TOP SJi:CRET Attaclled is .n translation of a r~ort by Lt. LUDWIG Chi stelle of 013.d.L: lR~f.

13) based on questions set for him at ADI(X). The repo:rt ' covers anawer'e on the follo\,rinc a) The Die-ppe raid. b) Warnin[,;sof major operations (ArnhemJ etc ..). subjects :-

c) Organisation of Referat


d) Interception of weather and exploitation. (Husum, W 22) Organisa.tion of Borriber Gode Work.


e) Ground nets British

in Britain.

Machrirre (513) Syko

4- Z (General recyphe:~·') (S:J''.lth and west)
(i'iied. and West) . Slidex Exeroise Sp-U··C.D~1 ~eports of ~dr. d. NA 5~ I'd 209 (9th p.J.r Force T:coop Ca~"j:iel"


8th Fi~hter OOJ1UiID.nd (65 and. 67 v,;) Delays in decodinG.


f) Call-sign

systems of the .Allies.

British D.D.3

No. of pages:


U.S. OP-20(-~ (2) (Via Lt.OClr.Mnnson) G-2 Vla. Lt.Col. Hille~) A:S.A. (3) (Via Major Seaman)
Di. "!'eo+oz-, S. I • D. T]sFET


D.D. (N.S.) D.D. (M.W.) D.D. (A.S.) r::.C.R. (2) Lt.Ool. Leathem
Cdr. Tandy M.a,jor Morgan

(vin Lt.Col. Johnson) Col. Lewis Powell, USSThF

S.A.o. ~3 Cdr. Bacon Lt.CoL Johnson Major Seaman

AMi. tiono.l ii-D. (VI.T.e.)

Lt.Cdr. Monson Major Cowan Lt. Few,. Tioom Files (4)

S.A.C. fo~ Sigs. 5, Iiinis try . G/Capt. Felkin, i•• D.r. (K)




DoD.5. Dm • .4-


DoDo, (MoW.

D.D. (N.


D.D.(A.S. Lt. 001. Leathem
Major Morean


ap.--2()"G(2) (via Lt. Cdr. Manson) G-2 (via Lt. Gol. Rilles) A.S."~. (3) (via Major Seaman) Director; S.I.D. USFET (via Lt. 001. Jol.nson) Col. Lew-:Ls Powell, USSTAF


Miss Mortimer (2)
ADDITION AL Chairman S.A.C. (2) Cdr. Bacon Lt. Col • .Johnson NJajor Lt. Manaon Cap-t. Cowan Lt-. Fehl A.D.(W.T.O~) S.A.C. for 5, Air Ministry q/oapt. FeU::in~ A.D. I. (K). ..



File~ (2)

Monitoring on the Landing near DIEP.E'E on 19.8.19~.2by the German Sir;int.

I. Introductio~

When the oirtncr was transferred .in April, 1942, to Section B at ASNIER:ES near PARIS, he received there the or-der to evaluate the wiroless traffic of the RAF Army Cooperation Comnand- As only a fe...-., flying fo~tions wer-e subordinate to this Comnnnd (Close Roconnal.SSance aircroi't in 32,33,34,35,36,37 and 39 Wings, Trans~ort formations in 38 Wing - later 38 G.roup - and Specw1 formations such as Anti-Aircraft Go~uporation Units under South Farnborough)tbe mOllitor:ip.g hcought little result. The Ground ..,virr"lf~ss networks were t1:l.'~ basis of the monitoring.
On the Gtl10r hand, a sys+emat Lc attempt was made to clarify the aiL' support w]XO:.'JdS t;:a:ffic, which had appear-ed durinc; ccmtrincd exez-oLaea of the Air Force and Army in Great Britain" in co-oper-at Lon with the Arnry (Sigmt Evaluation Station 5). In this connection the following (amongst othcJ.~things) W'11;:> cloJccrminedafter a comparatdveIy short

1) Jtr:my Exercises fairly st:cong urri.ts of Fighter Command, also elements of tho 2nd Dorriber C-"rOUD of Bomber Oonmandappeared in addition to the weak: fo;oe~ of the A.C. Command. From this it was ooncluded that iJ l the event of Invasion available foroes of Fighter GUHllnaJ.1.d D.n.:l thG 2n,:.,j. Bomber Group woul.d ~upp~rt the Anny, and not J h~' l~1..i.[!;ht have been expected an vaew of reports in the R-~;'-\'3. on the Radio, and from Agents, reserve forces of A.l;g '(>1::e'Luo'Lda'bed in all

2) The tactic's

of Army .... Air oo-operation details J for instanoe


a) Dut ies and wireless links of tho Army Air Support Controls (AASC). b .)Dut ies of the .Air Support Ldrika , c Duties of the Tentacles. ) .. Freq,uoncy Bands used. d Call si@1.usage. ~ Procedure and form f of 01 . R . 0 repor t s, ;from tho report s ose .ecce a:J..rcraft or the request by the Tentacles for Air suppo rt through the Oper,.tionE" Ord t .... or-s up 0 Victory report ..~ g Abbreviations. • h ~ Reporting Grid used.



3) From plain Language FJlCSsagcs nWllerous unit designations and locations were recognised, e. g. :the 38 Wing ,-nth 295, 296 and 297 Squadrons, the indiviaual Wing H.Q. '5 etc. 2nd Bomber Group, 88, 226 Sq., 40d, 414, Tact/Reece Sq. were particularly often named, Especi~.nY many Pl.aiIl: Language dat a al':aYs aPJ?e:.rr d at the end of the EXercises (.Tuesday Uil!I?JIes Conference in the nq of the .34 Wing etc). The Umpire Nc'{;i.vorl<:swere also vcry inf'ormative. The importance of thi.s branch of cur vrork ,rap. quickly :t':Joognised and a company (9/3) was detailed to conc'3~t'tate 0:1. monitoring these e:x:erCiG(~2, Thif; nunbcr of exercises monitored was very rarge, on f,lC:v'cral occasions excoed lng 100 a month. The co-operation with the Army Sigint was very close and .... s further a strengthened by an exchange of liaison officers.



The follo'riinr: E(~«(;:t'cd 3Ci-l~ wnf.oh wer-e very closely monitored and pr-cduoert many rerfult::;; are still in my nririd Exercise Exercise Exercise !TTIG-ERIT South East En:::L'.Dc.L, Spring 1942. in 11 LIMBER 11 in East Engl.and; somewhat; later. ITDRYSHOT" West Scotland or North West in EnglanD., shortly before DIFJ:'}?E.

The and immediate evaluation of the r-ecues't s by the Tentacles for air support was regardej. as particularly iu!portant, these, as far <loS can be recalled, took place in the follmrinz f'crm :L

AC~Many tanks at V 1980 (Desc;ripti,~:l of tar;""'p.:;)" 1 Sq. Fighter (Operational St!'Gngth vw.nt~G.' ~ IISP (.As so~n as fossi~le). (De.'S:l.r~d T~e 01.' '_,:.)(:)~a·'-·:c1t.' ... : Not N of r~ver Spoc~aJ_ ll1struot~ons an orc.:..,~;;.' v" E) Heavy IIJ.. (Defence to be expected). F) 1245. (Time of origin) ..



avoid attacks

on own



When the ~18.n~i~gJ ncar- DIEPPE took place in August 191f-2~ ~~.e;L:G haC!- ex~ell~nt wor~ing materi&_ at its spO",<w- '.7LU oh ,·ias n~ an t ~G of need roo t . , b~ 1 and m.loseu."cmtl' . ...' .·,··oJ. S - Va..Lua e _~_;-~LGOl:\plcL,ely Just~f~ed the enploYJ!\ent of ~h0 forces wh~.9h had hitherto monitored the. . ~ Great Britain. e:x:erc~ses II.

:0 G~~a_n.

The Landing ncar

DI&P.PE on


The PFwara.tions for the 1· . din ( cE1bDXkat~ons et"') , .:J th . ~ ane; "",.,. e !1pp'!:oach of th Landd ."up b-y thcG<i'rman S' , andine: floet wer-e not picked ~gl.n .-


Against that the ,fireless traff' . . . lC ,!h~(1h began at the cornmcncer'lcnt of th 1 wa al C tUIldinr;, bc.oi;.h tho nrmy and by the air force J. •S IllOS COlTmlc'" .. -.... ce l' 'J..ncercc.--p-tcd. .)T The follo1r.Lng . . . • ?J.roumatancGs preyed to be favourable for the ,,_,_ c ~~ .SJ.gJ.nt : U'O.i.~Il!Clll

-5TOP SIDRET 1) The intercep'c cOIiIpany (9/3) rosponsible for the moni.toro.nn of Land.Lnz traffio was favourably situo.ted in DEAUVII.J:.,E disposed of good line connections ,cith the German, fight~r defence and also ,vith the army forcesresportsible for defence against the landing.
2) The "fireless traffic during tl1C landing was largely carried out on nava.L froCl,uencic:)Fl (t'Qv_gh1y ;i.n 2:000 kc. Band), wh Lch ",_t ·j-.l1e"t tiJ!le wer-e -,)':~_',~.;~; :..ontinuously monitored. by t.he ;J:)'~10 (',,)l!1pany :i:r.. '.)rl\~.t· + o deternU11.C convoy sohc0.11.128.SOil :(·'.:::80UO inairlL.'J1;c· e+c, For this reason the h:±,orh1.T1CO of the ':CGCU,!.':l:'cnc.o we.s
ii"TIfficdiately rCcoE)":ie 00.,

3) Tho C:: of +ho (}om:x'~JT; +ho yd;cc]_(",ss operators and the eva.Luator-o (_,:C' 9,:) j~t;_s:iJo;:,p'~. uf L'cns~Ld.crab~eexperience relative to a~_l ,ict"tilH of t:ne y;-::":'clL~ss traffic after monitorin,3; the c7:E'~cises in Grc;,j,; I,:r.~cll~_n? as de acr-fbed t above,

4) By contmuous oorrbaon "ith -i::l1ce rmy an interpretation a of the ccver' names appoar-Lng (e.g. [-;:£'ecn Peter, red Peter etc.) Vlas quickly arrived at from the knowledge of our own si tuat ion.

5) The COCompanyof 9/3 rcaL:i..8G(l. t~1at the j.nlportcmt reports were to 1)0 tr an Sll1it icd ,firR":; to the fig.t'1.t:Lng troops of the army and to the ai:r- fL:':DE: for ::_'-::,lllnC!.iate evaluat ion, As the avaa.LabLe m-a.-::"'':'.'ltion 1)8;~;:;'-.:1'.":Jl and the line connections rrer-e not s'i.1.ffiG~.ent ~.,-'_-':'\:..i ~l'F' higher HQ\s simul t aneous.Ly as woE. (I,uftflot-c'_ .,; ;~YL..L Section B for GAFbps. Staff) he (!nnscious],y ~'t',;,:}'.m·~.)d'::::")8 risk of any blame from those HQ' 0'3: He SUbS;Cj1h3il"t\sr fO-,U1.d c approval of this act Lon,


Immedd atie oval uation for Fighter and ltrmy form..'ltions" Reports to the hiehec_':HQ's •


.As fur :J.~ I OCl.l1. romornb(;r the foliouir.r,· YT"crc:1oQlirk.c . were moru.t r-cd with good results o duri;:;'". "the l~~r:;,...r.c ' ~""O"

1 ) Links between the HG Shid ". ) ps 3.1"} Grc.:at BrJ_b_:m (PORTSMOUTH)' 2 Th:l1c b. '\ -,- _:.s e v we en the: una ts. la ..... c...y,d ~""e HQSh;ps d·:;:,l "D:'O"(; .- _1' . -• 3 J .P.- -_~ • d Ol!1ount of' purely ",a d": c~ '-'1'-' , 4) V{i:Lclcss;' '_'t;1C .,,~ : ~ r o:<'-' ,r "c.OJ " J. 1.;rd1(:" ~ , _c, ot 'i 5) l!hrcloss traf''''.., or the Sea ROSCl1.UL~.~v__ 1u. .. r J.G Sorvico
-l-,_ , ".
T a,








The b9st information was in t,he plain w'ireless meaaazcs of the units whioh had land0d~ . Fret ._1.,11 nor-at.Lon, the arn, J.~ these raports tho oour so 0 f th' U 01" partiru. succcsses , tho difficul tics encoUJ.1tercd m;d TOl1ards m],dd~ f";n-' ly t.ho "ri thdrawal were apparcmt. ... ~u..l ......• is fi htJ.ncr the r-equcaba for all' Stlpport by the ar::ny. UlU. g. '-" on land became ever more urgent. .,The SJ.uatl.on thu~ t recognised. in the individual sectors was fully explOJ.ted by the GGnflan conunanders.
C> .


Exaot dotalls of :iJI!pendingRAF operations were repcatealy given by the aircrntt control station in roughly the i'ollovdng form :""', tf2 Squadrons Fighter ana 1 Squadron Bomber will attack BISlvUrn.OK at ...... 0' clock" (BISMAROK cover name for a fortification, ~ these cover names wore soon elucidated).
SUch reports wez-e almost without delay phoned through to the Fighter Controls (JAFUES) and enabled them to employ the German fighter formations" to the best possible advantage~

before the operatioI1 because there would not be time fOl~thc opponent to take counter moasur'es , was disproved on many occas Lona at DIEFPE. UI. Evaluation of the DIEPPEE.x;pericnceSt

The widely hela 0pinion that urgent wireless messages coula \l1-lito happily be sent in plain language shbrUy

The succeaaes of Sigint brought it very mioh praise from the higher oornnands J amongst other from, the O. in C of the Fleet and from the Army. bWing to im.E.rudenae" the Public was also made aware of +haso successes. Wireless messages were publishod in tho Press~ Evc~ ReiohsmarslwJ.l Gooring mentioned these rmesazcs in a speech. The improved camouflage of vnrelcss traffic in the exercises carried out in Great Britain after DIEPPE is appartmtly to be traced back to this pUblicity.
_ i. U

For tho GAFSigint were drm,m ;1) The line

the following

final conclusions

connections had to be further doveloped as quickly as possible. 2) D:oase line connections should fail, links had to bo weLL praotised. 3) Tho m~nito::ing of wirelcss trai'fio illJring the excrot.scs ~n Great Britain had to be further strengthened sinoe this monitoring represented tho best training for a now landin~ to be expected later. 4-) O\;r ~ D/F base had to be £qrtheI' developed Sl.nce ~t had shown itself insufr1ci~t duri~ DIEPPE.


I.,: Adv8l1.CO Wnrninp;s and JUror aft Route Traokina by SIGJNT. f.agc No:

II R.AF Bomber Cor.nrnand. III 8th US Air Force.


8 ... 12 12 .. 14

IV MediumBomber Formations. V Prediction VI Prediction VIr VIII of the Invasion. of allied offensives. of Air

15 - 18
18 - 20
20 ...

Advance warnines on the basis Support wireless traffic. Predict ion of Air LandinE};;.


24 - 26



On the outbrca."k.of ;vBX' H was considered that the possibili tics of Sigint wer-e limited to determining the Order of Battle and strength of the enemy. ~ Dccomber, 1939, a fairly largo Welling;ton fOrIiJ£\.t~on of the R.A.F. n.ttcl"rtptcd 11 day attaok on north German territory. Its vril.~elesstraffic was intercopted wad evaluated and the results (locations, heights) ....... er0 immediatelj and diroctly reported to the Germa,nfighter defence, partially contravening existing regulations. On the basis of those reports a Fightcr Gcschwader waa enabled to take off in good tirne and to attack the ·r':>rmnt~.Ql1.:f'r01l1. favo·.. rrablo firing positions vlith great suoecss, the development of ('.o .•opcrc.tion between tho Sie;i.nt intoroept station~ and the flying fonnations \113.0 regularly urged 0spccially by the younger men, These exertions CSJ"noup o..eainst numerous diffioultics .. lack of understanding of buroauarn.ti.cally minded higher a.uthorities who did not want to be diverted from ro~tinc~ to~ stri~t D.T,l int~rJ?reta;tion of t.h£ secrecy rogulnt:l..Ons \ behind Which l.neff~mQncy waa often, trom .those who wanted to hinder direct QOoooperation with":i.n,g fonnat ions and so on.
~]il(;dia"\;c ;)valu&tion ~U1il the forming of d:ircct

After this

convincing success,

Gra.dually, ~,.~ ~·men got their own ..,"iay. So call~ 1'a<lPQl' Oenl:'GB'" were ~'tuaJ.ll pt UPJ
1theso oolleotoa tho PEiperhil frfSn tho Ukt:~ .tAt¥»'ut. evaluated thl.J:n and !aSSed bhem on in a suitable atyle to the formations. Reportin.~. Contra BJRK (( Fighters» Reporting Centro I ( ). '



In the course of tho yeElXs as the Garnlan defc:r:c? ~ot weaker and the Allied Air Force stronger, the [lct1.v:J. h.BS of tho rcp::>rting centres became all the mor-e irnportant especially in re specf of :

1) Advance warninee for our own defonce, the . civilian population, the army and the ra~lvmys. 2) Aircraft route tracki.QB. for own fightor defence. Short term advance warrri.ngs were r;ivon a few hours oraven minutes before the attac.lcs.. Long term predictions of larger allied operations - for instance, the Invasion or the AACHEN offensive - were passed by the strategic evaluation of Section B or by 25/351 (previously W. Control ((W.LEI~)) 3 and 14/3). The strategic evaluators had acquired in the course of tir:J.e such a good specialist lcnO\71ear;e allied wireless traffic of that they were often able to enemy intentions from the slightest indications. The various possibilities of advance warnings and. a:ircX'~tt. "route tracking arc describod below, in so far as they can be rei;}cmbored. It is pointed out that the author ~as not a ffyccialist for heavy bomber units, the details of the RAP Bomber C01i"UIIDnd and tho 8th Air For-ce arc therofore fragrnento..ry. II..
JL"I..F Bomber


and aircraft


tracking. As long as the author vras S1;"ationcd in the West (April 194-2 .. March 1945) there wer-e always possibilities for advance warnings. For sour-ces of Lnf'o.rmatzi.on y,hich ariod up thero .... zero u-sually new ones found after a short timc~ . J?o.rticular, I remember the follOlving poss~b~l~tl.esfar advance warning and aircraft route tracking :


1) ill in Great Britain occupied by Ril.F B~mb~rswere m~rutored oontinuously day and night. The o.ll'f~e~d trai'fw produced many indications of impending opcrat)J.ons, e~g. fr~mt:mine traf'fic" wireless s fl.enoe etc. 2 From the mom.torme; of \T.i.reloss traffic on short waves (6~O~cs. freq_uencies and later also airfield ~req_ucr:el.Csan the band above 5000 kcs ) operational. l...l1tcntl.ons'V~C currGn~ly recognised, e.g. moves fonlard before cpor-at.Lons tclcJ.l1e""off traffic, , etc., . 3) From weatiher- reports it •.rns often known ..... /hether a take O)ff r::ou the B~mber airfields .,;/as possible or not 4- "- Tunine 'traf'fl.c of the D/F sections before opcra;ions of Bomcer ommand, c 5) Tuning truffic of Sea Rescue Boats before operations of BoIIibcrConmand (for a 'Long trimo it was a sure indication later it diso..ppeared).





6) InLrc'-''Dtio~ r.nd r/v::.... of liP s'"t s (Gc;r:::l.'U'; ·1: .L • +h b ,.I. ., ,..s 1 cov[;r n:::.B(; ~ .. :}.;,-:_]jCC.-:E, for tc or.,"; .... l!1(., u. v .... " •. v_' for no.v<'.l'1ct.. -,n:.rni.."1 r- l'..!'.d ,dIel' It l"ouh. tr.:>.Cl.m::;). 7) Intcrc...;:ptio~ .mel D/Firl._, '!' Eottl-_' :+0' s~·ts (G<.:r;.,:.n cover n[<,.~U Idt.:r: 4wlf3fROSCH ~..J.Or ~) . 8) Interoeption D/:'ill:'; of thv lirul 3.' tr :.ffJ.C. (rifT) of 3ll1l:1u 'ooircr.'1i't, C.f.. ropo'to th ... thl.! opcr tJ.O.l t 'ilould. have to be brol:c.:n off a;ri!'.~ to on,:?-nu trcublc, SOS ru.t?Ort3, C!'r,lC:l.'e~ncy D/Fin::.;. 9) Wirvlos:J ord .... frotl Hll's to inc1ivi r-s .1 01' :.11 fon1t~tionn of tho (:roup oPlJr::..tin;~. c. S. to brl".;:k off' th opLr:'.tion (lllO:rtly encoded in. ~or:U:Jo.,:r Code.). . 10) Th.:! ilppC{Tl\I\CU of U:lcort Dl.rZ lell r,; rI n....,: nJ.,sht fif_;htcrn of 100 Grml11. Intl:rc,-,ption and nili'm£; of th IlWO.:\]!on" 'Ni[)lt fichtul' Sear-ch s(;to. Zincc tho <..:ocorti.':l.[; f ight on: £:CnQr~Q1y k0pt close.: to th ....ijor:llC1" ot!·" •.._., , thoSQ D/F 1-05\11ts pl'odUCucl "l)l)roJCil,lD.tuly the flY1!l ': routo of tho bOlibcr strefJj,l. 11) Dron.cloast::J of tho nircrni't l'oportint:; cc.ntr of tho ,· ...L.F. (cover nano - J!1lliISClIUETZreports). ...E Locr..tion of' this tro.llsnittcr nour London, call 8i[,n 0.58. 'i."n:a viroless station uorl~cd on aovcr'a.L froqucnci(;5 (nho::-t ~.!::i lon£ 'Have) and uppur-crrt'Ly infol'ucd by bronucn.stn dl inturel3tl.o. sta.tions concorning inpondin..:; fli.:;hts of' individur:l uircrd't or yrh.olc fonllations. Those rcpo!"tz vrcrc ~vun in 3. 3-Lottcr Code, the decyphcrin::; of' \;" ic:, 17M ".lorked at in vain. The lo..recr the fon,lll.tion announced and tho longor its pl~od flyin[; route, eo nuch Longer wer-e tho moasngcs concerned. The 10:-'.( t reports ';lcre accordingly produced by raids of tl1,() 8th
AirF'orc(; and RiI.F Bomber Cou:lD.nd. Fror.l th ... lcn[th of the J::LCGSn.gC and a fc\7 othor points YThichI ocnnct l} . J ~ l' it HLS possible to rocognize vrithout d,-,(;yphcrin:~ lh..... r J th for instnnce, a larr;e It. A. F. Oporn t ion vms to be "-"q1 otcd in the comine ni:,,)l.t or not. If the in.rc..loss statio i:Jsucd. one or mor-e pnrticulorly Ion,: m\Js!J:'~c;s lC'.t i. t 1(; nftc;rnoon, n.nd if those i-:1USSo't?:t,;c, rT0r<.l \t~l.' l'~_'C t~d by 0. L Yril"l,;lcss Btntion ncfl.t' PIJUS (pr<..;uU!i1. bl - rd.J:c::: t r .... ortin. ... ccrrtzo FRANCE) for tho infoI'lLJ:l.t;i.on f fOl.T:.tions Dt tioncd in F::CUlCC ( right i'irptQl'o and. A.J.. ?). t.hc then ",ppt\X'ant : a) " fnirly If'l::~~ IU.F O*}\.,lOO tion n. a 11 nL. If a dc"tcriorll.tion of tho lj(J th r .r.... o1'f of th~ ru.r bor ;):j"ro 11 )00 1")1", t tho::" t. tl a r .... >cctivv L' ~ w" -rcr.... I". lioitly c cW.1J (crncv,i. I~r ... 1..3S :;_, nco •••• ), the .tOn n .... 'int ... j_ nl'_'Jlcd to -it ru:o:.1 . _'r\;dicloio 0.. in ir-r i...
iSSll .....

b) Tho np£I:t'oach f1ic:ht





c..'JC1'X.ot over


12) ~;;_.; .... Cover 1 '~ Tl
= \7ild c_2:"~~



TOP SECRET m1anat io.n target no- 67 rooyphared. dotails of pesition of aircrnft vessell number of hostile, f friendly, details-of height in oourse, ?-g. or format loon air'craft vm x :: wUcno angels

t 67 ••• ps ••• m 8012 , ••.



...' ••• .




a8 .. '.' •• ,

kind had be~n continuously

of tho invasion, rG'Ports of this intorcG~ted. Generally, only Gdr'illan aircraft wore repo.:ctecl; allied aircraft only on theroturn flight from operations. After a fa~rly short time most of such traffic disappeared agaa.n , apparently because the reports were sent over line cOIIDcctions completed in the mcantilllP. From a date whioh I can no lo.nger romm.ib or exactly, ro.ughly AutUiTLl11944, an ilrrrerioan wireless station i.n Frru."lCO, wha ch seemed to. be.Long to the 9th Air Force (I cannot reoall the call-sign) rc:gorted the Allied formations flying tOW'ards the East alSo.. Thereby Sigillt acquired. a new and. very reliable moans for advance warnings 'which "VIaS especially :url.portant fer a timely interception of RAP night attacks.
The locations first reported were e;onerally in the area .Al'iiTI:NS-ABBEVILLE, tho last ones just in front of the German frontier. In so far as the GermruJ. nirr,ht fighters were able to achieve filly suocesses in the last months of the war, not the least reason for these VIas that a timely take-off and correot control of the night-fi[,;htcrs was made possible through the pioking up of the report d.escribed above.

SinOG the beginning





Some of the j2JlllJli.ngaircra.ft remained over the North Sea err tho Netherlands-Belgium area and others flew with formations. Their appearance WaSt it is true not a sure indicatio.n of impending RAF operation. Co~versely it oou~d not be slUcl that no RAF operation took plaoe '7ithout a s~ultm;caus operation of jar:1Lling aircraft of 100 Group and th~t an the absonoo of these j3.I:iiling aircrai't a lare;o opcratl.on 1:7&13 not yet under- '{ray,.


14) Interc;::ption

I-----·-w·~~· ~~~~

una. D!Fin,z of the of bOMburs_

WiT and R/T wtrel~

In oontr::o:st to the VIII US Borciber Commandthe RAF B~r.lbGrswere v~ry cautious in the Tray in which they handled wU'?less ItrafflC. Ocoasionally, howcvcr , reports to ~~;~ dHQ S VTorOnocceeary, and these ware intercepted and v e on eyery ocoasion. In so far as BIT traf'fio h as that ~f the ... Master of Cero:.nonics or the 11aster BO:~~r was cm;rlod ouc on short wave (6440 lees) or ultra short ;mve, It ,laSau db' also interccmtod. No sp eCl . al SUCCesses Vlare h01i1CVr....... . ~ ..... pro co , y :Lt. '



Intorc~~tion of tho Bema Direction ( Cover name RODEL13AHN).


J Beam

The do+ermarung of the beam direction was made difficult on account of the nurrow pencilling. Favourable results were usually only produced when. tho beam direction wont over a monitoring station. increasing rlJ.l1gothe vridth of tho boron also increasod, under most favourable conditions therefore only approxiwAtc forecasts of the preswnablc areas of attack were poss ible (c. e. North GGrr,lnny, South Germany). Towards the end of tho wa,r repeated attompts were made to determine the direction of the bema from monitoring aircraft. Sucoess by this means was only slight, as far as can be rOf:lcr"ber~d. All the mona torine results of the intercept and D/F stations'lif.Cre collected together at the Reporting Oentre. If the indications of an ll1pcnd:i,ngRAF operation accw..nu1atco the Head. of the: Watch gave an advance .., warndrig under th-G cover: name "Adlertl to all interested stations. If no raid was expoct ed IITaubc" was reported. SpeciaJ: Particulars.

TbB 5th Bomber Group ocoupiod a spec,;ial po.sition in RAF Bomber Oomnk'Uld. Elements flew numerous special day

operations, e.g. against a8~St harbour installations and against the IITIRPI.TZ". By night, the 5th Bomber Group Car:r'ied out attacks under its OVIDoomrnand usually apart from the other forces of Bombcr COTllll1lll1d. Ofling to exoeptionally good disc"iplinc in the usc of wireless and navigational equipment the German Sigint was repeatedly talcon unawares, this often brought it complaints from tne HIgh Ooromand, For example I I can remember an a.ttack on MUNICH which took place aboirt 5 0 t clock in the morning, and the first intercepts were obtained only a short distanoe from MUNICH. Since the Aircraft Reporting SC~ice had also failed. in its task, MUNICH during this rlld was allcaedly taken completely by surprise Ydthout tho preliminary Air Raid illGrt. 2) Jrd B. Group. Tho RAF day ra~d.s also, \7hic11wcz-o !;1()stly f'Lown by the 3rd ~roup ccusod S~aint many difficul tics. Advance .7armng was ot't on only :possible when the "Lancastors" were alraost up to ~he ~"':man Frontier. Only ~he R/T traffic of tho e~corh11[~ fl.zhtors of Fiehtor COEII:;lfUld repea.tedly gavo a hmt of such operations.
In the S[IL.10 way, .-1;hospccd.a.l. 0i::l8ration f -"_ from mlPSFOlID (1 8 1:. S0 squa •.. u:ons '. 3 and 161 Sq.) flying supplio:::lto agents om:-ld be p~ckod up neither before nor during the cutwaz-d f1:l.ght and at tho best on the return flight.

-12TOP SECRET o.dvoncc wornings Ropeo.tod o.ttUElptS ','foro Dado t 0 '.70rk au t ~ of ta:ro'(;t az-or, or at loast to determino Bubs.equcnijly '1 the t/lT[~ct ['.ron, neither tho o sa L' s vonLn» nor a c;, tho RadD,r J.~oni tarin;3 Sorvicus wor-e able to produce any usoful results.
J u J_


The wlz-cLcas disciplin~ of tho 8th B. Group was 1ikoYII'isa~1:bOVO tho avt.:ra~~ci Often it Yvas only from the at her broactcasts of tho HQIa that it was known that o.ircraft of tho 8th GrlDupwas oporatin(3 .. On tho other hand , tho Mosquitos which wor-e rOGularly o.ttac1c:L.,J Bcr-Lf.n at the end of the wrir wore picked up~ 1 .... through D/Fine; of the Rotterdam radiations, approxJ.JLlacey from the Friesie.n Es'Landa,
u • ,

III .. 8th US Air Force.


Warninc; and idrcra1~t Tracking.


AI though the raid forecasts for RAF' attacks were made with modcr-at.e certainty by Sigint, wrong conclusions occurred nov and again, o.g. with the 5th B. Group. On tho othorhand it can bo stated that no attack of the 8th US Air Fo'rc9_ ODI,10 as a. sUX"'Qrise. Generally advance waxning was gi.von some haurs before the rai~ Tho possibilities for this werc: as follows :1) l!Iovcs to advance bases [llld concentrations were sometimes dot ermine a, by tho of' the aer-odr-ome frequencies (WiT and R/T) .• 2) Splasher Radio Beacons. . Dur Ing the aSSOT,lblingSp18.shcr Radi.o Beacons served ~s a navigational aid. Theso radio beacons were of.ton switched on, however, without an opor-at.Lon boing . f'Lown; Conversoly, operations were nover. f'Lown 'in thout tho Splashers working. From tho locations of the radiating 3-plashorRadio Beacons somcb uace rough inforences Trould be made on the direction of tho attack. If the Splashers in South ''ikst Enelond wer'o ro,dio.tins; uno, not those in North East El1.,s18.lld thon an-a't t.ack in the direction of Prance could be ' reckoned Yri th, or if. J"ho cppos i to wor-e the C[lSO, an attack j;n tho direction of tho IIoligoland Bi3ht or NOr.7C1.Y. 3) Weathcr_1toco11JlCl.issol?;_c(; I.. scr:1bly Ar-ea, in o In ardor to discover tho 1'.108'\;fo.vOll.r[lblc ho i.zlrt a for;mbly, rroather rocco plano::; took off buforc oporations, these ona.blod the oporation:al int(;ntions to be rocoenizcd. 4.) Wirclcs3 ri'::~ffic'~ ;~scr.ibk. If ~l~c rrca~11cr.r cccc a1rc~~t rUj?ortod favourablo woather, t~c bonbor.'3. took off. '17:Lthhe .':';ro8,t strcne,'th t of the VIIJ. B. Crad, thu process of gcttine into fOrI[0.tion D.ll!~Ys to?k 0. lon~~ tilJO and of ton cauacd diffiGUl tics. Durll13 nhi.s , rmoh ai:c to air B/T traffic on ultra sho~~t vravca took p'Lacc,


TOP SECP.ET This traffic was eloo.rly hoard o.Lso after tho Vii thdrawal froD Pr ancc by the.: intorcej?t stations then situated in Gcrm£.1W. ObsorvQtion of assembly ::uus~d the; advance wo.rl1.ine nZUGVOEGEVI (== USAhF operD.t~on 0 '00 cxpoc+cd) to be issued. 0; the basis of the frequencies usod..~ it could bo stt'-toct oven aurin,;' tho D.ssOl:1.blywhich Divisions (sometimes also which Co'1bn.t \li11.2:8) wore pro~tioipatil1G and in whnt ardor the Divisions would be in the [L1JProo.chfl ight. 5) Tvko--nff of the cscortinr:; Fi_rllters. Tho asscubly took place without fir;htcr protection. The fighter fon:1E'.tions generally tool~ off when the bombers 'flow out. Tho first interception of FigM or R/T traffic '.'m.s, thorofore, at the same t be the si2,110.1 that the assembly of the Bombers 17n.S now




6) ChGek:ing.J'~_ Reports. '. Whon pas sine tho abovo mentrioncd checking po irrt s the forrnation Leader-s h ad to send a ruport (WiT Bomber Code) to their m2. Aocording to t.ho longth oT the f'orrnatrton and since n.ll mcssegcs wor-e not ttod sdmul,t3J.1.oou.sly, D/Fing of this itireless tro.ffic produced over a lone; t ll,lC a good trackinF;; of the aircraft route. 7) Open Transr,littors, It of ton happened th.'1.t VHF trc.msiJitter(s) TR 5043, navi88..tional dds, c. g. or other tranSI!littors z-cmad.ncd Lnadvor-trcrrt Ly s;clichod on. t RU11.l1.:ing D/F' s of these carrior waves gave the flying route, 8) R/T traffic BOr1bor-Bol~ber.l BGll::lber•Fipt1.tcE_, • and Fightcr-~r. Naturo.lly, tho often very lively R/T traffic \.73.S oontinuously D/Fod. From tho point or" viCYv of contents, the follouing wor0 some .of the result-s obtained froE! these trn.ffics :


a) details of flying hOights and speeds; be) positions (We ar0 over Cologne); ) painton; to the cffoctivoness of Gcrnl'l.l1fighter and Fhk ... cf'cnooj d d) deviations from tho orisinal tiEle-table (We az-o 20 min. in, rl.;t<1.rd (( sic nnslioa)) ); e) making ready to drop bombs, ordor to drop bomba,
by WiT .• The; roports of fOD.lf'.tions to their rtr-ound (Division or CODbfl.t Wing HQ) and ardors fr~!!l the to tho formdions ~Toro];lostly sent by WiT, us ing Bombor Oodc.s; Pl.atin 12J1..':;tl.D,8G vms soldon used. BOill'b::r:' ~OdO, ~ssagoS, vrer-o neurly ['J.nn.ys broken. corrbad ncd til.O follmn.n.:; d.:'\to. ru.l0ng othors :

9. ~adio_:'~r~c

stations latter the The Thoy

a) o~dc~s from H. Q. t ~, G.g. to br-eak off the operation; b) deto.l.l~ by f'crmat Lcns on alterations to the orit.·inal p'Lan; an order that the fightors r'li&-t be infor;:ed~ c) riJ'jJorts all. rosu'Lt s o.ftor bOii'.bine;, corrt a.irri.nn statem~nt whct hor- maf,n or subsidiary tar.r:;ot '"'was a~tackod., who+her- viSUally or by instrW'llcnts., and wlth what succoss. d) damage I:'(.lport s of the indi vidu.u1 a/ c.



10) D/Fing of JGhoNc.V"-i ,:;;o.tion:.:.l ,,:i~. J . :.:;.;.>o_ -,-=-~ ... d ~. , "" _ (covCr-M.,L1U No Ls r0uc;.lbcr",.. .. . Luubfrosch short) and GHr.:-..d.i[,.tions (covur-nD..iilO .... Diskus) wore D/.F1d. . r'hters could not ruTil2-ll1 . 11 r_,~ 101"0' as cscor~lnr. ll,o~ f tho 1'1ith tho borabcr fOrLnt Lon durlllB tho whole 0 '-.' rr flirTht but still had to fly in r-e.Lays , tho rOh(;Vln~ t' c 'bombor' rcnduz-vOUs fighters flow a diroot course GO n .. 1 . 0 point Thorofare the D/Fin~ of tho coursc.of.t~os fi .. t~rs was often narc; D:1pOrt2.ntfor idCl;tlfy:mt; h the fi~ target thal'"). that of the 'boi.ibcr s , wh ioh near-Ly rtl1'/uys flCl. a feint course.








IV. lvIcdilli,lbOiTibcrforrilutions, tracking. A.

advance varnines

and route ..

2nd Boubur C-.:ro1.p (2nd TAF). raids. Very good radio Group therefore produced Division,

No possibility of predicting disciplino. 1!Ionitoring of this negligible rusults.
B. IX Bomber COL1TIl.2:1'ld (or 9th

9th Air Forcc-Y:-The appr cach of lI~k'lIaudorll c t c , f'orraatn.cns WM sometrimee trcccked by n/Fin3 of VHFR/T traffic. As tho R/T discipline in those formations was also good., results were smaf.l , Vfnen IX BoIilbcr Coinnand began, somewher-e about DCCCI!lbcr, 1944, to carry out bad woat.her- ~_ttacks by means of "Bcomer-eng II-control, this 80VC Sigini: tho follouing novel possibility of obtaining an advance warning: the Beomor-ang control stations were in tho Franco-Belgian ar-ea, They wor-e in radio (W/T) contiac't -with one another. The evaluation of tIllS radio tr1?.i'fic (i. c. not the V1lFcorrbr-o.l ground to air) made it possible to dct ormtne the uPDroach uJ? to 45 uinutcs before bombing, and to identify cxact Ly the t8Xgct areas about 8-25 minutes b(;forc; bonbins. Tho control station of these r8.dio networks was in Croat Britain and had tho call-sign X25. I cannot rc:neH'oor the othor call-sir;ns.<,.tion was done: IYithout breaking of caphor- systeD"""J but solely by moans of the dr:.tCt dc:riv"a. frOl:clthe E:?-~ound stc"tions. No details known, Tho SC.L'.O cva.Lurrt Lori was possible for the 8th RLF Group t co , us Tlell an for the' Boomcr-ane controls in connoction with IX II. ca. '-'


4-2nd B. Vling and Tyol (1st


.. Adv~cc J_-~m.rnin~s mr-o ortLy possible v by raorritoring and, d/fl.n::; t.11.0 R/T traffic. R/T clisciplincwD.S not as '7ith TIt E'., Cd so nat routc-trackln8 rras
tl,..~J_ -

SOillCf,7hnt oClsier,



TIC01\,V 1-109.



of the


1. Setting \.~_tho_ l®~. About tho bcr;innin,:; of 1944, 9th us jlir Faroe brought its cnll-sirm use into Li.rie with thDt of 2nd TAP" thus usarrt as did tho lo.ttor call-signs cOl-..~oscd of a lett~~ and two fiC;uros, ~.3. 11.,83. From tl:is i~ was possible to tell that tho Allies had co)",1blncd luto one Conmand (accOrd:ll1C to the Pross, the JillAF) the Bri t Lsh and l!.;l!lcric:,.n close~sup:port Air f'or-oc s intended for support of the JtrDy. 2. Conclusion of tr2.ffic in Groat Britain. The yery livel; practi-;-c trC:l.ffic in Groat Britain, in the cour so of which cO-aDoration between ;"ir Force and lh'iTlY had 'b ocri pn.rticu1@';1y intonsively pr<:'.otised, had boon continuously monitorod from 1942 to 19~1J·. In Har ch 19411., thero took p.Le.oc in Southern En:,;land onothc..T vorN" bie; , to SOElO extont 0.. final onc , with tho covcr=nrrne "Sm:rtcul."; in this exorcise p<J.rticular cmphaai.e Ym~ agrd,n laid on Air-Army co ... peration o f'z-orn D. signals point of vim". After that, pr-ao't i cc activity ooascd alnost COLlpltltoly, ;:,pert from a fC\v rrrdio-cxcrcisus. Conclusion: end of practice o..ctivity, preparation of fonJatio.ns for opero.tio.ns.






of the

2nd T_AF.

The radio networks o f tho 2nd Ti.F had alreo..dy been identified in all by 1943. Tho radio stations of 83rd and 84th Fizhtur Cr-oup , as Vloll as of 2nd Bomber Group, wor-e always being D/Fod, prio.rity being given to. this oyer other tusks, so that aJ.l transfers oould be discovered iEn·,1cdiatoly. It was thus clearly scon in l,pril and Ma-y trot most of the radio stations wer-e transferring to Southern Enel('.nd, \(itb a clear concentration in tho PortsIilOuth-T~lGrO ar-ea, At the same tiE1C 2nd B. G-r. trcmBfcrrcd fro:m tho aroe, of the Wash to tho Rec.C1.inSOdihD.."':l .. area. fillen in Hay the H. Q. I s of 83rd and 84th Groups also transferred to tho South Coast this was a c'Lcor-inchcation of the pr-oposed a.ircction of 8.ttQck and of the conclusion of British preparations.


!£._~ ~ronE:th of IX_ond XIX Tactical

S(;tt~l1[;-up of XIX US Ta.ctiq_o.l:_ idr_OomrJand, bril,1Q!_l_.13-u.E. Air Connanda flyin(,; units. ----By the S-flrin~ of 1944, ,,1onitaring of 9th US Air For-ce had pr oduccd tho fo110l'"nne : IX JUr Su~port COT:'lL1and, Ltrt or- z-onamed IX Tactical Lir Ccraoand., 1m3 enrrilarkod for suppor-t of ...' y ft· 't f'. J: U'Ti1 orina lana • .i, . lrst only 67th Tflct. Recco Group, v,rith l07th, l08th, and ~09th Sq_uQdrons, and Si[';nals Units. (Air Support . Partl.OS UCTO subordinated to this unit. Later XIX TDcticnl Ai r Comraandwas also mentioned in 1. 1 . "' p ~l.n . anguago mcss;",ges. ThlS lllcc-,.rj o on.1y h a d one Rocco Group (No. 10) and .. - -s 1Ur Support PDrt1.0S attached to it.





0) Prob8:tly both TCccticc.l ,'cil' Car.ll.1<'"'.nds inter:dl:~ were for S1IJ?Dort on em l!J.lcricr1.h i>Iuy, But for tlus ~t 1-,~[1.Sstill l1OCL:ssnry to brins thc.L:up to strcn~th vri tl: flyin~:; for:1[\tions in sufficient sti"onc:;th. Tho invasJ..on need not be oxp\Jctca- untn.L +hi.s hnd tclccn 1110..00.

a) Tho ficlltcr units of tho 9th ..•r Force - o:nly one i Wing, statud by SOi.l0 prisonL)j's to PC 70, by others 100 Wine; _ Hero suoorBin::>.tuJ. to IX Fic;htur COJ!uJ.-'U1d m1.d were at t aohcd to 8th idl' l1'orce. They wor-e stationed in t::tc f\XlJa of the "[ash and f10YT, lil:o the: fi:~htcl's of VIII Fighter Ooumand escort for hoavy bO:·,lbcrs. , ThQir roturn to 9th ".ir Porco was t.akon to be 8. sure sign of tho ir,r_gondinc; c[~il1ninE: of the invasion. b
In tho iJiddlo of Liay , tho cxpccbcd duveloJ_Jl.1ont ook t plc,co; it was rocoJ1izcc1 M follO\{S :

0.) Changes in tho [';round radio networ-ks of the 9th Air Force took place which, in consequonce of the sir:rultoncous ch.':.l1.seof cn11-sisns, could not be eluciclatcd, but novorthuless vrcr c taken as 0.. wnrnin~.
b) The fiGhter units of 70 iHi11l; ceased to be subordino..tod to the 8th Air Por-co and took over- frequencies of the 9th Air l!'oroc.. At thv SDIaG time they moved frOy.l the area of the Wash to south-East Enr;lG'J1d (l:Iaidstonc a:reu.). c) All of a sudden thoro r.pp(;.:).rod lu:1criccJ]. Fighter R/T traffics as "ell on rnnacr'ous nOY,frequcncies; those traffics, on the basis of the frcq_uoncies, be.Longed to tho 9th Air Faroe and showed D.. division into two e;rmrpsl aa) A fairly Inrr;c group of'lO or 11 Groups il1. South Enc;land, sorcortncr-e in tho Miadle Wallop ar-ea, bb) A aomewhat sr,1s'110l' [;Toup of about 8 Groups, amongs't thou the Groups of 70th Wing in South East[md.

It was easy to conclude that this was the expected bringins up to streneth of IX and XIX Tactionl Air Conn•. anda, It was at first not o'l.ortr of the tyro fOTuat ions wc.s thc IXth T.A.C. and which the XIXth.



of, IX Tro~:reCD..l"Ticr CO);1l"land.

Tho follm7ing infonmt ion on t~1i.s subjoct He.S n.vo.ilablc; D.) In tIlv HQWireless not of tho 9Jch Air Force 1 there appcnrod a now, o.t first'Lcd. Ylireloss str.tionj this Yrc\s D/F' cd in the cottosLoro:Grc:nthrun CIrca, This .mr~lcss s trrt Lon Yrt'l.s ~l~SO iclcntificd as thr.; control s~at~on an tl~~oc subsidi3ry Yri::c(;leGs no t s whoso subsidiD.ry ulTGloss S'c:o.tlons wer-e situated in tho throe fol1o'\YinG areas




Gro..ntluu.l - cottcs'lOro. i.roa Lldcr'.1Elston. Aro". :JX(;t or.

In Braund to air \,rirolcss trDi'fic thoro o."tY,Jum-ed Groc_t Britain nnncr'oua j._j·lcricon ;:-,ircrliSt Yrhioh~ did nov bnLong to tho known for:!l~.tions. It nas at first as sumed. thnt a furtho:t.~ BOL.ID2rdincnt Division of VIII BomberCommand '.-;0.5 bein,2; set up.' .



It 'bocamo n.pparont, h0\7cV'or, tho..t tho aircro.ft trrin-.cngined and rrcrc prcsllicJ.<_'Cblyarryin~~out c


duties. . Fron the statistical oxoDin""tion of the stD.t~on Calls and fron othor indiu,tions which I OCU1Ilotnow rouonbor a strcD[:;th of rouc;h1y 1000 aircraft was calau.lat0d. The nircrDi't CC\.lTiuo. out n livl...!ly shuttle ohic:fly be+ween the a1'0[1.8listed under a). service

c) Frou decoded ;lCSS2,.:_:l:S in Bonbur Code it beCDJI1C known that tho above named aircraft VI'Cre prUdOl:lirw.ntly or exolusively of TYJ?c C47. In one Bor:lbor Code r.ll:sS2EO tho 50th Wing was (Since tho 51st Wins was known as P. Transport Wins in Italy, tho 50th Wi]'1..[3 would rcpPf1.l"cntly be 2. Tronsp?rt formation .. a further indication of Transl)Ort airoraft).

d) The nonitorinc; of short-nave R/T traffic of _Fulbeck acr-odr-one (Coltosmorc-Granthc'UIl area) I frequency appr-ox imat.c Ly 5100 kes, shewed thn.t on this airfield practices viitl1 freight co.rryinr; gliders wore c8Xried out, Durins th(:;sc:, reports in the fo11o.-ring forn were currently he2.ra :
"Have you tho Glider in +ow ?" "Can you seG tho rJateh-b~ ?" "Tncre is a 9-ship fOD;1.D-tion C

47 with Gliders

in tow",

TIrom the var-Lous indic2tions it cou'Ld., in the course of time be stated \Tith certainty thLlt 0. strong transport formation \i"i th D:Fj?roxit"illtoly 1000 type C 47 ai:r'cro.ft and, gliders was subor-ddric.t cd. to tho IX. Air For-ce, (Th€!so obscrvo.tions were 1.-_",:;(:r confirncd from capturGd raabcr i.a.L, This WetS the IX Troop C2.I'ricr COl!Hand). A largo air-landing operation at tho begim1ine of the Inva.sion was therefore certainly to be: reckonod "lit;1,



of the

ll?th R/.F


T~ho wirdess tro_ffic of tho 38th RiiF Group was loss easy to sec through. The: Ground wiroloss not of this Group was, hO'\T(;¥or,. c.lrcl'.dy olorified at tho tine of thQ Co-operation Cud. The f'r-oquonoy of tho -HQ tro.nsnittcr an :Nct~(;ravon (as fr:.r OB I 0011 rL!~_lc;_lbcr 3900 lees c~ll-s~V1 9 ViZ) 1/['$ o.Lso known; In th: g:caunCl to rei_r traffic BOi_lbcr COo.(; U(;SS2.:::;C3 occas~on<lly c.ppc2xod Yii-deh ~U'tcr o.u-codiD[:'; made it cloer ~h~t t~c 38th C~rouJ? a'Lso "I'iQS )?rc.:p.'lri110 air---lilllciin£ opc::r['.~~o"lS',n th tm1C;d fr(;i!~ht carryinc ::.;lide;rs and ~O~J?lll!3 o~ p.:;.rachute tj_~oops. ~,:-~~l:ss hnks of the.; 2110. _i.F '.'iC;rC a furthe;r T inoie<;,tion IJH"t )~ C-'1'ou]_) would be G.r2_"r,n on :'or air-lClI1dino' opcz-at i.ons o.t the bcginninE:; of the, ._,


("~~~ the. soco~d huf of Hay it \72.S dotc:onincd ~ t}-,~"',t _"rl.cnn . :lJ.!'Cr"_l"t contr 0 1 s "'" t. . .' ~[,.Clon8 on war shaps nerc pz-ac l.Sll::lg,· sJ.r;noJ.s Li.nks .-nth +no ..J.r ,.,ur.-n,'l, " J:a.rtl.OS " c.' n . - -- .. 1 YfhiC1 wort.; on Lorid., DfF ul -. . J:'~ area off' Pl th_V r-es ts :i,.n.dicatoo. tl:1C aea ;)"DOU and Southuupton.
l' ... J " a, " •

This l.1ade it cleru:- heed ~.; begu,D, At the end of ;_;p,ySii;~tis sued In:vt'.sion ·~i.e.!-~i~ in roughly the fol).or:ins for: 1 : II All prepn.rations by the British I'.nd .A;~lericcn JUr Forces 1U'8 co.~lete. 2 British and 2 ilLlel~icru'l Ol.ose Support Corps for the support of four .:'IXe available. The eLlbal~l-;:Cl.tion of Porce Staffs has 'oJ8B,-un.. The be[';inninC of e. le-l'ge seNe lo.ndinE;; .-:lust noVi be r-eckoned with any clay", b[",sis of the results of Sirf;lnt and of the ·target nrec.s of the f1.l1ied cdr force, th~ La.ndine; ,(<"S expected betYJ"een and Cherbourc; by the G-AFOps St[1.ff 1,0, The InndinL:; itself W[1.S picked up during the ni[3ht of the 5th to 6th June, 1944, [1.5 follows : 1) Shortly before nidnight, lively o.otivity of loath RAF Group oorr.tenced obviously for the purpose of neutrrJ.ising the Gernc.n Rndnr Sets on the chc.nnel coast. The jD.l.1l"dnc; screen noved slowly froLl EC',st to Uest, so thc.t it \IUD iI1uediutcly assUl_ldd that the jru7UJ.ine; as w sc·reening D. l:1I'e;e shipping forr.l.D.ti(m. 2) The wel".ther reconnaiSSDl1Ce for the VIII and IX Bm.lbe"r Coomands and the D.ssei.,bly of the VIII Bonber Corartand began long before the nOTl.12:.l tine on 6/6. This striking advancemertt of the tclce-off times indicated that SDLlcthing speoial 'WIlS under way, 3) The eppr-ouch of the landing fleet itself took pJ.aCG in coqplete wireless silence. The wireless traffic whioh bezo.n a.fter the landing vms intercepted and :i1:1l.1edidcly evc.Lua tod in the prepc.;t'ed fOrlel.
On the

t~ ~
,rl It


Predictions General.

of A1li?d Off~~ives

. A)

was soon apparent th.'l.t certnin Air Force fon."tations were closely connected ,dth cert[\in Army fon~lations, e.G':


The 83rd Group supported
The 84th Group The J:,x T.A,O. U

Tho XIX. T.A,O.

the 2nd British Arr·w, II 1 st Ccu1a.di on ;'..ruy. U U.S, Army, "3rd U.S. M·W.

From rJa"Vesl ~eiHiorCel'10n.ts or other

cnonges of the Ai+' Force fo:nw,tJ..~ns, conclusions could be reached c'Ux-rffi1tly on co::-;C'cspondw~ ohange s in tho ~1:l dep'Ioyuerrt , farnation of pOUlts of raaan effort Md intontions of atto.clAlso thE; morri, torin.::; of' the wireless traffic tho Tentf'.clc r-.nd Air Sup):)ort Purtie::;~ produced. . SJJll nr ~n d'~C2. J.ons. ···1 . t· p In thi s oonnccm.on the .mrl'.: of Si ....... '{['.s facil.;tated . nt very rauch by th e rJ..8J.. 00.11 s USD.'Je of the pEA -'-F .. a. G-'( Fhro ~kn)se of cill signs fror.: ~:.,:'..y 1944 until t~ ~f t e ,mr·. th ere f ore, could often -press .. The Air Force tt ~, '. l.L1pOran r-coor-ca to Lho . the J.rr:ry Sigintcould "'; ~l.rDY,r,lor(;.Qvcr f:.t EL tine when i7irclesp silence' f\chJ..~~ no rosu1ts on account of OyJjnp- to the ~ ~n the , end .Ar;lericm :,_r1-lie8 Qr '"" ~'r1.1ys goon HJ.rclGSS discip~ine,





B. Fir~:t ~'1ployncnt of

TICO~ 1-109.
Ar;.~Win the 1u\'cHlilNarea,


9 us



_~~ / .-


The settinG up of [L new Tactical Air CO:lJraand and the i.l.crpcmdin[} Glwploynent of [L nGVI/" U. S • .Arrny was known 0.t al:l.lOst the Slli:le ti2!le by :.1) The o.pp0<U'DJ.1.CC a new wir~less sta~ion of in the HQ network of the 9th Air Force whi.oh was .-cont:l-o.l-station in 8. subordi.nD.te network. It was k:no~ thnt it must be a new T.A.C, since Group ·wirelesf:3 statwIl.S left the neb-larks of other T.A.C. IS and joined the nC::W networ-k ,vi th thoir old eallsigns. 2) From decoded }'I 209 messages, in which the XXIX T.A.C. V/0.S named, 3) Frau the morri taring of R/T on uJ. tro. short waves : Appenrance of R08.ALJ]; (HQ XX:IX T.A:O); appearance of new frequency groups i departure of Groups from the IX and

' it


XIX T.A.C. and their
XXIX. T. A. C.


on the frequencies

of the

showed tha.t the HQ's of the IX and the situo.tdJd in 8pproxir:lD.tely the same ar-ea , nane.Ly West and North Vlest of Aachen respectively. Also the Grouns fon-Jed a clear SehweX1lunktin this o.rea. In the ar~a of the 3rd and 7th U. S. Arrni.e a, Air ' Support Parties disappeared only to turn up again a short tirle Io.ter in the arc as Ii-est and North-West of Aachen. Thus, it became clear that the 3rd and 7th armies had givon up divisions to the 1st and 9th ~ilies. On the basis of these results, an offensive in the general ar-ea of Aachen oouldbc foretold with certainty.

n/F results :XXIX T,A.C, IS


Last Allied

Offensive; in the Wests Februnry..I\;arohJ


The Gcrunn Ardennes Offensive of 16..12.44 had co.uscd considerable reGrouping in its first stages. For the dcf'cnco tho flying units were first of 0.11 subordinated to the IX T.A.C. At the conccncemerrt of the counter-offensive of the 3rd .A:nuy, the bulk of the Gr01.r.fls ~ne under the command of the XIX T.A. Ot I to which c ~ ~r 9 hghter Groups "i1E;rO o.t th0.t tine subordinatedJ whJ._l~ the :::XIX T. A. C. was alLlost cOi.1pletely denuded and now only disposed of 2 Fichtcr Groups. As support for the 9th Air Force , the 8th Air For-co had, transforrod France~ those fOnllO.t~ons. 2 Fie;htcr flew escort Groups from Grad Britain to protection for bomber

Aftc:: the Ger;-.lD.IloffEnsivo had been war-ded off p:epar~tlOns f~r a. new a1liGd offensive wor-e inf'lediately r<..:co[]D_sed a;3.:nn 3"S follows . 1) .Thc ~XII T..A.C. vms stren~thGned' by 2 Groups of the XXII To,.C. froi,l Italy and in r cturn rtave back one
G-rmr.fl to


XIX T. A. C.



.~h5e ~,

XIX and, :XXIX T.1...C. ~ehtcr a.nd 1 Tact/Eecce

each had subordinated


TIOUV 1-.1.09"

r Th.<J ~l(:j ::ud. t 11(, urn.t C of 84-t11 (_~rouj:l .10vlJd Ll 0. tll ':8 'lndis::ltec:. offensive north-o<'.sturly dir8c'G10l1, intentions of ti.1.l.; 3t 'J' ,':C'·'Y< 1 4) J'Jj'10St all t;lC Tl.;Dt.:-.clos of the 21st ..rny Groc:p rrer-o cm'borilin~'.tco- to thc Lat C~lT.Ji~:;l 1>r;;y J thus It bccr:,Llc clc.::-x thnt this :.r.,W haD. to t ho initi['l -r.;hrust. 5) Shortly boforo the: o:t'fcnsiv() it \flLS ~ct(,n_1incd, ,by UG:'J1S of D/F results, tklt tb) advunccd hQ of' t.he 9'Gh .~ir :F'orCL:hied trrllsforrcG. ' f'r o.r LUXJ:i1 :BURG toNi': ruB.. Thus it \/[10} clc,T tht'.t the) Sclx;rer.punkt of the{ "{£:'S 1 8.l,';2.into DC GxguctCQ a n +ho northern sect or of tho Wost front. 6) The advr.nccd HQ of +no X:::_,J!' ,r,w hear-d o..'; after a fr-.irly IDn~ tiBU and WO.s D/Jl110Q in the IlliIES o.r03.. This rc~,:.ppe~'I'::.ncCl of tho ;~J" ~.dv,"llcec3:He; 0.180 sUG.::;cstcdthe ir:rpendinc GOL'1J.1...:ncenunt of an offensive.

L3 descr-ibed iil t nc report: "norri taring of the landinr,; ncar DL&P_t; on 19/8/42 by 'chu C-crl,1OIJ isint" J the 2,ir S suppor-t uireless tr::-£fic 1)(., t',won t~le; .Lir Force and the _,:'i_n:1Y prl;scmtua LI_.c._n~1 :9os3ibillti!~,s of cv:::.J.U'-:.tiOl1a These possibilities -;.rerO s cud in o.0't:.i1 by :':'1c,ns of an n.ccu.rc.tu I:'.oni-Corin,r-;of c:.ll the cxcr-ca SOS CGrricd ()c:,t in Grad hl'itr,icl in the: puriod f'r-or.i ~~ft(;.r D:c.::P.P.C until Sprins 1944 end thu folloyrin:,:: :d!'(;j!;:-xc:.tions for evr.Luc.tLon in the CN0;-[JC of Inv',siol1 woru L1'1.dc ;

u~ of Repurt.l.il3 Cl;ntru II in cl1c :t'o.ris t::,;:;.: of' ,:o~,-.LtGl'Ll,S t.hc t~l.ctic,~ .,_ir Forco (..:J!l.i'J<') for tho Gcra'U1i,ir T'orc,-, an} .:J_~i,lY units str:.tionoCl in tau Jest. 2) Sup::?lyL1.~ of ~'.ll ('_rcn,ll'l o.rjW and ['.ll~ For ce Wi':3 dO\r[: to ilivisioncU Levol. with the S·pccio.l 'rfirolcss Corle for t>.c; of t,lO i7c\rni:'12: ~'nCl- oitucttion [ -;rircl.:..uw bro[,dcf.cot8 of Bcpol·JGin~ CC:Etrc IIo .?; 1'11(; cons br-uct.acn, ','..t th,-, S:',JlO tine, of SiC:;lKUS linLc> noccasrrry for line r-cpor-t s of Ropol'tiLG Ccntzrc II ~o ~l" h' hurl :3, COG' Lil)" . f~flottc j, C .in C West etc. 2::',,, mJ 4) Ptcp::.T'e.ticms for the riovo OClc.LC of listcilins urri.t s and pr~1?;:,.r~tion for the cvorrt of li;::,tcnin:::: units f~,11in0 out hll ~.nt(;rccpt st~_tion~: rl!ccivcd the ll(;Ccssary dotE'" to cnahLe thQ'.l +c COVUf' other S\,;ctOr::3 a,n C:lSG of CdGre;ency. .
;:).ron 'with the ;u'i::1
" c. L 0



Irnodin.t(;ly c, ftcr tl1U 1 '.110.1.11":;) t,:1('; UXPl;CtUC. Iflr(;le::ss trc'.fflc. ., ,-. ~t..,.,.te;' I" d c;c_." pr\,;Clol.unc-ntly \rlt:l rC4_uc::J'c l "" v f~r aa.r support by the; Dritioh ':'c.:nt;,clc.:s ~mu Ai.lcric"'~l all' su:pport 11/'xtics in th" follo·:dn.'_,; f'orr.«,
L • .

1) ::'c:':lt'.c10o B) BOj lbc;rs




~~ Fot ,,) of river
E) Lieht

(}D...scription of Tc..r::_;(;t) <:Ou"." '-(;;:1 ,,+) ,'" :.._'"'3"·u "Y'_)(; D. ~rcr[w_~ (D(;si~'_Cl TL.l~ of op cr- :tion) (3jJ.,,;cLl inctructiollS i.l orde:r to -'.vuiC: .-:;t":;_:3 0:. cs.tx: troops) (D,;fc.lQl,. to 0'-' 8Xlh ..ct"d)
L {'. •

TOP SECRET 2) Air Support po.rtiGs. A) PL1;".:/4 (Cdl

TICOli 1-109.

sisn and dCl:k'\.l1d ntunbcr of the ~SP) , B) Encny tanks o.t V 8013) (Desoription of t.:'.r;:;ut) C),D), E) and F) SiL1i1U to 1) Tentacles.

Tho GCrY.1'U1. intercept op~rators were urged to look cs-pecially for such '·,1CSSn.gos and ilt1li1odidoly :tt tho cO~l!TIoncc!ilont f the tro.nSlaission o to caLL tho lIGnd
o It

of the W::-.tch. Whon the Arncrico.n or Br:'. tish Ylic-olcss operators had semi the hco..dinss ic.~ Band C so thut ~hc tD.r[;et and tino of opor-airi.on was appo.rcnt, the report was bhen iLli.1cdiatoly circul,-,_tcd even if the , neasege wus not yet cOl:1plctely transuittcd. By thlS means vr'~uDblo rximrt ca vrer-e wen, In raany CEBOS it was Inter r-cpor-tiod by tho Air Force or )\XTflY forrD.ations that the wo.rnine had arrived in tLlO and that it had been possible to institute counter

Messa,'l;cs of this typo were l:::cter often encoded on the SLIDEX code, , nowover , wGnt so woll on many ~~ys that almost no delay occurred as a result of tho encoding. Further possibilities for if'ro.rnine; resulted frq.a the transmission of z-econnad.saance results in vaz-Lcus wireless networks, omongat others in the llTactical Reconnaissance Bz-oadcas t " of tho o.rlilios. By this moans it was po"ssible to establish: 1) Reconnaissance Schwer-punlct s (Gach single report was marked on a map). 2) Reoogn'i sed concentrations at r-a'i Iway station, troop concentrations, troi'fic movements, positions, battle HQ's etc. Co",operation with the Re i.chebahn was especially close, they r-ece.i vcd. our-r-cnt.Iy al.l reCOlU1::1.isSCUlCC neoor-t.s all railwn.y conccrrbr-zrt i.ona and took ,counter 41eas~'es in so fCtr as it was possible. B. Te1ephoI].X



l~ter the AmeriCE'TI break throu[!,h at Avr anchce , thc .AmcxlcEI11S went over to alHlost the entire air support wireless traffic in R/T on ultrn. short vmvcs Tho Schrrcrpunkt of the fighter control Yl2.S tro..nsferr~a. f--)I:l t,1e HQ' s o~ the. TAC' s to. the l',.ir Support Pnrtics, ,,;'.) '.7(,ro oporntlng 1il:lth the ar-nour-ed spctr-hc'-'as t S.:.,'!-.iCrplU'lktS. AS!l result of th01'r !..:> ~ Grc'1t' "l'r a y or n '.t .. • , t11C .J.~\marlc"l~.ns er-e riblu to provido w an air tJJ:lbrcllD con~J,nuousy over their <"ok• npcnc ....... 1. - d 8, th·· was _ ~ '" -!'lG0. u.s recallc~ when nc coasnr-y by tho ASP' 6 n.nd directed to worthwh11c tnreets. ~ to these altered cporatiollD~ toctJ_'cs ~nd ;n· consequence f' ' . ~- ... fR -t'0 v::-r10US trruJ.sfers, the vlDrnin'" nctivity o epor 1n2; Oonbr-e II was for 6~pe t..;~"", By t:lcnns of (;)Y"fY'o '-,. t .. ,wu"... nt . t _ ~d.l<"~ .... r1LIDn £1.1Trupps opc::ro.t. nC cl.oso to the i Fro l vms Cl.cruined tl':u:UI. "-h o nC\1 &:leriC£Ll1 proccdu.:ce J. . also offe a .. ~ Sir;int. ~ good charico s for evalu.'l.tion to tl1C;: Gcr;:JJ.i"l ";n S t' b Y aftGr the stabilise.h.' on of tho -,Just 1..""'on'.,_ cp o•..! Gr 1944 ' .i!L- II these possibil' t' ~tCOuldo, start be nade to utilize 1 lOs 0 the full.
L -


-22TOP SECRET It had 'become evident betweon the indior.tion of the attack i + se.Lf' WD_S too own units by tho previous


that tllC space of time tiho tnr~et by the ASp! S and snor b to warn in t~me our r.l0thod,3 - whioh 11.0_0. been

correct for WiT intercepts. (Previous reporting route: Reception at tho intercept Transmission via landlin0

stD_ticn. or wirel,08$

to ReportinG

Centre II. Encadine of the mossage there. BroadO.:lst \vireloss warning. RCloeipt of the ,tireless warning by a:'.'rnies, divisions,

DeoodinG. Transmission of report to the tlrreatened forr,lation) .. Even in the most favou,rable circuDston.::'3 a delay of the report from 15 to 20 minutes had to bCl.'eckoned with. New procedure woul.d have to be used, "Ghoro1'orc, for tnc immodiate evaluation of the ASP trC\i'fic on ultra short waves. Small and e:x:tr",.~small ultra short Nave intercept Trupps (moforized.) wer-e set up ar.d alloc2.tect to the;: Air Force Liaison HQ1s with A:rrJ.y G:"~oups, ~:'i!cies, 3:I'fny corps, and expecially i.rnpO:d8.nt divi"ions. Those Trupps had only to raorri tor the Tact ioal .iI.:_r operatinc in its own sector. The use of these T:.:up:tls wan .fully justified. It was attempted to OEP:"OY -in ,the British s ccbor , unsuccessfully, howevor , since \;h0 Tent,aclos were u s Yv/T us hi thert") and the R,/'l\ traffic of the 83rd and BL~thGroups pr-es crrtud f'ew },)ossibili tios of advance w::trl1.il1.~s. The author- '\'f;:,S Gmr,10yed ,\8 cormandor' of such a Trupp with the 5 Fanz er kr.:f,1J" [,.1_0. tho 11 Panzer: Division in the Alsc.oe-Lorrainc sector f\.Ill' later in the t~chen area.


of Ylo.rl1.:Lnc R~i?orts :in the sector of the 5tt Ge::iil£'..l1. krmy which was opposite tho 3rd U.~ • .Arr:ly (xn: TAG).. Ripsc_w


EEE cup


RilJSD:i{ :

2nd FreLch ]\rilloured Div (lISP). IISP 4th US iU"J.vured Div. Squadvon Cnll:::ign of n Squadr-on ,of XIX TAO. Squadr-on Ca'_ls-len of a r'ccce Sg_uadl'on OJ' XIX TAG.
We m.'e ,\i1:'bnrnc novr, OK, S;C 1 0 EC8cuP, he


to Ripsaw to Ee;ECUp:

Vibrate Ege;cup


Vibrate Loader Evaluation :

has a target for YJu. Ilave ynu r-ny tnrscts for ne ? Yus, I hove n tarr;ct for you. There j a :-..n i':lportD.ll:t COL1n:_'.no_ Post in the f,'.:r':_~ d r:j 3859, I roped S 3~~9. I z-cpcct , iiP at S 3859. Adv;--noc lilmn,ll::; to the Bdtle He}concerm,(1_ (the locations Givc~ in tre Ibdif'iod System could be: 1;"( a(~)




11 Llil1.utc8 rOI,w.il1.od until the ~t..-.G-'t... Pcrsonnel 1and the sios't att llll"OorJeo.nt 2,turif'.1 of t hc D thro['.tenod lit] could b", 11ovod to safety.

. . -" her .Llu"Ust in tho LtU1cvillo. i_U'O~l., " . ff' ul"''; es 2) Dur~ns Q. Gen.lLill courrc · .' \, dD "ot J.nto di J.O (,'" • the 2nd French ,\rmourc ~v~s~on ,,, -, t\· ',<"1") f' . b ,>-hr. f t tb",t L~ll)t:r .10 i>OL 0 This was rGeormJ.zed Y "lid o.o~· , 1" c '-', 1 ' t od ~up:port frO!l a _L this division, oont~ual Y roques au Q ave,ilo.ble ':'.iror2i't : "Lirjbcr e.-,lling trouble". The cneqy's WC[Lk POiTlt thus roooe;nized was OX1Jloited D.S fully [\S was then possible by tl)B ConuDnd.


Dur Lnr; a fliQ'ht undortakc:m. during tho Lrvt;e afternoon, l1L' rib " tho Vibrate Sq\l<.'ldron was reforred to ll: or • Limber: There about 10 enemy tnnli:S ],11. the vill[\.se at V 3852• Vibrate Leader We are in the target ar-ea but I can't see .:mythine, it' 8 too late for to-day. Limber,: OK, return to base. We shall attack thoso targetp tomorroVl
'" 0-

Evalu£\.tion Success:

Advanoe warning to the trunk forces concerned. Tonks changed position. FiGhter 'bomber-s did not find the tnrget on the ,follovdn3 morning. : I have a ~ood tar~et for bombers. In the Ek'U'shollint; yar-d of Saarburg t hero ar-c many trains with t3.l1ks and gu_.."1s. Advo.nco report to tho Rciohsb::lhn. RailmW stations could often 1)0 evacuated in th1e.


Rabbi gr-een to Ripsaw

Evaluation Success :

The vTarnine r-epor-t s did not arr-i, vo in in every 00.S0, on the contrn.ry the fiehter bOElbors were usu al.Ly victorious in the fight r_~[l.inst tiI:le. Never-tho'l.eaa, the w::rninr; c...'::.--t v ',;d in truae in so many cases that the employment of the '! .,p~ (so called wiT Listcmin,e: Liaison Dctachnents) \'{8.8 ··;_,h wni.Le and the Trupps were: very populnr with the Arr:1Y.
'.';~· r,

In addition the Trupps proved thoir ';iorth thus : 1) The I'[/T Listening Liaison Dct.achucnt s wore in the position constantly to .'Sivc their army HQIs such a cood picture of the air si tuo.tion in their own sccnor thfl.t m<,nynrr:J.l18oments,especially ro~nrdin;:; supply could aocordingly be nade , EXCiI:Iple f an air 8i tm~tion r-epor-t o for one day : 0830 hours 0910 hours Oompl.ct.e inD.ct i vi ty LTl O\'ffi sector. .Allied r-ecormai secnce C1.ircrllft report bad visibility. Fi5htcr bomberoper at.aons ar-c not to be reckoned wi th for the raonorrt,

TOP Sl:!:CRET 1025 hours , . 1 _,~ '-I e-~ l"i'i.rst IrjllJrOvoment ;111 'G 10 ·'iTUu." 1 .0;: ... ~ t~'~r.·" off. fi[;;htcr l)omber squc.'1.LU.Vn ~\'h"'-' " .... fly iut 0 the RecElives the cr-cer c o Hotz area, ~ further 3 fiChtor- bOL,ber sq_no.c1rons tal{e off. Fic;htm:-bonber SchwcrpuJJ.h.'"t in area of }1etz. In the southcr~ sector (N.moy ..Lunevillc) no fi[)tGcr-, bomber' activity to be expected for +he
J_. •



1115 hours

monon t • Fi!1htcr-bombor flight to their take~offspicked

squadrons airfields.

on tho reC"llIl1 :No now



1230 hours

lQ-30 hours 1700 hours:


DQterioration of the woathor appo.rcntly make s further tnke offs impossible. Fresh fighter~boElber operations 8.1'0 no IGlnger to be expected for the mOlLlcnt. CQmplete inc.c·iJ:i:,Ti in ow'!:'.sc)ctorr. ty In ~vn seotor continuinG inactivity.

2) In addition, the Trupps also morntorcd :purely. army traftio, e.g:, Tanks' R/T, artillery R/T (als~ art~l:ery. spotting aitoraft), R/T of advanced obscrvp_t:l.Onpas c s c"Cc. This ll(T traffic was established in the wave band between 20 and 40 mos. and ropeatcCl,ly produced indications of offensive intentions, r\1Pvesof enemy forces, etc. The Army Si.c:;int "TaS fro' behind deve.Lopnerrt s in resard to the monitoring of RIT traffic.

3) The Air Support Parties had fi.'Ced call nanee which were only very seldom changed and 'which '1;78re tied up with the tactioal ArrilYunit, The I\_ll' Support Party of the 80th Ini'. Division, for instance, had oonstantly the cover name II Ironclad" • The monitoring of the R/T tr2.ffic of the Air Support Parties on ulJera short 'waves, therefore made it possible to exactly bho deployment of the army, s inee:a) the llir Support Parties cons'terrb'Ly passed tr£l.ffie on frequencies of the krmy (i. e. of Tn.ctical Air COiJl.ili'Uld) to which their divisions were n.llotted. Thus if II Ironclad" D..}!}oaed under "Rapsaw'' it could be deducted vnth certainty tt: ..-'~_he 80th infantry t division was subor-dtnat e to the 3rd ,) the target areas, in which the l\'ir Support Parties CO:ct. 'olled the fic;ht ero-bOl'J1b •were always s i tua ted in en} front of the bn.ttlc sector of their respective division. Thorefor~, if "Tr-ono'Lad" cal.Led for the en[;3.gel~ent of TDro;ets an tho Chateau Salin area, it was ir.~1ediately clear that the 80th Infantry Division was employed thoro •.
VIII. Predictions of Air Londi!1Es.



The GerEl£ll1 Sigint had the Doni torino; of the large scale Normnndy. June, 1QIldil1.8s.



vrith the

l-Lrnhefi"i··E~ndhoven Sept ember- 1944Basbogne , air supplying December- 1944-..



TIOO~/I.. 09. .I

the In~['1(of. pa[;es 16 and ~7 J..' ~hC,' 1 at f1.11. oper at i.on ltself ~'TCls, hO"l1CVer, ~10u p_:ckcd. 'Q C!lly from Pill stateI;'lon1s and fran cD.pvured 1:1D..u:J.:L< was it 6ubscClucntly known thD.t (o.s cxpeotoa) bho DC "'raup and the Troop Currier Cormand Em d tl 1e 3· 8J..h R)'u.1\ ,x _ u_ 44th (or 46th ?) Rill' Group had actually flovm." . Tlvapossible reD.sons for this failure of Sl[pnt wore

f tihc TV Troop O[,-r'rier Though the oonC0nt raGlanS 0 . .LA. , b~foro CO""'",""d and tho 38th RAF Group vI.orc rccoouz~d



} ir LnnelJ.l1[;

:.p.., _~.'

1) The wireloss discipline of the transport formations durinG thcSG opeTntions had been so that no interception was 2:.ctually possible. 2) Tho GerI~1Dn intercopt company had fQ.ilcd.


Probably t.he truth ID.ybetYfoon thoso r-co.sona, After the withdre.:wal f'r-omFrance the norritaring of tihe transport formations was re·~or8anisod. The oomr,litlilcnt VTas trnnsferrcd frOB the nJ/Listening RociLlcnt Wcst (Bonber .. Monitorinr;, now dosie;nation L.N. Fwik Aufkl. Abt 357) to a new.Iy set up company (11) of ~hreloss Listening Regil1lE>nt West (r€JnaE10d L.N. Funkauf'kl., ReeiHont 351), with personnel and equtpnent , During the Arnhem-Eindhovon Air Land.Lng opor-at i.on in Septeaber, 1944, this re ... rganization o was aobuaf.Ly bein3 carried out, for this roason~ therefore, this opero.tion too WQ.s ot piclwd up. n The successful '\1rn.rcLins off of the Bri tish Landarig near Ar-nhera cannot , t.hor-cf'ore , be attributed to the operr.tion of Gcrnk'Ul i~i.nt. S Monitorine by the new company brought better results for operational evaluation, Neithor 1ifas tho now coupany Ln the position to pick up the largo scale oper-at.Lon of the IX Tr'oop CarriE.:r Commend .for supplyins the Amer-Lccn army forD~xions encircled near Bas~Dgne. Only during the last alliE.:d Lar-ge scale air lD.ndirl2: operation nenrBOlCholt at the end of 1iarch, 191.~5, could an advance warning be given about an hour bcf'or'e tho air landing and froD thence onws.rds the flying route of the f'ormat.Lon (fron Fr-anoe to the dest mation) could be currently tracked. In this case, too however the r~sults of Si.s~nt did not COBe from th~ monitoring of t1'G wlToloss troSfJ.o of the Transport aircraft themselvGs h_-,Jc ~rDn _~l:c morn. taring of the .ALlOr-ican ircro.ft Reporting A i5',~ • ~ -'.0 lllhldkntzox: Report s of pages 9 and 10) • . .The .conccntra~J.on for this Lar-ge scn.l.e oper-rt Ion had D.t;aJ.n been r'ccogm zod hmrovcr:' but without the co '1 '1·' t - f' di' t· 1. posul J. a, Y o pro c. :ng G no. LJ.m~ awl location of the air Landdrig, . The follmnnG morn'tor-tng results .... /ore avcd.Lab'Lo :
J .L' ,;,

1) The 52 an~J..5~ Wins of the IX [1·,,0.•O. were trD..nsfcrrinr from Great BrJ.v3.J.nto Fr-ance where the 50th'r r/'. d '"" already bee t t· ' J.n,-,na n s a acned for a fnirly 10118time. Those iranSfers took pln..c~ to the accoJtg?[\_nimcnt a ro.ther of argo amount of pl<un Language wircless traf'fic and w~elreg~dod as the first indication of [l fairiy larre planned from Franco. ,_,

2;\ liTom Army·Sir-int it nad beon 1'000511i50(1 tho..t both '-' ", (0' "lOlst lib of the .Amoric[l..'t1 Elitc Dl.1f3.Sl.ons 02.]').0. O,.J.'1n ,. y divisions) which wer-e above all consiClercc1 IJ.:~oly for lair landinp' opcl'o..tions had boon withelrmfl1 fl'Oi.l er.1ploYl.1lGl1t '-'at tho li'ront. No reports on their vlhol.'o,::.bou"ts wor-o thon iElll1cdiatoly av,1.ilublc. 3) Fr'orn Po.Lace wireless (l,iili tro"y police ?) it Y{[,3 known thnt one of tho two divisions was on route to r.~oUJ.."",lolon (a CClJ'~p nczrr The 1110SSD..[:;C question in W['.S in rougllly tho follovinG 'i'mrdinr; : liThe rOD..d fro: 1 •••• to }iiourmclon vrill be lxtrred to all )Grcl'fiC tor,10rrovr mOT:ninl3 frOEl 9 to 11 a I clock, booc'.Use the ••• (82nd '01' 101st, "Thid; of tho two eli visions I can no longer rcmonbor) is going to Mourmo.Lon with 1000 vehicles. II


G<::rmCUl photo-roconnaisso.nco, co..rrie;d out as a r0:31.11 t of this, quiokly confirmed tho occupation of 1iIour:mclon with very many tents (roughly 1700 lQ.=.)11,,[IIl tents) and vrith C 47 Trnnsport aircraft. Dotails vrorc e.Lso ' 1il.uailablo conccrrung the whoroo.bouts of the other Alb division. Evon so, ecrtnin wireless signs of the transport forra8.tion, and ,vir-doss silence of' the HQ trDIlsmi tter gavo indications of tho operation. Details, hovever," [,.I'O no Longer' known by tho author •


--.__...._----.--~--- ~------~-.....

I~ Tasks

and tn.sLs of Section of Chi ~tcllc Ob.d.L.

Party B

" ,Chi ~tollo ObI ~.~. was tho hi[)l.os't; authority for tho mr force sl~lnt for all s.J?coio.list mo.tters. It al.roc~od the, opcr atri.on of tho listening service in .~C;~o~~:~1Cc:rJ.ththe dcm[tn~s of tho G.A.]', Ops st:U'f ,rD.,=- .L Q,_pons.Lblo for the f11'1[1,loocr-at.Lonal cvaL 1.1... J.on ~t' ' ~ It" 1 ~Kl.L u. or ::o~u s ~J: istoning eorvaco and, for roport-in,' thor.:!. ~~).~h: G.'''',1 Ops St~f, and ensured oD-oPCrQtio~ "l ("11. Ll1C 5l.gmt scrVlCCS of the a )..1·' QI~ .o .._ ".,ohrr 1t ( ~ J.or US OJ. tho "lJ JtlC_1. army and na V:;;i) •
c. 1 '.

Tho C:b.i Stolle scctions : Scot ion A



.t arrto the; follovduC;







pcr~onn~l and oq_uipmcnt morn tor1ng Hest I7\on~tor~ng South (lloditerrc.nof'J1) lJ.on~ er-n L'uropc mom taring USj,_!l.~outside Europe crYl)tvn['lysis :Cast cry_ptrul.~ysis \fest uno. South.


-27TOP SECRET II. Loc~tion Qnd porsonnc~.

T1C01/1 .. 109.

Aft er the cfJlnprtiDl in FrD.l1.0C in 194D, so at ior: B moved from PotsdDJ!l.o.lJ:nrstcJ.l to Asniorcs ncar ParJ.s. It "iW.S thout!ht to bo bottor to have tho opcTt1.tional ov.'\luo.tion ~CtlI' the intor~_CI?.t y..!2t~ ruther t1;nn. n~,o.r trJ.c HQ (GAF Ops Sb.ff) which wa.s to be sorvco.. l11U ~ correctness of thio vi cw bOCfr;.10mora nnd marc o.P:98.X'C;llv in tho C01.U~seof trirac and thus other sccc;ions al.eo (for cX8.Y!TplcB 5 nnd C) took similar action. . Originally the porsonnel of scction B eom:;J.stod prii.1D.rily of ROichp;';:lsostullto in civiliru.1. clo~hos. who hnd al.r-eady boon YlDl~king for tho smi1L scrVloCD a.n To reinforce those Roichpm1[,;ostellta a Lar-ge number of soldiers - r,l.Ostly 1.U1ivcrsi ty men 'I'li th knowl.odgo of Languages or lJusineG8 ro.en ~ were transferred to work in section B. 'Tho distinction between the ReichsD.l1.p·ostu11to and the salrhors 1JCC8JIC mere and mor-e nobulo~s, as on the one hand the Reichso..ngcstcllto were co.llod up, much n.e;o.inst 'cheir Trill (usually they recoivod only a ninor n.c. o. "s rank 8.l1.0.were di sgr-urrt Lea.) , on tho OthcT hand the solchar:;> 'bcccmc familia.r wi, th the work and in sono oaacs ob t c.i.nod botter results +hen the Reichsan30stellte. In contrast to many othor orc[misiltions of sigint, scot ion B has h~el for yo~s an unvo.ryinG policy rognrdine; per-sonnel, viz. little change of personnel and a great deal, of trecining. Burclonine of pcr-sonno l, with militm-y duties (p::>rados ot.o, ) was cut down JGO an absolute IYlinirrn.ull; as 1.1. r-eau Lt, koonnosa in work was promoted. There was D. good spirit of cor, tr ado ship. For disoiplinary purposes tho personnel balanced - as long as thero wore no vD.cD.l1cies in the Chi~Stol1e - to 13/ob.d.L, which was subordinr,'~c(l in 1941J· to HI. Radio Listening Rcgt.West. At the end of 19~2 - bcgiillling of 1943 sane of the o.uxilia.ry personnel (statistioinns, clerks) wor-e ropl;cccd by LN. fClTlo.le e s, those f'cmo.Lc aux~lio.ries wer-e bottor thM tho soldiers, in work us asslstruJ.t~. On tho other hand, attempts to omp Loy the women on J.r:dopendont wor-k in ovc.Lurrt i on , rg;Jort f'r-om a foyr oxocpt i.ona, wore not succoasfu.L, nl The of Section B abou't t ho midcUc 0f . 1 di strength .w.y, 1 .Iclit·, ne 1)OrS01Ulal dct achcd to tho Du Lo,,' but not i;.-,cludinS Section B 5 (USA) vms c'bout : ... ·u,

4 officers, 3 offiei~~s, 45 NCO's and men, 25 female D.l.Xilinrios.
_/i.ftcr tho move buck f'r-ou ill Au~;u.ct. l')Lf-4.. seev~on B, to::_Dthcr with the R(;r'i;~cnb~ cv: .1u~·tJ.· r' ' o scct i on (r'ar-s t Dol 0,11 01'.11(;6 1'( ~, -" . 00'1J-I~ol (( ... .~.'.I.))' ) , L(;lv "- -th III __ ·• • ...,l_t. Ij. ~n I{ 3, ~ Id0r 2_)/351) novod to Li:.i:UuX'·o Il'" , thls nOMS It YTo.s possible":'1'" ,) ... ,. ...., .J . of work d ' vO U ldl.nL.UU •.nich U.U;)llC;·.tlon an reduce the pcr sonnc.L to nboirt hD~i'.--


III. Org::U1.isatioil of the Sooti_2!!. In tho m[l,tter of the most expedient or[;::'..I."1isatiol1. of the cvo.luation section +ncr o W(':l~C the: followinG schools

of thouc;ht ! D'i.vioi on according 1. 2.

to s our-cos of inforn'1.tion,




IVT oVfu:ufl.tion. HIT QvoJ.u[\tion. D/F ovduntion. Finnl ov_:.;l.u:'.tion (ooiJbinil1~

tho results




Division D.coordinc to t".ctioa1 units, oo1'ro020n<1in,::; to tho or2:Ll11is::ction the ol1C:',W , thu3 for oxr-,Dl)le.: of
1. RAF Baubor Cmm.'1Uld.





8 US Air Force etc,


The second solutioh provod suitable for opor at ion~J_ eye.luation in tho West and r osu.l ted in the scction bcil'-E organized us follows :

Liaison ltrJ.,.l.y


(Sigint InJc;erprotation Stn.5)

Liaison Detachment


J 1./'
.- .. -~

section ---.-----

Read z,.b.V. ~valuD.tor , ang, elcrl ".1 st[,j'f

1- I

rLiD.ison officer
GAF. Ops sto.:f'f


Fight er U_ni ts lRAFFighter enrVII lishter en/i,RAPI light Fighters.

.i'"13 4



~R~:~I/ / __ :
'L!~r COLIE1[l.nd /

Irrn:1edi~-~l EvDluD.tion --~ Collection and forv,m-diY'.[; of



t-------.---- ----'

B 5 USAAF --, outsido :b."'u:ropc and Supply ,





VIII U,S. B 221/ Boni'Mf' CoI'll'.i'\nd I


equlpr:1Cnt and Nu.viJption Evnluation.





11 SC.'PnI'Cltc

B 8. CO-OP;~:ti~~!l i'lrny - Air
llFl AE.t\F A,C, """


* ) B 5 beccno


in 194.4.



l\iethod of \7Orkin~. Evnluatio1<l..
J' • •

Seotion B o.s the opcro.tiono.l cVi'_luGtion offico, l;"'O, "d' '10 rO <"'lilt", 01 the t1lsk of cOLlbining Met co-or 1nn.Gll1.2, u~ .., ~ tllo units opqr[ltiD[5 in the \fest (LN. F1.:: ii.~kl. R:C~l', West, lr.ter liN l:'-'w1.h:aufkl.ReLt. 351 ana L1"\1~ _Funk<,U.L"_~ • • " 357) and tho Abtoiluns in Norway (III/liN, Rc,:_;t',5, later LN. :b'\.m.k..".ufkl. Abt 355). '111.thi::; vrork , soctJ_on B b asod itself in ;x'.:L'ton the evo.luf'Ltion rcm:u-t8 of tho Litcrccpt and Ev;,lu;lJcion Com.l?;>.nics, but it [1.1130 ctid evo..lun..tion i tsc1f on the b8.sis of o})er~i.tors I orisinctl intercepts (MY reports).. The principle L1lyi:;e;rici at its d.i.spo so.L ,7[c8' : 1. The dfl.ily radio sitLmtion r-opor-t e of the int~rcept or cva.lurrt i.on COi'1p[JI1ios, which 'were nostly sent in by , teleprinter, but sonetincs also by vri.r-e.Lc a or by oour-i cr , s 2. Tho detoi.1Gd cornposi te reports of the interccpt conpanics (appearing TJonthly) e. 3. SOI":lctinos, for R/T cvaluc-..tion, tho oricinC\.l intorcepts of tho operators (day reports). ~_. Other sources of inforuaiion: Pi/Yf statements, c8J.)tured natcrial, press and wireless (especiallyBBC) etc. These sour-ces served to supplement or elucidate the section's ovrn findinr;s. Groat care was t akcn to soc that no Sigint information was mixed in wrt.h this. If z-eccurcc wa.s had. to other sources, these had to be named, In addition thoro were very good signals cOE1Lllmiciltions avrd.LabLo, and they wer-e rruch used for exchange of viC'\if8 of spccd al with speciDlist botween the Section [:tnd tho intercept stations. Witll tho division of Lebour larGely clrlX'ifiod· tho . .,. J.. f ' SpCCHLL1S~S o: soc t' a.on B had nvv only to keep up to date arid to clohl' up in co-opcr-atuon "\Tvi th tl10 Dulac and tho r-eLovarrt intercept unit any changes occurred. If. the::o appeared any new fields (e. S. apJ?uD.TOl1Ce of ~hc USAAF In Grc[lt Britain, settinc-up of 2nd TiJ::1 etc.) ).t W2.8 the task of Section B to encour-age its advcnconerrt by us'ing t~o bcs'~ eval.uat oz-s QDd to keep t;i vi ng oncour-ar-cncrrt to the sJ.e;~nt una t s, '" In '(;his cormoot aon, it proved o.dVo.ntnFGOUS not to have tho pcr sonnc'l subor-dannt cd to LN Rc';;.t 'i"c",J.. ., d t' - f.-""l t" 3 . • ...... Y ~ v an nua t o L u v.L 0 ,,0 .' In th;l_s Y/ay it W'1.8 ')0:3 'bI' t ,-,_J_ 1 "~ <.I: ,Sl {; 0 announce '-.~ f.,._,dlL,p, and to nny necosso..ry corcp'Lad.rrt s w~tho:lt rv[,;ard, for, rank or D.:'ppointJ.1ont. On thc"othor "U, h::.n~ ,:lUch aupb.cCLtlon of wor-lc "WClS causod by th'~' l' pos rt fon of Section B d ft. .1.., pccu J..JX . .' an or h1S r-eason nQl1V pcop Lc held t1 V1C\7' pcrs.ormo.L of Sco t'aon B' lncludcd, 10 .c , .0..... tho.t the best s~~~_:J.on ~wo~ld bo ~o Lncor'por-at c tho Section in the RCG~lentc_l evnluo..tJ.on section (25/351) Qu '.._ , sabi.sf'actior-y sol f t1 • J..~u a their be 1 t ut.aon or .icsc questions was reached by .... a or brouO"ht t o[,cth or).n' ,C_"1C . 1 arc.:" "t Li -:ib _'-;, as norrt ioned above. '.
J, 'r' "'1 n'" . J v
.L.' U , '-' .


-30TOP S:EXJRET B. Control of Li~~.



After opcr<ltiond. cvo.luat ion tho control of listcninc; was tho ;:lOst :i.J:.1.portcntask of section B. t It waa tho [1.ubit:i.onof 0..11 intercept s'G::l.tions as for as possiblo only to monitor 81..1011 trttffics o.s yielded finny uessa[;c:s and thus offurod Dany possibi1itic.:s of achiovinc; oxternC'.lly visible successes. li.r,ainst; th:i.s., section B hal to sec thnt not only the pOl")ul!Jrfrcc1uencics but D.lBO all trp.fficB j;;:rportant for ohk.inins a cor:rplctc pictlU'e wor o norn, torod. Thus, for eXC'J.1pll., \. ,:jood many cor-paniGD could only by [ tho exorcise of pressure be persuaded to pick ~rv tho many c;round notworks of' tho R_i_F and USAilF, boccusc on these networks they novel' [3ot [;,ny ir.nedic.te reports f or the flyin[; urri t s • .It was, however, very ir:r_Qort ~t to mont tor those networks because they clearly sho11'iC('l tho order of battlo. V{hon new fields came up, the intercept units often tried to keep to their accustomed Y.lonitorins pro['l'ill:1uC and to pass off new tasks to other dG'Pf'.rtrJonts. In these cases Scot ion B ':uYfaysha.d to control interception aecording to the exie;encies of the si tudion and often do the evaluation itself for the time boil1G' Tho nccesaary instructions were not issucd direct by Section B to tho conpanios, but via tho higher fOrL"tD.tion, thus, for exarap Lo, L1\[ Regi. \fost. C. Cn~oturcd Mn.terin.l, - EguiJ?D.ent_z a~d Nuvis0iono.l Evduation.

The wrmE'.riSigint service vm.s E,-roo.tly ho Lpod in its work by tho plentiful cpptured D:ltcriD.l from o.ircrD.ft shot down, With tho rise in tho number- of sorties, Dna. (at least until the sr.lD.shin,sof the GcrEJaIl dof'cncca ) the corresponding risein the fieurcs of losses, the ruaount of m~tcriDl captured also roso, cspocielly tho following itm.1s : 1.. X- or Q- group li3ts. 2. OaLl-sign lists (R/T and wIT). 3. :b"'roquencylists (chiefly WiT). 4. Boaber Codes• .5- Airfield lists 2:iving oxc ct data on at at Lon cullsi£l1s ... and frequencies, position of n.irfi(;lds, rc.diobcaccns, e-t;c. (Gspoci2lly frequently found in ~ircro.ft of ':In. BOr.1ber Cm-:ll lend shot dmm). G. I.jota-books \71 th rmpor-tarrt crrbr-Lc s 7. Lists. of .radio-bcacon~ :'-'1d othor "'~1'.visd{onr.l .:J.ids. 8. Dcscr~pt~ons of appcxatuses. 9. l, 10. R~dio and n~vigntional sets. 11. Crystals from VEF-sets •. Captur-ed LlC..toriul as it "'''''''C ~n '·f. u._ -f' ory/c:rduQ ,oy " t . ......"., ~!': ~ -'-• ,hoso s',uvae;ing it to .~£'.e Obcr-uz-sc L, If drcrn:ft ~lcre s~t down near s~v-nt offices or stations, the o~f~cors and ~fficials of the sieint acrvaco had the rlght to CXO.nUllO those; things th:':.t inturestcd theu.



The importanoe of thoroughlY appraisi~g the value of this captured material for sigint has reoognized and let to the setting-up of this sub-section B3 of Section B. Th~s subsection w~s taken out of the Section at the end of 1944 and subordinated to the RfldJ.:JControl post (potsdam--

Eiche) • The; Lictisan of:I technical inspector, 3 Foldwebcl, 1 j"Lmior NCO or TIlo.11J 1 femnlc assistant, ;1D.S responsible for sec;:irl[:;thr,t thoro '!'fas cf,c sa co-operation bohmen sigint and p/W intorroc;o..tion and 11ad above rill to see that nll co.pturod r:lv.tcrial do31ine ii'lith radio was quickly ova1w\tccl. Important findil1£:;s (0. g_ rsra onll ...siens or fra(l~uencias) wore ir.-nncdiately reported by D.. dirE;ct to1ophonc 1ino to the spooialist at Scction B, who WD.S rcsj)onsiblc for its enward trD.l1.snission to thc.: interce:;?t stcttion. Aftur this prclir,lincry evaluo.tion the who Lc of the captured Ii1D..tcrir>~ as sent by courier to suction B for 0. most w d.etailed[1.tion. Tho results of the Gvaluation of cc.pturcd mEl.tarial by individual specialists were sent about once D.. eek in so-,callod w URcflorts on CD.p~urGd ffiD.teria1" to all }if.)! IS in·corestod. Ar.1ong the:: further tasks of scction B 3 WD.S the evaluation of all cv.ptured dOC'6lT.lOnts concernine; navi8ation aids that COlao in fron tho follovnne; points of view :1. Elucidation of new systems. 2. Establishing Yfh0thcr any aid WfLS suitable for usc by GorQ..'U1 units (D.S far' as I remember this ~as the cuse e.~. with the SplD..sher r-ad'i,o beacon and the [';1"ouprl"-dio beacons) • 3. Establishing whether GcrLk'lll. o.dio beacons wore r used D..S naVigation a.ids by the enemy (this was so for a oon sador-at.Le perioa.). The rosults of this ovo.luation uoro recorded about once a nonth in the "navie;D.tion rcports". Tho l::st main t~sk of sub-section B 3 was to v.: [l.ttond to as ra~~d as p~ss~~lo an ovc.Lua+Ion of capturod sc t s and crys~['~s COrcll:;~ c o hand., in oo'l.Lnbor-antion with the sE'.lvaEo dctn.chmcmts at the Luftg2.US (Qsp(;ci<'~l B\.,;l(·iw~l'" Northern Fr'CJ:lC0 D.ndHolland) In the c our s 0 Yf r:Ja11y '-' , .• 0 pcrs?nal conVCrSfl~1.0ns.tho s:;.lv8.Co det,'\.chi.lonts wore convJ.ncod of tho }J,lport once af thi work Ev· t· thGy exnrn.ncd a sbot.-down "Uli(;d /0 thC'y t C1 oprJ.nt-.;d ~r~ J.lJ.o t ' anf'or' '.' . "y ne alu:1.tJ.OL1 J.ntcr(;st to sir-int r-ou-rhl, of followinG p:"'.ttorn : Y on the
U 0 n
U ~

dct achuerrt of Seotion B at Dulag



nV~ctory. Nr. 5870. 18.4..44, 16L .5 hours. ku. N L1.1ll! <.nrfJ.Gld. Type Thill1do 8rw h Pi.L t rv•. J. L. V;O cre,s • J. 0 c_.pturod. Bqur.dr-on rcco·'nitJ.· on -,0 -'{' 1 at TR 5043 ~... • I J.TO COG S 0 ~. . J not clustroycd, CCl11 bo collected. Sp t tuned Chrumcl B. Receiver crystals : J.,-71~O, B-7~60J C-destroyed, D-7210. T-.cunSl.:.ittc crysLals~ h-dostroyod, B-7Gi.f-O G-7310 r D d0stroycd. II " (Not c.ctU:ll dct... e ils , bUt [:;J. ' von as an oX1u:glc.;).


On tllC thin n ~,-'C~S -Cr2.:en : I. C)lled~h1. ,,.·llct:'.c;r -[;;,e viG·~or· .... s . )ic' :t;(1. :


1.1"! 1.1.1

.: 6:,./




PiT tr~'i'fic .. Establishin[:; Ylhether frequencies or sets of frequencies were known, , In case of unsolved questions, contaot 'w1 t1'1Dulo.~~, to interroGate the prisoner for this purpose • .All the ['..vailClble information ,Gls8.Iled was reported to the interroEn.tinC o:('ficer via the liaison detachr,lent.

Sonctir.1Cs the captured vrl r-eLeas sets vrcr c exaiai.ned. in secti'on 'B 3 in order to establish the frequency bands (e.g. TR 1143 of 96- 125 mc/s, 'TIl. 5043 of 100-156 me's), the transmitter power o+c; , s ome irces B 3 tckes over the t exru1unation results of other H8s (GL ~ Director-General of GilJ!' equipment). Close collaboration vii th the director General GAB' equipment was ensured by a chief el1.C:ineer who yras pCTImll'lently attached to scct~on B by the directorgeneral. Sir;int units were kept infoYl!lod by B 3 of eXQQt dotails of the type of set with which the indiviCluo.l units were equipped and of the sets themselvE;s. This infoI"I'1ution \7as very important for the control of interception and for evaluat i.on f'r om the tactical point of vievv. For examp'Le , it 'became known in this V'cl.y that intruder night fiGhters in with the long rru1:::;e nic;ht fighters of 109 group had no 1t"\Vcaponlr set. l}hen, therefore, "ifeaponll setsl oano up, vve cou Ld say that l?ns r-ange night fichters of 100 GTOUP were Gperat~ng. As these nicht fiGhters flew near the bomber' strean, the DF'ing of IIWeapons!!G;&ve an indication of the bomber positions. D. Scndinp' in of reports.

B had to

The most iJ,Iportant HQl s to 'which section report wer-e :eli roceor Eencral sign~ls ~ ~ 0'1" 0I'Il~ OIill Dular:;-Obcrurscl Luftflotte 5 Chi Stelle Ob.d.L. scction C.

GAF Ops staff


Often reports wore also "'ivan to H')1 hi' to be served b the '7', "- 'rp , -"." S '7 en wer-e really West (25/351) ~_. re,-"lLlen~.., (:v~lluiJ..tlon section in thE:;

-33TOP SECRET ii..distinction

TICOIVI-I09. reports : ...

was made bct170cn tho followinr;

Dlmedic.te reports by tolc,)rinter (Thero was no dircct telephone

or phono. conncction wit·~

GAF ops staff). Daily [:;cncr2J. r.evi61il of the lust 24· hours, sO~Gllllcd 'Ilir.eless situation reports. lo..daiJ,y operational SUE1IiL.'iIy. Honthly C;encrol reports. Detailed Ylork ilith DlDpS etc. Usuo.lly about 50~GO typed pe.cos. Special rep art 13: - e.<:-;. "etr.Gty air co-operationu• "British nisht-fichtcr Elethoosll. "Bri tish sea rescue service" etc.

In addition there aJ_Yinys existed the closest porsom:,l contact between the specialists of section B and the depar-tticrrt a above them on the one hand and the Lnt er ccpt units on the other hand.

Co-.s.-pcration "between sigint and Eloteoroloaical in the Hast •. service

For givine advice on the weather to C-..crr.13.Il flying units, .Ulied weather reports (or even just weat.horindicA.tions) picked. up by si,zint wore of great value. The units of sigint had therefore standing instructions to pass on all ncath€:r reports direct to the nearest weather- station of sigint or via the evaluation companies (c. g. 0:(' W control 3 J later 11/3 or 251351) to tho weather stations of the Luftflotten. On an aver age , in the area of Luftflotte 5 (Nor,·;ay) alone, for examp.Ic about 300 17eathcr reports , a month were picked up by III./5 (later Ln. Funkauf'kl., Abt 355). Such weather reports or i..Yldications C8LlG up for c:x8l.1ple in the follmring contexts :1.
In f'ic;hter B/T traffic.· Indications of- bad visibility. Requcat to be hqned back to base by D/F. Orders from base to land on other airfields as tho home airfield is not serviceable for LandLng because of SLeterioration in weather conditions. In bomber radio traffic srol.Uld to air or air to air : Dif'f~cul ties in nDkin::; fonnation, c. c;. of the; heavy 1\merlcnn bomber units. Diversion to other airfields bGC~1.Use detcri~ratioll of in the weather. Hany requests for detalls of landing weather etc. In radio tr8l'fic of sea roccc </c: Frou decoded Sy~o messQ[';esand details given in o'Lcar- text., 'Jh.llo monitorinG sea r'ecce al c the 16/3 (I have forGotten the later dcsiQ1-dian of the cOJJpany) and tl:e Ii 22 (Inter 15/2) intercepted '.10 ather reports to tho Atlantic on 2.. p.:trticularly larse eoal,e, Anon8 tha:n encoded vroat.her- reports W(;rc also decoded by these: stations (I have fOTG"otten uhat syste]cls.)





Indications in air support radio traffics, G. C· refusal of the:: flying control stations of requests for air support with a referonce to weather condi tions. To ensure close co_oporationbctvroon the mctcorolosic£ll service and sisint, and as D. c~nst,?-nt check that absolutely all weD-ther reTorts conung In ore evalu.atcd and passed on to the metoorological service" a weather evaluator, workine; also in close co: laboration TIiin the director of the Elctcorological servioe, was put into service with section B. This evaluator also S8":,Y to it that nessascs on purely ,veathcr ,fireless networks, e.g. those of bho 9th AF or the 2nd T.AF, were passed on to the director of the meteorolo[:;ichl service. He had f'ur-ther' to check over all captUJ_~ed ateri81 coming in m for weather codes etc. and pass on such material, if necessary, to the dirGctor of th-e meteorological service, for further evaluation. Under the director of the meteorological service there operated a special listening station for the interception and ~tanalysis of enemy woatihe.r mcssaees in cipher. Its scope and suoce as is unknown to the writer, as he has never seen the-station. He only knows that there WaS a cortain rivalry between the cryptanalytic department of the Chi-Stelle (scction E) and tho correspondiniJ cryptarl2Llytic dep::trtmGnt, of' the direotpr of the me't eor-o At the beGinning of 1944 the diroctor of the met. service took a keen intorest in all .fireless networks in whiCh weather messages 1idth the 000.13 word !lVn-list"appeared. This system W8i3 probably broken, it was certainly worked on.



The c:rzlPtana!lsis I. General

of llllicd

cipher systems in the -}est • .. ...,._-----_. ----.


Tl~e i'1'r~ter never- worked as a cryptographer and can t.-h(;rciore :m the f'o o.rticle only r--;vc ,-,cnorUJ'" - ", _ a_' ~~1. a.cata.ona or sys t cns studicdl etc. The most romunor-at.tvo of si"'int I s t_~L.J...G·vSlS - brL;Bl.n,17 ar-net . ku ~nLO CnCI!l,Y oapncr- systcr:ls, in order to make usc of the '-' IDeSSa[-(c ?on~ent. In ,vi th the Z~\stC:!rn front and th~ .l:ilBdJ._~crrcUlcan thoo..tre of war, \7hor8 cr t~ul!~lS achl(;Vcd considcr2ble success tho rC~ulJ_s 2tIle .,est --c c' - . f' L n t in compar Lson '.1ith sisint I.S 'f ~ J.nS~U:ll lCm:: o er ",~urces of ~On1lttlon (e.g. piT evaluation D/F eva'lua't i.on, traff~c evnluation , .LI. . ar I:.l0nl OTlTIg.)' Rad - 't ' Th . was d Ct CITlJ..Ucd tho f'o'Ll.owi . OELuses:'bv • . lS '-Ivnns .
J_ _" '-' __,"'-



ih ."





1. Udcil

"rere only rarely 1 usually by inc. p,.-,..t , . _ d vcd for the l!10st __ wThe clJ?hcr sYSb:''lllS usc pro _ unbr-cakab Le with the moans 8.v[cllable.
jchc invr,sion iElportnnt l<l0 SS0_CDS , t B ,-'- in but by Hireloss an G~~oa rl ca

' -rvicc kept Nevcrtheless the GerL18.Il rYl)to.nrt 1y t lC SlJ o -. 11 t sec; t'lTOU;:;h the on strivi~ sOLlCtir~lessuccc se f.u y, 0 'l _ t' individual ~ystcr'ls. Go-operation bctvlOon .~11(; ~~~L~~ a.on in tho West (section B) and the cry:ptano~(:'(tlc, ~er~lC~ en ( sect ~_onE) cannot be dos~~i 'bed as [';0 ~d 111 d H fe:- the places, lack of understandli1S of tactlcal values In crypto.nalytic section, which som?t:imes secued to hold back its inforrnation or to bluff). II. British A. ciphGr~.Ei~!.'?ms. code-book (general subtr~).



The system was used in R1J<' around- to E;Tound traffic, The messages could be recognised by the fact that the first group was the same as the second last and the second group the SaIJ18 as the last. ExDJ'!lple: (preamble and order of first and second and of last two gr:oups only vaguo ly remembered)



3cb 1630 - . m0b m LP4- v 2zr (delivery


gr 11 11

generally made out).

groups , meaning


ib29 3216


4652 7608



Work on mcsaages appcar ing in the w-ireless ne.twor-ks in Great Britain was done in se-rt Lon E at Potsdam-Maratall. Result s were not achieved. On the other hand, this systOl'l in the Hediterro.nean area was euc ocsst'ul.Ly broken in Spring, 1941. Work on it was done to besin with on rather a smal.L scale in 9/40 (VI-Toni), at Taormina (Sicily), later on a lD.I'[\er scale at W 3 Ob.d.L. (Later LN. Funkaufkl. Abt. South ..East) at il.thens. l; code book was Dover captured, as far as I know, but was r-ecover-ed by the cryptanalytic sect ion. At the mo.rt f'rwour-ab.Lo period, decodarig was done after 2-3 day-s I wor-k, but on an average with a dolay of 2-4 weeks. In sp Lt o of this de Lay the decode results were very vc~u(\_ble, for, f'r-om then the orGanisation and strength as ';mll as thl:: deplo;}'1ilcnt of the RAF in the I.IcditerrDl1CDl"l area could be o'lBccrtaincd for the first time. By cOLplications introduced into the cncapher (change of subtractor etc.), broakin,g was later made much more difficult and finally ir;]_Jossi1Jle. But the know.Ledgeonce c;ained formed thu basis for ovo.Luut.Lon till the end of the war. B.. 5-lctter r,lachine cipher •.

Tho most frequent cipher syat em in RAF cormand net\'lOrks was 0. 5-letter mach.i.nocipher.. It \70.8 vror-k cd on for some time Ln Po'tedarn ill ac ot i on E, but finally classed as unbrcakab'l,e,


Tho reconnaissanoe a/ c of Coastal Conulland for a long timo _ W1til about the and of 19L/<3 - used a wero reciphenront tl:'blo (Syko ItHlchinc). Tho l,lOSSo..C;cs in groups of 4-, letters and, fieures mix8d, e. g. k~_tp ru8l zru:,ll 3bfn

The sy s't ern was ivorkod 011 w:i,th Good rosults. In tho middle of 1941 there wer-e , f'or E:xaTlTple, three cryJ?tanalytic detachments for Syko in operation :-

1. 2.


Husum... IN ..22. Paris _. W control

Taormina - 9/40, later


W control


aohf.eved daily in the cour ae of the raorning, so that the day" e table was reoovereaby about noon. From then on

These st Ztt ions oxohariged the ro sult

t hoy had

it was possible to decode rooce reports. Later, S0p2_rc'tr: -!;,l~loG 'wore UEcd, fo;" '~,hJ ~:::;f1,i:or:t·'1.L,r:cJ.1. .. aro a rum CoastDl Comnand., wnach mad o broak:iIl"f'; considernbly mor-e difficult; it did, hovrever , [!,O on .. Tho Syko systOlU wo,~ r-op'Laoed in Ooastal Corillnand at the end of '43 or the beGinninG of I ~A by a 3-lottm,code-table ((Si3rialtafc1). ch~~ing daily. This system was wor-ked on at Hueura in 15/2 (previously Y{22). The first rc])arts of decoding ro::u'2mcd section B at tho end of tho W3X'. Rosult s were very slight.
D. Met.

sJ'st ems,

Met. systems were worked on ~Qer th~ director of tho meteorological service. I do not know wM,t systeJilS wer-e broken. In SyrinG, '44, tho urri.t s of sieint got instructions to look out for vrcabher- ElOSSo..:_:;OS with thE; code word lIWhist" and r-epor-t the frequoncies these mcsso.~es "orc intoroepted 011. fortm-rith to ~he director of the fj'l_ct-servico. It must therefore be asoumcd tl:J.,;<').t this system w[\,s broken, or at least worked on.
III. i.r:Joric.['ns.Y,stOr:1s. A. j,!i:.209 (Small oipher 11k.9.chino).

G<;rman U'1JaO for system: AJ:.ij (American 1). Tho cd.pher- system appeared in .AJrhrioNl army and Bir networ-ks belOW' i'cr:r'JY Corps or Command,

Specimen message :-

BLKXS RAZI.J.. MACDP XPYUR J].IBST YCAIN BLI~ (first and ?ocond last, sccond and. last
samc~ possJ.bly the other \7ay round S econd and sa oond 10.s the same}, t - first


groups were the and last,


Y{ark on the system was dono sil~lliltanoously an . section E at Potsd£!Jil~WildpD.rk and Sisint intcrpruto.tJ.on station 5 ((N1JlST 5)) at st. As far as I remember the first messaGes iverO decoded in Februl!:ry,," 1944, by NAAST 5.' They originated f'r om the ground no twcr'lcs of VIII FiGhter ComElB.nd th, 66th (65 and 67th wing) and contained statoHunts of an administrativ~ nature, but also tactical indications, such as the chrulSC: over to Mustangs etc. Tho orisinal of every messU3c was sont to potsdam, one copy to the llJ:nWe The array [3ot bet:ter results. 'Bycaunc of those results the interception of such messages was stc.pped up considcro..bly, from about 50 200-300 mes sagea a d:J.y, with priority over other tasks. On the invasion starting, the GAF cryptanalytic section too was finally moved from Potsdam to Paris (14/3,. formerly W control 3) and close co-operation in cry!?tanalytical work was established wi th t.he mmy.. jU'teI' the start of the invasion some interesting messages about the losses of the lOlst Airborne Di vi.sion were decoded; apar-t from that the decoded mes s age s were of greater value to the krIfi:Y than to the GAF. Cryptanalysis VlUS, as far as I remember, made more difficult later by the fact that the individual service groups (armies, cOIIll!1ands) longer used the same no cipher setting, so that they had to be workGd out separately. . As far as the GJV'was concerned, therefore, each individual oornnand was rnoru.t or-ed and worked on in turn with all available resources. Good rosults wore achieved. in the case of' IX .Air Defence Command(details of A.A. units) and the IX Eng. Command(extension of airfields, offect of the V 1 bombardment on Liege airfield). The monitoring of tho notworks of tho Tactic::u Air Gornrrumds lso brought results; a c.13. the forming of tho XXIXTactical Lir CommandbocD..USO known f'r-ora a decoded messaCe.


The last

two lettors
of the day J


of group 2 were the same Di. bclonsint; to the sruUG tr0.ffJ.c







;·;0 C~hcr

Eachin'?_ (Gcl'Ilk'Ul name, syst om .PJ/i. 2)

~ A letter ci:Qhcr machine (,groups of 5), '711.ichwas used in the ~\.n(;rican commandnetworks (nrmy, Air Force (( Luftflotte) )~ Vigorous offorts wer-e made to br-eak it e spec'i.aLl.v in the I.l.TIlty. .Armyexperts considered d.ecipherment ~ possible up to the end of the "l7OX. I did not hear of any results.


-38TOP S:Er:RET IV. Allied A.~. In use, among others,
RJ\F Bor:1bE;r



'th . t he follr<rerJ_'nr: LUlits tn v"_~



US VIII Bonlier COLll;"Ic'Lnd. 3. us IX Bornbor Cou:l8.l1d. ll~ Transport units. The code in question was a 2-1cttcr Group code table, cl1flJ'lCinr; daily. ' Tho crypt~moJ_ytic sGction was u.n.der the conmand of section E and worked with 1/nest,. later V357. (Report Centro 1 • In many cases the mcasagcs 'were decouod already durinrr the courso of the o::leration, so tha.t COElli1£..nd recei~ed ir.,!!?ortant inforI!lation for the operation of its ovm fiehters (0.::;. flying altitude:s" changes of dispositions, de Lay in fishtors' arrival etc.)o CryQtD..n~J..ysis wc.s helped by capt.ur-cd codes th.::-.t often COlao in. Is~ as I remCilber, tho key was in force from 1800-18QO hours. ~ It hap~ncd fairly often t hat captured codes frQhl a/ c shot down at ni£ht wer-e r-coover-cd so prol:rptly, thcct they wore already available next at tho stm-t of the 8th Air Force 1 s operation. Thorefore, spocial instructions had been given out and oommcnda't i.on promised for the quick recovery and communioation by tole-printer of capt.ur-ed codes to 1/357.

B. Slidex


SystG1~1. In use in the army (front line units) and in ! support networks (tentacle no twor-ks }, The systOL1 'Was known frm.:J. the raorri, torine; of exercises in Groat Bri tnin before the invasion, 0.13. "Bpar-t an", Tho cI''''Jptrmulytic detachments in CLT1TIJ LmQ GAF were eb Lc to Gut so much experience on those exercises thut dcccdtinrt 'worked ";7011riE;ht at the start of tho Lnvas i.on, <..> Recovery ,rna done in tho arny a[~~dn at NitA. st 5, in tho G.AF in 14/3 (1;1 control 3). Decoding was often done \'"dtn so little do.Lay that the mos sa.jcs could be dealt with like cloar toxt in tho cv a.Luzrt Lon, The results Hero of mor-e il:f_9orto.ncc to the o. rqy thnn . ~o '~hc ~1,FJ but they pr-ovi.ded tho latter too Tli th v:~.J..u2.ble ]_l1dJ_catlO~s~. e. G. clucidat~on of the l!1diviChlal corps tentacle; no 0'1':rorksJ r'econnaa aaanco opcre.tions (e. n. 400 and 4-14 Squadrons) etc. ~ T~e ~l1eSSa8es docodcd do..ily wor-e exchanged and G .F 1n tho form of nri ttcn r'epor-t a, . a. bemeen

BisrE'L1 substitution






. 'I'ho British I,(:,p)(,rtlnr: known from cffpturod. :sri tish

.dill' 'La d.if'~ od 8.''''-'-'''1 CCl 1 '_iY",~vl'


'rrL" ,·'L.,

of Gruat



North .tfrica. Long bcf'or-e the invasion, it had boon seen fran air maps of l1estern E'urope in ,{hat Vlay tho l!~odificd SyctOL1 WO.S relC1.tud to the French [:;rid "Lamber+h Zone Hord do Ouerr-e", On tho ")CLsi£l of this knowlcd[:;o, mapa of Fr~ulCc, Ho.l.Land.,B21Cilliil, H81i[pl:md Biu1t were prG--PD.rOd for all .mny and G·,A. F. Sie;int Units with the tioClificd Systom superir.T_:?osed. Ju'tor the Landang it imrnodiately became apparent that the anvas i.on forces (Air Force and LtrWY) wer-o Giving positions accordin[s to this SyztC;i!1. l".s the maps wc had wor-ked out proved to be correct, it Wo.s possible frcrJ the vcry bcSinnin~ to read positions [:;ivcn Qccorcling to the Modified System as if they WGTe in clear. In many CQSCS it was only by this means that the wor-k of sisint (c.G. evaluation of r-cqucs t s for air support by Air SlIJ?Port Par-t.Lcs and Tentacles) was made possible. .. Irrrportant allieo. positions (Bomb-lines, positions of H(l' s ) were of ton rGoipherod again with letters. As far as I r-emember- such re:ports could not be interprotedo


Jones Tcm,plate (.American grid).

This grid Arr;w exercises

often used on i\JllE:-TicW1 Air Force in Great Britain before the invQsion. Tho>positions were given in letters and fir;uros (e.g.

such as Y 8 M 13).

point s. Nei ther the positIons,.

It was clearly a syster" with daily changing reference the l\.rrny no:r tho G. A. F. could bra ak

C. Position, Enciphf""rlncnt of Coas+a.L ~Sea Recolllli~issru'lceJ

.When Gi~ng positions, tho dcgr-ee s WOre always r-cc Ipher-ed WJ. th 'bIYOletters, the l'linutos boinc: rd.von in clear. In this syat.ora tho decrees wor-e C;i vc~ tor."othcr in a 4-lctter [;roup, in tho ordor Lat i tude - lono·itudr..; the rri.nubca in a 4-fi[1ur~ e;rOUl) , in the eano orde~ ,
( cf', .]!ago

The minutes wor-e alway" r(;.-L,l cf'f frO!,l 1 Cft t 0 rlc:;.'lts .r.·'· _v.. _ oven ..zhen vrcsf of j}recl1'1'rich. '.i'hc points of the corzpaae {East, \Test,. etc) were OIllittcd. . Originally ~h~ rccipheril1.g Has only very so Ldom chnn:Je;d. Host of tho posa t.Lons h. .....been idontified .d by sir;in.t i ~ collab~ra.tion rri.t.h the Navy and flyinS urrrt a i~ the n folloviln:::; .ro.y 8HOI1[; others :'



page 39a




R ..A.F.
010 west T



° Ost



x 53° 43' 010 50' ROTZ 431

TOP SECRET 1. By eOTI1;Qurins the ropor t of the JJritishrc~c~ o..ircr~_ftwith our O'ivnbo..ttlcreports. (pos~ t~on at the time of the report of our own submarine, our own convoy, our own r-ccoe aircrC'i't, etc.) ., By D/Fing the rrrdio traffic of the recee a~rcraft the report. By reconstructing tho course of this rccce airerai't by means of details of cou)..~se e received fran his h ground-station, cOI1\PorCdwith flying tine and speed.



Later, the rccipherment changed on the 1st and 15th of every month. This consid.erably increased tho ilifficulty of identifying positions in r-emot.e sea orea.s. But in the aroas most imPortant for nnvQl operations (at tho cnd--"O'f the War, North Sea, NOr'lmgiru1 Coastal Waters) so manyrvports were always coming in that the positions' could be broken after only a few days. Absolute safety could probably only be attained by daily change, but in practice a 5-daily change a~pcro~s to be the best solution.

VI. Traffic Signals.
A. X...Groups of th~.

The x.. gr-oups wer-e used QS traffic abbreviations RAF radio traffic (wiT). Example X 242 .Air raid e.Larrn, X 636 (?). '. Vfuat is my frequency ?



These X-GCoupsgave no security for cOl!plcte lists fell into Germanhinds almost d:::,ily fr0Y,1 aITeratt shot down,

Whenlarzer oorrtd ngcntie of the llIDoric."'l..n air force arri~Gd in Great Britain, the R1\.F carne into line with .Ar'1er~?8nS used Q-groups :in place of X-groups. arid Ihth TC8ard to security ~ tho saUG applies to tho groups as to the X-[7'oups.

had the [)" !t'orce Codc (Nav[I.lSection).

Thc suo. rocco aircrC'..ft of Coastal Oomnand used the :dr Force Code, N:>.vnl eet ion ,_.for acndan re the.' B . " ,-,~r rUDort"S RJ\F, J.n~tructJ.Ol:S sa i.d that importe.nt LlCSS~::';us were to be'\Jr~d acam, bocause tho Air ForcG Code offc cd no 5G cur aty. r :Nuv8rtholoss, L1."U1Y roports \7CrOoften Onl1 cnctipher-edon~the "d..r Force Colic rv.: y. alv:ro: ,..,tt' ,. ~ ,i,.S J.' "no """I'!.,!U.i'1S 1imrc y3 ,,;,0 ~nu copa.e a, ... pce sfb Le to s r-ead thJ.s tr['i'f~c clear text.






Usc of Callsir;ns ..kl..»l=hs.d l~ir Force ~

All eiound yviro1c:ss h wireless svatJ-ons of tel d all were ullotted fJ-xe, C .. seldom (once or tInGe 3. were kept in force even
J..' .
. ,0 '0

· D. d mcny [1.irbornc st at J-ons an tihe Hest lJ.licd Air FOTCCS a.n hJ-Q. anl.y ch"Tt{."odery h v p:ns W Uo"u SJ.u )' The freilucncics used yeer. . --'ODC cases they never longer, J-n s _ 11'" rr " and 'dOt in the usc of ca",J.t:..ns c • c1'1ane;ed. This r1.e;l. 1. Y nt much easJ.Gr, f1'Gquencics raade tho "fork of Germat; Sl.EP· : -b iblo. somctimus it ,f<J_S tho only thing wh:wh r,1adc J. poss
c: •.
O 0 0 0 0 0


in the ._-West.


Details :


call signs.
RAF and USAl,]'. 1.



The ground stations had crtllsigns owhi~h were Il1:'\~e up of 2 lotters and 1 fiGure (not 0, 2 or 4) ~ any order.

3cb, cb3,b3c,

3bc, etc.

It was no t 1?ossible on the basis o~ ?allsi~s to distinguish betYfeon AmericDJ1 and,Brl.tlsh radio stations. 2..

J,\.irbon1.~o'y'!_~cless stations. As a r-ul.e , aircraft were nllottcct 4... ottor 1 ballsiGns. Example: MRQA. The first t hrce letters

(IVRQ) ere used by 0.11 the aircraft w of a squadron or flight, the last lotter (A) beine individual to the aircraft. A different system W8_S used by Coastal, sometimes also by Training Oommand, fi[,"ltrcs be irig used to indicate tho aircraft.. \\rr.en on flights against the enemy the aircraft received different oallsigns from operation to o:poration (so-called Ops Calls).. This usc of callsigns made it oonsiderably mor-e difficult for tho GerLwn sigint to identify what units were opero.tine;. It was often only possible to find out from the troi'fics of the tlircraft returning fro)'.1ops on what ops they had been and in what strongth. F.or all other flic;hts oallsie;ns bused on the Stations wore used (so-oalled Station Calls). The station cal.LsLgns heard were for the most part known from ccp+ur-cdmdcrinl or idontified by our arm monitorin~ acrvi oo, Exact statistic3~ v7atch-ing of these crd.Lei.gns provided exact data on the strenGth of in<lividual units density of occupation .of stations, QUa. co~~ections I bomGon one station and ano'ther- (8. C;. tho fact that thero wor-omany fliGht.s fronl Nethcravon to Tomosford indicatod that thore wore definite connections'" between the at TeIIq?sford. and. .38 Group) ..



3. Deli vor~oups,
There appeared in tho mC[3:J8.[,;O proOJ"l~lCs t~~ tho networks doli very [9:'oups OOj'lposed, l~kG,. "' ground station callsigns, of 2 lotters [ll"ld, f~Q.U'1.J 1 '" -d These groupS wer-e distinQ.ushc.blc frolll In ~m.y OJ: or. . f. .. 0 2 and oallsigns in that they oontc.ined tho J.,e;UTOS ,<, ~.". The groups indioated to'livh:-,t tacticnl H.Q. the . . • . questJ.on was t 0 be f orsi'1 ar dod by the rGcG1.V~ne; .. message ari c station. Tho doli vory c;ro" ,:rere ~GO some. ext ent identified, so that they often fJ,uveindio8.t~ons of a tactical nature.


.ASAP with


TjI_F 1



and lat.Gr 1;st U§!£!E.

Whenthe 2nd TfJi' was set up in May, 1943, its ground station.s, unlike tho other air force/.units" used call signs· which always consisted of a letter followed by 2 fiQ,'lU'os, e.e. Y 48. WhOP the AEiIFU1;'.S sot up about January, 19M·, this d callsign practice was also adopted by the 9th iIF, Lat er' by 1st USTAFtoo. From that time it was poss:ble olearly to distinguish by "leans of oallsigns the una ts bC'lon,zine to the AE.AF from fill other air f'or-ce units. The /..rborne radio stations (WiT) of tho ARAF, o. Si IX Bomber Commond{had the same callsign practioe D..S described under A)"



futeYflret8.tt_on of Callsigns.

In many COBOS sigint had to interpret oullsigns 17ithout beinE able to have r-ecour-se to cnptured materic.1, prisoners' ste,toments or D:ny other sources of intclli5ence• As an exampl,e of such an interpretation I Viill quote the interpretation of the ,tireless networ-k of 38 Group (earlicr .38 Wing) which was done as early as 1942 1jlhcn this unit .... still subordinatod to ilTfi1Y Co·~oporation ilaS First of 8J.l the Triroless stations of the e;;round network whioh had been picked up were alfed. It ·was dd soovor-cd that tho Control Station was in the Net.horn.. on v area and tho subsidiary sta.tions rouvuy in tho same general area. This could not bu n close rocco Wine of .ADO, for 36 'iring was alrer:dy knovrn to be in the sano az-oa r.nd it never hcppcned that there wer-e sever-al, Win[\s in tho sphere of coranand of an kr1'1Y COEu.1D.nd. il_h~~o the groun~ to air trc.i'fic wae buinC; Donitorod, [1_. new vrrcloss stc.tJ.on was pickud up at about the S8..l:1C tu.J.G and also D/Fod in the.: Nct.horavon arc;;).: it had n.ll the vri.z-e.Lcaa char2..cteristics of ::1.11 Hq transuittcr: ~oQ.t siV1~s ~tr(m[.th, half-hourly trc.nsL1ission of the L::-rno and c~cckJ-nc numbor-, Comparisons ahowod th[;_t this i'llTcleas S Lation LUe:l.t be. Lderrt co.l, uith the control i stD.tien doscyibcd in tho abovo-ncrrt i.oncd ,r::;ro"Lmd neWork.

... 43TOP SECRET ., h v ')-''1 alrcrDft The W'lwiroless station was ].n tiouc V{J.Ld. . h "" eport" SarliC; of wha oh llsod Bar.1berCoele w en r ..... those messages were decoded and produced ovia.onc~ of transport flir;hts with freiGht-cE·..ryi.l1C; gliders :1D~OYr r . soa Wl.t 11. parae.hUlolS S c"'Y'l'ied. out • ,,_·t / h ttle or of .exor-ca c..... later, on an army exercise in tho [dr f'or-oc also p<rrticipo.ted, 38 Wing was merrt i.oncd in clcnr in connoc't i.on with freight-cnrryinc gliders. On tho basis of these' wireless data prisoners (I:c$ feI as I r-emcmbcr , of 10 Fighter Group) were asked whnt .... goiTl-C'on in tho Ncthoravon area, {as It turned out that there was a tro.ininn- Cf'Jf(iJ for parachute units not f'ar from Notheravon (Buaford"'? or Buldford ?). On the b!;1.sis of all this thlD radio netw'or1c was interpreted as 1138 Wing, Transport unit of ..t\.CG for ;::,irlanding' oper flt ions II , and the control station as the H. Q. at NethorD.von. A later cornparison wi, th captured documents in nearly every case oonfirmod these interpretations. No serious false appreciations were

made, In

t his way tho whoLc 9th Air For-co, tho 2nd TAF and other units were larsolyinterprotod long before the inv~tsion. Whon a short t imo after tho a completc set of wireless data, of the jtb. Force foIl into Geni18Il hands, it 'was found that hardly n.ny changes had to be made in the cal.Ls i gn intorprotntions that had been made , When a wi.r e.Lcas station or a whole network had boon intorpretGd in this "Way the picturo was not lost a.r:;ain even ' I when callsiC;hS wore ch~n~cd.
D. Callsie;n change.
In gener-al, oa.l.Ls i.gns wer-e changed at

5-6 morrt.hs up to the t:i.n'lC of tho invasion. From the middle of J.vj£o.y" 1944, urrb i.L tho end' of the yrro:-, no



further gGner2~ ohange s of callsi[7J.s wore observed (excoption : changes in the usc of Station Oe,lls in Coas t al ~orom8ndand with sane bomber units). The H. q•. of 2nd T1IF for oxnmpf,e thus kept the cnllsign Y 48 frou tho middle of 11103.Y, 1944, until the end of tho 'im.:r H 0 83 a r«. . , ••• ::. \.T::oup c etc. ~hG change of c2:.l1signs which took a.n ~he n1J.Cldlo of ltlay ~ 1944, 'was dono so lone; before the lnvas].on that all the Lmportant callsimns O~d mo ~ f bhe th . '. CT" ........ S l. 0 no a .c~~swore already l.ntorprGtcd ugain by the time ~he. Land-ing took I?l::,"ce, 3. o iz'cumat anco which gr-eatly assd Gen;mn s::-gl.nt. . The difficulty of the work of the German SOTVJ..CC was offocti voly incre .d b another callsign chance which took place on D-da, ~~:ClfY When there had been no cnllsisn chanrros, f y1 .~ sigint d 0.11 . '="'W or D. on[; b.Ule th rna 0 c prepara~ ions to courrt cr-arrt the effect of ' we;e e~omy mansura when J.t took place. Such propnro.tions



TIC01,vI-I09 •

, . tructj on bv 1. ListCnil1G ODCr::ltors wore g~ven ~ns ' Gvuluation offi~crs in which their attention wo.s d.r8.vm to tho irrrporto.ncCl of paying attention to tho small:~t l!1istDkos Dcdl3 by the allied wireless o:pero.tors D.~ nne time of tho oallsie;n chango. Rewards w-ere prom~scd for especially eood work at tho r8coivor. 2.' Listening op<,r~\:cors 'were



to be fmnilinr vnth every ~GculiaTity of tone and procedure. , 3. An er,1crr;cncy plan was worked out which came ~nto force on D. chanrte of callsign and envisaged o.lymy.s bringing tho be~t operators to the receivors and holding the ~ntiro evr~uating stnff availnblov
linen tl1.G expected callsic;n oho..ngodid taKe plD..ce, it was only 11 fo.,-r minutes or hours till the most i1l1port8.llt cnllsigns (RQ transmitters) were iGlontifiecl. In 24 hours abou"\;30% of t)J.c allied vfireless stations were identified, the r-omaander in tho course of the next 8-10 days by the use of D!F. All identified co.llsigns were reported forthlqith to the regimantls evaluation seotion or Chi Stelle section B by the intercept stations. There the existing interpretations wore compar-ed and o.Leared 1J±) in the case of contradictions and new call signs identified beyond all doubt innnediately brought to the knowLedge of all outffc£1.tions. Thus work as 8. whole proceeded with

employed on tho smmo traffic,


possible nlymys

a b;"eak.

The most frequent

possi'blc ways of idcm,tifyinS


were :L, Mistcl<es in p1.v1.n~ca1lsiBns. In the first period a,'tcr the Ch2J1go, the allied. 'wireless operator who had teen familiar with his callsign for months often cave tho cld c~llsie;n by mistake, then cancelled and gave 'the new sal.Ls 1.en. K 7 T •••••••• (cancel), B L 9. [nterprotation :.. K 7 Thad changed to B L 9.

'::cc;m the

2. . It was even enough if the .virelcss operator inn.dvurhmtly old and oorrected himself at once ;.. K 7 •••• or K •• (cancel) BL9 :0 let t~e' Go rraan l' t operator who knovr tho traffic l.S inside out to SOG o.t once thd K 7 Thad changed to B L 9.


8JJ.d answered

The wireless. station vm.scdlod by its iirith its n6\'1 oa', I'1'n
u: ...

old callsign

K7T v reWA v
Fromthis, too,


int qsn

it ,las clear

trrl+~ IC7T had chongod

to BL9.



K7T had answercd :My

cle:::lX'crif in the previous instance now oo.llsign is BL9 (such givc-aways wor o not unusueJ..)•. Tho wiro18ss station refers under the now co.11sir;n to a nossO-Be th".t vms tapped out under the old collsi,91, e •.g. "Cance L ray message number 13 of 0913 II. If this me ..:;o had 'been serrt by Ie?T and vias now asn cance byBL9, tho change was again evident.

It was still


6. Most HC) and many other ..,vireloss stations were ro-identified by tho tone and proceduro of the vrirolcss operators. 'That was easily possiblc because change of frequency did not take place at the srune time as the change of calls iBn.
If, by Ii1ConS of such or similnI' rLustakes, tho control st8.tion and one out~statiol1 of a network of say 4 stations had boon idcntified, thcn the lint: bearing of a D/F sot was of ton enough to re~·idontify the rcnaininc; "b;qO wirulc ss stations.


of unit suborc:.inations by usa of, Galls~-

It proved to be spocic.lly fctvourablc to sit;int that '{fireless st!ltions, wh'i ch appe ar cd in sever-al. links, used tho same cal.Ls in aJ.l networks (e.g. HQ TAF in oonmand links to tho lill.AF and 9th .AF and in links with subordinate units). Unit subordinations could be g_uickly ~o.rified from this; for which reason, too, the (7'o1J..l1.d ,nrclcs8 networks formed the best basis for operational evaluation. EXDmJ?lc;-


HQ ~ndT.AF

HQ AEAF (H 65 7)

(y 48 )

HQ i;-t"UST .i\F (L 24) With the some crd.Ls in traffic wi th suoo~dirlD.tG urii.t s , like Y L~.


HQ 85th Gr.



HQ 2nd Gr.


;:Ubolain~ units

Use of ch[mge of loc::.tion cnllsi~.

t t· us of the Cho.nges of 1oc:"l.tion of vvireless s [:'~o n . d by the f['ct thd d.11 1.E.i\F could often be reco[g1~se . . .'_ "the same c['.llsign ndvrmoe det:'..cbment COJil8 on the ~ar WJ. vh 11 . . ~ut'\vith an A or a 1 CI.}?pended. The 1ntter c<'. SJ.h~d .pf· I, .pter the mOve ,. gradunlly took over the trE!.J. J.C" "l-J,. es st"tion been completed, first of al.L the old Wl.rel s. d.isnppe~ed fIll.d then the oppen~ed change of loctLtJ.on indic['.tor (1\ or 1) wc..s dropped. Excunpl.e.. :
e, ••


c 55



D 15

c 55




;f.'Z 48


48 D 15

G 55A D 15

C 55

had liloved. once D!F'd.


Change of locr:.tion c2.llsigns were at




On the whole wht\.t was said under I about VV.T stands for the use of B/T oD.llsigns, The co.llsigns of the l£ound wireless stations wer-e never changed, those of the airborne wireless sts/!;ions seldom ohanged., The f'r-equency sets of the units were seldom chrmged. Only the 2nd Tl\F had made things difficult for the Germr.r1 sigint by repeated changes of their sets of frequencies (VHF) especially at the beginning of the I invasion •. Easily pronounceo.ble cover names were used 0.3 c~~lsigns, e.g. King Kong, X-r~y, Q~ysong. Ground stc.tions were not irronediately distinguishn.ble from airborne stations by the make-up of their cnllsigns, but, the type of tn..ffic always made it clear in a short time .. whether it was Q. q_uestion of a ground st e..ion or an t c. If ground stations wer-e subordir:w.te to o.nother ground stntion, then the subordinate stcctions used the main cal.Ls' \vith a number- at t ached., e.g. Ripsnw 1, Ripsmv 2, etc. . 1:/0 callsi_ms were usually allotted to the squadr-on in j,merican U11i t s t a the groups J in Brit i sh unit s I also to airfield wings. In the 8th US AF lo.rger units e. C. divisions, had, c,,~lsiens. ' , Flights used the squadron cc>.llsign with a colour nttached, e. G. G.:1.ysonG red. " Individu8.1 r/ c pilots reported with the squadr-on, their flight dc ai.gnat aon and their flight number,(e. g. Gr'-Ysong r-ed 2) or with the squadr-on calls ign and p~lot number n.ttached (e.g. Gnysong 32). The commander of the flying formation W1'..S called "Leader-" thus "G.."\ysong leader II etc. c, J '1 . I can remember the follo"';.nr! det nJ. s rcso.r din~: ". 5 th e lllClivid.ual units ;_ ~




RAF Fi&k!ter COl1lnwnd.

had at its disposal a cert~in nUlllber of cnllsigns which were nllotted to the sg_uo.drons stationed thore. If a sg_UD.dron ohangcd its st rrt ion, it therefore rro't one of the new st:\tion's c0J.lsigns. Thi~ system had the advnnt!'.E8 for Germm1sigint that, cl'ter the individual sta'l;ion callsigns h... been . ad identified from captured matoriru.. and. its own observt"'.t~on, the exacb strenGth of the c on the individual o.irfields ccul.d 'cie stated rrt any time. On the other hand there was the disn.dV[1JTGf'..r:o tl:aIl.t definite units could not be followed when thOY~lilovod, unless) which often occurred, the D/ c pilots the wr-ong thing .:\fter the move.

E~oh stntion



2nd Tl;F

Cc,llsign usage was not uniform. Basicclly ouch squndr-on hnd its fixed cal.Ls Lgn, On changes of Loco..ion, t these cal.Lsd.gns vrere sometimes kept on, but sometimes, too, spore onllsigns of the airfield Yrine: were used. Because of this difference in ccQlsie;n treatment., the org2nisation into individual airfield wings could not be seen through D.Seasily D.Swas the case in the Tlills of the 9th US i,F regarding group organisation (cf. para C). But the tot<ti strength of the two groups and their stations were cQvrays known, EvaluD.tion of R/T traffics was sometimes made considerably more difficult by repeated change s of sets of frequencies. 2. 2nd Bomber Group.

The 2nd Bomber Group used different callsicns fron operation to operation. R/T discipline Wf'.S very good. Its oper:J.tional activity w~s not very great, so that only few conclusions could be drawn from the few messages tho.t came in. It was possible to distinguish the individual units (lrIosquito wings, etc.) from one nncbhe r only by the fact that se t s of frequencies wore identified by captured crysto~s.


9th US Force. IX.J XIX <md XXIX T£l.cticd id.r Conu!lands •

. All squadrons nne. gr-oups had fixed ccllsi s, These ealls~gn~ wer-e known ~thout on exce.ptio~ from o~ own obaer-vatri on and from captured r.1ateri~tl. li'ron this, we could sayan every What unit (Yr.i th what "/e J.' t ,.~ fi tted out L·· . . . »t c...s f t~ ~Ghtn7ngs, Thunderbolts etc.) wes on the ~o.y. had n~t ~t ~~ePo~3~~lCt·. tell to at any timP how many squ::.:.drOll.S . n an 110 a.ori, how J!Lmy had done their first opera t aon, how Ulc'lny the ee d Tl . • -L tf . '.. . can. neae deta1ls 'Here very ~mpoJ.·\;an. or c..dV~SDlfl' . t z-anspor-t ) of'f'a oer-s cur-.ccntly. . u our ovm
ct, "'.



Example:If on days vith sunset about 1800 h~urs, 'ol-d ull squadrons had complete d th' (;1.r sec 1 o"cratl.on n.t ~ 1735 hours, then it oovJ.d be stated ',lith some o.sauz-ance that further operations were nof to be expected that d:cy and our own trcnsport could tr.".~~~ on. The indi vidurJ.. Tactical Air OOl'J[,mnds had f J.xed sets of frequencies, were exrtctly known : •. 1. frequency B 11
II 11

Group frequency. lrrequcncy of the T.:D. 0') frcqucncy of the 9th 1,F. 2nd frccLuency of' the TLC.

"_"Y' . L'__ -'-v If now, f or exnrClp a&>-, oup vn: '" .r~" on U'" by the 10, ') to the XIX TLC J this could be r-coogn.i.scd :\t once in the f'o' way :-




The ca.llsigns of the sroup's three squadrons U).1U tho (saldmil used) r;roup co.llsign no longer CDJllC up on the B and D frequencies of tho IX but of the XIX TlI.C. Oomporisol1.-nth the V-VT intercepts of the tw·o TAO networks showed the same thing :.. The group cnllsir;n had dd sappear-ed from the network of the IX TAOand appeared in the nctuor k of' the XIX TAC. of the

In this \'fr1yn11 changes in the organisation TAOsand all concentrations could be recognised. 2. IX Bomber COJIlIn<1l1d Bombar&nent Division). (or

The R/T callsigns were changed from oper-atdon to operation. The who.l,e cullsign system was devised on model lines anCl could not be elucidated in spite of every effort. Although the R/T trrLi'fics of the IX BO oould nevertheless always be recognised at once by the f'r-equcncdc s , there were not by C1 long way the same chanoe.s for sigint as, for example, in tho case of the TAOs. I It could only rnrely be s't abcd what unit was in the cdr and in what strength.


8th US Air Force.
On tho first

two [;rent


ap:}enrru1co of the 8th US Air Parae ar-ose for GermtLnsigint :_



The av.:.'.ilable ul tr<'l short'<17::Lvcecci ver-a were r dcs Lgncd for the frequoncies of the REF (100 - 125 mc/' s ) and were not adcquatie for intercepting the j,rncricon traffics (100 - 155 rlle/ s}, The Cor-man listonillG opcrdors wer-e not o.ccuaboraed to tho /.mc.Ticnn accorrt .'U1d could not cc.t ch the c.'ulsie;ns cspoci:lily.

It was SOIi1e months bof'or-o these difficulties were ovcr~m~1C. llftor the ilIllBricon c::tllsicn systcn hud been cloTJ.. ~ed, further monitoring brcuzht fOl7cr difficult' f ., than thn.t of British trm'fics. ~ a.cs




The ll1dividunl flying units (squadrons, groupS, combat vlings and combat divisions) had fixed callsigns. In cont.ras+ with all other und.t s , not tho squadron but the division call sign came up most in the 8th AF. 1\J..rcady at the end of 1943 the callsigns and most frequencies had been so far cleared up, that as soon as R/T trni'fic had bee;un, it could be st[!.ted .,hat unit


The vory o.ctivc air to air R/T traffic, e~eciully of bombers to one another, often tempted our men to cut in to tho trrtffic (,virele 68 ruse trai'fio). On 8ever£'~ occasions, det2.ilcd proposals all. this subject were sent OKL direc:tor-gencr!'~ of sign:lls·, but .uways rejected. It was feared that the results of tho listenin~ service would be exposed by using this ruse.
D. RJ.\.F Bomber Cornrnand.

oper-at ing.




As British ale nn.vigatod independenJely, the use of tr~fie was not necessary near-Ly on the samo sec.le as in the case of the VIII US B0111ber or.1!tlEtnd. t i sh C Bri c usually had only short wave R/T apparatus on board for cnrryilli3 on tn.}:e-off and lo.nding trrli'fio. For some time there ~ppeared on D. frequency of 6440 kcs a so~called raid leader (master of ceremonies) who was listened to by Cill the r:/ c t.akmg part in the The monitoring of these trn.ffios; did, it is true, bring in some interesting bits of information about the CQrrying out of ro.ids but no possibilities for tD.ctio8.1 eV8.1uD.tion. OllJ.y5 and 8 Bomber groups and the long r2nge night fiGhters of 100 group Vlorked on ultra short "\1.'8.VO. As the writer did not work in this evrd.uab i.on, he oannot give any details eboirt the use of callsig,n.s etc" But no striking results were obtained from monitorins. traffic on RJ\F daylight raids between thc bomoer s and ·the escorting fighters of Fighter Command were not picked up till very lately.




:Miscelhmeous. 1. Trni'fics of

the Air Support P3T'ties.
with the .l.J1uerican to the ~;rrl1y units

The air foroe liaison detachments o..rruy ( Support Forties) were allotted in a fixed ratio, nzcne'Iy 1~.:rmy Corp 8 In£:. Div. Armld niv,

1 ASP 1 i,EP 3 liSP's (1 for CCL, 1 for CCB, 1 for div.)

t~ the army

The J..SP~ had fixed CD..llsi[J1s·w~1.ich s vor e exclusive urn, t in ques t Ion, The l:SP of tho 80th iI'S. dJ. «, ·di· excmp'l.e n.h1<lysused, the calls -;rrn 11 Iron 1 d" v for J l· ....,_"..' no.Lau:", ThG J..ll. . VJ.OJ:8 C.:ll1S1~nSwere eome'ti nea identified by our own monltorlrlB, scnctimes known t'rom oaptur-ed material.



In September, 0. complete list of IISP co.l1siens, '.'rhich. proved. of the groatest val.ue to siGint J was capturod J.Il Al.sace , sector of the 7th US Iumy. The ASP's always used the B or D frequencies of the Tactical Air Oommandwhich supported the army and to which they wore subordinate, thus :...



trn.ffics 1. 2.



1st US .ilX:my
7th US flrmy 3rd US Army 9th US iW::DlY·


It waa therefore very easy to evaluate J'SP Yvirc1ess for the arE).y for operational pur-fioses. The occurrence of jlSP o2.11signs gave a;wf-'Y what ,di~sion vms oper-atring, The frequency used by the l.",gpl s showed what arny the division 'was subordinate to. The target D.rCD.S for wh' the llSP's onlled for air support revealed their exact area of cper at Lon,


It was not till about j;-iarch" 1945, that the 12th US Army Group OF tho 9th id.r Force changed its c9.l1sie:,TI system.= instead of fixe(l callsigns, c3..11signs were introduced into R/T trn.ffic. Since then, evaluation of R/T trnffics in tho mD..nncr escribed has no·lon/3cr been d possible. 2. RIT trn.ffic of Radar units.


Most Radar- units made their reports by wiT - if not by line. But sometimes, too, thc reports were R/TI d on shor.t wave. Towards the end of the war some sueh tr~£fios were observed also on ultra short wave in the 30-40 mcls band in the 6th US Array Group (1st USTltF) Seotor.



TI001vVI.. 109 •.




The D.ppeartU1Ce of the USAi& in GrEJ3.tBritain placed g;reut difficulties i!l tho way of sigint. Monitorincr of the J~ricans had to bo done vnth tho means available in aa.dition to th~ other tasks. Heelvy demands were 8lre8.dybeint;; n0.,de on porSOlU101 and oq_uipm.ent by other tasks. The incrcuse in wor-k '!TaE copod with by :



of periods

of duty

of intercopt

Shelvip~e of other The followin8

operD.tors and eVD.1uators.

monitoring tasks

tasks. wer'e discontinued.

or curtailed





Training. units.

Ground networks

and flyinG

Maintenance COll1J:land. d-round not1irorks. RJl.F Bomber Comrnarlo/Opcrational Traininr;

OTUI ho.d been continuously s monitored until this time bocause the OTn's sometri.inea had taken p<U't in flights over t he front, and because the German COT!:U:1:..Uld wo.ntOd to have dc't ai.Ls on these units. Moni t orins W£LS reduced to 1/3 later, 1. o , only one of the three Gr01J.p.s (91st, 92nd, 93rd) was monitored each day with the receivers aV£Li1r.\ole.

No.val TreSfics.

lIany naval rCl.dio stati-ons on the Channe L he:.d been monitored because positions of British convoys coul.d . often be discovered by this racana, and thoy could then be attacked by the G. A. F. The changed war' s i.buzrt Lon ID£Lde this monitorinG ~uperfluous. II. R!T troi'fics. or_QTU! s.'ight

i.810ng as the fighter prod.uced. v~uo.ble daba on ITill'! s.. pac acd, out b . . < these 8.cho018, state of efficiency 1 ocrrc i.ona C t c. c"" . Y I ' V{hon th e OTU S werrt over from shor-b-wavc to 111.1. a shor-t cr '" or,,-',m.vo tlley co uld no Lonzer be hear-d by tl 1.0 Gc'l.~jmnJ.nt cr cect .' ' "'1' " '"" Svav~ans. .1.1'+' 110 J.l1.teroretcr-opcr'1.--or'" '" tl 1U8 ,.1tL d e 2.V[· .r; ~ble ~ v J.l

on :mor~ wave they could easily

OTlJl s still pas sod R/T tro.ffic be monitored. This


were snor-e Y ar ter urgently nccdc:d for ,h .' ever .!lJn3rican B/T trrd'ficso


.t c , rilon~


• the


TOP' SE:CRET B. . Schools.

Other schools of nl1 kinds - "eclsoof the Fleet Air i.:r"L1 _ were now only monitored' in Nonrc.y 'by I~:r/5 (later LN. ]:I1mk2.ufkl \bt. 355).. ]:I'rom •• re:_")ortnplcked up some conclusions could be dra'im" on" loc.utions, strcn~th, end training progro..mmo of these schools. l\Ionitqrinr:: was continued in NOI'\7ay because one wanted to hove lllterprcter-radio opc.r2.tors irmned'i[dely 2:v'"-'.i1~blcin the event of on enemy landing in Non;iD.Y, and other thn.n school traffics woro only to bo heG.rd. in tho event of attacks on Norw2'.y. 'l'hus monitoring served. r8.thc..:r the purpose of continuous training of listening than of tc.ctico.1 req_uirements. III. Hiz.h-spced radio traffics

(1Yb') ..

in the west etc, probably because we looked suitable intercept D.pparatus. The frcq_uencicp on which transmitters appeared were all determined and rcported to a Special l·Ionitoring Station in or near Ber~in. I know, nowcvcr , of no results from there.
IV. Ruse uire1ess

There was no systcHl..'1.ticmonitoring of maoh ine trc..nsmiJcters, radio teleprinters



It was D. very moot :point 'irhothcr one should to dece-ive the enemy by cutting in on his R/T or WiT radio tr.:U'fic.. The opponent-s of this iclca f'car-ed thD..t this would the listcnins scrvaco and, thus endanger the oorrbinuanoe of theiL' work. On the other hand. proposals for deception vrcr-o ,'rorked out which soemed to pr craiee euccessr and uithout . .' ceang rec0Q.l1zablc as ruses. Such I)roposoJ.s wer-e co~:f~ed almost exc1usiv~ly to iUI1c::cicnn,F/T tr2.ffic, pI'lnclpnlly of tho 8th Alr Force. " . lila::: eX8.Hp1c, if \7? warrtod to cut in on the R/T t:r;o.ff:LC or the ~ 17 or Llbcrator fon:!i.."1.tions from 0. Gcrr.1Dl1. D.:.rcrnft, the arrernft would be fitted out 2 or 3 ~nrcless sets TR 5043 with tho crystals of the most J..rJp~~t::mt CGr,IDat 'wings and tho Di visionnl C.o.. froqucnc.':.os. It .~'-s proposed. t~ us~ a Ju 8B which 'would fly at a ;;t'ent hc~_;h.~ above the ~unurlCo.n fornw.tion. ,':\ll scts crY':. tal ana 'iTlr~les~ dcl.t~'. (oo.llsigns, et c, ) were Ct,vr'.ilublo. ps s, . 1ho .ldo". Vlas, on days when tho nerves of the Ancr1.ormpllots wor-e .on 'odEc Dnyliay ca o. result of the ~trong Germa.l1 defence (us at Sch'ircinfurt 1943) to the general dl' scu.i,at by curSli~ .' '":L e t.C.





"Here nrc 801".10 rror-e Gerro1CLl1. fiSh-cers, happened to our fi01.tcrs ?"

what has firod

liThe Lasf B 17 ~ the one 1c..8Cine behind, on me. It limst be a GcrmD.11. B 1711• tlI'vc had. enough SyJi zer land .. II t In o.ddition; to bo exploited.

rtm going to lQild in
any s i.tu.. o.tion as it rrro so

lUI such proposals ,-/Bra rejocted. by OKL, Direotor General of Si[_l;Th.'\ls. Ruse ... viroloss traffic on those Li.nos WD.S thorofare ncve r oar'r out in tho YTost. .

( Trona:



KUO) •

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