FRIENDS OF KELLY AYOTTE, et al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) CASE NO. 2010-CV-501 JUDGE JOHN J. MCCONNELL

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RULE 59E RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT Now Comes Plaintiff to issue a thoroughly-documented set of facts that indicate where the Court did not address salient facts while dismissing this case prior to onset of Discovery. I. Relevant Background of Unethical Conduct. This case began amidst a showing of bad faith and questionable ethics on the part of the initial Court when Magistrate Judge Landya B. McCafferty and opposing counsel Jennifer Parent and Jack Middleton (and presumably Nashua PD counsel Brian Cullen) all failed to disclose the fact that Magistrate McCafferty worked under Jennifer Parent and Jack Middleton for the law firm of McLane, Graf. Her period of employment at McLane, Graf immediately preceded the arrival of Defendant Kelly Ayotte, and both McCafferty and Ayotte were managed by founding partner and litigation chair Parent. At the outset the Court made every possible factual determination possible against Plaintiff in spite of the following facts as noted in Plaintiff’s Memorandum for 27 October 2011 Telephonic Conference showing that Magistrate McCaffferty: a. Was potentially ethically compromised or conflicted. b. Failed to disclose such potential compromise or conflict as required by standards of professional practice and codes of Judicial Conduct. c. Glossed over the “acrimonious past” of Defendant Kelly Ayotte and Plaintiff without mentioning the racial and First Amendment context of the past, when Plaintiff prevailed against Defendant Ayotte as NH AG against criminal charges that were arguably frivolous as Southern NH NAACP Legal Chair. d. Issued every adverse ruling or inference possible on the facts and law against Plaintiff, ignoring the fact that former U.S. Marshal Stephen Monier threatened to call the Manchester Police even though the video evidence clearly showed Plaintiff was standing on the sidewalk at the time. In spite of the clear-cut duty to report the working association and to recuse


herself (McCafferty recused herself from several other cases during the same time period) McCafferty and Judge Paul Barbadoro instead initially insisted that Plaintiff’s Rule 28 USC §455 Motion was “completely without merit.” Despite the presence of conflict the Court never fully addressed the fact that McCafferty’s Report and Recommendation should have been Voided from the Record. When Plaintiff called for Judge Barbadoro to Certify his Decision denying Plaintiff’s Motion in that regard, Judge Barbadoro instead immediately recused himself (citing to an association with former U.S. Marshal Stephen Monier) as did all other NH Federal Judges without explanation, in spite of the fact that Plaintiff had never sought their recusals. II. The Case Caption.

The proper Case Caption should be: Christopher King a/k/a v. Friends of Kelly Ayotte et al, as reflected by Judge Paul Barbadoro’s Recusal Entry.


The Judgment entered on 5/17/2012 must be reconsidered in light of the following facts and issues: First of all, the Court outlines some of Plaintiff’s background but failed to

mention that he was also the Southern New Hampshire NAACP Legal Chair when he faced failed criminal and ethics charges by Defendant Ayotte. He sat through voir dire and was ready to try the case of Attempted Felony Extortion when the State buckled and issued a nol-pross to avoid an eventual lawsuit after Plaintiff would have prevailed


at Trial. It is an inescapable fact that those charges were steeped in a First Amendment, racial context as noted in Fn 1, infra. Second, it is crucial to remember that this case was dismissed on a Motion to Dismiss level, without benefit of any discovery whatsoever. What if Plaintiff’s sought discovery resulted in a finding that the GOP alternative press policy was to include any and all alternative press? Then we would have a deviation from that policy that, when coupled with the prior history of Defendant Ayotte’s prior failed attempts to restrict Plaintiff King’s First Amendment Rights, could prove probative of racial animus.1 Nothing is threadbare and these are not “bald assertions per Iqbal or Twombly. In contrast, from what we have available in a pre-discovery context we have seen a series of actions or inactions by Defendant Ayotte that a reasonable trier of fact could readily conclude involve race, just as one of the court observers opined in the movie seen on YouTube “I definitely believe it was racial.” (Exhibit 1). In addition, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint should have been granted because the facts contained therein help Plaintiff hurdle the Iqbal and Twombly thresholds against both the Political Defendants and the Nashua PD Defendants.2 As noted in Plaintiff’s Memo for 27 October 2011 Telephonic Conference: 1. Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint vis a vis Rule 15(A)(2): a. Is it potentially defamatory for a U.S. Senator to claim to the entire U.S. Senate and U.S. House that someone who holds a law degree from the same top 50 law school as His Honor (Case Western Reserve) has “filed frivolous lawsuits” against her when in point of fact there is

Defendants were quick to argue that Defendant Ayotte was entitled to Prosecutorial Discretion and Immunity with respect to her attempts to imprison Plaintiff as NAACP Legal Chair when he exercised his First Amendment Rights to issue a simple Demand Letter in the Willie Toney matter. However that analysis is perfunctory and limited: A Jury is still free to conclude in this Civil Case that her actions taken against a leader of the Nation’s Oldest Civil Rights organization demonstrate clear cut racial animus 2 The Court, held that the Third Amended Complaint was immaterial and issued commentary in a footnote about Plaintiff allegedly failing to cure deficiencies. The events noted in the Third Amended Complaint all occurred AFTER the Court granted the Second Amended Complaint so Plaintiff could not have noted them prior to such time. It is not clear to Plaintiff where exactly he has demonstrated a “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed” but perhaps he did miss a thing or two because he was so busy addressing the blatant ethical violation that went unmentioned in the Court’s Order filed 17 May, 2012.


no such specific finding of fact or law?

b. May Plaintiff Amend his Complaint to include the pattern, policy and
practice Monell fact that another independent reporter who has covered this case was wrongfully and arrested for trespass by the Nashua PD and subsequently found Not Guilty by bench trial? This given the fact that they ran him out of an entire hotel in similar fashion to the way they ran Plaintiff out of the Crowne Plaza, chilling his First Amendment Rights as caught on KingCast video. This given the fact that Defendant Nashua PD counsel Brian Cullen stated in his own filings that the case at bar involves application of the trespass statute to an independent reporter.

c. May Plaintiff Amend his Complaint, with or without the Affidavit of
Mike Gannon or Pamela Reynolds, to note that Nashua PD uttered the words “You are a YouTube sensation” to Mr. Gannon as they tackled him and maced him after they saw him running hand held video of two Detectives on Canal Street. This particularly in light of the First Circuit ruling of Glik v. Boston.3 Wachsberger v. Pepper, 583 A.2d 77 (1990) informs this case: HN2: Although leave to amend a pleading lies within the sound discretion of the trial justice, R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 15(a) liberally permits amendment absent a showing of extreme prejudice. The court's liberal interpretation of Rule 15(a) encourages the allowance of amendments in order to facilitate the resolution of disputes on their merits rather than on blind adherence to procedural technicalities….Aside from the trial justice's misplaced reliance on delay only, there was no evidence that suggested that the Peppers and Tenev would be prejudiced by allowing Wachsberger to amend her complaint. The trial had not commenced, there was no allegation that witnesses were lost, and the Peppers and Tenev could not have been surprised by Wachsberger's further specification of fraud since it was alleged in her original complaint. The Peppers and Tenev failed [**7] to carry their burden to show they would be substantially prejudiced under our decided cases; therefore, we believe the motion to amend should have been allowed. In this case there was no delay whatsoever. The Plaintiff raised these issues in timely fashion and Defendants, rather than face them head on, are attempting to hide from them but they are clearly valid concerns.


Again, it must be noted that virtually all of Mr. Gannon’s YouTube presence exists because of KingCast videos. This type of antipathy toward the First Amendment should be heard by a Jury as far as intent to interfere with Plaintiff’s Substantive Right to gather and to disseminate news regardless of, but also contemplative of, unlawful racial animus.


SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES FRIENDS OF KELLY AYOTTE – POLITICAL DEFENDANTS A. First Amendment Analysis4 The Court stated that Plaintiff failed to establish state action with respect to the

political defendants while erroneously stating that Plaintiff is not entitled to any discovery because he could not make the Defendants fit into any of three (3) general categories. Plaintiff did in fact meet his burden but the Court failed to acknowledge it. There is no direct case law on point cited by the Defendants or the Court, in which a reporter could not attend and observe when an event is being held. The oft-cited New Hampshire case of Kay v. Bruno 605 F. Supp 767 (1985) is simply not on point as Plaintiff has stated on numerous occasions, this time from his Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Ayotte’s Motion to Dismiss: The Defendants’ touted case of Kay v. NH Democratic Party is materially different and a red herring, a fact that will be thoroughly explained throughout Plaintiff’s Pleadings because Kay determined only that: “with regard to the free speech and association claims, we find no basis for appellant's asserted First Amendment right to speak at the party meeting. " Kay, 821 F.3d 21. Plaintiff is of course not looking to take to the podium, but rather to attend and to report, as the ONLY MINORITY REPORTER PRESENT AT ANY OF THESE RALLIES. The Court also cited to Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2011) but that case does not involve the First Amendment Right of a Reporter to attend political rallies, but rather a case of a private bus driver who allegedly abused a child in a public school district. That is an apples-to-oranges comparison at best. Further, the Court failed to cite to Plaintiff’s case law which is closest to being on point, again given Plaintiff’s background as Southern NH NAACP Legal Chair that the Court completely ignored, but which a Jury is certainly entitled to consider when addressing the relationship between the parties and motivational animus.


We don’t even know what arrangements the Nashua PD had while they were at this private event. They were wearing uniforms so taxpayer dollars are likely being expended for the private Nashua events.


Further, the Court’s cited case of Cape Cod Nursing Home Council v. Rambling Rose Rest Home, 667 F.2d 243 (1st Cir 1981) does not involve a Reporter’s Right to observe and report, but instead involved an area not consonant with mass general public use for political rallies, such as the Crowne Plaza. While Plaintiff is quite certain that the measure of permitting and licensing of a nursing home is quite substantial, it fails on the public policy prong of this analysis and cannot be used for this particularized evaluation. In sum, “The entrance into a nursing or rest home is hardly a "traditional public channel of communication."(Cape Cod at 240). But a political rally, however, open to the public and press by mass invitation, is precisely such a venue. It is crucial at this point to again go through the careful analysis offered by Plaintiff on prior occasion before this Court, but which was not addressed in the Decision: As stated above, NAACP v. Thompson, 648 F.Supp. 195 D.Md.,(1986)(issued AFTER Cape Cod, supra, is a case factually similar to the instant action. In Thompson, the Court held that blacks may attend -- but not actively participate in -- the KKK rally at a private home.5 The Court attempted to downplay the relevance and significance of Thompson at Fn. 7 by stating “that case involved a county-issued permit system used to exclude certain members of the public based on race. The active state involvement critical in Thompson simply does not exist here.” That is not accurate because both cases involved the issuance of facially-neutral permitting for host venues that was then misused by host venues to discriminate. In this case we have places of public accommodation that could not operate or house the events in question without substantial licensing and permitting being used to unlawfully discriminate. Once again, note that Thompson even reached into the private residence realm where Plaintiff in the case at bar is taking a substantially more moderate approach contemplated by Pruneyard, Thompson and the other cases cited below, including but not limited to Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972).
It is critical to note that Plaintiff made it clear he was not seeking access to political events held at a private home, even though he believes he is entitled to that as well. Instead, in trying to take a reasonable ground, Plaintiff asserted that because of the plethora of licensing and permitting required for places like the Crowne Plaza or the VFW provides a cause of action, particularly when coupled with Police presence contemplated by Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972).


Courts must reasonably consider persuasive law from another Federal Jurisdiction in order to compare apples-to-apples and when it does, the yield supports Plaintiff: As NAACP v. Thompson, 648 F.Supp. 195 D.Md.,(1986) shows Plaintiff has a certifiable constitutional question, the Court can take Judicial Notice that the VFW and Crowne Plaza have to have State and Local permits (liquor, lodging, food & beverage) to operate so there has to be a legal analysis conducted to see whether the amount of permitting and licensing equates to the type noted in Thompson, as Thompson used the Pruneyard rationale the same exact way that Plaintiff used it in the TRO hearing, much to the chagrin of Attorney Middleton: It bears repeated emphasis that we do not have under consideration the property or privacy rights of an individual homeowner or the proprietor of a modest retail establishment. A handful of additional orderly persons soliciting signatures and distributing handbills in connection therewith, under reasonable regulations adopted by defendant to assure that these activities do not interfere with normal business operations ... would not markedly dilute defendant's property rights. Pruneyard at 78, 100 S.Ct. at 2039 (citations omitted). And the law is exactly as Plaintiff urged the Court to adopt earlier, distinguishing the Kay NH case because Plaintiff is not looking to participate, but rather to observe and to ask a few questions. See Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Maryland Chapter v. Town of Thurmont, MD. 700 F.Supp. 281 (1998) (at leagle). That case held that the NAACP -- much like the Kay Plaintiff -- cannot barge in and command a place on the dais, but that's just common sense. An excerpt from Thompson from a 4 Nov. 2010 Journal Entry that Defendants read: Nor do plaintiffs challenge the Klan's right to hold private, members-only, segregated meetings on private property. Rather plaintiffs contend that the exclusion of individuals from a public rally on private property which is *203 authorized by, and may not be held without, a county-issued permit, is unconstitutional. That language virtually tracks the language set forth by Plaintiff from the podium at Oral Argument on the TRO but without explicit persuasive legal case citation, as Plaintiff had not yet read Thompson his common sense told him that such an argument is reasonable, and indeed it is reasonable. As to the level of State and Local permitting involved at all three facilities herein, it is substantial – food, liquor, beverage, lodging, entertainment -- and needs Discovery to address, provided that the Court embraces the concept of fairness and equality.6

As far as the type of Interstate Commerce involved, there is also of course a little thing called the Dormant Commerce Clause that Defendants might want to brush up on, giving the Federal Government powers to regulate activities involving Fundamental Rights. See generally Heart of


As a New England Zoning and Entitlements manager Plaintiff has worked on some of the same projects (e.g. Omnipoint v. City of Nashua) as Defense Attorney Parent for OmniPoint, and he worked at the Crowne Plaza while he was suffering under a series of bogus, racially-motivated and failed prosecutions brought by Defendant Ayotte. Plaintiff is therefore aware of many permits and licenses involved, particularly at the Crowne Plaza and VFW locations, which of course makes it necessary to engage in discovery as to those matters, meaning that the Motion to Dismiss on the matter is entirely specious. From Pruneyard at 81, 100 S.Ct. at 2040 (citations omitted)...... It may well be that Mr. Kelly, by opening his private farm property to the public for a Klan rally did not bestow upon attendees of that rally any right to speak during that rally or to require the Klan to call upon anyone to speak at the rally other than as the Klan desired. But, herein, plaintiffs do not seek the opportunity to speak at such a rally; rather, plaintiffs complain herein of being excluded entirely from attending such Klan rallies.7 ............But, “by choice of its owner,” the property was, on the occasion of each Klan rally, made “open to the public.” Having made that “choice,” the private property owner cannot complain that he has been deprived of his privacy, or of his freedom to use his own private property as he desires, if he is required not to discriminate among the members of the public by excluding all persons belonging to a particular race or to a particular religious group. A private property owner can surely invite whomever he selects to attend a private gathering on his property. But when he offers his private property to the public, he has placed himself in a position which enables the government, if it so desires, to impose certain requirements upon him.8 If, as in Pruneyard and in Hudgens, a state or federal statute can require a shopping center owner to permit certain solicitation or picketing within the shopping center, then there would appear no federal constitutional barrier to Frederick County requiring the Klan to hold an open-to-all, non-racially, nonreligiously discriminating, public rally on private property before issuing a permit. KingCast submits that such an analysis is entirely consistent with principles of Heart of Atlanta, supra. Lastly, Justice Rehnquist added in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972),
Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 7 KingCast note: That is precisely the distinction Plaintiff is making between Kay v. Bruno, 821 f.2d 31 (1987), and his desire to merely be present and to gather news.

KingCast note: Plaintiff’s offer of compromise made in Open Court did not include the Ayotte home. It was, and is, a valid attempt to balance private property rights against matters of public interest as noted in Thompson, supra.


Lastly, as to Defendant’s specious claim that they are immune from liability because they are not State Actors, Plaintiff states the following. First, as in the words of U.S. Supreme Court Justices – William Rehnquist -- in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972), Our cases make clear that the impetus for the forbidden discrimination need not originate with the State if it is state action that enforces privately originated discrimination. Shelley v. Kraemer, supra. Secondly, and equally as important, whether state action is implicated is a factually matter that cannot be summarily determined on a Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff has sufficiently pled that state action was involved in order to survive the minimal hurdle of F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).


42 U.S.C. §1981 – It is not disputed that Nashua PD on both Nashua events stated

on video that they were following the orders of the Political Defendants. Therefore they were of course working together and acting in Concert with respect to the Constitutional and Statutory deprivations. The Court’s opinion does not address the fact that an accepted RSVP is indeed a form of a contract. See Plaintiff’s cited case of Williams v. Le Crewe De Spaniards, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4852 (Appendix A). There were open invitations issued on all three initial instances giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims in this case, and a very specific RSVP at the third event at the American Legion as noted by the Nashua Telegraph.9 The following excerpt from Plaintiff’s Memorandum provides a salient analysis: *****************************

Defendant’s arguments concerning Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. §1981 claims are equally as unpersuasive. Again, Defendant appears to overlook the salient fact that an offer to purchase a ticket for entry to an event constitutes a contract within the meaning of the Statute, which is to be construed liberally, in order to effectuate

The Decision entered May 17, 2012 at p.2 incorrectly states “because the general public was invited, he too was entitled to attend.” No. Time and time again, Plaintiff has made it clear that the gravamen is the fact that the media were all invited to attend, and all white media with no prior racially-involved events with Defendant Ayotte, were allowed to remain while Plaintiff was summarily escorted out or refused entry.


the remedial intent of the legislation. ***************************** While enunciating such phraseology the Court in actuality took quite a different approach that has Unconstitutionally prevented Plaintiff from engaging in Discovery toward a Trial on the Merits. The Court must take Plaintiff’s assertions at full face value as a Jury might find and it must not, in the face of Iqbal and Twombly, ignore the wellplead background that may indeed tend to show unlawful racial animus in the eyes of a reasonable Jury. From Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint: 29. The Actions complained of herein are the byproduct of pattern, plan and

practice of unlawful racial bias that has been applied by Kelly Ayotte and her witnesses against Plaintiff and other strident black males for the past half-decade. a) Kelly Ayotte, tinged by unlawful racial animus, did bring NH Hillsborough Superior Case 2005-E-430, an Unauthorized Practice of Law case against Plaintiff as NAACP Legal Chair without any basis in New Hampshire Law.10 Plaintiff had written a simple Demand Letter, which he signed as “Christopher King, J.D.” (not Christopher King, Esq.) regarding a black man named Willie Toney who faced three (3) drawn guns and a visual body cavity search for LOITERING, a charge he beat pro se. The applicable Statute read: 311:1 Right to Appear, etc. – A party in any cause or proceeding may appear, plead, prosecute or defend in his or her proper person, that is, pro se, or may be represented by any citizen of good character. For the purposes of this section, a citizen shall be presumed to be of good character unless demonstrated otherwise. Plaintiff was a duly-licensed Notary Public and therefore a person of good character, ipso facto. Further, Plaintiff’s conduct was squarely protected by established Case Law including, but not limited to, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). b) Kelly Ayotte, tinged by unlawful racial animus, coordinated with, and assented to the failed prosecution of Plaintiff for Attempted Felony Extortion based on the same common nucleus of operative facts. Plaintiff Demanded a Jury Trial in that matter and went through voir dire, but the State instead nol-prossed the case so that Plaintiff could not sue for Malicious Prosecution. Jaffrey Police Chief Martin Dunn was fired and his Prosecutor, Bill Albrecht, resigned under a pending Ethics Investigation. c) Kelly Ayotte, Prosecutor Albrecht and Martin Dunn did, tinged by unlawful racial animus, bring such cases after repeated requests from Plaintiff to come before them and the Grand Jury to explain the relevant law but they all ignored him. d) Kelly Ayotte, tinged by unlawful racial animus in her attempts to punish Plaintiff, did in fact violate the Rules of Civil Procedure as determined by Hillsborough County Superior Court Judge Groff, 6 October 2006. e) Kelly Ayotte, tinged by unlawful racial animus, did in fact file Case No. 430

May the Court and Defense Counsel take Judicial Notice that the NAACP is the United State’s oldest Civil Rights organization, dedicated to forwarding the concerns of people of color.


before she gave Plaintiff a copy of an audiotape crucial to her alleged case, violating principles of the Best Evidence Rule, Procedural Due Process and Substantive Due Process. f) Kelly Ayotte, tinged by unlawful racial animus, did in fact file Case No. 430 before she gave Plaintiff a copy of a CD crucial to her alleged case, violating principles of the Best Evidence Rule, Procedural Due Process and Substantive Due Process. g) In said case Kelly Ayotte was never compelled to answer any of Plaintiff’s requests for Admission or Proposed Stipulations and Findings of Fact, however she did dismiss the case immediately after Plaintiff filed said Stipulations as part of his Memorandum Summary Judgment. h) Kelly Ayotte, tinged by unlawful racial animus, did in fact file and maintain Case No. 430 and did argue newly-enacted law, specifically then HB 1768 vis a vis Chapter 311, in direct contravention of ex post facto principles of Constitutional Law, the case was dismissed with no finding of liability. i) Kelly Ayotte, tinged by unlawful racial animus, did ignore Plaintiff’s Complaint when an all-white mortgage company forged his name to a mortgage and sent it off to a certain bank for funding, a clear-cut case of Wire Fraud. j) Kelly Ayotte tinged by unlawful racial animus, did ignore Plaintiff’s Complaint letter on behalf of a minority storeowner who was the victim of False and Deceptive Business Practices put in place by “Vericomm Leasing,” even as other attorneys have sought and obtained Class Action status against this company, see Pludeman v. Northern Leasing Systems, 2008 NY Slip Op 04183 (2008). The class was certified on 24 April 2009, 2009 NY Slip Op 51290U. k) Kelly Ayotte, tinged by unlawful racial animus, did attempt to ignore Plaintiff when she issued her press packs in the Franconia shooting tragedy cover up, in which she, inter alia, used the third and last version of shooter Gregory Floyd’s story in clearing him of any wrongdoing whatsoever in 24 hours, to say that he spoke with Liko Kenney before he shot him in the head and neck, killing him. See Case No. 2010-CV-181 before His Honor. l) The aforementioned issues go well beyond general incompetence and dereliction of duty and stand as substantial proof that Kelly Ayotte is operating out of an illegal bias against a strong black investigative journalist and Civil Rights activist.


NASHUA PD DEFENDANTS Plaintiff restates all that precedes and notes further: The Nashua PD has a documented history of harassing those who film them, resulting in dismissal of criminal actions against the accused, as noted by Plaintiff’s cited examples of independent journalist Dave Ridley (Not Guilty of Trespass), and Nashua Citizens Mike Gannon (Charges dropped for wiretapping from 2006, case pending on July 1, 2011 arrest) and Pamela Reynolds (Not Guilty following her July 1, 2011 arrest with Mike Gannon). In light of those facts we turn to the facts and allegations that must be taken at face value at this point, and with all logical inferences in favor of Plaintiff that include the following: A. Crowne Plaza Joe Arpaio Steak Out – As noted below, the Defendants ran

Plaintiff out of the entire Crown Plaza, refusing to recant even after Plaintiff told them “this is a place of public accommodation, right?” Just prior to that, Defendants had ignored a white woman who struck plaintiff’s camera with her GOP flier while instead telling Plaintiff -- who had not touched anyone – not to touch anyone. The Court ignored all of this even though a reasonable Jury could find that Hargreaves did not treat Plaintiff fairly in comparison to the white GOP operative Karen Thoman, who had issued an insouciant response to Plaintiff “none of your business” when he asked who she was. B. VFW event with John McCain –- It is an undisputable fact that John McCain has on

prior occasion ejected the sole black reporter at one of his events, without reason or explanation, much as Plaintiff was singled out at the VFW after issuing his RSVP that specifically asked Defendant Ayotte to notify him if there would be any issues. As noted in the Nashua Telegraph, on 1 Oct. 2010 in the Patrick Meighan story, “Blogger files charge after rally removal.” “Please advise, in writing, if there is any special press requirements equally applied to all media,” King wrote in an e-mail sent to Ayotte and to various others, including Telegraph reporters, as noted in Inj. Attachment 7. Defendant Ayotte did not respond, and her failure to respond to this direct press invite and acceptance constitute a contract under any reasonable analysis, just as in Williams. The only difference between this case and the Williams case is that the Williams Defendants openly admitted the exclusion was race-based. As noted in oral argument on


the matter, Plaintiff stated “Your Honor it isn’t always obvious and they don’t just call us niggers anymore.” What is obvious by the video and by the stills presented by Plaintiff is that the Police were enforcing a racially-discriminatory policy. Moose Lodge, supra. Plaintiff was not disorderly, he did not disrupt any business yet and still he was singled out by Nashua PD and admonished to remain on the sidewalk and away from a backing car even as white people were off the sidewalk:

The fact remains that Plaintiff was jovial and well-presented and did not cause alarm to anyone, including the stringer and Ayotte supporters pictured:


The Court Omitted Several Key Points in Protecting Nashua PD from Liability as seen in the following screen capture of p.10 of its Decision:

In reviewing p. 10 of the Decision note how the Court omitted the fact that Defendant Hargreaves allowed a white GOP woman to slap Plaintiff’s camera while admonishing him. Note how the Court omitted the fact that Plaintiff only “felt compelled to leave or


be arrested” AFTER Nashua PD and run him out of the foyer area as well as the leased space. It is a simple fact of law that Nashua PD had no right to threaten arrest at that point yet and still they did and it is in video as provided to the Court, yet the Court overlooked this crucial fact. This is how Plaintiff’s para. 30 actually read, with Plaintiff reinserting what the Court removed. It makes a huge difference: 30. Nashua PD Officer Hargreaves expressly told Plaintiff he was being ejected from the event because of “the people running the event “ – which was the New Hampshire and Nashua GOP. Hargreaves drove Plaintiff out of the entire Crowne Plaza under threat of arrest even though the GOP did not exercise dominion over the building, even though Crowne Staff said they were not throwing Plaintiff out and even though Plaintiff told him on video, “this is a place of public accommodation… I can chill here and get a sandwich, right?” Hargreaves never retreated from his position and Plaintiff felt compelled to leave or be arrested. Then at the VFW the Court whitewashed and omitted the facts by noting only that Plaintiff was instructed to stay on the sidewalk when in point of fact that Complaint clearly alleges that Plaintiff was singled out amongst white people who were NOT on the sidewalk and who were closer to a backing car than he was. All of this activity occurred as Plaintiff was attempted in the prosecution of Plaintiff’s duties as a journalist, as he was trying to ask Candidate Ayotte a question about the unlawful DNA testing she allowed against New Hampshire children. Let us review exactly what Plaintiff alleged rather than the limited summary offered by the Court. Again, it makes all the difference in the World. 44. Lieutenant John Fisher spoke out of turn as Plaintiff attempted to ask Candidate Ayotte a question about Unconstitutional DNA testing, as the video clearly shows other white people closer to a loud, backing car than Plaintiff. Fisher admonished Plaintiff on the backing car and did further continue to caution him to remain on the sidewalk, even though Plaintiff had never once left the sidewalk. 45. One may clearly see that other white people were closer to the backing car yet Fisher said nothing to them because he was too busy harassing Plaintiff, such that Plaintiff was not able to ask another question of Candidate Ayotte, thus his First Amendment Rights to speak AND to gather news were at once chilled and trammeled. Of course as previously noted, Defendant Fisher is being sued in this Court at this very moment for lying about a vehicular incident more tragic in nature that resulted in the death of the actual driver. Gorsuch v. Fisher et al. 2010-CV-495. The problem with the Court’s analysis is that by gerrymandering the Complaint and just flat out deleting salient portions of Plaintiff’s allegations, it makes it appear


that Plaintiff is only offering conclusory diatribe when in point of fact there are distinct issues of disparate treatment that got buried. The actions of Defendants, once the Court accurately reads and reflects what was truly in Plaintiff’s Complaint, clearly provide a Jury with enough factual backdrop to find that Nashua PD unlawfully trammeled Plaintiff’s First Amendment Rights to gather and to report news irrespective of race, but also contemplative of race. The Court stated that Plaintiff did not allege a custom or policy on behalf of the Nashua Defendants.11 The Court may be correct in that sense because Plaintiff believed he had included Nashua PD in para 51, which read as follows: 51. The Actions complained of throughout the entire Complaint, are the byproduct of pattern, plan and practice of unlawful racial bias that has been applied by Kelly Ayotte and her witnesses against Plaintiff and other strident black males for the past half-decade: Be that as it may that is not a matter to dismiss an entire case, and it was more clearly alleged in Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint that should have been allowed. As to the Court’s assertion that the Nashua PD are simply protecting Trespass Rights, Plaintiff points the Court to Fn 11 and to the fact that Nashua PD, during the pendency of this case, wrongfully arrested Dave Ridley, another independent reporter who has from time to time mentioned Mike Gannon (and Plaintiff) in his online journals. They arrested him in exactly the same context as the one in which they threatened to arrest Plaintiff even after he had alighted from the leased area. Surely the Court did not mean to prevent Plaintiff from airing these concerns as relevant.

CONSPIRATORIAL CLAIMS Once again the Court is allowing Defendants to use Iqbal and Twombly as sword and shield while ignoring the basic fact that the Nashua PD have clearly stated to Plaintiff (on video, as presented to this Court on repeated occasion) that they were operating under the direction of the Political Defendants. They were not engaged in the process of eliminating an unruly person or any other such thing. Once we have established that fact Plaintiff cannot possibly be so clairvoyant as to know when they

Note that Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, which should have been allowed, expounded on this allegation with the Pamela Reynolds and Dave Ridley Not Guilty verdicts, as well as the derogatory YouTube reference to Mike Gannon, who exists on YouTube because of Plaintiff.


met, what they discussed or anything else unless or until he is afforded some Discovery, which is exactly what Defendants do not want made public in general. But this Court is not in the business to protect or to shield Defendants who are engaged in fighting to restrict Free Press. No, rather, this Court is in the business of accurately and fully noting the arguments of all parties – even unpopular and opinionated journalists – before making a Decision. Unfortunately that is not what happened, as noted throughout this Motion, particularly at pp. 10-16


PENDANT STATE LAW CLAIMS Plaintiff will focus on the Common Law Assault allegation where the language he used directly echoed that of the First Circuit case of United States v. Lee, 199 F.3d 16; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32449 (1st Cir. Mass, 1999). Plaintiff’s Complaint read simply: FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION Common Law Assault Testimony will reveal that the Officers of the Political Defendants at the Ayotte Facebook Rally did all approach Plaintiff in a menacing and threatening manner, and did put their hands on him as he tried to roll video. He was placed in serious apprehension for his safety. ********************* Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition noted: This claim speaks for itself and it is obvious that it can’t be dismissed without discovery, testimony, Affidavits and Jury review. United States v. Lee, 199 F.3d 16; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32449 (1st Cir. Mass, 1999). HN3 Common law assault embraces two different crimes: one is attempted battery, that is, an intended effort to cause bodily harm to another which falls short of success (an example would be striking at a police officer but missing), regardless of whether the intended victim knows of the attempt. The other branch of assault is an act which is intended to, and reasonably does, cause the victim to fear immediate bodily harm; such "menacing" constitutes assault even if no physical harm is attempted, achieved, or intended. The Court, however, found that Plaintiff “failed to specify who did what and when and what their intent was.” But that is completely unfair to Plaintiff because he did in fact indicate where and what the intent was, but without any discovery how could he possibly know who touched him? Moreover, the Court has once again whitewashed the case because this is what Plaintiff actually alleged: 21. Defendant Ayotte, by and through her campaign office, conferenced with her crew as she witnessed the intrepid black reporter and subsequently threatened Plaintiff with arrest by several white men in a Conspiratorial mandate. These men, including former U.S. Marshal Stephen Monier, put their fingers in his chest and pushed him. Plaintiff, who was trying to operate a camera at the time and who had not touched anyone of his own accord, became fearful of his safety as would anyone. 22. To compound matters, Monier then threatened to call the Manchester police, who are known for beating civilians and settling 42 U. S.C. §1983 Actions after the victims endure plastic surgery.


Those paragraphs are lifted from the Kelly Ayotte Facebook Rally so it is pretty clear that the pushing occurred at said rally where Plaintiff attempted to pay his $10 and was pushed away as a Kelly Ayotte supported loudly proclaimed him as “a bigot,” also captured on video. CONCLUSION Plaintiff respectfully asserts the Court will reinstate this case once the Court delves back into this matter by re-reading Plaintiff’s Complaint and filling in the portions that were not reflected in the Court’s Decision Entered on 17 May 2012. Such a result would be consistent with the Demands of Justice and Fair Play. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Christopher King, J.D. _____________________________ Christopher King, J.D. -- Reel News for Real People 617.543.8085 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I the undersigned, solemnly swear that a true copy of this Motion was Electronically delivered on 14 June 2012 to: Jennifer Parent and Jack Middleton, Esq. City Hall Plaza 900 Elm Street Manchester, NH 03101 Gordon MacDonald, Esq. Nixon Peabody LLP 900 Elm Street Manchester, NH 03101 Brian Cullen, Esq. 10 East Pearl Street Nashua, NH 03060 /s/Christopher King, J.D. __________________________________ By and through Christopher King, J.D. 617.543.8085m