Man and World 30: 5–33, 1997. c 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.


Husserl’s debate with Heidegger in the margins of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics 
Department of Philosophy, MacMurray College, Jacksonville, IL 62650, USA

Abstract. Husserl received from Martin Heidegger a copy of his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics in the summer of 1929 not long before Husserl had determined to reread Heidegger’s writings in order to arrive at a definitive position on Heidegger’s philosophy. With this in view, Husserl reread and made extensive marginal comments in Being and Time and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. This essay by the translator of the remarks in KPM offers some historical background and comment on the importance of the remarks in KPM and attempts to describe Husserl’s counterposition to Heidegger on six issues that divided the two major twentieth century philosophers.

One of the saddest stories in twentieth century philosophy, with dimensions of betrayal and tragedy, is that of the breakdown of the Husserl-Heidegger relationship. The break became clear to Husserl only after Heidegger had been elected – with Husserl’s support – to succeed Husserl at Freiburg in 1928. After Heidegger’s “desertion” of phenomenology became inescapably evident to Husserl, he determined that he must devote several weeks to an intensive review of Heidegger’s position as soon as possible: right after he finished preparing his Formale und transcendentale Logik for publication. The main text in this project was Sein und Zeit (1927), of course, but also Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (1929), which had appeared only a few weeks before. Reading these two works and possibly other offprints, Husserl made extensive comments (in his Gabelsberger shorthand) in the margins. When Husserl’s manuscripts and other effects were smuggled out of Germany by Father van Breda in the late 1930s, these volumes came with them and have been preserved in the Husserl Archives at Louvain, Belgium. In the over fifty years since that time these volumes with their marginal remarks in Husserl’s shorthand have rested peacefully untranscribed and unpublished in the Husserl Archives at Louvain, Belgium. It was thus an event of some importance in Husserl scholarship when they appeared in 1993 in French translation.1 And in 1994 the original German text – as transcribed by Steven 
Part of this article will appear in the author’s translation (in Edmund Husserl Collect-

ed Works), Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger, to be published by Kluwer Academic Publishers, forthcoming.



Spileers and introduced by Roland Breeur, both on the staff of the Archives – from which the French translation was made was published in Husserl Studies.2 Now these marginal remarks have been translated into English by Thomas F. Sheehan (those in SZ) and myself (those in KPM).3 The English translation places the relevant sentence or sentences in the Heideggerian text alongside Husserl’s remark, which the Husserl Studies publication of them simply indicated by giving the page and line number in the Heidegger text where the remark appeared. The present essay was originally written to serve as an introduction to its author’s translation of Husserl’s remarks in KPM to be published in a volume titled Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger, but essay grew far too long for a subsidiary introduction in that volume. By Husserl Archive orders the introduction had to be cut to ten manuscript pages plus notes, about onefourth of its original length. Man and World, however, has arranged to offer its readers the original introduction here as a more fully annotated prolegomenon to Husserl’s marginal remarks in KPM. Admittedly, Husserl’s marginal remarks in KPM do not reflect the same intense effort to penetrate Heidegger’s thought that one finds in his marginal notes in SZ.4 In terms of length, Husserl’s comments in the German text as published in Husserl Studies occupy only one-third the number of pages.5 In addition, pages 1–5, 43–121, and 125–167 contain no reading marks or notes by Husserl at all – over half of the 236 pages of KPM. This suggests that Husserl either read these pages with no intention of returning to the text, or that he skipped large parts of the middle of the text altogether.6 Nevertheless, we will in the first major part of the present essay attempt to show that Husserl’s marginal remarks in KPM are of continuing importance for several reasons. First, many of Husserl’s notations respond substantively and at length to Heidegger’s text and dispute his statements, articulating a clear counterposition to that of Heidegger on many points. Second, they are important because of the place in which they appear, for the content of KPM was to have served as a further part of SZ, but shortly after publishing it Heidegger abandoned altogether the project of a “fundamental ontology,”7 although he did not abandon the quest for the “meaning of Being.” Published on the heels of his famous “Davos Lectures” with Ernst Cassirer, KPM represents at least a certain closure in Heidegger’s public dialogue with NeoKantianism, and by extension also in relation to the NeoKantian tendencies in Husserl’s phenomenology after the Logical Investigations. Third, the remarks in KPM are important because Kant is a key figure for both Husserl and Heidegger. This essay cannot do justice to an elaboration of the two relationships to Kant, but it will offer some remarks on it and refer the reader to primary and secondary sources in which the two relationships are explored.8 Fourth, KPM is



important as an example – indeed, a prime example – of Heidegger’s method of Destruktion or “deconstruction.” In KPM Heidegger is “deconstructing” Kant’s First Critique. This raises in Husserl’s mind (and in a few others’ also) the issue of violence in text interpretation. Unfolding these four dimensions of significance will provide the organizational structure of part one. The second major part of the present essay will sort out several points of Husserl’s counterposition in the margins of KPM. Six themes in the “debate” will be discussed. Readers who wish to do so may skip the first part and read only part two. But readers who wish an annotated discussion of the importance of the marginalia that goes into the historical and philosophical background may find part one of interest. Prefacing both discussions we offer some notes on when the texts in question were written. Heidegger probably gave KPM to Husserl shortly after its publication in late June or early July of 1929. No exact date is included with the inscription, “Mit herzlichem Gruß. M. Heidegger” [“With heartfelt greetings. M. Heidegger”], but in a letter from Karl Jaspers to Heidegger dated July 14, Jaspers thanks him for sending the Kant book and also acknowledges receiving his rather flowery encomium of April 8, celebrating Husserl’s 70th birthday.9 About the speech Jaspers remarks that he has a few “impertinent questions,” presumably about the sincerity of Heidegger’s lavish praise of Husserl.10 In any case, since we know Jaspers received his copy of KPM during the week or so before July 14, we can assume that Husserl also received his copy about the same time – i.e., middle to late June or early July, 1929.11 It cannot be known with any certainty when Husserl wrote his marginal remarks in KPM. However, Husserl states in his letter to Pf¨ nder of January 6, a 1931, that he decided he must in 1929 arrive at “a sober and definitive position on Heideggerian philosophy,” so when he finished readying his Formal and Transcendental Logic for publication that year, he devoted two months of his summer vacation “to the study of Being and Time as well as the recent writings.”12 It would seem reasonable to assume that the “recent writings” to which Husserl refers in this letter would have included KPM, that had appeared just a month or so before, and also Heidegger’s essay, “Vom Wesen des Grundes,” which was included in the Festschrift Heidegger presented to Husserl on April 8, earlier that year, celebrating his 70th birthday. On the other hand, Heidegger’s inaugural address in Freiburg, published as Was ist Metaphysik?, was given on July 29, and not published until December 1929, so it was probably not among the “recent writings” to which Husserl refers.13 In any case, Was ist Metaphysik?, the topic Heidegger chose for his inaugural address, had absolutely nothing to do with Husserl’s phenomenology. Indeed, Heidegger’s choice of subject was a glaring insult to Husserl.14



We do know with certainty where a good number of the notations, especially those in SZ, were written: Tremezzo, a resort on Lake Como in Italy where Husserl vacationed from mid-August to early September, 1929.15 Of course, it is quite possible that some of the notations in KPM and in SZ were made after Husserl’s return to Freiburg, but given the publication of KPM just before Husserl left for Italy, and given the importance of the content of this book in relation to Husserl’s thought, it seems likely that at least some and probably most of the notations date from Husserl’s Italian vacation in August and September of 1929, or shortly thereafter. We can date Heidegger’s final three weeks of work on KPM with greater certainty. From several sources we know that he addressed himself to this task shortly after returning from the “Davos Lectures” with Ernst Cassirer.16 This specially arranged “lecture course” was offered during the period from March 17 to April 6.17 In a letter of April 12 to Elisabeth Blochman after he returned to Freiburg, Heidegger said that after returning from Davos he “slept for two days.” After that, he continues, there was Easter with Elfride and the children, which included “a fine hike to the Schluchsee, and from there up to the hut.”18 So the dating is pretty clear: a few days after returning from Davos, approximately April 12, Heidegger moved up to his hut and devoted three weeks or so to preparing for publication his lecture-course on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason from the winter semester of 1927–1928.19 1. Husserl and Heidegger: background factors Husserl’s marginal comments in KPM are important, as we have indicated, first, because they give us an intimate glimpse into Husserl’s reaction to Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant at a key time in their relationship. They were not intended for public viewing, so Husserl was speaking his mind. Although large portions of KPM are without markings or remarks, one still finds a good number of substantive comments in it, in a few cases at considerable length. These alone make the marginalia of interest to readers of Husserl. But marginalia gain additional significance because they are placed in a turning-point document in the development of Heidegger’s early thought. KPM is important, we recall, because the analysis of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason presented in it was to have been a continuation of Being and Time: Part I. Part I was to have had three divisions, of which only two were completed. Part II was to have consisted of three divisions: 1) Kant’s schematism and the doctrine of time; 2) Descartes’ cogito sum, and 3) Aristotle’s treatises on time. KPM, then, would have provided the substance of the first division of Part II. Heidegger himself explicitly relates KPM to the project of SZ in the preface to the fourth edition (1973):



In preparing the lecture course on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, my attention was drawn to the chapter on Schematism, and I glimpsed therein a connection between the problem of Categories, that is, the problem of Being in traditional Metaphysics and the phenomenon of time. In this way the manner of questioning from Being and Time came into play as an anticipation of my attempted interpretation of Kant. Kant’s text became a refuge, as I sought in Kant an advocate for the question of Being which I posed. (Page xv in Robert Taft’s English translation of KPM.) Towards the end of this same preface, Heidegger states: “The Kant book remains an introduction . . . to the further questionability which persists concerning the question of Being as set forth in Being and Time.” Then, in a gesture characteristic of the later Heidegger, he adds toward the end of the preface, “The growing and unacknowledged anxiety in the face of thinking no longer allows insight into the forgetfulness of Being which determines the age.”20 So it is quite clear that KPM was to have been a continuation of the project of SZ. There are other links of KPM to SZ. The substance of the Kant book took shape just after SZ was published – in the semester lecture course during the winter of 1927–1928. Heidegger’s statement of the “theme” of the investigation both in the table of contents and on the opening page of the text: “The Unfolding of the Idea of a Fundamental Ontology through the Interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason as a Laying of the Ground for Metaphysics” explicitly links it with SZ because the goal of KPM, like that of SZ, was a fundamental ontology.21 Yet Heidegger chose not to wait and make this highly original and controversial interpretation of Kant part of his projected continuation of SZ; rather, right after the Davos lectures, and perhaps even because of them,22 to publish it immediately as a separate work. KPM basically marks his last major effort in the whole general approach to the “meaning of Being” that was undertaken in SZ. A comment written by Heidegger in his own copy of KPM during the 1930s reads: “Ganz r¨ ckf¨ llig u a in die transzendentale Fragestellung” – “[This] falls back completely into the transcendental standpoint.”23 Heidegger was about to desert even his own effort to come to terms with transcendental philosophy. Historically, then, KPM marks a certain point of closure in the project of SZ – at least in the form in which it pursued the question of Being in that volume.24 KPM is important, however, not just because it constitutes a continuation of SZ, and indeed marks the virtual closure of that project, but also because KPM focuses on Kant. This is our next major point. Both Husserl and Heidegger relate importantly to Kant, so a contrast of their relationship to Kant sheds light on the Husserl-Heidegger relationship and its breakdown. An exhaustive



and detailed study of Husserl’s relation to Kant is offered in Iso Kern’s lengthy study, Husserl und Kant.25 Given this study, we will only make a few general observations. First, for Husserl, it was Descartes rather than Kant who was the truly revolutionary figure in modern philosophy. Kant failed to live up to the promise of his philosophy, and it is precisely the failures of Kant that Husserl seeks to remedy with his phenomenology. Thus, even Husserl’s rapprochement with the NeoKantians in his middle period remains basically a tactical effort to interest them in phenomenology. In the Krisis, however, Husserl is quite frank about the shortcomings of Kant. Heidegger’s evolving grasp of Kant is also relevant in this connection because KPM represents an effort by Heidegger to come to terms with Kantian philosophy. This complex story cannot be adequately rehearsed here, but we will discuss a few major factors and refer the reader to some key sources. The posthumously published lectures of Heidegger during the Marburg period (to be discussed subsequently) and books by Theodore Kisiel, John van Buren, and others now give us a far full picture of Heidegger’s relation to Kant. Also, in his preface to the fourth edition of KPM Heidegger himself refers us to the detailed article by Hansgeorg Hoppe on his evolving relation to Kant.26 While Husserl viewed his phenomenology as going beyond both Kantian and NeoKantian philosophy, indeed as a “breakthrough,” Heidegger saw Husserl’s philosophy, especially after Ideas I (1913) as falling back into NeoKantianism. Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, for its part, is an excellent illustration of his interpretive violence and Destruktion (deconstruction). For Heidegger, Kant represents a position in the history of the Western metaphysics that he is trying to dismantle and reconstruct – or “deconstruct” – in developing his own project of a fundamental ontology. In keeping with this strategy, Heidegger here carefully goes inside the Kantian text and analyzes the inner workings of the schematism. At the Davos debate with Cassirer which just preceded his publication of KPM, he went so minutely into Kant that Cassirer professed not to understand where Heidegger diverged from NeoKantianism. Cassirer asserted there: “I have found a neo-Kantian here in Heidegger!”27 Cassirer then asked Heidegger: “Who are the NeoKantians?”28 Heidegger, after listing a number of obvious names, explicitly said: “In a certain sense, Husserl himself fell into the clutches of neoKantianism between 1900 and 1910.”29 This shows that Heidegger’s effort to take a definitive position on Kant within the horizon of his own ontological philosophy is also taking a position on Husserl’s perceived NeoKantianism. It is of interest that at the end of his Kant lectures (in GA 25 but not in KPM itself in GA 3), Heidegger asserts that his study of Kant “had confirmed for him the correctness of the path he had chosen” – the way of grasping phenomenology hermeneutically and preliminarily arriving at an ontological



conceptuality through “formal indications” of the lifeworld.30 Otto P¨ ggeler o reminds us that Husserl also played a role in Heidegger’s relation to Kant. “The formally indicating [formal anzeigende] hermeneutic,” says P¨ ggeler, o “could become a schematization because Husserl had stimulated Heidegger to a temporal interpretation of the component moments of the Kantian ‘power of the imagination’ and thus directed him to Kant’s doctrine of the schematism.”31 So, against his previous plans, Heidegger in his 1925–1926 lectures on logic, “went into Kant and showed how the three Ekstasen of time are related to the schemata.”32 Yet in spite of his debts to Kant, Heidegger was also critical of him, but in a distinctive way. In keeping with his method of Destruktion, he argued in KPM that Kant himself wanted to overcome the metaphysics of idealism but did not have the means, the conceptual tools – die Mittel. Which is to say, he did not have a “metaphysics of metaphysics.” In ontological terms, Kant did not explore the Being of Being [das Sein des Seins] but only the being of existent beings [das Sein des Seienden]; this “fundamental ontology” had to wait for SZ. Heidegger’s later public account of why he deserted Husserl’s phenomenology involved Kant, also. He stated: “Phenomenology in the Husserlian sense was developed into a position prescribed by Descartes, Kant, and Fichte.”33 That is to say, it became a transcendental and idealist philosophy that took human subjectivity as its starting point and sought to uncover the intentional structure of the transcendental ego. But already in SZ Heidegger had been attempting to avoid the traditional language of subjectivity and consciousness which had led Husserl to take a form of transcendental psychology as the propaedeutic to transcendental phenomenology. Even the Husserlian slogan, “Zur Sachen selbst!” – which Heidegger reinterpreted in SZ – still entailed, in Heidegger’s view of Husserl, that things themselves were objects of consciousness and thus Husserl retreated to the standpoint of Kantian idealism.34 Instead of using such terms as consciousness and transcendental subjectivity, Heidegger employed an ontological terminology centered on the being of Dasein human being-there] and its finite, temporal, caring, future-oriented being-in-the-world. Like Husserl, Heidegger returned to the unobtrusive life-world, but this is an ontologically defined life-world. And it is in terms of the ontological project in SZ that Heidegger interpreted Kant with a deconstructive violence that drew widespread protest.35 Today, with the posthumous publication of Heidegger’s early lectures from the Marburg period in the Gesamtausgabe, it becomes possible to gain a more nuanced picture of Heidegger’s Auseinandersetzung not only with Kant but also with Husserl in the Marburg years.36 Franco Volpi, in an extensive and illuminating article on this latter topic, finds in these early Marburg lectures a



double relation to Husserlian phenomenology: a repetition of phenomenology and at the same time a radicalizing of Husserl’s project.37 The ambivalence Heidegger felt toward traditional philosophy, Valpi argues, he also felt toward Husserl insofar as Husserl continued that tradition; yet Volpi insists: “even where Heidegger’s critical tone becomes louder and more insistent, the explicit acknowledgement of the greatness of his teacher – as well as other great strugglers, Scheler above all – is never omitted.”38 Also, Volpi notes, Heidegger’s project in the Marburg lectures is always presented as an ontological transformation of the phenomenological approach. For instance, when his 1925 summer semester lectures were offered, they were titled “Prolegomena to a Phenomenology of History and Nature of the Concept of Time.”39 In these lectures Heidegger dedicates the extensive “preparatory portion” to Husserl’s “phenomenological breakthrough” beyond Brentano, referring to the “three great discoveries” of intentionality, categorial intuition, and the function of the apriori.40 Yet each of these discoveries, Heidegger argues in the lectures, must be more radically interpreted – perhaps we might say “demythologized” or “interpreted deconstructively,” so as to separate the breakthrough insights from the “metaphysical” presuppositions of their proponent. Brentano, says Heidegger, based his thinking on the essential character of the “psychical” (or “mind”) which distinguishes humans from other beings, but he failed to go into “a closer determination of the ontological manner of being of the psychical.”41 Heidegger traces this failure back to the Cartesianism of Brentano, and finds both Husserl and Scheler entrapped in a traditional metaphysics of the psychical, a metaphysics based on substance and conscious subjectivity. In these Marburg lectures of 1925, Heidegger explicitly asserts that “intentionality” in Husserl has fallen back into traditional concepts just when he was expecting phenomenology, with a new concept of intentionality, to go beyond them. “Today, too,” he says, “intentionality is simply grasped as a structure of consciousness or a structure of acts of the person, and thus again these two realities, of which intentionality is supposed to be the structure, are taken up in a very traditional way.” One seeks in phenomenology, Heidegger continues, whether that of Husserl or Scheler – who move in two quite different directions – “to get beyond the psychical character of intentionality: Husserl, in that he grasps intentionality as universal structure of reason (reason not as psychical, differentiated from the physical), and Scheler, in that he takes intentionality as structure of spirit or person, distinguishing it from the physical. But we will see that because of what they mean by reason, spirit, or anima, the approach with which these theories work is not overcome. I refer to these because we will see how phenomenology requires



that this determination of intentionality be placed within a more radical development.”42 Instead of deconstructing Kant, now Heidegger is deconstructing Brentano, Husserl, and Scheler! Like intentionality, categorial intuition and the apriori – the two other great “discoveries” and anchors of Husserlian phenomenology – have also been “covered over,” Heidegger argues, with traditional concepts and need to be liberated. “Categorial acts,” he argues in these lectures, “constitute a new objectivity, which is always to be understood intentionally and certainly does not mean that you just somehow let things arise.”43 That is to say: “to constitute does not mean constructing as making and getting ready but the entity allowing itself to be seen in its being as an object.”44 Volpi shows Heidegger in the Marburg years working through and transforming Husserlian insights and terminology but always with a show of respect, treating Husserl as a classical philosophical thinker to whom he is deeply indebted. In his discussion of “the apriori” in the 1925 Marburg lectures, Heidegger again formally maintains the Husserlian and Kantian term while transforming its context and its meaning. He discusses “the threefold presentation of the apriori” in a phenomenological context in terms of the following dimensions: First, its universal breadth and indifference over against subjectivity, second, the access to it (simple grasp, originary intuition), and third, the preparatory determination of the structure of the apriori as a character of the being of beings and not of beings themselves – discloses to us the originary meaning of the apriori, and this is of essential significance, that it in part depends on the clear grasp of ideation, i.e., on the discovery of the authentic sense of intentionality. (GA 20: 102–103) In these lectures Heidegger presents his work in phenomenology as a matter of redefining, even purifying, terms like intentionality, categorial intuition, and the apriori, in ways that recover their essential insight but at the same time pare away the encrustations of “traditional concepts.” This deconstructive approach, applied here to Husserl himself, but presenting its critique as appreciative analysis, contrasts with Husserl’s more direct expression of dissatisfaction with Kant on behalf of his own phenomenology. Certainly at that time Husserl himself saw no special need to revise the basic terms of phenomenology, yet in his self-doubt, to which he refers in his January 6, 1931, letter to Pf¨ nder, he says he had hoped that the popular and charismatic a Heidegger would be able to carry his phenomenology to new heights. A number of relatively recent articles by Hans-Georg Gadamer, who served as Heidegger’s assistant in the Marburg years, also explore the issues



that divided Husserl and Heidegger in the Marburg period.45 According to Gadamer, the essential issue at stake was the need for an ultimate grounding in consciousness and transcendental subjectivity.46 Husserl’s insistence on the terminology and assumptions of subjectivity and consciousness, and his frequent references to psychology in the Britannica Article and the Amsterdam Lectures, posed for Heidegger an “insurmountable barrier.” Indeed, Gadamer asserts: “The ‘destruction’ of the concept of ‘consciousness’ was [for Heidegger] necessary to regain the question of Being.”47 This assertion makes it clear that Husserl’s very vocabulary of science and psychology and his goal of an ultimate grounding [Letztbegr¨ ndung] for knowledge stood u totally at cross-purposes to Heidegger’s quest for the “meaning of Being.” Thus, Husserl’s dream that Heidegger would carry forward his version of phenomenology eventually became an obstacle in Heidegger’s quest – a quest that eventually took him into explorations of the “origin of the artwork,” Nietzsche, H¨ lderlin’s poetry, the embracing of Gelassenheit and rejection o of “humanism,” and, in general, down unscientific “forest paths” [Holzwege] in search of a form of thinking that did not make “subjectivity” – either transcendental or psychological – its starting point. 2. Themes of Husserl’s counterposition in KPM What do we learn from these marginal notations on Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant in KPM? For one thing, we find that at this point Husserl has clearly given up on seeking a reconciliation with Heidegger’s general position. Rather, he is sharply taking issue with Heidegger’s reading of Kant. We find in the margins an abundant sprinkling of question-marks, exclamation points, and nota bene [NB] marks, not to mention comments and counter-arguments. These may seem to the casual reader to be quite fragmentary, yet on closer examination they show themselves not to be an inconsistent set of fragmentary remarks but a coherent counterposition on assertions made by Heidegger in KPM. We will focus on six major themes. They by no means represent all the topics in Husserl’s marginal notations, but they will suffice to set forth a fairly consistent counterposition, which we will formulate as a series of questions. First, on the issue of Heidegger’s general approach to Kant: Is Kant to be considered as an epistemologist or as a philosopher laying a new foundation for metaphysics? Second, what is the significance of the finitude of human knowledge? Is it necessary for Heidegger to posit what God’s knowledge must be like, and indeed can one really do this? Third, what does Heidegger mean by the “ontological synthesis” and is it needed? Fourth, how is the transcendental self to be conceived? Fifth, is Heidegger’s interpretive violence



justified in relation to this text of Kant? Sixth is Heidegger’s question: “What should be the foundation for a new transcendental metaphysics?” Should it be philosophical anthropology or a finite Dasein’s preconceptual comprehension of Being – or neither of these? First, the question of Heidegger’s general approach to Kant. Heidegger’s approach to Kant clearly represents a challenge to the NeoKantian interpretation of him as an epistemologist.48 Indeed, Heidegger’s final step before revising the manuscript for publication in 1929 was his debate with the NeoKantian philosopher, Ernst Cassirer, at Davos. For Cassirer and NeoKantians generally, the First Critique represented the philosophical foundation of a modern epistemology that freed itself of the problematic philosophical limitations of both rationalism and empiricism. As we have noted, for Husserl it was Descartes more than Kant who marks the great turning point in modern philosophy. Important as Kant’s move beyond the aporiae of rationalism and empiricism may have been, Kant’s great accomplishment was compromised, according to Husserl, because he did not rigorously carry through the implications of his own transcendental philosophy. For Husserl and the NeoKantians, however, Kant was to be seen as an epistemologist, not a metaphysician. Heidegger, however, had other fish to fry. He makes the general approach of his Kant book unambiguously clear in the preface to the first edition: “This investigation is devoted to interpreting Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as laying the ground for metaphysics, and thus placing the problem of metaphysics before us as fundamental ontology.”49 Heidegger goes so far as to assert, in contrast to the NeoKantian interpretation of Kant, that the First Critique “has nothing to do with a ‘theory of knowledge”’ (KPM 16), and much later he even cites Kant’s own words in a letter in which Kant refers to the First Critique as a “metaphysics of metaphysics.” This, Heidegger says, should “strike down every effort to search for a theory of knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason” (KPM 221). Jumping back to the beginning of KPM, we also find Heidegger asserting that “Kant’s grounding of metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason discloses the nature of ontology” (14). It is clear here that Heidegger’s reinterpretation of Kant’s Critique is continuing the project of SZ and further developing the project of a fundamental ontology. Going back now to Husserl’s very first marginal remark in KPM we find him picking up on Heidegger’s use of the term Seinsplan (Plan of Being) and writing in the margin “Seinsplan?” (10). He is here clearly taking note of Heidegger’s seeming transformation of Kant’s First Critique into a work on fundamental ontology. Two pages later (12), Husserl writes in the margin, “What does Seinsverfassung [constitution of Being] mean?” And when Heidegger, attempting to establish at the outset that Kant was really not doing epistemology but metaphysics, refers to



Kant’s prize-winning essay of 1791 on the progress of metaphysics in Germany since Leibniz and Wolff, Husserl writes in the margin, “But one must glean Kant’s meaning! There I read a quite different meaning!” (11). Later, midway through the book, when Heidegger asserts that Kant wants to replace ontology with transcendental philosophy, Husserl writes, “So do I” (118). Here it would seem that Husserl wants to make Kant’s transcendental turn a forerunner of his own transcendental phenomenology while continuing to view Kant as an epistemologist, while Heidegger wants to view Kant as an anticipation of his fundamental ontology. Husserl finds Heidegger’s ontologizing of Kant the epistemologist to be strange. From the first comments of Husserl, we see him continuing to see Kant as an epistemologist in opposition to Heidegger’s view of Kant as an ontologist. A second area of disagreement arises as Husserl responds to Heidegger’s discussion of the finitude of human knowledge in section 5. Here Husserl fills the margins with well over a dozen comments. Since intuition is a major topic for Husserl and the focus of section 5 is on the process of intuition in relation to thought, it is not surprising that he pays intense critical attention to Heidegger’s exposition at this point. Heidegger’s opening sentence in the section notes that human knowledge stands in contrast to divine knowledge: “First of all, we can put the matter negatively by saying: finite knowledge is not creative intuition” (KPM 23). Human knowledge, rather, is receptive, receiving intuitively something whose nature it does not create. Kant calls this intuition an intuitus derivativus. On the other hand, for Kant God’s knowing as Creator is original and creative. It is an intuitus originarius. There is in man, Heidegger notes, an echo of God’s creativity, of activity rather than mere passivity, as thought actively categorizes the bodily givenness of the individual object such that it can be shared with other people. So the process of an object becoming manifest, combined with understanding what the object is, involves a synthesis of thought and intuition. Later Heidegger also notes that insofar as knowing gains access to something other than itself, i.e., something not resident in its prior knowledge, something it did not create, this knowing by use of apriori processes and the human senses transcends the self; it becomes a form of “finite transcendence.” But in Kant’s text the focus is primarily on the “veritative synthesis,” the synthesis of intuition and thought by which a thing becomes “manifest” as what it is. What Heidegger is finding in Kant’s close analysis is a much more nuanced description of what he described in SZ in such general terms as “the ontological comprehension of Being,” phenomenology as the “letting something appear from itself,” and the “hermeneutical as.” Small wonder, then, that William Richardson in his major book on Heidegger devotes a lengthy chapter to the Kantbook, a length which itself suggests the importance of KPM in Heidegger’s thought. Here he asserts



that Heidegger’s effort at a “retrieve” [Wiederholung] of Kant’s fundamental problematic really gives us “the most authoritative interpretation of SZ,” and the final section of KPM serves as “the best propaedeutic to SZ.”50 Husserl sprinkles just the second page of section 5 with half a dozen marginal comments. He underlines and puts a question mark next to Heidegger’s reference to “a concept of sensibility which is ontological rather than sensualistic” (KPM 24, italicized emphasis added; hereinafter indicated simply with e.a.), and puts the rather quizzical remark in the margin: “not related to the sense organs.” And alongside the next sentence (24), which asserts that “it follows [from such a concept] that if empirically affective intuition of beings need not coincide with ‘sensibility,’ then the possibility of a nonempirical sensibility remains open,” Husserl writes, “Does it follow?” Alongside the sentence, “Knowledge is primarily intuition, i.e., a representing that immediately represents the being itself” (24, e.a.), Husserl writes, “Is this Kant?” and also, “Das Ding an sich?” Next to Heidegger’s sentence stating that finite creatures also must be able to share what they have intuited with others [thus the need for thinking in addition to receptive sensing of the object], Husserl again writes, “Is this Kant?” One has to answer: No, this is not Kant but Heidegger’s story of what Kant is doing, a story that stands in the context of Heidegger’s account of “the ontological synthesis.” When Heidegger develops the contrast between the divine intuition and human intuition as the difference between an intuition that creates and an intuition that receives, Husserl writes in the bottom margin: “Better: God needs no explication through intuition, no step-by-step getting to know things and bring them back to himself, no apperceptive transference or fixation in language, etc. – but such a God is an absurdity!” (26). Husserl continues at the top of the next page, “What is infinity over against finitude? Why talk at all of finitude rather than receptivity, the grasping of the thing-as-it-givesself in anticipation, a relative self-giving depending on the ever new? On the other hand, absolutely adequate intuition, etc. . . . is an absurdity” (26, e. a.). For Husserl, the contrast with an infinite creative intuition is unnecessary, and Heidegger’s effort to unfold the terms of infinite knowledge is phenomenologically impossible as well as unnecessary. Alongside Heidegger’s remark that the finitude of understanding in its active mode shows us the nature of absolute knowledge as originating intuition, Husserl writes, “Finitude is not absolute,” and after the words “absolute knowledge,” he writes “nonsense” (27). Next to Heidegger’s assertion that “absolute knowing discloses the being in its letting-stand-forth and possesses it in every case only as that which stands forth in the letting-stand-forth” (28), Husserl puts a question mark and writes “an absurdity.” This is the third time he has used this term in this section, but not the last. His final remark in the section is: “This matter



is and remains absurd!” (31). For Husserl, Heidegger’s speculations about divine intuition and absolute knowledge, and about how, for God, “the beingin-the-appearance is the same being as the being-in-itself and this alone” (28), an assertion next to which he puts a question-mark, do not transform Kant’s basically epistemological analysis into fundamental ontology; rather, they show us that Heidegger is going beyond even his own ontology and falling into speculative theology. The third issue, which we formulated as “What is the ontological synthesis and is it really needed?” is answered quite differently in the margins. For Heidegger the ontological synthesis is the crucial next step in his transformation of Kantian metaphysics into the terms of SZ’s fundamental ontology. The vertative synthesis of sensory intuition and thought is for Heidegger an ontic process, but as he puts it in the opening sentence of the second of the four major divisions of the book – a division titled “Stages in Carrying Through the Project of [Unfolding] the Inner Possibility of Ontology” – the issue Heidegger is now inquiring into is “the essential possibility [Wesensm¨ glichkeit] o of the ontological synthesis” (38, e.a.). Not surprisingly, Husserl underlines “ontological synthesis” and replies at great length in the bottom margin. Before we consider Husserl’s reply, let us note what Heidegger has in mind by the term “ontological synthesis,” a crucial point in his argument. A little before the passage on the ontological synthesis on which Husserl makes his lengthy comments (KPM 38), Heidegger asserts that “knowledge of beings is only possible on the basis of a prior knowledge, free of experience, of the constitution of the being of beings. . . . If finite knowledge of beings is to be possible, then it must be grounded in a knowing of the being of beings prior to all intake” (KPM 34, e.a.). In the margin next to these sentences Husserl had put a question-mark. What Husserl is questioning here is a key premise in SZ, that Dasein has a “knowledge of the being of beings” that is prior to all its acts of cognition and doing things in the world, a comprehension of being that makes Heidegger’s effort at unfolding the meaning of Being possible. The ontological synthesis, then, bridges the gap between the being of the knower and the whatness of the being of the thing known, and thus is the vehicle of a finite transcendence by which one goes beyond oneself to a being that is beyond oneself. Heidegger puts this in ontological terminology as follows: “How can a finite creature [endliches Wesen], which as such is given over to being and directed by its perception of these beings, know, i.e., intuit, prior to all instances of taking-in, without being their creator? In other words, how must this finite creature itself be constituted with regard to its being [seiner eigenen Seinsverfassung nach] such that it is able to bring forth the way a being is constituted that is out there in the world, which is to say, how is an ontological synthesis possible?” (35). There are further elaborations of the



ontological synthesis, but since it is these two instances to which Husserl is responding, they will suffice for our purposes here. Next to Heidegger’s pregnant sentence, “We are inquiring into the essential possibility of the ontological synthesis” (38, e.a.), Husserl attempts to reframe the discussion, saying that he would define the ontological synthesis as “the constituting of the invariant structural form of the pre-given world.” Then he adds: “One need not begin with traditional ontology; one can pose the question as Hume did before Kant. One does not need the problem of finitude either – Hume did not consider this at all” (38, e.a.). As Heidegger continues his exposition, saying, “What is at issue is the essential possibility of ontological synthesis: How can finite human Dasein transcend beings and things . . . when it has not created these things and beings but must be directed toward them to exist as Dasein?” (39), Husserl underlines “in order to exist as Dasein” and asks: But is this the right way to pose the question philosophically? Isn’t here an entity already presupposed whereby the presupposed Being already presupposes subjectivity? Is not man himself already pre-given, etc.? . . . This is already Heidegger (39, e.a.) As Husserl sees it, Heidegger is really arguing in a circle, relying on his own presuppositions. One does not need to posit infinite knowledge to understand and describe perception phenomenologically, nor does one need traditional ontology; and human existence does not require an “ontological synthesis” to enable it to take place. It may seem to Husserl, who elsewhere reproaches Heidegger and Scheler with anthropologizing, that a certain anthropologizing lurks behind the reference to something that Dasein requires “in order to exist as Dasein.” The fourth issue has to do with the nature of the transcendental self: How is the transcendental self to be conceived? Here we should go back to Heidegger’s objection in SZ that Kant failed to grasp the transcendental ego as a factical, essentially temporal existing entity; rather, while it was not thought of as substance, it was described in substance-based terms as something vorhanden [on hand], and as an abiding, unchanging entity. In this regard, Kant made the same mistake as Descartes, who did not think the “I am” in an originary way but rather with the tradition of the metaphysics of presence. Thus, according to Heidegger, both Descartes and Kant failed to think the temporality of the self in an originary way. In Husserl, however, the transcendental ego becomes not just the center of the self but the ultimate anchor for his phenomenology. Heidegger recognized that Husserl had already taken a step beyond such a Kantian transcendental ego in his 1907 lectures on inter-



nal time-consciousness in making time a definitive factor in consciousness. Just for this reason Heidegger had urged Husserl to publish these lectures and indeed eventually edited them for publication in 1928, but seemingly put little genuine effort into the project, leaving the notes pretty much as he found them. In any case, it is not surprising that Husserl, considering the importance to him of transcendental subjectivity and the role of time in perception, would pay special attention to section 34, titled “Time as Pure Self-Affection and the Temporal Character of the Self.” Here and in the later part of the Kantbook, Heidegger makes temporality the essence of the “metaphysics of Dasein.” In the margins of the eight pages of this section, there are two dozen notations or remarks by Husserl. To understand the two sides, we will need to go into Heidegger’s argument at this point. In the two sections leading up to section 34, Heidegger explores the relationship of the transcendental imagination to time. Because time is the basis of pure sensory intuition by the transcendental imagination, it only takes a single further step, Heidegger notes, to see that time is definitive for the transcendental imagination (KPM 165). Heidegger next argues that the transcendental imagination is the “ontological basis of the metaphysics of Dasein.” Because Kant was a child of the Enlightenment, according to Heidegger, he held himself back from the implications of making the transcendental imagination the source of both reason and sensory intuition; so he changed the first Kritik in its second edition. Following the metaphysical tradition, Kant labelled pure thought the ego, and interpreted time as something “standing and abiding” [stehend und bleibend]; so like Descartes, Kant accepted the traditional view of being as “static presence” and defined the pure ego “according to the reigning interpretation as outside all temporality and standing over against all time” (164, last paragraph of x31). Thus Heidegger finds that the first edition of the Critique is much more supportive of his effort to put time at the core of his new metaphysics of Dasein. With some creative interpreting of the first edition, Heidegger is able to “retrieve” the almost lost temporality of the self that can be found in the transcendental imagination. So in his Kantbook Heidegger works from the 1st edition of the Critique when he is exploring the transcendental imagination as the root of both intuition and thought. And time in Heidegger’s interpretation is the essence of the shaping that takes place in the imagination. Says Heidegger, “Since the shaping power of the imagination is in itself temporal, it must first of all shape time itself. . . . Time as pure intuition is the intuition shaping that which is intuited. Only when we realize this do we have a full concept of time” (167, e.a.). In the next section (33), Heidegger finds that the three modes of intuition parallel “the threefold unity of time as present, past, and future” (169), and he goes through an elaborate analysis to prove his point. Interestingly, we find



not any marks from Husserl in these two sections; he holds his fire for section 34. Space only permits us to give a few of the points Husserl makes in his extensive comments on this section. Time as such is the first theme in section 34, and after that the theme is temporality as the essential character of subjectivity. Husserl’s first notations seem simply to be going along with Heidegger, restating the point in Husserlian terms. Still, he does complain about such Heideggerianisms as “letting-stand-against,” and alongside the key assertion, “Time as pure self-affection forms the essential structure of subjectivity,” Husserl puts two question marks. Is he perhaps surprised that Heidegger is using the term subjectivity? When Heidegger makes his point more explicit by saying that time and Descartes’ I think now “no longer stand incompatibly and incomparably at odds with each other; they are the same” (183), Husserl underlines “time” and “I think” and also “they are the same,” and places an NB in the margin, as if to ask how the abstract concept, “time,” could be “the same as” the concrete thinking self. As if replying to this question, Heidegger on the next page asks whether it follows from Kant’s assertion that neither the ego nor time are within time, and that they are not temporal in their essence. On the contrary, he answers, what this means is that “the ego is so very ‘temporal’ that it is time itself and only as this itself does it become possible in its ownmost essential nature” (184). Alongside this, Husserl reformulates Heidegger’s point into a question, perhaps to himself, perhaps to Heidegger: “Is the ego the immanent time in which objective time temporalizes itself?” Husserl would seem here to be preserving the concept of an “objective” time that Heidegger does not consider when he locates time in the essential nature of the self, leaving Husserl at least space for other determinations of what the transcendental ego is in its essence. The contrast Heidegger is making here is between a radically temporal transcendental subjectivity and the traditional Cartesian concept of the ego as a static structure of apriori possibilities, an essentially timeless, unchanging structure. In this case, Husserl, having himself also sought to describe internal time consciousness phenomenologically, seems to be inching along with Heidegger by conceding that objective time temporalizes itself as the immanent time of the ego. We stand here before a key issue for both Husserl and Heidegger: the nature of the temporality of the transcendental self. Heidegger asserts that “if the ‘temporality’ versus the timelessness of the ego is to be decided, then we must be guided by the original essence of time as pure self-affection” (185, emphasis indicates Husserl’s underlining). Here Heidegger seems to be arguing in a circle by going back to his own definition of time in order to decide the issue. Husserl quite justifiably underlines “the original essence”



and asks in the margin: “What does ‘original essence’ mean?” He wants to know how one could know what the “original” nature of time was. When Heidegger asserts that “it is contradictory to want to determine the essence of what time itself is originally with the help of a product derived from it” (187), Husserl writes in the margin, “The origin of time is not original time.” Is this a critical rephrasing of Heidegger’s point or a counterassertion? It seems more like the latter. The following sentence of Heidegger asserts, “Because the self in its innermost essence is time itself, the ego cannot be conceived as something temporal, that is to say, within time” (187), so one is wont to ask for the difference between innermost essence and original essence. Next to this sentence Husserl seems to be offering his alternative formulation when he writes, “The immanent life of the ego as, rather, originally temporalizing.” Earlier in the margins, Husserl had remarked that for Kant, on anthropological grounds, everything whatsoever is within time. Still, Husserl, as he writes that “an immanent temporal horizon is necessary,” seems to be agreeing with Heidegger. What Husserl seems to be saying here is that of course time is a component of the transcendental ego; what bothers Husserl is all this talk about what time is primordially. The question of the “primordial essence” of time seems unnecessary to him. Why is it so important here, he wonders. Heidegger seems to answer this question in the next section when he asserts that “primordial time makes possible the transcendental power of the imagination” (188, e.a.), but Husserl underlines “makes possible” and asks in the margin: “What does this ‘makes possible’ [erm¨ glich] mean?” o Perhaps Heidegger is using it in a Kantian transcendental sense as being that which makes something possible. In any case, for Husserl, Heidegger is not describing the experience of time phenomenologically, or even accounting for it philosophically, but rather doing metaphysics right along with Kant. Yes, of course there is an immanent temporal horizon for transcendental subjectivity, but that does not make the transcendental ego “time itself”! Whether time makes possible the transcendental power of the imagination would seem to depend on what “makes possible” means. If Heidegger only means that it is the “condition for the possibility” of the transcendental imagination, yes. But Heidegger seems here to be claiming more than this. He seems to be making claims about the metaphysical nature of Dasein. This brings us to the question of the nature of man: anthropology, a topic we have reserved for the sixth and final question. The fifth question raises the issue of Heidegger’s interpretive method: Is Heidegger’s interpretive violence justified in relation to this text of Kant? Responding to strong objections, Heidegger in 1950 still defends his interpretive violence in the forward to the second edition of KPM, which he explains he is republishing unchanged. He acknowledges that readers have



“constantly taken offense at the violence of my interpretations,” but he argues that such violence is unavoidable “in a thinking conversation between thinkers” (all citations of the preface are from GA 3: xvii). A “thinking dialogue” [Zwiesprache], he says there, must operate “under quite different rules than those governing historical philology.” After all, philology has a different task, and in the adventurousness of a thinking dialogue, “the risks of going astray are greater, and the errors are more common.” Of course, between 1929 and 1950 a lot had happened in terms of mistakes and going astray, perhaps more blatantly on his political path than on the forest paths of his adventurous thinking. Philosophically, his thought had taken a “turn,” a turn away from metaphysics, and he seemingly scrapped his whole project of a “fundamental ontology” that was begun in SZ and continued in KPM as having “gone astray.” This assertion applies specifically to KPM is clear from his statement in that preface: “The errors and going astray have in the meantime become so clear to me that I refuse to make this writing into some kind of patchwork by supplements, appendixes, and postscripts.” This writing was not like a scientific or even philosophical treatise that could be added to and patched here and there. By then, KPM was more an historic record of his thought than a foundation to build on. His concluding sentence in the second preface is very Heideggerian: “Thinkers learn from their errors to be more persevering.” Yes, thinking is a risky business, and Heidegger more than others came to know this. But Heidegger did not wait until 1950 to defend his interpretive violence. Already in Division Three of the Kantbook Heidegger offered a pragmatic justification of interpretive violence: “Certainly every interpretation, if it wants to wring from what the words say what they want to say, must use violence. Such violence, however, cannot simply be a roving arbitrariness. The power of an idea that sheds advance light must drive and lead the explication” (KPM 193–194).51 Next to this assertion Husserl underlines the words “every interpretation must use violence” and in the margin he puts three exclamation points followed by three question marks. This is very rare among his markings. Clearly Husserl is astonished that Heidegger would make such a provocative statement. We may note that Heidegger himself hastens to qualify it in the next sentence, cited above. Husserl comments in the margin, “I differentiate between what they [the words] wanted to say and what they ultimately aimed at and wanted to say as they were said” (193). But this falls far short of Heidegger’s requirements. Heidegger feels that in KPM, the light that his ontologizing interpretation sheds on the fundamental ontology of SZ justifies his interpretive violence. Needless to say, “wringing” from a text what it really wanted to say but could not do so because it was constrained by the thought-forms of the time is more than a little risky. The idea that a text



can “want to say” [in French, vouloir dire is translated as “means,” a usage possibly on the side of Heidegger] something but be “constrained” by the thought-forms of the time, such that it has to wait more than a century in order to be understood in the context of an existential ontology of Dasein must have seemed strange to Husserl. Still such a view would seem to find support in the Habermasian concept of a speaking that is distorted by a “false consciousness,” or even such Freudian concepts of censorship and repression. In this case, interpretation becomes a bit like psychoanalysis, a discovering not of what the patient intended consciously to say but repressed; rather it ferrets out what the text unconsciously wanted to say. But as Heidegger points out, the thinking dialogue between thinkers is a risky business. And it gets more risky when one is willing to use interpretive violence. The larger issue is Heidegger’s whole project of Destruktion, of finding what has been “covered over,” of saying what a thinker admittedly did not say but might have said if only he or she lived two hundred years or twenty-five hundred years later. It is hard enough to grasp what a thinker did say, or what he or she intended to say, but to grasp what a thinker did not say and could not say because of the thought-forms of the times – but was “on the way” towards saying – certainly requires the extraordinary art of “a thoughtful conversation between thinkers.” And, as Heidegger rightly says, in this risky business of thinking one can go astray and make mistakes. Still, if it sheds light on the forgotten question of the meaning of Being, he holds, such thinking is justified. Husserl can only be shocked at such leaps of thought. The sixth issue concerns Heidegger’s reference to philosophical anthropology and his characterization of “finite” Dasein as possessing a preconceptual understanding of the “being of beings.” Philosophical anthropology is a bone of contention between Heidegger and Husserl and the issue is complicated by Heidegger’s close friend Scheler’s advocacy of a philosophical anthropology.52 Without this, one has the impression Heidegger might have taken a different position in relation to it. Heidegger’s discussion of philosophical anthropology occurs in the fourth and final division of KPM, and it provokes a major response from Husserl. About half of Husserl’s comments, in terms of total number of words, occur in Part Four, although it occupies only the last forty pages of the volume (pp. 296–336). In these pages, Heidegger, having “retrieved” in Part Three the ontological synthesis implied in the transcendental imagination, now turns to Kant’s assertion that the first three of his famous four questions – What can I know? What ought I do? What may I hope? What is man? – are summed up in the fourth. For Heidegger, “What is man?” raises the issue of a philosophical anthropology and whether a philosophical anthropology can be the foundation of metaphysics, or whether metaphysics should serve as the foundation of anthropology. In



briefest terms, for Heidegger the answer is no, if the anthropology is an empirical anthropology of the usual sort. What is needed is a thinking that is rooted in the finitude of Dasein and its comprehension of the being of beings. But perhaps this is a kind of philosophical anthropology? To explore this line of thought, Heidegger’s three sections of Part Four are devoted first to the question of whether and in what way, in his retrieve of the problematic of Kant, metaphysics could be grounded in man; second, the significance of the finitude of man in relation to the metaphysics of Dasein; and third, “the metaphysics of Dasein as fundamental ontology.” To understand Heidegger’s argument, we will need to go into section 37, “The Idea of a Philosophical Anthropology.” In section 37, Heidegger basically follows Husserl in rejecting an empirical anthropology in favor of a transcendental position. Still, some of his analysis further confirms Husserl’s suspicion, long held, that Heidegger and Scheler do not really understand the transcendental reduction. For instance, when Heidegger says that anthropology “describes a fundamental tendency of man’s contemporary position with respect to himself and the totality of beings” (KPM 199), Husserl underlines these words and writes in the margin: “In other words, it is the prejudgment of Scheler, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the whole anthropological Richtung [direction, line of thought].” But Heidegger himself later acknowledges that “perhaps there is a difficulty in the very concept itself” (201). Husserl again underlines these words and puts NB in the margin. Husserl seems to be noting that even Heidegger recognizes the problems in this concept. When Heidegger goes on to assert, “If the goal of philosophy lies in the working out of a world-view, then an anthropology will have to delimit the ‘place of man in the cosmos ’ ” (the title of a wellknown book by Scheler), Husserl writes scornfully in the margin above it, “The goal of philosophy as the working out of a worldview.” What Husserl is implying is that is the sort of philosophy one can expect within the horizon of a philosophical anthropology. Of course, Husserl knows very well that neither he nor Heidegger wants to be lured into the perspectivism of a philosophy interpreted simply as a quest for a worldview. Heidegger goes on to observe that now and again the temptations of an anthropology do attract philosophers, and after all Kant himself found all his questions leading back to the fundamental question, “What is man?” Thus, when Heidegger asks (and Husserl underlines the words here italicized) the following question, “If anthropology in a certain sense gathers into itself all the central questions of philosophy, why do these allow us to follow them back to the question of what man is?” (203), Husserl asserts in the margin: “It is just this that is not correct.” But in the end, Heidegger cannot base his thought on an anthropology. He himself concludes that the “indeter-



minate character” (204) of a philosophical anthropology means that “we lack a basis and framework for a fundamental questioning as to its essential nature” (204). To this, Husserl adds in the margin that the same applies “for fundamental questioning with regard to all positive science.” Presumably Husserl’s phenomenology, in his own view, offers such a “framework for fundamental questioning,” but Heidegger had already rejected this. In any case, we may say that for Heidegger, Kant’s famous fourth question and Scheler’s focus on man both offer a measure of support for his use of a Dasein-based ontology, but they do not mean that philosophical anthropology can be a foundation for metaphysics. Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein in SZ had been interpreted by Husserl, at least up to their parting of the ways, as a regional area within phenomenology. Heidegger’s focus on Dasein, facticity, and “human finitude” as the basis for authentic philosophizing only showed Husserl that Heidegger did not understand the transcendental reduction correctly, and his description of Dasein, for all its subtlety and brilliance, remained dangerously close to a philosophical anthropology. Heidegger opens his next discussion, that of finitude, by emphasizing its central importance, saying that he undertook the interpretation of the Critique in order to bring to light the question of human finitude in laying the groundwork for a metaphysics (209, e.a.). Next to this sentence, Husserl merely puts an NB, but his resistance to Heidegger’s emphasis on finitude is evident throughout this section and in earlier remarks. Heidegger asserts that Kant, too, presupposed the finitude of human knowledge (209), and a little later says that just naming at random any human imperfection [Unvollkommenheit, incompleteness] is sufficient to indicate this finitude (210). But Husserl asks in the margin, “How does imperfection enter into this?” Later, when Heidegger acknowledges that “an essential relation [of the question of Being] to the finitude of human beings is not evident [ersichtlich]” (216), Husserl put a “yes” in the margin. He could not agree more. This brings us to our final point: the preconceptual understanding of Being. Husserl’s comments peak in the final section of KPM, x41, where Heidegger makes the key link between Dasein and Seinsverst¨ ndnis. Next to a Heidegger’s sentence, “When I ask about the possibility of grasping something like Being . . . I am asking about the possibility of grasping that which we all as human beings already and constantly understand” (216), Husserl has a lengthy comment: “We already experience the world, we already make claims about the world, the worldly, and eventually with evidence; and as we do so, we experience ourselves as humans in the world and we grasp ourselves as human beings who inquire in this manner. But we get bogged down in difficulties through subjective reflection.” Husserl certainly grants that there is an inconspicuous, pregiven world for each person and that we need to describe



that world, but we should practice an epoch´ on our experience of that world e instead of falling into a merely “subjective reflection” about it. The key issue, of course, is Heidegger’s inclusion in this pregiven world of “a preconceptual understanding of Being.” When Heidegger asserts that “the question of Being arises from the preconceptual understanding of Being” (216, e.a.), Husserl writes in the margin, “Not by pursuing the possibility of the concept of Being, but rather the possibility of doing away with the bewilderments in which the world as ‘world for us’ has entangled us and also every entity whatever as entity for us.” And when Heidegger emphasizes this phrase with wide spacing (not indicated in GA, here indicated with italics), “The Being-question arises on its side from our preconceptual understanding of Being” (216), Husserl comes forth with a lengthy, exasperated, top-andbottom-margin-filling alternative position statement: Yes, we obtain all our concepts of entities in a primordial, self-given way from the grasping activity of our minds on the basis of preconceptual experience, even the concepts we have of Being. . . . What is at issue here, however, is not the possibility, essence, or concept of Being, but rather the psychological and . . . transcendental possibility of an entity as such also being an entity for us. That is to say, with the not yet conceptually grasped, the not yet systematically investigated constituting subjectivity, and also the essential unity of that which has arisen out of naive, lived, but unthematized constitution, [i.e.,] which is simply and exclusively there for us existing beings with transcendentally functioning subjectivity. And on the basis of this, of a concrete, full grasp of the essence of the being or thing, a grasp which leaves open no question of essence for beings-as-such and for the entity with world . . .” (e.a.). And then on the next page, alongside Heidegger’s assertion that “with the question of Being as such, we venture to the brink of total darkness,” (e.a.) Husserl writes: Not the understanding of ‘Being’ but rather of understanding, of experience, of otherwise having awareness of being and things. The obscurity of the meaning of Seiendem [the being or thing] is really the unclarity about how the essence of the being or thing is to be held free of the incongruities which stem from subjective reflection” (217, e.a.). For Husserl, Heidegger’s talk about the “being of beings” is elusive and obscure. It does not make the transcendental reduction. It is not the product of careful phenomenological and transcendental reductions and description at all but of “subjective reflection.” Thus it creates rather than eliminates obscurity.



It is therefore not surprising that, when Heidegger says, “We understand Being but as yet we lack the concept,” Husserl exclaims, “We lack it? When would we need it?” We conclude our review of six topics in Husserl’s marginal remarks, and our remarks, with a glance at two of the last three comments he makes in the book – this time very short ones. First, next to Heidegger’s sentence, “If the essence of transcendence is grounded in the imagination, then the very idea of a ‘transcendental logic’ is a nonconcept” (233, e.a. to indicate words Husserl’s underlined), Husserl simply puts a “?” Of course, he had just finished preparing his Formal and Transcendental Logic for publication shortly before turning to this reading of KPM, so he is presumably unimpressed with the idea that a transcendental logic is a “nonconcept.” Finally, to Heidegger’s question, “ – or is there not within our own endeavors . . . also in the end a hidden sidestepping of something which we – and not accidentally – no longer see?” (235, e.a.), Husserl simply answers “Yes.” But this is a “yes” pregnant with meaning – and finality. The sidestepping Heidegger alludes to here is not what Husserl has in mind when he writes his final “Yes.” And Husserl’s “yes” closes the door on a relationship initially filled with hope and promise but doomed to end in disappointment and despair. Acknowledgement I want to thank Professor Hans-Georg Gadamer for his personal recollections of the Husserl-Heidegger religionship and Dominic Kaegi, also at the University of Heidelberg, Germany, for helpful comments on my interpretations and for suggesting many sources on which to check. I also thank Jean Grondin on Montr´ al University, Canada, as well as Sam IJsseling and Roland Breeur of e the Husserl Archives at Louvain for suggestions and corrections of this essay. My student assistant, Lisa Gilmore, also made valuable corrections of the final draft. Finally, I deeply appreciate the Fulbright Fellowship and Sabbatical Leave from MacMurray College that enabled me to study in Heidelberg during the 1995–1996 academic year using the Philosophy Seminar Library, whose resources made possible many of the references to German articles and books in the notes below. Notes
1. The book that contains the French translation of the marginal remarks in [Sein und Zeit] and [Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik] – Edmund Husserl, Notes sur Heidegger ´ (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1993) – also offers translations of the three earlier drafts of the Britannica article and an interpretive essay by Denise Souche-Dagues, “La lecture husserlienne de Sein und Zeit,” pp. 119–152.



2. See “Randbemerkungen Husserls zu Heideggers Sein und Zeit and Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik” in Husserl Studies 11, 1–2 (1994): pp. 3–63. 3. Edmund Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger: The Encyclopedia Britannica Article, The Amsterdam Lectures, “Phenomenology and Anthropology,” and Husserl’s Marginal Notes in Being and Time and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, translated and introduced by Thomas F. Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer. “Husserl in English” series. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, 1997. 4. For discussion of Husserl’s remarks in SZ see Sheehan’s introduction in the work just cited. 5. As presented in Husserl Studies (see note 2 above) Husserl’s marginal remarks on SZ occupy pages 9–48, while the marginalia in KPM take up only pages 49–63. 6. Roland Beeur’s “Einleitung” for the “Randbemerkungen” as they are presented in Husserl Studies cited above, pp. 3–8, notes that we have no way of knowing whether Husserl ever read these other parts of the text. Breeur helpfully divides Husserl’s remarks in SZ and KPM into three categories: the first of these is basically index words to tag the content of a passage for future reference. He notes that there are very few notes of this type in KPM but quite a few in SZ, suggesting that Husserl read SZ much more analytically than KPM. Page references in this introduction will be to the original edition, since that is the edition in which the remarks appear. My translation of the marginal notes gives the corresponding pages in GA 3 and in the recent English translation by Richard Taft. 7. Ironically, Heidegger states in the preface to its fourth edition (1973) that he undertook KPM precisely because by 1929 he saw that the Being-question as put forward in SZ was misunderstood. Later in the same preface he says that the Being-question was also misunderstood as it appeared in KPM, so he abandoned the project of a reinterpretation of traditional metaphysics as a means profiling the question of Being. 8. A detailed tracing of Heidegger’s changing relation to and interpretation of Kant can be found in Hansgeorg Hoppe, “Wandlungen in der Kant-Auffasung Heideggers,” pp. 284– 317 in Durchblicke: Martin Heidegger zum 80. Geburtstag, ed. V. Klostermann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1970. 9. This speech has some substance and anticipates the later Rektoratsrede. A penetrating analysis of Heidegger’s “ethics” in this speech – and ethics in Heidegger in general – may ¨ be found in Christoph von Wolzogen’s “Die eigentliche metaphysische St orung: Zu den Quellen der Ethik bei Heidegger und Levinas,” in Zur Grundlegung einer integrativen Ethik: F¨ r Hans Kr¨ mer, ed. Martin Endreß (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch, 1995), u a pp. 130–154, esp. 137–138. For Heidegger’s speech itself see his “Edmund Husserl zum 70. Geburtstag,” Akademische Mitteilungen, die Organ gesamten Interessen der Studentenschaft an der Albert Ludwigs-Universit¨ t, Freiburg im Br., 4th volume, 9th Semester, a Nr. 3 (14 May, 1929), p. 47. 10. Martin Heidegger/Karl Jaspers, Briefwechsel: 1920–1963, ed. Walter Biemel and Hans Saner (Frankfurt: Klostermann/Z¨ rich: Piper, 1990), letter of July 14, 1929. Editors Biemel u and Saner suggest that Jaspers, because of his strong anti-scientific understanding of philosophy, would have strongly disagreed with Heidegger’s praise of Husserl. Private, disparaging remarks about Husserl on both sides occur in their correspondence during this period. 11. Professor Gadamer referred me to a lengthy unpublished letter from Heidegger to Hannah Arendt, dating from before this final period, in which Heidegger expresses to her at length his excitement as he works on the Critique of Pure Reason. This would be an important document in future research on this topic. The translator did not have access to this letter, and could not verify its present existence. 12. See Edmund Husserl, Briefwechsel, vol. 2: Die M¨ nchener Ph¨ nomenologen (Dordrecht: u a Kluwer, 1994). This volume is part of a scrupulously edited magnificent edition of Husserl’s voluminous correspondence: Edmund Husserl, Briefwechsel. 10 volumes. Edited by Karl Schumann in cooperation with Elisabeth Schumann (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993–1994). A










translation of this letter appears in the appendix of our volume containing the English translations of the marginalia. Sheehan states in note 44 of his introduction to Edmund Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger, cited in note 3 above, that in any case there are only two “insignificant” marginal notations in Was ist Metaphysik? Karl Schuhmann notes this in his extensive essay on the Husserl-Heidegger relationship, “Zu Heideggers Spiegel-Gespr¨ ch uber Husserl,” Zeitschrift f¨ r philosophische Forschung a ¨ u 32 (1978): 602, article 591–612. See especially section 3: “Die Entwicklung der Differenzen bis 1931,” pp. 595–603. It was shortly after hearing this inaugural lecture that Husserl undertook to come to a definitive position on Heideggerian philosophy. Cf. his letters to Ingarden (2.12.29) and Misch (8.3.29). In a letter dated December 2, 1929, from Malvine Husserl to Roman Ingarden, Malvine wrote that “in our summer vacation on Lake Como, he carefully worked through Heidegger’s book [SZ ].” Briefwechsel, vol. 3. Also, Boyce Gibson in a letter dated September 10 of that year, refers to several weeks “am Comersee (Tremezzo)” from mid-August to early September (Briefwechsel, vol. 6), and we know that Husserl’s stay at Tremezzo ended about September 5. The availability of Husserl’s voluminous correspondence makes the process of dating events in Husserl’s life much easier and also makes available many more of Husserl’s later comments on Heidegger. For a lively collection of these sometimes frank and salty comments in Husserl’s correspondence, see the “Einleitung” to the German publication of the marginalia in Husserl Studies. Davos is not a famous university but rather an international health spa and sport center in the Swiss Alps. A Swiss doctor, Peter M¨ ller, arranged and sponsored this special u “Hochschule” lecture course. The Davos Lectures were a series of seven lectures given at Davos, four by Cassirer and three by Heidegger, plus questions and answers each addressed to the other. A summary of the lectures and a transcript of the important disputation between Heidegger and Cassirer, derived from notes taken at the time, appears as an appendix in the 4th edition of KPM (1973) and this is included in its English translation by Richard Taft, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (Bloomington/London: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 169–185. These and also other relevant documents are contained in a 68 page appendix in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, GA 3 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1991). They include: “Aufzeichnungen zum Kantbuch,” pp. 249–255; Heidegger’s review of the second volume of Cassirer’s three-volume Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (Cassirer also reviewed KPM in Kant Studien 1931), pp. 255–270; Heidegger’s reply to reviews by Cassirer and Odebrecht, pp. 297–303; and also a short article from 1927 that describes (according to the “Nachwort,” p. 316) “the rise, development, influence, and transformation of the NeoKantianism of the Marburg School to which Cassirer belonged”: “Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Lehrstuhles seit 1866,” pp. 304–311. GA 3, of course, closely parallels the lecture course in GA 25: Ph¨ nomenologische Interpretationen von Kant’s Kritik der a reinen Vernunft: Marburger Vorlesung WS 1927–1928, ed. Ingtraud G¨ rland (Frankfurt: o Klostermann, 1977). Martin Heidegger/Elisabeth Blochmann Briefwechsel: 1918–1969 (Marbach am Neckar: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, 1989), letter of April 12, 1929. Also, he mentions in this letter that Husserl’s birthday was “very worthily celebrated” on April 8: “Elfride had arranged among the admirers and friends of Husserl to buy a bust of Husserl that the young Rickert [the son of philosopher Heinrich Rickert] had sculpted a number of years ago. Husserl was pleased and surprised. Finally, I presented a Festschrift volume to him [a surprise], with a little speech which you will receive. And now [April 12] I am sitting down to the final working out of the manuscript for my Kant interpretation, which will be printed in May by Cohen in Bonn.” See Heidegger’s letter to Jaspers (in the Heidegger-Jaspers Briefwechsel) of April 14, 1929, also, written from the “sch¨ nen Haus am Lande,” which states that they must put o



20. 21.




25. 26.

27. 28.


30. 31.

off a visit because he must finish preparing KPM “by the end of April.” We also know that on May 14 Heidegger was writing the preface, so by that time the manuscript had probably already been transmitted to his publisher Cohen in Bonn. See Tom Sheehan’s general introduction, cited in note 3 above. Ibid, p. xvi. GA 3: vii and 5. For an extensive summary and discussion of KPM, see Richardson’s Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, pp. 106–160, and for a less extensive but still enlightening discussion, see Otto P¨ ggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, 2nd, o revised edition (Pfullingen: Neske, 1983 [3rd ed. 1990]), pp. 80–87, [Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking, trans. Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Barber (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1987)]. The Preface to the fourth edition suggests this. Whether the Kantbook itself was written against Cassirer is an “open question,” according to Iso Kern in Husserl und Kant: Eine ¨ Untersuchung uber Husserls Verh¨ ltnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus (The Hague: a Nijhoff, 1964), p. 198, footnote 4. See also pp. 188–191. This 448-page volume is a valuable resource on the Husserl-Kant relationship. Cited by Gadamer in “Der Weg in die Kehre,” GW 3 (T¨ bingen: Mohr, 1987), p. 279. u Gadamer borrowed Heidegger’s copy of KPM in 1940 (his own was lost) and noticed this sentence written in it. Also, a luminous sentence in a letter from Heidegger written to Hans-Georg Gadamer in Marburg in the early 1930s reads: “Es kommt alles in Rutschen” – “Everything is on the skids.” (cited in “Die Kehre des Weges,” Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke 10 [T¨ bingen: Mohr, 1995]: 74.) This and many other letters of Heidegger to u Gadamer remain unpublished. When I asked him (in an interview in Heidelberg, October 23, 1995) to explain this remark, Gadamer said, “Heidegger meant that everything he held before was sliding. Nothing was firm anymore – a clear mark of the turn.” It would be tempting to say that Heidegger was also through with Kant, but he did later publish two other works on Kant. The first was GA 41 – Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grunds¨ tzen. Edited by Petra Jaeger. a Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1984. 254pp. (written 1935–1936, published 1962). The second ¨ was Kants These uber das Sein. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1963. 36pp. (written 1961, published 1963), and also published in the GA 9: Wegmarken, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976). See note 22. “Wandlungen in der Kant-Auffassung Heideggers,” in Durchblicke (1970), pp. 284–317 cited above. In English, see the volumes on the early Heidegger by Theodore Kisiel and John Van Buren cited in footnote 37 below. See Cassirer’s opening salvo, Appendix IV to GA 3: 274 – p. 171 in the English translation. Heidegger was well equipped to answer this particular question because he had published an article in 1927 on the history of the Marburg Neo-Kantians, “Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Lehrstuhles seit 1866,” in Die Philipps-Universit¨ t zu Marburg 1527– a 1927 (Marburg: N.G. Elwer’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1927), pp. 681–687. This article is included in the appendix to GA 3: 304–311. See KPM, pp. 246–247; Eng. trans., p. 172, and GA 3: 275. For an extensive and well documented critical analysis of the Heidegger-Cassirer encounter, see Massimo Ferrari, “Cassirer e Heidegger, in margine ad alcune recenti pubblicazioni,” Revista di storia della filosofia, 2 (1992): 409–440. Andreas Graeser, in his Ernst Cassirer (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1994), says that Cassirer and even more Cassirer’s wife, felt that Cassirer had gotten the best of Heidegger in the debate. Also, Gadamer mentioned to me (in a tape-recorded conversation of May, 1992) that Heidegger was caught off guard by Cassirer’s extending the debate beyond the First Critique into the issue of freedom, and later Heidegger even (in Die Frage nach dem Ding lectures) tacitly acknowledged that Cassirer was right. See Otto P¨ ggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, rev. ed., p. 176. o Ibid.



32. Ibid. P¨ ggeler points out that Heidegger’s own path, which is to unfold a hermeneutic o oriented to “formal indications” from the doctrine of the schemata, is not worked out in KPM but reserved for the Logic lectures. He also goes into why KPM is dedicated to Scheler (p. 182). 33. In Heidegger’s Letter to Richardson, which serves as the preface to Richardson’s Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, pp. xiv–xv. My italics. ¨ 34. See Martin Heidegger, “Uber das Prinzip ’Zu den Sachen selbst’, “a recently published fragment dating from the 1950’s, in Heidegger Studies, vol. 11 (1995): 5–7. Here he asserts that this principle in Husserl “leaves nothing undetermined, for ‘die Sache selbst’ is what consciousness holds; it is a consciously having in consciousness, and this consciousness is that of a knowing ‘ego. ’´ Heidegger then turns to the Greeks for his answer to what ’ is really “die Sache selbst.” At the end of this remarkable fragment, Heidegger lists 5 factors that for him made a break with Husserl’s form of philosophizing “unavoidable” [unumg¨ nglich]: a a) because in (“Kantian”?) transcendental philosophy “what is at stake” [die Sache] – “consciousness” – is less and less permitted to be worthy of questioning [frag-w¨ rdig]; u b) because in this way the principle [“to the things themselves”] is as such made rigid [erstarrt, made stiff, ossified] and its possibilities silenced; c) above all, precisely because with the stimulus of this principle the claim of Seyn itself in the forgottenness of its difference was lighted up; d) because Seyn itself goes through and beyond all basic positions [Grundstellungen]; e) on both sides – however different – [there is] a personal denial [Versagen] of the existence of this break, which is something other than a mere break. 35. He indirectly acknowledged this protest in defending himself against it in the preface to the third edition (1949). 36. For a lengthy and detailed assessment see Walter Biemel, “Heideggers Stellung zur Ph¨ nomenologie in der Marburger Zeit,” in Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger in der Sicht a neuer Quellen, ed. Ernst Wolfgang Orth, contributions by Gerd Brand, Manfred S. Frings, and W. Biemel. Ph¨ nomenologische Forschungen Series, nos. 6–7 (Freiburg/Munich: Karl a Alber, 1978), pp. 141–223. 37. “Heidegger in Marburg: Die Auseinandersetzung mit Husserl,” Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 37 (1984), pp. 48–69. This is the first of a series of three essays on “Heidegger in Marburg” in the same journal. The other two are dedicated to “Die Auseinandersetzung mit Aristoteles” and “Die Auseinandersetzung mit Kant.” See also the substantial books on the early Heidegger by Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of ‘Being and Time’ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) and John van Buren’s The Young Heidegger: Rumor of a Hidden King (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), as well as the collection edited by Thomas Sheehan, Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1981), especially Sheehan’s biographical sketch of the early Heidegger which introduces the volume. 38. Volpi, p. 55. 39. But the term “phenomenology” was dropped when the lectures appeared in GA 20 titled Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979). Translated by Theodore Kisiel as History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986). My italics. 40. See Heidegger’s extensive review of Husserlian phenomenology in GA 20. Also see Volpi, op. cit., for extensive discussion of this and other aspects in Heidegger’s relation to Husserl during this period. 41. GA 20, p. 62. Cited in Volpi, p. 57. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid., p. 58. 44. Ibid. “ . . . das Sehenlassen des Seienden in seiner Gegest¨ ndlichkeit,” – “the letting be a seen of the entity in its objectivity.” My italics.



45. See in his GW 10, Hermeneutik in R¨ ckblick (T¨ bingen: Mohr, 1995): “Subjektivit¨ t und u u a Intersubjektivit¨ t, Subjekt und Person” (1975), pp. 87–99, “Ph¨ nomenologie, Hermeneua a tik, Metaphysik” (1983), pp. 100–109, “Erinnerungen an Heideggers Anf¨ nge" (1986), pp. a 3–13, “Heidegger und die Griechen” (1990), pp. 31–45, “Die Kehre des Weges” (1985), pp. 71–75. See also “Der Weg in die Kehre” (1979), in GW 3 (1987): 271–284. 46. “Subjektivit¨ t und Intersubjektivit¨ t, Subjekt und Person,” ibid., GW 10: pp. 87–99. a a 47. Gadamer, “Heidegger und die Sprache,” GW 10: p. 25. 48. Otto P¨ ggeler in Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, makes this point in his valuable o discussion of the Husserl-Heidegger relationship, pp. 80–87. 49. The page references to KPM in the following discussion are to the first edition, since those are the pages on which they appear in Husserl’s copy of KPM, but in my translation of the complete marginal remarks, the corresponding pages of the Heidegger text in the fifth edition and GA 3 are also given. For reasons of space they are omitted here. 50. The chapter occupies pp. 106–160 in Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963). The citation is from p. 106. 51. Also, on the “violence” of phenomenological encounter, see also SZ 7c. 52. Note on Heidegger and Scheler: Heidegger’s dedication of KPM to the late Max Scheler also represents a significant move in relation to Husserl, since Husserl viewed Scheler as a dangerous influence in phenomenology. In a letter to Georg Misch of August 3, 1929 (Rriefwechsel 6), for instance, Husserl begs Misch “not to understand phenomenology in this letter according to Scheler but as in my Ideas.” Gadamer has noted that Husserl regarded both Heidegger and Scheler as two uncontrollable geniuses and dangerous corruptors of phenomenology. (See Gadamer’s commemorative article, “Max Scheler – der Verschwender,” in Max Scheler im Gegenwartsgeschehen der Philosophie, ed. Paul Good [Bern/Munich: Franke, 1975], pp. 12–13.) On the other hand, Heidegger found in the effusive Scheler a true dialogical partner, with whom in December 1927 he had “day-long, night-long Auseinandersetzungen and struggles.” (Cf. “In memoriam Max Scheler,” in Metaphysiche Anfangsgr¨ nde der Logik u im Ausgang von Leibniz, GA 26 [Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978], p. 63.) In a recent article on the Heidegger-Scheler relationship, Otto P¨ ggeler goes so far as to assert that the o dialogue between Heidegger and Scheler entailed “a turn in phenomenological philosophy ¨ that went decisively beyond its form in Husserl.” (Cf. Otto Poggeler, “Ausgleich und anderer Anfang: Scheler und Heidegger,” in Studien zur Philosophie von Max Scheler, ed. Ernst Wolfgang Orth and Gerhard Pfafferott. Ph¨ nomenologische Forschungen series, no. a 28/29. Freiburg/Munich: Alber, 1994, pp. 169.) Indeed, according to P¨ ggeler, “the new o encounter with Scheler transformed Heidegger’s thinking and pushed it off the old tracks” (ibid., p. 181). It was Scheler, one may recall, who caused Heidegger to offer a seminar on Schelling’s concept of freedom in 1928. Certainly Scheler sharply criticized Heidegger for his “solipsism” in Being and Time, saying the first absolute astonishment of philosophy is “not [astonishment] at the Dasein of solus ipse” but at the fact “that there is something at all and not nothing.” (Max Scheler, Sp¨ te Schriften, ed. Manfred S. Frings. Bern/Munich: a Franke, 1976, p. 261.) Scheler also criticized the dominance of Angst in Dasein: its lack of relationship to nature or other persons, and its lack of eros. Heidegger criticized Scheler and Husserl for reducing the problem of time to Sinnlichkeit [sensory experience], but he and Scheler had the highest respect for each other. Indeed, at Scheler’s death in May, 1928, Heidegger placed Scheler at the pinnacle of contemporary philosophy, characterizing him – not Husserl – as “the strongest philosophical power in today’s Germany, no, in today’s Europe – even in today’s philosophy as such.” (Cf. “In memoriam Max Scheler,” GA 26: pp. 62–64, citation 63.) After Scheler’s death, Heidegger began editing Scheler’s Nachlass [unpublished writings]. So Scheler would appear to be an important factor in Heidegger’s desertion of Husserl’s phenomenology and in his “new beginning” in the early 1930s. On this, see especially P¨ ggeler, “Ausgleich und anderer o Anfang: Scheler und Heidegger,” cited above.


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