REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPIINES MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES BRANCH 9 ILOILO CITY ILOILO TOWN CENTER, herein Represented

by LUIS TINSAY, JR. Plaintiff, -versusJOSEPHINE TAÑO, FELIPE PERALTA JOSEPHINE MADRIGAL, TERESITA NOLASCO, EDDIE NOLASCO their spouse, relatives, privies and all those acting for and in their behalf. Defendants. x---------------------------------------------------x CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30

FOR EJECTMENT

DECISION This is an action for Ejectment tried under the Summary Rule. The plaintiff, a duly organized corporation, with principal office at Iloilo City and herein represented by Luis C. Tinsay, Jr1., in the verified complaint allege that it is the registered owner of the property situated at Iloilo City known as Lot No. 6 of the consolidation-subdivision plan LRC-Pcs-11215 with an area of Two Thousand Nine Hundred Nineteen (2,919) square meters, more or less and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1525742 the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo City and particularly described as follows:

Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-152574 “A parcel of land (Lot 6 of the consolidationsubdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-11215, being a portion of consolidation of Lots 90, 633, Iloilo Cadastre and Lot 1090-D, (LRC) Psd-25567, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 9739) situated in the City of Iloilo, Island of Panay. xxx
DECISION-CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30
1 2

Secretary’s Certificate Annex “A” Annex “B”

ILOILO TOWN CENTER vs TAÑO et.al. MAY 7, 2010 Page 2 of 19 x----------------------------------------------------x

Containing or less.xxx

an

area

of

TWO

THOUSAND

NINE

HUNDRED NINETEEN (2,919) SQUARE METERS more

The defendants, their spouses, their agents and representatives, and such other persons acting for and in their behalf, are occupying the subject property through the plaintiff’s tolerance. Defendants are not paying any rentals on the subject property, neither do they have any agreement with the plaintiff Corporation relative to their occupation of the subject property. Plaintiff corporation acquired the subject property from its previous owner, Luis M. Tinsay Sr., in February 2005 and the title to the subject property was transferred and registered to plaintiff Corporation in July 2005 as Transfer Certificate of Title No. 152574. Immediately after its acquisition, plaintiff corporation through Luis C. Tinsay Jr., informed the defendants of its intention to use the property and demanded that the defendants vacate the premises. On January 15, 2009 plaintiff, through counsel, sent notice of eviction3 to defendants through registered mail giving them fifteen (15) days from receipt to vacate the subject lots. As per information from the post office, most of the defendants refused to receive the letter and sign the return card. Another copy of the same demand letter to vacate was sent to the defendants and were personally delivered to them by plaintiff’s personnel on February 5, 2009. Notwithstanding the demand to vacate, defendants continue to illegally occupy the subject property, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the Plaintiff Corporation.

DECISION-CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30
3

Annexes “C” to “G” and “C-1” to “G-1”.

ILOILO TOWN CENTER vs TAÑO et.al. MAY 7, 2010 Page 3 of 19 x----------------------------------------------------x

Their unjustified refusal to vacate the premises owned by the plaintiff corporation and occupied by them, the defendants, their spouse, household members, agents and representatives, and all persons acting for and in their behalf have unlawfully deprived the plaintiff corporation of the possession of the subject lot. Plaintiff prays that the defendants vacate the premises of the subject property and pay a reasonable rent in the amount of PhP1,000.00/month per defendant to be paid from the time of the demand to vacate until they actually vacate the subject lot. Defendants Felipe Peralta and Teresita Nolasco in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim deny that they are occupants of Lot No. 6, Iloilo Cadastre, when in fact their residential house is situated within Lot 115-D as per Relocation Survey/Plan4 prepared on July 26, 2000 by Geodetic Engineer Jose M. Mañosa Jr. In the aforesaid relocation survey/plan for the identification of residential houses on Lot 115-D, 131, 90 and 89, defendant Eddie Nolasco’s house was identified as House No. 26 which was then listed in the name of his brother, Rodrigo Peralta. Defendants further stress that recorded in TCT No. T-152574 is an annotation of a Notice of lis Pendens under entry No. 372437 in connection with Civil Case No. 05-28498 filed by the defendant Felipe Peralta and his other codefendants against Luis M. Tinsay Sr., for Quieting of Title, Declaration of Nullity of Certificates of Title and Damages before the Regional Trial Court Branch 35, Iloilo City. The defendants question the means by which the ownership of said property was acquired from Luis M. Tinsay Sr. Trial of the said case is still ongoing with the defendants having already presented their evidence.

DECISION-CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30
4

Annex “A” for the Defendant

ILOILO TOWN CENTER vs TAÑO et.al. MAY 7, 2010 Page 4 of 19 x----------------------------------------------------x

Defendants stress that their houses are standing inside Lot 115-D, the same area occupied by their parents and family even way back in 1945 in the concept of an owner. They further deny that their occupation of their premises is through tolerance of the plaintiff corporation, firstly because they occupy a parcel of land known as Lot 115-D and not Lot 6, and secondly plaintiff corporation became the alleged registered owner of Lot 6 only after Luis M. Tinsay Sr., transferred its alleged ownership of said Lot 6 despite the fact that a case for Quieting of Title was already file before the Regional Trial Court Branch 35, Iloilo City. Defendants further aver that plaintiff corporation has no cause of action against them as their house and other improvements built by them are situated within Lot 115-D and not Lot 6. LRC Cad. Rec. No. 9739). TCT No. 152574 shows that Lot 6 is a consolidation of Lots 990, 633, Iloilo Cadastre and Lot 1090-D, (LRC) Psd-25567, Lot 115-D was not shown to be included nor was consolidated with the other nearby parcels of land to form Lot 6 described in the title of the complainant-corporation. Moreover, Lot 6 covered by TCT No. 152574 is “situated in the City of Iloilo, Island of Panay” which does not describe with particularity its exact location. In their affirmative defense defendants point out that plaintiff corporation is claiming ownership over a parcel of land known as Lot No. 6 which emanates from the consolidated lots of 1090-D, 633 and 90 as described in TCT No. T-152574. However, a certification issued by the Registry of Deeds shows that no title was issued covering Lot No. 1090 or 1090-D5. Lot No. 115-D is considered land of public domain being formerly a foreshore lot as shown by a Verification6 dated June 08, 2005 issued by the Office of Land Evaluation Party Coordinator, Department of Natural Resources stating that Lot No. 115-D situated in Brgy. Flores, Iloilo City is within Project 8, alienable and disposable block.
DECISION-CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30
5 6

Annex “E” for the Defendants. Annex “F” for the Defendants.

ILOILO TOWN CENTER vs TAÑO et.al. MAY 7, 2010 Page 5 of 19 x----------------------------------------------------x

Defendants stress that they have been in open, public and continuous possession of a portion of Lot 115-D since time immemorial and such occupation has ripened into ownership7. The dismissal of the case is prayed for by the defendants on the grounds that

Due to the filing of the unfounded and groundless case, defendants were forced to secure the services of counsel and to defend their interests from plaintiff’s action and incur expenses in the amount of Sixty Thousand Pesos (PhP60,000.00) as Attorney’s Fees and the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (PhP2,000.00) as appearance fee whenever the case would be called for hearing, defendants pray for their reimbursement. The malicious and oppressive filing of this case by the plaintiff has caused the defendants mental anguish, serious anxiety, sleepless nights, embarrassment and has besmirched their reputation for which they should be compensated by way of moral damages which should not be less than Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000.00) for each defendant. Defendants also pray that the reckless and wanton attitude of plaintiff in bringing the present action against defendants should be penalized by way of exemplary damages, the amount of which is left to the sound discretion of the Court. Defendant Taño submitted a separate Answer but also containing the same averments and prayer as that of her other co-defendants.

DECISION-CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30 ILOILO TOWN CENTER vs TAÑO et.al.
7

Annex “G” Certification of Punong Barangay and Affidavit of the Defendants.

MAY 7, 2010 Page 6 of 19 x----------------------------------------------------x

Facts Which Remain Uncontroverted:
1.

That Plaintiff Iloilo Town Center is a corporation duly

established and existing under Philippine laws with principal office at Iloilo City;
2.

That Luis C. Tinsay, Jr., is authorized to file and That a notice of Lis Pendens (Entry No. 372437) was That there was no prior physical possession on the

institute the instant case and to represent the corporation; 3. 4. annotated at the back of TCT No. 152574; part of the plaintiff corporation and/or its predecessor-ininterest over the parcel of land subject matter of this case.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the defendant may be ejected from the property subject of this case; 2. Whether or not the defendants are liable of damages; 3. Whether or not there was tolerance in defendant’s possession.

EVALUATION AND FINDINGS: From the parties’ pleadings, position papers, affidavits and evidences are the actual facts as follows. Plaintiff corporation acquired the property covered by TCT No. T- 152574 herein particularly described:

DECISION-CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30

ILOILO TOWN CENTER vs TAÑO et.al. MAY 7, 2010 Page 7 of 19 x----------------------------------------------------x

Transfer Certificate of Title No. (T-152574) A parcel of land (Lot 6 of the consolidated subdivision plan (LRC) Psc 11215 it being a portion of Lots 90, 633, Iloilo Cadastre and Lot 1090-D, island of Panay..Containing an area of Two Thousand Nine Hundred Nineteen (2,919) square meters, more or less.

On March 1, 2005 Luis M. Tinsay Sr., executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of the plaintiff corporation Iloilo Town Center. Months after its acquisition and the title to the subject property was transferred to the plaintiff corporation, its authorized representative Luis C. Tinsay, Jr., informed the defendants of its intention to use the property and demanded that the defendants vacate the premises. Notices of Eviction was sent to the defendants on January 15, 20098 through registered mail giving them fifteen (15) days from receipt to vacate the subject lot. All of the defendants, except Eddie Nolasco, refused to receive the said demand letters.

ON WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE ACTION/ SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE? Jurisdiction over Ejectment is governed by the allegations of the complaint and conferred by law. Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer is lodged with the first level courts. This is provided in

8

Exhibits “D” to “D-2”; “E” to “E-2”; “F” to “F-2”; “G” to “G-2” and “H” to “H-2”.

DECISION-CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30 ILOILO TOWN CENTER vs TAÑO et.al. MAY 7, 2010 Page 8 of 19 x----------------------------------------------------x

Sec. 1 Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and in Sec. 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise referred to as the Judiciary Act of 1980. Sec. 33(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 provides: "Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial

Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: xxx "(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession; xxx As a general rule, it is essential that plaintiff’s prior possession should have been actual, peaceable, exclusive, adverse and continuous in ejectment cases. However, while in forcible entry the complaint must be predicated upon the plaintiff’s prior physical possession of which he was deprived by the defendant by means of force, intimidation, stealth or strategy; in unlawful detainer9, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession, as the defendant therein unlawfully withheld possession of the property after the
DECISION-CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30 ILOILO TOWN CENTER vs TAÑO et.al. MAY 7, 2010
9

Aguilar vs. Cabrera 74 Phil 66

Page 9 of 19 x----------------------------------------------------x

expiration of his right thereto under any contract express or implied, hence prior possession is not required10. Plaintiff corporation does not need to have prior physical possession of the property so long as she can prove that she is entitled thereto. The existence of the Certificate of Title in its name is sufficient proof of its title to the property, such that as owner, plaintiff corporation is entitled to its physical possession and is vested with legal personality to file the instant case against the defendant. The allegations of the complaint are sufficient to confer to this Court jurisdiction over the said case. The transfer of ownership of the property subject of this case from original owner Luis C. Tinsay, Sr.., to the plaintiff corporation has not been ruled invalid by any decree or order of the court. This Court then could not rely on the mere allegations of ownership made by the defendants to deprive the plaintiff corporation of its rights over the property.

Furthermore the defendants were served with notices of demand to vacate by the plaintiff and this case was filed within one year from date of last demand. Under the rules, if the addressee refuses to accept delivery, service by registered mail is deemed complete if the addressee fails to claim the mail from the postal office after five days from the date of first notice of the postmaster.11 In Co Keng Kian v. Intermediate Appellate Court,12 the Supreme Court held that "[t]he Court cannot countenance an unfair situation where the plaintiff in an eviction case suffers further injustice by the unwarranted delay resulting

DECISION-CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30 ILOILO TOWN CENTER vs TAÑO et.al. MAY 7, 2010 Barbara vs. CA 428 Phil 598, 607-608. 2002. Maddamu vs. Judge of Municipal Trial Court of Manila, 74 Phil 230 (1943); Fideldia vs. Mulato, G.R. 149189, September 3, 2008. 11 Rules of Court, Rule 13, Section 10. 12 Co Keng Kian v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75676, August 29, 1990, 189 SCRA 112, 116.
10

Page 10 of 19 x----------------------------------------------------x

from the obstinate refusal of the defendant to acknowledge the existence of a valid demand."

ON WHETHER LIS PENDENS WILL SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS OF THIS COURT

The Court is guided by law and jurisprudence in appreciating the weight of the Notice of Lis Pendens in the present case.

Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides: "SECTION 14. Notice of lis pendens — In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing of such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.

DECISION-CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30 ILOILO TOWN CENTER vs TAÑO et.al. MAY 7, 2010 Page 11 of 19 x----------------------------------------------------x

The

notice

of lis

pendens hereinabove

mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded. (Emphasis ours)13

In several cases decided by the Supreme Court, it has held that:

For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules which requires the party seeking annotation to show that the land belongs to him. In fact, there is no requirement that the party applying for the annotation of the notice must prove his right or interest over the property sought to be annotated.14 Hence, even on the basis of an unregistered deed of sale, a notice of lis pendens may be annotated on the title. And such annotation can not be considered as a collateral attack against the certificate of title. This is based on the principle that the registration of a notice of lis pendens does not produce a legal effect similar to a lien. It does not create a right or lien. It only means that a person purchases or contracts on the property

DECISION-CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30 ILOILO TOWN CENTER vs TAÑO et.al. MAY 7, 2010 Page 12 of 19 x----------------------------------------------------x

13 14

Lim vs. Lim G.R. No. 143646, April 4, 2001. Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 298 (1997).

in dispute subject to the result of the pending litigation.15

Also indispensable is the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Samonte vs Century Savings Bank16:

As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere filing of another action raising ownership of the property as an issue.17 The Court has, in fact, affirmed this rule in the following precedents: 1. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in ejectment actions in the municipal trial courts or other courts of the first level (Nacorda v. Yatco, 17 SCRA 920 [1966]) do not abate the latter; and neither do proceedings on consignation of rentals (Lim Si v. Lim, 98 Phil. 868 [1956], citing Pue, et al. v. Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81 [1950]). 2. An "accion publiciana" does not suspend an ejectment suit against the plaintiff in the former (Ramirez v. Bleza, 106 SCRA 187 [1981]). 3. A "writ of possession case" where ownership is concededly the principal issue before the Regional Trial Court does not preclude nor bar the execution of the judgment in an unlawful detainer suit where the only issue involved is the material possession or possession de facto of the premises (Heirs of F.
DECISION-CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30 ILOILO TOWN CENTER vs TAÑO et.al. MAY 7, 2010 Page 13 of 19 x----------------------------------------------------x
15 16 17

Somes vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 62 Phil. 432 (1935-1936). G.R. No. 176413,November 25, 2009. Amagan v. Marayag, 383 Phil. 486, 489 (2000).

Guballa, Sr. v. C.A., et al.; etc., 168 SCRA 518 [1988]). 4. An action for quieting of title to property is not a bar to an ejectment suit involving the same property (Quimpo v. de la Victoria, 46 SCRA 139 [1972]). 5. Suits for specific performance with damages do not affect ejectment actions (e.g., to compel renewal of a lease contract) (Desamito v. Cuyegkeng, 18 SCRA 1184 [1966]; Rosales v. CFI, 154 SCRA 153 [1987]; Commander Realty, Inc. v. C.A., 161 SCRA 264 [1988]). 6. An action for reformation of instrument (e.g., from deed of absolute sale to one of sale with pacto de retro) does not suspend an ejectment suit between the same parties (Judith v. Abragan, 66 SCRA 600 [1975]). 7. An action for reconveyance of property or "accion reivindicatoria" also has no effect on ejectment suits regarding the same property (Del Rosario v. Jimenez, 8 SCRA 549 [1963]; Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167; De la Cruz v. C.A., 133 SCRA 520 [1984]); Drilon v. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 352 [1987]; Ching v. Malaya, 153 SCRA 412 [1987]; Philippine Feeds Milling Co., Inc. v. C.A., 174 SCRA 108; Dante v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517 [1989]; Guzman v. C.A. [annulment of sale and reconveyance], 177 SCRA 604 [1989]; Demamay v. C.A., 186 SCRA 608 [1990]; Leopoldo Sy v. C.A., et al., [annulment of sale and reconveyance], G.R. No. 95818, Aug. 2, 1991).
DECISION-CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30 ILOILO TOWN CENTER vs TAÑO et.al. MAY 7, 2010 Page 14 of 19 x----------------------------------------------------x

8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting property operate to abate ejectment actions respecting the same property (Salinas v. Navarro [annulment of deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and/or to declare the same an equitable mortgage], 126 SCRA 167 [1983]; Ang Ping v. RTC [annulment of sale and title], 154 SCRA 153 [1987]; Caparros v. C.A. [annulment of title], 170 SCRA 758 [1989]; Dante v. Sison [annulment of sale with damages], 174 SCRA 517; Galgala v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. [annulment of document], 177 SCRA 288 [1989]).18 Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of a pending civil action. In Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño,19 and Amagan v. Marayag,20 we ordered the suspension of the ejectment proceedings on considerations of equity. We explained that the ejectment of petitioners therein would mean a demolition of their house and would create confusion, disturbance, inconvenience, and expense.21 Needlessly, the court would be wasting much time and effort by proceeding to a stage wherein the outcome would at best be temporary but the result of enforcement would be permanent, unjust and probably irreparable.22

DECISION-CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30 ILOILO TOWN CENTER vs TAÑO et.al. MAY 7, 2010 Page 15 of 19 x----------------------------------------------------x

18 19 20 21 22

Palattao v. Court of Appeals, 431 Phil. 438, 447-448 (2002). G.R. No. L-40437, September 27, 1977, 79 SCRA 135. Supra Note 13. Amagan v. Marayag, id., at 499. Id.

The Notice of Lis Pendens does not operate to deprive the plaintiff corporation, or one who is entitled to rightful ownership, of its right over the subject property. A notice of lis pendens is a mere notice of pending litigation, that serves as warning to third persons that the anyone who buys it, buys it at his own risk. It does not even serve as lien on the subject property. The defendants have not shown enough cause or evidence to allow this Court to apply the exception rather than the general rule. The plaintiff corporation has clearly shown through its evidence that it is entitled to possession of the subject property having been issued title to it. The Relocation Survey23 submitted by the defendants was prepared on June 16, 2000 when the said property was indeed not in the name of the plaintiff corporation. the original. This evidence, which was only a photostatic copy, could hardly defeat the evidence of the plaintiff corporation, a most recent survey24 and also

WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANTS CAN BE EJECTED FROM THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND The Court is constrained to rule in the Affirmative.
While possession by tolerance is lawful, such possession becomes illegal upon demand to vacate made by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand.25

DECISION-CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30 ILOILO TOWN CENTER vs TAÑO et.al. MAY 7, 2010 Page 16 of 19 x----------------------------------------------------x

The case of Calubayan vs Pascual26 finds application in this case:
23 24 25

Exhibit “1” for the defendants. Exhibit “E” for the Plaintiff. De Prieto vs Reyes 14 SCRA 432. 21 SCRA 146

26

“A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary

action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. The status of defendant is analogous to that of a
lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.”

The plaintiff corporation was aware of the occupation by the said defendants of the subject property after the same was surveyed and inspected prior its conveyance. After the subject property has been transferred in the name of the plaintiff-corporation demand letters to vacate were sent to the defendants although the same refused receipt thereof. As registered owner, respondent had the right to the possession of the property; which is one of the attributes of his ownership thereof. Defendants’ argument that plaintiff-corporation is not the true owner of the land is a collateral attack on its title, which is not allowed. Plaintiff-corporation’s title can only be challenged in a direct action, for it is well settled that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Having obtained a valid title

DECISION-CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30 ILOILO TOWN CENTER vs TAÑO et.al. MAY 7, 2010 Page 17 of 19 x----------------------------------------------------x

over the subject lot, plaintiff-corporation is entitled to protection against indirect attacks against its title.27
The ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Sps. Refugia vs CA28 finds application in this case:

“Where the question of who has the prior possession hinges on the question of who the real owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve the issue of ownership and make a declaration as to who among the contending parties is the real owner. In the same vein, where the resolution of the issue of possession

hinges

on

a

determination

of

the

validity

and

interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these issues. This is
because, and it must be so understood, that any such pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.”

DECISION-CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30 ILOILO TOWN CENTER vs TAÑO et.al. MAY 7, 2010 Page 18 of 19 x----------------------------------------------------x

27
28

Tan v. Philippine Banking Corp., G.R. No. 137739, 26 March 2001. 327 Phil. 982 (1996)

In conclusion, the Court finds the ruling in the case of Parran v. Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, 10th Judicial District29 and Dio vs Concepcion30 relevant:

“There is no legal obstacle for the owner of the land to allow another person to remain in her property one month, one year, several years or even decades. Only when that consent is withdrawn and the owner demands of that person to leave the property is the owner’s right of possession asserted and the person’s refusal or failure to move out makes his possession unlawful because it is violative of the owner’s preferential right of possession, hence UNLAWFUL DETAINER is proper when a person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission without any contract between them, fails to vacate the premises upon the owner’s DEMAND.”

It is however reiterated that the judgment rendered in unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect ownership of the land and in the building. Any controversy over ownership rights could and should be settled after the party having a better right of possession is returned to the property31.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff-corporation and against defendants JOSEPHINE TAÑO, FELIPE PERALTA, JOSEPHINE MADRIGAL, TERESITA NOLASCO and EDDIE NOLASCO.

DECISION-CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30 ILOILO TOWN CENTER vs TAÑO et.al. MAY 7, 2010 Page 19 of 19 x----------------------------------------------------x

29 30 31

125 SCRA 78 (1983) 296 SCRA 579 [1998] Fuentes vs Justice of the Peace of Pilar Laguna, 67 Phil 364.

The defendants, their agents, successors-in-interest, privies and assigns are hereby ordered, to wit: 1. Vacate Lot 6 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-152574

located along de Leon St., Iloilo City and peacefully turn over the same to the plaintiff corporation or its authorized representative;
2. Pay plaintiff the sum of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (PhP1,000.00) a month as rental from the time of the filing of the case until defendants shall have fully turned over possession of Lot 6 to plaintiff;

No pronouncement as to cost of suit. SO ORDERED. Iloilo City, Philippines. May 7, 2010.

EVELYN P. RONDAEL Judge

/mii /decisions in mii/itc vs tano/decision

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