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Magallanes v. Sun Yat Sen Elementary School (G.R. No. 160876, 18 January 2008, 542 S 79)

sustainable under the social justice policy even if the separation is for cause. But where the cause of the separation is more serious than mere inefficiency, the generosity of the law must be more discerning. x x x Separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Two exceptions when NLRC or the courts should not grant separation pay based on social justice, if the dismissal falls under serious misconduct or acts that reflect on the moral character of the employee.

The Labor Code was promulgated to promote the welfare and well-being of the working man. Its spirit and intent mandate the speedy administration of justice, with least attention to technicalities but without sacrificing the fundamental requisites of due process.

Arco Metal Products Co., Inc. v. SAMARM-NAFLU (G.R. No. 170734, 14 May 2008, 554 S 111)

Once a practice has been ripened into a custom, the company cannot unilaterally withdraw such benefits for such company practice would result to diminution of benefits.

Toyota v. NLRC (G.R. No. 158798-99, 19 October 2007, 587 S 171)

PLDT v. NLRC (G.R. No. L-80609, 23 August 1998, 164 S 671)

The Court found that in addition to serious misconduct, in dismissals based on other grounds under Art. 282 like willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, and commission of a crime against the employer or his family, separation pay should not be conceded to the dismissed employee. In analogous causes for termination like inefficiency, drug use, and others, the NLRC or the courts may opt to grant separation pay anchored on social justice in consideration of the length of service of the employee, the amount involved, whether the act is the first offense, the performance of the employee and the like or other attendant circumstances. Reno Foods, Inc. v. NLM-Katipunan (G.R. No. 164016, 15 March 2010, 615 S 240)

When it was considered warranted, separation pay was required regardless of the nature or degree of the ground proved, be it mere inefficiency or something graver like immorality or dishonesty. x x x Where it comes to such valid but not iniquitous causes as failure to comply with work standards, the grant of separation pay to the dismissed employee may be both just and compassionate, particularly if he has worked for some time with the company. x x x Under this, the award to the employee of separation pay would be

Separation pay is only warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the employees fault as well as in

cases of illegal dismissal. It is not allowed when an employee is dismissed for just cause. x x x Length of service and a previously clean employment record cannot simply erase the gravity of the betrayal exhibited by a malfeasant employee. Thus, it may be said that betrayal by a longtime employee is more insulting.

NLRC. This is the meaning of the clause "in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists" in Art. 128 (b). The existence of an employer-employee relationship is a statutory prerequisite to and a limitation on the power of the Secretary of Labor, one which the legislative branch is entitled to impose. The rationale underlying this limitation is to eliminate the prospect of competing conclusions of the Secretary of Labor and the NLRC. If the Secretary of Labor proceeds to exercise his visitorial and enforcement powers absent the first requisite (the existence of the employer-employee relationship), as the dissent proposes, his office confers jurisdiction on itself which it cannot otherwise acquire.

TAPE, Inc. v. Servana (G.R. No. 167648, 28 January 2008, 542 S 578)

Jurisprudence is abound with cases that recite the factors to be considered in determining the existence of employeremployee relationship, (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employers power to control the employee with respect to the means and method by which the work has to be accomplished. The most important factor involves the control test. Under the control test, there is an employer-employee relationship when the person for whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the end achieved but also the manner and means used to achieve that end.

Tongko v. ManuLife Insurance, Inc. (G.R. No. 167622, 7 November 2008, 622 S 58)

It bears clarifying that such control not only applies to the work or goal to be done but also to the means and methods to accomplish it. Not all forms of control would establish an employeremployee relationship. (Sonza v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp.) Logically, the line should be drawn between rules merely serve as guidelines towards the achievement of mutuality desired result without dictating the means or methods to be employed in attaining it, and those that control or fix the methodology and bind or restrict the party hired to the use of such means. The first, which aim only to promote the result, create no employer-employee relationship unlike the second, which address both the result and means used to achieve it. (Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. NLRC) Francisco v. NLRC (G.R. No. 170087, 31 August 2006, 500 S 690)

Peoples Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo) v. Sec. of Dept. of Labor (G.R. No. 179652, 8 May 2009, 587 S 724)

The DOLE, in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power somehow has to make a determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Such prerogatival determination, however, cannot be coextensive with the visitorial and enforcement power itself. Indeed, such determination is merely preliminary, incidental and collateral to the DOLEs primary function of enforcing labor standards provisions. The determination of the existence of employer-employee relationship is still primarily lodged with the

In addition to the standard of right-of-control, the existing economic conditions prevailing between the parties, like the

inclusion of the employee in the payrolls, can help in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship. x x x Economic realities of the employment relations help provide a comprehensive analysis of the true classification of the individual, whether as employee, independent contractor, corporate officer or some other capacity. x x x The proper standard of economics realities test is whether the worker is dependent on the alleged employer for his continued employment in that line of business.

Areno, Jr. v. Skycable PCC-Baguio (G.R. No. 180302, 5 February 2010, 611 S 721)

It is axiomatic that appropriate disciplinary sanction is within the purview of management imposition. What should not be overlooked is the prerogative of an employer company to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary for the proper conduct of its business and to provide certain disciplinary measures in order to implement said rules to assure that the same would be complied with. Respondent then acted within its rights as an employer when it decided to exercise its management prerogative to impose disciplinary measure on its erring employee. The decision to suspend Areno was rendered after investigation and a finding by Skycable that Areno has indeed made malicious statements against a co-employee. The suspension was imposed due to a repeated infraction within a deactivation period set by the company relating to a previous similar offense committed. Thus, Areno was validly dismissed on the ground of willful disobedience in refusing to comply with the suspension order.

San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC (G.R. No. 146121-22, 16 April 2008, 551 S 410)

An employer has the prerogative to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary for the proper conduct of its business, to provide certain disciplinary measures in order to implement said rules and to assure that the same would be complied with. An employer enjoys wide latitude of discretion in the promulgation of policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of the employees. It is axiomatic that appropriate disciplinary sanction is within the purview of management imposition. Thus, in the implementation of its rules and policies, the employer has the choice to do so strictly or not, since this is inherent in its right to control and manage its business effectively. Consequently, management has the prerogative to impose sanctions lighter than those specifically prescribed by its rules, or to condone completely the violations of its erring employees. Of course, this prerogative must be exercised free of grave abuse of discretion, bearing in mind the requirements of justice and fair play.

Pantoja v. SCA Hygiene Products (G.R. No. 163554, 23 April 2010, 619 S 216)

. Exercising its management prerogative and sound business judgment, SCA decided to cut down on operational costs by shutting down one of its paper mill. x x x SCA implemented its streamlining or reorganization plan with good faith, not in an arbitrary manner and without prejudicing the tenurial rights of its employees. Work reassignment of an employee as a genuine business necessity is a valid management prerogative.

Pharmacia and Upjohn (Pfizer) v. Albayda, Jr. (G.R. No. 172724, 23 August 2010, 628 S 574)

Jurisprudence recognizes the exercise of management prerogative to transfer or assign employees from one office or area of operation to another, provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits, and other privileges, and the action is not motivated by discrimination, made in bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or demotion without sufficient cause. Thus, the objection to the transfer being grounded solely upon the personal inconvenience or hardship that will be caused to the employee by reason of the transfer is not a valid reason to disobey an order of transfer. The transfer or assignment of employees from one office or area to another was proper if there was no diminution of the employees benefits and if there were no hardships on the part of the employee.

for the loss of rights or privileges if he does so is not in restraint of trade. A post-retirement competitive employment restriction is designed to protect the employer against competition by former employees who may retire and obtain retirement or pension benefits and, at the same time, engage in competitive employment. These two elements should be contained in a valid employment ban: (a) the ban should be time bound and (b) within geographical bounds.

United Kimberly-Clark Employees v. Kimberly-Clark (G.R. No. 162957, 6 March 2006, 484 S 187)

Rivera v. Solidbank Corporation (G.R. No. 163269, 19 April 2006, 487 S 512)

In cases where an employee assails a contract containing a provision prohibiting him or her from accepting competitive employment as against public policy, the employer has to adduce evidence to prove that the restriction is reasonable and not greater than necessary to protect the employers legitimate business interests. The restraint may not be unduly harsh or oppressive in curtailing the employees legitimate efforts to earn a livelihood and must be reasonable in light of sound public policy. A restriction in the contract which does not preclude the employee from engaging in competitive activity, but simply provides

In numerous instances the undoubted right of the employer to regulate, according to his own discretion and best judgment, all aspects of employment, including but not limited to, work assignments and supervision, working methods and regulations, time, place and manner of work, processes to be followed, and hiring, supervision, transfer, discipline, lay off, dismissal and recall of workers. Encompassing though it could be, the exercise of this right is not absolute. Management prerogative must be exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employers interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws, valid agreements such as the individual contract of employment and the collective bargaining agreement, and general principles of justice and fair play. Thus, restricting qualifications for possible employees is a valid management prerogative.

Pepsi Cola Products v. Santos (G.R. No. 165968, 14 April 2008, 551 S 245)

Attorneys fees may be awarded only when the employee is illegally dismissed in bad faith and is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his rights by reason of the unjustified acts of his employer.


EDI-Staffbuilders Intl., Inc. v. NLRC (G.R. No. 165968, 14 April 2008, 551 S 245)

In order to prevent disputes on the validity and enforceability of quitclaims and waivers of employees under Philippine laws, said agreements should contain the following: 1. A fixed amount as full and final compromise settlement; 2. The benefits of the employees if possible with the corresponding amounts, which the employees are giving up in consideration of the fixed compromise amount; 3. A statement that the employer has clearly explained to the employee in English, Filipino, or in the dialect known to the employees that by signing the waiver or quitclaim, they are forfeiting or relinquishing their right to receive the benefits which are due them under the law; and 4. A statement that the employees signed and executed the document voluntarily, and had fully understood the contents of the document and that their consent was freely given without any threat, violence, duress, intimidation, or undue influence exerted on their person. It is advisable that the stipulations be made in English and Tagalog or in the dialect known to the employee. There should be two (2) witnesses to the execution of the quitclaim who must also sign the quitclaim. The document should be subscribed and sworn to under oath preferably before any administering official of the Department of Labor and Employment or its regional office, the Bureau of Labor Relations, the NLRC or a labor attach in a foreign country.


SEAFDEC v. NLRC (G.R. No. 86773, 14 February 1992)

Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. Philippine Courts have no jurisdiction over SEAFDECAQD because such subjection to local jurisdiction woud impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its ember-states.

PNOC-EDC v. Leogario (G.R. No. 58494, 5 July 1989)

Under the present state of law, the test in determining whether a government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law is the manner of its creation such that government corporations created by special charter are subject to its provisions while those incorporated under the general Corporation Law are not within its coverage.

PNOC-EDC, having been incorporated under the general Corporation Law, is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code.

Paloma v. PAL (G.R. No. 148415, 14 July 2008)

During the period material, PAL was a governmentcontrolled corporation in the sense that the GSIS owned a controlling interest over its stocks. However, through the years, PAL functioned as a private corporation and managed as such for profit. Their personnel were never considered government employees. Thus, Paloma, while with PAL, was never a government employee covered by the civil service law. As such, he did not acquire any vested rights on the retirement benefits accorded by EO 1077.

contingencies resulting in the loss of income. Thus, as the official agents charged by law to implement social justice guaranteed by the Constitution, the ECC and the SSS should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection with the illness or injury, as the case may be. It is only this kind of interpretation that can give meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations should be resolved in favor of labor.

Marcopper Mining Corp. v. NAMAWU-MIF (G.R. No. 103525, 29 March 1996)


Lopez v. MWSS (G.R. No. 154472, 30 June 2005)

While Marcopper acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private persons. What Marcopper has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in the Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, that the courts are, likewise, sworn to uphold. When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker.

Protection to labor, it has been said, extends to all of labor: local and overseas, organized and unorganized, in the public and private sectors. Besides, there is no reason not to apply this principle in favor of workers in the government. The government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, as employers, should set the example in upholding the rights and interests of the working class.


Obra v. SSS (G.R. No. 147745, 9 April 2003) People v. Dela Piedra (G.R. No. 121777, 24 January 2001)

P.D. No. 626, as amended, is a social legislation whose primordial purpose is to provide meaningful protection to the working class against the hazards of disability, illness and other

The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create that presumption. A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group. To convict appellant for the recruitment and placement of persons other than those alleged to have been offered or promised employment for a fee would violate her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her.

recruitment is qualified into large scale, when three or more persons, individually or as group, are victimized.

People v. Sadiosa (G.R. No. 107084, 15 May 1998, 290 S 92)

Salazar v. Achacoso

(G.R. No. 81510, 14 March 1990, 183 S 145)

The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code has been declared unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

There are at least four kinds of illegal recruitment under the law. One is simple illegal recruitment committed by a licensee or holder of authority. The law penalizes such offender with imprisonment of not less than two years nor more than five years or a fine of not less than P10,000 nor more than P50,000, or both such imprisonment and fine. Any person "who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority" commits the second type of illegal recruitment. The penalty imposed for such offense is "imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000 nor more than P100,000 or both such imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court." The third type of illegal recruitment refers to offenders who either commit the offense alone or with another person against three or more persons individually or as a group. And the fourth type of illegal recruitment was committed by a syndicate or a group of three or more persons conspiring and confederating with one another in carrying out the act circumscribed by the law. For the third and fourth types of illegal recruitment the law prescribes the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000 and is considered an offense involving economic sabotage.

People v. Bartolome (G.R. No. 129486, 4 July 2008, 557 S 20)

Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.

Illegal recruitment is committed when two (2) elements concur: First, the offender does not have the required license or authority to engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. Second, the offender undertook (1) recruitment and placement activity defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code or (2) any prohibited practice under Art. 34 of the same code. Illegal

(G.R. No. 167614, 24 March 2009)

Prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixedterm employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their

contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment. The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. Thus, violates Serrano's right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid governmental purpose.

Ritual v. People

(G.R. No. 178337, 25 June 2009)

Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 does not require that the illegal recruitment be done for profit.


Nitto Enterprises v. NLRC (G.R. No. 114337, 29 September 1995, 248 S 654)

It is mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into. If the apprenticeship agreement executed between the employer and the employee has no force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, the supposed apprentice would not be considered as such but as a regular employee as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code.

Becmen Service Exporter v. Sps. Cuaresma

(G.R. Nos. 182978-79, 27 April 2009)

Under Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. 8042), or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,22 the State shall, at all times, uphold the dignity of its citizens whether in country or overseas, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular. 23 The State shall provide adequate and timely social, economic and legal services to Filipino migrant workers.24 The rights and interest of distressed overseas Filipinos, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular, documented or undocumented, are adequately protected and safeguarded. Becmen and White Falcon, as licensed local recruitment agencies, miserably failed to abide by the provisions of R.A. 8042. Recruitment agencies are expected to extend assistance to their deployed OFWs, especially those in distress. Instead, they abandoned Jasmins case and allowed it to remain unsolved to further their interests and avoid anticipated liability which parents or relatives of Jasmin would certainly exact from them.


Bernardo v. NLRC (G.R. No. 122917, 12 July 1999, 310 S 186)

The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts from the

ambit of Article 80 of the Labor Code. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code. The primary standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety.


NASURECO v. NLRC and PACIWU-TUCP (G.R. No. 101761, 24 March 1993, 220 S 452)

It is apparent that the members of respondent union discharge duties and responsibilities which ineluctably qualify them as officers or members of the managerial staff. Union members should be considered as officers and members of the managerial staff and are, therefore, exempt from the coverage of Article 82. Perforce, they are not entitled to overtime, rest day and holiday.

Even if petitioners did not institute a "no time card policy," respondents could not demand overtime pay from petitioners if respondents did not render overtime work. The requirement of rendering additional service differentiates overtime pay from benefits such as thirteenth month pay or yearly merit increase. These benefits do not require any additional service from their beneficiaries. Thus, overtime pay does not fall within the definition of benefits under Article 100 of the Labor Code.

Union of Filipino Employees v. Vivar (G.R. No. 79255, 20 January 1992, 205 S 200)

Pearanda v. Baganga Plywood Corporation (G.R. No. 159577, 3 May 2006) The Court disagrees with the NLRCs finding that Pearanda was a managerial employee. However, Pearanda was a member of the managerial staff, which also takes him out of the coverage of labor standards. Like managerial employees, officers and members of the managerial staff are not entitled to the provisions of law on labor standards. As a supervisor, Pearanda is deemed a member of the managerial staff.

Under Article 82, field personnel are not entitled to holiday pay. Said article defines field personnel as "non-agritultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty." The clause "whose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer" did not amplify but merely interpreted and expounded the clause "whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty." The former clause is still within the scope and purview of Article 82 which defines field personnel. Hence, in deciding whether or not an employee's actual working hours in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty, query must be made as to whether or not such employee's time and performance is constantly supervised by the employer.

San Miguel Corporation v. Layoc (G.R. No. 149640, 19 October 2007)

Article 82 of the Labor Code states that the provisions of the Labor Code on working conditions and rest periods shall not apply to managerial employees. It is thus clear that, generally, managerial employees such as respondents are not entitled to overtime pay for services rendered in excess of eight hours a day. Respondents failed to show that the circumstances of the present case constitute an exception to this general rule.

Autobus Transport v. Bautista (G.R. No. 156367, 16 May 2005, 458 S 578)

it is necessary to stress that the definition of a "field personnel" is not merely concerned with the location where the employee regularly performs his duties but also with the fact that

the employees performance is unsupervised by the employer. Field personnel are those who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. Thus, in order to conclude whether an employee is a field employee, it is also necessary to ascertain if actual hours of work in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty by the employer. In so doing, an inquiry must be made as to whether or not the employees time and performance are constantly supervised by the employer.


Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Luzon Marine Dept. Union (G.R. No. L-9265, 29 April 1957)

Lambo v. NLRC (G.R. No. 111042, 26 October 1999)

There are two categories of employees paid by results: (1) those whose time and performance are supervised by the employer. (Here, there is an element of control and supervision over the manner as to how the work is to be performed. A piecerate worker belongs to this category especially if he performs his work in the company premises.); and (2) those whose time and performance are unsupervised. (Here, the employers control is over the result of the work. Workers on pakyao and takay basis belong to this group.) Both classes of workers are paid per unit accomplished. Piece-rate payment is generally practiced in garment factories where work is done in the company premises, while payment on pakyao and takay basis is commonly observed in the agricultural industry, such as in sugar plantations where the work is performed in bulk or in volumes difficult to quantify. Petitioners belong to the first category, i.e., supervised employees. The mere fact that they were paid on a piece-rate basis does not negate their status as regular employees of private respondents. Payment by the piece is just a method of 7 compensation and does not define the essence of the relations. Nor does the fact that petitioners are not covered by the SSS affect the employer-employee relationship.

There is no need to set for seamen a criterion different from that applied to laborers on land, for under the provisions of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 444 known as the 8-hour Labor Law, the only thing to be done is to determine the meaning and scope of the term "working place" used therein. As We understand this term, a laborer need not leave the premises of the factory, shop or boat in order that his period of rest shall not be counted, it being enough that he "cease to work", may rest completely and leave or may leave at his will the spot where he actually stays while working, to go somewhere else, whether within or outside the premises of said factory, shop or boat. If these requisites are complied with, the period of such rest shall not be counted. However, even if the seafarers cannot go out of the ship or boat, they cannot ask for overtime pay unless they have rendered actual work.

National Development Co. v. CIR (G.R. No. L-15422, 30 November 1962, 6 S 763)

It will be noted that, under the law, the idle time that an employee may spend for resting and during which he may leave the spot or place of work though not the premises of his employer, is not counted as working time only where the work is broken or is not continuous. Work in petitioner Company was continuous and therefore the mealtime breaks should be counted as working time for purposes of overtime compensation.

Arica v. NLRC (G.R. No. 78210, 28 February 1989, 170 S 776)

P.M. or about three hours daily was not overtime work as he was merely enjoying the benefit and convenience of free transportation provided by Philnor.

The thirty (30)-minute assembly time long practiced and institutionalized by mutual consent of the parties under Article IV, Section 3, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement cannot be considered as waiting time within the purview of Section 5, Rule I, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. Furthermore, the thirty (30)-minute assembly is a deeplyrooted, routinary practice of the employees, and the proceedings attendant thereto are not infected with complexities as to deprive the workers the time to attend to other personal pursuits. This, therefore, demonstrates the indubitable fact that the thirty (30)minute assembly time was not primarily intended for the interests of the employer, but ultimately for the employees to indicate their availability or non-availability for work during every working day.


University of Pangasinan Facuty Union v. University of Pangasinan (G.R. No. L-63122, 20 February 1984, 127 S 691)

The scheduled semestral break is an interruption beyond the faculty unions control and it cannot be used effectively nor gainfully in the employers interest. Thus, the semestral break may also be considered as hours worked. The legal principles of No work, no pay; No pay, no ECOLA must necessarily give way to the purpose of the law to augment the income of employees to enable them to cope with the harsh living conditions brought about by inflation and to protect employees and their wages against the ravages brought by these conditions.

Rada v. NLRC (G.R. No. 96078, 9 January 1992, 205 S 69) PAL v. NLRC (G.R. No. 132805, 2 February 1999)

Project employees are not entitled to termination pay if they are terminated as a result of the completion of the project or any phase thereof in which they are employed, regardless of the number of projects in which they have been employed by a particular construction company. The time used by Rada to and from his residence to the project site from 5:30 A.M. to 7:00 A.M. and from 4:00 P.M. to 6:00

The 8-hour work period does not include the meal break. Nowhere in the law may it be inferred that employees must take their meals within the company premises. Employees are not prohibited from going out of the premises as long as they return to their posts on time. Dr. Fabros act, therefore, of going home to take his dinner does not constitute abandonment.