VIGIL INCIDENTS HISTORY

UNTIMELY IN-AIRCRAFT ACTIVATIONS CUTTER FAILURES

Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures
INDEX Summary Vigil claim of $2.2 million against Vigil developers AAD sa lawsuit against the developers of the Vigil Fatal in-plane activation Cessna P206; NTSB DEN08FA078 Further known in-plane activations Vigil activation risk chart Cutter failures Conclusion APPENDIXES NTSB report # DEN08FA078 NTSB photos crash Cessna P206 Statement Vigil about in-aircraft activations Graph crash Cessna P206 Restriction Vigil on door openings (Vigil Manual) Announcement Lawsuit Concerning the fatal crash of April 2008 Vigil claim of $2.2 million against Vigil developers 13-18 19-20 21-23 24 25 26 27-28 Page 3 4 5 6-7 8 9-11 12

FURTHER STATEMENTS AND SERVICE BULLETINS Statement misfires 2006 Statement activations in pressurized aircraft Forum discussion on open door restrictions when Vigil is on board Cutter Service Bulletins

29 30 31-32 33-42

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Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures
Summary: - During the spring and summer of 2010, a total of 6 (six) in-aircraft Vigil misfires were reported. At the moment of activation, the planes were flying almost level. Both models Vigil 1 and Vigil 2 were concerned. AAD NV issued an official statement claiming the units did what they were supposed to do. Similar statements are used in most other Vigil untimely activations. - On 19 April 2008, a Cessna P206 crashed near Mount Vernon. The crash killed two skydivers and left another skydiver and the pilot seriously injured. The aircraft stalled at 10,500 feet. The pilot was able to recover between 3000 and 2000 feet. Seconds after recovery, a reserve parachute deployed and got entangled around the tail. The reserve parachute was activated by a Vigil automatic activation device, estimated approximately around 1500 feet.1 - In September 2006 AAD sa sued IPSO and Alliance, the contracted developer(s) of the Vigil AAD, for having negligently designed and manufactured their safety devices and claimed 1.6 million Euro ( 2.2 million USD). These units are in the field. AAD sa is unable or unwilling to offer any solution. AAD did not recall these affected units. They claim that the Vigil remains to work as designed.

The NTSB report, the recent incidents, the questionable track record and the lawsuit raises serious doubts about the reliability and exactitude of both models of the Vigil AAD.

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Appendix I; NTSB Final Narrative DEN08FA078: “The skydiver whose reserve parachute had deployed and became entangled around the airplane's tail was wearing a Vigil AAD.”

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Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures
1. AAD sa lawsuit against the developers of the electronics and software of the Vigil In September 2006 The owner of the Vigil sued the contracted developer(s) IPSO/ Alliance* and Declerck of the Vigil AAD for having negligently designed and manufactured the Vigil. AAD sa claims 1.6 million Euro (2.2 million USD).2 The date of the lawsuit indicates that this is a direct response upon the mass misfire at the World Freefall Convention at Rantoul in July 2006. (Text 3.1) In an interview during the PIA Symposium 2007 mr. Smolders, CEO of AAD sa states that he is not planning to issue a recall despite the multiple misfires in planes and beyond.3 However, at the same period AAD sa sues the developers for the dangerous Vigils being around. The similar misfires with Vigil 1 & 2 prove that at crucial points the software is identical and that the same dangerous flaws in software design are back integrated in the Vigil 2. This is also confirmed by the statement of the project manager of AAD sa, mr Bollaerts. The motivation to sue was that there are dangerous Vigil units out there. An extremely worrying factor is that the users of the Vigil AADs are not informed or officially aware of this and AAD sa is unable or unwilling to modify.

In September 2006 one of our foreign subsidiaries, Alliance International BVBA, was named in a lawsuit in the Belgian civil courts by a Belgian customer for having allegedly negligently designed manufactured and assembled certain safety devices. These safety devices are not being used in our products, but were sold to a Belgian customer prior to the CLD Acquisition. The cause of the alleged defect is unknown and is being investigated by a court appointed e xpert. The damages claimed of EUR 1.6 million by the Belgian customer are currently unsubstantiated. No court hearing is expected before the third quarter of 2008. No injury has been reported as a consequence of the alleged defect. Although the outcome of this matter is not predictable with assurance, management believes that the amount of any potential damages resulting from this action would not exceed accruals and available indemnification recoverable from LSG pursuant to the CLD acquisition agreements. Text 3.1
*The team was responsible for manufacturing and design at least from the period 2003 -2006

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IPSO YEARLY REPORT page 24, 25 Link to PIA interview of February 2007 < http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=glW9qnFQvG c>

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This indicates that the Vigil still activated despite the lack of significant vertical speed. making the unit to activate at 1097 feet.The unit activated because the unit registered a vertical speed of 79MPH. Activation altitude was 260 feet above the set parameter of 840 feet.Cessna P206. the manufacturer of the Vigil. Several witnesses have stated that the plane leveled out and flew when the reserve parachute appeared. Several lawsuits have been introduced. AAD S.” “The skydiver whose reserve parachute had deployed and became entangled around the airplane's tail was wearing a Vigil AAD” The reserve deployed due to the activation of the Vigil AAD.) 3. .The unit. The known incidents of 2010 cast a doubt about the uniqueness of the 2008 accident and formed the proof that it could happen again anytime soon. Fatal in-plane activation . “ Contributing factors in this accident were the entanglement of the parachute in the elevator control system. states that: .lawyersandsettlements. . 2. This should be 840 feet. activated at an altitude of 1097 feet as the vertical velocity was over 79 Mph.11 Article: Plane Crash: Parachutist Sues for Injuries: Appendix 5 < http://www.A. Airtec. Fig 1. The vertical speed of the plane increased after the reserve parachute appeared. set in PRO mode.4 4. Airtec's report to the NTSB mentioned: "The parameters for an activation were not met at any time. That the parameters to justify activation have been met is further questionable as: 1.. NTSB Final Narrative DEN08FA078 Two skydivers killed.com/articles/10659/plane-crash-parachutist-injured. manufacturer of the Cypres AAD contradict this as onboard was a skydiver equipped with an Expert Cypres AAD. (It was only than the aircraft started to nose dive.There is a 260-foot safety margin incorporated to allow for pressure differentials and body positions. reducing the pilot's ability to regain control.html > 5 . This lethal accident took place in 2008. No other devise registered anything near vertical triggering speed (Cypres. pilot and one skydiver seriously injured. L&B).Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures 2.5 4 5 Appendix 3.

In all cases the Vigil triggered in what AAD calls “the activation zone” while the plane flew almost level or was climbing. a total of 6 Vigils fired inside the plane or during exit.com/cgi-bin/forum/gforum.search_string=vigil. In August 2010. Carolina.10 June 2010 (appendix 2) Quote 1 “The opening of the door alone should not have activated the cutter”. USA Colorado. The statement contains two quotes that give reason to serious concern: Vigil statement .14 June 2010 Vigil restrictions on door openings: < http://www. 2. Further known in-plane activations In the spring and summer of 2010. Vigil manual modification . France Narbonne. 2. Here they clearly admit they don‟t know the cause of these activations (Fig.1 Quote 2 “If you take off with an open door (even partially) nothing will happen because the pressure will be equal to the outside pressure” (Fig.guest=73836783#3876615 >> 7 Appendix 2 6 6 .Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures 3. 2. USA Belluno. Planes known to be involved were the Cessna 205 and the Airvan. France N. Italy Location Canada Canada witnesses claim right out the door left door removed (open door) Door closed Door closed In response to the incidents in Colorado the Vigil manufacturer.dropzone. USA Colorado.1) Fig 2. Italy also questionable.2 This last statement is since the activation in Belluno.2)7 Fig.cgi?post=3876615. 2010 April 14 April 14 May 2 May 8 May 8 August 6 2006 July July Type Vigil 2 Vigil 2 Vigil Vigil 2 Vigil 1 Vigil 2 Type Vigil 1 Vigil 1 Aircraft Airvan Airvan ? Cessna 205 Cessna 205 A-star Aircraft Cessna Cessna Location Narbonne. while ascending to exit altitude a Vigil activated aboard an A-Star helicopter (in French Ecureuil). AAD SA published a statement on 10 June 20106.

This may cause serious injury or death even to people equipped with other brand AADs or no AADs at all. Vigil writes in its manual. 2. Classic progression Bail-out Bail-out and other emergencies When a Vigil is aboard an emergency bail out is turning into an even more hazardous event.8 Remark: This is direct in the bail-out altitude window Fig. If a tandem is on board.3 These statements are against standard operating procedures and are dangerous. disciplines and emergency situations. The activation zone reaches from 150 feet up to 2300 feet. revised and published on 14 June 2010 7 . these recommendations prohibit the following:         The release of a wind drift indicator Accuracy jumps (classic and sports) Hop & pops Demonstration jumps Static line operations Jumpmaster leaning out of the door to check the performance of a static line student.) Affected disciplines & jumps The door of the aircraft cannot be opened between 150 and 2300 feet in order not to trigger the Vigil. 8 Appendix 4. Activation zone Vigil‟s recommendations have consequences for all skydiving situations. Opening the door between 150 and 2300 feet may involve in a parachute entanglement with the plane‟s controls and tail.4). (Tandem activation altitude of 2040 feet plus 260 feet margin = 2300 feet. published 4 days after the previous statement: “Do not open the door of the plane during the flight in the activation zone to avoid a possible pressure variation which could result in an unexpected activation” (Fig. 2.Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures In direct contradiction to the previous statement. AAD Vigil manual page 21. (Fig. 2. The pilot in command should at all times be able to order to open the door for a bail-out.3). disregarding the AADs.

 Classic progression  Bail-out Feet 1000 VIGIL PRO 500 • ARMING (150 Feet> 32 sec. 2.) 0 1 VIGIL TANDEM VIGIL PRO Fig.Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures VIGIL ACTIVATION ZONE 2500 VIGIL TANDEM 2000 1500       ACTIVATION RISK ZONE* RESTRICTIONS FOR The release of a wind drift indicator Accuracy jumps (classic and sports) Hop & pops Demonstration jumps Static line operations Jumpmaster leaning out of the door to check the performance of a static line student.4 *Zone where the aircraft door has to be remained closed upon the risk of a Vigil activation 8 .

The enclosed environment would have burned the reserve canopy severely. In both cases a skydiver pulled the reserve manually..1. 4.1. 4. Both cutters exploded to design flaws at different locations:  By the first incident this was the top (Fig 4.2 9 . 4. 4.2).4. Vigil had twice to deal with an exploding cutter.1 Fig.Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures CUTTER FAILURES 4.3. Of one out of two exploding cutter incidents. 4.5) No Service Bulletin has been issued here (Fig. Otherwise the cutters would have exploded inside the reserve container. The cutter activated during the opening sequence and exploded. 4. no bulletin was issued. 4.2)  By the second the bottom (Fig 4. Exploding cutters Vigil has a long-standing history of problematic cutters and issued 4 service bulletins about it. Vigil presents this as an isolated case. In both incidents the cutter blade could not move forward and was thus unable to cut the reserve loop. Burn mark Fig.

Vigil states that the bottom “separated” from the body. The photos of that incident (Fig.4 Fig. 10 . This is a serious understatement as actually the cutter had exploded. 4. 4. 4.3 Fig.5 Two different incidents of structural failure at different places of the cutter show that the design is flawed and dangerous. 4. In service bulletin PSB 5 of 10 October 2009.Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures Fig.2) with clear burn marks speak for itself.

when a dummy bounced.Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures 5. Failing cutters In the past Vigil issued failing cutters that were unable to cut the loop.9 9 Service Bulletin concerning failing double cutters 11 . Further testing revealed that the propellant charge of all cutters of that batch was inadequate and all would have failed when needed. The problem was discovered by Strong Enterprises during a droptest.

The company issues contradicting. 9. 12. 3. Their one liner “the unit performed as designed” versus the law suit says enough. 5. 11. 10. accuracy. Their answer is limited to adding extra limitations and recommendations via the manual. Door open at take off. The Vigil does interfere with the correct functioning of TSO‟d equipment such as parachutes and type certified aircraft. 8. The in point 3 mentioned restrictions imposes new limitations on the jump pilot in command and do also affect skydivers not equipped with an AAD. 7. By the vast majority of their huge number of untimely activations. E. The activation at the fatal crash in 2008 and the recent in aircraft activations proves that the Vigil can activate with altitude only and even when climbing. The use of an AAD should not change standard operating procedures and safety measures in aircraft. Bail-out altitude is direct in the „activation‟ zone. The Vigil is not suitable for instruction. Vigil still claims to be the most accurate AAD ever. With a Vigil. People equipped with a Vigil should not be sitting close to an aircraft door. altitude and time). Door closed at take off. 12 . The Vigil can activate even on level flights when it is getting nowhere near the vertical activation speed of 78 Mph. dangerous and illegal advices. Its patent claims 3 criteria to activate (speed. Vigil states the unit performed as designed. 2. Despite a fatal accident that killed two persons. Vigil knowingly sells dangerous and inaccurate AADs. AAD SA continues to state that the Vigil AAD works as designed and activates as intended. The Vigil remains to be prone for misfires in all aircraft (non-pressurized and pressurized alike). (Appendix 2 and 4). g. Conclusion 1. Vigil gives series of contradicting recommendations. Other AAD manufacturers formerly contest this statement. Vigil is unable or unwilling to solve the misfires.Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures 6. as if they ignore anything regarding the aerospace safety. Despite a lawsuit against Alliance. just opening the door could result in a reserve parachute/aircraft entanglement. Jump-pilots should be properly informed about the flying restrictions when having Vigil equipped parachutes on board. Disregarding all known facts Vigil remains to claim to be the most accurate. 4. swoop. or any form of low altitude exits. The constant denial and downplaying of their problems with untimely activations is unethical and extremely dangerous. Vigil claims erroneously that other AADs will activate on level flight under the same circumstances (Appendix 2). 6. the developers of the Vigil. An AAD should not activate on horizontal flight.

the pilot signaled for one of the parachutists to open the door. Somewhere between 1. the stall warning horn sounded intermittently several times. The airplane then spun or dove to the ground. The skydivers became disoriented and nauseated. fatally injured. and piloted by a commercial pilot. she told the pilot that the airplane had overshot the drop zone by approximately 1 mile. the stall warning horn sounded again. The pilot was seriously injured. Downloaded data from the onboard GPS and Automated Activation Devices worn by three of the skydivers corroborated these accounts. Narrative Type: NTSB PRELIMINARY NARRATIVE (6120. The reserve parachute on the fifth skydiver deployed and became entangled around the tail of the airplane.000 feet. Ground witnesses reported hearing the engine RPMs decrease.19) HISTORY OF FLIGHT On April 19. As the pilot started a right turn back towards the drop zone. a Cessna P206. N2537X. Inc. When the airplane reached the jump altitude. then saw the airplane spinning. the airplane leveled out for a few seconds and witnesses saw a parachute wrapped around the tail. Four skydivers managed to bail out safely.4) Surviving skydivers said that as the airplane was climbing to the jump altitude of 10. They paid no particular attention to it because they had heard it on previous flights. She sustained fatal injuries. registered to and operated by Freefall Express Skydiving.Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures *highlights added by reporter ASF Accident Details NTSB Number: DEN08FA078 Aircraft and Flight Information Make/Model Tail Number Airport Light Conditions Basic WX Conditions Phase of Flight CESSNA / 206 N2537X N/A Day VMC Descent Uncontrolled Narrative Type: NTSB FINAL NARRATIVE (6120. approximately 1615 central daylight time.500 feet agl.000 and 5. When she did. 2008. then the airplane "rolled off on its right wing" and entered a spin. was destroyed when it struck trees and impacted terrain following an in-flight loss of 13 .. The sixth skydiver was unable to exit the airplane and was found inside. but one of them broke her right leg when she struck the right horizontal stabilizer after exiting the airplane.

the stall warning horn sounded again. then "it began to spiral nose first again. The skydiving flight was being conducted under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 91 without a flight plan. When the airplane reached the jump altitude. The following is a summary of their accounts." Another ground witness saw the airplane "in a head-down spin.000 feet. As the airplane was climbing to the jump altitude of 10. The local flight originated from the Mount Vernon Municipal Airport (2MO) approximately 1530. she said she activated her reserve parachute and landed safely. the pilot signaled for one of the parachutists to open the door. I felt sick from the spinning. Approximately 3.000 feet the airplane leveled out on a westerly heading and appeared to climb. and out of control. The plane then began another series of spins. and then a white parachute seemed to come out beside the plane and catch on the tail. the stall warning horn sounded intermittently several times." That is when the witness noticed a "white reserve [para]chute caught on the tail of the plane. "We were spinning so fast.000 feet when she saw the fifth parachute. nose first. but estimated the altitude of the airplane to be between 500 and 1. The parachutists said they paid no particular attention to it because they had heard it on previous flights. Because she was disoriented. The pilot was airlifted to Mercy St. she told the pilot that the airplane had overshot the drop zone by approximately 1 mile. Missouri." A second parachutist wrote. my head was touching the ceiling. then the airplane "rolled off on its right wing" and entered a spin. The pilot and one parachutist were seriously injured. it was difficult for me to tell what direction we were facing or in what direction we were spinning." 14 . I was holding on to the pilot's seat with my left hand." Another ground witness observed the same sequence of events.Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures control near Mount Vernon. Then it started "spinning and heading nose down again. The plane leveled out and flew normal for a few seconds. "[an] indication that the [air]plane [was] slowing down for the skydivers to jump. The sixth parachutist was unable to exit the airplane and was found inside. As the pilot started a right turn back towards the drop zone. my feet on the floor. Seven ground witnesses submitted written statements. "The plane then angled 45 degrees toward the ground and fell nose first.000 feet.000 to 3. "We were holding on to each other. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The reserve parachute on the fifth parachutist deployed and became entangled around the tail of the airplane.500 feet agl (above ground level). two parachutists were fatally injured. and three parachutists were not injured. Written statements were received from all four surviving parachutists. the airplane seemed to slow or stop spinning and he observed four skydivers in the sky." She said the parachute "appeared to come put of the door and inflate beside the plane. When she did. and I was being forced to the back of the plane.000 feet." Then he saw the airplane "falling nose down and spinning." She said the airplane made a 90 degree turn to the west and she could see the parachute was attached to the tail. he noticed "a white parachute on the tail of the plane. The pilot told everyone to move aft." A third ground witness saw the airplane "spiraling downward." Three parachutists exited the airplane and parachuted to safety. and it appeared to climb. "to transfer our weight to the tail of the airplane." Approximately 2. fatally injured. and two of them were interviewed in person. Missouri. She sustained fatal injuries. John's Hospital in Springfield. A fourth parachutist broke her right leg when she struck the right horizontal stabilizer after exiting the airplane." A third parachutist said the force of the spin pushed her against the cabin." He said that approximately 5. The pilot was able to pull the plane out from the downward spiral" between 2. One parachutist wrote. One witness said he heard the engine RPMs decrease. the door frame with my right hand. "It appeared to inflate and then collapse.

He made his first solo flight on October 19.4 hours of various stalls and slow flight.n.5 hours. During this time. he was given a Freefall Express Skydiving checkout in the Cessna 182. 4. According to the pilot's logbook. Abilene. the pilot had logged the following flight time (in hours): Total Time. 2002. 2008.6 AIRCRAFT INFORMATION N2537X. 73. During this time. 236.3 Instruction received. He failed the commercial singleengine practical test on August 31. Arizona. 30. he failed the instrument rating practical test on February 26. On November 15. the pilot was given no less than 2 lessons involving 1. age 32. 2006.0 Actual instruments. This was the last recorded entry in his logbook. and received his private pilot license on August 10. On April 6. then passed it on March 14. dated October 24. It contained entries from July 13.0 Pilot-in-command. 2007. 2000. As of that date. He also held a first class airman's medical certificate. 2008. The chief flight instructor failed to respond to this investigator's request for an interview. then passed it on July 31. held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single/multiengine land and instrument ratings.9 hours of various stalls and slow flight. "Must wear corrective lenses." A photostatic copy of the pilot's logbook was submitted for examination. 2008. 42. 1964. It was equipped with a Continental IO-520-F-9 engine (s. On November 12. During this time. 2007. 2007. with the limitation. the pilot began his flight training at Elmdale Airpark (6F4). the pilot enrolled in Pan Am Flight Training Academy's instrument and commercial curriculums at Deer Valley Airport (DVT). only flight instructor applicants are required to have spun an airplane (or had a spin demonstrated).0 Cross-country.9 hours of various stalls and slow flight. the pilot was given no less than 12 lessons involving 17.n. all-metal. constant speed propeller (m. 2007.9 hours.5 Multiengine. 55. a model P206 (s. P206-0037).0 Simulated instruments.3 Night. At the time of the 15 . driving a McCauley 3-blade. At no time during his training in either Abilene or Phoenix was the pilot given spin instruction.2 hours of various stalls and slow flight. he logged 66 hours in the Cessna 182. During this time. 553089). 278. 222.Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures PERSONNEL (CREW) INFORMATION The pilot. Between that date and April 5. he flew skydivers in the Cessna P206 and logged 8. the pilot had no less than 18 lessons involving 18. all of which was flying skydivers. the pilot was given no less than 6 lessons involving 7. 2007. Texas. According to the various FAA practical test guides. 2007. 2007. According to the aircraft's maintenance records. then passed it on September 2. to April 6. He failed the commercial multiengine practical test on July 24.227. Phoenix. According to this document.5 Single engine. 2001.n. 2007. D3A34C402). and received its FAA airworthiness certificate on December 11. the last annual inspection of the airframe and 100-hour inspections of the engine and propeller were accomplished on May 18. 73. 320. was manufactured by the Cessna Aircraft Company. at a tachometer time of 3. 2007. dated September 2. 2007.5 Flight simulator.

dew point. 78-05-06.95 hours since major overhaul. the airframe and engine had accumulated 4. 405 hours ago A. encoder. Other anomalies that were uncovered by the inspector were: A. pitot-static system. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION The following Aviation Routine Weather Report (METAR) was recorded at Springfield-Branson Regional Airport (SGF). 17 degrees C. visibility. Approximately 1543:23. due every 100 hours.D. sky condition. 2006. At 1601:15 recorded groundspeed began to drop below 58 mph and fluctuate between 34 mph and 78 mph. respectively. due every annual inspection. 290 degrees at 10 knots.45. last complied with on July 6. sea level pressure 1038 mb. The first tracklog began at 1028:06 (a previous flight) and ended at 1218:02. At 1606:20..94 inches of mercury. At 1605:28. and 2 tracks were recorded on April 19. Springfield. 76-07-12. tracklog data indicates that the aircraft initiated a right hand turn to the southeast with groundspeeds well below 59 mph. 7 degrees C. Vernon Municipal Airport. 2006. tracklog data indicates that the aircraft course changed 90 degrees in one (1) second. Track 02 recorded "groundspeeds above 58 mph with motion on a northerly course" over Mt.D. 85-10-02.2 hours. at 1552: Wind. Five (5) seconds later the airplane changed 90 degrees in three (3) seconds to a 16 . last complied with July 6. 2006. 33 user defined waypoints. due every 100 hours. last complied with July 6. 2008. seat rails. 8 user defined routes. altimeter. Missouri.D. 21 months ago Other recurring inspections that had expired were the transponder. induction air box inspection. According to the FAA principal airworthiness inspector who had been recently assigned to Freefall Express Skydiving.621. The engine and propeller had accumulated 1. tracklog data indicates that the aircraft made a sharp right hand turn to the north. FLIGHT RECORDERS The airplane was equipped with a Garmin GPSMAP 195. which was sent to NTSB's Vehicle Recorder Division for download and analysis. temperature. 2006. The second tracklog began at 1256:04 and ended at 1606.7 and 4. At about 1605:01.302. and the emergency locator transmitter check (see FAA Form 1360-33. attached). and altimeter tests. fuel system inspection.Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures accident. followed by another sharp right hand turn to the south one (1) second later. Recorded groundspeed during the next 3-4 seconds varied from 246 mph to 187 mph.394. "Recorded track data indicate that the aircraft maneuvered in the immediate vicinity of the airport for approximately 18 minutes before turning to a northwesterly course. neither the engine nor the propeller were certificated for the Cessna P206. Bendix ignition switches. Tracklog data indicates that the aircraft traveled on a southeasterly heading for the next 5-seconds at groundspeeds between 18 and 162 mph.500 feet.7 and 440. 29. 405 hours ago A. According to the GPS Factual Report.. remarks. 21 months ago A. few clouds at 3. 10 statute miles (or greater). last complied with on July 6. 87-20-03.D. to a southwesterly heading. due every annual inspection.

Calculated average groundspeed and course during the last 3 seconds of recorded data were 81 mph and 226 degrees true. The other deceased skydiver was wearing an Cypres-USA AAD. and two (2) seconds later changed back to a southwesterly heading. which lasted 23 minutes. The unit was removed from the airplane's instrument panel and sent to NTSB's Vehicle Recorder Division for readout. Germany. cylinder head temperatures. It is an audible altimeter and freefall computer. and other parameters. Deland. The airplane was also equipped with an J.223. According to Airtec's report. respectively. there is a 260-foot safety margin incorporated to allow for pressure differentials and body positions. Preliminary (filtered) data was graphed by Vigil USA.P. will automatically deploy the reserve parachute at a preselected altitude if the skydiver hasn't already done so or is unable to do so. The unit did not detect a vertical speed higher than 35 m/s (79 mph) below 750 feet on the second flight of the day and therefore did not activate. Bad Wunnenberg. was approximately 3. According to graphs attached to this report. The Vigil AAD has three modes: PRO. feet. She exited the airplane and deployed her reserve parachute at 1. W093 degrees. Instruments EDM 700 Engine Analyzer/Monitor." manufactured by L&B of Germany. the reserve parachute will deploy at 840 feet (256 meters) if the freefall speed is equal to or greater than 78 mph (35 m/sec). Times and distances indicate the skydiver was in the descending aircraft.000 feet. "Pro Track" data indicates the maximum altitude attained was 10.576 feet. 04. Belgium.470. The parameters were within normal operating limits throughout the flight. The recording ended at an altitude of 155 feet. Inc.220 meters (10. 53. this cancelled its sensing of the freefall velocity. Ohio. The AAD senses freefall speed and. Lebanon. Two flights were recorded on an unknown date (the unit does not have a calendar function).097 feet. fuel used. oil temperature. freefall time.100 feet. Vigil. Florida. The AAD deployed the reserve parachute at 1. The remainder of the tracklog data indicate that the aircraft entered a right turn before recording ceased 16-seconds later. maximum altitude attained was 10." Since witnesses said the airplane recovered from the spin momentarily approximately 1.Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures northwesterly heading. and the raw data was analyzed and graphed by Advanced Aerospace Designs. The unit should have activated approximately 1. The final recorded GPS location was recorded at 1606:45 and placed the airplane at N37 degrees.500 feet) agl. Time spent in freefall was 91 seconds. 17 . reaching a maximum speed of 101 mph. In this mode. According to these graphs. The unit shut itself off automatically after 14 hours total running time. It was set in the PRO mode. The surviving skydiver who was seriously injured was wearing an audible altimeter "Pro Track. and TANDEM. AADs also record data that can be downloaded.886'. "The parameters for an activation were not met at any time. The skydiver whose reserve parachute had deployed and became entangled around the airplane's tail was wearing a Vigil AAD. It is worn on the skydiver's hemet. manufactured by Airtec Safety Systems. and distributed by SSK Industries. and battery voltage parameters. the readout included exhaust gas temperature. It gives altitude warnings and tracks the skydiver's freefall speed. The highest altitude recorded on the second flight." Most of the skydivers were wearing Automatic Activation Devices (AADs).. STUDENT. and creates a digital logbook.966'. if exceeded. fuel flow. The Cypres AAD will deploy the reserve parachute at 750 feet (229 meters) if the freefall speed is equal to or greater than 79 mph (35 m/sec). According to the company.85 feet.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION The pilot submitted a written statement to the effect that he had not regained cognitive skills and could not recall the accident. Full power was achieved and no anomalies were noted. Narrative Type: NTSB PROBABLE CAUSE NARRATIVE The pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed.) CAS. 53.) CAS. There were chops marks on several tree limbs. The airplane impacted trees and terrain on a magnetic heading of 285 degrees. and 093 degrees.955' North latitude. reducing the pilot's ability to regain control. TESTS AND RESEARCH On June 19. In addition to the Federal Aviation Administration.) and 62.g.g.g. respectively. Neither Lawrence County or the State of Missouri requested autopsies on the two deceased skydivers. In a 60-degree bank. The parachute lines were not binding the elevator or rudder. the stall speeds should have been reduced to 63. resulting in an inadvertent stall/spin. the engine was successfully test run at the facilities of Teledyne Continental Motors. manufactured by Stene Aviation. Alabama.920' West longitude.1 mph (aft c.g.) and 88. In a 60-degree bank.Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The accident site was at a location of 037 degrees. Mobile. According to the Cessna Aircraft Company.g. and came to rest in a nose down. the stall speed is 98 mph CAS. With the installation of the Sportsman STOL kit.g. Montana. Polson. under the supervision of the National Transportation Safety Board.) to 10 per cent (aft c. The statement was recorded by his wife. parties to the investigation included the Cessna Aircraft Company and Teledyne Continental Motors.2 mph (aft c. The kit extends the wing leading edge cuff. 2008. stall speed reduction of 8 per cent (forward c. According to a company spokesman. respectively. Flight control cable continuity was established. 18 .16 mph (forward c. adding wing area and thus reducing the stall speed and dampening stall characteristics without an attendant increase in drag.48 mph (forward c. the clean configuration stall speed of the Cessna 206 in a wings-level attitude is 69 mph calibrated airspeed (CAS). slightly inverted attitude of approximately 105 degrees. Contributing factors in this accident were the entanglement of the parachute in the elevator control system. the stall speeds should have been reduced to 90. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION N2537X was equipped with a Sportsman STOL (short takeoff and landing) kit. 04. and at an elevation of 1.232 feet msl.) can be expected.

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1 24 .1.Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures APPENDIX 3 Fig.

Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures APPENDIX 4 25 .

Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures APPENDIX 5 26 .

Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures 27 .

Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures *highlights added by reporter 28 .

Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures 29 .

Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures 30 .

Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures 31 .

Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures 32 .

Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures 33 .

Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures 34 .

Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures 35 .

Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures 36 .

Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures APPENDIX 2 “2 37 .

Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures 38 .

Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures APPENDIX 3 39 .

Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures 40 .

Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures 41 .

Vigil untimely in aircraft activations and cutter failures 42 .

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