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Employment Discrimination Notes

Yin Huang Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) [492] Abbott was HIV-positive. Bragdon was a dentist. Abbott went to Bragdon to have a cavity filled. Upon learning that Abbott was HIV-positive, Bragdon refused to fill the cavity in his office. Bragdon offered to perform the procedure in a hospital, though Abbott would have been responsible for the cost of using the hospitals facilities. Abbott accused Bragdon of violating the ADA. The Court ruled for Abbott, finding HIV infection to be a disability. The Court noted that HIV could be transmitted from parent to child, thus preventing HIV-positive individuals from having children, which was a major life activity. Toyota Motor Manufacturing Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) [501] Williams was an assembly line worker at Toyotas manufacturing plant. Williams developed carpal tunnel syndrome, which made her unable to perform certain tasks. Toyotas response to the problem caused its relationship with Williams to sour. Williams accused Toyota of violating the ADA. The Court ruled for Toyota, finding Williamss carpal tunnel syndrome not to be a disability. The Court noted that Williamss condition did not prevent her from performing most activities for daily life. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) [509] Petitioners were prospective pilots looking for employment with respondent airline. Petitioners were severely nearsighted. Corrective lenses, however, allowed petitioners to have effectively normal vision. Respondent refused to hire petitioners because petitioners uncorrected vision did not meet respondents visual acuity requirements. Petitioners accused respondent of violating the ADA. The Court ruled for petitioners, finding the use of corrective measures to have no effect on the existence of a disability. The Court announced that an impairment was a disability if it was in fact limiting. The dissenters argued that corrective measure should not be taken into account in findings of disabilities. The dissenters pointed out that congressional reports stated that 43,000,000 Americans were disabled. The number, they argued, was so high that it necessarily included individuals with correctable disabilities. The dissenters conclucded that petitioners should be considered disabled but that respondent should be allowed to raise a business necessity defense. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) [524] Petitioners further argued that they were regarded as having a disability for the purposes of the ADA. The Court found petitioners not to be disabled under the regarded as definition of the ADA. The Court noted that petitioners did not have enough evidence to show that nearsightedness was a general obstacle to employment. Rehrs v. The Iams Co., 486 F.3d 353 (8th Cir. 2007) [534] Rehrs was an employee of Iams who had diabetes. Iams had a rotating shift schedule, which required employees to switch periodically between daytime and night shifts. Rehrs requested to

work only day shifts, his doctor having found that a steady schedule would help Rehrs to manage his diabetes. Iams refused to provide the accommodation, arguing that shift rotation was an essential function of the job. The Court ruled for Iams, finding Iams to have no obligation to provide an accommodation that would force other employees to work more night shifts. Humphrey v. Memorial Hospitals Association, 230 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2001) Humphrey was a transcriptionist who worked for Memorial. Humphreys developed a severe case of obsessive-compulsive disorder, which caused her to be frequently tardy or absent from work. Memorial allowed Humphrey to have a flexible work schedule as an accommodation, but Humphrey continued to miss work. Memorial fired Humphrey, and Humphrey accused Memorial of violating the ADA. The court ruled for Humphrey, finding Memorial to have a duty to continue exploring ways to accommodate Humphrey. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) [540] Barnett was a cargo handler who worked for US Airways. After hurting his back, Barnett was transferred to a mailroom position. US Airways, however, had a seniority system that allowed others to bid for Barnetts position, thereby forcing him to transfer to another job. Barnett asked for his mailroom position to be exempted from bidding by other employees, but US Airways refused, arguing that an exemption would be an undue hardship. Barnett accused US Airways of violating the ADA by refusing to accommodate his disability. The Court ruled for US Airways, finding US Airways to have no obligation to alter its seniority system to accommodate Barnett. The dissent argued that such alterations were necessary to provide a reasonable accommodation. Huber v. Wal-Mart, 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007) [548] Huber was a grocery handler at Wal-Mart. An injury to Hubers arm and hand made her unable to continue in her grocery-handling position, so Huber applied to a different position. Hubers application was turned down after Wal-Mart determined that she was not the most qualified candidate. Huber accused Wal-Mart of violating the ADA by not allowing her work in the appliedfor position. The court ruled for Wal-Mart, finding Wal-Mart to have no obligation to give Huber an advantage over a more qualified employee. Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department of Administration, 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995) Vande Zande was a paraplegic employee of the Wisconsin Department of Administration. Vande Zandes condition required her to stay home periodically. Although the Department already allowed Vande Zande to have a flexible schedule, Vande Zande found the accommodations inadequate. Vande Zande argued that the was additionally obligated to lower certain sinks at her office, which would have cost several thousand dollars. The court ruled for the Department, finding the modifications to be an undue burden. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) [568] Echezabal applied to work in a Chevron refinery. Chevron rejected Echezabal because he had hepatitis C. According to Chevron, exposure to toxins at the refinery could cause Echezabals condition to worsen. Echezabal accused Chevron of violating the ADA, arguing that the direct threat defense did not cover threats an employee posed to himself. The Court ruled for Chevron.

finding a reasonable interpretation of the ADA to include threats to oneself. Jenkins v. National Board of Medical Examiners, 2009 WL 331638 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009) Jenkins was a medical student with a reading disorder. Jenkins asked the Board to grant him extra time on his medical licensing exam, but the Board refused under the Toyota rule. Jenkins accused the Board of violating the ADA. The court ruled for Jenkins, finding the ADA Amendments Act to provide for a broad definition of disability. The court remanded the case for further proceedings under the ADA Amendments Act. Slack v. Havens, 7 F.E.P. 885 (S. D. Cal. 1973) [2] Plaintiffs were four African-American women, who normally worked on an industrial manufacturing process. Plaintiffs employer ordered them to do janitorial work, which was outside their ordinary duties. The disagreement ultimately led employer to fire plaintiffs. Plaintiffs accused employer of violating Title VII. Testimony showed that plaintiffs supervisor made racist remarks concerning plaintiffs. The court ruled for plaintiffs, finding a causal link between employers racial remarks and plaintiffs termination. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) [9] Biggins was an employee of Hazen Paper. Biggins was terminated as he approached retirement, and the evidence strongly suggested that Hazen Paper had fired him to prevent his pension benefits from vesting. Biggins accused Hazen Paper of violating the ADEA, arguing that the termination had been motivated by age. The Court ruled for Hazen Paper, finding the termination to have motivated by pension benefits. The Court noted that pension benefits and age were distinct, such that a younger worker could have more benefits than an older one. The Court, however, additionally noted that Hazen Paper might be liable under ERISA. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) [16] Hishon was a female associate at the law firm of King & Spalding. Hishon had joined the firm because she had been assured that becoming partner was a matter of course for associates after five or six years. When it came time for Hishon to be promoted, however, Hishon was denied a partnership position. Hishon accused the firm of sex discrimination. The Court ruled for Hishon, finding the promise of becoming a partner to be a benefit the firm had unfairly denied to Hishon. Minor v. Centocor, Inc., 457 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2006) [18] Minor was a female sales representative for Centocor, a manufacturer of medical supplies. Minors job required to her to travel to various hospitals to promote Centocors products. Minors supervisor drastically increased her workload, causing her work-related travel to become burdensome. Minor accused Centocor of sex discrimination. The court ruled for Minor, finding that increasing an employees workload had the same effect as lowering the employees hourly pay. The court found that such an action could constitute sex discrimination if proven to be motivated by sex.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) [50] Green was an African American employee of McDonnell Douglas. Green participated in a protest against McDonnell Douglass hiring practices, in which Green and other employees blocked access to company buildings. Green was fired, though other employees managed to keep their jobs. Green accused McDonnell Douglas of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. The Court announced that Green had the initial burden of proving that his firing was motivated by race, but that McDonnell Douglas would have an opportunity to rebut evidence suggesting a racial motivation. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) [62] Patterson was an African American employee of McLean Credit Union. McLean denied Patterson a promotion, finding a white employee to be better qualified. Patterson accused McLean of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. The district court ruled for McLean, finding that Patterson had not shown that she was more qualified than the white employee. The court reversed, finding the district court to have erred in stating that proving better qualifications was the only way to rebut McLeans proferred explanation for refusing the promotion. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 (2006) [63] The Court found that the slap you in the face test was not a workable standard for determining whether an employer was acting under pretext. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) [68] Petitioners were white employees of Santa Fe Trail Transportation. Petitioners and an African American coworker stole some merchandise being transported by Santa Fe. Santa Fe fired petitioners but retained the black employee. Petitioners accused Santa Fe of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. The Court ruled for petitioners, finding Title VII to protect whites as well as blacks. The Court found no justifiable reason for firing white employees for misconduct while retaining a black employee who had committed the same misconduct. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) [78] Reeves was an employee of Sanderson. Sanderson fired Reeves after finding irregularities in Reevess time records. Reeves accused Sanderson of violating the ADEA, arguing that age was the true reason for his termination. The parties produced abundant evidence on Sandersons reasons for firing Reeves. The Court found enough evidence to create an issue of fact. The Court noted that a plaintiff need not always introduce additional, independent evidence of discrimination to rebut an employers proferred explanation. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) [32] Hopkins was a female employee of the accounting firm Price Waterhouse. Hopkins was due to become partner at the firm, but the promotion was denied after she failed the firms review process. The reviewing partners had made comments describing Hopkins as insufficiently feminine. Hopkins accused Price Waterhouse of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. A plurality of the Court ruled for Hopkins, finding sex stereotypes to be a motivating factor in the denial of

Hopkinss promotion. Justice OConnor concurred, adding that plaintiffs should prove the existence of a motivating factor through direct evidence. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) [24] The Court found no heightened evidentiary requirement for a showing of motivating-factor causation. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004) [95] Rachid was a manager in appellees fast-food chain. Rachid was fired after his supervisor found certain irregularities in his time record. Rachid accused appellee of age discrimination, arguing that the true reason for his termination was age. The court found Rachid to have raised an issue of fact. The court noted the lack of clarity concerning appellees policies on timekeeping. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) [370] Vinson was a female employee of Meritor Savings Bank. Vinson accused Meritor of violating Title VII by creating a hostile working environment. Vinson testified her male supervisor had sexually harassed her over the course of several years, going so far as to rape her on several occasions. Meritor argued that Title VII did not impose liability for purely psychological aspects of the work environment. The court ruled for Vinson, finding that sexual harassment could be a Title VII violation, even if the victim technically consented to sexual activity. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) [376] Harris was a female employee of Forklift Systems. Harriss supervisor regularly crass and sexual remarks to her, including calling her a dumb ass woman and asking whether she had offered sex to the companys customers. Harris accused Forklift Systems of creating a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. Forklift Systems argued that Harriss treatment was not so severe as to support liability. The Court ruled for Harris, finding no single factor to be required to show the existence of an abusive work environment. Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Division, General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994) Carr was a female employee in a plant operated by General Motors. Carr, who was the only woman in the work enviroment, was subject to frequent harassment by male coworkers. Her coworkers called her epithets such as cunt and whore and made sexual jokes about her. They additionally played sexually discriminatory pranks against Carr, such as painting her toolbox pink. Carr accused General Motors of creating a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. The court ruled for Carr, finding that harassment by coworkers could be a Title VII violation. The dissent argued in favor of deferring to the trial courts judgment as to whether Carr was sufficiently offended to warrant liability under Title VII. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) [384] Ellerth was an employee of Burlington. Ellerths supervisor repeatedly made sexual advances on her, which were accompanied by vague threats to make work difficult for her if she refused to comply. The threats, however, never materialized into any action against Ellerth. Ellerth accused

Burlington of creating a hostile work environment. The Court ruled for Ellerth, finding Burlington to be vicariously liable. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004) [394] Suders was an employee of the Pennsylvania State Police. Suders was constantly harassed by her supervisors, who made sexual remarks and gestures toward her. Suders accused the Police of constructively discharging her in violation of Title VII. The Court found that the Police should have an opportunity to establish an affirmative defense, finding affirmative defenses to be available in constructive discharge cases. Matvia v. Bald Head Island Management, Inc., 259 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2001) [403] Matvia was a housekeeper working for appellee. Matvias supervisor made multiple sexual advances toward her. Although Matvia rebuffed the advances, she did not formally report the harassment under appellees formal reporting structure. Matvia did not receive any negative treatment in connection with rebuffing the managers advances. Matvia accused appellee of harassment. The court ruled for appellee, finding appellee to have established an affirmative defense by showing that Matvia failed to report the harassment. The court noted that a nebulous fear of retaliation was not an excuse for failure to report. Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) [116] The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power administered retirement plans for its employees. The plans were funded entirely by employee contributions. After finding that women lived longer on average than men, the Department required women to make greater monthly payments than men. The Court found the Departments policy to be sex discrimination. The Court emphasized that Title VII protects individuals, so that even accurate group-based generalizations cannot be used to disadvantage particular employees. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) [123] Teamsters was accused of having a racially discriminatory policy for determining which workers were promoted to desirable positions. In particular, the accusation stated that Teamsters discriminated against African Americans and Latinos. The Court ruled against Teamsters, finding the evidence to show a drastic statistical disparity between the number of whites who were promoted and the number of minority employees who were promoted. The Court found statistics to be useful in establishing a prima facie case, though it emphasized that statistics may be rebutted. Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) [129] Hazelwood School District was accused of having a racially discriminatory policy for hiring teachers. The evidence showed that African American candidates accounted for a significantly smaller fraction of hired teachers than in the pool of qualified candidates. The Court found the statistical evidence to be problematic, remanding the case for additional findings. The dissent argued that the statistics were enough to prove racial discrimination.

Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 422 U.S. 256 (1979) [155] A Massachusetts law required employers to give hiring preferences to veterans. The law was challenged for violating equal protection. The challenger argued that the law discriminated against women because the vast majority of candidates qualifying for the preference were men. The Court upheld the law, finding that an intent to give an advantage to veterans did not imply an intent to indirectly disadvantage women. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) [173] Johnson Controls had a policy of prohibiting fertile women from working in industrial settings where they could be exposed to lead. UAW challenged the rule, arguing that it discriminated against women. Johnson Controls argued that the rule was within the scope of the BFOQ defense since it was intended to protect fetuses. The Court ruled for UAW, finding the protection of fetuses to be insufficient to justify the rule. The Court found that responsibility for the health of a fetus lay entirely with the mother. Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) [184] Johnson was a male employee of the Transportation Agency. The Agency had a promotion system wherein candidates were evaluated partly on test scores. The Agency had also implemented an affirmative action plan designed to increase the number of female employees in certain position. Johnson was applied for a promotion, but the promotion was denied. Under the affirmative action plan, the promotion was granted to a female candidate with a lower test score than Johnson. Johnson accused the Agency of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. The Court ruled for the Agency, finding the consideration of sex to be permissible in affirmative action programs. The Court noted that the program did not unnecessarily disadvantage men. Taxman v. Board of Education of Township of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) Respondent was laying off teachers because of financial difficulties. Respondent had to choose one of two teachers lay off, one of whom was African American and the one of whom was white. The teachers were otherwise equally qualified. Respondent ultimately chose to lay off the white teacher, keeping the black teacher to preserve racial diversity. Petitioner challenged respondents decision as racially discriminatory. The court ruled for petitioner, finding respondents racial preference to be unrelated to any attempt to remedy the effects of past discrimination. The court further found the policy to unduly disadvantage non-minority teachers. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) The University of Michigan Law School had an affirmative action policy for admitting students. The policy provided for a holistic evaluation of each applicant, in which no single factor was determinative of the final decision. Grutter was an applicant who had been rejected by the Law School. Grutter challenged the affirmative action plan, arguing that it was racially discriminatory. The Court ruled for the Law School, finding the Law School to have a compelling interest in maintaining a diverse student body. The Court further found the policy to be narrowly tailored to serve the interest.

Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) The University of Michigan had an affirmative action policy for admitting undergraduate students. Under the policy, the University implemented a point system for evaluating applicants. Applicants were scored on academics, involvement in extracurricular activities, and race. Petitioners were rejected applicants. Petitioners challenged the policy, arguing that it was racially discriminatory. The Court ruled for petitioners, finding the point system was not sufficiently tailored to the purpose of maintaining a racially diverse student body. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) [207] Griggs was an African American employee of Duke Power. Duke had a promotion policy that required candidates to take a qualification test, with selections based on the scores. The test disproportionately disqualified blacks. Griggs challenged the policy for violating Title VII. The Court ruled for Griggs, finding the test to have little relationship to job performance. The Court noted that use of the test was not justified by business necessity. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) [213] Wards Cove operated a seasonal packing plant, which processed fish. The vast majority of cannery workers were non-white. Managerial employees, by contrast, were predominantly white. Atonio challenged Wards Coves hiring policies, arguing that they caused disparate impact against racial minorities. The Court ruled for Wards Cove, finding the difference in racial composition between the two classes of employees to be immaterial. The Court held that the relevant comparison was between the racial composition of the cannery workers and that of the labor pool. The dissent argued that Title VII was intended to address racial disparities between upper upper-level and lowerlevel employees. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) [232] Watson was an African American woman working for the Bank. Watson applied to become a teller, but her promotion was denied. While Watson was applying, her supervisor made racially charged comments, stating that tellers handled a lot of money for blacks to have to count. Watson accused the Bank of creating disparate impact. The Court ruled for Watson, finding disparate impact theory to be applicable to promotion policies involving subjective criteria. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) [237] Petitioners were African American employees of a government agency in Connecticut. The agency had a promotion policy that required candidates to pass a written examination. The examination disqualified a greater fraction of black candidates than white candidates. Other portions of the hiring procedure, however, gave preferences to minority candidates, such that the overall promotion policy did not result in disparate impact against blacks. Petitioners argued that the disparate impact of the written examination caused the promotion policy to violate Title VII. The Court ruled for petitioners, finding that bottom line statistics did not negate disparate impact occurring at particular stages of the promotion process. The dissent argued that liability for particular portions of the promotion process could discourage employers from administering otherwise useful tests.

Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) [246] Rawlinson was a woman who applied to work as a prison guard in Alabama. Her application was rejected because failed to meet the height and weight requirements set by the Alabama government. Rawlinson challenged the requirements, arguing they created disparate impact against women. Evidenced showed that the requirements disqualified fourteen percent of women but less than one percent of men. The government argued that the height and weight requirements were necessary to ensure that guards could effectively maintain order in prisons. El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007) [255] El was a driver for SEPTA. El specifically drove buses transporting disabled persons. SEPTA had a policy prohibiting persons with certain kinds of criminal convictions from being bus drivers. Upon discovering that El had a forty-year-old murder conviction, SEPTA fired El. El accused SEPTAs policy of creating disparate impact, arguing that minority individuals were more likely than whites to have criminal convictions. The court ruled for SEPTA, finding SEPTA to have shown the policy to be justified by business necessity. The court noted that individuals convicted of violent crimes were more likely than ordinary persons to commit further crimes. The court further noted that a disproportionate number of crimes were convicted against disabled persons. These factors, in the courts view, were sufficient to justify Els termination. Adams v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2006) [268] The Chicago Police Department had implemented a new promotion policy, which required candidates to take a written examination. Adams accused the policy of violating Title VII after the tests created an apparent disparate impact against minority candidates. The court ruled for the Police Department, finding Adams to have offered no alternative selection method. The court rejected Adamss argument that a merit-based selection method, which was later implemented by the Police Department, would have been an acceptable alternative. The court noted that the subsequently invented selection method did not exist during the events in question. Baylie v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 476 F.3d 522 (7th Cir. 2007) [295] Baylie challenged the Banks hiring and promotion policies, arguing that the Bank had discriminated on the bases of race, sex, and age. Baylie relied exclusively on statistical evidence showing that minority individuals were treated less favorably than their white counterparts. Baylie argued that the statistics alone were enough to create an issue of fact. The Bank argued that statistical evidence in itself can never create an issue of fact. The court found both parties to have taken an extreme position with regard to statistics. The court noted that statistics could serve as a tiebreaker, provided that other facts first created a tie. EEOC v. Dial Corp., 469 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2006) [303] Dial operated a meatpacking plant, in which workers were expected to frequently lift heavy loads. Dial implemented a strength test for prospective workers. According to Dial, the purpose of the test was to reduce the likelihood of worker injury. The EEOC challenged the test, arguing that its use was intentional discrimination. The court ruled for the EEOC, finding Dial to have continued using the test even though it disproportionately disqualifed women. The court noted that men were offered jobs more frequently than women with equivalent scores.

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) [332] Oncale was a male employee of Sundowner. Oncales male coworkers subjected him to sex-related, humiliating actions and threatened to rape him on at least one occasion. Oncale accused Sundowner of sex discrimination, arguing that his mistreatment was motivated by sex. The court ruled for Oncale, finding same-sex harassment to be actionable discrimination. Jesperson v. Harrahs Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2005) Jesperson was a female bartender for a Harrahs casino. Harrahs implemented a new dress code, which set forth different requirements for men and women. Women, in particular, were required to wear makeup. Jesperson challenged the dress code, arguing that it was sex discrimination because the makeup requirement burdened women. The court ruled for Harrahs, finding that the policy was not motivated by sex stereotyping. The court noted that Jespersons subjective dislike of the policy could not create an issue of fact as to sex discrimination. The dissenters argued that the differences between the respective requirements for men and for women created a triable issue of fact. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2001) Glenn was a transgender employee. Brumby was Glenns supervisor. Brumby fired Glenn after Glenn announced her intention to make the male-to-female transition. Brumby made derogatory comments as to Glenns sexual orientation, including his belief that it was unnatural. Glenn accused Brumby of sex discrimination. The court ruled for Glenn, finding Glenns treatment to be motivated by gender stereotypes. Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) [461] Breeden was a female employee of Clark County School District. Breeden complained to School District officials that her male supervisor had made a crude sexual remark regarding a job applicant. Breeden accused her supervisor of retaliating against her, claiming that she was punished for reporting the remarks. The court ruled for the School District, finding Breeden not to have shown a causative link between her complaint and the subsequent punishment. The court noted that Breedens supervisor did not know about any complaint proceedings when the alleged retaliation occurred. Laughlin v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, 149 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 1998) [468] Laughlin was a secretary in the Airports Authority. Laughlin served an employee who was involved in certain proceedings concerning alleged retaliation for the reporting of a potential civil rights violation. By chance, Laughlin encountered certain documents that appeared suspicious to her. Believing the documents to be part of a retaliation effort, Laughlin sent photocopies of the documents to a party to the dispute. Laughlin was fired after the Airports Authority discovered that she had made the unauthorized copies. Laughlin accused the Airports Authority of retaliation. The court ruled for the Airports Authority, finding Laughlins actions not to be a protected activity. The court noted that Laughlins actions were not sufficiently connected to a civil rights investigation to constitute participation in any investigation.

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006) [473] White was a female employee of the Railway. White had been working as a forklift operator. After White filed an EEOC complaint accusing the Railway of engaging in discrimination, the Railway transferred to a track laborer position, which was dirtier and more physically demanding. White accused the Railway of retaliating against her, arguing that her reassignment was a response to her first EEOC complaint. The Court ruled for White, finding that retaliation could include any action calculated to dissuade an employee from complaining of a civil rights violation. Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005) Jackson was a high-school teacher who coached the girls basketball team. Jackson noticed that the girls team received less funding and less access to facilities than the boys team. Jackson was fired after he complained of the disparity to school officials. Jackson accused the school of retaliation. The school argued that Title VIIs prohibition of retaliation did not apply to sex discrimination, which was governed by Title IX. The Court ruled for Jackson, finding retaliation to be a form of discrimination in itself. Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center, 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006) [337] Vickers was a male employee of Fairfield Medical Center. Vickers was friends with a gay doctor who worked at the hospital. After Vickers befriended the doctor, Vickerss coworkers began to harass him physically and verbally. Vickers accused the Medical Center of harassment. The court ruled for the Medical Center, finding differential treatment on the basis of sexual orientation not to be actionable under Title VII. The dissent argued that harassment for non-conformity to gender norms was actionable under Price Waterhouse. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1974) Ulane was a pilot for Eastern Airlines. While working for Eastern Airlines, Ulane underwent a maleto-female sex reassignment surgery. Eastern Airlines fired Ulane after discovering the sex reassignment. Ulane accused Eastern Airlines of sex discrimination. The court ruled for Eastern Airlines, finding Title VII not to cover treatment based on transsexuality. The court noted that neither the text of Title VII nor its legislative history supported an interpretation favoring protection for transsexual individuals. Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry, Inc., 164 Misc. 2d 547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) Maffei was an employee of Kolaeton Industry. Maffei was transsexual, having undergone female-tomale sex reassignment surgery. After the surgery, Maffeis supervisor began to mistreat him, humiliating him at the office and ostracizing him from the staff. Maffei accused Kolaeton of harassment in violation of a New York City statute. The court ruled for Maffei, finding the municipal statute to cover discrimination based on transsexuality. Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 1999) Schmedding was a male employee of Tnemec. Schmeddings received harassment from coworkers, apparently because the coworkers perceived him to be gay. Schmedding filed a complaint against Tnemec for harassment in violation of Title VII. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding

the harassment to be motivated by sexual orientation rather than sex. The court reversed the dismissal, finding that the use of anti-gay statements in harassment did not automatically convert sex discrimination into sexual-orientation discrimination. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) Smith was a firefighter in the Salem Fire Department. While employed by the Fire Department, Smith began the process of a male-to-female sex transition. Smiths coworkers began to ridicule him for his feminine demeanor, and his supervisors formulated a plan to fire him. Smith filed a complaint against the Fire Department for harassment. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding Smiths treatment not to be sex discrimination. The court reversed, finding the treatment to be actionable under Price Waterhouse. The court noted that characterizing the victim as transsexual did not automatically place the victim in an unprotected category. Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009) Prowel was a male employee of Wise Business Forms. Prowel had an effeminate demeanor, which drew the ridicule of his coworkers. Prowels coworkers called him slurs such as faggot and rosebud. Prowel was eventually fired from Wise. Prowel accused Wise of harassment. Wise moved for summary judgment, arguing that Prowel was not mistreated because of sex. The court ruled for Prowel, finding an issue of fact as to whether the harassment was motivated by sex for the purposes of Title VII. Maldonado v. U.S. Bank and Manufacturers Bank, 186 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 1999) [355] Maldonado was a female employee of the Bank. Shortly after Maldonado announced that she was pregnant, the Bank fired her. Maldonado accused the Bank of sex discrimination in violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. The Bank argued that Maldonados termination was not due to pregnancy per se but rather her reduced availability to work during pregnancy. The court ruled for Maldonado, finding the Banks justification to be insufficient. The court found that an employer cannot take anticipatory action against a pregnant employee without a good-faith belief that pregnancy would affect job performance. California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) [362] Guerra was a female employee of California Federal Savings and Loan Association. Guerra became pregnant and took pregnancy disability leave from her position. A California statute required the Association to restore Guerra to her position unless it could show that business necessity required giving the job to someone else. When Guerra tried to return, she was told that no position was available. Guerra and the Association then disputed whether the Association had reneged on its obligation to preserve Guerras job. The Association argued that the California statute was preempted by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, so that the California government could not impose obligations beyond those set forth in the PDA. The Court ruled for Guerra, finding the PDA to set a floor rather than a ceiling on employers obligations to pregnant women. EEOC v. Bloomberg, 778 F. Supp. 2d 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) The EEOC filed a complaint against Bloomberg, alleging that Bloomberg engaged in a pattern of discrimination against pregnant women. The court granted summary judgment, finding the EEOC

not to have produced enough evidence to show that a pattern of discrimination existed. General Dynamics Land Systems v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004) Respondents were employees of General Dynamics. General Dynamics had recently reached a collective bargaining agreement, under which General Dynamics agreed to provide health benefits for employees who were more than fifty years. Respondents ages ranged from forty to forty-nine years, thereby qualifying as protected individuals under the ADEA but not as recipients of General Dynamicss health benefits. Respondents accused that General Dynamics had violated the ADEA by failing to extend the health benefits to them. The Court ruled for General Dynamics, finding the ADEA to impose no obligation on employers to favor comparatively younger workers over comparatively older ones. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) [223] Petitioners were employees of the police department in Jackson, Mississippi. The police department granted salary raises to employees. The amount of the raise for each employee, however, depended on the number of years the employee had worked for the police department. Employees who had been with the department for fewer than five years received higher percentage raises than those who had been with the department for longer than five years. Older employees accused the police department of creating disparate impact in violation of the ADEA by granting the younger workers higher percentage raises. The Court ruled for the police department. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 2009 WL 3517584 (E. D. Mo. Oct. 26, 2009) The EEOC brought an action for religious discrimination on behalf of a Lakettra Bennett, a female employee of Abercrombie & Fitch. Abercrombie required employees to dress in a style that was consistent with its brand image. Abercrombies dress code required to Bennett to wear short skirts. Bennetts religious beliefs required her to wear skirts that were knee-length or longer. Abercrombie found knee-length skirts not to be acceptable and recommended solutions such as wearing short skirts with leggings underneath. The court found an issue of fact as to whether Abercrombie had made reasonable accommodations for Bennett. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) Hardison was an employee of TWA. Hardisons religious beliefs required him to refrain from working on Saturdays. TWAs scheduling policy required employees to work periodically during weekends to ensure staffing whenever flights were operating. Hardison accused TWA of religious discrimination when TWA refused to accommodate his need to avoid work on Saturdays. The Court ruled for TWA, finding the disruption of TWAs schedule to be an undue hardship. Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986) Philbrook was a teacher in the school district of Ansonia, Connecticut. Philbrooks religious beliefs required him to observe six holy days every year. Philbrook, however, could not observe all six days without missing work. Philbrook accused the school district of discrimination, arguing that his religious observances should count as personal business off days. The Court found a factual issue as to whether granting Philbrook additional personal days was a reasonable accommodation.

Webb v. City of Philadelphia, Permitting Webb to wear hijab was an undue hardship.