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Legazpi vs CSC Facts: The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspis request for information on the

civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas who were employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians. Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent CSC to disclose said information. The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the suit. It is asserted that the petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspis actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit

Held: The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the person at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right.

Valmonte vs Belmonte FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo Valmonte wrote a letter to Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, GSIS General Manager, requesting that he be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan. Belmonte replied through the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS whose opinion is that is that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts. ISSUE: Whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information HELD: The information sought by petitioners is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. The Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. However, although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians

of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.

Echegaray vs Secretary of Justice Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final and executory, still has jurisdiction over the case

Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. The power to control the execution of the SCs decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them comform to law and justice. The Court also rejected public respondents contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts.

For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the government.

INFORMATION)] March 8, 2010 Right to Information, access to public documentsCHAVEZ vs PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT Facts:-Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a former governmentofficial) initiated this ndents [PCGG and itschairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Phi theyongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or relating to such negotiations andagreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."-Chavez is the same person initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies whocommitted unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of thecountry's economy; he says that what impelled him to bring this action were several newsreports 2 bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news itemsreferred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various codedaccounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government(through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.-PETITIONER DEMANDS that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreementspertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that anycompromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount publicinterest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatlyprejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have aright to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that they do not deny forging a compromise agreement with theMarcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is noshowing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if hehas, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms andconditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.-PETITIONER INVOKES Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of publicconcern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining toofficial acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis forpolicy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided bylaw.Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts andimplements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that the above constitutional provisions refer to completed andoperative official acts, not to those still being considered. Issue: Whether or not the Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and all government functionaries and officials who are or may be directly indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlement, as well as the final agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision. No pronouncement as to cost.