized in
categories and may be presented in separate appendixes if necessary.
•Supply. Levels for each class of supply at organizational, direct support,
and general support echelons. Location of MMC, map, and water supply.
•Transportation and Movements.
••Strategic movements. Coordination with TRANSCOM and other
services for airlift and sealift.
••Establishment of intermediate staging bases.
••Movements in operational area. Ports, airfields, railroads, airlift, LOCs.
••Location and functions of the MCC.
••Graves registration.
••Field services.
••Explosive ordnance disposal.
••Local procurement and contracting.
•Medical evacuation and hospitalization. Evacuation policies.


FM 100-7


•Personnel Service Support.

••Strengths. Casualty reports and replacement policies.
••Morale, welfare, and recreation.
••Religious support.
••Discipline, law, and order.
S - Communications-Electronics. This annex includes items contained in
subparagraph 5b when its contents are too voluminous to put in the body of the
OPLAN. It describes the link provided by the force headquarters between the
Army tactical command and control system, which 2
exists among its
subordinate units, and the joint and multinational C systems, as well as those
of the sustaining base. A joint communications support element can be
attached to the force headquarters to provide joint interface.
•This annex provides for employment of three communications conduits:
area common user (ACU), data distribution system (DDS), and combat net
radio (CNR). These systems are automated, with provisions for parts of the
force (allies, other services, reserve components) not possessing the degree
of automation capability possessed by the bulk of the force.
•This annex describes dealing with the possible degradation of
communications, with provisions for redundancy, electronic
countermeasures, OPSEC, and hardening and the use of radio silence and



Appendix D
Digitization of the Battlefield
The concept for information operations describes the explosion in
information technology and the effects on Army operations. It relates
the importance of information and how to win the information war in
military operations, now and into the twenty-first century. The
ability to manipulate, isolate, or negate portions of information
infrastructure systems (electromagnetic spectrum, computers, and so
forth) will be key element of future military operations—in war and
MOOTW. Disrupting an opponent’s ability to effectively use these
systems, while protecting our own, will prove crucial in the future.


Information Age technology will provide distributed among all committed forces—land,
the means to control and dominate the battle sea, air, and space-to create a common view of
space in any situation. The Army of today and the battle space and a shared situational
into the twenty-first century will meet the awareness across the force. This shared
challenges of the Information Age by achieving situational awareness, coupled with the ability
force coherence through shared knowledge, to conduct continuous operations, will allow
instead of through traditional means such as Force XXI armies to observe, decide, and act
graphic control measures or geographical faster, more correctly, and more precisely than
demarcations. Joint Pub 3-13 and FM 100-6 their adversaries.
establish doctrine for this new domain. Soldiers do not gain advantage over the
Information operations provide commanders
the METT-T-specific knowledge, coupled with enemy by simply using automated equipment.
a rapid and precise vision of the battlefield, to Soldiers achieve and exploit the advantage
gain dominance in a battle space and control when they optimize information presented by
the tempo of operations. digital systems. Optimizing the use of
automated information begins with discretion
Rapid advances in automated C systems in the use of digital reporting. Digital reporting
require commanders and soldiers to operate and the digital display are not substitutes for
highly sophisticated equipment to function hard copy reports or maps; they are aids in
effectively on the battlefield. Information about managing and presenting information for the
the adversary and friendly formations will be purpose of decision making.


Future information technology will provide conventionally-equipped predecessor. The
the means to collect, process, disseminate, and digitized force has an improved capability to
display information in unparalleled volume, achieve the agility, depth, and synchronization
speed, and accuracy. Digitization of the that characterize successful Army operations
battlefield provides common formats, rapid through the use of shared collective unit
processing, and timely transmission of data. images.
The ASCC/ARFOR commander must be
concerned with asymmetrical capabilities Collective unit images form a battle space
within the force. While modernizing the force, framework. This framework is based on shared
he must be cognizant of units that are real-time awareness of the arrangement of
maintaining current capabilities—not only forces in the battle space, instead of a rigid
ARFOR but also joint and multinational as framework of battlefield geometry such as
well. The digitized force has capabilities and phase lines, objectives, and battle positions.
limitations distinctly separate from its Digitization of the force permits commanders

FM 100-7

at every level to share a common, relevant which provide the capability to share
picture of the battlefield scaled to their level of information at each level of the chain of
interest and tailored to their specific needs. command. The recipient of a report can look
Commanders of digitized units at the same at the location of the reported enemy
echelon share a perspective (situational element and compare it to his operational
awareness) of their position in relation to
adjacent units. Combat, CS, and CSS leaders, graphics and friendly unit locations. This
horizontally linked by common information, comparison allows the recipient to
visualize how they will conduct and support determine potential problems with the
major operations, battles, and engagements. disposition or orientation of friendly units
Their execution is integrated by a shared vision and adjust accordingly.
of the battle space.
The commander of a digitized force has In offensive operations, automated
significant advantages over commanders of reporting is useful in synchronizing the scheme
conventionally-equipped forces. The most of maneuver during unexpected contingencies
significant advantages are- such as identifying enemy obstacles. This
exchange of automated combat information
•An increased situational awareness. provides the commander and his staff critical
information necessary to maintain and exploit
•Enhancement of the planning and the initiative during offensive operations. In
preparation of orders and the distribution defensive operations, automated reports
process. enable commanders of digital units to transmit
•Digital aids that enhance the timeliness and all information on enemy activity in sector in
accuracy of the reporting process and one digital spot report, instead of in many
employment of assets. separate spot reports. With the increased
reliance on digital technology comes the
•An improved capability to achieve mass at limitations of the hardware and software
the decisive point. (This includes the associated with the systems. Limitations in
achievement of mass of CS and CSS assets computer memory and communications
as well). capabilities address the requirement to
maintain conventional control methods for
•Digitization and automation of reports, units.


The integration of digitally-equipped The ASCC/ARFOR commander must use
elements with conventionally-equipped liaison officers or establish other positive
(nondigital) elements into the force presents control measures to ensure proper coordination
special challenges for the commander and staff. between digital and nondigital units. The
The commander must ensure that both digital ASCC/ARFOR commander must establish
and nondigital procedures are available for procedures that specify which reports will be
communicating and supporting. The ASCC/ communicated digitally, by voice, or in hard
ARFOR commander must establish provisions copy. Digital information will be processed for
to receive automated information from digital distribution to nondigital units.
units. Control measures used by digital units
are identical to hard-copy overlays.


Application of information operations requirement for Army-managed, in-theater
(electronic management and information stockpiles and incorporate split-based
systems) necessitates the formation of strategic operations. Because of situational awareness
alliances between Army logistics mechanisms (the shared knowledge on the digitized
in theater and civilian industry. This forged battlefield between combat, CS, and CSS
linkage between the sustainment base and the units), CSS units can maintain an on-time
ASCC/ARFOR commander will negate the inventory of supplies and deliver the supplies
Appendix D

more efficiently. CSS units will push required 2

support forward—to the right units at the right •C on the move.
time. •Horizontal integration.
Digitization of the battlefield will increase
awareness and coordination over a wide area, •Combat identification.
enabling the commander to obtain the near
real-time information he needs in the most •Fratricide prevention.
efficient and effective format. This digitization To effectively plan the application and
provides the commander with— employment of these new technologies within
•A common view of the battlefield. the force, the ASCC/ARFOR commander must
•Situational awareness. be aware of their advantages and
disadvantages. Synchronizing digitized and
•Battlefield synchronization. nondigitized units will be a major task.

These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.

Public Law 94-329. Arms Export Control Act of 1976. 30 June 1976.
Public Law 87-195. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 4 September 1961.
Public Law 61-253. National Security Act (NSA) of 1947. 26 July 1947.
Public Law 433. The Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986. 1 October 1986.

Joint Strategic Capability Plan.
National Military Strategy. February 1995.
National Security Strategy. January 1994.
National Security Strategy. January 1995.


FM 90-12/FMFRP 2-73/TACP 50-50/PACAFP 50-50/USAFEP 50-50/AACP 50-50.
Base Defense - Multiservice Procedures for Defense of a Joint Base.
2 October 1989.
FM 90-23/TACP 50-49/USAFEP 50-49/PACAFP 50-49/AACP 50-49. Rear Security
Operations - Army-Tactical Air Forces Procedures for Rear Security Operations
at Echelons Above Corps. 14 November 1989.
FM 100-103-l/FMFRP 5-61/NDC TACNOTE 3-52.l/ACCP 50-38/USAFEP 50-38/
PACAFP 50-38. Multiseruice Procedures
for Integrated Combat Airspace
Command and Control (ICAC ). 3 October 1994.
Joint Pub 0-2. Unified Action Armed Forces. 11 August 1994.
Joint Pub 1-02. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 24 March 1994.
Joint Pub 3-0. Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations. 9 September 1993.
Joint Pub 3-05.5. Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning
Procedures. August 1993.
Joint Pub 3-07. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.
18 July 1994.
Joint Pub 3-09. Doctrine for Joint Fire Support. February 1995 (second draft).
Joint Pub 3-10. Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations. 26 February 1993.
Joint Pub 3-10.1. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense.
15 March 1993.
Joint Pub 3-56.1. Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 15 August 1993.

FM 100-7

Joint Pub 5-O. Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. 15 August 1994.
Joint Pub 5-00.1. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Campaign
Planning. 1 July 1994 (first draft).
Joint Pub 5-00.2. Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.
September 1991.
Joint Pub
6-O. Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer
(C ) Systems Support to Joint Operations. 3 June 1992.
Joint Pub 6-05.1. Employment of Joint Tactical Communications Systems.
24 April 1992.

AR 500-5. Army Mobilization, Operations, and Planning Execution System.
May 1992.
FM 3-3. Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance. 16 November 1992.
FM 3-4. NBC Protection. 29 May 1992.
FM 1-111. Aviation Brigades. August 1990.
FM 3-4. NBC Protection. 29 March 1992.
FM 3-100. NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare, Smoke and Flame Operations.
23 May 1991.
FM 3-101. Chemical Staff and Units. September 1993 (final draft).
FM 5-116. Engineer Operations: Echelons Above Corps. March 1989.
FM 6-20. Fire Support in the AirLand Battle. May 1988
FM 6-20-10. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process (to be
FM 7-85. Ranger Unit Operations. June 1987.
FM 8-10. Health Service Support in a Theater of Operations. March 1991.
FM 9-15. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service and Unit Operations.
20 March 1989.
FM 10-67. Petroleum Supply in Theaters of Operations. February 1983.
FM 11-45. Signal Support: Echelons Above Corps (EAC). April 1993.
FM 11-75. Battlefield Information Services. October 1993.
FM 12-6. Personnel Doctrine. September 1994.
FM 14-7. Finance Operations. August 1994.
FM 22-103. Leadership and Command at Senior Levels. 21 June 1987.
FM 24-1. Signal Support and the Information Mission Area. May 1993.
FM 25-100. Training The Force. 15 November 1988.
FM 27-100. Legal Operations. 3 September 1991.
FM 31-12. Army Forces in Amphibious Operations (The Army Landing Forces).
28 March 1991.
FM 31-20. Doctrine for Special Forces Operations. April 1990.
FM 33-1. Psychological Operations. February 1993.


FM 33-1-l. Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.

November 1992 (coordinating draft).
FM 34-1. IEW Operations. 27 September 1994.
FM 34-37. Echelons Above Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations.
January 1991.
FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations. December 1985.
FM 44-1. US Army Air Defense Artillery Employment. 21 September 1984.
FM 44-100. US Army Air Defense Operations. December 1994 (final draft).
FM 46-1. Public Affairs Operations. July 1992.
FM 54-40. Area Support Group. July 1987.
FM 55-1. Army Transportation Operations (to be published).
FM 55-10. Movement Control in a Theater of Operations. December 1992.
FM 63-3. Corps Support Command. September 1993.
FM 63-4. Combat Service Support Operations - Theater Army Area Command.
September 1984.
FM 71-100. Division Operations. July 1994 (coordinating draft).
FM 90-29. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). 1 November 1993 (final
FM 100-1. The Army. December 1991.
FM 100-5. Operations. 14 June 1993.
FM 100-6. Information Operations. 22 July 1994 (coordinating draft).
FM 100-8. The Army in Multinational Operations. December 1994 (revised draft).
FM 100-9. Reconstitution. 13 January 1992.
FM 100-10. Combat Seruice Support. 18 February 1988.
FM 100-15. Corps Operations. September 1989.
FM 100-16. Army Operational Support. 31 May 1995.
FM 100-19. Domestic Support Operations. 1 July 1993.
FM 100-20. Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. December 1990.
FM 100-23. Peace Operations. 30 December 1994
FM 100-25. Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces. 1 January 1991.
FM 100-103. Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone.
7 October 1987.
FM 101-5. Command and Control for Commanders and Staffs. August 1993.
TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9. Blueprint of the Battlefield (to be published).
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5. Force XXI Operations. 1 August 1994.

AFM 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine. 16 March 1984.
FMFM 1. Campaigning. 25 January 1990.

FM 100-7

FMFM 1-1. Warfighting. 6 March 1989.

Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War. Washington, DC: Headquarters,
Department of the Army. August 1990.
“Elimination of the Field Army.” Military Review. October 1973.
Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress. Washington,
DC: United States Department of Defense. July 1991.
Foss, John W. “Command.” Military Review. May 1990.
Holder, L.D. “Training for the Operational Level.” Parameters, Vol 16, No 1.
Spring 1986.
Large Units: Theater Army—Army Group—Field Army. Combat Studies Institute
Report No 6. January 1985.
Luvass, Jay. “Thinking at the Operational Level.” Parameters, Vol 16, No 1.
Spring 1986.
Naval Doctrine Publication 1. Naval Warfare. 28 March 1994.
Operational Art in Low-Intensity Conflict. Center for Low Intensity Conflict
Papers. September 1985.
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. The Operational Art of Warfare
Across the Spectrum of Conflict. 1 February 1987.
After-Action Report Executive Summary. US Army Forces, Somalia, 10th Mountain
Division (L). May 1993.
Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and
Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1976.
Yeosock, John J. “Army Operations in the Gulf Theater.” Military Review.
September 1991.
Yeosock, John J. “H+1OO: An Army Comes of Age in the Persian Gulf.” Military
Review. October 1991.

These documents must be available to the intended user of this publication.
AR 523-13. The Army Combatting Terrorism Program. 26 June 1992.
FM 3-100. NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare, Smoke, and Flame Operations.
23 May 1991.
FM 3-101. Chemical Staffs and Units. September 1993 (draft).
FM 63-4. Combat Service Support Operations, Theater Army Area Command.
December 1989.
FM 100-5. Operations. 14 June 1993.
FM 100-6. Information Operations. 22 July 1994 (coordination draft).
FM 100-8. Combined Army Operations. 1 November 1993 (revised final draft).
FM 100-10. Logistics. April 1994 (initial draft).
FM 100-15. Corps Operations. September 1989.
FM 100-16. Army Operational Support. (to be published).


FM 100-17. Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization.

28 October 1992.
FM 100-20. Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict. December 1990.
FM 100-25. Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces. 1 January 1991.
FM 101-5. Command and Control for Commanders and Staffs. August 1993 (final
Joint Pub 0-2. Unified Action Armed Forces. 11 August 1994.
Joint Pub 1. Joint Warfare for the US Armed Forces. 11 November 1991.
Joint Pub 1-01. Joint Publications System (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures Development Program). 14 September 1993.
Joint Pub 2-0. Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.
12 October 1993.
Joint Pub 3-0. Doctrine for Joint Operations. 9 September 1993.
Joint Pub 3-00.1. Joint Doctrine for Contingency Operations (to be published).
Joint Pub 3-01.2. Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations.
15 March 1993.
Joint Pub 3-01.4. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Suppression
of Enemy Air Defenses. June 1990.
Joint Pub 3-03. Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations. 11 December 1990.
Joint Pub 3-04. Doctrine for Joint Maritime Operations (Air). 31 July 1991.
Joint Pub 3-05. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 17 October 1990.
Joint Pub 3-07. Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low-Intensity Operations.
18 October 1990.
Joint Pub 3-08. Doctrine for Joint Ballistic Missile Defense (to be published),
Joint Pub 3-10. Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations. 26 February 1993.
Joint Pub 3-10.1. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense.
15 March 1993.
Joint Pub 3-11. Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)
Defense (to be published).
Joint Pub 3-12. Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations. 29 April 1993.
Joint Pub 3-13. C CM in Joint Military Operations. 10 September 1987.
Joint Pub 3-14. Joint Doctrine for Space Operations. 15 November 1990.
Joint Pub 3-15. Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mines. 20 June 1993.
Joint Pub 3-17. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Airlift
Operations (to be published).
Joint Pub 3-51. Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations. 30 June 1991.
Joint Pub 3-52. Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in a Combat Zone.
3 December 1993.
Joint Pub 3-53. Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine. 30 July 1993.
Joint Pub 3-54. Joint Doctrine for Operations Security. 21 August 1991.

FM 100-7

Joint Pub 3-55. Doctrine for Joint Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target
Acquisition. 15 November 1990.
Joint Pub 3-56. Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and
Procedures for Joint Operations. 16 May 1979.
Joint Pub 3-57. Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs. May 1990.
Joint Pub 3-58. Joint Doctrine for Operational Deception (to be published).
Joint Pub 3-59. Joint Doctrine for Meteorological and Oceanographic Support.
1 June 1990.
Joint Pub 4-0. Doctrine for logistics Support of Joint Operations.
25 September 1992.
Joint Pub 4-01. Mobility System Policies, Procedures, and Considerations.
15 September 1983.
Joint Pub 4-01.3. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control.
26 January 1994.
Joint Pub 5-00.2. Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.
3 September 1991.
Joint Pub 5-03 Series. Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (to be
Joint Pub 5-03.1. Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (Execution).
August 1993.
Joint Pub 6-02. Joint Doctrine for Operational/Tactical C Systems. 7 March 1978.
Joint Pub 6-04 Series. United States Message Text Formatting. October 1991.
Joint Pub 6-05.1. Employment of Joint Tactical Communications Systems.
24 April 1992.
Joint Pub 6-05.2. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Voice Communication Systems. 1 March 1989.
Joint Pub 6-05.3. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Record Data Communication. 15 November 1990.
Joint Pub 6-05.4. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Transmissions Systems. 1 July 1990.
Joint Pub 6-05.5. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Communications Security (C). November 1989.
Joint Pub 6-05.6. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Tactical Technical Controls Procedures/Systems. 15 October 1987 (in
Joint Pub 6-05.7. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Network Management and Control Systems. 31 August 1992.
Joint Pub 6-05.2. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Voice Communication Systems. 1 March 1989.
Joint Pub 6-05.3. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Record Data Communication. 15 November 1990.
Joint Pub 6-05.4. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Transmission Systems. 1 July 1990.

Joint Pub 6-05.5. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Communications Security (C). November 1989.
Joint Pub 6-05.6. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Tactical Technical Controls Procedures/Systems. 15 October 1987 (in
Joint Pub 6-05.7. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Network Management and Control Systems. 31 August 1992.

These readings contain relevant supplemental information.
AFM 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the US Air Force. March 1992.
FM 22-103. Leadership and Command at Senior Levels. June 1987.
FM 25-100. Training the Force. November 1988.
FM 100-19. Domestic Support Operations. July 1993.
National Military Strategy. February 1995
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5. Force XXI Operations. 1 August 1994.