You are on page 1of 12

166 SCRA 533 (1988) GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of Legislative Power EXCEPTION: Subordinate Legislation Tests for Valid

Delegation of Legislative Power FACTS:

Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The widow filed a complaint for damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter which stipulated death benefits and burial expenses for the family of an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity of the memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case. ISSUE: W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers

HELD: SC held that there was valid delegation of powers. In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no authority to promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative. Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.

Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields. Power of Subordinate Legislation The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the power of subordinate legislation. With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute by filling in the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.

PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT G.R. No. 103144 April 4, 2001 FACTS Philsa is a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. Sometime in January 1985, private respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees in the amount ofP5,000.00 for private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and P6,500.00 each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric P. Leyson. After the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents left for Saudi Arabia on January 29, 1985. They then began work for Al-Hejailan Consultants A/E, the foreign principal of petitioner. While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a second contract which changed some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits and privileges. They were again allegedly forced by their foreign employer to sign a third contract which increased their work hours from 48hours to60hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. When they refused to sign this third contract, the services of private respondents were terminated by Al-Hejailan and they were repatriated to the Philippines. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from petitioner Philsa the return of their placement fees and for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case before the POEA against petitioner Philsa and its foreign principal, Al-Hejailan. On the aspects of the case involving money claims arising from the employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal, the POEA rendered a decision dated August 31, 1988 ordering respondent PHILSA to pay complainants, jointly and severally with its principal Al-Hejailan. In a decision dated July 26, 1989, the NLRC modified the

appealed decision of the POEA Adjudication Office by deleting the award of salary deductions and differentials. The awards to private respondents were deleted by the NLRC considering that these were not raised in the complaint filed by private respondents. Private respondents then elevated the July 26, 1989 decision of the NLRC to the Supreme Court in a petition for review for certiorari where it was docketed as G.R. No. 89089. However, in a Resolution dated October 25, 1989, the petition was dismissed outright for "insufficiency in form and substance, having failed to comply with the Rules of Court and Circular No. 1-88 requiring submission of a certified true copy of the questioned resolution dated August 23, 1989." Almost simultaneous with the promulgation of the August 31, 1988 decision of the POEA on private respondents' money claims, the POEA issued a separate Order dated August 29, 1988 resolving the recruitment violations aspect of private respondents' complaint. In this Order, the POEA found petitioner guilty of illegal exaction, contract substitution, and unlawful deduction. Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the decision of the POEA thru the LRO suspending or canceling a license or authority to act as a recruitment agency may be appealed to the Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment. Accordingly, after the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed the August 31, 1988Order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. However, in an Order dated September 13, 1991, public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed in toto the assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was likewise denied in an Order dated November 25, 1991. ISSUES 1. Whether or not the petitioner can beheld liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication. 2. Whether or not the public respondent has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner liable for illegal deductions/withholding of salaries for the supreme court itself has already absolved petitioner from this charge. HELD 1. No.The administrative circular under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or filed with the National Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced. The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely private employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres, the administrative circulars questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or implemented. Our pronouncement in Taada vs. T uvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of these exceptions. 2. Petitioner is correct in stating that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC has attained finality by reason of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari assailing the same. However, the said NLRC Decision dealt only with the money claims of private respondents arising from employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal and as such, it is only for the payment of the said money claims that petitioner is absolved. The administrative sanctions, which are distinct and separate from the money claims of private respondents, may still be properly imposed by the POEA. In fact, in the August 31, 1988 Decision of the POEA dealing with the money claims of private respondents, the POEA

Adjudication Office precisely declared that "respondent's liability for said money claims is without prejudice to and independent of its liabilities for the recruitment violations aspect of the case which is the subject of a separate Order." The fact that petitioner has been absolved by final judgment for the payment of the money claim to private respondent de Mesa does not mean that it is likewise absolved from the administrative sanctions which may be imposed as a result of the unlawful deduction or withholding of private respondents' salary. The POEA thus committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner administratively liable of one count of unlawful deduction/withholding of salary.

Philsa International Placement and Service Corp. v. Sec. of Labor and Employment G.R. No. 103144 April 4, 2001 Gonzaga-Reyes, J. FACTS: Private respondents, who were recruited by Philsa for employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees. After the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents left for Saudi Arabia. While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a second contract which changed some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits and privileges. Their foreign employer forced them to sign a third contract which increased their work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. When they refused to sign this third contract, the services of private respondents were terminated and they were repatriated to the Philippines. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from Philsa the return of their placement fees and for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract. When Philsa refused, they filed a case before the POEA against Philsa on the grounds of illegal dismissal, payment of salary differentials, illegal deduction/withholding of salaries, illegal exactions/refund of placement fees, and contract substitution. Philsa insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for the POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11 and 2, Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication. HELD: See the landmark ruling in Taada case. The assailed issuances upon which private respondents based their cause of action were not published or filed with the National Administrative Register as required by the Administrative Code of 1987. Hence, Philsa is not liable. Calalang vs Williams, Constitutional Law Digest September 9, 2008 G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940 MAXIMO CALALANG, petitioner, vs. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., respondents. Maximo Calalang in his own behalf. The case of Calalang vs Williams is known for the elegant exposition of the definition of social justice. In this case, Justice Laurel defined social justice as neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy but humanization of laws and equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.

As I browse through the entire case, I found out that there is more to this case than the definition of social justice. In fact, another important issue raised here is whether there was a valid delegation of power by the National Assembly to the Director of Public Works. Let us begin with the facts of the case. Facts: In pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548 which mandates the the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads, the Director of Public Works adopted the resolution of the National Traffic Commission, prohibiting the passing of animal drawn vehicles in certain streets in Manila. Petitioner questioned this as it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Issues: Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative power? Ruling: There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest. The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. Group 6 DigestCalalang vs. Williams G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940 Petitioner: Maximo CalalangRespondents: A.D. Williams, Et al.Ponente: Laurel, J: Facts: Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila filed apetition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents.It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passingalong Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenue extending from therailroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with

the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of there commendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940.The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well. Issue: 1. Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion? 2. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people? Held: 1. No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving. 2.No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number. THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER

MILLER VS. MARDO BARRERA; July 31, 1961 FACTS - These are different cases taken together as they present only one identical question - 1st case: Manuel Gonzales filed complaint against Bill Miller at the DoL, claiming that he is a driver of Miller and was arbitrarily dismissed without separation pay. - Miller filed petition for prohibition against Hearing Officer Mardo of the DoL on ground that HO has no jurisdiction to hear and decide on the case. - Court rendered decision though that Reorg. Plan 2-A did not repeal Judiciary Act that conferred to CFI original jurisdiction to take cognizance of money claims re violations of labor standards. - 2nd case: Cresencio Estano filed complaint at the DoL against Chin Hua Trading Co., for not being paid overtime and vacation leave pay as a driver in the company. - Same circumstances as 1st case, and court issued permanent injunction against hearing the cases by the Hearing Officer, as Reorg. Plan 2-A is null and void. - 3RD case: Numeriana Raganas filed with CFI a complaint against Sen Bee Trading Company for being underpaid, not being paid overtime, without sick leave and vacation leave pay, as a seamstress. - Sun Bee filed motion to dismiss, and insisted that CFI does not have jurisdiction as money claims must be filed with Regional Office of DoL under Reorg. Plan 2-A - 4th case: Vicente Romero filed case against Sia Seng at the DoL Sia Leng did not file an answer and a decision was rendered in favor of Romero. But Labor Administrator Hernando refused to issue the writ of execution of the decision as he believed that Sia Seng deserved to be heard they insist as well that Reorg. Plan is not validly passed as a statute and unconstitutional.

- 5th case: Mariano Pabillare filed at the DoL a complaint against Fred Wilson and Co., as he was summarily dismissed wihout cause, without separation pay, and without sufficient notice. - They moved to dismiss as it is only an administrative body, with no power to adjudicate money claims. - Certiorari, prohibition and injuction was filed as well that Reorg Plan is null and void insofar as it vest original exclusive jurisdiction over money claims. ISSUES 1. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A, prepared and submitted under the authority of RA 997 as amended by RA 1241, is valid, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor to decide on claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay, etc. 2. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A was validly passed by Congress. HELD 1. No it is not valid. - While the Reorganization Commission could create functions, it referred merely to administrative and not judicial functions such as deciding on money claims. Judicial power rests exclusively on the judiciary - While legislature may confer administrative boards quasi-judicial powers, it must be incident to the exercise of administrative functions. - Conferment of quasi-judicial functions cannot be implied from a mere grant of power to create functions in connection with reorganization of the Executive. 2. No it was not validly passed by Congress - A law is not passed by mere silence or nonaction of Congress even if it be stated in Sec 6(a) of RA 997. - It is contrary to well-settled and wellunderstood parliamentary law- that two houses are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations and the determination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other.

TANADA VS TUVERA ESCOLIN; April 24, 1985 FACTS - Petition to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to the President. - Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. ISSUE WON publication in the Official Gazette is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. HELD Yes. It is the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern & corollarily access to official records, & to documents & papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (Sec. 6, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid & enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents. Decision Respondents ordered to publish in Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances of general application, and unless so published shall have no binding force and effect. Important Point: It illustrates how decrees & issuances issued by one man Marcos are in fact laws of general application and provide for penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos both executive & legislative powers. - The generality of law (CC Art. 14) will never work w/o constructive notice. The ruling of this case provides that publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice & is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse. - Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime. TANADA VS TUVERA CRUZ; December 29, 1986 FACTS - In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows: "WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect." - This is a motion for reconsideration/clarification of the first decision, specifically, on the following questions: ISSUES 1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"? 2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not? 3. What is meant by "publication"? 4. Where is the publication to be made? 5. When is the publication to be made?

HELD 1 & 2. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. 3. The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. The mere mention of the number of the

presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance.33 4. We have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature. 5. We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.

The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not part or ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities. A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City. For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained however just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or part of any). Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and

that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR. COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs. HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides: Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province. Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Semas contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 157870, November 03, 2008] SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), PETITIONER, VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD AND PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), RESPONDENTS. Facts: In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions. Issues: (1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? And (2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power? Held: WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g)of RA 9165and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and(d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.No costs. Ratio/Doctrine: Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.[8] In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.[9] It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator. Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicion less drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicion less drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement. We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicion less."In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicion less. The ideas of randomness and being suspicion less are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled

before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.[40] To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves. In 2005, tapes which allegedly contained a conversation between GMA and COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano surfaced. The said conversation contained a plan to rig the elections to favor GMA. The recordings then became subject to legislative hearings conducted separately by each House. In his privilege speech, Sen. Escudero motioned a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. Lacsons motion for a senate inquiry was referred to the Committee on National Defense and Security headed by Biazon. Garci subsequently filed to petitions. One to prevent the playing of the tapes in the each house for they are alleged to be inadmi8ssible and the other to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation. ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the petitions of Garci. HELD: Garcis petition to strike the tapes off the record cannot be granted. The tapes were already played in Congress and those tapes were already highly publicized. The issue is already overtaken by these incidents hence it has become moot and academic. The second petition must be granted however. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that [t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that [l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Senate admits in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.

Inquiry in Aid of Legislation Senate Rules of Procedure