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Convincing the Colossus: Latin American Leaders Face the United States Whether measured by economy, trade, or military spending, the United States dwarfs any country in Latin America. In fact, it even dwarfs the region taken in its entirety, as has been the case at least since the turn of the twentieth century. This simple fact—overwhelming asymmetry—has defined both relations between the United States and Latin America and the study of those relations. It is reflected in the names of some of the subfield’s most popular texts: Schoultz’s Beneath the United States, Smith’s Talon’s of the Eagle, Blasier’s The Hovering Giant, or Grandin’s Empire’s Workshop.1 The focus on asymmetry has constricted the study of inter-American relations, creating a gap in our understanding of key issues. Two sets of blinders, one empirical, one theoretical, have led much of the work on U.S.-Latin American relations to understate the agency of Latin American actors. An important current of recent works has begun to explore this area, looking at how Latin American leaders have been able to maneuver around U.S. policies. If the United States were so dominant and Latin American leaders so helpless, we should expect to see great U.S. success in determining outcomes in Latin America. This often was not the case. During the Cold War, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba sought to exert influence throughout Latin America. More important, however, was the role of Latin Americans—oftentimes the conservative elite—in shaping how history unfolded on their own turf.2 The treatment of Latin American leaders as the “puppets” of external actors missed how much latitude these leaders actually exercised.3 However, this paper goes one step further. I argue that not only do Latin American leaders preserve important freedom of action in their own foreign and domestic policies, but they have at times been able to influence the United States’ foreign policy. This article will briefly examine the literature on U.S.-Latin American relations, with a focus on how different strands of literature have dealt with (or more often ignored) the agency of Latin American leaders. It will then draw on work in international relations theory and foreign policy analysis to propose a framework and a typological theory that helps us understand when and how Latin American leaders are able to influence U.S. policies. That framework examines how the level of Latin American and U.S interest in the issue, the degree of policy divergence, and the clarity with which a problem is understood affect both the likelihood and strategies of Latin American influence. Finally, it uses that framework to deal briefly with two cases, both of which draw on archival work and elite interviews in Latin American and the United States. The first examines the negotiation of the Torrijos-Carter treaties on the Panama Canal, while the second looks at the initial formation of Plan Colombia.
A one-sided story: The literature on U.S.-Latin American relations Early works on U.S. policy to Latin America stressed the dominance of U.S. policymakers and often offered justifications for U.S. decisions. For example, Bemis examined Latin Americans’ reactions to U.S. policy; as actors they had minimal roles.4 During the Cold War, a body of critical scholars offered a harsh reappraisal of U.S. policies, especially the period of frequent interventions stretching from the late 1890s to the late 1920s.5 Scholars identified a split between “establishment” and “radical” authors, the latter strongly influenced by Marxism and dependency theory.6 Though Marxism and dependency have lost much of their sway, the divide remains. Russell Crandall recently described the literature as split between an establishment—itself divided along U.S. partisan lines—and an “anti-imperialist” critique.7 Establishment authors frequently have policymaking experience. While more critical of U.S. policies than the previous generation of scholars, they tend to criticize specific issues within U.S.-Latin American relations rather than the foundations of those relations. On the whole, the United States is a beneficial presence—or at least does not behave worse than any other great power.8 Anti-imperialists dominate the field. Some stress dependent economic conditions, while others examine policymakers’ prejudices and assumptions about Latin Americans. 9 Much of the work in both of these camps suffers from a pair of blind spots. The establishment and anti-imperialist scholars wear different theoretical blinders that result in a similar inattention to Latin American agency. Anti-imperialists’ theoretical blinders lead them to believe that what matters in inter-American relations is U.S. aggression and how the exercise of U.S. power creates tight and binding constraints on Latin American foreign policy choice. Establishment scholars see the “inside baseball” story of how U.S. policy is made as the most important and interesting question. They tend to organize their studies according to the terms of U.S. presidents and characterize those presidents’ policies under broad themes and eras. Secondly, the subfield as a whole suffers from empirical blinders, relying overwhelmingly on sources from the United States, and from the U.S. government in particular. It is perhaps unsurprising that works built on U.S. sources reflect a U.S.-centric perspective.10 However, a subtler option exists—one that has been overshadowed by the emphasis on power asymmetry. In 2003, historian Max Paul Friedman noted an incipient trend of “retiring the puppets,” ending the treatment of Latin American leaders as marionettes guided by a northern master.11 A growing group of political scientists and diplomatic historians argue that Latin Americans possess important leeway. U.S. intentions rarely determine outcomes. Robert Pastor posits an “interactive” focus, which incorporates both U.S. and Latin American actions.12 Hal Brands has recently, and persuasively, argued that U.S., Soviet, and Cuban designs for Latin America all largely failed. The actions of Latin American elites, many of whom exhibited profound anti-communism, mattered more, most of the time.13 Empirical and theoretical blinders have led to a general neglect of the Latin American side of U.S.-Latin American relations. But what exactly have we missed?
For one thing, the general literature on Latin American foreign policymaking is surprisingly thin. While this is especially true for works in English, it even extends in large part to works published in the region. Descriptive works on legal processes exist,14 and specific episodes are explored in foreign relations histories. Latin American works on foreign policy tend to borrow and adapt theories rather than creating new ones that apply nationally or regionally.15 This seems to reflect, at least in part, the long shadow that dependency theory continues to cast over the social sciences in much of the Latin American academy, and the focus on economic development issues.16 There is a relative dearth of empirical material on Latin American foreign policy—that is, carefully constructed case studies—that could facilitate broader comparison and theory building.17 While volumes of work have been done in the fields like comparative politics in Latin America, the study of foreign policy seems to have mostly slipped into the chasm of the foreign-domestic divide. The inattention to Latin American agency has also had a deleterious effect on IR theory as it concerns the Western Hemisphere. There are a handful of overarching theoretical paradigms that seek to explain hemispheric relations. None of them is satisfactory. For realists, the Western Hemisphere has long been considered the exclusive hegemonic zone of the United States. Under realism, there is almost no interest in the motivations or actions of Latin America. They are not great powers. This dominant view exaggerates the U.S. power to control outcomes in the hemisphere—always a dubious proposition where the Southern Cone is concerned. The second body of theory is dependent foreign policy, in which the foreign policy choices of Latin American leaders are almost entirely constrained by the United States. While the international system of core and periphery is an object of study, the theory emphasizes constraints on Latin American leaders and not their actions. A third group of theories aim to examine international relations from a third world perspective. For example, Carlos Escudé’s theory of “peripheral realism” argues that because Latin American states are confined to follow the hegemon, they should make the best of it by avoiding confrontation with the United States and hoping to enjoy the benefits of favor—greater economic development. Escudé’s theory is largely prescriptive, and his counsel gives little freedom for foreign policy choice to Latin American leaders.18 It is not the aim of this paper to craft a new, overarching IR theory for the hemisphere. However, an understanding of how Latin American leaders can preserve freedom of action and even shape U.S. policies will call the above theories into serious doubt. Before proposing a framework for understanding when and how Latin American leaders might exercise this influence, we first look at some of the broader theoretical underpinnings that explain the actions of small states under asymmetry. Influence under asymmetry This is not the first study to suggest that there are foreign influences on U.S. foreign policy decisions. However, almost all of the work on the subject has ignored Latin America, following the dominant perspectives offered in the literature of the hemisphere. Those blinders
do not appear to have been present to the same extent on studies involving NATO countries or Israel, for example. In IR, a number of authors suggest that small allies retain room to maneuver, as do the historical works of Longley and Clark on Latin America.19 However, Robert Keohane argues that “lesser allies have not only been able to act independently; they have also been able to use alliances to influence American policy and to alter American policy perspectives.” The U.S. “crusading spirit,” a bipolar world structure, and open democratic institutions make the U.S. policy process uniquely susceptible to small-ally influence. Influence could occur through forma state-to-state negotiation, at the level of sub-national government agencies, or with U.S. interest groups and society.20 However, Keohane excludes the Western Hemisphere because its nations “have lived for 150 years within an American sphere of influence.”21 Studying NATO, Thomas Risse-Kappen argues that the influence of smaller, democratic allies can be deeper than alliance typical behavior. Democratic norms of consultation and nonuse of coercion defined debates between Alliance partners. During the cold war, officials from NATO allies helped shape the very definition of the U.S. national interest and were treated as “legitimate bureaucratic players.”22 However, like Keohane, Risse-Kappen excludes Latin America from these processes of influence. It is my contention that there is no systematic reason to do so. Keohane’s appeal to the constituent parts of the U.S. government puts him at the intersection of literature of alliances and that on U.S. foreign policy decision making. The U.S. foreign policy process constitutes the context in which influence may occur, and an exploration of that influence inevitably opens the “black box” of the state, shifting the level of analysis to the individual decision-maker, or, in another school, to the level of bureaucratic agencies.23 Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin argue that the state is the individuals who act in the name of the state, and that the natural reference for foreign policy analysis is the understandings and actions of those individuals.24 This focus has led some to a two-step study of the decision-making process, poliheuristic theory.25 In this approach, decision-makers first define the situation in relation to their goals and means (sometimes called framing),26 before making decisions in accordance with a rational-actor approach. In relation to this study, influence could occur at two levels. Latin Americans could influence the manner in which U.S. leaders “frame” the region and U.S. interests. Secondly, they could affect the rational decision process through the introduction of new information or via bargaining. A handful of other scholars have borrowed concepts from domestic politics on problem definition and agenda-setting and tried to apply it to the international sphere.27 I expound on this work and apply it more concretely to bilateral relations between the U.S. and Latin American countries. A typological theory Latin American leaders, even those of the largest countries, make foreign policy decisions in the context of asymmetry. This context will invariably shape their options and strategies. That is not to say that Brazil and Nicaragua have the same choices open to them; the
This is perhaps the most traditional understanding of how asymmetry constrains options—in addition to making direct military action impractical. the options for most leaders exist within a broad spectrum of cooperation. even if policy divergence is high. policy.S. the symbolic and strategic importance could be much larger. interest in the problem. though as with Cuba. and more so for a country geographically close the United States.28 We can sort out the likelihood of change and the possible effective Latin American strategies by analyzing cases along four dimensions: Latin American interest in the issue.S. we can take Latin American interest as a precondition for examining the case. we should not expect to see Latin American leaders pursuing change on issues of little importance. embargo on Cuba. Is the Latin American country’s issue on the U. gives us the following “scorecard”: 5 . One consequence of asymmetry is that policy change is unlikely if the Latin American leader is not extremely interested in the issue. policy is likely to be difficult and involve political costs. However.S. To understand the options open to Latin American leaders who seek to influence the United States in this meaningful middle ground. I seek to offer to general concepts about how asymmetry might shape the choices open to Latin American leaders. They are happy to make rhetorical statements on the issue. The option of allying with a foreign power has largely been removed since the end of the Cold War. the costs of taking this route are quite high. interest in the issue.countries are massively different in size. which would seem to make Brazil a more self-evident priority to the United States. Therefore. they can gain acquiescence or even considerable assistance from the United States for those goals. we need to understand the degree and nature of the divergence between Latin American interests and U. First. Second. A visual depiction. allowing us to focus on the three remaining conditions.S. Because changing U. cooperation does not mean compliance. we need to examine.S. this might apply to the U. and the level of clarity with which the problem is defined. Given that in most cases the costs of openly challenging the United States (during the Cold War) or the international system it shaped and continues to lead (after the Cold War) will nearly always outweigh the benefits. how well defined the problem is. the degree of divergence between Latin American interests and U.S. The actual affect on the balance of power of a small Latin American republic switching sides would be minimal. At times. we need to understand the level of interest the Latin American country has in the problem. policy. for example). Regardless. stripping away much important nuance. There is a large and meaningful middle ground in which Latin American leaders can pursue their own priorities. leaders.S. we need to assess what “type” of case we are dealing with. In this section. through the actors’ eyes at the time. Leaders are not puppets simply because they do not seek to overturn the international order.S. Finally. we should assess the U. U. For many leaders in Latin America. but unlikely to put their own political capital on the line (by boycotting meetings with U. though alternate economic agreements might be available without drawing much opposition from the United States. Many of the options open to larger alliance partners (especially in multipolar systems) would not seem to offer much leverage during the Cold War. agenda? Third. however.
just as much as U.S. The conditions should not be understood as deterministic structures. actions might. I do not wish to exclude Latin American interests and goals as an object of study.S. I will briefly visit each of the columns. what goals are. One is empirical. The strategies Latin American leaders adopt and the skill with which they execute them will determine success or failure.31 The second dimension concerns the content of policies and interests. In addition. This rubric allows us to hypothesize about whether we will see change and how that change might occur. but to give us a sense of how we might compare cases. policy. as defined by his or her government. In fact. though I do not think that coding and quantifying cases is likely to be a productive approach for several reasons. If a Latin American leader wishes to change U. policymakers are central concerns to the leaders of smaller nations. there are different pathways to producing change. The Latin American level of importance will not necessarily be reflected in the United States. In particular. this approach is needed to better understand processes and mechanisms of influence. foreign policy agenda. We must first understand the political context of the Latin American leader to explain why interests diverge in from U. policies with the goals and interests of the Latin American 6 .S. the researcher needs to compare U. priority Policy divergence Problem clarity High Low Broad generalizations like “high” and “low” are not intended to deny the myriad shades of gray.29 The corollary is that the central concerns of Latin American leaders. The first question is a relatively simple one: Does the Latin American country’s issue matter to the United States?30 This first dimension is largely one of agenda-setting.Case A U. given the dearth of case studies that incorporate the Latin American perspective. Therefore. which will make it very difficult to have confidence that it was Latin American influence and not some other factor that explains the shift. At this early point of theory development. One frequent effect of asymmetry is that issues of peripheral importance to U. This will also help us later in defining the Latin American perspective on the conditions of policy divergence and problem clarity.S. especially those from smaller countries. there are different likelihoods of change for different types of cases. and what domestic political constraints he are involved. Before looking at how combinations on the scorecard are likely to affect Latin American strategies and final outcomes.S. Perhaps most importantly.S. Depending on how cases score. Another is that an approach focused strictly on causal outcomes will not give us much insight on the process of change.S. policies. we need to assess the interests of the Latin American leader. in which process-tracing allows both for testing and refining the framework. cases are treated as theoretically oriented narratives. Though I am treating the level of interest from Latin American leaders as a precondition. Latin American agency is crucial to case outcomes. prior to looking at the other conditions. are likely to exist only on the margins of the U. he must first have the United States’ attention.
How clearly defined is the problem for both U.S. Latin American leaders must try to get the issue onto the U.government. the current U. they must first come to an understanding of the problem they face. is a large change in U. In some cases.S. Policy can be the remnant of previous bureaucratic compromise or the product of drift. and the extent of that divergence matters to both the likelihood of change at the strategies through which Latin American leaders might achieve it. For example. This step precedes any sort of rational choice framework. When the U. policy—given that they have much less ability to oblige the U. change is unlikely. The question is. but it is of paramount importance. but divergence is high. this offers another opportunity for Latin American leaders to influence U.33 The second involves a breakdown in the “policy paradigm” that had been applied to a problem. Reagan and Sandinista Nicaragua U.S. for example. policymakers’ conceptions. does not place a high priority on an issue.35 This framework allows can indicate when Latin American leaders are unlikely to be able to influence U. interests in the sense realists would define them. Policymakers might try to understand these situations through the use of metaphors. If the problem is 7 . and Latin American policymakers? A great deal of research in foreign policy analysis suggests that before policymakers can rationally weigh the costs and benefits of policy options. it conflicts with the interests defined by the Latin American government. and in itself is not a purely rational matter.S.S.S.S. An example of this might be the Reagan administration’s punitive policies toward Nicaragua. Regardless of the origins of the policy. given that the issue has not been one of salience. conceptions of its interests are malleable.S.S. agenda. and these times might allow for shifts in both the understanding of a problem and the policies that are seen as possible solutions to that problem. or they could argue about the correct “framing” of the issue. decisions not just through negotiating but by shaping the definition of the problem itself. I believe there are two situations in which we are likely to see low levels of problem clarity. Sudden moments of crisis might signal that a policy clearly has failed. especially when the level of U.32 Shifting problem definitions can suggest very different policy options.S. The first regards issues that are “new” or appearing on the political agenda for the first time.S. policy might not reflect U.S. In cases of low clarity. priority X Policy divergence X Problem clarity X High Low However. attention is low. How they do so will depend largely on the degree of problem clarity. The third dimension is perhaps the most difficult to assess empirically.S. they might be able to reshape the U.34 If U. to shift its stance. if an issue scores “high” on all the dimensions. policy required to satisfy Latin American interests. the other possible combinations of interest and interest divergence are more propitious. or would small adjustments do? There are very different degrees of divergence.
the defense ministry. and the Department of National Planning. Cooperative negotiations are likely. Latin American leaders are more likely to recast their issue to make it fit with an overarching narrative. However. the conclusion of a treaty making Latin America a nuclear-weapon-free zone appears to have been along this lines. I interviewed figures including former presidents. Tlatelolco Treaty: Prohibition on nuclear weapons in Latin America U.36 The cases of greatest interest to scholars will be likely to involve high levels of policy divergence (hard cases for influence) or uncertainty in problem definition. In Panama. I conducted archival work primarily in the foreign ministry. as well as in various libraries. though further research would confirm that. Prima facie. I worked in the administrative department of the presidency. on their own merits thee cases were perhaps the most important U. priority X Policy divergence X Problem clarity X High Low This led to a largely cooperative negotiation over the details of an agreement that both sides want. I have selected cases that provide a broad variation across the above conditions. where I was given broad and direct access to primary documents. the foreign ministry. These conditions are likely to evolve throughout cases.S.-Latin American issues of their respective eras. changes in policy are likely because they only be changes of degree. in an attempt to overcome the “empirical blinders” discussed above. case selection has been guided by the logic of theory building.38 Both selected cases appear prima facie to have been “successful” in the sense that there was a policy change in the direction of the Latin American leader’s goals. As George and Bennett note. the divergence was very low and the political costs to the United States appeared to be minimal. one during and the other after the Cold War. a typological theory like the one above is useful for clarifying comparisons between cases.S. like democratic governance. The empirics combine archival work and interviews from each Latin American country and the U. I interviewed the foreign minister.37 Methodology and case selection Because the aim here is to develop the above framework. along with variation on other issues.clearly defined. cabinet ministers. In Colombia.S. and the director of planning from that 8 . On issues where there is high interest and low divergence. Of course. the very goal of Latin American strategies might be to change these conditions: agenda-setting strategies try to increase U. interest on terms favorable to the Latin American leader.S. the defense minister. facilitated by a shared understanding of the problem the new policy is meant to address. the original treaty was not a U. They also reflect broadly different contexts. In fact. while combining with-in and cross-case analysis. In addition. and treaty negotiators.S. I supplemented this in the National Library and at foundations. imposition but a Brazilian suggestion that was embraced by many in the region. rather than to test hypotheses.
S. the National Security Archive. many of these individuals had championed Panama’s cause. He was able to befriend Fidel Castro by sending conservative. D. that he was loved by leading democrats in his region.S. Over the previous years. drawing support internally and internationally by trumpeting his nationalism and demanding justice. The general led a country of just over two million people. one of the world’s smallest in physical size and population.”42 Much of the focus on the Torrijos-Carter Treaties has been on the role of President Carter—his political calculations and the backlash engendered amongst the “new right” in the 9 . despised by democrats like Venezuela’s Carlos Andrés Pérez. along with several others. managed to rise to the top of the U. in spite of the political costs those positions entailed? In the front row of the Pan American Union sat a collection of Latin American leaders— many of whom held deep grudges against one another. For Torrijos the treaties had risen nearly to the level of his raison d’être over his nine years in power. they represented the main foreign policy fight of his first year. “Torrijos was an extremely smart person. How had Torrijos. He astutely managed contradictions. For Carter. “Carlos Andrés Pérez said the man he most admired in Latin American politics was Omar Torrijos. The other.S. chastising the United States for its inflexibility and calling for justice. and published sources from both the U.” said treaty negotiator Adolfo Ahumada. foreign policy agenda? Once there. there is little question that the Panamanian victory was the larger of the two. the principal foreign policy goal in Panama’s history. Eighteen Western Hemisphere heads of state bore witness to the signing ceremony. It was Panama that had fought for decades against what it considered the unjust treaty of 1903. looked on as the Panamanian leader achieved. “Street smart. The treaties included major reversals and concessions to U. a military man dressed in a dark civilian suit. and the small nation he led.40 The Chilean General Augusto Pinochet. wealthy businessmen as his emissaries. positions from just a few years prior. It was part of the political genius of Omar Torrijos. who had seized power in a military coup and ruled without the electoral consent of his population.S. archives. The treaties that sat on the table in front of Carter and Torrijos carried great political costs for both. President Jimmy Carter.C. However. how did Panama manage to influence the U. I have integrated this data with work in U.” said his former foreign minister. was the chief executive of the world’s leading superpower. stance.time. It was Panama that spoke with a desperate passion about its incompleteness as a nation. and Latin America.S. of its partial and wounded sovereignty. with the stroke of a pen. Omar Torrijos. For both. “And now [Hugo] Chávez says the same thing!”41 Torrijos was able to oppose the United States while working with it. A host of leaders from across the globe had supported Panama. the signing ceremony was a victory. sat next to the president of the United States in the ornate hall of the Pan American Union in Washington. and of a humiliation borne of daily experience. including positions that had been tightly held by various administrations over decades of negotiation.39 Case 1: The Panama Canal Panamanians had waited for this moment for nearly as long as there had been Panamanians.
but U.45 the case has not been the object of great attention in the study of Latin American international relations. could be better accomplished without permitting democracy. Assessing the case. just elected to the presidency for the third time in contested elections. neither Robles nor Johnson presented the treaty to their legislatures. In this brief version. though this date did not include defense and continued to give the United States bases and defense rights until 2004—or with a new canal. coercion was part of his undemocratic repertoire. It could 10 . Torrijos decided early on to create a different relationship with the United States. he was faced with a key question regarding the canal and the relationship with the United States. It could accept it and submit it for ratification. After dramatic internal squabbles amongst coup plotters.S. both a participant in and a student of the treaty negotiations. Most importantly. and on the interaction that approach with the United States. 1972 Though the complicated history of the United States and Panama stretches back to the mid-1800s and the construction of the isthmian railroad.United States. when Torrijos had consolidated his grip on power. the earlier government of Marco Robles had negotiated in 1967 a “three-in-one” treaty with the Lyndon B. Following an outbreak of bloody riots and protests in the Canal Zone. the immediate context for this case study begins in October 1968. until 2067. Though many of his former friends and followers believe that Torrijos was ready to step away from power and usher in democracy—having increased somewhat the space for free expression in 1980—the general’s early and accidental death makes the question unanswerable.43 Scholars have examined how the anticipated reactions of the U. General Omar Torrijos emerged as the unchallenged commander of the National Guard and the supreme chief—though not president—of Panama. dismissing the legislature. In 1970. wrote that “Panama implemented a very sophisticated strategy to achieve a nearly impossible mission … Panama’s success can be understood only if one abandon’s the region’s stereotypes of the United States. He decided that many of his goals. It would abrogate the original 1903 pact.44 However. frustrations. leaving out much background and only summarizing between these key points. 1999. wrote the foreign minister Juan Antonio Tack. Though Torrijos did not reach the levels of violence of his contemporaries in Argentina or Chile. December 31. Johnson administration. Senate constrained executive negotiators. would do the same. I focus on a handful of crucial moments. with the exception of one extraordinarily detailed history of the negotiations. create a joint. Robert Pastor. The narrative in this chapter focuses on the goals and strategies of the Panamanian government. It is a story of frictions.”46 This case stretches from 1972 until the signing of the treaties in 1977 (excluding Senate ratification and House implementation legislation). and increase tolls to give a direct share to Panama.S. both domestic and regarding the return of the Panama Canal. the treaty contained an expiration date.S. hoping the U. This included banning political parties. when a group of young military officers overthrew Arnulfo Arias.-led canal administration. and failures—but finally of common ground. Torrijos’ government had three options regarding the 1967 treaty. and tightly controlling the media.47 Sensing opposition. He judged that those goals justified the repression of real political organization and expression.
then. the United States was not particularly interested in the issue. Capitalizing on that attention.S. it could reject the treaties in their entirety. Panama got agreements in principle in the 1974 Tack-Kissinger agreement. Panama Canal: Early 1970s U. The World Meets on the Isthmus Early talks in 1970 – 1972 were a disappointment. position that the canal was to be discussed bilaterally and confidentially. There was a great divergence between the interests of Panama—speedy and full transfer of the canal and abolition of the Canal Zone—and Nixon administration policy. “[I]t became obvious that the Panamanian positions from January 1971 were not acceptable to the United States. If Panama wanted even modest concessions. little interest in changing the status of the Canal. but argued in 1970 that “US control over canal and defense should be “non-negotiable” for “the indefinite future. basic points of the position from December 1970 were not acceptable to Panama. and then maneuvered around U. and less in making major concessions. During 1972 and 1973. Lastly.48 Torrijos and his advisors decided to entirely reject the pact. Panama’s initial hopes collapsed into disappointment. Finally.”49 By mid-1971. The first involves Panama’s coup in setting the international agenda.S. the issues involved were clearly defined for both Panama and the United States. but in a dramatically different relationship.”50 Clearly. How. leading Torrijos to challenge the decades-long U. I focus on a handful of key episodes. In 1975. military presence there and eventually bring the Pentagon onboard with the later treaties. Panama and the United States negotiated a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that would regularize the U. priority High Low X Policy divergence X Problem clarity X As the above rubric indicates. and that the U.S. However. did Panama eventually achieve its goal? To explain that story. objections to hold an UNSC meeting in Panama. seeking to launch entirely new negotiations.S. Tack wrote that. Unexpectedly.S. it would get them only if it respected these U.use the treaty as a starting point and try to negotiate revisions. and also to get the United States to radically alter its hard-line policy. It would need both to gain the United States attention to get the canal on the agenda. the United States took a much harder line than it had in 1967. Panama faced a steep uphill climb. Panama gained a UN Security Council (UNSC) seat. the treaties were Panama’s top foreign policy priority. conditions. Torrijos was not interested in modest concessions. Furthermore. Panama was able to capitalize on the change of administration in Washington with the election of Jimmy Carter to achieve major goals—while deciding to give in on others in order to reach a deal. Panama’s ambitions were stalled by Nixon’s political crises and then by Ford’s political weakness and timidity on the subject. “General 11 .S. The Pentagon accepted renewed talks.
and they decided to adopt a new approach. George H.S. nobody does that. Waldheim that if the current negotiations for a new treaty failed. Panama would not sign a treaty.”51 In late 1972. “And he said. in the executive and legislative. The attack caught the U.” “Then I came back and my report to Torrijos was.S. with U. even if it was necessary to wait for a new generation of Americans to achieve Panamanian demands. “Our problem simply does not exist in the agenda of U. ‘Have you ever solved a problem that you don’t have?’” González Revilla said.” he remembered telling Torrijos. negotiator David Ward privately warning.”58 U. Alfonso López Michelsen in Colombia. loyal recruit. lead negotiator Anderson told both Boyd and foreign ministry 12 . filling the position with a 27-year-old. González Revilla.’” Torrijos wanted the young man to “take a look. ‘Wait. representatives tried throughout 1972 to mobilize allies to oppose a meeting in Panama.”52 Torrijos gathered his advisors.S. Meanwhile.S.”56 Though the Panamanian representative had put himself out on a limb. W. Panama fired the first salvos in international organizations. Boyd invited UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim to visit Panama to gain a better appreciation of how the stagnated negotiations threatened peace.59 U. off guard. principally with the democratic governments. he would continue negotiating until a new generation had taken over the country's leadership. Torrijos told his new ambassador. Within Latin America and out of Latin America.S. with the goal of winning international public support for its just cause. Bush. pushing for and obtaining Latin American support for a 1972 UN Security Council term. the support the idea garnered from Torrijos was just as strong as the resistance it engendered in the United States. have you ever solved a problem you don’t have? Well of course. the Panamanian government. Torrijos engaged in intensive personal diplomacy to secure the support of his democratic neighboring countries—the most influential would be Daniel Oduber in Costa Rica.55 The U. Panama had already begun taking steps toward internationalizing the canal issue. “So then he realized that he needed to create an issue. When the Security Council held an extraordinary meeting in Addis Ababa—the first in the developing world—Boyd used the forum to equate the U. employing arguments ranging from fiscal strain and organizational headaches to increased regional tensions.54 Boyd also suggested. Torrijos appointed a new ambassador to the United States.” González Revilla added. condemned Boyd’s departure from bilateralism. “’You are not being requested to go to Washington because you are an expert in either [the treaties or history]. Latin America. government.57 In March 1972. that an UNSC meeting be held in Panama. problems.S. what do you mean’? “I mean.Torrijos had told [lead negotiation Robert Anderson] that so long as Panamanian aspirations were not fully met. a fresh look.”53 In fact. “He went to the third world. “The Panamanian presentation of a complaint against the United States in the Security Council had provoked adverse reactions in many circles of the U. and he did it brilliantly. had the intention of appealing to the United Nations.S representative. and Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela. what are you talking about.S. … He started to travel a lot. Non-aligned. as an improvisation of his own accord. presence in Panama to the colonial and racial oppression faced by his African colleagues. which is his opinion would reverse progress by at least three years. “I told Mr.
” Torrijos proclaimed. the Soviet Union.68 On the second day. despite its fear the meeting would be effective. and Panama was ready. supported a resolution that was not too watered down. delegation.” Secretary Rogers wrote Scali before the meetings. it is nobler to amend an injustice than to perpetuate an error. The government had honed its message. France. the U.S. Peru. A revised Panamanian resolution gained wider backing. aimed both abroad and at buttressing Torrijos’ image amongst the Panamanian people. U.61 Meanwhile. By the time the China and Russia announced they would back the revised resolution. George Bush had left his position as U.N. the U.S. “For us.”60 Despite these pressures. The first was to raise the issue’s profile on the international agenda.”67 Scali warned that the U. and others. In his place. “No possible glory can come to us (or the UN) from it. John Scali.S. the U.S.63 In March 1973. organism. the gambit was a remarkable success. re-affirmed Panama’s sovereignty over the Canal Zone. The second was to increase the diplomatic costs to the United States of failing to resolve the problem. Torrijos sought the “moral backing of the world.”66 Early on. opposed any draft resolution on the grounds that the United Nations should not be involved in bilateral affairs. permanent representative to the United Nations. On January 26.S.70 13 . foreign policy agenda. with eager support from China.S.S. the United States sought to block any text on the canal. Panama received favorable responses to its inquiries from most Security Council members. was isolated and just beginning to consider a counterproposal. anti-Yankee propaganda.69 The United States continued to claim that the United Nations had no place in the matter—though the new draft used more agreeable language. “Highest leaders of North America. and called for immediate Panamanian jurisdiction. Panama and Peru introduced a resolution that demanded the abrogation of the 1903 treaty. There was little common ground and the talks were further complicated by internal struggles within both the U. Frustrated at the bargaining table.”64 The United States was less prepared.advisor Jorge Illueca “that regardless of what happened in the Security Council or any U. “Panama understands the fight of countries that suffer the humiliation of colonialism. a relative diplomatic novice led the U. the multilateral component of Panama’s approach took ever-greater importance. Panama will essentially be a damage-limiting operation. Panama’s chief of government took the stage to welcome the delegates.-Panama negotiations approached complete collapse in December 1972. while also saying that the U. would continue considering these problems as internal to the two countries.65 In the Council’s opening session on March 15. had no intention of introducing its own resolution.S. the Security Council approved Panama’s initiative to host a meeting. On these points. becoming increasingly isolated. Panama initially showed some willingness to work to the United States—if the U. hoping that it could minimize the damage. would veto any resolution that did not adequately consider its interests. 1973. and by November was moving ahead with plans for a meeting in Panama City. Panama’s strategy at the United Nations and through Torrijos’ personal diplomacy had two main goals.S. Instead.S. the attention of world leaders shifted to Panama.62 The United States recognized that it had been outmaneuvered and put aside its opposition.S. and thereby gain the attention of more important actors who set the U. and Panamanian governments. He closed with an appeal to the United States.
Due to Anderson’s stubbornness and his increasingly obvious isolation from his own team and his superiors.75 saying that “the present resolution addresses the points of interest to Panama but ignores those legitimate interests important to the United States. Instead of focusing on details. delegation. government. including the removal of longtime negotiator Robert Anderson. they also got the attention of an audience of one.N. but the Panamanians did not stop seeking U. military-led country without a trained civil or diplomatic service. Kissinger took note in a way that he previously had not.81 While the meetings succeeded on the world stage. knowing it had the support of nearly the full council. They began to pick up on divisions within the U. The meeting produced an immediate breakdown. “The Nixon administration had faced a small. made an ominous call to the U.”77 Now that Torrijos had the United States’ attention—negative as it was—he pushed for another change to the negotiating approach between the two countries. side. Torrijos later told the U.S. ambassador was “not sent as blackmail or threatened violence.73 The U. even though they continued to engage in them sporadically. Finally.S.78 This suggestion would pay dividends in the wake of the contentious Security Council meeting.S.S. and it failed spectacularly. and later in trying to halt Panama’s resolution. Scali cast the third Security Council veto in U. “it would be best to do it from Panama’s Tocumen airport. The United States failed to grasp that the piecemeal concessions that had worked with previous Panamanian governments would not satisfy Torrijos. A month before the 14 . refused to compromise on the point. sought to employ. telling Scali that if he planned on casting a veto. having already isolated the United States. This was the main bargaining chip the U. Panamanians concluded that continuing negotiations with him was useless. with thirteen votes in favor. “legitimate interests” in the canal in any resolution.71 Torrijos did realize that a veto would serve Panama’s interest. The U. offered its first counterproposal on the conference’s last day.S. meetings. Torrijos and advocated starting with broad principles. State Department officer Morey Bell even told his Panamanian counterpart that Anderson would be replaced.72 To drive home the point. repeatedly insisted on referring to U.Many in Torrijos’ circle had concluded that.-Panamanian cooperation on security for the meeting.74 It was too little. Panamanian negotiators moved from their polemic criticisms of the United States to push for specific goals. without any economic or military power.”80 Why? The Panamanians had decided that they negotiations were stalemated.S.79 In trying to block the Security Council meeting in Panama. Great Britain abstained. Panama. history on direct orders from the White House.S. Manuel Antonio Noriega. second in command of the National Guard. the council voted on Panama’s resolution. the Nixon administration repeatedly warned that any such publicity would set back the negotiations for years.” but was just a helpful piece of close U. forcing it to veto would be a major public relations victory.S. which had been exacerbated by the U. saying. but the world has vetoed the United States.”76 Foreign Minister Tack closed the meetings.S. too late. and it had been beaten on difficult ground.” The call. support for their resolution. “The United States has vetoed Panama’s resolution. but also a serious reevaluation on the U.S.S.
N. Panama still was not the central issue for Kissinger.87 Though Rogers discussed the proposal directly with President Nixon. but the primary effect of the eight points remained the same.93 By mid-January. 1973. activities to the maintenance. operation. but it was at least on his radar. They worked through several drafts of the eight points.85 Kissinger goes to Panama Tack and Torrijos had decided that the previous approach of focusing on details and trying to negotiate up to the bigger issues was doomed.S. Morey Bell stayed on Contadora to hammer out language on the principles with Ambassador González Revilla. jurisdiction at treaty’s end.91 Bunker’s initial trips to the Panamanian resort island of Contadora resulted in friendly and productive talks on Tack’s eight points. “I believe that what really made Kissinger understand he was sitting on a potential powder keg was the U. Kissinger’s assistant for Latin America. Tack handed Rogers a letter that included eight principles. who was predisposed to a treaty. and 8) mutually agreed upon options for any new construction.89 The energetic seventy-nine-year-old was internationally recognized and well respected in the Department of Defense. beyond an allusion to the end of perpetuity. word leaked that the veteran diplomat Ellsworth Bunker was being considered as a new chief for the delegation. military activities. Kissinger had told Scali that he didn’t “have any very clear views on [Panama]. and Panama told U.S. they shifted to broad principles that could later be used to structure the discussions on details. officials that Bunker would be an “excellent choice. 4) elimination of the Canal Zone.84 Nixon called for a “fresh look” at the status of the canal. the eight principles contained substantial ambiguity and failed to address issues such as the length of the treaty. On May 24. marking the first time the president had directly addressed the issue in such a prominent venue. which had evolved from Tack’s proposals through Bunker’s modifications to become a joint document.S. 5) a fair share of economic benefits. There were many changes in wording from Tack’s letter. A month after the meeting. 2) an end to perpetuity. Security Council meeting in early 1973. word leaked out that the U.”90 The summer also brought Rogers resignation and replacement by Kissinger. the timing could hardly have been worse. Instead.S. After Bunker’s departure. 7) limitation of U.”83 The meeting empowered Jorden.92 As both sides recognized.88 Both the Panama team and the Nixon administration were in upheaval.meeting. and Panama had agreed on a statement of principles and that Kissinger would travel to Panama to sign them. later reflected.86 which mostly reiterated Panama’s key demands: 1) the abrogation of the 1903 treaty. to advance his views in the NSC. and defense of the Canal. 3) the complete end of U. Bunker and Kissinger were confirmed to their new positions and started a burst of progress.82” The international attention forced Kissinger to clarify his own position. which he saw as key to any agreement. Congressional hearings on Watergate had started. News of progress shook 15 . The two men knew one another from Washington. Nixon’s attention was clearly elsewhere. By September 1973. 6) limiting U. Jorden penned text on Panama for Nixon’s annual address to Congress on foreign policy.S. He gave Bunker wide latitude and support with the Pentagon. William Jorden.
98 The inflexible instructions frustrated both sides. I think. the first round of negotiations was absolutely ridiculous. The Panamanian crowd roared at the second principle. In April. and we will wait. 16 . Kissinger planned a whirlwind visit to Panama. and their assistants. with Torrijos telling his ambassador. González Revilla felt Nixon and Kissinger had used the eight principles as a way to prolong the negotiations without making progress. that’s good too. “After the eight points. The secretary directed his speech beyond Panama’s borders to call for a “new dialogue” with Latin America.” He pointed to the old negotiating guidelines as evidence that nothing was being done. opposing any treaty that would return the canal to Panama. “What Kissinger was doing. the Panamanians showed great appreciation for the progress they had seen since Bunker’s arrival. “If they want a treaty in a few months. Tack and Kissinger signed the eight principles at a lively ceremony. Panamanian interlocutors acknowledged the political constraints Nixon faced. and stated a new level of flexibility and patience. the U. with longer options for a sea-level canal. Democratic Representative John Murphy alleged that the Torrijos government was unstable and linked to drug trafficking— even warning that a coup was in the offing. playing with the same guidelines.”97 Stagnation and small agreements The negotiating teams. but if they want to have it next year or even later. Bunker avoided the issue. if we have these eight points. Senator Strom Thurmond continued his bombastic opposition. Tack. even as the signing spurred loud opposition in the United States. The ceremony provoked hopes for a quick treaty in Panama. elaborated by Bunker. that is good.”96 It would not be so easy. and the amount of work remaining eroded some of the optimism. including Bunker. calling called the Tack-Kissinger principles “a pseudotreaty which will cause grave harm to United States interests. fearing that an insistence on 50 years would scuttle the progress. a close personal friend whose home often served as a getaway for the general. the treaty.95 The eight principles. he urged Tack to make a “negotiating breakthrough” before further opposition to the treaties was able to mobilize. The two powerful men chatted comfortably. nor did he expect miracles. but with more brilliance. Torrijos noted that he didn’t expect Kissinger to have all the answers to the problem with Panama. including a 50year treaty. joining him in his motorcade through Panama City to the site of the ceremony. Torrijos met Kissinger at the airport. “Tack used to say. negotiators were still working under the same guidelines as their predecessor.treaty opponents from their slumber.”94 Convinced by Bunker. The day after the ceremony. The position of the US had gone back to the worst position in the last ten or fifteen years. Given that he had no instructions to change the date. At the same time. Despite the principles. it’s got everything. reconvened on Contadora after Kissinger’s departure.” González Revilla reflected. it appears Kissinger did want to conclude the treaties.S. declaring an end to the hated “perpetuity” clause of 1903. a Congressional campaign began. After the signing. Kissinger met Torrijos at the Panama City apartment of Rory González. now bore the name Tack-Kissinger. we will write it down in a couple of months.”99 In fact. “This conceptual agreement.
that he would resign rather than face trial on articles of impeachment. they were never of more than marginal importance.”106 Bunker and Tack signed the final accords March 6. He knew the U.” At the same time.102 During President Ford’s first months. Nicolás Ardito Barletta. Treaty talks were stuck on these major points when President Nixon announced on August 8.103 The U. He approached democratic Latin American leaders about reinstating. Torrijos sent a delegation headed by Panama’s best-known. Panama’s Marxists and activist students would not likely oppose it. After months of waiting to hear a proposal on duration.101 As the teams on Contadora tried to take the next steps. “[T]he SOFA opened the doors to the rest of the negotiations. Bunker presented a draft based on agreements the United States had used elsewhere. but U. Torrijos wanted to cause alarm.S.” Kissinger intended to “press ahead” for a new treaty. On the SOFA.108 17 . they were not his top priority. the House Judiciary Committee was discussing impeachment and a special prosecutor prepared a request for the White House tapes. he did not want to give Panamanian businessman and foreign investors the idea he might enact widespread. He deftly played to both sides. in Washington.105 Given the years of resistance from the U. To open relations with the hemisphere’s most socialist state.107 “The SOFA was resolved without any serious problems. military could breathe calmly about their presence in Panama.S. government would be watching him closely. At the same time.S. … The negotiations took off when the U.100 for Nixon. free-market economist.However. Torrijos responded by again “shaking the monkey’s chain. personal note for Tack to assure him that the change of president “will not in any way affect the negotiation. Kissinger sent Ambassadors Bunker and Jorden an urgent. As the news broke in Washington. if a leftist like Rómulo could work out a SOFA with the American. Department of Defense. Frustrated by the pace and feeling pressure from the left. Nixon faced an ever-growing battle with the Congress. His deputy was student leader and lawyer Adolfo Ahumada.S. This was perhaps more surprising given Torrijos’ choice to head the SOFA negotiating team—the notoriously anti-gringo Rómulo Escobar Bethancourt. with a decision to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The choice played well domestically. but progress elsewhere was slow. Cuban-style nationalizations. there was no word of what direction he would take. pressures steeled Torrijos’ determination to demonstrate his independence. Negotiations continued through August 1974.” Ahumada said. “Torrijos concluded that. diplomatic ties with Cuba. tied Panama’s Cuba policy with treaty negotiations. too.104 The decision helped Torrijos shore up his left flank just as the slowly moving negotiations turned to the questions on which he was most open to criticism—neutrality and defense. He knew the decision would greatly placate students and other leftists.S. en masse.” as he liked to put it. rector of the Universidad de Panamá. after months of intrigue. Panama had started a process of reducing the fourteen military bases on the isthmus. and he had no incentive to pick another fight on an issue he carried little about. the military arrangements were handled surprisingly swiftly.
officials who frequently interacted with the Panamanians—Jorden and Bell. Carter’s intentions on the canal became clearer—and more favorable to Panama. This process worked slowly during the months in which progress was largely stalemated because of Ford’s unwillingness to settle bureaucratic disputes between State and Defense. however.S. Days after the election. though not unproductive. His first presidential directive ordered a review of U. negotiators used them with reluctance. team was the near-total lack of engagement of President Ford.S. Jimmy Carter. Panama often argued that “the creation of a friendly environment [is] indispensable to effective defense. Carter appointed Sol Linowitz as a temporary. whose ambivalence led to a frustrating. brought hope to the Panamanian team. they changed so little that U. The failure of the new guidelines had been foretold. year. troops. saying Carter’s responsibility was to “approve the new treaty which will put an end to a situation which identifies a great nation with colonial practices. Carter signaled the issue’s importance in two ways. though Carter had spoken cautiously during the campaign. with options for a post-treaty presence and new canal construction. but it gained currency with U.S. Panama not only negotiated certain points. participants credit Carter’s political will—especially his decision to address the treaties while his popularity was highest—as crucial to the treaties’ eventual ratification. What is sometimes lost. Carter decided before inauguration to attack the Canal negotiations early on.S. Panamanian pressure. a new one for the Panamanian negotiators. the best way to ensure the security of the canal was to have a content Panamanian population that took pride in it. is that Carter’s team was able to conclude the treaties with a few months of hard work because of significant advances made during the previous years. Panama became more assertive making its own proposals. The U. rang of perpetuity.S. When Ford did offer new instructions.112 Once in office. presidential elections in 1976 guaranteed the lack of progress continued. Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez declared the canal an international concern and called on Carter to move quickly to address the impasse. special envoy for the negotiations. strictly speaking.The major problem confronting the U. aided by friendly Latin American presidents. The fact that the treaties figured so high on the Carter agenda was a testament to a long Panamanian struggle to put them there. Second. Carter described his decision as both a matter of justice and as necessary to ensure the canal’s safety—using an argument similar to that advanced during years by Panama about the importance of a friendly population. This began to redefine the issue for the United States.S. The foreign ministry was increasingly open to an arrangement in which the United States and Panama guaranteed the neutrality of the canal after the treaty’s expiration—without the physical presence of U. A new president The election of a Democratic president. but advanced a new type of conventional wisdom regarding how the security of the canal could best be achieved. Both Panamanian and U. especially on the issue of lands and waters. In those talks. The point was not. position of seeking at least 40 years for defense.”111 In the days before inauguration. and the U.”109 That is. Panama also was reviewing its position.S.S.110 Pérez raised the issue in his congratulatory letter to Carter. 18 . continued even in the pre-inaugural period. policy on the canal negotiations.
in partnership with Panama or. He had been replaced by González Revilla. though. The initial position from Bunker and Linowitz did not meet Torrijos’ expectations. government. and very emotional for the individuals concerned). the presentation of U. Boyd insisted the treaties expire by 2000. retained certain defense rights beyond that date. the negotiators remained distant. but the idea had not yet gained Torrijos’ approval. An exchange of letters between Carter and Torrijos improved the disposition of both teams. if the U. the rights and privileges of American citizens working for the canal company (an immensely complicated question. Did Torrijos want a treaty or a constant issue to harp on? Was Carter ready to back away the “never” he articulated in the campaign? The February breakdown led Linowitz to reconsider the treaty format. guarantee. Escobar Bethancourt even invoked Carter’s letter against his counterparts.The arrangement would be enshrined in a “cooperation treaty” that would be renewed periodically. again on Contadora. Foreign Minister Boyd shuttled to Washington to meet the new secretary and review the main issues in the negotiations. the authority of the United States to protect the canal from armed challenge of any kind. The first negotiations under the Carter administration began in mid-February.”118 19 . … The second treaty would deal with Panamanian sovereignty in the Canal Zone. That’s the spirit that should be reflected in this meeting.S. team sought to clarify questions of neutrality. and the logistic details of the presence of American forces on Panamanian soil. This point exposed a split within Panama’s government. In particular.113 Two weeks after inauguration. money matters. When the U. where many insisted on a guarantee by Panama alone or through the United Nations. quit in disgust—making the announcement on TV without warning Torrijos.” He told Torrijos he looked forward to meeting the leader to sign the accords. that the foreign minister would no longer be a permanent member of the negotiating team. The Panamanian scene was still unsettled by Boyd’s departure.117 On many issues.S. in declarations made live on television. 115 Boyd. “The cornerstone of the strategy would be to divide one treaty into two. who five years prior had launched the internationalization of Panama’s cause at the United Nations. and Ancón Hill. The two sides were testing one another. seeming to convince each that the other wanted a treaty. while Escobar now pressed for 1990. unilaterally. successful approach. Carter noted their “common interests” and called for a “balanced agreement. Secretary Vance said this was a possibility. defense after the treaty’s expiration sounded too much like perpetuity for the general to accept.S. if necessary. the ports of Balboa and Colón. Panama pushed for the transfer and lands and facilities like the railroad. They started poorly. The first of the two treaties—and we would insist on agreement on this treaty before we would proceed to the second—would deal solely with security questions.114 Boyd was undercut by González Revilla when Panama’s embassy stated that Torrijos would support neutrality under a UN framework. Linowitz spoke of a treaty lasting until 2000.”116 This two-treaty formula became the centerpiece of the next round of talks.S. Torrijos added. control of the company that operated the canal.S. but not a U. saying that the president had “proposed a new spirit for arriving at a treaty. who was well known and liked by many in the U. Boyd considered this a feasible compromise. and helped produce the final.
S. and accepted even in the Nixon administration’s 1971 policy review. needed parts to operate communications and other facilities. after years of divergence.” Escobar Bethancourt explained that jurisdiction over all of Ancón was a matter of pride for the Panamanian people—something not affected by having U. “I hope that we will have a new treaty before the first snowfall.” As Royo told Linowitz and Bunker. “our aspiration and your interests are wed happily. while the U.”119 Lewis Galindo’s reception also differed from that accorded to González Revilla. Panama had been willing to risk the treaty talks to call the U.S. the chief Panamanian negotiator presented his counterpart with a demand for over $1 billion as a lump-sum. and not of the partnership Carter pledged. the new ambassador was received the day after his arrival by Warren Christopher. acting secretary in Vance’s absence. up-front payment. In contrast.Gabriel Lewis Galindo. were finally solved. The U. Torrijos’ choice for ambassador in 1977 could hardly have been more different than his choice in late 1972. That meeting marked the beginning of a close. The negotiations returned to crisis mode. Christopher told Lewis.121 Panama insisted on resolving questions on high-profile lands.123 failing to realize how a marginal issue to the United States mattered deeply to Panama. The two sides were taking past one another. considered “big” issues. use of its territory. Panama also wanted an increased annuity payment of $300 million per year. The United States would be turning over an asset of incredible value. Lewis Galindo was a businessman from a wealthy family. This point had been uncontested in 1975.”120 The State Department made arrangements for Lewis Galindo to present his credentials to the president as soon as Carter returned to the country. Panama would “give you all the necessary facilities for the operation and defense of the Canal. Carter never considered it. Panama insisted on the return of the whole hill. If the United States would give Panama the whole hill. Both agreed that Panama should derive greater benefits from the canal tolls. Whereas González Revilla entered as a 27-year-old known for his leftist leanings and proximity to the general.S. they lowered the total.124 To get the treaties. the concept would be a deal breaker. Furthermore. was stuck in the mindset of the Pentagon. like Ancón Hill. which towers above Panama City before addressing what the U. but in the spirit of cooperation and out of respect for President Carter. who got the distinct impression when he arrived that the Panama Canal was not a problem anyone in Washington was trying to solve.125 As payment for seven decades of nearly free use of Panama’s land and waters. The solution on Ancón is emblematic of how many of questions.S. Panama calculated that the United States actually owed Panama more than $6 billion. On other issues. Why should it pay for the privilege? Bunker and Linowitz accepted that Panama had been drastically undercompensated for the use of its land. personal relationship between Lewis Galindo and the president. Lewis Galindo could “could say ‘no’ to Torrijos. something that a lot of people could not do.S. bluff 20 .126 The United States held that for the Senate and U. experts work there for some years.122 All the Panamanians coincided in this—give us the territory and we will let you use it to run the Panama Canal during the treaty period.S. public. Perhaps the largest was a large package of financial compensation as reparation for the decades of free U.S. Panama had to give up several major demands.
it appeared so. Sol Linowitz’s appointment would expire on August 10. however. and April 18 the second. and then retreating slowly to previous agreements.S. more than 67 percent. To do that. home to the autonomous Kuna tribe. team headed to Panama City with an impending deadline.128 Carter’s letter was a crucial element in convincing Torrijos to scale back his demand for compensation. had made on land-use and insisted the U.S. testing the U.S.131 The only province to vote against the treaties was San Blas.000 Panamanians headed to the polls.130 On October 23.805 of them. and Royo127 that an economic payment of the type they sought was impossible. the sides were distant on the question of a lump payment. The Panamanian people had given the treaties their stamp of approval less than two months after the two leaders had signed them at the OAS. With a largely acceptable draft of the treaty being prepared. Lewis Galindo and Ardito Barletta. Carter’s letter highlighted the “major concessions” the U.that it could go no further in its “two-level game. Ardito Barletta hashed out an agreement that included a compromise on tolls. Standing in front of the gathered throng of reporters.S. Before it could pursue these goals in negotiations with Washington. about 800. with 506. a package of loans. voting to approve the new treaties. Panama had more to risk. it vigorously pursued its main goals—an abolition of the Canal Zone and a handover of the canal to Panamanian authority. After deciding to reject the 1967 treaty.” That was before Panama had achieved so many of its goals.S. it radically altered the 21 . to get any final advantage.S. Even with the major issues laid to rest. while Carter stressed to Escobar Bethancourt. Case conclusions Omar Torrijos’ government began seriously assessing its options regarding the canal in 1970. history. both close to Torrijos had come to believe that the compensation demand would kill the treaty in the U.S. Lewis Galindo. The United States turned to the same Latin American leaders who had so effectively pressed Panama’s case in the past. The vote was the closest treaty ratification in U. General Omar Torrijos had gotten much of what he started out seeking. increased toll compensation and offered some other foreign aid. However. Bunker. investment for public housing. Though the U. had given as much as it could. The Senate would take considerably longer to do so. The U. and some cash. but voted on March 16 to ratify the first treaty. could succeed in getting the general to back away from what he saw as a just demand. U. much work remained in drafting the treaties. The treaties still faced an intense Senate ratification fight and in a plebiscite in Panama. Linowitz. In the late afternoon of Linowitz’s final day the two sides stepped out of the Holiday Inn where they had been working.129 After dealing with three presidents over seven years of negotiations. and Royo announced that the “basic elements” of the treaties were ready. Would Panama once again try to face down the United States? At first. They convinced Carter that only direct communication to Torrijos. who held Carter in very high esteem. with Panama presenting especially tough language.S. Escobar Bethancourt. Panama learned that it would need to gain attention from a much higher level in the United States. The final days were tense.
S. It did result in a major increase in revenue derived from tolls. While the U. there was an immediate or shortterm reversion of the vast majority.S.S.S. Certainly the final package did not approach the massive totals they felt they were owed. At the bargaining table. or perhaps an extension on the order of 90 years. This institution left Panama three years after ratification. military activity was regularized under the SOFA. Regarding compensation. the Watergate scandal. was comprised mostly of the same men throughout. which increased over the treaty’s lifespan. At several points. the 1976 elections— bogged down the negotiation. Panama also adjusted its plan by getting the U.” On the issue of duration. and Ancón. Torrijos and Carter agreed to a broad phrasing on the issue of a sea-level canal. Ford’s weakness. goal of perpetual defense rights. Panama demanded an end to U. refused Panama’s preference for a United Nations mandate. On every item of the Tack-Kissinger principles. First. to an increasingly favorable interpretation of each point. Regarding lands. The power of the larger country was often the power to repeatedly delay. as enunciated in 1972. the presence was minimal. political problems— feuds between State and Defense. which unlike the U. did not have to worry about the Soviet Union or China.bilateral approach that had dominated U. Panama insisted that it should have the right to determine where and whether a new canal was construction. it is clear that Panama attained most of its objectives. Panama’s original demand for neutrality was largely secured in the neutrality treaty. In August 1977. the railroad. such as the ports.S. Other U.S. with the final treaty.-Panama relations from their inception. It then tried to hold the U. military presence officially ended in 1999. U. Instead the neutrality guarantee was held in the OAS. Panama made the canal an international issue. with de facto jurisdiction transferred over three years. The final result was that Panama. Even as Panama’s interpretation of the problem became the conventional wisdom in some cases—the best way to secure the canal was to have a happy Panamanian population—the small country still faced a constant struggle to overcome U. naming the School of the Americas.S.S. political process.S. where the U. the U.S. military activities not related to canal defense. after the expiration of the treaty. was to maintain a single-minded focus. All the while. Today. to agree to broad. linking its own struggle with those of its neighbors and a host of unlikely allies across the globe. Panama’s fallback position of 2000 was accepted—a remarkable concession from the 1972 U. ambiguous principles in 1974.S. After more than five years of negotiations. Panama began seeking a full transfer of the canal by 1995. responses and to evolve its understanding of the U.S. inaction. exhibited an ability to learn from U.S. The Panamanian leadership. the former building serves as a luxury hotel for Panama Canal tourists. Panama also achieved direct and immediate participation in the operation of the canal. it achieved an immediate elimination of the zone. during the last years of the treaty. Comparing the goals Omar Torrijos. it managed to walk a careful line of nudging the United States without provoking too harsh of a reaction. especially one led by a military dictator whose control was rarely in doubt. This included the most important sites. The power of the smaller country. Panama’s goals early in the 1970s were less clear. stance gradually gravitated to Panama’s position. the treaties eliminated “perpetuity. voted to 22 .S. though the U. On the Canal Zone.S.
just in time for the one-hundredth anniversary of the canal’s opening. The nation decided via referendum to make a huge investment to build news sets of locks to accommodate much larger ships and secure the canal’s importance to world shipping for years to come. torture. perhaps. Colombia’s principal cities. unlike government troops. they seemed to have little trouble obtaining resources. President Pastrana surveyed his options and crafted a strategy. while bombings in the city brought home the intense danger. and drug traffickers—operated nearly unchecked. many of the institutions of the Colombian state were crumbling around him. It later agreed that both flags could be flown at military institutions. participation. its material conditions were perhaps worse. the Colombian government faced a crisis of legitimacy. FARC encampments moved closer to Bogota. The Colombian Army was seen as tainted by ties to paramilitary groups. with only a handful of functioning helicopters to pursue enemies across the country’s mountainous jungles.-Colombian ties during the Samper administration. a huge Panamanian flag waves atop Ancón Hill. The FARC were adding soldiers and amassing weapons.S. forced displacements. aid to the South American country had plummeted.132 His denials (later recanted) fell on deaf ears in Colombia and increased the ire of a hostile U. A host of armed groups—guerrillas. without U. Finally. had remained largely isolated from the decades-long conflict. the country became the third-largest recipient of U. which involved intense collaboration with the United States. U. and other human rights violations. Head to head with the FARC. and lacking many tools with which to address them. Most of the aid that remained was funneled directly to the Policia Nacional. Set against the background of hostility that engulfed U.S.expand the canal on its own. Colombia faced a sharp recession that was only exacerbated by the violence. with the conspicuous purpose of further marginalizing Samper. The government exercised only titular control over much of the national territory. it is perhaps surprising that under Colombia’s next president. but by 1998. More surprising. Today. Facing overwhelming challenges. the Colombian army was often overmatched. In addition.S. and lead to the creation of Plan Colombia. Case 2: Plan Colombia As Andrés Pastrana prepared to take the oath of office. The army’s morale was disastrously low. Panama demanded exclusive use of the Panamanian flag. is that much of that aid 23 . leading to international aid cuts and public anger. aid. who were guilty of massacres. armed fronts of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) encroached on the oases of urban safety.S. A series of drug-money scandals had engulfed Pastrana’s predecessor.S. sometimes letting towns slip out of control of the Colombian state. ambassador.S. That expansion is expected to be complete in 2014. Ernesto Samper. but this faded along with the U. The strength of the paramilitaries furthered eroded the reach and legitimacy of the government. presence. paramilitaries. serving as a landmark and a reminder for Panamanians in the city below. Samper had spent his entire term embroiled in scandal after audio tapes made clear that his campaign had taken millions of dollars from the kingpins of the Cali drug cartel. including Bogota. As a result of opposition to Samper and concern about human rights.
human rights violations. was deliberately channeled around the president through the head of the Colombian National Police.S.S. Much of the aid that remained.S. did not “pass the test with human rights groups. counternarcotics aid laws.-Colombian relations during the presidency of Ernesto Samper created the immediate context for Pastrana’s presidency. which intensified as embarrassing details about administration corruption came to light.”138 The nature of the country’s drug trafficking. The scandal took down top Colombian officials. the FARC captured hundreds of millions of dollars in funding from drugs.-Colombian cooperation from the late 1990s to the present. I focus here on the overlapping mandates of the Colombian President Andrés Pastrana and U.136 In 1996 and 1997. Samper was tarnished by allegations that his presidential campaign had been funded by drug traffickers. corroborated by cassette recordings of major kingpins. the Colombian military was in retreat.S. while seriously weakening the Colombian state at home and abroad.139 In the months before Pastrana took power.135 Before his inauguration. it is important to note several things this chapter is not trying to do. The FARC routed the Colombian army’s supposedly elite unit in March 1998. However. It is not seeking to justify Plan Colombia in particular or the war on drugs more broadly.S. president trying to appear tough on drugs and a Colombian president soiled by substantiated accusations proved a poisonous combination that drove relations to their nadir. According to a broad range of both academic and policy students Plan Colombia did not accomplish goals set out in the U. While the Colombian government was starved of revenue because of a deep recession and a sharp aid reduction. For the first time. causing a major embarrassment. Because of the complex and controversial nature of this case. Its purpose is to re-examine the case in light of the guiding question of this dissertation: how did Colombian leaders seek to pursue their goal via a change in U. Samper faced harsh reactions from the U. Decertification cut off most U.S.went to the Colombian military.S. once again excluding the important role of the U. armed groups. war on drugs in terms of reducing drug availability or purity or increasing street prices. went on the “decertify” Colombia under U. which a U.”133 Though “Plan Colombia” has been used to describe a wide swath of U. and domestic opposition.S. The combination of a U. President Bill Clinton.S. in the middle of 24 . aid programs. policy? Context The intense strain on U. There is no question those goals have not been met in some forty years. The incoming president would later summarize his limited tactical options: “It was clear then. official said in June 1998. and decades-old conflict were rapidly changing. in the 1990s.137 The Clinton administration denied a visitor’s visa to Samper.S. paramilitary links to the government. or the media.S. the aid cuts and bad relations “helped weaken the Colombian state at precisely the most inopportune time. coca plants were cultivated in Colombia on a large scale. the U. the US Congress.S. given under a national security waiver. Congress in the final Plan Colombia from this analysis. signaling that Colombia was not cooperating in the war on drugs.134 Nor does this chapter try to examine the Plan’s effect on serious problems in Colombia—displacements.
to take advantage of significant U. Pastrana set out many of his goals clearly in his campaign speech at the Hotel Tequendama on June 8. and political reforms.”142 Goals and evaluation. that the Armed Forces were not capable of mounting a large offensive against the illegal groups because they did not have the means or human and logistical resources to do so. In his inaugural address. and the FARC.”144 Colombia. and shifting answers favored new policy alternatives.140 In 1997. stressed the difficulty of combining political and military realities in Colombia. Was the question just drug traffickers? How should the FARC be defined? These questions played a major role in the relationship. policy. and Pastrana was dedicated to gaining international assistance. The United States was concerned about the situation in Colombia.S. Peace would require a military strategy as well. even as a candidate he did not plan on betting the house on a negotiated solution. interest.S.S. Though the cards were not officially counted. Rodrigo Lloreda.143 One of Pastrana’s main goals was to receive international funding for development and assistance from international financial organizations to restructure Colombian sovereign debt—what Pastrana called a “Marshall Plan” for Colombia. emphasizing peace negotiations with insurgents. embassy. Lloreda told us Pastrana knows the guerrillas must be weakened militarily before they come to the negotiating table. if they wished. That policy remained in place when Pastrana came into office.S. there was a major debate in both countries about the nature of the problem. there had been a major gap between Colombian interest and U. to address a host of problems. the United States. Pastrana called Plan Colombia “a combination of alternative development projects that will channel the shared efforts of governments and multilateral institutions with those of Colombian society. the Mandato Ciudadano por la Paz. but the United States’ tone and actions shifted rapidly—and had already started to become less hostile while Samper was in office. 1998 High Low U. a top Pastrana deputy who would later be appointed defense minister. “On peace. Ernesto Samper.1998. In a meeting with Peter Romero at the U. rural development. 1998. Pastrana and others cited “10 million votes for peace” as a demand to address the conflict. 25 . most likely from the United States. While Pastrana did have a true interest in his peace agenda. priority X Policy divergence X (Samper) X (Pastrana) Problem clarity X In fact all the major Colombian presidential candidates realized they would have an opportunity. but this was not a popularly acceptable campaign theme. Under Samper. or the Citizens’ Mandate for Peace instructed voters in municipal elections to deposit a white card alongside their ballot as a demand for peace. 1998 Pastrana’s goals were largely dictated by the failures of his predecessor.141 Pastrana and Serpa competed to be seen as the most pacifistic candidate. However.
closely linked with the domestic situation.Archives and interviews point to shifting understandings of Colombia’s problems in both the Colombian and American administrations.148 Pastrana’s objectives almost demanded improved cooperation with the United States. During the first meeting and the state visit. With only a handful of staff members. In the balance. apparently improvised. and which served as a safe haven for conducting peace talks. recover our international relations. also called el despeje. The incoming Colombian administration also requested enhanced equipment and training for the Colombian military and help in stabilizing Colombia’s fiscal situation. the president-elect boarded a small plane and flew to the FARC stronghold of San Vicente de Caguan for a secret meeting with the legendary FARC commander Manuel Marulanda—alias “Tirofijo. Both the peace process and the despeje were routinely criticized in the U.S.S. where he pushed Clinton to back his Marshall Plan proposal. Importantly. Pastrana emphasized the need to attack drug trafficking as a means to sap funding from the conflict and to strengthen the Colombian military in order to improve the government’s positions vis-à-vis guerrillas and traffickers. Congress.145 Pastrana summarized his goals: “It was urgent to reform and modernize the military forces. that “Colombia faced two clearly different wars. Pastrana did not stop there. He wasted little time planning the dramatic encounter.149 During the campaign. The two governments jointly explored policy responses. arguing that the prolongation of fighting benefited only drug kingpins. teams worked out an agenda that emphasized counternarcotics cooperation. until these talks had abjectly failed to produce results. To facilitate the incipient peace process. the Colombians achieved several of their initial priorities in their foreign policy toward the United States. The visit was speedily organized. a significant geographic area in which the army would not pursue the FARC. the Colombian and U. to obtain fiscal and development aid. Reiterating his call for a Marshall Plan. largely cut off under Samper. The actors’ ways of seeing the conflict—or perhaps more to the point. and to gain international backing for peace negotiations. and Pastrana returned with a larger delegation from October 26 – 30.” one against drug trafficking and the other against groups with social and political aims. Pastrana spoke at length about drug trafficking and its relationship to the Colombian conflict. military assistance.147 Pastrana proposed a reorganization of the Colombian military and an increase in the U. The speech also included a statement that Colombia would move away from as peace talks with the FARC faltered. Pastrana travelled to Washington. launch a plan of social investments. for a state visit.” Several days before his inauguration. the armed actors participating in the conflict—mingled. but also expanded the bilateral agenda to 26 . Pastrana had pledged to sit face-to-face with FARC leaders to seek a negotiated peace. fight drug trafficking and seek reconciliation. Pastrana maintained a zona de distension. Pastrana also managed to preserve several aspects of his policies that were unpopular with important sectors of the United States. His foreign policy goals.”146 Pastrana stated these goals as a candidate in his address at Tequendama and restated them at the beginning initiation of his presidency.S. Pastrana continued negotiations with the FARC during most of his presidency. were to restore respectability to Colombia.150 Clinton signaled his backing for Pastrana by issuing an invitation.
and he lobbied personally for U. with the Colombian conflict seen not just as a local matter. in their eyes. U. Pastrana’s state visit made clear that officials from across the Clinton administration agreed on the country’s importance to U. the strengthening of civil and military institutions. would be free to train. it provoked outrage amongst the Colombian military brass. officials said. or whether. but a broader risk. in a July 1998 meeting. But Pastrana believed that international involvement would lend credibility to the process while also helping it continue beyond his four-year term. officials showed cautious enthusiasm about the peace process. In both cases.S. and the unfolding peace process.”152 In Washington. U.154 While there was not a U. the Colombian energy sector. The state visit produced a series of important agreements between Colombia and the United States. and to the FARC in particular: “The Armed Forces that I command could be armed forces for peace or for war. acting Assistant Secretary of State Peter Romero met with the top Colombian officials.S.S. produce cocaine.S.include economic issues. Pastrana asked Clinton directly for $150 million in U.”153 In Washington. and launch attacks before retreating into the zone. Pastrana gained President Clinton’s support for the passage of an IMF fiscal package to help avert a balance-of-payments crisis with $1 billion in 1998 and another $1 billion in 1999. there was considerable division within the executive branch about how. “close coordination plus informal brainstorming and feedback are essential. The Colombians stressed that the peace process might lead in uncertain directions. that is the point of departure for any serious negotiations.” Fernández de Soto said. Therefore. Ten days after the state visit. they need to be efficient. The Colombian high command had proposed the battalion to both Pastrana and the United States just weeks before the state visit. in Bogota. mid-level 27 . The desire of the Pastrana administration to link peace negotiations with the international community was a new facet of Colombian foreign policy. During his inaugural address.157 Pastrana saw the United States as an essential participant. While initially many believe that the FARC role consisted of levying protection “taxes” on traffickers. “My top priority will be the recuperation of our international relations and a frontal attack on the problem of drugtrafficking. Pastrana was clear.S. Direct contact with the FARC might help the United States understand how complex Colombia’s situation was. the Clinton administration was increasingly concerned about stability in the Andean region. participation. Starting during the summer of 1998.155 Furthermore. including Pastrana. interests. “We are now convinced that some factions of the FARC and ELN are heavily involved in the production of illicit drugs.S. Previous talks. while outlining his plans for the peace talks. many of the right in the United States did not. and that its immediate impact on counternarcotics was uncertain. However.156 Top commanders saw the despeje as a giveaway to the FARC. Paradoxically. The concept of the new unit was designed to meld Colombian and U.”151 Days later.S. had been almost entirely domestic. support for a specified counternarcotics battalion. Crucially. In mid-December 1998. including successful negotiations with the M-19. the United States should work with the Colombian army. priorities. who. Pastrana also laid out a challenge to the guerrillas. consensus on how to approach Colombia.
On March 4. written in late 1998 and early 1999. and these advisors saw the military. argues that all the aspects of the eventual Plan Colombia were present in the government’s early plans. sought to “increase the offensive capability of the armed forces. but would not turn them over to Colombian law enforcement. Ambassador Kamman accepted the invitation to witness the opening of negotiations on January 7. involvement in the talks more politically costly. though initially as separate policies.162 The Plan. Luis Alberto Moreno. Meanwhile. support for the talks was increasingly cool and cautious. it was clear that funding any major increases in military capability would have to come from outside the government.S. Ruiz.-Colombian cooperation continued to intensify. the United States backed away from its previous contacts with the FARC and declared the group “terrorists. Despite that.S. the FARC admitted to the murders. This in part reflected the availability of resources from the United States.S. and attack helicopters.S.S. Luis Fernando Ramírez. economic. the bodies of two missing women and one man were found.State Department officials met with Raul Reyes.” U.S.158 Two events scuttled Pastrana’s plan for closer U. The final blow was the murder of U. One was a mechanism for social investments targeted to conflict and drug-producing regions.S. there were in fact two parallel “Plans Colombia” developing inside the Colombian government. coordinated by the entity Plan Colombia. and Fernández de Soto.164 During the first half of 1999. Days later. drawing criticism from the U. crop substitution.”159 Though the peace talks continued. and eradication.161 Director of Planning Jaime Ruiz was leading the creation of the administration’s strategy document.165 The other was led by a small group of advisers close to the president. social. The killings called into question the goodwill of the FARC. indigenous rights activists by FARC commandoes. officials stated that they were only there because of Pastrana’s strenuous lobbying and stressed their intentions to continue counternarcotics efforts alongside the Colombian government. the FARC’s primary spokesman. collaboration with peace process. saying it would discipline those responsible. with the extensive consultation of the ambassador in Washington. eager to challenge the many critics of the Pastrana administration. Cambio para Construir la Paz. The ministers closest to Pastrana moved increasingly to a security focus.S. U. 1999.160 At a breakfast with Pastrana. U. Mauricio Cárdenas. At hemisphere-wide meeting of defense ministers. which in large part focused on social and economic development. but more than that reflected the 28 . The U. namely Ruiz. Lloreda again pressed Cohen with plans for the counternarcotics battalion. Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Colombian Minister formalized the defense working group initiated in Washington.S.” The new battalion gain strong support from Secretary Cohen. showing evidence of torture. in a secret meeting in Costa Rica.166 For Ruiz—who Pastrana called “the man chosen for the definitive design of Plan Colombia”167—the goal of the plan was to strengthen the Colombian state. Congress and making any U. U. word of the initial meeting was leaked to El Tiempo in Bogota.”163 Given Colombia’s fiscal constraints. as well as the control it had over its disparate “fronts. and institutional components as complementary. possibly by the FARC. Lloreda’s “objective was to strengthen Colombia’s military capability as a key tool for reinforcing the government’s peace dialogue with the guerrillas. First.
Paramilitaries responded with high-profile massacres aimed at anyone who might support the guerrillas.170 From that point forward. McCaffrey became the administration’s most visible advocate for aid to Colombia—no doubt contributing to the image of Plan Colombia as entirely focused on drug production. were ready to assist Colombia. as they attacked police stations in small towns with the aim of pushing out the Colombian state and instituting their own governance. “Well. Newly installed Defense Minister Ramírez and armed forces chief Tapias arrived in Washington on July 16. Ramírez said.171 A new plan emerges 29 . a retired general. The request followed the Plan de Desarrollo.S. and told the drug czar that if Colombia were going to purchase instead of borrow all the equipment it needed. Military cooperation between the FARC and the ELN become more common. supplemental commitment. package began to solidify. Colombia needed nearly $4 billion. was aimed at gaining political concessions during the negotiations and to influence upcoming elections. McCaffrey looked at accounts that he had prepared before the meeting.168 By the time the U.” If the U. As Pastrana announced during his first days in office. with a spike in killings starting around May 1999. While Colombia was clearly on Washington’s agenda. I am saying we’d need a billion per year. some in the Colombian government believed. seeking $500 billion in additional aid. He sent a letter to other administration officials advocating a massive.” Stressing the need for action. After Ramírez presented McCaffrey with the helicopter request. Pastrana and his advisors were also pushed in mid-1999 to unite their strategies and increase the emphasis on counternarcotics and the military. he would build an army for peace or war. how much would Colombia need? The new defense minister scrambled to make mental calculations. it would need about a billion dollars.breakdown in the peace negotiations with the FARC and the growing conviction that the political wing of the guerrillas had lost influence to those who controlled the purse strings and had no intention of extricating themselves from lucrative drug-trafficking. with a focus on air mobility and intelligence. This violence increased during a FARC military offensive during July 1999.S. The FARC launched an increased military campaign aimed at the government and at paramilitary groups who had captured formerly rebel-held territory. McCaffrey anticipated a possible fight in Congress and explicitly framed the issue as an “emergency and a “near-crisis situation. telling the minister that according to his numbers. The two met with Clinton’s “drug czar” Barry McCaffrey. The strategy. primarily in the form of decommissioned Vietnam helicopters—UH-1H or “Huey II”— that the United States would lend to a Colombian military severely lacking air support.” “Now you’re talking!” McCaffrey exclaimed. McCaffrey took the original Colombian request and doubled it.169 The surge of violence increased public skepticism of the chances of a negotiated peace. the American paused and “asked [Ramírez] a question [he] was not prepared for. Colombian government officials believed the latter was more likely.
getting on the U. from both Clinton and Congress. That assistance. It reflected many of Pastrana’s original goals and priorities. Pickering said.S. Conclusions The two cases offer a chance to build the typological theory of influence under asymmetry.S. Therefore. which would cover the rest of Pastrana’s term. he said. though many in the U. In the Colombian case.174 “The primordial objective was to strengthen the state.173 Pastrana chose Jaime Ruiz to design a comprehensive aid request. especially in Congress. Neither the Nixon nor Ford administration had any particular desire to deal with the Panama Canal. Pickering surprised them by saying the Clinton administration would back a three-year package. while at the same time favoring a solution. about launching a highly visible response to public concern about drugs. Rather. especially given the opposition first from the Pentagon and secondly from Congress. The 30 . poorer country. Comparisons of earlier Colombian planning documents support the claims of Colombian officials that this is false. along with adjustments made to reflect changing conditions in Colombia. and it was asking for billions of dollars.Following up on Colombia’s request and the ensuing proposal from McCaffrey.S. Congress did not. For Panama. could start that year if the Colombian government were to draft a plan quickly. Arturo Valenzuela.”176 But Colombia did not tacitly accept a Plan written for it by the United States.S. Colombia did not need to do much to try to set the agenda.S. “was actively involved in assisting the Colombians in drafting this plan. however.175 Numerous studies repeat a claim that Plan Colombia was written first in English.S. Rather. it was an active agent seeking the resources and cooperation it needed to address problems it had identified. for Colombia it was a means to undermine the financing of both the FARC and paramilitaries. it made compromises and couched some of its priorities in language that would appeal to the U. U. allowing the state to reassert itself in a territory where it had lost influence. It also reflected U. agenda from before his term began. But where many in the United States. Their concern was having an answer for constituents who were concerned about drugs in their communities. interest was high. For that reason. and Peter Romero arrived in Bogota on August 9.S. starting with Pastrana’s pre-inaugural visit. Torrijos adopted a number of strategies that forced the U. Congress. three top Clinton administration officials traveled to Colombia. saw counternarcotics as the end of the plan.172 Pastrana went into the meeting confident of the Clinton administration’s support. by the State Department. agenda was a major challenge. The refutation of the idea that the Plan was penned by the U. Pastrana was on the U.S. with Pastrana pursuing strategies much different (and less confrontational) that those employed by Torrijos. Clinton understood this. The two cases represent different types and followed different paths.S. the Plan was the result of increasingly close collaboration between the two governments. and he planned to present a one-year aid request. Thomas Pickering. government is not to suggest that it was written by Colombians in total isolation. to pay attention. Colombia was the smaller. Ruiz and Pastrana agreed that attacking drug trafficking needed to be part of the solution. A secret Defense Department memo notes that the U.” Ruiz stressed. political priorities.
he would be replaced by an option much friendlier to Cuba and the Soviets. the manner in which the United States saw the problem gradually shifted and was to a large extent at the heart of the feud between the State Department and the Pentagon. administration in 1977. slowly changed its position on treaty duration. began working with Pastrana as president-elect. and importantly to its democratic Latin American neighbors. No significant deal could be made with him. negotiators. though this too is greater in the case of Panama.S. like holding the UNSC meeting in Panama City and by attaching the canal issue to narratives of great importance to the Third World at the moment. while connections to democrats lent Torrijos credibility. This movement in U.S. Torrijos convinced U. attention. policy occurred as the U.S. In terms of problem clarity. we see significant evolution over both cases. we actually see in the case a steady movement in Panama’s direction. In part. Torrijos was able to do this through astute tactics. Panama gave ground. In Colombia. Torrijos intimated that in the absence of a deal.S. punctuated by Carter’s election.S. Samper was irreparably tarnished in front of the international community and the Colombia people.S. and only later with some in the Pentagon. There was a fairly low degree of policy divergence. On the issue of policy divergence. Secondly. Finally. Doing so increased the diplomatic costs to the United States of doing nothing at a time when it was concerned about its image in front of the world as compared to the Soviet Union and China. The issue was seen as one of national security by everyone involved in the United States. The connection with the NAM drew U.S.S.S. like the peace process and despeje. and lands and waters. though in areas where the U. The question of policy formation largely exhibited cooperation. defense rights. Several factors were important in Panama’s approach. first with U. Though this change has often been summarized as being entirely due to a change in U. changing faces do explain much of the reduction in policy divergence. Panama’s contrary argument that only a happy Panamanian population could secure the canal gained traction. negotiators that the consequences of failing to reach an agreement would be serious. the Panama Canal issue was quite clear to both sides.first was to take a previously bilateral issue and put it on the world stage. like colonization and racism. the changed that mattered was President Samper’s replacement by Pastrana. too. 31 . we see the reverse. Torrijos emphasized the possibility of riots or acts of violence that could jeopardize the operation of the canal. reputation as described from the international campaign.S. The United States lacked similar unity of purpose or focus. However.S. after the TackKissinger agreements that it rather watch the talks fail than accept an agreement that did not meet its goals. had doubts. Perhaps the most important was that Torrijos and his government convinced the U. Panama continued this strategy by building bridges to the Non-Aligned Movement. then with the State Department. living with a transition period and dropping demands for large-scale compensation. this had to do with the risks to U. Secondly. While it remained clear to the Panamanians. control. but whereas in the early 1970s there was a general agreement that the canal’s security was best ensured by strong U. Initially. for the most part is sought to strengthen Pastrana’s hand rather than undermine policies it did not particularly like. As soon as possible the U.
Clearly. For Colombia. 1998). it did not care. 2010).S. the United States. understanding of the issue was contested and changing after 1974.S. the dominant problem was the weakness of the state. Endnotes 1 Cole Blasier. Smith. Congress by and large did not—more to the point. Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United StatesLatin American Relations.S. it challenges the dominant notion in the study of U. The Clinton administration came to accept this somewhat. concern in Colombia. As this study demonstrates. By doing so. no. the goals and strategies of Latin American foreign policy— and the interaction of U.President Carter also brought a new understanding. Pitt Latin American Series (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 5 (2003). Colombia was intentionally strategic in how it presented the problem. one which jived with the Panamanian presentation. After the collapse of the peace process in 2001. Empire's Workshop : Latin America. neither side initially saw the FARC primarily as a drug-trafficking organization. 4 Samuel Flagg Bemis.S. the U. Pastor and Tom Long.S. 3 Max Paul Friedman. the theory helps us understand when and how Latin American leaders might be able to influence U. 2 Hal Brands. cocaine was the primary U. no. 3 (2010). In summation. Initially. Greg Grandin.-Latin American relations that the agency of Latin American leaders is a marginal concern. there was a significant degree of uncertainty about how to define Colombia’s struggles. war on drugs and worked within its confines by accepting related limitations of spending. Beneath the United States : A History of U. "The Cold War and Its Aftermath in the Americas: The Search for a Synthetic Interpretation of U.S.-Latin American Relations (New York: Oxford University Press. cocaine was an issue in that it funding the FARC. Policy toward Latin America (Cambridge. The U. However. It strategically employed the rhetoric of the U.S.S." Latin American Research Review 45.: Harvard University Press. In Plan Colombia. For Colombia. this understanding began to dominate in both countries. The Hovering Giant : U.S. "Retiring the Puppets. and Latin American leaders—should be at the center of subfield. it did not lose sight of its primary goal of strengthening the Colombian state and weakening the FARC by cutting off their funding and confronting them with a stronger military. Mass. 1976). Carter also saw treating Panama fairly on the canal as an issue of justice and morality—an argument made by Panama since the 1973 UNSC meeting. Latin America's Cold War: An International History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press.S. Robert A. Because of that. 1971). 2006). and Panama was able to take advantage of these changes to achieve many of its goals. However. Policy." Diplomatic History 27. and the Rise of the New Imperialism (New York: Metropolitan Books.S. Peter H. 32 . Lars Schoultz. policies. Talons of the Eagle : Dynamics of U. The Latin American Policy of the United States : An Historical Interpretation (New York: Norton. drug trafficking was a concern to both the United States and Colombia. It never ceased to be important. 2000). and the FARC were then in de facto control in much of the national territory. as well as the actors involved. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America.
Schoultz. Russell Crandall. U. Martin's Press. Gunboat Democracy : U. Walter LaFeber. Abraham F. see Abraham F. Departamento de Ciencia Política-CESO. Kyle Longley. Exiting the Whirlpool : U. "Review: Explaining U. 4 (2008). Factores." Foreign Policy 2 (1971): pp. In the study of U. Pastor. Gilderhus.-Latin American Relations (New York: Praeger. 19 Paul Coe Clark. Field. 2009).: Brookings Institution Press. 1933-1956 : A Revisionist Look (Westport. and important figures in the region include Mario Rapoport. 11 Ibid. Stephanie G. A Hemisphere to Itself : A History of U. no. Bases Y Fundamentos De La Política Exterior De México (México. Política Exterior Colombiana : De La Subordinación a La Autonomía? (Bogotá. On Panama. Arlene B. 1985). 18 Carlos Escudé. no. Colombia : Política Exterior (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes. Inevitable Revolutions : The United States in Central America (New York: Norton. which at the graduate level is taught as a part of law.: Plaza y Valdés. "Latin American Foreign Policy Analysis: External Influences and Internal Circumstances." 13 Brands. 15 Rita Giacalone. policy towards Latin America. Colombia: Ediciones Uniandes : Tercer Mundo Editores. Policy toward the Caribbean Basin: Fixed and Emerging Images. and Panama (Lanham [Md. Keohane.S. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. no. Robert A. histories exist.5 This school was heavily influence by the “New Left” of William Appleman Williams." International Studies Review 10. For a counterpoint on this period in particular. The United States and Latin America after the Cold War (Cambridge. 16 These trends were noted by Abraham Lowenthal as far back as 1983.: Zed Books. the perspective often merged with dependency theory. Theodore J." in International Relations Theory and the Third World. 2000). Grenada. but there is no general text on foreign policy. 2005). D.C. 1 (1983). 2008). On Mexico see Rafael Velázquez Flores.-Latin American Relations. Andru’es Rivarola Puntigliano. eds. 1988). "Suspicious Minds: Recent Books on U." and "Bureaucratic" Perspectives." World Politics 38. there is more variety." Foreign Policy Analysis (2012). "Latin American Ir and the Primacy of Lo Práctico1. Atlantic Highlands. 1998). no. Kryzanek. 1990). Relaciones Internacionales Y Política Exterior De Colombia (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes. Walter LeFeber has been especially influential. The Obama Administration and the Americas : Agenda for Change (Washington. Lowenthal.S. 2001). The Second Century : U. "The Big Influence of Small Allies. 20 Robert O.S. 14 A partial exception in Portuguese-language works on Brazilian foreign policy. 9 There are myriad works within this school. and Laurence Whitehead. 2006). 33 . 3 (1978). Rodrigo Pardo and Juan Tokatlian. The United States and Somoza. Tickner. 17 An effort in the 1980s by the Programa de Estudios Conjuntos sobre las Relaciones Internacionales de América Latina (the Program for Joint Studies on Latin American International Relations) petered out quickly." Latin American Research Review 8.: Westview Press.. 4 (2008). "American Imperialism: The Worst Chapter in Almost Any Book. 10 Friedman. Jr. "Review: Explaining U.S. Pastor. "Research in Latin America and the Caribbean on International Relations and Foreign Policy: Some Impressions. 1983). Harry Drost (London.. 1982). The Sparrow and the Hawk : Costa Rica and the United States During the Rise of José Figueres (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. New York: Cambridge University Press. which emphasized economic aspects of empire.S. Policy toward the Caribbean Basin: Fixed and Emerging Images.. 8 For works within this school. Tickner. 1997). N." Latin American Research Review 18." Latin American Politics and Society 50.F. see Russell Crandall. 1992).S. Abraham F. Grandin. 3 (1973)." The American Historical Review 83. Colo.]: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.-Latin American Relations. Frank Niess. no. Gerhard Drekonja Kornat. Piccone. no.S.-Latin American Relations since 1889 (Wilmington. D. Interventions in the Dominican Republic.S. Lowenthal. Lowenthal. 2011). see Sandra Borda and Arlene B. Del: Scholarly Resources. 7 It is worth noting that even this dichotomy and its emphasis of U. Michal J. 6 For earlier reviews of the literature that used similar divisions. Robert A. Some with a broader focus include Mark T. "United States Policy toward Latin America: "Liberal. 162." "Radical. ed. On Colombia.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean (Boulder. ibid. political parties reflects that lack of attention to Latin American agency in the literature. trans.J. "An Introduction to Peripheral Realism and Its Implications for the Interstate System. 3 (1986).S. 12 Pastor. In Argentina. Neuman(New York: St. see James A. CT: Praeger.
"How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?. 29 An early look at this can be seen in Robert O. 1977).” Framing also has a connotation of positioning a policy in political posturing. greatly overstating U. Keohane and Joseph S." Foreign Policy Analysis 3. Rosati. Alternatives. no. 23 The landmark work on foreign policy analysis is Richard C. 1993). his claim is historically dubious. 32 Mintz.: 2010)." International Studies Quarterly 36.C. Allison. 27 In domestic politics. 24 Snyder and others. 26 For works that interrogate the complex question of framing. N. 1 (2007). 25 Alex Mintz. 1992). Hagan. "Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach. pp." 33 Houghton. David Patrick Houghton. 34 . "Explaining State Responses to International Change: The Structural Sources of Foreign Policy Rigidity and Change.S.J. pp. Internationally. 30 John Kingdon astutely notes in a domestic context that getting an issue defined as “a problem” is itself a significant political accomplishment and a necessary precursor to policy change.C. no. no. 2005).. no. 35 Very similar concepts to the idea of problem definition have been referred to by others as “framing” or “common knowledge. Jones. Without doubt. Livingston. 1984)." Synthese 135." 34 J. Robinson. Martin W. Munich. no. The “common knowledge” literature is more closely tied to negotiations. 1994).: Princeton University Press. ed. no." in American Political Science Association (Washington." Political Psychology 25.: Princeton University Press.J. Welch. Brown. Durant and Paul F. Alex Mintz and Steven B. 1 (1999). Diehl. Alternatives. Steven G. III(Columbia. N.21 Keohane gives no other justification for his exclusion. Foreign Policy Arena. Joe. Kingdon. "The Politics of International Agenda-Setting: Reagan and North-South Relations. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press.. 28 Here I use “type” in the sense of Alexander George’s work on typological theory. "Applied Decision Analysis: Utilizing Poliheuristic Theory to Explain and Predict Foreign Policy and National Security Decisions. N.S. Cooperation among Democracies : The European Influence on U. Nye. David Skidmore. power before World War I and underestimating British influence. "Agendas. Essence of Decision : Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little and Brown. Alex Mintz. and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton. 1 (2005). Gustavsson. III. 31 Certainly. (1970). Boettcher. 2 (2003). Welch.S. Agendas." International Studies Perspectives 6. and Public Policy: Lessons from the U. D. 2 (1989). and Sampson. some low-level changes might occur without high-level intervention. R. Dien Bien Phu. 1995). 3 (2004).J. David A. "Asymmetry and Agenda-Setting in Us-Latin American Relations: Rethinking the Origins of the Alliance for Progress. 2002). John W. Jerel A. "Applied Decision Analysis: Utilizing Poliheuristic Theory to Explain and Predict Foreign Policy and National Security Decisions. Foreign Policy Decision-Making Revisited (New York: Palgrave Macmillan. S. no. see William A." in Foreign Policy Restructuring. "Framing Effects in International Relations. "The Prospects for Prospect Theory: An Empirical Evaluation of International Relations Applications of Framing and Loss Aversion." Journal of Conflict Resolution 48. Foreign Policy.. Power and Interdependence : World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little. Redd. 204209. the most influential application of differing levels of analysis to a foreign policy problem is Graham T. 1 (2004)." American journal of international law The American journal of international law 64. the key works are Frank R. no. 161." Journal of Public Policy 9. no. Mintz and Redd. Analogies at War : Korea.: University of South Carolina Press. But the significant policy changes we are examining here will almost certainly need the involvement of top officials to make decisions. 36 D. Snyder and others. and not directly the Weberian notion of ideal types. 1971). Ibid. Yuen Foong Khong. In the case of South America. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton. Brown. 22 Thomas Risse-Kappen. Painful Choices : A Theory of Foreign Policy Change (Princeton." COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 34. D. "How Do Leaders Make Decisions?.: Princeton University Press. and Public Policies (Boston: Little. so I avoid it here. see Christopher Darnton. "The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the United States : A Latin American Nuclear Free Zone. Robert F. 3 (1992). "Framing Effects in International Relations.
Keeping Faith : Memoirs of a President (Toronto. 54 Jaén Suárez.S. "La Lucha De Omar Torrijos Por La Recuperación De La Integridad Nacional. 12. 51 Memorandum. 40 Jimmy Carter.” May 4. 2002). "Informe de la conversación. 2. AMREP. Panama Odyssey (Austin: University of Texas Press. Ward’s account of the meeting is much briefer and less passionate. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge. ch. but concurs with the basic points presented by Illueca. the first thing you have to do is make it a problem. n. pp. 58 Aquilino Boyd to JA Tack." Revista Lotería agosto-diciembre. and also in convincing senators concerned about the lack of democracy and political rights in Panama. "The United States and Central America: Interlocking Debates. 2011. New York: Bantam Books. 42 Author interview with Nicolás González Revilla. 161.S." International Organization 42. pp. Md. Putnam. 2004). 2005). 228-229. 176. pp. 5. “The first thing was to get them to consider that it was a problem.’ He was persuaded the only way to do that was to move the issue to the center of the world stage. 35 . pp.state. AMREP. 41 Author interview with Adolfo Ahumada. Folder no. 1118.” Jorden. 38 George and Bennett. Their support throughout the 1970s was crucial to Torrijos in his dealing with the U. 53 Torrijos made a similar point in a conversation with U. 55 Carlos Ozores. pp. Until very recently. FRUS 1969-1976. 2011. “NSSM 68 – Panama Canal. 1984). Omar Jaén Suárez. 03 (1988). 13. 177-178. “The general said he based his strategy on a ‘very simple principle.’ That was: ‘to resolve a problem. Robert D. 1972. 45 The premier historian of the treaty negotiations is without doubt Omar Jaén. Harold Karan Jacobson. Folder no. 1972. "Omar Torrijos Y Sus Proyecciones En La Política Internacional. n. saying. Robert A. no. Henry E. 46 Pastor." March 23. 26. 305-309 (1981).: MIT Press. Munck. David Ward. Michael Hogan. AMREP. 1118. Mass. Las Negociaciones De Los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979. 1972. Pastor. Las Negociaciones Sobre El Canal De Panamá : 19641970 (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma. New York Times. 1118.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d534 50 Tack to Anderson. Evans. letter. Las Negociaciones De Los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979.p. 2005). pp. Omar Jaén Suárez. Translation from Spanish. Exiting the Whirlpool. These same three leaders were highlighted in nearly all of my interviews with Panamanian policymakers. 1970. 2008). 57 Jorden. The Panama Canal in American Politics : Domestic Advocacy and the Evolution of Policy (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Kan. Torrijos also used similar language talking to a reporter in early 1975. Jaén Suárez. no. Putnam(Berkeley: University of California Press.p.” Qtd. pp. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." Jorge Illueca to JA Tack. They are essential reading. 1118.: Rowman and Littlefield. 1982). 1993)." in Rethinking Social Inquiry. 5. 7. 1985).37 Alexander L. Online: http://history. 1986). 56 Jorge Illueca. Folder no. diplomat William Jorden. "Tools for Qualitative Research. 49 Packard to Kissinger. March 29. Oct. they didn’t even think it was a problem. 43 Adam Clymer. 116-117. George D. Folder no. Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch : The Panama Canal Treaties and the Rise of the Right (Lawrence. Sec. ed. letter. 634-638. vol E-10. The Limits of Victory : The Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties (Ithaca. Translated from Spanish. N. 39 The cases included here are reduced versions of longer and more complete cases done as drafts for my dissertation. Gerardo L." in Double-Edged Diplomacy : International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. ed. J. 48 Juan Antonio Tack. but unfortunately are neither widely cited nor widely available in the United States.: Cornell University Press. pp. Panama City. 305-309 (1981). AMREP. Brady and David Collier(Lanham. executive. Jorden.” February 4." March 23. in “Panama’s leader hopeful on canal. no. Panama City. Translated from Spanish. 47 William J. 1972. September 20. George and Andrew Bennett. letter.: University Press of Kansas." Revista Lotería agosto-diciembre. whose three volumes carefully incorporate an impressive array of sources. Peter B. Las Negociaciones De Los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979 (Panamá: Autoridad del Canal de Panamá. 1975. December 7. 44 Clymer.Y. pp. and Robert D. 52 Interview with González Revilla. 11. 1972. Moffett. "Memorandum of Conversation: Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations. Copies of those are available upon request. September 27. pp.
“Panama SC Mtg Amb Scali Press Conf. n. pp.” August 10. 546.” March 20. Tack to U.N. 63 http://history. pp. 1973. RG59. n." Jorge Illueca to JA Tack. AMREP. chorus. Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad. Folder Negociacones 1973. Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Online: http://aad. RG59. 81 Manfredo to Tack. December 7. March 16. Russia Endorse Panama’s canal stand. “General Torrijos and Captain Villa.” NARA-ADA. Reference to this collection of U.archives. 11. Las Negociaciones De Los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979. 1973.state. Tack to Kurt Waldheim. pp. Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad.S. Las Negociaciones De Los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979. 1972. March 21. AMREP. Electronic Telegrams. 77 Speech of J. 28. "Memorandum. Online: http://aad. 1973. 8. 72 Scali to Rogers. Chi Ping Fei to J. Kent. 62 "U. 1973. 17. March 21." The New York Times.archives. 1973. Kissinger Telephone Conversations.state. 1969-1976. council decides to meet in Panama. 250. RG 59. RG59.S.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/d146 64 Eric Morgenthaler.state. no. Armitage and Herz to Bush. 1973. Henceforth. 1973. letter. “Panama SC meeting. 1973.N. 1973. “China. May 15. NARA-AAD. warns of UN veto on Panama issue. “UN panel sits in Panama today.” Washington Post.p. Sayre to State Department.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=147&dt=2472&dl=1345 68 Francis B. 4-5. NARA-AAD. Online: http://aad. Folder no. doc. pp. RG59.S. 82 Meeting request from John Scali. March 17. January 27..S. Delegation to State Department. 67 Rogers to Scali.” Washington Post. 247. pp. Security Council. no. 1-9. no. February 22. pp. FRUS 1969-1976. AMREP.d. 1-4. March 15.archives. Folder Negociacones 1973. online database referred to as DNSA. 1. 28. Kent. 66 Speech of Omar Torrijos at U. Jorden to Henry Kissinger. January 14. NARA-AAD. “UN Security Council in Panama – GOP preparations. Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad.A.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/d126. 1973. Digital National Security Archive. sec. AMREP.S. 1972. Security Council inaugural session. AMREP. Folder Consejo de Seguridad. 5. Quote from Richard Severo. 17.N.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=8048&dt=2472&dl=1345.S. will henceforth be referenced as NARA-AAD. 1973. no. doc. Assistant Secretary Charles Meyers said in early 1973 that agreement existed around “seven basic principles. Jaén Suárez. 1973.” March 21. Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. 1973. Central Foreign Policy Files. 70 U.archives. Online: http://aad. “Ref: Panama 1491. pp. AMREP. 5. 1973. Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad. March 15. FRUS.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=5529&dt=2472&dl=1345. March 20.” n. 69 “Proyecto de resolución revisado. 1973. Online: http://aad. “UN Security Council is meeting in Panama amid anti-U. 12. “Panama’s leader hits U. 1973. no. Online: http://aad. 16. RG59.N. vol. no. 195. 1972. Boyd to Brin. 1983. 61 J. section 15. telegrams from Record Group 59. Online: http://history.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=5321&dt=2472&dl=1345 73 Scali to Rogers. Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=729&dt=2472&dl=1345 74 Draft resolution submitted by the United States.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/d131 60 "Memorandum. Online: http://history. 1983. on Canal. 17. 1973. sec. 36 . NARA-ADA. pp. Tack.59 Rogers to all American Republic Posts.” Los Angeles Times. c. Security Council. published online by the NARA. 126. doc. 1973.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d562 79 U. 78 William J. vol. pp. 562.” Los Angeles Times. Folder Consejo de Seguridad. 546. AMREP. “For Ambassador Scali from the Secretary.” Charles Meyer to Demetrio Lakas.state. 75 Jorden. “Possible Security Council meeting in Panama. “UNSC meeting – Canal resolution. 1973. “U. “Possible SC meeting in Panama. NARA-AAD. in Marlise Simons. 8.d.” New York Times. section 15.” March 12. pp.” Wall Street Journal.archives. 131. “UN body ways Canal Zone stand. 1973. no. Sayre to State Department. November 23. 1-6. no. 1973. 65 Qtd. 10. vol E-10. 76 Speech by John Scali before the U.A. 1973. 1969-1976. RG59. January 1973. March 21.. tomo II." April 17. Online: http://history. 80 Jaén Suárez. AMREP. 1118. Simons.” March 14. 195-196.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=5324&dt=2472&dl=1345 71 Jorden.A. 1972. Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad.archives. FRUS. 33. 1973. AMREP.” October 3.” March 9. March 17.
569. 96 Interview with González Revilla. “Canal Treaty negotiations. NARA-AAD. no. 89 "Bunker Is Expected to Get Panama-Negotiations Post. Nixon’s only mentions of Panama in his memoirs mention the country in passing while talking about travels during his vice-presidency. Jorden. “Secretary’s conversation with Foreign Minister Tack.-Panama treaty negotiations: report on developments. pp. 88 Jorden.83 84 Jorden. 107 Interview with Ahumada. 1974. 109 "Minutes of the meetings on lands and waters. pp.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=124886&dt=2474&dl=1345 103 Jaén Suárez questions Jorden’s interpretation of the ties with Cuba being driven by Torrijos’ frustration with negotiations. however.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=301725&dt=2082&dl=1345 37 . Shortly after the signing of Tack-Kissinger. proposal does not show great differences. 105 Bunker to Kissinger.” March 20. “U. RG59. no. 100 Bell.S. agrees to yield sovereignty of canal to Panama. Online: http://aad. Online: http://aad. NARA-AAD. Online: http://aad. 206. 209. 4.” 94 Bell to Bunker. 92 Jaén Suárez writes. Las Negociaciones De Los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979.S. Others.S. Folder Negociaciones del nuevo tratado. RG59. 554. 104 María Mercedes de la Guardia de Corró. 1974. 1976. AMREP. “U. 256-260. Online: http://aad.S.. AMREP.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=50915&dt=2472&dl=1345 91 Jorden. “Message of congratulations from President Perez to President-elect Carter. 1974.” New York Times.archives. Las Negociaciones De Los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979. pp.archives. "Puntos fundamentales de la conversación de Rogers con Tack. 1973. RG59. 2. pp. 1-7. pp. Jorden. 206. “U. 1974. no.” November 11.” April 23." New York Times 1973. NARA-AAD. 99 Interview. 198-199. 10. including González Revilla. 1974. pp. 306.” November 7. 98 Jorden. 93 In a later NSC meeting. 111 Pérez to Carter. 1975. RG59. Online: http://aad. February 9. Folder Negociaciones 1973. 1974. Online: http://aad. pp. Colombia: Cargraphics. 87 Tack to Rogers.” August 1. “U.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=51979&dt=2474&dl=1345 101 For example. 546. “A comparison of the eight principles proposed by Tack with the U. pp. RG59.archives. 2. “Negotiation of Status of Forces Agreement. pp. Jorden to Kissinger. which was clearly frustrated with the pace of the canal talks. 90 Bennett (USUN) to Rogers.-Panama relations. 1974. Tack told a Danish diplomat he expected a treaty draft by September or October. Folder Negociacones 1973. transmitted in Pete Vaky to State Department.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=171119&dt=2474&dl=1345 106 Jorden. Las Negociaciones De Los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979. Interviews with Ahumada and Ardito Barletta. 1973. Ibid. n. A23. 281.archives. pp. NARA-AAD. May 21. 108 Interview with Ahumada. Kissinger referred to the principles as deliberately ambiguous “platitudes. AMREP. 328-329.” Jaén Suárez. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 546. pp. 219-222. Woolley. Daniels to Kissinger. Online: http://aad. made this connection. 86 Ricaurte Antonio Acheen." May 27. sec.. pp. NARA-AAD.archives.archives. NARA-AAD. pp. sec. pp. RG59. Washington Post. RG59. 2009).gov/aad/createpdf?rid=33742&dt=2474&dl=1345 97 “A campaign starts in Congress to keep control of Panama Canal.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=1382&dt=2474&dl=1345 95 David Binder. Jaén Suárez." May 3.-Panama treaty negoaitions (sic): Reports of chief negotiators’ session.” NARA-AAD. 102 Kissinger to Tack. Hasta La Última Gota: Gabriel Lewis Galindo (Cali. February 8.p.S. The American Presidency Project.” August 9. “Venezuelan: Canal a test for Carter.” New York Times. RG59. translated from Spanish by the author. It seems clear that the move was made in part to help Torrijos with the left.” January 24. 3. pp. NARA-AAD. he emphasizes that Torrijos had slowly built ties with Cuba since 1971 and had previously considered establishing relations. 1973. 277. 1975. “Secretarial message." Feb. 110 Jaén Suárez.” January 21. 268. Instead. 85 Richard Nixon: "Fourth Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy. 1973.
” August 11. 2002).D. 2004).. n. events mentioned place it in late 1976 or early 1977. Policy toward Colombia. 131. Driven by Drugs : U. 529. American Presidency Project. Sci. Military Engagement in Colombia. New York Times. Las Negociaciones De Los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979. 38 . DNSA. Fracasos Y Extravíos. pp. May 10. 139 Arlene Tickner. Jaén. Russell Crandall. Jorden. 153. Derek S. in Carter: “Digest of Other White House Announcements Week Ending Friday. 137 Dean A. “Consultations with SOUTHCOM. DDRS. “The Internationalization of Domestic Conflicts: A Comparative Study of Colombia. and he actively lobbied for Samper to step down. However. Palgrave. pp. 116 Sol M. AMREP. 173-175..edu/ws/?pid=7894. pp. New York Times. "Alternativas sobre duración y garantias de la neutralidad del canal." in Políticas Antidroga En Colombia: Éxitos. 157. Brown. 128 The text of the letter was printed in Graham Hovey. 140 Pastrana Arango and Gómez. Linowitz. 85. Martín. 1977. pp. March 9. Cook. 602-603. pp. 131. 119 Ricardo Bilonick qtd. no. 1977. “Carter draws the line in talks on canal. and González Revilla. La Palabra Bajo Fuego (Bogotá: Planeta. Alejandro Gaviria Uribe and Mejía Londoño(Bogotá. explanations of the origin of the proposal diverge.S. Borda. in de la Guardia de Corró.. 2011. 114 Carter. 89. 132 Pastrana played a role in bringing these tapes to light. see Jaén Suárez.S. Ch. pp.” New York Times. describe it as the result of more careful planning. see R. Diego García. Jaén Suárez.Political Science and Politics 45. ed.S.” June 1. Linowitz. Jorden.d. pp. 1977. pp. 126 Accounts of the lunch and Escobar’s proposal largely coincide." transcript. September 15.: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Driven by Drugs : U. 392-395. 4. ed.112 113 Carter. Colombia: Universidad de los Andes. Online: http://www. pp. 2005). as well as Panamanian interviewees. 1 (2012). pp. and Panama reach accord to transfer canal by 2000.. 135 Andrés Pastrana Arango and Camilo Gómez. 120 Jorden. 2009). Valencia Editores. 372-381. pp. Jaén Suárez." PS Polit. 1985). “U. 117 Carter to Torrijos. Rómulo Escobar Bethancourt. 8.ucsb. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan . Southern Command: General Charles E. May 1977.S. Folder Negociaciones 1973. 122 Ibid.p. Las Negociaciones De Los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979. with an emphasis on his role in it. ibid. pp. "Press release.S. Scherlen. pp. 115 Embassy of Panama. Policy toward Colombia (Boulder. pp. Jorden describes the demand as the product of a booze-fueled." n. 136 Sandra P. 366. 131 For full results at a province level. "Actores Violentos No Estatales Y Narcotráfico En Colombia. "Memorandum of conversation: second general meeting of the negotiators. El Salvador and Guatemala” (Ph. 101-106. pp. Linowitz. 154-155. 1977. 9. "U. AMREP. Royo. Panama. 121 Samuel Lewis Navarro would go on to become Panama’s vice-president. running-mate of Omar Torrijos’ son.23. pp. PS .” August 11.S. 1. 112. Interview with Samuel Lewis Navarro." February 9.” July 29. 134 For a recent assessment. 573-575. 59-61. Torrijos : Colonia Americana." in America's Viceroys : The Military and U. 138 Crandall. Also. Wilhelm and the Shaping of U. late-night bull session. pp. "The Never-Ending Drug War: Obstacles to Drug War Policy Termination. 129 Hovey. 123 Jorden gives an explanation of this “a-ha!” moment. Policy toward Colombia. Polit. 164-167. pp. 127 The meeting participants are listed.. 1997-2000. 1981). pp. 2011). 1998. Translation by author. 5. pp. Colo. with unfortunate mistakes and misspellings for the Panamanians.S. Though the document is not dated. pp. Translation from Spanish by author. pp. 671. 118 Ibid. 133 David Passage to Roberta Jacobson. 1977. pp. No! (Bogotá: C. Driven by Drugs : U. 125 Interviews with Ardito Barletta. no. The Making of a Public Man : A Memoir (Boston: Little. Panama City. and Catalina Arreaza. Crandall. Foreign Policy. 278-279.presidency. pp. Reveron(New York. Ahumada. 130 “Leftists and nationalist say Panama has made too many concessions. 1977. 124 This was General Dolvin. 257. Las Negociaciones De Los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 19701979. pp.
148 Eva Weigold. Archivo Presidencia de la República. (The Heritage Foundation). 40. see John P. 144 Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz. 75. Pastrana Arango and Gómez. Departamento de Ciencia Política-CESO.. carpeta Informe Conyuntura. Sweeney. Parade of Candidates I: Bedoya and Pastrana Representative Meet with A. March 11. see Oficina de Alto Comisionado para la Paz. Congress for aid to Colombia. 282-283. “Parade of Candidates 1: Bedoya and Pastrana. “Colombia rebels say own fighters killed 3. pp. Dirección Secretaria General. caja 43. pp. but to say he convinced the Colombians that they should involve the military against drug-trafficking ignores that Pastrana had already made that decision." March 26. 1998. 158 Phil Chicola. A10. 2011. 160 "Despacho de la Viceministra de América y Soberanía Territorial.A. Wilhelm was clearly an influential strategic voice and an advocate in the U. where nonpolicymakers often expressed their opinion that he had turned the country over to the FARC. though it is cited by everyone from Pastrana to UNICEF.” December 22." in Relaciones Internacionales Y Política Exterior De Colombia. pp. 163 Plan de Desarrollo Nacional.. 208. pp. For reactions from Colombia. 2004).R. “Tread cautiously in Colombia’s civil war. 150 ibid. Also. it is clear that the movement had a large impact on the tenor of the secondround campaign. 151 Pastrana Arango and Gómez. "Informe semanal de coyuntura.141 Given that this would represent nearly everyone who voted. 31. 1998-1999. 45-52. "La Política Exterior De La Administración Pastrana (1998-2002). 153 “Read-ahead for July 30. 149 Guillermo Fernández de Soto. 34-35. during the pre-inaugural visit. 93. ff.” n. 162-167. 147 Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz. 162 Interview with Jaime Ruiz. 157 Diego Cardona. 76-77. 40. However. pp. 122123. APA 1999. caja 3. pp. However. DNSA 154 Dean A. Memoria al Congreso Nacional. pp.S.d. 155 For the original report. Universidad Nacional Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales(Bogotá: Editorial Planeta Colombiana.org/research/reports/1999/03/tread-cautiously-in-colombiascivil-war. 39 . we have clearly seen that Pastrana and his advisors emphasized the role of the military during the presidential campaign. 152 Ibid.” April 6. 15-11 156 Diana Marcela Rojas Rivera and Adolfo León Atehortúa Cruz. 1999. and immediately after his August 1998 inauguration. 1998. pp. Online: http://www. “Pastrana breakfast and Colombia bilateral. interviews with Fernández de Soto and Ruiz. 1998 meeting with U. Tickner(Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes. DNSA.heritage.d.S.” New York Times." pp. pp.” March 26. pp. especially in the Colombian military. 93-95. La Ilusión Posible : Un Testimonio Sobre La Política Exterior Colombiana (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma. 1999. 120-123. 145 It is worth noting that they also had many detractors in Colombia. 142 Eva Weingold. "El Momento de la Paz. Alto Comisionado para la Paz. Archivo Presidencia de la República. 161 Kamman. ed. 146 Pastrana Arango and Gómez. pp.. 134-135. 164 This point was made repeatedly in interviews with members of Pastrana’s cabinet. The ultimate failure of these two policies has left Pastrana with a rather unpopular legacy in Colombia. 2001). APA 1998.. 1998). Sandra Borda and Arlene B. carpeta Directivos Presidenciales. (DNSA. 1999. DNSA. 2011). “Memorandum of conversation between USG representatives and representatives of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Pastrana Arango and Gómez. ed. 143 Pastrana Arango and Gómez. the total is dubious. "Ecos Del Proceso De Paz Y El Plan Colombia En La Prensa Norteamericana. pp." Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. 159 Pastrana Arango and Gómez. pp." in El Plan Colombia Y La Internacionalización Del Conflicto. pp.” n. Cook writes that SOUTHCOM Commander Charles Wilhelm pushed the Colombian military to take a larger role in attacking drug trafficking during Samper’s final year in the presidency. 1998. DNSA. 397-401. 187-188. Cook also says that Wilhelm met with Pastrana in September 1998 to convince the Colombian president that military pressure needed to be part of the peace process. pp. "El Momento de la Paz" October 22. embassy Bogota deputy chief mission.
176 “Read-ahead for September 24. 171 Larry Rohter and Christopher S. for example. "Informe confidencial: Dinámica del conflicto armado y las manifestaciones de violencia en el primer año de vigencia de la zona de distensión. 40 . 170 Ramírez recounted the meeting during an interview. 2003). caja 43.” written for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy." Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores.com/especiales/no-plan/37934-3. DNSA. 118. U. pp. Pastrana Arango and Gómez. Translated by author. See. 173 Pastrana Arango and Gómez. Plan Colombia. carpeta Informe Conyuntura II 99. Pickering." November 18. but his account squares closely with others’. 168 Pastrana used this phrase many times. pp. the “Comité interinstitucional. 118. 1999 Principal’s Committee meeting on Colombia. 1999. "Anatomy of Plan Colombia. The United States and Colombia : The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity (Carlisle Barracks.” July 17.” August 23. 1999-2000. 202-203. pp. DNSA. 1999. pp. "Subdirección de Estados Unidos y Canadá. Archivo Presidencia de la República. with the exception of McCaffrey’s exclamation. 1999. Memoria al Congreso Nacional. 71.S.S. APA 1999. starting in late 1998.” Pickering. 353.aspx 169 One of the most complete records of violence is available in Oficina de Alto Comisionado para la Paz. 1999 Principal’s Committee meeting on Colombia. Guillermo Fernández de Soto. official proposes $1 billion for Colombia drug war. 174 Ibid. Army War College. 118. pp." The American Interest2009. Alto Comisionado para la Paz. “U. Published sources also mention these individuals as the key Colombian figures in the development on Plan Colombia.. 22-1. pp. n.p. See Gabriel Marcella. Wren.165 This is quite clear from the archives of the entity Plan Colombia and the notes from consultative-group meetings it held throughout late 1998 and 1999. pp. Semana. writing. caja 1. and Luis Fernando Ramírez.semana. 175 Thomas Pickering made this point independently. 166 Author interviews with Jaime Ruiz. Thomas R. New York Times. 1999. which was recounted in English. 172 Pickering. See “No hay Plan B. PA: Strategic Studies Institute.” APA 1999. Online: http://www. and other folders for that entity. September 22. September 22.” written for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. located in APA 1999 in the Archivo de la Presidencia. 39. ff. Archivo Presidencia de la República. carpeta Alto Comisionado para la Paz. 1999.. pp. 167 Pastrana Arango and Gómez. A7. Also see “Read-ahead for September 24. “We understood that the drug problem and Colombia’s internal decay were intimately connected … So we were mindful in shaping the policy that support for its drug-related aspects would have to be leveraged to accomplish more than met the Hill’s eye. He was asked about the phrase at length in interview with Semana.
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