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The Social Science Journal 49 (2012) 127–138

The Social Science Journal 49 (2012) 127–138 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect The Social Science

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The Social Science Journal

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Journal journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/soscij Minority comparison model: Effects of Whites’ multiracial

Minority comparison model: Effects of Whites’ multiracial evaluation on symbolic racism and racialized policy preferences

Young Min Baek a,b, , Angela M. Lee a,c

a University of Pennsylvania, USA

b Graduate School of Convergence Science and Technology, Seoul National University, South Korea

c School of Journalism at University of Texas at Austin, USA

a r t i c

l e

i n f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history:

Received 23 May 2011 Received in revised form 2 September 2011 Accepted 29 September 2011 Available online 19 June 2012

Most Racial Studies primarily focus on African Americans without paying attention to non- black minorities, and it fails to capture recent increase in racial diversity. Based on previous theories and empirical findings, we propose a new model, minority comparison model, which accounts for theoretical shortcomings in Racial Studies. This model (1) captures psy- chological processes that compare blacks and nonblacks, and (2) explores the effects of whites’ multiracial evaluation on racialized policy preferences. Drawing on a 2008 national representative sample, this study finds that whites who have positive stereotype of non- blacks (e.g., Hispanics and/or Asians) but negative stereotype of blacks show substantially higher symbolic racism and stronger opposition to Affirmative Action, whereas whites who have positive stereotype of blacks but negative stereotypes of nonblacks have stronger opposition to expansive immigration policy. Our study offers new ways of understanding and accounting for symbolic racism in modern context, and shows how whites’ preferences in racialized policies are influenced by multiracial evaluation. © 2011 Western Social Science Association. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Most studies of race in America focus exclusively on African Americans (blacks) and Caucasians (whites). While this is understandable for both historical and demographic reasons, the United States is no longer predominantly a nation of two colors, consisting of more people of differ- ent races, ethnicities, and cultural backgrounds than ever before. Consequently, existing theories in the field need to move beyond dichotomies in their attempt to under- stand the role of race and ethnicity in American politics. With the steady increase of new immigrants from Asia and Latin America, African Americans are becoming only one of

Corresponding author at: Graduate School of Convergence Science and Technology, Seoul National University, 864-1, Iui-dong, Yeongtong- gu, Suwon-si, Gyeonggi-do 443-270, South Korea. E-mail address: ymbaek@gmail.com (Y.M. Baek).

several minority groups who are compared to, or con- trasted with, both each other and the white majority. Recently scholars of race have emphasized the impor- tance of multiracial evaluation, defined as evaluation of racial/ethnic minorities in comparison to other races. For example, Asian Americans have long been situated in a racial position “in relation to the black–white binary” (Junn & Masuoka, 2008, p. 729), and Hispanic workers are “racially sandwiched by employers, who place them somewhere between Black workers and White work- ers” (Maldonado, 2006, p. 354, emphasis in original). In other words, a more racially diverse environment has demanded multiracial evaluation among white minds, which changes the dynamics of racial tension and also affects white citizens’ preferences in racialized politics (Kim, 1999, 2000). Building upon existing theories and findings in the field, and taking into account the multiracial nature of modern American society, we propose a new model that we term

0362-3319/$ – see front matter © 2011 Western Social Science Association. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.soscij.2011.09.006

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the minority comparison model. Examining white Ameri- cans’ multiracial evaluations of both black and nonblack minorities, our model aims to explain whites’ symbolic racism (Kinder & Sanders, 1996) against blacks, as well as their preferences in black-oriented (i.e., affirmative action) and nonblack-oriented racialized policies (i.e., immigration policy) by performing secondary analysis of a 2008 national survey. To our knowledge, this is the first study that inves- tigates the influence of multiracial evaluations on racial resentment and white racialized policy preferences. To demonstrate the advantage of multiracial evaluation, the minority comparison model connects theoretical insights from racial triangulation theory (Kim, 1999; Maldonado, 2006) to empirical findings about the role of race in deter- mining white Americans’ policy preferences and public opinion (Kinder & Sanders, 1996; McDonald, 2001).

1.1. Linking model minority discourse to empirical

findings in public opinion research

Until fairly recently, blacks comprised the largest racial minority in the United States, making them an important and often decisive voting bloc. Because of their political importance, as well as past history of racial discrimina- tion, blacks (and white opinions regarding them) have been studied extensively in political science literature. Never- theless, with increases in the number and percentage of nonblack immigrants to the United States, political dynam- ics have changed over the past several decades. When we consider the American political system, num- bers are crucial: the growth of nonblack minority groups present new challenges and opportunities for forming vot- ing blocs with blacks and/or whites (Browning, Marshall, & Tabb, 1984; Sonenshein, 1997; Sonenshein & Pinkus, 2005). Moreover, when we consider quantitative research, num- bers are also important in deciding whether a group is likely to be studied in part because studies of nonblack minori- ties such as “Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans” cannot warrant “the same reliability” as those of blacks (Entman & Rojecki, 2000, p. xxiv). For these and other reasons, most quantitative studies have focused on the binary racial rela- tionship between white and black Americans, especially on how white perception or evaluation of blacks influences whites’ preferences in candidates for elected office, or for racialized policies and issues such as affirmative action, social welfare, black poverty or urban crimes. Theories emanating from some critical racial scholars have been more advanced in conceptualizing multiracial relationships and their political effects on the forma- tion, modification and/or consolidation of racial ideology in American politics. One promising approach is the ‘racial discourse analysis of model minority’ (Guinier & Torres, 2002; Kim, 1999, emphasis added). Model minor- ity discourse emphasizes the success stories of nonblack minorities, in particular Asian Americans. According to Kim (2000), model minority discourse produces a color- blind ideology that allows whites to maintain racial power “not through the direct articulation of racial differences between whites and blacks, but rather by obscuring the operation of racial power, protecting it from challenge” (p. 17). The core arguments of model minority discourse are

subtly racialized and contribute to the stability of exist- ing racial order in American society. Simply put, the logic behind model minority arguments is summarized as fol- lows:

(1) Asians and blacks are both racial minorities;

Asians have the motivation to move up the social ladder

and succeed “with no help from anyone else” (Petersen, 1966), but blacks have no such motivations; (3) Therefore, Asians’ success stories are evidence that American society is reasonably fair and open to all racial minorities.

(2)

Model minority discourse is based on multiracial evalu- ation beyond ‘black and white,’ but with major implications for both blacks and whites. Racially resentful whites can justify black poverty or even black inferiority by empha- sizing blacks’ lack of motivation, and can do so not by comparing blacks with whites, but by comparing blacks with other nonblack minorities. Despite lack of quantitative studies that examine white multiracial perception and its policy implications, two empirical studies provide supportive evidence of Kim’s theory (1999). The first is the theory of symbolic racism (Henry & Sears, 2002; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Kinder & Sears, 1981). This theory provides an empirical clue that is telling of whites’ multiracial evaluation. While symbolic racism theorists do not consider multiracial evaluation by itself, two items on the symbolic racism scale pro- vide important empirical cues as to when symbolic racism becomes more pronounced in black–nonblack minority comparison than in black–white comparison:

Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same.” (Emphasis added) “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be as well off as whites.” (Emphasis added)

As can be seen, the first statement, as a measure of symbolic racism, compares blacks to nonblack minorities, 1 and the second compares blacks to whites. Symbolic racism measures are empirically helpful in clarifying the difference between black–white and black–nonblack com- parisons, as these two items are included in the American National Election Studies (University of Michigan), and thus demonstrate trends in nationally representative opinion. Fig. 1 shows the rate of white American’s agreement with both statements. Whites in general showed stronger agree- ment with the first than the second statement, and this suggests that, at least since the mid-1980s, symbolic racism has become more pronounced when nonblack minorities were compared to blacks than when whites were compared to blacks.

1 The first item compares one racial group (i.e., blacks) to other ethnic groups because “Irish, Italian and Jewish” are considered racially ‘white’ in racial classification.

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4.03 4.01 3.99 3.93 3.9 3.88 3.75 3.76 3.66 3.56 3.57 3.55 3.47 3.45 3.42
4.03
4.01
3.99
3.93
3.9
3.88
3.75
3.76
3.66
3.56
3.57
3.55
3.47
3.45
3.42
3.36
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
year of survey
vs. Other minorities
vs. whites
Agreement among white citizens
3.53
4
4.5

Fig. 1. Opinion trends in white explanations of how blacks should over- come black poverty. Note: only self-identified white respondents are selected. A higher number denotes stronger agreement with the given statements (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The first question item mentions many other minorities (i.e., “Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overtime prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same”), while the second compares only blacks and whites (i.e., “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be as well off as whites”). The 1996, 1998, 2002 and 2006 surveys do not ask about respondents’ agreement with those two statements. Statistics are unweighted. Refusal and ‘Don’t know’ are treated as missing values. All mean differences across years between two questionnaires are statistically significant (p < .001). Source: ANES (Cumulated Data File, self-identified white respondents only).

The second piece of research that supports the model minority theory is McDonald’s study (2001) that com- pares whites’ explanations for black poverty and Hispanic poverty. McDonald finds that whites ‘differently’ inter- pret poverty of the two minorities. 2 Whites attribute black poverty to “lack of motivation,” but explain Hispanic poverty as due to “no chance for education” (McDonald, 2001, p. 567). In other words, whites ‘blame the victim’ when explaining black poverty, but ‘blame the system’ when explaining Hispanic poverty (McDonald, 2001, p. 563). Relating to multiracial evaluation, whites have dif- ferentiated evaluation schemes for blacks and Hispanics. Unfortunately, McDonald did not provide any theoretical explanations as to why whites use distinguished evalua- tion schemes, one for blacks and the other for Hispanics. In our view, plausible explanations should be imported from studies on white employers’ evaluations of Hispanic work- ers (Maldonado, 2006; Moss & Tilly, 2001). According to Maldonado (2006), Hispanics are generally thought to be less educated and have poor work skills, like black work- ers. However, white employers think that Hispanics have better work ethics because they are motivated to realize their ‘American Dream,’ and thus are more reliable than blacks. In other words, Hispanics are frequently praised as a sort of model minority when compared to blacks because Hispanics have motivation to overcome economic hardship despite their low level of education or poor job skill.

2 Note that his findings are only based on white respondents in Florida, and should thus be interpreted with caution.

Based on findings introduced above, we argue white Americans have dual routes of racial evaluation: biracial and multiracial. Biracial evaluation compares blacks and whites, and multiracial evaluation compares blacks and nonblack minorities, such as Asians or Hispanics. While biracial evaluation dominated American society before the

rise of multiracial and multiethnic immigration in the

United States, multiracial evaluation has become more

prominent over the past few decades. As racial evaluations move beyond ‘black versus white,’ racial theories should also reflect this change in American demographics. Build- ing upon racial triangulation theory (Kim, 1999, 2000), we propose the minority comparison model.

1.2. Minority comparison model: multiracial evaluation

among whites

Minority comparison model aims to show that opin- ion toward racialized policies, such as affirmative action and immigration policy, is better explained by incorpo- rating multiracial evaluations. The theoretical notion of racial triangulation articulated by Kim (1999) is useful as a conceptual framework for understanding the role of multiracial evaluation in racial phenomena. Racial tri- angulation, according to Kim (1999, p. 107), is a social psychological process for placing a racial group in relation to other racial groups in the field of racial positions. While Kim’s studies (1999, 2000) mainly deal with Asian Ameri- cans, racial triangulation of Hispanics by white Americans is also observed in recent field studies (e.g., Maldonado, 2006; Moss & Tilly, 2001). Racial triangulation of racial minorities serves to solidify existing racial hierarchies through two evaluation processes: racial valorization and civic ostracism. Racial valorization occurs when people evaluate a racial group in comparison to other racial groups. Model minority discourse is the perfect example of racial valorization (Kim, 1999; Tuan, 1998). Studies on racial and ethnic stereo- types among white Americans (Allport, 1954; Fiske, 1998) consistently demonstrate that Asians are stereotypically associated with ‘diligence,’ ‘competence’ and ‘frugality,’ in contrast to blacks’ association with ‘laziness,’ ‘incom- petence’ and ‘poverty.’ Some whites valorize Asians or Hispanic Americans relative to blacks on work ethic and competence/ability, which solidifies white supremacy over blacks and simultaneously suppresses black protest with- out provoking white–black racial tensions. Civic ostracism occurs when nonblack groups are eval- uated or treated as ‘foreigners’ who fail to assimilate into mainstream cultures, and are ostracized from society. Critical racial theorists have accumulated much historical evidence of dominant racial discourse targeting Asians and Hispanics. For example, Hispanics and Latinos are often not accepted as Americans because they are perceived as off- spring of ‘illegal immigrants’ from different ethnic cultures (Maldonado, 2006). Moreover, while Japanese Americans were forced into concentration camps during World War II, German Americans were not only free from physi- cal confinements, but also allowed to serve in the U.S. army (Tuan, 1998). Historical examples of ostracization of nonblack minorities indicate that Hispanics and Asians

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“Negative

stereotype”

of nonblacks

(Hispanisc/Asians)

“Positive

stereotype”

of nonblacks

(Hispanisc/Asians)

“Negative

“Positive

stereotype”

stereotype”

of blacks

of blacks

All-negative

Black-positive

group

group

Nonblack-positive

All-positive

(Hispanic-positive

Group

/ Asian-positive)

group

Fig. 2. Typology of minority comparison model.

are frequently considered cultural foreigners (Kim, 1999; Maldonado, 2006; Tuan, 1998), which carries a negative connotation. Civic ostracism may partly be explained by different minority groups’ “length of stay” in the United States, as it is possible that those who have been in the United States longer (e.g., blacks and Latinos) are more accepted by American society, whereas those who came later (e.g., Asians and Hispanics) are more seen and treated as foreigners. To better understand this phenomenon, we reviewed historical evolution of racial categories in the U.S. Census, 3 and we found positive association between dif- ferent minority groups’ length of stay in the United States and the aforementioned process of civic ostracism among different racial minority groups. 4 To summarize, the racial valorization process aims to justify racial inequality faced by blacks by focusing on merits of nonblack minorities, while the civic ostracism pro- cess tries to rationalize racial inequality faced by nonblack minorities by focusing on their ‘foreignness.’ Racial val- orization and civic ostracism, according to Kim (1999, p. 107), often occur “simultaneously to dominate both [black and nonblack minority] groups.” Critical racial theorists, therefore, conclude that the racial triangulation process has arisen as a new racial discourse in multiracial envi- ronments for whites to justify and preserve existing racial hierarchies (i.e., white supremacy over black and nonblack minorities). Fig. 2 illustrates the overview of our minority compar- ison model. The main thrust of our model is that whites make relative comparisons between blacks and nonblack minorities when evaluating social policies. To facilitate understanding, let us focus on dichotomous evaluations (i.e., positive–negative) of: (1) white stereotype of blacks, and (2) white stereotype of nonblacks (see Fig. 2).

3 U.S. Census Bureau claims its racial categories to be social-political constructs designed for collecting data on the race and broad population groups in the United States (see Anderson & Fienberg, 2001), and thus it can be argued that the ways in which U.S. Census classify racial groups is implicative of larger societal and political definition and interpretation of different racial groups in the United States.

4 In the U.S. Census, “Black” made its first appearance in 1790, whereas other non-black minorities did not appear in the census until about 80 years later: “Chinese” (1870), “American Indians” (i.e., Native Ameri- can, 1870), “Japanese” (1890), “Hindu” (i.e., South Asian, 1920), “Korean” (1920), “Filipino” (1920), and “Hispanics” (as an ethnicity, 2000).

The all-positive group has positive stereotypes of both black and nonblack minorities; whereas the all-negative group has negative stereotypes of both black and nonblack minorities. On the other hand, the other two groups adopt multiracial evaluation because they have positive stereo- types of one racial group but negative stereotypes of the other: the nonblack-positive group has positive stereotypes of nonblacks (e.g., Asians or Hispanics) but negative stereo- types of blacks. Contrastingly, the black-positive group has negative stereotypes of blacks but positive stereotype of nonblacks. In other words, nonblack-positive and black- positive group have differentiated evaluation schemes for racial minorities. According to the minority comparison model, black- positive and nonblack-positive groups are interesting because the model assumes that their different racial valorization accounts for their preferences in racial- ized policies. For instance, if a policy is controversial for its influence on blacks (e.g., affirmative action), the nonblack-positive group is not likely to support it because, echoing model minority discourse and empirical find- ings of symbolic racism where white symbolic racism is more pronounced when evaluating blacks against nonblack minorities, it thinks blacks should not receive privilege that other nonblack minorities do not receive. In other words, the occurrence of multiracial evaluation process among nonblack-positive group members is similar to the racial valorization process (Kim, 1999), as illustrated earlier. Meanwhile, if a policy is controversial for its effect on nonblack minorities (e.g., immigration policy), black- positive group is more likely to have negative opinions on the policy because it has positive views of blacks but negative views of nonblack minorities. Black-positive group members think that blacks have assimilated into American society because blacks share a long history with whites and have formed a common fate as mem- bers of American society, whereas Hispanics and Asians are cultural foreigners who have not assimilated (Kim, 1999; Tuan, 1998). In short, the multiracial evalua- tion process among those in the black-positive group resembles the civic ostracism process that was discussed earlier.

1.3. Research hypotheses and research questions

Employing the minority comparison model, this study aims to assess the effects of multiracial evaluation on racialized policy preferences by testing three hypotheses. The first hypothesis connects the symbolic racism scale (Henry & Sears, 2002; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Kinder & Sears, 1981) to theoretical predictions derived from racial triangulation theory, especially the racial valorization pro- cess (Kim, 1999; McDonald, 2001). According to racial triangulation theorists, white Americans justify negatively racialized opinions toward blacks by comparing them to other model minorities (i.e., by emphasizing success stories or positive stereotypes of Asian Americans). If arguments of racial triangulation theorists are correct, and symbolic racism is present among some white Americans, then we predict:

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Symbolic racism hypothesis: Individuals in the Nonblack-positive group will show higher levels of symbolic racism than those in the other three groups (i.e., all-positive, all-negative, and black-positive groups).

The second and third hypotheses will investigate the effects of our minority comparison model on white Ameri- cans’ policy preference. As mentioned, some policies – such as social welfare or affirmative action – are black-oriented in that they are particularly controversial among blacks. According to our model, whites that oppose black-oriented policies often justify their resistance by emphasizing success stories of nonblack minorities. In other words, indi- viduals in the nonblack-positive group (i.e., those who have a positive view of nonblack minorities but negative stereotype of blacks) will show greater opposition to black- oriented policies. Thus we hypothesize:

Black-oriented policy hypothesis: Individuals in the Nonblack-positive group will show greater opposition to black-oriented policy than those in the other three groups (i.e., all-positive, all-negative, and black-positive groups).

Unlike social welfare or affirmative action, policies that deal with illegal immigrants or the strengthening of bor- der control mainly target nonblack racial/ethnic minorities (e.g., Hispanics or Asians), and are thus termed nonblack- oriented policy in our study. The third hypothesis follows the same logic underlying the second hypothesis, although it predicts a contrasting pattern due to the nature of the political policies in question. Namely, opposition to an expansive immigration policy should be more pro- nounced among individuals in the black-positive group (i.e., those who have a positive view of blacks but negative views of nonblack minorities). Thus, the final hypothesis follows:

Nonblack-oriented policy hypothesis: Individuals in the Black-positive group will show greater opposition to nonblack-oriented policy than those in the other three groups (i.e., all-positive, all-negative, and nonblack- positive groups).

2. Method

2.1. Sample

In order to reflect the most updated trend, this study uses data from 2008 American National Election Studies (ICPSR Study #25383). All of the data were gathered via face-to-face interviews. The 2008 sample contains 2,323 respondents, but this study selects only self-identified white respondents (n = 1,186, 51%) because its primary aim is to investigate white Americans’ multiracial evaluation of racial minorities, and their effects on racialized policy preferences.

5 Specific question wordings are provided in Appendix A.

2.2. Measures 5

2.2.1. Typology of multiracial evaluation

Our minority comparison model contrasts white stereo- types of Hispanics and Asians with those of blacks. White stereotypes of racial minorities are measured by using two items that ask whether or not the three racial minorities (blacks, Hispanics, or Asians) are: (1) lazy–hardworking, and (2) unintelligent–intelligent. The two items are measured using seven-point scale and averaged to operationalize stereotype of racial minorities where a higher value indicates positive stereotypes of racial minorities. In summary, white stereotypes of Asians are the most positive (M = 5.13, S.D. = 1.24); white stereotypes of blacks the most negative (M = 4.07, S.D. = 1.17); and white stereotypes of Hispanics lie somewhere on the continuum (M = 4.50, S.D. = 1.11). Correlation coefficients among three racial minorities showed similar strata of racial minori- ties. While the correlation between stereotypes of blacks and stereotypes of Hispanics is .53 (p < .001), correlation between stereotypes of blacks and stereotypes of Asians is .30 (p < .001), and correlation between stereotypes of His- panics and Asians is .49 (p < .001). In general, this finding is consistent with that of previous Racial Studies (Kim, 1999; McDonald, 2001; Sidanius, Devereux, & Pratto, 1992). We create two typologies of multiracial evaluation: (1) the Asian–black typology compares white stereotype of Asians and blacks; (2) the Hispanics–black typology com- pares white stereotype of Hispanics and blacks. White stereotypes of all three racial minorities (i.e., blacks, Hispanics and Asians) are dichotomized by applying a mean-split: (1) “positive stereotype” of a racial minor- ity (i.e., above the mean of stereotype), or (2) “negative stereotype” of a racial minority (i.e., below the mean of stereotype). In our minority comparison model, whites who have “positive stereotypes” of all racial minorities are put into the all-positive group; whites who have “negative stereo- types” of all racial minorities are put into the all-negative group; whites who have “positive stereotype” of Hispan- ics but “negative stereotypes” of blacks are put into the Hispanic-positive group; whites who have “positive stereo- types” of Asians but “negative stereotypes” of blacks are put into the Asian-positive; and whites who have “positive stereotype” of blacks but “negative stereotype” of Hispanics and Asians are put into the black-positive group.

2.2.2. Outcome variables

2.2.2.1. Symbolic racism scale. Symbolic racism scale is

adopted to test the validity of multiracial evaluation in the minority comparison model. Since 1986, the ANES dataset has contained five symbolic racism items (see Appendix A) (Henry & Sears, 2002; Kinder & Sanders, 1996), and this study constructs its symbolic racism scale by averaging these five items (Cronbach’s ˛ = .77; M = 3.59, S.D. = .93).

2.2.2.2. Black-oriented and nonblack-oriented policy opinion.

This paper’s main hypotheses test the effects of mul- tiracial evaluation on white racialized policy preferences, ergo chooses two racialized policies: Affirmative action

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and Immigration Policy. While affirmative action causes chronic controversy in scientific and policy-making set- tings relating to the status of the black population (Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993), immigration policy incites social controver- sies relating to the recent growth of nonblack minorities, such as Hispanics or Asian immigrants (Junn & Masuoka, 2008; Kim, 2000). Support for affirmative action is measured by asking respondents how much they support the stance that federal government ought to see whether black people are get- ting fair treatment in jobs or not. 6 Respondents are asked to rate their preferences on a five-point scale (strongly oppose–strongly support). In the 2008 survey, 30% of white respondents opposed the government’s role to ensure fair jobs for blacks, whereas 23% showed supportive opinion.

In general, of all the white Americans, opinion on affirma-

tive action policy is skewed toward opposition (M = 2.96,

S.D. = .91). Support for an expansive immigration policy is measured by asking people whether the government should increase, keep the same, or decrease the accepted number of new immigrants from foreign countries. Unlike the question on affirmative action policy, however, there are no racially

explicit cues in the immigration policy question (e.g., spe- cific reference to immigrants from Asian countries or Latin America). 7 Respondents are provided with five-point scale to express their opposition to the increase of accepted number of new immigrants: ‘increase a lot’ (1)–‘decrease

a lot’ (5). In the 2008 ANES survey, 47% of white Amer- icans thought the U.S. government should decrease the number of admitted immigrants either “a lot” or “a lit- tle”; and only 13% of white respondents thought that the government should increase its number of admitted immi- grants. As with the affirmative action policy attitude, white Americans on average expressed opinions that were highly skewed toward the desire to ‘decrease’ the number of admitted new immigrants (M = 2.47, S.D. = 1.06).

2.2.3. Socio-demographics

To adjust for social demographic differences in multira- cial evaluation, this study selects four variables: gender, age, annual income level, and educational achievement. In the 2008 survey, 44% of white respondents are male. Averaged age year of whites surveyed is 49.26 (S.D. = 17.29). Median level of annual household income is about 45,000–49,999 dollars. Average year of education it 13.67 (S.D. = 2.23).

2.2.4. Political orientations

To control for political orientations of respondents, this study adopts (1) self-reported measures of political

6 The question contains a very clear and explicit racial cue, that is, blacks. As Sniderman and Carmines (1997) pointed out, racially loaded question wording (e.g., black) generally elicits greater opposition to the policy implementation than racially neutral question wording (e.g., poor people).

7 Although expressions such as immigrants from foreign countries may work as racially implicit cues in the same way that inner city residents cues black implicitly (Peffley & Hurwitz, 2002), empirical tests are required to verify whether such implicit assumption is valid.

ideology, and (2) political party affiliation. Sixteen per- cent of white respondents report that they are political Liberals; and 27% identify themselves as political Conserva- tives. Relating to party affiliation, 30% of white Americans express their attachment to the Democratic Party, whereas 27% choose the Republican Party as their preferred party.

2.2.5. Control variables

Since final outcome variables are policy preferences, two control variables are adopted to reduce the danger of confounding the effects of multiracial evaluation with principle-related influences in determining policy opinion. Based on previous studies that investigated racially con- scious policies (see Chapter 6 in Kinder & Sanders, 1996), equality and limited government scales are chosen for sta- tistical control. Equality scale is calculated by averaging the scores of six items (˛ = .68; M = 3.38, S.D. = .73), for exam- ple, “If people were treated more equally in this country we

would have many fewer problems” (see Appendix A for all the other items). Limited government scale is estimated by asking whether government should provide more or less services using seven-point scale (M = 4.23, S.D. = 1.69). Since the minority comparison model might be influ- enced by in-group evaluation, white citizens’ stereotype of its own racial category is also entered as a control variable. Consistent with stereotypes of racial minorities, the follow- ing two items are averaged: (1) ‘lazy–hardworking,’ and (2) ‘unintelligent–intelligent’ (˛ = .70; M = 4.98, S.D. = 1.06). Finally, since the dataset on which we rely to test hypotheses are gathered by interpersonal interviews, the race of interviewer (Davis & Silver, 2003) is also controlled (9% nonwhite interviewers).

2.2.6. Statistical method

In the first and second hypotheses, we predict that nonblack-positive group will manifest the strongest sym- bolic racism and opposition toward black-oriented policy. We used analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with planned contrasts between nonblack-positive group and other three groups to test symbolic racism and black-oriented policy hypotheses. Similarly, we used ANCOVA with planned contrasts between black-positive group and other three groups because the nonblack policy hypothesis antic- ipates that black-positive group will manifest the strongest opposition toward nonblack-oriented policy.

3. Results

3.1. Testing symbolic racism hypothesis

The first hypothesis seeks evidence that white respon- dents’ symbolic racism is more pronounced among those in the nonblack-positive group (i.e., Asian-positive or Hispanic-positive group) than the black-positive, all- positive, and all-negative groups. Results of ANCOVA with planned contrast offers clear statistical support for Asian- black typology, but only marginally significant support for Hispanic-black typology, after controlling for socio- demographics, political orientations, and other policy- related attitudes (see Appendix B for specific significance

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Symbolic Racism scale among white citizens

(Minority Comparison Model)

Comparing Blacks and Hispanics (i.e., Hispanic-black typology)

Hispanic-positive 3.67 3.673.67 3.673.67 3.67 3.67 3.673.673.67 3.673.67 3.67 3.67 3.67 3.673.673.67 3.67
Hispanic-positive
3.67
3.673.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.673.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.67
3.673.673.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.673.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.67
3.673.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.673.67
3.67
3.673.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.673.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.673.673.673.673.67
3.673.673.67
3.67
3.673.673.673.67
3.673.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.673.67
3.67
3.673.673.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.67
3.673.67
3.673.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.673.673.67
3.673.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.67
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.61
3.613.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.613.613.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.613.61
3.613.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.613.613.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.613.613.613.613.61
3.613.61
3.613.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.613.613.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.613.613.613.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
All-negative
Black-positive
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.53.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.483.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.483.48
3.483.48
3.483.483.48
3.483.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.483.483.48
3.483.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.483.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.483.483.483.483.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.483.48
3.483.483.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.483.483.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.483.48
3.48
3.483.483.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.483.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.483.483.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.483.48
3.483.483.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.483.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.483.483.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.483.483.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.483.48
3.483.48
3.483.483.48
3.48
3.48
3.483.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.483.483.483.48
3.483.483.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.483.483.48
3.483.48
3.48
3.483.48
Hispanic=Negative
All-positive
Hispanic=Positive
Blacks=Negative
Blacks=Positive
Symbolic Racism Scale
3.4
3.8

Comparing Blacks and Asians (i.e., Asians-black typology)

Asian-positive 3.743.74 3.743.74 3.74 3.74 3.74 3.74 3.74 3.74 3.74 3.74 3.743.74 3.74 3.74 3.743.743.74
Asian-positive
3.743.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.743.74
3.743.743.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.743.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.743.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.743.743.74
3.743.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.743.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.743.743.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.743.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.74
3.743.74
3.74
3.743.743.74
3.743.74
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.613.61
3.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.613.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.61
3.613.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.61
3.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.613.613.613.613.61
3.613.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.613.613.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.613.613.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.61
3.61
3.61
3.613.613.61
3.61
3.61
All-negative
3.593.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.593.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.593.59
3.593.593.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.593.59
3.593.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.593.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.593.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.593.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.593.59
3.593.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.593.59
3.593.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.593.59
3.593.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
3.59
Black-positive
Asians=Negative
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.433.433.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.433.43
3.433.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.433.43
3.433.433.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.433.433.433.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.433.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
3.433.43
3.43
3.43
All-positive
Asians=Positive
Blacks=Negative
Blacks=Positive
Symbolic Racism Scale
3.4
3.8

Fig. 3. Results of symbolic racism hypothesis. Note: Planned contrast detects marginally significant evidence that whites’ symbolic racism is more pro- nounced among those in the Hispanic-positive group (i.e., those who have “positive stereotype” of Hispanics but “negative stereotype” of blacks) than those in the other three groups (t = 1.93, p = .06, two-tailed test); and whites’ symbolic racism is more pronounced among those in the Asian-positive group (i.e., those who have “positive stereotype” of Hispanics but “negative stereotype” of blacks) than those in the other three groups (t = 3.18, p < .01, two-tailed test).

tests of control variables). Fig. 3 provides the mean pattern of symbolic racism in minority comparison model. In Asian-black typology (right panel in Fig. 3), whites in the Asian-positive group (i.e., those who have “pos- itive stereotype” of Asians but “negative stereotype” of blacks) show a substantially higher symbolic racism score (M = 3.74) than black-positive (M = 3.59), all-positive (M = 3.59), or all-negative group (M = 3.61). Planned con- trast confirms that whites’ symbolic racism is more pronounced among Asian-positive group than any of the other three groups (t = 3.18, p < .01). In Hispanic–black typology (left panel in Fig. 3), whites in the Hispanic-positive group (i.e., those who have “pos- itive stereotype” of Hispanics but “negative stereotype” of blacks) show slightly higher symbolic racism (M = 3.67) than black-positive (M = 3.50), all-positive (M = 3.48), or all- negative group (M = 3.61). However, planned contrast only detects marginally significant evidence that whites’ sym- bolic racism is more pronounced among Hispanic-positive group than any of the other three groups (t = 1.93, p = .06). In sum, there is supportive evidence that white symbolic racism is augmented among whites that have “positive stereotype” of nonblack minorities but “negative stereo- type” of blacks, which is supportive of the symbolic racism hypothesis.

3.2. Testing black-oriented policy hypothesis

The second hypothesis posits that whites who have “positive stereotype” of nonblack minorities but “neg- ative stereotype” of blacks are most likely to oppose black-oriented policy (i.e., policies that ensure fair jobs for blacks) than any other whites (i.e., those in all-positive, all-negative, or black-positive groups). Similar

to the results obtained from the symbolic racism hypothe- sis, there is supportive evidence for Asian-black typology, but no evidence for Hispanic-black typology, after con- trolling for socio-demographics, political orientations, and other policy-related attitudes (see Appendix B for specific significance tests of control variables). Fig. 4 provides the mean pattern of support for black-oriented policy in the minority comparison model. In Asian-black typology (right panel in Fig. 4), whites in the Asian-positive group (i.e., those who have “pos- itive stereotype” of Asians but “negative stereotype” of blacks) show substantially less support for black- oriented policy (M = 2.82) than those in black-positive (M = 3.02), all-positive (M = 2.95), or all-negative (M = 2.90) groups. Planned contrast confirms that whites’ support for black-oriented policy is substantially weaker among Asian- positive group than any of the other three groups (t = 2.03, p < .05). In Hispanic-black typology (left panel in Fig. 4), how- ever, whites in the Hispanic-positive group (i.e., those who have “positive stereotype” of Hispanics but “neg- ative stereotype” of blacks) are only the second to the least supportive of black-oriented policy out of the four groups (M = 2.94). Instead, whites in the all-negative group (i.e., those who have “negative stereotypes” of both blacks and Hispanics) are the least supportive among the four groups (M = 2.83). Planned contrast does not support black- oriented policy hypothesis in Hispanic-black typology (t = .10, p = ns). As Fig. 4 clearly shows, whites’ support for black-oriented policy is mainly determined by whether a white respondent has “positive stereotype” of blacks or not, regardless of his/her stereotype of Hispanics. To summarize, there is partial evidence that whites’ support for black-oriented policy weakens only among

3.12.8

3.1

Support for black-oriented policy

Support for black-oriented policy

2.8

134

Y.M. Baek, A.M. Lee / The Social Science Journal 49 (2012) 127–138

Support for black-oriented policy among white citizens

(Minority Comparison Model)

Comparing Blacks and Hispanics (i.e., Hispanic-black typology)

Hispanics=Negative

 

Hispanics=Positive

All-positive

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.023.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.023.023.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.023.023.02

3.02

3.023.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.023.023.023.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.023.023.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.023.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.023.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.023.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.023.02

3.023.02

3.023.023.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.023.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.023.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.023.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.023.023.02

3.02

3.023.023.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.023.023.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.023.023.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.023.023.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

2.94 2.942.942.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.942.94 2.942.942.942.942.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.94
2.94 2.942.942.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.942.94 2.942.942.942.942.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.94
2.94
2.942.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.942.942.942.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.942.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.942.94
2.942.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.942.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.942.942.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.942.94
2.94
2.942.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.942.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.942.942.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.942.94
2.94
2.942.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.942.94
2.942.94
2.942.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.942.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.942.94
2.942.94
2.94
2.94
2.94
2.942.942.94
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.832.832.832.832.83
2.832.83
2.832.83
2.832.832.832.832.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.832.83
2.832.83
2.832.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.832.832.83
2.832.83
2.832.83
2.832.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.832.832.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.832.83
2.832.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.832.83
2.83
2.832.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.832.832.832.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.832.832.832.832.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.832.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.832.832.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.832.832.832.832.83
2.832.832.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.832.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.832.83
2.832.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.832.83
2.832.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.832.832.83
2.832.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.832.832.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.832.83
2.832.832.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.832.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.832.832.832.832.832.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.832.832.832.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.832.832.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.832.832.832.832.832.83
2.832.832.83
2.832.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.832.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.832.832.832.83
2.832.832.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.832.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.832.832.832.832.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.832.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.83
2.832.83
2.832.832.832.832.83
2.83
2.832.832.832.832.832.832.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.832.832.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.972.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

2.97

Black-positive

Hispanic-positive

All-negative

Blacks=Negative

Blacks=Positive

Comparing Blacks and Asians (i.e., Asian-black typology)

Asians=Negative

 

Asians=Positive

All-positive

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.023.023.023.02

3.023.02

3.023.023.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.023.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.023.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.023.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

3.02

3.023.02

3.02

2.9 2.92.92.9 2.92.9 2.9 2.9 2.92.92.92.9 2.92.9 2.9 2.92.9 2.9 2.9 2.92.9 2.9 2.9 2.92.9
2.9 2.92.92.9 2.92.9 2.9 2.9 2.92.92.92.9 2.92.9 2.9 2.92.9 2.9 2.9 2.92.9 2.9 2.9 2.92.9

2.9

2.92.92.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.92.92.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.92.92.92.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.92.9

2.92.9

2.92.9

2.92.9

2.92.92.9

2.92.92.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.92.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.92.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.92.92.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.92.92.9

2.92.92.92.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.92.92.9

2.92.9

2.92.92.92.92.92.92.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.92.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.92.92.9

2.92.9

2.92.92.92.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.92.92.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.92.92.92.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.92.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.92.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.92.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.92.92.9

2.92.92.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.92.92.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.92.9

2.92.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.92.92.92.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.92.9

2.92.92.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.92.9

2.92.92.92.92.9

2.9

2.92.92.9

2.92.9

2.92.9

2.92.92.9

2.92.92.92.92.92.92.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.92.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.92.92.92.92.9

2.9

2.92.92.92.9

2.92.92.9

2.92.9

2.92.92.9

2.9

2.92.92.9

2.92.92.92.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.92.9

2.92.92.92.92.92.92.92.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.92.92.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.92.9

2.92.92.92.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.92.92.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.9

2.92.9

2.9

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.952.95

2.952.95

2.95

2.95

2.952.95

2.95

2.952.952.95

2.952.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.952.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.952.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.952.95

2.95

2.95

2.952.95

2.95

2.95

2.952.95

2.95

2.952.95

2.952.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.952.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.952.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.952.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

2.95

Black-positive

All-negative

2.82 2.82 2.82 2.82 2.822.82 2.82 2.822.82 2.82 2.82 2.82 2.82 2.82 2.82 2.82 2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.822.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.822.82
2.82
2.822.822.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.822.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.822.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.822.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.822.822.82
2.822.82
2.822.82
2.822.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.822.822.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.822.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.822.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.822.822.82
2.822.82
2.822.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82
2.82

Asian-positive

Blacks=Negative

Blacks=Positive

Fig. 4. Results of black-oriented policy hypothesis. Note: Planned contrast fails to detect significant evidence that whites’ support for black-oriented policy weakens among those in the Hispanic-positive group (i.e., those who have “positive stereotype” of Hispanics but “negative stereotype” of blacks) than those in the other three groups (t = .10, p = ns, two-tailed test); however, planned contrast indicates that whites’ support for black-oriented policy significantly weakens among those in the Asian-positive group (i.e., those who have “positive stereotype” of Hispanics but “negative stereotype” of blacks) than those in the other three groups (t = 2.03, p < .05, two-tailed test).

whites in the Asian-positive group (i.e., those who have “positive stereotype” of Asians but “negative stereo- type” of blacks). However, consistent with our finding in the Asian-black typology, whites’ stereotype of Hispan- ics has no influence on their support for black-oriented policy.

3.3. Testing nonblack-oriented policy hypothesis

The final hypothesis posits that whites who have “positive stereotype” of blacks but “negative stereo- type” of nonblack minorities are more likely to oppose nonblack-oriented policy (i.e., policies in favor of new

Support for nonblack-oriented policy among white citizens

(Minority Comparison Model)

Comparing Blacks and Hispanics (i.e., Hispanic-black typology)

All-positive 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.662.662.662.66 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.66
All-positive
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.662.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.662.662.662.66
2.662.662.66
2.66
2.662.662.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.662.66
2.662.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.662.662.662.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.662.662.66
2.662.66
2.662.662.66
2.662.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.662.66
2.662.662.66
2.662.662.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.662.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.662.662.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.662.662.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.662.662.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.662.662.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.662.66
2.662.662.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.662.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.662.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.662.662.662.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.66
2.66
2.66
2.662.662.662.66
2.66
2.66
Hispanic-positive
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.442.442.442.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.442.442.44
2.44
2.442.442.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.442.44
2.442.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.442.442.44
2.442.44
2.442.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.442.44
2.442.442.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.442.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.442.442.44
2.442.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.442.442.44
2.44
2.442.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.442.44
2.44
2.44
2.392.39
2.392.39
2.392.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.392.392.39
2.392.39
2.392.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.392.39
2.39
2.392.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.392.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.392.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.392.39
2.392.39
2.39
2.39
2.392.392.392.39
2.392.392.392.392.392.39
2.392.39
2.39
2.39
2.392.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.392.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.392.39
2.39
2.392.392.392.392.39
2.39
2.392.392.392.392.39
2.392.39
2.39
2.39
2.392.39
2.392.39
2.39
2.39
2.392.392.392.392.392.392.39
2.39
2.39
2.392.392.392.39
2.392.392.39
2.392.39
2.392.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.392.392.39
2.392.39
2.39
2.39
2.39
2.39