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A. WHEN DO LAWS TAKE EFFECT? (NCC 2) 1. PESIGAN v ANGELES Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in a 10-wheeler truck in April 1982, 26 carabaos and a calf, from Camarines Sur to Batangas. Despite the health certificate, permit to transport, and certificate of inspection issued to them by the provincial veterinarian, provincial commander and constabulary command, respectively, while petitioners were negotiating the town of Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabaos were confiscated by private respondents, Police Station Commander Lt. Zanarosa, and provincial veterinarian Dr. Miranda. The confiscation was based on Executive Order 626-A which prohibited the transport of carabaos from one province to another. Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr Miranda distributed the carabaos to 25 farmers of Basud. Petitioners filed for recovery of the carabaos and damages, against private respondent Judge Angeles who heard the case in Daet and later transferred to Caloocan City, and dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its publication in the Official Gazette. HELD: NO. EO 626-A should not be enforced against petitioner on April 2, 1982, because it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only 15 days thereafter as provided in Art. 2 of the Civil Code, and Sec. 11 of the Administrative Code. 2. PEOPLE v VERIDIANO Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged w/ violation of BP 22. Before he could be arraigned, Go Bio, Jr. filed a Motion to Quash the information on the ground that the info did not charge an offense, pointing out that at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, w/c was about the 2nd week of May '79 (date of issue of the check), BP 22 has not yet taken effect. The prosecution opposed the motion contending, among others, that the date of the dishonor of the check, 9/26/79, is the date of the commission of the offense. Resolving the motion, the court granted the same and held that BP

22 cannot be given a retroactive effect to apply to the case. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner submitting for review respondent Judge's dismissal of the criminal case. HELD: When private resp. Go Bio, Jr. committed the act complained of in May '79 (at the time he issued the check-the law penalizes the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check and not only the fact of its dishonor), there was no law penalizing such act. Following the special provision of BP 22, it became effective only on 6/29/79. The copy editor of the OG made a certification that the penal statute in question was made public only on 6/14/79 and not on the printed date 4/9/79. Differently stated, 6/14/79 was the date of publication of BP 22. Before the public may be bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, the law must be published and the people officially informed of its contents. For, it a statute had not been published before its viol., then, in the eyes of the law, there was no such law to be violated and, consequently the accused could not have committed the alleged crime. The effectivity clause of BP 22 states that "This Act shall take effect 15 days after publication in the OG." The term "publication" in such clause should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, i.e., to make known to the people in general. If the legislature had intended to make the printed date of issue of the OG as the point of reference, then it could have so stated in the special effectivity provision of BP 22. 3. TANADA v TUVERA Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders. The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorntia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect. 4. MRCA vs COURT OF APPEALS The Petitioner MRCA Inc., filed a complaint against private respondents spouses (who were defendants in said civil case). Said case was dismissed by the trial court due to the non-payment of proper filing fees when petitioner failed to include include in the complain the amount of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed said ruling, hence the petitioner comes to SC by petition for review. Petitioner contends that the Manchester ruling does not apply to the case since said court decision was not published in the Official Gazette. It should be noted that petitioner filed said complaint ten months after the promulgation of the Manchester ruling. ISSUE: W/M court rulings need to be published in the OG order to be effective HELD: NO. Publication in the OG is not a prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling even if it lays down a new rule or procedure. It is a wellestablished doctrine that the procedure of the court may be changed at any time

and become effective at once so long as it does not affect or change vested rights. (Aguillon v Dir. of Lands) As such, the court granted the petition and held that the Manchester ruling should apply to the case of the petitioner though it was modified by the Sun Insurance case where the court allowed the payment of docket fees within a reasonable period but not beyond the reglementary period. Petitioner was allowed to amend the complaint and specify therein the amount of damages it seeks from defendant and pay the proper filing fees. 5. YAOKASIN vs COMMISSIONER On May 27, 1988, the Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 bags/ sacks of refined sugar, which were being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs. On June 7, 1988 the District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the seized sugar to the petitioner Yaokasin. On July 15, 1988, the Collector of Customs reversed his order to release the seized sugar since it is still subject for review by the Commissioner of Customs since it is adverse to the government citing the Customs Memorandum Order No. 20-87. This CMO implements Sec 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan, which is under P.D. No. 1, dated September 24, 1972. This section 12 states that a decision of a Collector of Customs in seizure and protest cases adverse to the government is subject to review by the Commissioner of Customs or the Secretary of Finance. When no decision is rendered after 30 days by either commisioner or secretary, the decision of the Collector of Customs shall become final and executory. The petitioner objected the applicability of the Sec. 12 of the reorganization plan and the CMO No. 20-87 on the ground that they had not been published in the Official Gazette. ISSUE: Is the enforcement of the Sec. 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan and thereafter CMO No. 20-87 valid when these laws have not been published in the Official Gazette? HELD: Yes. CMO and Sec 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan is enforceable. The requirement of Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to CMO No. 20-87 since it is only an administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs to his subordinates, namely the customs collectors. Also in the Commonwealth Act No. 638, which enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, states that administrative orders and

proclamations shall be published except when these have no general applicability. CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance which is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons, hence no general applicability therefore need not be published in the Official Gazette. B. IGNORANCE OF THE LAW (NCC 3) 1. KASILAG vs RODRIGUEZ This is an appeal taken by the defendantpetitioner from the decision of the Court of Appeals which modified that rendered by the court of First Instance of Bataan. The said court held: that the contract is entirely null and void and without effect; that the plaintiffs-respondents, then appellants, are the owners of the disputed land, with its improvements, in common ownership with their brother Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are entitled to the possession thereof; that the defendant-petitioner should yield possession of the land in their favor, with all the improvements thereon and free from any lien SUBSTANTIVE FACTS: The parties entered into a contract of loan to which has an accompanying accessory contract of mortgage. The executed accessory contract involved the improvements on a piece land, the land having been acquired by means of homestead. P for his part accepted the contract of mortgage. Believing that there are no violations to the prohibitions in the alienation of lands P, acting in good faith took possession of the land. To wit, the P has no knowledge that the enjoyment of the fruits of the land is an element of the credit transaction of Antichresis. ISSUE: Whether or not P is deemed to be a possessor in good faith of the land, based upon Article 3 of the New Civil Code as states Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith, the Ps lack of knowledge of the contract of antichresis. HELD: The accessory contract of mortgage of the improvements of on the land is valid. The verbal contract of antichresis agreed upon is deemed null and void. Sec 433 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides Every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated shall be deemed a possessor of good faith. And in this case, the petitioner acted in good faith. Good faith maybe a basis of excusable ignorance of the law, the petitioner acted in good faith in his enjoyment of

the fruits of the land to which was done through his apparent acquisition thereof. C. RETROACTIVITY (NCC 4, 5) 1. PUZON vs ABELLERA


3. MRCA v CA (supra)

4. BPI vs IAC Rizaldy T. Zshornack and his wife maintained in COMTRUST a dollar savings account and a peso current account. An application for a dollar draft was accomplished by Virgillo Garcia branch manager of COMTRUST payable to a certain Leovigilda Dizon. In the application, Garcia indicated that the amount was to be charged to the dollar savings account of the Zshornacks. There was no indication of the name of the purchaser of the dollar draft. Comtrust issued a check payable to the order of Dizon. When Zshornack noticed the withdrawal from his account, he demanded an explanation from the bank. In its answer, Comtrust claimed that the peso value of the withdrawal was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, brother of Rizaldy. When he encashed with

COMTRUST a cashiers check for P8450 issued by the manila banking corporation payable to Ernesto. ISSUE: Whether the contract between petitioner and respondent bank is a deposit? HELD: The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received by the bank for safekeeping. The subsequent acts of the parties also show that the intent of the parties was really for the bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it to Zshornack at a later time. Thus, Zshornack demanded the return of the money on May 10, 1976, or over five months later. The arrangement is that contract defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code, which reads: Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other contract. D. WAIVER OF RIGHTS (NCC 6) E. REPEAL OF LAWS (NCC 7) 1. GUINGONA vs CARAGUE This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strenghthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose. The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees. Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the expiration

of the one-man legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative power was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution was ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to the present, has not approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced. They contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of President Marcos, after the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the said decrees are inoperative under Section 3, Article XVIII which provides Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked." (Emphasis supplied.) They then point out that since the said decrees are inconsistent with Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, i.e., Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. (Emphasis supplied.) Whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law must be passed by Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees violate Section 29(l) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as follows Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation, otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service. HELD: The Court is not persuaded. Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions

and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or, are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked. The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement the same. F. DUTY TO RENDER JUDGMENT (NCC 9) G. APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOM (NCC 11-12) 1. MARTINEZ vs VAN BUSKIRK Both parties agree that on the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding a carromata in Ermita, Manila. When a delivery wagon owned by the defendant which was used for the transportation of fodder and to which two horses are attached, was coming from the opposite direction, the carromata in which the plaintiff was seated went close to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon pass by. However, instead of passing by, the horses ran into the carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing a serious cut upon the plaintiffs head and injuring the carromata. However, the defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time of the accident, was actually a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. He also claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage at Calle Herran, and for that purpose the defendants employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by the driver and made noises that frightened the horses causing them to run. The employee failed to stop the horses since he was thrown upon the ground. From the stated facts, the court ruled that the defendant was guilty of negligence. The court specifically cited a paragraph of Article 1903 of the Civil Code. Finally, masters of directors or arts and trades are liable for the damages caused

by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. Hence, this is appeal to reverse such decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for the negligence of such driver. HELD: It was held that the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case. It is believed that acts or performances which, in a long time, have not been destructive and which are approved by the society, are considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as unreasonable or imprudent. The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One could not easily hold someone negligent because of some act that led to an injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cochero negligent because of such circumstances. The court holds that it is a universal practice of merchants during that time to deliver products through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left during the accident. It has been practiced for a long time and generally has not been the cause of accidents or injuries. The judgment is therefore reversed. H. LEGAL PERIODS (NCC 13) 1. ARMIGOS vs COURT OF APPEALS The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against the herein petitioner with the Municipal Court of Digos Davao del Sur, for the collection of damages and attorney's fees. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the private respondent and against the herein petitioner. A copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on 8 June 1977, and the following day, 9 June 1977, he filed a notice of appeal with the said municipal court, and on 24 June 1977, he completed the other requirements for the perfection of an appeal, including the filing of an appeal bond and the payment of the appellate court docket fee. However, when the case was elevated to the CFI for the consideration of the appeal, the presiding judge thereof ruled that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period; consequently, he dismissed the appeal. Petitioners contention: that from 8 June 1977, when he received a copy of the decision of the municipal court, to 24 June 1977, when he perfected his appeal,

only fifteen (15) days had elapsed so that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, dismissing his appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period, is erroneous and contrary to law. The petitioner contended that the computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour he received copy of the decision, so that the first of the 15-day period comprising 24 hours is from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 9 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 10 June 1977 and the last day, from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 23 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 June 1977. HELD: Day is synonymous with Date; consequently the 5th day shall be the 15 days after the appeal regardless of the time when it was submitted. The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that "In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included" is similar, but not identical to Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided that "Unless otherwise specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday it shall be excluded", as well as the old Rule 28 of the Rules of Court which stated that prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, by order of a court, or by any other applicable statute, the day of the act, event or default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday or a legal holiday." In applying this rule, the Court considered the day as synonymous with the date and we find no cogent reason to adopt a different view. Human memory is frail: Human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an extraordinary one for a person, there is no reasonable certainty of its correctness. What more for the exact hour when a pleading, order or decision is received by a party? The period laid down by the law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional: While it is true that rules of procedure are to be interpreted liberally so that the real matter in dispute may be submitted to the judgment of the court, and that the trial court is vested with discretion to allow or admit an appeal filed out of time, this discretion is not unconditional. There must be justifiable reason to warrant such action, since the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the

period laid down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and in the absence of any justifying circumstance, the court has no jurisdiction to approve or admit an appeal filed out of time. 3 In the instant case, the petitioner failed to prove, or even claim, that his failure to appeal on time was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. 2. NAMARCO v TECZON The CFI-Mla. rendered judgment in a civil case, Price Stabilization Corp. vs. Tecson, et al. Copy of this decision was, on 10/21/55 served upon defendants in said case. On 12/21/65, NAMARCO, as successor to all the properties, assets, rights, and choses in action of Price, as pltff in that case and judgment creditor therein, filed w/ the same court, a complaint against defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered therein. Def. Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of prescription of action, among others. The motion was granted by the court. Hence, the appeal to the CA w/c was certified to the SC, upon the ground that the only question raised therein is one of law, namely-ISSUE: W/N the present action for the revival of a judgment is barred by the statute of limitations. Pursuant to Art. 1144 (3), NCC, an action for judgement must be brought w/in 10 yrs from the time the judgment sought to be revived has become final. This in turn, took place on 12/21/55 or 30 days from notice of the judgment-- w/c was received by defs. on 10/21/55-- no appeal having been taken therefrom. The issue is thus confined to the date on w/c the 10 yrs from 12/21/55 expired. Pltff alleges that it was 12/21/65, but appellee maintains otherwise, bec. :when the law speaks of years xxx it shall be understood that years are of 365 days each"-- and, in 1960 and 1964 being leap years, so that 10 yrs of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3650 days, from 12/21/55, expired on 12/19/65. Pltff.-appellant further insists that there is no question that when it is not a leap year, 12/21 to 12/21 of the following year is one year. If the extra day in a leap year is not a day of the year, bec. it is the 366th day, then to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must belong to the year where it falls, and therefore, that the 366 days constitute one yr. HELD: The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory

contravenes the explicit provision of Art. 13 limiting the connotation of each "year"-- as the term is used in our laws- to 365 days. [The action to enforce a judgment which became final on December 21, 1955 prescribes in 10 years. Since the Civil Code computes "years" in terms of 365 days each, the action has prescribed on December 19, 1955, since the two intervening leap years added two more days to the computation. It is not the calendar year that is considered.] I. BINDING EFFECT (NCC 15) 1. BARRETO-GONZALES v GONZALES The plaintiff & defendant were b oth citizens of the Philippines, married & lived together from January 1919 until Spring of 1926. After which they voluntary separated & have not lived together as man & wife, they had 4 minor children together. After negotiations, both parties mutually agreed to allow Manuela Barreto (plaintiff) for her & her childrens support of P500 (five hundred pesos) monthly which to be increased in cases of necessity & illness, and that the title of certain properties be put in her name. Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), when to Reno, Nevada & secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion dated November 28, 1927. On that same date he went through the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as well & had 3 children with her. When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support of Manuela Barreto & her children & has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony. Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and shortly after, Barreto brought an action at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm & ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of Nevada & invoked sec 9 of Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to the Guardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have been due to their children as their legal portion from respective estates had their parents died intestate on November 28, 1927, they also prayed that the marriage existing between Barreto & Gonzales be declared dissolved & Gonzales be ordered to pay Barreto P500 per month, counsel fees of P5000 & all the expenses incurred in educating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of the children also filed as intervenors in the case. After the

hearing, the CFI-Manila granted the judgement in favor of the plaintiff & intervenors, but reduced the attorneys fees to P3000 instead & also granted the costs of the action against the defendant, Hence, this appeal by Gonzales saying that the lower court erred in their decision. ISSUE: WON any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of the Philippine Islands would grant a divorce. HELD: NO. The lower court erred in granting the relief as prayed for on granting the divorce, because: The court said that securing the jurisdiction of the courts to recognize & approve the divorce done in Reno, Nevada cannot be done according to the public policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce. Its clear in Act No. 2710 & court decisions on cases such as Goitia VS. Campos Rueda that the entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted praying the ratification of the Reno Divorce was clearly a circumvention of the law regarding divorce & will be done under conditions not authorized by our laws. The matrimonial domicile of the couple had always been the Philippines & the residence acquired by the husband in Reno, Nevada was a bona fide residence & did not confer jurisdiction upon the court of that state to dissolve the matrimonial bonds in which he had entered in 1919. Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the Philippines does not allow such to be done, the effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines says that litigants cannot compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the Philippines to be affected by decrees of divorce of foreign courts in manner which out government believes is contrary to public order & good morals 2. TENCHAVEZ v ESCANO In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escao secretly married each other and of course without the knowledge of Escaos parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaos parents learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but Escao withdrew from having a recelebration because she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later,

Escao went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also married an American. In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged from him hence hes asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the Escaos. ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar HELD: Yes. On the part of Tenchavez: His marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier (because Escao filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her nonappearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escao left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorneys fees to be paid by Escao and not her parents. On the part of Escaos parents: It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaos is unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only. 3. VAN DORN v ROMILLO Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; they were married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their residence in the Philippines and begot two children. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioners business in Manila is their conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. The denial now is the subject of the certiorari proceeding. ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse. HELD: Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 4. PILAPIL v IBAY-SOMERA Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983. The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure

of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued. HELD: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. J. HUMAN RELATIONS (NCC 19-21) 1. PEOPLE v RITTER