You are on page 1of 70






Submitted for the 2009 NPSA Conference Philladelphia, Pennsylvania Nov. 19-22, 2009

2009 Ermira Neki Babamusta All Rights Reserved

Source: Van Christo. May 21, 2007. Albania and the Albanians. Frosina Information Center Network. Boston: MA. <> This Map shows Albanian lands in the nineteenth century in the Vilayets of Shkodr, Kosova, Manastir and Janin. The Albanian ethnic line starts from Novi-Pazar to Ni; it comes down to Vranje in the NE, continues south to Manastir, and includes Presheva, Kumanova, Shkup, Tetova, Gostivar and Krova. In the NW, it includes Rozhaja, Tutin, Istog, Peja, Plava, Gucia, Podgorica, Hot, Gruda and Ulqin. [KIC, Expulsions of

Albanians and Colonization of Kosovo, (Prishtin, Kosovo: The Institute of History, 1997)].

Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency


In April 2007, at the age of twenty-six, I undertook a field research project in the nascent nation of Kosovo under the auspices of UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo) and UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees). The purpose of the trip was to examine the effectiveness of the status negotiation talks and to research the role of the international community in aiding the establishment of the political institutions in Kosovo. As a researcher of the U.N. Diplomacy Program and Political Science at Long Island University (LIU) in New York, I worked with Dr. John Ehrenberg (Chair of Political Science Department), Dr. Lester Wilson (Director of the U.N. Diplomacy Graduate Program), Dr. Caroleen Sayez (Advisor) and Professor Nancy Wright (Mentor). I am grateful for their guidance and advice throughout my academic career at LIU. I was fortunate to personally witness the political movement in Kosovo that accomplished independence subsequently on 17 February, 2008. I am pleased that the finality of my research predicting the unilateral declaration occurred as anticipated. I am grateful to all the helpful people I have had the pleasure of meeting during my work in Kosovo and New York. Accommodation for the entire stay during my field research in Prishtina (Kosovo) was provided by the wonderful Hajredini family. The hosts were marvelous; they organized trips to historical cities, arranged my scheduling for interviews, and provided transportation and much needed security. To name a few special people who assisted my wonderful host and tour guide Valbona Hajredini and UNHRC: the magnificent team of ATRC (Advocacy Training & Resource Center), namely Emine Emini, Gzim Kunoviku, Hysen Hamzaj and Zahid Kulinxha. To name a few people who deserve special mention: my family (Neki, Suzana, Eda, Russ); the Dakaj family, Stanley Kusz, Vigan Jashari, Driton Shala, Fatmir Limaj, Melvudin Krasniqi, Wolfgang Koeth, Naser Rrugova, Lieutenant-Colonel Enver Dugolli, Shpend Halili, Dr. Zymer Neziri, Dr. Muhamet Ternava and Dr. Emin Kabashi. This book is intended as a scientific contribution to the scholarly work in the disciplines of political science, diplomacy and international

relations. It also serves as a testimony to the centuries long Albanian struggle for justice in its ethnic lands and of its indigenous people. A significant percentage from the book sales will be donated to the Institute of the Albanology in Prishtina (Kosovo) and to the Kunoviku family who suffered tremendous loss during the war. ONE


THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS acknowledges selfdetermination as the right of all people. U.N. Resolution 1514 (1960) states that all peoples have the right to self-determination; inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.i The Albanian quest for self-determination and national identity during Yugoslavian hegemony commenced in July 1990, when ethnic Albanian legislators declared Kosovo independent, followed by two referendums in September 1991 and May 1992 approving the creation of an independent Republika e Kosovs [Republic of Kosovo], electing Ibrahim Rrugova as president. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic did not recognize the action. Kosovos Prime Minister Hashim Thai conveyed to the international community intentions of a unilateral declaration in December 2007, after the United Nations negotiated solution deadline.ii European Union foreign ministers advised Kosovo against a declaration of independence without prior consultations with the EU and the U.N. Security Council. Since 1999 Kosovo had been administered by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Following the failed attempts of the U.N. Security Council to pass a new resolution in 2007 (replacing Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999), US leadership had become crucial in shifting international diplomacy toward multilateral negotiations. The fourteen months of UN-led talks deadlocked in April 2007 with no agreement being reached between Kosovo and Serbia regarding the final status. Then in July 2007 Russian rejection of the

U.N. plan of supervised independence and the fresh round of talks initiated in August 2007 ended with no agreement in December 2007. The international mediators of the final status talks reported to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on the set deadline of 10 December 2007; however, no acceptable alternative was reached between Prishtina (Kosovo) and Belgrade (Serbia). During Kosovos status talks, President Fatmir Sejdiu unilaterally declared independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008. Serbian President Boris Tadi did not recognize the independence and urged the United Nations to not recognize its legitimacy. The initiative of former U.S. President George Bush Jr., followed by that of President Barack Obama, subsequently gathered the support of most E.U. and U.N. Member States to recognize Kosovos independence. According to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 60 out of 192 United Nations Member States have formally recognized Kosovo as of May 2009, including three U.N. Security Council Permanent Member States: the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Additionally, 22 out of 27 European Union Member States and 35 OSCE Member States fully support Kosovos independence.iii Today the issue of recognition remains to be determined by countries such as Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Vietnam, Russia, China, etc, many of which struggle with domestic ethnic unrest. The international community consisting of the European Union and the United Nations, have promised European integration provided both Kosovo and Serbia respect cultural differences, reexamine interethnic relations and thereby embrace multiculturalism. If multiculturalism is to be the objective of sociopolitical manifestation in Kosovo, it must be acknowledged this framework is successful in a society where in diverse groups demonstrate varied social and ethnic identities. However, Kosovo is not a genuine multicultural society. The ethnic composition of Kosovo is 92% Albanian and a few minorities, specifically 5.3% Serbs and 2.7% other, according to the OSCE estimates.iv This illustrates a perfect example where the social structure is predominantly one ethnic group, with a small representation of another. In principle, ethnic constituents should be granted rights in a democratic society. Thus Kosovo, in respecting its minority groups must consider characteristics that contribute to their social character. Variables such as culture, politics, history and economics represent perspectives that ethnic minority groups must freely participate in order to enjoy their rights in Kosovo. For instance, a Serb or a Bosnian would enjoy Kosovan citizenship, and regardless of their respective ethnicities, each would enjoy equal career possibilities, economic prosperity, political expression and cultural individuality provided within the social realm of Kosovo. In this framework, the individual would identify as a Kosovan first, and then relate with the country of

origin second. A similar approach to racial identities applies to gender differences. Here the equal social experiences of both men and women in Kosovo are illustrated in voting rights, property ownership, political expressionism and economic welfare. In the case of Kosovo, attenuation of identity is a threat to democracy and an encouragement to the Kosovo-Serbia conflict. In a democratic society the symbols of the statehood are exhibited in the countrys flag, emblem, cultural motifs and other national symbols. Kosovos new flag does not contain any representation of the Albanian identity such as the two-headed black eagle or the red background, commonly referred by ethnic Albanians as Kuq e Zi [Red and Black]. Instead of nationalistic depiction, the flag contains the EUs yellow and blue colors and Kosovos map, reflecting Kosovos desire for European assimilation and integration. The symbols of statehood of the new Kosovo were imposed by the international community as a neutrality bargain, to avoid favoring one ethnic group over another, threatens the very core of Albanian national identity, afflicting democratic ideals. The new symbols displayed on the flag take away the historical significance of the ancient ethnic Albanian identity, reflected in a 1000-year-old Illyrian language and 300-year-old Albanian flag. Should Kosovo settle for supervised independence via international key players at the risk of losing its own identity? If historicity of the region can be used as a guide, it was the ineptness of the diplomatic powers of the day at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, which unfortunately configured inappropriate geographic borders within the Balkans. How have the current ethnic groups in Kosovo progressed to their present position? In discussing this question a historical approach best explains the differences between these social identities. To give a fair representation of the involved groups, it is important to examine them from five historical paradigms: (1) Ethnic Albania under the Ottoman political rule (Kosovo was within the Albanian demarcation at this time); (2) Autonomous Kosovo under Yugoslav influence (Kosovo was annexed by Yugoslavia); (3) Serbias control and ethnic Albanian minority; (4) United Nations Administration of Kosovo (Kosovo was a neutral territory); and (5) Independent Kosovo and other minorities (A sovereign nation, separated from its motherland, Albania). If one were to draw a spectrum of the Kosovo problem, one would imagine the Albanians claiming the problem is part of the Greater Serbia ideal; the Serbs, blaming the Greater Albania ideal; and the international community in the middle, realizing the Kosovo problem is part of a larger quandary the Albanian Question. The issue of Kosovos statehood is part of a bigger problem, the Albanian problem. The Albanian problem also known as the Albanian Question refers to the national identity of Albanians in Kosovo, Western Macedonia, Southern Montenegro, Southern Serbia (Presheva) and Northern Greece (ameria). The international community

recognizes that it has a vested interest to protect the welfare of individuals and their right to exist, granting the protection of international human rights. Incidents in Kosovo in both 1998 and in 2004 were characterized by armed internecine violence. Sporadic violent instances still occur in Northern Kosovo by Serbian inhabitants. In May 2009 Kosovo Serbs attacked Kosovo Police officers in a demonstration protesting the need for Serbs to institute payment for domestic electric usage. The Serbs demanded Belgrade supply their electrical needs as oppose to Kosovan private companies. This book takes a closer look at the obstacles that the international community faced in reaching an agreement between the negotiating parties during Kosovos final status talks. It examines survey data and empirical literature on the negotiating process, in particular the interests of the political leaders of Kosovo and Serbia, as well as the mediating third parties, namely the delegations from the U.N. and EU. The results suggest that the effectiveness of multilateral diplomacy depends on the method of negotiation utilized during the diplomatic talks. Specifically, the use of principled negotiation might have been the ideal answer to Kosovos dilemma. The change in bargaining over positions would shift the focus to efforts of creating options for mutual gain for the involved parties. The key to overcoming cooperative barriers in the negotiation process is to employ the technique termed principled negotiation. This methodology was developed by the Harvard Negotiation Project and this concept has led to the development of negotiation workshops at Harvard Law School.v This technique has proven successful in dispute resolution and in multiparty negotiations. The principled negotiation model has become increasingly popular as a negotiating tool in managing difficult business dialogues and in dealing with international conflict. These tools have been used broadly by companies and international diplomats to study underlying interests of the involved parties as well as the legitimacy of the parameters of the case. For example, this model was employed in the 1998-2000 Ecuador border issue; in the Iran Hostage situation; and in many instances of legal This book uses the principled negotiation model as opposed to the positional bargaining model, because unlike the latter, it allows for compromise to be reached through cooperation regardless of any fixed ideas or positions. More importantly it uses a mutual gain approach to reach win-win outcomes, rather than win-lose ones in positional bargaining. Principled negotiation combines soft negotiation (avoid personal conflict) and hard negotiation (taking extreme positions). The new method discourages activities focused on analyzing what each side will or will not do; it encourages shifting focus on a win-win context where there are no losers at the end of the agreement.vii This kind of endeavor emphasizes the importance of cooperation for the express

purpose of manifesting options and proposals that serve mutual gain. Therefore, it is a win-win negotiation with no loser. In this book, the technique of principled negotiations is applied to the Kosovo final status dispute as a case study, the purpose of which is to illustrate suggested resolution of a confrontation evincing no mutual agreement. The Kosovo case provides a good illustration to apply the win-win cooperative modality since the positional bargaining method used by the involved parties proved fruitless. The ethnic cleansing of ethnic Albanians by the Serb and Yugoslav government sparked the engagement of the international community in preventive diplomacy (the U.S. and NATO). Though legally part of Serbia, the province of Kosovo came under UN administration in 1999, when NATOs intervention put a halt to the Serbian and Yugoslav genocide of ethnic Albanians. For eight years the international community attempted to use positional bargaining techniques to solve the issue; however, this proved unsuccessful when Ahtisaaris proposed resolution failed a definitive U.N. Security Council agreement in 2006. The subsequent rounds of talks initiated in the summer of 2007 employed cooperation and mutual interest (too late in the game however) as the basis of the negotiation principles, but were unsuccessful. The Kosovo case demonstrates that soft and hard negotiated agreement methods are not effective in obtaining an agreement. The best alternative in this case is principled agreement through a three-level tier approach to account for local, national and international interaction and collaboration with the participants. Had this approach been employed in the first stages of the international involvement in 1999, Kosovan leaders would not have resorted to unilateral actions. THE UNIQUENESS OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT The Kosovo crisis is considered to be an extraordinary case of the frozen conflict phenomenon. The frozen conflict concept also known as the unacknowledged countries refers to the areas of what was formerly the Soviet Union, namely: the Trans-Dniester in Moldova, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh.viii Each of these de-facto countries for years has been struggling with unresolved territorial claims and has been denied full independence.ix However, Kosovo is not grouped with the other frozen conflicts and is treated as a unique case by the international community to avoid the domino effect on the other conflicts. According to western diplomats, the uniqueness of the Kosovo case is due to the principled differences between the post-Soviet and all other conflicts, a claim rejected by Russia which urges the international community to solve older statehood problems such as the

unresolved conflicts of Palestine, Northern Cyprus and Transdniestria.x According to Daniel Fried, the US assistant secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Kosovo is unique for the following reasons: Kosovo is a unique situation because NATO was forced to intervene to stop and then reverse ethnic cleansing. The Security Council authorized Kosovo to be ruled effectively by the United Nations, not by Serbia. UN Council Resolution 1244 also stated that Kosovo's final status would be the subject of negotiation. Those conditions do not pertain to any of the conflicts that are usually brought up in this context.xi In this context, the concept of uniqueness in the Kosovo case is a direct result of NATOs intervention in the Kosovo crisis, with neither the authorization nor the approval of the U.N. Security Council. Therefore, NATO took unilateral action, deeming intervention as a necessary action to stop the violence against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. In particular, both the human rights issue concerning the ethnic Albanians and security concerns were decisive factors in NATOs unilateral military intervention, calling it a just war. Kosovo has the full backing of United States, while Serbia has the strong support of Russia and China: all three very influential global players. The multilateral actors that intervened in the Kosovo crisis emerged to be somewhat restrained. The failure to reach a negotiated agreement in Kosovo has imposed a complex and long-term commitment for the international community in the province. It has been over eleven years since the conflict escalated in 1998, and the road to diplomatic talks reached an impasse, with no renewal of SC Resolution 1244 issued in 1999. Relations between the Kosovan and Serbian political leadership appear pessimistic, unless improvements are made in the techniques used during the diplomatic process. Serbian President Boris Tadi rejects recognizing full independence of Kosovo. In a meeting with U.S. Vice-President Joseph Biden during his May 2009 visit to Belgrade Tadi stated: Serbia views the unilateral proclamation of independence of its southern province as a violation of international law. Serbia does not recognize independent Kosovo and it shall never recognize it. Serbia has a legitimate right to protect its integrity by peaceful, diplomatic and legal means.xii Former Prime Minister Agim Cejku of Kosovo strongly advocated for Kosovos independence and refused return to Serbian rule, which drove over 800,000 ethnic Albanians out of their homes during the 1998-99 war. He expressed Kosovos desire for multilateral

collaboration to resolve the status issue via the U.N. Security Council; however such course proved to be futile: Independence of Kosovo should happen without any delay. Kosovo would prefer to get it from the U.N. Security Council, but more and more we see this will not happen [due to Russia]. Kosovos unilateral independence declaration on 17 February 2008 highlights the intricacy of the international community acting in unison. There is a cogent need for the international community to utilize coordinated multilateral efforts. Further progress on Kosovos economy, property rights and the rights of minorities depend on the full support of Kosovos independence by all members of the international community.




MANY SCHOLARS have focused their interest in understanding the Kosovo conflict via root causes of the war; aftermath of the war; involvement of the international community, particularly NATO, the USA, the U.N. and the EU; performance of the international organizations in solving the problem; and the use of international law. Little attention has been given to the diplomatic process and its efficacy. There is lack of scholarly work on the role of the international community in the realm of diplomacy. This book examines the role of the international community, but differs from previous works as it analyzes its effectiveness in multilateral negotiations. The Kosovo crisis, when analyzed as a case study, will help to better understand the core issues that have been a challenge to successful negotiations. In addition it will provide a better perspective for understanding the Albanian Question at large, concerning the well-being of Albanians in Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro (Alb. Mali i Zi) and other areas which the international community will have to confront. Lessons learned from this case can be applied in the negotiation phase of the multilateral diplomatic process in instances where negotiations have proven very difficult almost impossible in the Kosovo case. This research will contribute to the current debate regarding the effectiveness of the international community in three areas. First, it will add new definitions to the limited existing body of literature. Secondly, it will push the debate regarding the notion of international community arguing that it is not an ephemeral concept but a decisive influence in problem-solving. Finally, it will offer a critical analysis of successful techniques of negotiations that further enhance diplomacy and strengthen multilateral cooperation.


This research was conducted to critically evaluate and examine the interests and the needs of the involved parties in Kosovos final status dispute. This book explores how the use of international diplomacy can identify the different behaviors of the key parties, Kosovo and Serbia, as well as the behaviors of the third party, the international community. For the purpose of this case study, the international community will include OSCE, the U.N., NATO and the EU as main players. The role, the efficiency and the challenges of the international community are also discussed in this study. The publishing of this research is likely to benefit the primary actors, Kosovo and Serbia, as well as the international community players. Specifically this study helps the reader obtain a clearer understanding on manifesting solutions that will give the best outcome to all sides through the principled negotiation strategy based on mutual interests. Thesis Statement My aim in this scientific study is to address the following research questions: 1. Why is there still no agreement between the leaders of Kosovo and Serbia regarding Kosovos statehood? 2. What is the nature of the relationship between the parties? 3. What role did the international community play in the final status talks? 4. What are the pros and cons of using principled negotiation as a negotiation strategy in the case of Kosovo? The Method The case study of the descriptive research method was used for this analysis. Specifically, this research serves as a descriptive and an interpretive analysis. The descriptive study is used to describe, emphasize and understand the nature of the involvement of the main players and the conditions of the relationships between the conflicting parties and the third parties. The interpretive study is used to interpret the effectiveness of international diplomacy in an effort to conceptualize the Kosovo status negotiation process and to theorize about the strategies used by the main players.

Gathering and Analyzing Data I chose to use published documents and interviews. The primary data were obtained from the published documents and scholarly literature that were relevant to the Kosovo status diplomatic process. I have formulated two important timelines: Security Council Actions in Kosovo, 1993-2007 and Kosovo Status Talks: 1989-2007. Both timelines were established for the express purpose of identifying important historical events and key meeting dates that can help the reader understand what the sequence of events suggest about the negotiation process for the final status talks of Kosovo. The secondary data were derived from the answers of the participants during the interview process of my research study conducted in Prishtina, Kosovo from 05-19 April 2007. The purpose of the trip was to collect useful information in support of the primary documents used in this study that would help to better understand the role of the key players and public officials who have an interest in the end result of Kosovos status. Specifically, the meetings were organized in a face-to-face interview format with open-ended questions. To determine the intentions of the agency, questions were asked about purpose and goals. To determine the objectives, questions were asked about actions taken, current plans and future involvements in the status process. To assess the end result, questions were asked about the proposed alternatives regarding the final status. To address the perceived emotions of the main players regarding the influence of the third party, questions were asked about the nature of the relationship with the other participants. Case Study Participants A total of 30 individuals were asked to participate. Considerations were given to public officials in Kosovo, mainly in the city of Prishtina, where the research was conducted. I did not consider choosing a large sample nor integrating the public opinion of the citizens since such data is available through two referendums conducted by Kosovo and Serbia. In addition, photos are included in support of the descriptive and interpretive method as secondary data. The Model This research analyzes the Kosovo status negotiation process. It also discusses various negotiation strategies such as Track I, Track II, Multi-

Track and positional bargaining process. However, emphasis is given to the principled negotiation model, developed by Fisher and Ury.xiii The model of positional bargaining and principled negotiation was used in the Kosovo diplomatic negotiations. Positional bargaining was applied chiefly during U.N. efforts unfortunately culminating in no resolution by summer 2007. Following this failed method, the negotiators applied the model of principled negotiation in a new round of talks of 120 days. However, it too ended in November 2007 with no resolution and with little progress made on identifying mutual interests. I argue that the positional bargaining technique was the wrong method for the Kosovo case because it limited the number of options and increased the likelihood for the adversaries to disagree. The principled agreement model is the best alternative to the Kosovo case and should have been applied in the initial phases of the negotiations in 2005 not as a last resort. I apply the principled negotiation model developed by Fisher and Ury in the Kosovo case, using the four-step strategy (people, interests, options and criteria) as the main variables to analyze the efficiency of the negotiations and the challenges of the international community in this process. I contribute to Fisher and Urys model of principled negotiation by adding two new variables: relationships and collaboration. In the new model that I propose called The Three-level Principled Negotiation, I employ it under the assumption that both relationships and collaboration occur on a multi-level scale. The dynamics of my model are illustrated in Figure 4 and Table 1.2. The new model strengthens Fisher and Urys model because it gives answers to crisis management and cases that are onerous to resolve. By using the four-step strategy of principled negotiation and by incorporating the two variables that I offer, the case study of the status of Kosovo will have a detailed analysis of all contributing factors important for attaining successful agreement. The three-level principled model identifies hidden interactions, influences and pressures that are not clear in Fisher and Urys model, such as those happening within the third party players. The model of Fisher and Ury focuses mainly on the conflict party, assuming that the third or intermediary part has an influential meditating role. I argue that the actions of members within the third party can impose difficulties on the negotiation process unless the issues of collaboration and interactions are addressed. Therefore, my three-level principled model looks at these relationships at the local, national and international level, without excluding the behaviors of the conflicting parties. The Scope of the Book

Talks involving the international community (in particular the United Nations) regarding the status of Kosovo were launched in early 1990. Immediately after the conflict escalated to war in 1998, the U.N., OSCE, NATO and the U.S.A. initiated the discussion regarding the protection of ethnic Albanians from ethnic cleansing by the Serb and Yugoslav forces. Talks involving Kosovo and Serbia regarding the status negotiation process were launched in March 2005, after a one year hiatus due to the 2004 violence against the Serb minority in Kosovo by ethnic Albanians. Constructing a model a model via multilateral diplomacy, several negotiation strategies were examined. However, my focus was the model of principled negotiation through the three-level game concept strategy applicable to final status talks. The trio of mediators, namely, the U.S.A., Russia and the EU reported back to the U.N. Security Council in 10 December 2007 with no resolution. As many countries consider supporting Kosovos unilateral independence declaration of 17 February 2008, the book aims to contribute to the debate by providing useful arguments on the developments of multilateral diplomacy. Chapter Four will describe the Kosovo crisis. In this chapter I will describe the Albanian and the Serbian view regarding the conflict giving a historical overview. In addition, the chapter will identify the conflicting issues that in my judgment formed a difficult relationship, limiting collaboration among participants for the status talks. I will also describe the opening moves of each participant, including the two adversarial parties, Kosovo and Serbia, as well as the third party acting as the mediator, the international community. In Chapters Three through Five, I will expand on the definitions of international community and the strategies of diplomatic negotiations, beginning with participation and collaboration during the negotiation phase. In Chapter Four I will present the methods of negotiation, namely Track I, Track II, Multi-track, positional bargaining and principled negotiation. I will describe the characteristics of each model explaining how international negotiation has developed to incorporate all levels of influence, arguing that principled negotiation is the best model to reach effective win/win outcomes in negotiated agreement. Chapter Five focuses on the principled negotiation model proposed by Roger Fisher and William Ury of the Harvard Negotiation Project, discussing the advantages and limitations of the model. After challenging the principled negotiation model, I will offer my own model proposing to use a three-level game concept approach to principled negotiation, including interactions amongst all levels of collaboration. Chapter Six is a case study focusing on the negotiation process of the Kosovo status talks. This chapter will examine primary and secondary data relevant to the negotiation process during all the stages of negotiation. The discussion section will analyze the role of

the international community and will apply the principles of the proposed three-level system approach. Chapter Seven discusses the multi-level interactions. Chapter Eight describes experiences during my trip to Kosovo, in April 2007, focusing on the cities of Mitrovica, Prizren and Prishtina. Finally, Chapter Nine will conclude this research on multilateral diplomatic negotiations. NOTES



THERE ARE TWO OPPOSING VIEWS of history that shape current Albanian and Serbian perceptions regarding the Kosovo conflict: The Albanian view is that Kosovo is the Albanian heartland. Since as early as 1300 BC the present day Kosovo (Dardania) belonged to Iliria, the most ancient state of Albania. Slavic groups, including Serbs, settled in later, around the sixth century AD. Kosovo was the center of attraction during the Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman Empires, each incorporating Kosovo into its realm. During the Turkish rule (1878) Albania was separated into four vilayets: Kosovo, Shkodr, Manastir and Yanin.xiv At the end of World War I, Kosovo became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later forming Yugoslavia. Despite the oppression of foreign occupation, Albanians found pride in their culture and regard Kosovo as the homeland of ancient Dardania. The Serbian view is that Kosovo is holy soil and the cradle of Serbian history. A decisive date in Serbian history is the epic Battle of 1389, fought in Kosovo Polje (the plain of Kosovo - field of the black birds). Prince Lazar Hrebeljanovic of Serbia joined forces with Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Montenegro to fight against the Ottoman oppressors. Despite the loss, this date is celebrated in Serbian tradition to remember the nobles who fell at the battlefield. The Balkan wars of 1912-1913 weakened Turkey and it withdrew from the territories. In 1918 the rise of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom brought an end to the Ottomans. During WWII, the Yugoslav federation was composed of six republics, including: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro and two autonomous regions, namely Serbia, Vojvodina (northern Serbia) and Kosovo-and-Metohija (Kosovo).

Map 3: The Ethnic Composition of Kosovo (2005)xv

Country: Kosovo Area: 10,908 km2 Capital: Prishtina Population: 2.1 million (est. 2007) Language: Albanian, Serbian, English Ethnic Composition: 92% Albanian, 5.3% Serbs, 2.7% other (est. 2007). President: Fatmir Sejdiu (2006 - present). Prime Minister: Hashim Thaci (January 2008 - present). Political status: Prior to Kosovos unilateral declaration of independence on 17 February 2008, Kosovo was administered by UNMIK (1999-2008) and the Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG), the government and an assembly of 120 members (2002currently), established by UNSCR 1244 (1999).xvi

THE CONFLICT PARTIES AND THE ISSUES The backing of the U.N. to ameliorate extant conditions, particularly the efforts of Hans Haekkurup, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo in 2001, accelerated the interests of both Kosovo and Serbia to collaborate in creating a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo. However, the violent events that usurped the legitimacy of the international community in 2004 and 2009 caught NATO and UNMIK by surprise; in reality they reflected the hostile relationship between the ethnic Albanians and the Serbs. Kosovo: Ancient regional ethnic and religious differences increased dramatically in the late nineteenth century concomitant with the spreading influence of nascent nationalistic and independence movements. When Milosevic revoked Kosovos autonomy in 1989 ethnic Albanians had already desired complete independence. The key issue is that ninety-two percent of the ethnic Albanian majority of the province claim that they have been an oppressed minority within Serbia and desire self-determination.xvii In the spring of 1998 serious fighting broke out in Kosovo involving Serbian troops and Yugoslav forces against ethnic Albanians. Kosovo opposed provincial autonomy fearing Serbian oppression. Albanian leaders believe this would undermine Kosovos territorial integrity as an Albanian land, replete with a rich history and culture and vital to ethnic Albanians. They also charge the Serbs with committing ethnic cleansing in the disputed territory, which led to bitter feelings between the two sides. The ethnic Albanians in Kosovo felt poorly represented and unprotected and thus wanted independence. The U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 in 1999 granted authority to UNMIK to administer Kosovo. Though under the U.N. protectorate, Kosovo legally remained part of Serbia. Following the unsuccessful December 2007 U.N. Security Council final status deadline, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence. Serbia: According to a 2007 OSCE estimate, the minorities in Kosovo account for eight percent of the total population including only about five percent Kosovo Serbs and three percent other minorities such as Roma, Bosniaks, Turks, etc. The Kosovo Serbs claim that they are an

oppressed minority within Kosovo and want protection from the Albanians.xviii Serbs consider Kosovo, particularly the northern part, as having great historical importance to the motherland because of centuries old religious sites. The Serbians felt that Kosovo was culturally important within Serbia, and wanted to preserve Yugoslavia as a whole. They felt that Yugoslavia was part of an historic empire that needed to be preserved.xix Serbia refuses independence for Kosovo and claims that it will not recognize the unilateral declaration of independence of 17 February 2008. At its heart, the Kosovo-Serbia conflict is a struggle between Albanian and Serbian nationalism. Since WWI both sides have fought over two major issues: ethnic and religious identity. The ethnic differences that fueled the conflict involve ethnic Albanians who are of Illyrian origin and Serbs of Slavic origin. The religious frictions involve the Serbs who are followers of the Serbian Orthodox Church and ethnic Albanians who are mainly followers of Islam.xx These two aspects have been the dominant identifying differences, emphasized by the media and the outside players. However, many fail to realize that economic gain and power expansion are predominant subliminal causes of most international conflicts, including that of Kosovo. For instance, the intentions of the Ottoman Empire for territorial gain and control in Europe resulted in the initial partition of Ethnic Albania. The Big Powers aim for power and economic advancement in Europe split Albania in 1912 amongst Greece, former Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Montenegro. This found Albania the only country in the world surrounded by ethnic territory and its own indigenous people, excluded by the current formation of the Albanian border. Had the international community left the Albanian borders to its original ethnic demarcation, today there would not be crisis of Albanians in Kosovo, Serbia, Greece, Macedonia and Montenegro. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONFLICT PARTIES In medieval times ethnic Albanians and Serbs fought together as allies in the Battles of Kosovo of 1389, 1448 and 1689 against the common enemy, the Ottomans. In fact, their relationship was amicable, uniting to stop the advancements of the Ottoman armies. Prince Lazar, ruler of northern Serbia and Gjergj Kastriot Sknderbeu, leader of the Albanians formed alliances together with other Balkan allies. During the late nineteenth century the relationship between Albanians and Serbs was strained with the rise of tensions between the two communities, due to the birth of nationalistic and independence movements. The period from 1945 through 1966 witnessed Albanians subject to both Serb aggression and Titos Yugoslav regime countering

Albanian nationalistic movements. Throughout the twentieth century tensions between the Albanian and Serb communities worsened. In particular, Albanians were concerned with the mistreatment of their population, including hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians being arrested, interrogated and expelled from educational institutions and their jobs. Milosevic, former president of Serbia, continued repression against ethnic Albanians, leaving behind a legacy of genocidal ethnic cleansing. The relationship between Kosovo and Serbia escalated to war in 1998-1999 with the mass-expulsion strategy of Serbian and Yugoslav forces using terror to drive ethnic Albanians out of their homeland. Security problems present another parameter in the relationship between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. The Albanians express insecurity due to their experience of misconduct; the Serbs feel vulnerable following the violent events of 2004. The security issue is a major concern in areas where there are mixed Albanian and Serbian communities. For instance, in Mitrovica, the city is divided with the Serbian community in North Mitrovica and the Albanian community in South Mitrovica. Mitrovica is an example of ethnic division and ethnic clashes highlighting the tensions between the two communities. Albanians find it difficult to trust the Serbian government. After Milosevic retracted the special autonomous status of Kosovo within Serbia, ethnic Albanians boycotted the Serbian political institutions. In lieu, they formed a parallel state to the Serbian one and declared Kosovo independent on 2 July 1990. Later, in 1992 Kosovos parliament held an unofficial referendum observed by international organizations. However the ninety-eight percent vote to proindependence for Kosovo (out of an eighty percent voter turnout) was not recognized by the international community, with the exception of Albania. The Serbs, for their part cannot trust the government of a state they believe does not exist, recognizing Serbia, not Kosovo as their primary authority. They perceive Kosovos government as corrupt and intolerant of minorities. In the elections of 17 November 2007 less than one percent of the Serbs voted, marking a successful Serb boycott of the parliamentary and local elections.xxi The Serbian community is dissatisfied with Kosovos declaration of unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008 as well as the poor economic and security conditions in the area. In the referendum of October 2006 Serbia approved a new constitution, reinforcing Serbias claim over Kosovo with a narrow margin of approval: 51.4 percent approval out of the 53.66 percent voter turnout. xxii Even though Serbia celebrated this law as a victory, ethnic Albanians did not participate in the elections and saw such measures as an act of aggression.xxiii

THE GLOBAL PLAYERS The main global players in the mediation between Kosovo and Serbia are: the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (U.N.) and the European Union (EU). For the purpose of this book, the global players will be considered as one entity forming the international community. The key issue of the international community is the legitimacy of the independence declaration of Kosovo. The international community did not recognize Kosovos selfdeclared independence in 1990. During the UNMIK administration (1999-2008), the international community legally recognized Serbias sovereignty; however Kosovo remained under the U.N. umbrella due to the political and territorial dispute between Kosovo and Serbia. During this time frame, the international community showed commitment to provide support to the diplomatic negotiation process. The negotiations failed, resulting in the unilateral declaration of independence by the Albanian leaders in February 2008. The legitimacy of Kosovos independence depends on the full support of all the Member States of the international community. OSCE OSCE has sent three missions (1992, 1998, 1999) to Kosovo to encourage a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the Kosovo-Serbian conflict. The first mission ever sent by OSCE (then CSCE, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) was the CSCE Mission of Long Duration. The mission was established in September 1992 covering Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The role of OSCE was to promote stability and to counteract the risk of violence in the three regions using preventive diplomacy.xxiv Relationships between the international community and Serbia strained when Serbia (then Serbia-Montenegro, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) denied extending the mandate of the mission (valid for one year) and refused to allow CSCE to continue its diplomatic activities. The U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 855 (1993) and called on

Serbia to recognize the great importance to the work of the CSCE missions and to the continued ability of the international community to monitor the situation in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina. xxv CSCE expressed concerns regarding human rights, freedom of media, and free elections particularly in Kosovo and recommended action to be taken to address the concerns. It wasnt until a few years later when President Milosevic signed the October Agreement (16 Oct. 1998) in accordance with the OSCE to establish a second mission, known as the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolutions 1160 and 1199 in support of the OSCE mission, calling on Serbia and Yugoslavia to verify the cease-fire, monitor movement of forces and promote human rights and democracy-building.xxvi According to OSCE, the KVM mission (Oct. 1998 to March 1999) proved to be both the largest and most challenging endeavor in their history of trying to prevent conflicts and restoring stability.xxvii OSCE was limited due to the increased violence and instability in Kosovo and was forced to withdraw in March 1999. The third OSCE mission authorized by the U.N. was established on 1 July 1999 led by Ambassador Tim Guldimann of Switzerland. It served as one of the pillars of UNMIK (the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo). The mission was established for the purpose of promoting human rights and assisting in building democratic institutions in Kosovo, as a supporting element of UNMIK.xxviii This mission is an example of cooperation and multi-lateral efforts of the international community coming together in the peacekeeping process in Kosovo. OSCE worked closely with the UNHCR, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, EU and KFOR to maintain security, rule of law and to promote human rights. NATO US and NATO in 1998 ordered the president of Yugoslavia to complete negotiations within the framework as outlined by the OSCE and the U.N. Concurrently, NATO Air Verification Mission over Kosovo (1998) was established in addition to the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo urging Yugoslavia, to end the crisis and to come to a negotiated solution to the Kosovo problem.xxix NATO was successful in reaching an agreement with Yugoslavia in establishing the missions but Yugoslavia failed to comply with the agreement. NATO engaged in an Air Strike campaign forcing Serb and Yugoslav forces to withdraw. On June 1999 NATO deployed the Kosovo Peace Keeping Force (KFOR). United Nations

The United Nations involvement in Kosovo commenced by passing five Security Council resolutions and by establishing two The first U.N. mission UNMIK was authorized under the Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). The Secretary-General granted substantial autonomy to the province of Kosovo by establishing an interim civilian administration led by the United Nations. The functions of UNMIK as specified in SCR 1244 included the following tasks:

(1)to perform basic civilian administrative functions; (2)to promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo; (3)to facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status; (4)to coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies; (5)to support the reconstruction of key infrastructure; (6)to maintain civil law and order; (7)to promote human rights; and (8) to assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.xxxi The U.N. was successful in the emergency phase and the post-war reconstruction phase in Kosovo in rebuilding the democratic institutions. However, it was unsuccessful in passing a new resolution in 2007 to replace the expired mandate of the SCR 1244. Russia, a key permanent member of U.N,, divided the international community by threatening to block the new U.N. resolution by using its veto power. Additionally Russia turned down four subsequent proposals drafted by the U.N. Therefore, the Security Council has failed to pass a new resolution. In this context, the U.N. has a limited influential role, since it was unable to resolve the final status issue of Kosovo, failing to reach an agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. The US has stepped in and emerged as a key actor. The U.S. became the driving force of the international community, leading its members towards multilateral diplomacy, in collaboration with the EU, advising both Kosovo and Serbia to compromise. Another key development of Security Council action includes the approval of the Fact Finding Mission in Kosovo and Serbia, proposed by Russia. The mission took place from April 25-29, 2007 under the leadership of Ambassador Johan Verbeke of Belgium.xxxii The purpose of the mission was to collect first-hand information in Belgrade and Kosovo and to determine the progress in Kosovo. Ambassador Verbeke

visited Belgrade, Prishtina and Mitrovica and stopped in Brussels and Vienna to meet with the EU and NATO representatives. The Kosovans saw the mission as a Russian pretext to stall independence. The United Nations took the leading role in providing diplomatic support during the negotiation status talks. For instance, the U.N. provided full support to the Troika mediation group. Troika is a mediation effort, with representation from the E.U., the Russian Federation and the United States. The U.N. also used the Contact Group to be involved in the direct talks between the Kosovan and Serbian delegation in preparing the agenda, the venue and the decisions for the Security Council.xxxiii In March 2007, UN envoy Marti Ahtisaari proposed the plan for internationally supervised independence for Kosovo. United States supported the proposal, but Russia, Serbias ally, opposed it. The new round of negations brought Kosovans and Serbian political leaders in face-to-face talks for the first time in New York, on September 28, 2007. The meeting was overseen by the Contact Group Troika, comprising Russia, the EU, and the United States for the express purpose of initiating shuttle diplomacy between Prishtina (Kosovo) and Belgrade (Serbia). Prior to the talks, Troika met with the Kosovo Unity Team on 11-12 August 2007, and with the Serbian government on 10 August 2007, to obtain their research views. Albanian and Serbian delegations did not reach a mutually accepted compromise. The UN imposed a 10 December 2007 deadline for the completion of talks. Some Western leaders feared that pressure of the December deadline, the unilateral declaration of Kosovo or the threat of Serbian force, could lead to fresh bloodshed in the region. In addition, Kosovo and Serbia held very serious positions in the solution to the status question. Kosovo will not discuss anything but independence; Serbia will discuss anything but independence. Serbia proposed substantial autonomy or a state within a state solution, following the Hong Kong Model, which offers Kosovo 95% sovereignty, retained borders, human rights protection, but defense and foreign affairs policymaking are denied. This status would last for several decades, and decisive final talks would come later, with the agreement of U.N., Belgrade, and Prishtina. Kosovo rejected this proposal. No agreement was reached by the UN December deadline. The Kosovans have unilaterally declared Kosovo independent in 17 February 2008. European Union The EU has undertaken the dominant role in providing assistance and international civilian missions to Kosovo. EU has taken a mediating role in status talks with the U.N., US and Russia. During the status talks, the EU expressed that, if necessary, a possible Kosovo

Conference could take place in November or December, in addition to the diplomatic talks. The conference-style meeting would prove useful to focus on the status situation, if the negotiation parties have not reached any agreement through the shuttle diplomacy and mediation of the Contact Group. Russia has voiced that it opposes any deadlines for future status, and is doing everything possible to stall the diplomatic progress headed towards status issue. The US has publicly stated it will recognize Kosovos independence if they declare unilateral independence after the 10 December deadline, which Russia interprets as an artificial one. There is no indication that the positions of Kosovo and Belgrade will change. There is obviously a dire need to change the character of the negotiations. Table 2.1: UN Security Council Actions in Kosovo Timeline: 1993-2009
25 May 1993 23 Sept. 1998 31 March 1998: Serbia 24 Oct. 1998: 10 June 1999:

SCR 827 to gather information regarding violence in Kosovo. SCR 1199 demanding all parties to seize fire in Kosovo. SCR 1160 calls upon open dialogue between Kosovo and and offers the Contact Group to facilitate the talks. SCR 1203 in support of NATO and OSCE missions. Established UN mission UNMIK under Resolution 1244.

1999 to Jan 2001: Dr. Bernard Kouchner (France) served as head of UNMIK. January 2000: October 2000: Feb 01 to Dec 2001: SRSG. May 2001: June 2000: since Joint Interim Administrative Departments were created. Local elections took place in 30 municipalities of Kosovo. Mr. Hans Haekkerup (Denmark) served as the second

Adoption of the New Constitutional Framework. Marked the end of the Emergency Phase of Reconstruction humanitarian assistance led by the UNHCR was successful. Shift to the next phase of Substantial Phase of Reconstruction. New four pillars were established in the operational framework of UNMIK in the areas of police, justice, economy, civil administration and building democracy. Monitored the Kosovos wide Elections that took place. Mr. Michael Steiner (Germany) served as third SRSG.

May 2001:

November 2001:

Jan 02 to July 2003:

Aug 03 to June 2004: Aug 04 to June 2006: SRSG April 13 2006: to Aug 2006 - 2007: November 2007:

Mr. Harri Holkeri (Finland) served as fourth SRSG Mr.Sren Jessen-Petersen (Denmark) served as the fifth

Security Council approved to send a fact finding mission Kosovo and Serbia under the request of Russia. Mr. Joachim Rcker (Germany) served as the sixth SRSG. Monitoring of the Parliamentary and local elections in Kosovo.

June 2008-present: Mr. Lamberto Zannier (Italy) serves as the current SRSG. Source: Ermira Babamusta, Kosovo Status Talks, A Case Study on International Negotiations, (MA thesis, New York: Long Island University, 2007). This timeline was created by using the U.N. Security Council Resolutions and Secretary General Statements.

The answer is principled negotiation where no side looks bad or appears to have a better deal. If employed correctly the outcome will be a win-win situation. The group dynamics call for a shifting of negotiation change from bargaining over positions, to highlighting issues concerning four main principles: people, interest, options and criteria. This model emphasizes finding options with mutual gains that would satisfy both sides. This alternative offers a potential solution to situations where agreement cannot be reached. NOTES

Principled Negotiation Talks The negotiation team from the Harvard Negotiation Project, including Roger Fisher, William Ury and later Bruce Patton opposed the fixed-pie approach of the negotiating theory. The group proposed a new theory in conflict resolution called Getting to Yes theory. The Harvard Negotiation Project contributed to the theory of negotiations and conflict resolution methods by developing a new model, called the principled negotiation model. The principled negotiations model outlined key principles applicable to all levels of individual business or international relations. Getting to Yes offered a step-by-step strategy to the negotiation process for the purpose of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement where all parties reach win-win negotiation. The four key principles emphasized in the straightforward method of principled negotiations are: Separate the people from the problem; Focus on interests, not positions; Invent options for mutual gain and Insist on using objective criteria. 1

In understanding the people problem, Fisher and Ury suggested that perception, emotion and communication are three key factors that influence the problem. Conflicting interests exist if there are no accurate perceptions, clear communication or appropriate emotions.2 To avoid misunderstandings, the parties should improve communication. For an astute solution, Fisher and Ury recommend emphasis on the other parties interests to better identify the full scope of the problem. In conflicting situations reconciling interests rather than compromising between the positions maximizes mutual alternatives.3 When considering mutual gain, parties must work together to create options that will satisfy both parties and avoid the fixed-pie situations where it is either/or either I get what is in dispute or you do. 4 Other obstacles include premature judgment, single answer solutions, and the view that solving the problem is their problem. In the final talks phase Fisher and Ury recommend using an objective criteria. In the Kosovo case the negotiators initially employed the positional bargaining model. Specifically, two years of intensive positional negotiations ending with Ahtisaaris failed plan in July 2007 were unsuccessful due to the hard positional bargaining methods. Had the principled negotiations model been introduced from the inception
1 2

Fisher et al., Getting to Yes, 15. Fisher et al., Getting to Yes, 21. 3 Fisher et al., Getting to Yes, 42. 4 Fisher et al., Getting to Yes, 59.

perhaps a more compliant outcome would have ensued. A principled negotiation model was applied in Kosovo only at the so-called lastditch talks of the trio of mediators from the Troika group. The 120 days of intense principled negations focused on interest and mutual gains; it terminated with no compromise at the end of November 2007.

Chapter 5: Principled Negotiation Model in Practice Principled agreement can be an effective resolution approach if the goal is to reach an outcome based on the principle of maintaining positive relations and fair procedures. Fisher and Ury emphasized applying the four principles of Getting to Yes model to attain successful agreement. Separating people from the problem allows for the negotiators to focus on the people and understand their emotions. Perception and emotion should be addressed about yourself and not about them to avoid blaming the other party for your problems for the sake of maintaining friendly relations.5 Problems are defined by the manner interests are expressed in the proposed alternatives. Therefore, for better outcomes, Fisher and Ury recommend to focus on interests, not positions, in asking questions such Why, Why Not and But to understand the concrete concerns, desires and fears of the party. The model developed by Fisher and Ury is ideal not just for the Kosovo case but for all cases requiring a conflict resolution. This model has been used on domestic, business and international negotiations and has been successful in reaching mutually acceptable agreements. The fact that the model is based on mutual gain and understands the interests of the conflicting parties enables the negotiation to proceed more propitiously. The four steps of the model coincide with reaching desired outcomes in win-win situations. No other method developed prior to the contribution of Fisher and Ury allowed for a more effective way for negotiators to reach a successful agreement. The following table outlines the differences between the game of positional bargaining and principled negotiations. Fisher and Ury concluded that choosing the principled negotiation game offers realistic objectives and effective outcomes.

Fisher et al., Getting to Yes, (1991).

Table 5.1: Contrasts between Positional Bargaining and Principled Negotiation

Problem Positional Bargaining: Which Game Should you Play? Soft Hard Participants are Participants are friends. adversaries. The Goal is The Goal is agreement. victory. Make concessions to Demand concessions cultivate the as a condition of relationships. the friendship. Be soft on the Be hard on the people and the problem and the problem people. Trust others. Distrust others. Change your position easily. Make offers Disclose your bottom line. Accept one-sided losses to reach agreement. Search for single Answer, the one They will accept Insist on agreement Try to avoid a a contest of will. Dig in to your position Make threats Mislead as to your bottom line. Demand one-sided gains as the price of agreement. Search for the single answer, the one you will accept. Insist on your position. Try to win a contest of will.

Solution Change the GameNegotiate on the Merits Principled Participants are problem-solvers. The Goal is a wise outcome reached efficiently and amicably. Separate the people from the problem. Be soft on the people hard on the problem. Proceed independent of trust. Focus on interests, not positions. Explore interests. avoid having a bottom line Invent options for mutual gain. Develop multiple options to choose from; decide later. Insist on using objective criteria. Try to reach a result based on standards independent of will. Reason and be open to reason; yield to principle not pressure.

Yield to pressure.

Apply pressure.

Source: Roger Fisher, William Ury, and (2nd ed.), Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1992), p. 13.

Fisher and Ury identified three main phases of the principled negotiation process the analysis phase, the planning stage and the discussion stage.6 The analysis phase determines the nature of the situation. During this phase, the negotiators gather information, consider the problems and think about identifying possible challenges such as perceptions, emotions, interest and the relationships between the adversarial parties. This will help the negotiators to identify the criteria that will be the basis for the agreement. According to Fisher, interests are defined in terms of the underlying positions of the party, meaning the needs, concerns, desires hopes and fears. Fisher and Ury recommended that this is the best scenario as it satisfies the interests of both parties otherwise referred to as mutual interests. The planning stage tackles all elements of the problem separately. This is done for the purpose of generating ideas and making decisions on how to best handle the situation. During this stage, the negotiators invent options according to the priorities of the known interests and objectives of the parties. Fisher defines options as the full range of possibilities which parties might consider when reaching an agreement.7 The options include the possibilities on the table and those that might be put on the table for the parties to decide on. Fisher recommended that it is best if all options are on the table. If there are many options then the party should decide to choose the best options rather than lesser ones which might cause problems. Finally, the discussion stage involves the communications between the parties, discussing the same elements. Both parties can jointly generate options that serve their best interests. In cases where an agreement cannot be reached, each party will develop alternatives that it is willing to walk-away with, without achieving the complete goals of the party. Roger Fisher refers to this situation as BATNA meaning the Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement. BATNA is the course of action taken by the negotiating party which is not satisfied with the course of diplomatic talks and projected outcome of the negotiation process.8 Fisher and Ury recommend that in difficult negotiations where there is a deadlock, or no win-win solutions are likely to be achieved, then the negotiating party would develop its own BATNA. In the case of Kosova, the BATNA would be the declaration of unilateral independence shortly after the December 10, 2007 deadline. From a realistic perspective, a party would not accept any solution that is not as good as its own BATNA to protect its interests. In choosing the best
6 7

Fisher et al., Getting to Yes, 12 Fisher et al., Getting to Yes, 12 8 Fisher et al., Getting to Yes, 105.

alternative in negotiations, the party has to first evaluate its positions and the interests, and then choose the best option that satisfies all alternatives of the party. Advantages of Principled Negotiation talks The model provides the best negotiation techniques based on the four principles the people, interests, mutual gain and objective criteria to achieve effective win-win situations. To reach an agreement that is mutually acceptable and satisfactory to both parties, parties must not feel they are locked in a win-lose situation. The principled agreement solution is beneficial to both conflicting parties because it provides for win-win solutions (unlike the positional bargaining method) and amicable relations between the adversary parties.9 Another advantage to using this model is the use of fair criteria. According to Fisher and Ury wise and efficient agreements result only if there are objective criteria. For example, the mediating party should mandate the use of fair procedures and standards. One party will occasionally use pressure to cause the other to deduce their intentions from fear. However, it is wise to never yield to pressure to avoid victimization.10 Therefore there should be fairness and objectivity. Having the international community as a third mediating party enabled the employment of the fair standards in the Kosovo status talks. Generating additional options increases the chances of the conflicting parties to reach agreements and to move toward collaborative approaches to a satisfactory conflict resolution. In the case of Kosovo, during positional bargaining the parties were limited with few options, either independence or separation or single answer solutions such as supervised independence. Later, the parties focused on mutual concerns such as the minority issue. Limitations of Principled Negotiation talks The fact that principled negotiations applied in the Kosovo case failed suggests that there are limitations to the model. Among these limitations are concerns such as cooperation, framework flexibility and the interest of the intermediate players at the international level. Participants face constraints that make it difficult to accomplish the goals set out by principled negotiations. One concern is that even after recognizing and understanding the interests of the involved parties, in sensitive cases, the parties tend to hold competing interests. This puts a limit on the cooperation amongst the participants. In Kosovo, rather than reaching an end result suitable to both parties, the outcome has been heightened tension and an uncertainty of how the conflicting parties will act after the December 10 deadline. The parties
9 10

Fisher et al., Getting to Yes, 14. Fisher et al., Getting to Yes, 142.

maintained hard positions, with little flexibility to changing what they will/ will not accept. Another limitation is not having adequate time for the negotiators to address the shortcomings of the competing interests. More importantly, in principled negotiation talks, the common goal of reaching reasonable outcomes is often overlooked. Having a unified vision is an ideal characteristic that drives mutual solutions and strengthens collaboration among participants in solving a tough problem. However, the unified vision overlooks the objectives and the interests of the intermediaries at the international level. For instance, in the Kosovo case, during the negotiation when the SC was overseeing the process, the UN was considered to be the international community. Therefore all members of the UN organization compromised this community. Particularly, the five permanent voting members of the SC have greater significance in the decision-making process due to the veto power, thus failing any proposed resolution if rejected by one of the members. While the UN would be impartial to the mediation process, one cannot overlook the interests of the five members holding the vote. In this case, Russia was the only member that threatened to fail the resolution if it mentioned independence of Kosovo in support of Serbias position. Even though Russia is not one of the conflicting parties it does represent the international community. The principled negotiation suggests that the negotiator should look for mutual interests where conflicting parties can find a common ground. However, the model lacks clarification on cases where negotiation has become deadlocked, especially when the negotiation party (the UN) may step out of role of the negotiator (figuratively speaking) when interests of the third party play a role in final outcome (like Russia). Therefore, the focus is no longer trying to find mutual gains between the conflicting parties, but trying to find unity between the many voices of the UN, who should come to an agreement for the proposed resolution, before finding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. The model provides good information regarding the interests of the conflicting parties, but leaves out the third party assuming that it will stay impartial. This might be the case if the mediating party is one individual, one country or one organization. But when dealing with the UN or the EU, in principle these organizations should act collectively, in practice, however members look for their own singular interests and relations with other states before taking any drastic decisions that could alter these relations. In the Kosovo case, the interests of the various governments involved differed. In this case the process becomes a multi-system negotiation: negotiations between the conflicting parties, negotiations between the conflicting parties and the international community and negotiations inside the international community.

My proposed Three-Level Principled Negotiation Model Since principled negotiation occurs between (1) two parties or (2) the two conflicting parties plus the third party acting at the intermediary, it is the responsibility of all players to collaborate either in bilateral or multilateral relations. The principled negotiation model offers excellent guidance in the four-step strategy in bilateral cases. However, it lacks steps for multilateral level talks, where the objectives and interests of the third party should be evaluated in addition to those of the conflicting parties. The principled negotiation model does offer an insight to the collaborations that occur at the intermediary level. In order to illustrate such relationships, I have proposed to use the three-level game approach for best desired negotiated outcomes. To study the relationship between the diplomatic processes and the international community I propose to use a multi-scale system approach, to best measure the efficiency of the international talks. The advantage of this type of approach is in the ability to analyze interactions at all levels that affect the ultimate behavior of the key actors. While the system-level approach analyzes the behavior of states, the relationship between each and interaction at the international level, the individual-level focuses on the behavior of individual players such as political parties or influential representatives. In addition, the domestic-level approach is considered when analyzing the interests and objectives of the concerned parties, to better understand the motivations and actions of the states. A combination of system level, domestic level and individual level best fits the needs of this research in providing a complete qualitative and quantitative methodology that allows the participants to best address the negotiation phase. To conceptualize the negotiation strategies, in Figure 3, I have divided the negotiation process in two categories: (1) Getting to Yes or The Principled Negotiation category and (2) Getting to No or The Positional Bargaining category. In this model, principled negotiation is considered to be the desired strategy to reach successful negotiated agreements. Positional bargaining category incorporates principles that allow for the failure of reaching agreement. The method of principled negotiations is contrasted with positional bargaining using the three-level game approach, in the international, domestic and individual level. These efforts include practical attempts to improve collaboration among key actors and to advance results of the negotiation talks. The multiple relationships that exist among actors at all levels are vital elements that complement the model of Fisher and Ury principled negotiation. Often the starting point of negotiation is the collaboration between the two conflicting parties. However, there are

expectations on behalf of both sides, from the third mediating party, in cases when bilateral diplomacy fails. Multiple relationships among states and international organizations are seen through realist or liberal perspectives, in terms of interests and objectives of the particular parties. However, the functions of collaboration and cooperation in such multilateral relations in diplomatic negotiations are best explained through the three-level games. If collaboration within the third party is difficult to reach (if the third party has more than one actor, i.e. UN), then low expectations from the conflicting parties (i.e. Kosovo and Serbia) may lead to further disputes and unrealistic expectations. The multi-scale system approach helps the development of an effective model, based on the examination of issues at a full spectrum. As shown on Figure 3, the elements of successful negotiation are outlined on the Getting to Yes section. The unsuccessful or Getting to NO method is outlined in the red section. Many agreements fail because the real issues are not clearly understood and the vision is based on a fixed-pie solution. Only significant proposals that enhance mutual interests and mutual gains, such as principled negotiations, will allow for successful agreements. Negotiation experts regularly encounter many problems during the diplomatic process. However, it is crucial to identify such barriers at the initial phase of negotiations, for any successful progress or to achieve desired outcomes. Problems such as to clearly understand the real issues as the root cause and basis for the negotiation and insufficient time to clearly identify and frame the problem or issues to be resolved and negotiated are the biggest errors negotiators make.11 Since all members of the negotiation parties can be divided into the Getting to Yes or Getting to No sections as illustrated in Figure 3, the determining factors in my proposed approach are interaction and collaboration. I look at the relationship of each party at the multilateral level, not excluding the interactions that happen between bilateral processes or the pressures within the domestic level. Figure 4 illustrates the interactions between each party. Each participant is illustrated as Player A, Player B, Player C and so on. Each player acts on influences and pressures on three main levels: individual, domestic and international. The direction of the errors explains the direction of interaction and collaboration between the players. For example, each player has the three influences/pressures based on the three-level game. Each player interacts with the conflicting party, outside the domestic level, and with the third intermediary party, at the international level. In addition, each player has to consider the individual forces that put pressure at local level, as well as the individual forces within the intermediary.

The Negotiating Problem..<>

Table 5.2 illustrates the specific interactions that exist among all parties. The three-level game is applied to Fisher and Urys principled negotiation model. I have identified the four-step strategy of principled negation in the three-level game, by applying the variables of people, interest, option and criteria to the individual, national and international level to each participant of the negotiation.

Table 5.2: The Dynamics of the Three-Level Principled Negotiations

The Problem Principled Negotiation at multi-level . Solution Modify the GameConsider Collaboration and Interaction at the three-level game

THE PARTICIPANTS The Conflict Parties: Player A + Player B (ie. Kosovo, Serbia)
People -->

THREE-LEVEL GAME INDIVIDUAL Local groups, political parties coalitions NATIONAL The government INTERNATIONAL The state

Interest --> Option --> Criteria -->

Personal experience
Empathy Influence/ pressure INDIVIDUAL Member Negotiation Co-operative power Assertiveness

Community concerns
Managing emotions Willingness to resolve NATIONAL State Negotiation Co-operative power Response

Global significance
Co-operative power Broaden perspectives INTERNATIONAL Organization/ mediation efforts Negotiation/ Mediation Mapping conflict Designing options Win/win

Third Party/Intermediary: (multiplayer: Player C, D, E+: ie. UN, EU)

People -->

Interest --> Option --> Criteria -->

Source: Ermira Babamusta, Kosovo Status Talks, A Case Study on International Negotiations, (MA thesis, Long Island University at New York, 2007).

The participants are the two conflicting parties and the third party who has the role of the intermediary or the mediator. It is important to understand who the players are and who they represent. In addition, it is important to understand the different interactions and the collaborations that occur among all participants. As illustrated in Figure 3 and on Table 5.2, Conflict Party A and Conflict Party B represent the country at the international level, the state at the national level, and the various individuals at the local level. However, at the negotiation table, Conflict party A, and Conflict party B are

individually one member or one delegation representing the interest and objectives of all the concerned groups. The third important participant is the third party. In business relations, a third party may consist of an individual or agency. In international relations, and international diplomacy, in order to maintain fair criteria, power and trust is vested in the international community. The members of the international community may vary depending on the international conflict. However, key players in previous conflicts and in the current Kosovo conflict have been the UN, the EU, NATO and OSCE. Participant Conflict party A or B views the third party as one entity in the process of the mediation efforts. However, the third party in the case of UN and EU are actually composed of many members that represent the interests of organization at large. It is important to analyze the relations within the members of the international community as well as interactions with the conflict party. Ideally, the international community, acting as third party, should maintain a unified vision expressing a singular voice. However, the fact is that there are many other members within the third party. It is important to analyze their interests and objectives in the representation of the vision of the organization. Frequently, depending on the complexity of the conflict, it is hard to maintain a unified vision within the international community (the intermediary) because each member of the intermediary has subjective interests that could possibly influence the relationship with Conflict party A or B. So the question then becomes, how should the international community behave? What role does it have? Is the international community effective? During the negotiation phase all parties should follow the fourstep strategy as proposed by Fisher and Ury, because it maximizes mutual gains for all parties. However, in considering the possible collaborations and interactions among all participants, it is important to view the principled negotiation model through the three-level game approach. This approach identifies possible challenges and limitations that place a strain on the collaboration and interactions among the parties that occur at multi-lateral levels. Therefore, the final outcome should still remain win/win solution as Fisher and Ury have suggested. However, in reaching a consensus within the third party consisting of many members (like the UN), the participants should be aware of .the multi-level interactions. Consensus within the third party is necessary to support the outcome; consensus between the two conflicting parties is necessary to reach an agreement. The response and the assertiveness of the members of the third party will influence the outcome of the negotiation.

CHAPTER 6: KOSOVO STATUS NEGOTIATIONS: A CASE STUDY Primary and secondary data are analyzed in this chapter; the former is employed to assess the role of international community in the negotiation process while the later, in the format of interviews, is used to support items raised in the discussion. Kosovos Status Negotiation Process The long negotiation process of the final status of Kosovo can be best approached by analyzing the phases of the negotiations. Figure 5 & 6 illustrate the phases of negotiations covering a time span from 1989 to 2007.12 For the purpose of this study the initial negotiation process starts with the landmark year of 1989 with Milosevic revocation of Kosovos autonomy; it ends with the significant year of 2007 with the UN Security Council December deadline for a negotiated solution. I have divided the negotiation process into three phases because of the role of the international community and the nature of the talks. Initially, the international community expressed concerns about the endangered state of justice in Kosovo. Therefore, the role of the international community in Phase I was to settle the dispute between Kosovo and Serbia by promoting peaceful dialogue between the adversarial parties. Subsequently, the role of the international community shifted from a peace settlement to a political settlement. In Phase II the international community addressed the post-war reconstruction process and in Phase III it addressed the final status resolution process in several rounds of talks. Each phase is divided into three stages analysis, planning and discussion.13


Please refer to the Kosovo Status Talks Timeline, 1989-2007 in Appendix M to learn about each action taken in the respective calendar year, 227. 13 I have adopted Fisher and Urys basic stages of negotiations. See Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes, 12.

Phase I (1989-1999): Interim Peace Settlement The initial negotiation process of the peaceful dispute settlement started in March 1989. However, due to the engagement of the international community in solving the Bosnian situation, no significant effort in the Kosovo diplomatic talks occurred from 1989 to 1998. Additionally, the peaceful Albanian struggle led by President Ibrahim Rrugova did not attract the attention of the international community. Albanians were disappointed when the Kosovo issue was excluded from the Dayton Peace Accords agenda. Throughout 1996 and 1997 Albanians continued massive peaceful demonstrations. The escalation of the crisis in December 1997 prompted the international community to dedicate serious efforts to the Kosovo issue. The Analysis Stage (March 1989 - March 1998): This stage is known as the pre-negotiation phase where the third party gathers information to establish the nature of the situation. Immediately after the rescinding of Kosovos autonomy in 1989, Germany and France emerged as key players concerned with the Serbian repression of the ethnic Albanians. The United States, disappointed with the violent activities of the Serbians and Yugoslav government, issued warnings to Milosevic in 1992 and 1998. Priority was given to the Kosovo crisis when the international community became deeply concerned over extant tensions in Kosovo in 1998. The Contact Group emerged as the mediator focusing at initiating a dialogue between the Kosovar and Serbian leadership. The Contact Group met in New York (September 1997), in Washington (January 1998) and in Moscow (February 1998) to address the problem, to consider the perceptions of the populace and to identify the interests of the Group and of the parties. The Group repeatedly called for dialogue between the two parties to solve the issue. In addition, the US envoy to the Balkans, Robert Gelbard and the EU representative Robin Cook (the British Foreign Secretary), played a crucial role in the mediation process by pressing both parties for dialogue and calling on Milosevic to terminate the political unrest in Kosovo. The Planning Stage (March 1998 - May 1998): During this stage, the third party generates ideas and considers appropriate measures to alleviate the situation. The European Union became gravely concerned with Serbian actions and called for greater autonomy as an option for the ethnic Albanians. Foreign ministers of the six-nation Contact Group held emergency talks to discuss the Kosovo crisis. The killing of the 58 members of the Adem Jashari (the KLA leader) family in the Donje Prekaz massacre of March 1998, galvanized the international community. Switzerland immediately called for an international conference on Kosovo and the US Secretary

of State Madeleine Albright and the British foreign secretary Robin Cook put pressure on Milosevic to restore Kosovos autonomy. During the planning process, the Contact Group met in London (9 March 1998) and in Brussels (20 March 1998). The group discussed possible economic sanctions but remained divided on how much pressure to apply on Milovevics government. The Group demanded the following actions to be taken by Milosevic: to withdraw his troops within 10 days to cooperate with ICTY to allow the return of the OSCE mission in Kosovo, Sandzak,Vojvodina.14 To follow up on the decisions the Contact Group met in Bonn (25 March 1998), in London (6 April 1998) and in Rome (29 April 1998). The Contact Group assessed Belgrades response and agreed that Milosevic failed to meet the demands.15 The Discussion Stage (May 1998 1999): During this stage communication between the two adversarial parties occurs to discuss the proposed options, intending to reach an agreement. President Rrugova and President Milosevic met in Belgrade (15 May 1998) under the mediation of the US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke. Another meeting between the working group of Kosovo and the Serb/FYR was held in Prishtina (22 May 1998). However, the Albanian leadership withdrew from the diplomatic talks in 4 June 1998, demanding an end of the Serb offensive in Kosovo. In response, the Contact Group demanded Serbia and Kosovo to cease hostilities and to maintain a ceasefire in a Moscow meeting in June 1998.16 This demand was reinforced by the UN with the passing of the Security Council Resolution 1199 in September 1998.17 The Racak Massacre of January 1999 in Kosovo prompted the international community to begin negotiations in the Rambouillet Conference held in Paris in 6 February 1999. The peace talks were led by the Contact Group and the co-Chairmanship of the Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine of France and the UK Foreign Secretary Robert Cook. However the peace talks failed in March 1999 due to Serbian refusal to sign the agreement. After NATOs intervention in 24 March 1999, Serbia and NATO reached agreement in 3 June 1999, known as the

See London Contact Group Statement on Kosovo (9 March 1998). <> 15 See Contact Group Statement (16 July 1998). <> 16 See Contact Group Statement (16 July 1998). <> 17 See UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (23 September 1998). Adopted by the Security Council at its 3930th meeting on 23 September 1998. <>

Kosovo Peace Accord. Following the agreement, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1244 (10 June 1999) placing Kosovo under an interim administration by the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).18 Phase II (1999-2002): Interim Political Settlement After border security was no longer an issue, the diplomatic talks shifted from peace accord discussion to a political settlement. Phase II is the essential ingredient in the process of building a new democracy in Kosovo. The beginning of 2000 found the region at a very crucial stage. The formulation of a new, free Kosovo would manifest a safe environment and a civil society with democratic institutions. To the neighboring Balkan countries such as Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece, it signified a new relationship of collaboration within the region. The post-war reconstruction and renewal stage was not an easy task for the international community and the Kosovars.19 The Emergency Phase of Reconstruction (June 1999 June 2000) is defined by The Institute for Development Research (RIINVEST) as a critical phase, focused on contending with the greatest problems caused by the war. The spectrum of problems in the emergency phase is very complex, including housing, public services, reactivation of administration, creating conditions for income generation, increasing employment, consolidation of central administration and moving from an aid economy to a market economy. 20 This phase aimed at condensing the emergency period and shifting to the second reconstructive phase. RIINVEST concluded that during the nine month duration of the first phase Kosovo overcame most conditions; however, it still has serious problems to deal with, especially economic problems. The Substantial Phase of Reconstruction (2000 2002) can start in some segments during the emergency phase, because a successful realization of post-war reconstruction is conditioned by

See S/RES/1244 (1999). Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting on 10 June 1999. <> 19 The research report published by the Institute for Development Research RIINVEST in March 2000 outlined two key stages of reconstruction the Emergency Phase of Reconstruction and the Substantial Phase of Reconstruction. In this report, solutions for an independent economy and methods to develop infrastructure were proposed. The report discussed the issues of social, demographic and economic problems as well as future implications. The report was prepared by the Project team: Muhamet Mustafaproject leader, Muhamet Sadiku, Ekrem Beqiri, Ali Hamiti, Ilaz Ramajli, Sejdi Osmani, Haki Shatri, Ymer Havolli, Luan R. Gashi, Isa Mulaj and Avdulla Hoti, in preparation for the International Conference PostWar Reconstruction of Kosovo 2000.See, Institute for Development Research, Post War Reconstruction of Kosovo: Strategy and Policies, (Prishtina: Instituti pr Hulumtime Zhvillore RIINVEST, March 2000).

RIINVEST, Institute for Development Research, Reconstruction, 13.

synthesizing of physical reconstruction and social and economic development.21 The duration of this space depends on complexity of the problems but should be in a time period of three to five years. According to the RIINVEST report, the management of this phase is focused on developing and building and stabilizing an independent open market economy and creating institutions governed by rule of law and rehabilitation of infrastructure. At the end of the emergency phase, Pillar I of UNMIK, humanitarian assistance phased out in June 2000. 22 The Humanitarian Assistance was led by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It is the duty of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo to ensure the implementation of the pillars. In May 2001 a new Pillar I was established: Pillar I: Police and Justice, under the direct leadership of the United Nations Pillar II: Civil Administration, under the direct leadership of the United Nations Pillar III: Democratization and Institution Building, led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Pillar IV: Reconstruction and Economic Development, led by the European Union (EU). 23 The successful realization of the reconstruction phase has been influenced by two main factors: (1) the Kosovars participation and engagement in the building-up process and (2) the commitment of the international community. Both roles of the local and international influences have been crucial to the reconstruction implementation phase. The Institute for Development and Research concluded that Kosovars have demonstrated an impressive energy for rebuilding of their society.24 There has been rapid return of the citizenry after deportation. In addition, Kosovars have taken immediate steps in reconstruction to restart business activities and create a better living environment. Phase III (2002-2007): Future Status Resolution The Analysis Stage (2002- 2003): In 24 April 2002 the UN Security Council held session at the headquarters in New York to discuss progress on Kosovo. In December 2002 the UN sent a mission
21 22 23 24

RIINVEST, Institute for Development Research, Reconstruction, 23. United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, 3, <>. Ibid., 4. RIINVEST, Institute for Development Research, Reconstruction, 34.

to observe the implementation of the UNSCR 1244. Previously the UN had sent similar missions in Kosovo in April 2000 and June 2001. The Planning Stage (2003 - 2005): The Serbian and Kosovar politicians met in June 2003 and October 2003 and agreed to start dialogue to discuss technical negotiations such as issues of energy, communication, missing persons and refugees. In November 2003 the Contact Group met with both delegations and urged the institutions of Kosovo to cooperate with UNMIK and KFOR in creating conditions for a multi-ethnic democratic Kosovo.25 In December 2003 the UN established conditions for final status talks in 2005. However, due to the violent events of 2004 talks were suspended for a year from March 2004 until March 2005. Peace talks resumed on 16 March 2005 and priority was given to the missing people of the 1998-99 Kosovo war. In October 2005 the United Nations Security Council agreed that talks on the future of Kosovo were to be mediated by the UN Special Envoy, the former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari. The Discussion Stage (February 2006 December 2007): The UN-backed talks led by Ahtisaari began in February 2006. The talks focused on finalizing Kosovos status; however, after ten round of talks held in Vienna the negotiation process ended unsuccessfully in September 2006. In February 2007 Ahtisaari proposed a draft on a path to independence for Kosovo, which was welcomed by the Kosovar delegation and rejected by the Serbs. Ahtisaari revised the proposal four times to meet the interests of both parties and proposed supervised independence. Russia threatened to veto the resolution at the UN Security Council. Russia was granted the request to send a fact-finding mission by the UN. The mission took place in April 2007 and concluded that Kosovos overall progress was encouraging, however more efforts were needed on the process of full reconciliation and integration of Kosovos communities 26 Fresh talks started on 9 August 2007 in London under the mediation of the Troika also known as the Trio of Mediators, referring to the EU, the US and Russia. The UN set 10 December 2007 as the deadline for a negotiated solution. However, after five rounds of talks held in New York, Brussels, Vienna and Brussels, the adversarial parties failed to compromise.


See, Joint Statement of the Contact Group on Kosovo, (20 April 2004). < or/37539.htm> 26 See S/20o7/395, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), (29 June 2007), 8. < %202007.pdf>.

Initial Positions In 1989 Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic revoked Kosovos autonomy. This action raised concerns in foreign governments and prompted the international community to take interest in Kosovo. The initial negotiations involved a third party and employed principles of Track I diplomacy. Track I talks were initiated in 1989 by two key participants of the international community, Germany and France. Official discussions took place in Belgrade between Milosevic and the Foreign Ministers of Germany (Kalus Kinkel) and France (Hubert Vedrine) to persuade the Serbian president to restore the previous status of Kosovo. The participants of the international community, employing their political expertise, endeavored to dissuade Milosevic from the continuation of the recision of Kosovos autonomy and to address increasing ominous sings of conflict from this action. Another key participant, the United States, strongly urged Milosevic to reconsider his decision. President George H. W. Bush warned Serbia in 1992 that if it instigated action against Kosovo, the US was prepared to respond militarily. However, Track I diplomacy was lethargic pace of negotiation due to the hard positions of the adversaries: Kosovos position was independence; The Serbian position was that Kosovo remained part of Serbia. The intent of the international community in the initial phase was to influence Serbia to open dialogue with Kosovo regarding the status of autonomy. However, despite the cooperative efforts of the international community, the use of multilateral diplomacy proved an ineffective tool to modify the Serbian position. With the rise of the use of force by Serbian forces against ethnic Albanians, the international community accelerated its involvement. Both formal and informal multilateral efforts by foreign governments increased. Another player emerged in the international community scene Albania. In 1998, the Albanian Prime Minister Fatos Nano warned the international community about the possibility of the conflict spilling over to Kosovos neighbors, Albania, Greece and Turkey.27 Albania put pressure on the global players, calling for NATOs intervention to stop the violence in Kosovo. During the pre-war phase of negotiation the third party employed Track I and Track II diplomacy. Track I talks were initiated by the Contact Group, involving representation from six nations: Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the United States. However, there was no direct dialogue between the delegation of Kosovo and Serbia in this phase, thereby contributing to the failure of the role of the Contact Group.

Worldly News. Contact Group debates tougher stance on Kosovo. (CNN: April 29, 1998). Available online at: <>

The US offered a peace proposal that combined incentives and sanctions, but not all European diplomats were in support of it. The Italian representative suggested finding a common approach to the proposal.28 The United States continued the official interaction with both delegations and was perceived to be pushing for a carrot and stick approach meaning incentives and sanctions to persuade Yugoslavia to start the talks with leaders of Kosovo.29 If Yugoslavia agreed to the help of the US, then in return the United States would offer its vote in lifting the proposed freeze on Yugoslav assets; if Yugoslavia refused, then the US would agree with the Contact Groups ban. Concerned about the lack of Yugoslavian progress to meet the demands of the Contact Group, the delegates held several formal meetings in London, Bonn and Rome. At the meetings, the representatives condemned the Serbian use of force on ethnic Albanians. The group imposed a comprehensive arms embargo on Yugoslavia under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. All members with the exception of Russia agreed to impose a freeze on funds and an investment ban on Yugoslavia. Since Track I diplomacy proved to be ineffective in persuading Yugoslavia to meet the demands of the Contact Group, Track II diplomacy was employed to undertake new efforts. The demand of withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from Kosovo and return of the OSCE mission in Kosovo were further debated in the Group of Eight (G8) informal meetings. The Group of Eight (G8) is an international forum for the representatives of different countries to discuss matters of economy and security. With the exception of Russia, all members participated and agreed to implement the Contact Group decision to freeze funds held abroad by the Yugoslavian government.30 The inability of the third party to influence the outcomes of the negotiations was due to the following reasons: Milosevics reticence; acrimonious relations between Kosovo and Serbia; and different criteria for the negotiation process. In particular, Milosevic and Serbia refused to participate in the diplomatic dialogue with the mediation of an outside third party. On the other hand, Kosovo refused to participate in direct dialogue with Serbia, unless representatives of the international community were present at the talks. Notwithstanding the probable imposition of a trade embargo, the Serbians were not ready to make adjustments to their position. Ironically, the US is often criticized about its unilateral initiatives; however, it takes the leadership and the effectiveness of the United

Wordly News. US and Euro Split on Kosovo. (CNN: April 29, 1998). Available online at: <>
29 30

Wordly News., Contact Group debates tougher stance on Kosovo. (1998). The members of the Group of Eight are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

States to promulgate actions that steer the international players in the right direction. The US role is strategic in the Kosovo crisis. When the situation became alarming due to the war in 1998, the international community initially used the threat of imposing sanctions on Yugoslavia. The United States chose deterrence in this case; if Yugoslavia did not withdraw its troops from Kosovo then the US would support the sanctions. To promote the settlement of the conflict, US Special Envoys Robert Gelbard and Richard Holbrook visited Prishtina, Belgrade and Bosnia in May 1998 and arranged the meeting between the leaders of Kosovo and Serbia. The United States role as a mediator acting singly was successful. In May 1998 President Rrugova and President Milosevic met in Belgrade under the mediation of envoy Holbrook. Track I mediation of the United States acting singly, proved successful in getting the adversarial parties to agree to meet. Progress was made and for the first time the working group of Kosovo met with the Serbian representatives in Prishtina. The United States effectiveness in the Kosovo crisis was enormous, because it provided the nascent effort for future negotiations. The international community seized the opportunity and continued mediation acting collectively through the Contact Group. Shuttle diplomacy between Prishtina and Belgrade, led by the US Ambassador to Macedonia, Christopher Hill in September 1998 made Track I meditation possible and successful, as exemplified by the following agreements: the Kosovo Verification Agreement; NATO Air Verification Agreement over Kosovo: the agreement signed in Belgrade by the Minister of the Foreign Affairs in support of the OSCE-KVM mission under the UNSC Resolution 1203; and the NATO/FRY agreement to end use of force on ethnic Albanians. The 1998 Deal The 1998 Deal was a peace plan proposed by the US mediator Richard Holbrooke. The plan was based on four key provisions: (1) it required Milosevic to allow ethnic Albanian refugees to return home; (2) withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo; (3) OSCE and NATO international monitoring by land and air; (4) both a political framework and timetable for autonomy talks.31 The Options The preferred option for Kosovo during Phase I of the negotiation process was restoring Kosovos autonomy. This option had the full support of the United States and the European Union members. For this phase, Serbia had suggested limited/conditional autonomy as a possibility. The U.S. called for an enhanced autonomy status for

Julie Kim, CRS Report for Congress: Kosovo Conflict Chronology September 1998 - March 1999, The Library of Congress, 6 April 1999. <>

Kosovo.32 Kosovos leader Ibrahim Rrugova advocated that full independence was the only acceptable outcome. Kosovo Kosovars did not believe that the European Union was the answer to their problem; consequently they sought greater US involvement. Albania positioned the army on the Serbian border, which agitated Russia.

Serbia Serbia was dissatisfied with international community involvement in the Kosovo crisis. There was unified pressure on Serbia by the major powers condemning Serbias violence over Kosovo. The European Union The EU members supported the US efforts in both advocating autonomy for Kosovo and economic sanctions on the Belgrade regime. British Prime Minister Tony Blair led the efforts to win UN Security Council approval of a resolution authorizing all necessary means to deal with the situation in Kosovo.33 Britains efforts were supported by the United States but opposed by Russia. NATO NATO countries were alarmed with the refugee crisis and the serious abuses occurring in Kosovo. NATO considered many military options in support of the diplomatic efforts made by the Contact Group, the US Envoys Holbrooke and Hill, the OSCE and the UN Security Council. NATO increased regional cooperation in alliance with Albania, Macedonia, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) to provide humanitarian and security assistance to the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.34 The Contact Group Excepting Russia, there was full cooperation among the members of the Contact Group, which lead to their agreement seeking the UN arms embargo and the freezing of overseas Serb assets.35 Russias pervasive refusal to accept the 1998 package deal was

The U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright Statement in a London briefing, Albright Briefs on Kosovo, South Asia, G-8, 15 June 1998. <>


CNN, NATO Weighing Military Options for Kosovo, 11 June 1998. < europe/9806/11/kosovo.early/> (20 December 2007). 34 NATO, NATOs Role in Relation to the conflict in Kosovo, <>

interpreted by the international community as threatening cooperation by pursuing a single position rather than common position. Standards Before Status After the phases of reconstruction manifested, the role of the international community shifted to addressing the future status resolution of Kosovo. During the early stages of Phase III of the negotiation process, the US and the UN were the key players. In April 2002 the UN Secretary General's Special Representative in Kosovo, Michael Steiner, laid out a new approach called Standards Before Status.36 The standards were designed to insure the functioning of a multi-ethnic democracy and an operating economy in Kosovo. The new approach called on Kosovo to meet the following eight benchmarks set by UNMIK before addressing the final status question: 1. Functioning Democratic Institutions 2. Rule of Law (Police/Judiciary) 3. Freedom of Movement 4. Returns and Integration 5. Economy: Legislation, Balanced Budget, Privatization 6. Respect for Property Rights (Clear Title, Restitution, Preservation of Cultural Heritage) 7. Dialogue with Belgrade 8. Kosovo Protection Corps (Size, Compliance with Mandate, Minority Participation).37 The United States supported the UNMIK benchmarks and called on Kosovo to meet the standards in order to address the economic problems, to increase regional cooperation and to participate in European integration.38 The new benchmarks called for the full participation of the Kosovar leaders and its political institutions, as well as the support of the international community in achieving the benchmarks. The European Union reaffirmed its commitment to fully support Kosovo in the development and integration process during the EUWestern Balkans summit in Thessaloniki, Greece (19-21 June 2003). However, the position of the European Parliament and the Commission

The Contact Group was established by the 1992 London Conference regarding issues of the Former Yugoslavia. 36 US Department of State, U.S. Reaffirms "Standards Before Status" Stand on Kosovo, The Bureau of International Information Programs, 21 May 2003. Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Central Europe Janet Bogue before the House International Relations Committee. <>

UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, Standards for Kosovo, UNMIK/PR/1078, 10 December 2003, <> (20 December 2007).

US Department of State, Standards Before Status, 23.

was divided following the violent events of 2004 in Kosovo.39 The European Commission members and the EU Representative Javier Solana indicated that the Standard Before Status approach was the right policy approach. However, members of the EU parliament were critical of this proposal and called for a policy change to Standards and Status, emphasizing on solving the status question.40 In April 1, 2004 the European Parliament adopted a resolution asking the European Council to commence debate on the final status of Kosovo with delineated deadlines.41 In 23 August 2004 the Council of Europe Secretary-General Walter Schwimmer and the UN administrator Soren Jessen-Petersen signed two documents calling for the protection of minorities and prevention of torture in Kosovo.42 A significant change that occurred in the negotiation process is the shift from peace agreement to technical agreement. Because the concerns and the needs of Kosovo changed, the international community considered the changes in the ensuing 2005 UN- led political process. The international community took the right steps in Phase I and Phase II in addressing the peaceful and the political settlement of Kosovo. Phase III of the negotiation process focuses on technical arrangements (minority rights, prevention of torture and missing persons) and on the determination of Kosovos future status. The Positional Bargaining Process The negotiation process of the future status of Kosovo started in October 24, 2005 when the United Nations agreed to mediate talks by its Special Envoy, former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari and his deputy, the Austrian diplomat Albert Rohan. From 2005 until 2007 Kosovo, Serbia and the international community engaged in intensive discussions, drafted many resolutions, and brought forth many proposals. The 2005 status talks identified Kosovo advocating the full independence assertive position, and Serbia expressing the autonomy option for Kosovo but remaining part of Serbia. The adversarial parties employed the hard positional bargaining technique. Each party demanded the proposed alternative as a condition without any further discussion. Agreement was impossible due to the distrust between the parties, one-sided demands, singleanswer resolution and firm claims on the positions. The final outcome was viewed as victory rather than an agreement; therefore the parties

Adrian Toschev and Gregory Cheikhameguyaz, The European Union and the Final Status For Kosovo, Chicago Kent Law Review, 80 no 273 (23 February 2005), 281. <> (20 December 2007).
40 41 42

Toschev and Cheikhameguyaz, The EU, 282. Toschev and Cheikhameguyaz, The EU, 283.

Agreement between UNMIK and European Council signed on 23 August 2004 <>

made no effort to understand the concerns, desires and fears of the other. The mediating role of the UN became clearer throughout 2006 talks. During the round of talks 1 through 5 Ahtisaari was successful in bringing the adversarial parties for the first time in mutual dialogue. Progress was reached on the technical arrangements, but no consensus on the status question. The subsequent rounds of talks, held in Vienna, involved the first high-level talks focusing mainly on the status outcome. Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu and Prime Minister Agim eku were not surprised to hear the extreme position from the Serb delegation opposing full independence. Serbian President Boris Tadi and Prime Minister Vojislav Kotunica suggested full autonomy and hinted on partition. The meetings reached no breakthrough. In efforts to determine Kosovos political status, Ahtisaari proposed supervised autonomy in February 2007 as an alternative to be considered during the status talks. Ahtisaari undertook multilateral efforts in discussing the proposal with the International Contact Group, and delegations from Prishtina and Belgrade. However, due to Russian intransigence the negotiation process ended in unsuccessful results. Russia threatened that it would use the UNSC veto power to oppose Ahtisaaris resolution for proposed independence. Russia fiercely opposed Kosovos independence. By April 2007 Ahtisaari rewrote his status settlement proposal five times to please Russia, and had the support of the US, the UK and other European countries. The idea was that the new resolution would replace the UNSCR 1244 and Russias vote meant passing of the resolution at the UN Security Council. Ahtisaari failed to solve the status question. From the nascent state of the negotiation process Russia has been recalcitrant in supporting the international community. Russian control of the outcome of the status of Kosovo would give it regional strategic importance in the region. Cooperation is crucial in achieving mutual benefits; however Russia unfortunately resorted to realist unilateral actions. This proved that realism can be a great challenge to multilateral negotiation efforts. Efforts of the US and the EU members to reach an agreement on the UNSC Council Resolution were put on hold on July 20, 2007 after meeting Russian opposition. Knowing Russian intentions to both oppose the resolution and threaten to employ their veto prerogative, an impasse had been reached. The Endgame: Principled Negotiations Following the failed attempts of Ahtisaari, the international community shifted strategy. The US, Russia and the EU became the main mediators in the status talks. At this phase, the perception of the international community regarding the status shifted from future status to final status resolution. The international community had hoped to resolve the Kosovo status issue in 1999, in 2006 and in 2007;

however all deadlines proved artificial with little progress on each phase. In 2007 the international community shifted from the positional bargaining technique and employed the principled negotiation method. Based on the progress of the bargaining technique in 2006, it was not surprising that the Troika mediating team failed to reach an agreement by the December 10, 2007 deadline. Previous efforts of the international community to reach a unanimous decision at the Security Council failed due to Russian opposition. Little progress was made in the new efforts of the final status talks of 2007, with the proposal of Troikas working points focusing on cooperation and mutual interests. Belgrade rejected Troikas 14 working points set in the last-ditch talks, opposing any kind of suggested independence for Kosovo.43 To maximize cooperation between the two parties, the international community must set out principles and guidelines to insure that mutual importance and benefits are guaranteed to both sides. However, a joint effort in promoting mutual interests is crucial in resolving the status successfully. If EU membership is a mutual interest for all parties, then multilateral efforts should be employed to provide guidance. The international community should set standards according to international law and EU principles. Interests Table 7.1 outlines the interests of each participant: Kosovo, Serbia and the international community. For instance, Kosovo is concerned with the delay of status and the progress of the status talks. Kosovo is also worried about discrimination of Kosovar Albanians, denial of linguistic and cultural rights. The province fears going back to the period of Milosevic repression. Serbia is also concerned with the well being of the Kosovar Serbs as well as territorial integrity. It fears the loss of sovereignty over Kosovo and desires that the province remains nominally within the state of Serbia. The international community is concerned with the cultural heritage issues, minority rights, as well as the functioning of the provisional governing institutions in Kosovo. It insists on a continued international monitoring presence in Kosovo. Table 7.1: General Interests: Kosovo, Serbia and the International Community Interests Concern




1. Repression 2. Discrimination of

1. Sovereignty 2. Discrimination of

1. Technical issues (cultural heritage,

See Appendix for a list of the 14 Working Points.

Kosovar Albanians 3. Partition 4. Denial of linguistic and cultural rights Desire 1. Independence and Freedom 2. Regional stability 3. EU membership 1. Violence 2. Non-recognition if independence declared 3. Regional instability 4. Serbian use of force

Kosovar Serbs 3. Territorial integrity 4. Denial of cultural rights 1. Autonomy 2. Kosovo remains within Serbia 3. EU Membership 1. Violence 2. Kosovos unilateral independence 3. Regional instability 4. Imposed solution

municipalities, minority rights) 2. Progress of status. 3. Hard line oppositions 1. Intl supervision 2. International monitoring presence 3. EU Integration 1. Unpredictable situation 2. Unsustainable status quo and instability 3. Legitimacy of UN, NATO, EU.


Source: Ermira Babamusta, Kosovo Status Talks, A Case Study on International Negotiations, (MA thesis, New York: Long Island University, 2007).

The international community has a vested interest in maintaining regional peace and stability in Kosovo. It must avoid any risks of new violence in Europe while promoting credibility and trust in its role. Therefore, the international community is concerned with the multiethnic accommodations inside Kosovo. Minority protection and minority rights are primary concerns for the international community in considering the mutual interests of both Albanian majority and Serbian minority (not excluding rights for other minorities such as Roma, Bosniaks, Gorani, Turks, etc). Yugoslav and Serbian police have committed discrimination against ethnic Albanians via numerous acts of ethnic cleansing, genocide and expulsion. In addition, Kosovo has experienced institutional discrimination when its autonomy was rescinded in 1992 and the Kosovar state was not recognized. In retaliation the Kosovars committed violent acts toward Serbs in 2004 and destroyed Serbian religious buildings. Fear of violence is prevalent.44 NATO, the United Nations and the United States have intervened to prevent such; however, the foremost impediments remain human rights violations and the fear of another armed conflict if no agreement is reached on the final status talks. It is crucial for the international community to maintain its peacekeeping presence, and to accelerate its efforts in promoting collaboration among all parties. For such cooperation to be successful, the international community must set out principles that promote mutual gains.


UN Security Council Report, Kosovo, (December 2007). <> (20 December 2007).

Options The debate on the final status talks of Kosovo has identified the following options: (1) independence of Kosovo; (2) supervised independence or international protectorate; (3) remain autonomous Serbian province or the Hong-Kong model; (4) partition among ethnic lines; and (5) independence and unity with Albania. The principled negotiation model of Fisher and Ury recommends that the dialogue not be limited to few options. The ideal solution for Kosovo should be a compromise that ensures regional stability, rights for Kosovars and minorities in Kosovo. The troika of mediators discussed a wide range of options, namely: full independence; supervised independence; a territorial partition; substantial autonomy; and confederal arrangements. In addition, the EUs representative Wolfgang Ischinger, suggested a new option neutral status.45 However, Kosovo expressed a strong desire for independence. It supported the notion of supervised independence and maintenance under international protectorate. Serbia expressed its strong opposition to Kosovos independence and has displayed a hard position in rejecting the independence option. Serbia desires sovereignty over Kosovo, and is supported by Russia. These hard positions have contributed to the deadlocked negotiations. Serbia is embracing a single answer approach of the positional bargaining, in maintaining Kosovos provincial autonomy as the only option. Roger Fisher has identified such approach as Getting To No instead of Getting to Yes negotiating agreement.46 Initially, in 2005, the Contact Group established three benchmarks, no pre-1999 return, no partition and no creation of unity with another country such as Albania. In hopes to reach a compromise in the last round of talks in 2007, the Contact Group developed 14 working points identifying four red lines among other principles: (1) no return to pre-1999 situation; (2) no rule of Belgrade over Kosovo; (3) no recurrence of Belgrades physical presence in Kosovo; and (4) continual international military and civilian presence in Kosovo, even after status is determined.47 The Contact Group focused on mutual gain, considering cooperation on standards of human rights (return of the missing/displaced persons), minority rights and religious rights. It included international benchmarks presented by the EU in contemplation of both Kosovo and Serbia gaining memberships at the European Union. Belgrade opposed Troikas 14 points and recommended its own 14 points, rejecting independence and offering broad autonomy for Kosovo.
45 46 47

UN Security Council Report, Kosovo, (December 2007). Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes, (1991). Refer to Appendix J for the full list of 14 points as decided by the troika negotiating talks, 220.

Alternatives In absence of a credible alternative and failed diplomatic talks, Kosovo has declared unilateral independence as of February 2008. Employing Fisher and Urys method, Kosovos BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) was to declare unilateral independence to overcome the failure of the negotiations.48 During the fourth round of talks (November 2007), Kosovo Prime Minister Agim Ceku suggested that shortly after the deadline he would declare independence if no progress resulted from the negotiations. Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica responded that a declaration of Kosovo unilateral statehood would not be recognized by Serbia. The international mediators failed to negotiate a compromise on the status of Kosovo by the U.N. deadline. The EU members are divided into pro independence allies United States, Britain, France, and Germany and opposing countries Cyprus, Hungary, Slovakia, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, and Romania. The latter fear the growth of separatist movements in their respective countries. Currently 63 UN member states have legally recognized Kosovos independence. NOTE: I am currently updating the rest of the chapters of the book. I appreciate everyones feedback.


Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes, 97.

The U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960, Articles 2 & 3. Hashim Thai emerged as the winner of Kosovos general elections of 17 November 2007, claiming victory for the Partia Demokratike e Kosovs (PDK), [The Albanian Democratic Party]. iii International Court of Justice Press Release 2009/17, 21 April 2009. iv OSCE Mission in Kosovo April 2009 Report, Kosovo non-majority communities within the primary and secondary educational systems,Annex 2, p. 27. From v The Harvard Negotiation Project (HNP) was founded in 1979 and it has been a pioneer in creating negotiation materials dealing with negotiation theory and practice. It is best known for Getting to Yes, a best seller in 1999 and a respected addition to negotiation literature. The first edition was published in 1981 by Roger Fisher (Director of the Harvard Negotiation Project) and William Ury (Director of the Negotiation Network at Harvard University and Associate Director of the HNP). The Second edition was published in 1992, including author Bruce Patton (Deputy Director of the HNP). For more information visit Harvard Negotiation Project at vi Ibid. vii This method is also known as negotiation on the merits. See Roger Fisher, William Ury, Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, eds., 2nd ed., (New York: Penguin Books, 1991). viii Denka Katsarska, Kosovo Issue Solution to Affect Frozen Conflict, Focus News, 9 November 2007. From view=story&id=253&sectionId=2. ix Jason Cooper. Lithuania President Warns of Frozen lives and dreams in Transdniestria; Elsewhere, The Tiraspol Times on the Web, 27 Sept. 2007. From x Times, Russia: First, Solve Older Self-determination Issues Before Kosovo, The Tiraspol Times On the Webs, 23 August 2007. From xi David Young, Growing International Opposition to Imposed Solution, American Council for Kosovo, 5 November 2007. From xii Kosovo Compromise, Biden: Recognition of Kosovo is not a condition for Serbia's EU integration Kosovo Compromise on the Web, May 20, 2009. From, 4.

Roger Fisher, William Ury, and (2nd ed.) Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. New York, (NY: Penguin Books, 1991).

See Map 1 for the division of Albania to four provinces under the Ottoman Empire. Map by J. Patrick Fisher, Ethnic Composition of Kosovo According to the OSCE in 2005. See OSCE Mission in Kosovo April 2009 Report, Annex 2, p. 27. From xvi Statistical Office of Kosovo, Some Key Indications on Population. From xvii Michael Albert and Stephen R. Shalom, The Kosovo/NATO conflict: Questions and Answers, Z Magazine Online. From xviii Albert, The Kosovo conflict, (2007). xix NHS, An Historic Intervention: The US in Kosovo. From xx A minority of Albanians are followers of Roman Catholic faith and the Albanian Orthodox church. xxi Kosovo Compromise, Record low turnout, Serb boycott mark Kosovo elections, The Kosovo Compromise Online, (Institute 4S, Brussels), 30 November 2007. From xxii DPA, Serbia narrowly passes constitution, averts crisis by Boris Babic, The DPA German Press Agency, 29 October 29 2006. From xxiii The international community assured the Albanian leaders that the referendum would not influence the UN-led status talks. See, KIM-info, Kosovo Referendum Results Strengthens Serbia: PM, The Kosovo News Archives Online, 31 October 2006. From xxiv Resolution S/RES/855 August 9, 1993 (UN Security Council 3262nd Meeting). xxv S/RES/855 (1993). xxvi OSCE, Background, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Online, 1995-2007. From
xiv xv

OSCE, (2007) OSCE, History, (2007) xxix U.N. Resolution 1203(1998). Adopted by the Security Council at its 3937th meeting, on 24 October 1998. xxx For a complete list of Security Council Actions, including a list of Resolutions, Missions and Special Representatives, see Table 2.1:UN Security Council Actions in Kosovo. xxxi United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, 2, From xxxii U.N. Security Council, Security Council Report, Kosovo, (May 2007). From xxxiii The Contact Group is composed of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, US and Russia.
xxvii xxviii