Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008

Hester / Bormann / Stevenson

1 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Nuclear Power AFF Supplement
This file builds off the Scholars Nuclear Power work. Included are extensions off many of the arguments in those files, plus enough evidence to run a “Fast Reactor” AFF.
Nuclear Power AFF Supplement.....................................................................................................................................1 ........................................................................................................................................................................................2 Inherency.........................................................................................................................................................................3 Inherency – Energy Policy Act of 2005 Fails.................................................................................................................9 Inherency/Solvency – Investors not ready....................................................................................................................12 Domestic Inevitability...................................................................................................................................................13 NP is inevitable.............................................................................................................................................................16 Advantage – US Leadership.........................................................................................................................................19 Global Nuclear Competitiveness..................................................................................................................................26 Energy Leadership Good...............................................................................................................................................30 International Cooperation.............................................................................................................................................33 Advantage – Emissions/Pollution.................................................................................................................................35 Advantage – Uranium Market.......................................................................................................................................36 Advantage – Future Energy Supply..............................................................................................................................38 Advantage – Accidents..................................................................................................................................................39 Advantage – Hydrogen Economy.................................................................................................................................40 Russia............................................................................................................................................................................41 Terrorism ......................................................................................................................................................................50 Solvency – Incentives...................................................................................................................................................53 Solvency – First Mover Incentive.................................................................................................................................56 Solvency – General/Catch-all IFR Good......................................................................................................................57 Solvency – Argonne IFR Program................................................................................................................................59 FYI – IFR types.............................................................................................................................................................60 Advantage – prolif........................................................................................................................................................63 Proliferation Inherency & Solvency.............................................................................................................................64 Proliferation Solvency...................................................................................................................................................65 Proliferation - SQ Fails.................................................................................................................................................67 Proliferation - Carter Repro Ban...................................................................................................................................69 Proliferation - IFRs Solve.............................................................................................................................................70 Proliferation - IFRs Solve.............................................................................................................................................72 Proliferation - IFRs Solve............................................................................................................................................73 Proliferation - IFRs Solve............................................................................................................................................74 Proliferation - IFRs Solve.............................................................................................................................................75 Misc FRs reduce prolif risk...........................................................................................................................................76 Prolif Impacts................................................................................................................................................................82 Reprocessing.................................................................................................................................................................93 PUREX Bad..................................................................................................................................................................96 LWR/PUREX BAD......................................................................................................................................................98 Advantage – Waste/Mining.........................................................................................................................................100 Mining Bad - Indigenous Nations Impacts.................................................................................................................104 Misc Mining ...............................................................................................................................................................105 YUCCA MOUNTAIN ADVANTAGE.......................................................................................................................106 Advantage:Fossil Fuels Causes Mass Extinction ......................................................................................................109 Advantage – Transportation........................................................................................................................................114 IFR general/FYI..........................................................................................................................................................115 ALMRs........................................................................................................................................................................119 Sodium Cooled Reactors.............................................................................................................................................120 Supercritical Water Cooled Reactors..........................................................................................................................121 Lead Fast Reactors......................................................................................................................................................122 Molten Salt Reactor....................................................................................................................................................125 SQ reactor research.....................................................................................................................................................126 Generations of reactor technology..............................................................................................................................127 Thermal vs Fast Reactors............................................................................................................................................128

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Hester / Bormann / Stevenson

2 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Answers to Economic Arguments...............................................................................................................................132 *Economic Add-On.....................................................................................................................................................137 *Poverty Add-on.........................................................................................................................................................138 Politics – Plan is Popular............................................................................................................................................139 Politics – Dems supporting Nuclear Power................................................................................................................141 Elections......................................................................................................................................................................143 Answers to Terrorist Attack Nuclear Plants................................................................................................................144 Solvency – Catch All...................................................................................................................................................145 Solvency – Safety........................................................................................................................................................148 Solvency – Efficiency.................................................................................................................................................158 Solvency: Better than other alternatives.....................................................................................................................162 Solvency – USFG action key......................................................................................................................................163 Solvency: US Key.......................................................................................................................................................164 Topicality – Alternative Energy..................................................................................................................................165 T- Incentives include Insurance Coverage..................................................................................................................167 T- Argonne is part of USFG........................................................................................................................................168 Misc FRs feasible/Solvency .......................................................................................................................................170 AT: Author Indicts.......................................................................................................................................................174 The George Stanford Email........................................................................................................................................175 NEG: Nuclear Power Not Inevitable..........................................................................................................................176 NP is not inevitable ....................................................................................................................................................176 NP is not inevitable.....................................................................................................................................................177 NEG: No Inherency – AFCI Solves............................................................................................................................178 The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative, the technology development element of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) is requesting $395 million in FY 2008. This research and development program is focusing on methods to reduce the volume and long-term toxicity of high-level waste from spent nuclear fuel, reduce the long-term proliferation threat posed by civilian inventories of plutonium in spent fuel, and provide for proliferation-resistant technologies to recover the energy content in spent nuclear fuel. Advanced recycling technologies can extract highly radioactive elements of commercial spent nuclear fuel and use that material as fuel in fast spectrum reactors to generate additional electricity. The extracted material, which includes all transuranic elements (e.g., plutonium, neptunium, americium and curium), would be consumed by fast reactors to reduce significantly the quantity of material requiring disposal in a repository and to produce power. With the transuranic materials separated and used for fuel, the volume of waste that would require disposal in a repository would be reduced by 80 percent. Improving the way spent nuclear fuel is managed will facilitate the expansion of civilian nuclear power in the United States and encourage civilian nuclear power internationally to evolve in a more proliferation-resistant manner. The United States and other countries having the established infrastructure could arrange to supply nuclear fuel to countries seeking the energy benefits of civilian nuclear power, and the spent nuclear fuel could be returned to partner countries for eventual disposal in international repositories. In this way, foreign countries could obtain the benefits of nuclear energy without needing to design, build, and operate uranium enrichment or recycling technologies to process and store the waste.........................................................................................................................................178 NEG-States CP............................................................................................................................................................179 NEG: Offset CP...........................................................................................................................................................180 NEG- Answers to prolif..............................................................................................................................................181 NEG – Long Time Frame for FRs..............................................................................................................................182 NEG – No Nuclear Renaissance (not inevitable)........................................................................................................183 NEG: Solvency – Incentives Fail................................................................................................................................185 NEG: Solvency – NP not solve warming....................................................................................................................187 IFR Bad - Fuel Reprocessing......................................................................................................................................191 IFR Bad - Prolif/Terrorism..........................................................................................................................................192 NEG: Nuclear Power Too Costly................................................................................................................................193 NEG: Pro-Nuclear Propaganda & Lies.......................................................................................................................194 NEG: Uranium Industry Econ.....................................................................................................................................195

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Hester / Bormann / Stevenson

3 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Inherency
SQ energy policy de-emphasizes Fast Reactor technology US DOE ’08 [US Dept of Energy, April 25, http://nuclear.energy.gov/genIV/neGenIV4.html] While the Department is supporting research on several reactor concepts, priority is being given to the VHTR, a system compatible with advanced electricity and hydrogen electricity generation capabilities. The VHTR concept is being pursued in the United States as the next generation nuclear plant (NGNP) in accordance with the Energy Policy Act of 2005.The emphasis on VHTR reflects its potential for economically and safely producing electricity and hydrogen at high efficiency without emitting noxious gases. This fits within the medium-term Administration goals of enhancing the security of our energy supply and doing so in an environmentally responsible manner. Fuel cycle options for the VHTR (a thermal-spectrum reactor) are more limited than for fast-spectrum reactors. Fast-spectrum reactors are a potential component in our long-term energy solution and, as such, are researched at a lower level of activity than the other reactor concepts. Their mission strengths result from their superior ability to burn recycled nuclear fuel. Closing the fuel cycle by recycling will reduce quantity and radiotoxicity of nuclear waste and increase uranium fuel utilization. US only uses open fuel cycle reactors now Bodansky 06 [David, emeritus prof physics- U of WA, Physics Today; Dec2006, Vol. 59 Issue 12, p80-81] The once-through (also called open) fuel cycle, which does not include reprocessing, is currently used for US commercial nuclear power. Spent fuel is initially kept in water-filled cooling pools at the reactor site, pending eventual transfer to a central repository for interim storage or longterm disposal. No central repositories have been developed yet, and some of the cooling pools have reached their capacity. A common solution has been dry storage--moving the fuel to on-site, heavy, protective casks where convective air cooling suffices. An American Physical Society study published in 2005 judged that dry cask storage, either at the reactor sites or at central facilities, would be "safe and affordable" for at least 50 years. Two years earlier an MIT study recommended continuing the US reliance on the once-through fuel cycle "for the next decades." The possibilities of interim storage and of long-term disposal in the Yucca Mountain repository do remove the urgency of selecting a reprocessing option, but the once-through cycle will not suffice for the long-term, large-scale use of nuclear energy.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Hester / Bormann / Stevenson Stanford ’03 [George, nuclear physicist, ret Argonne Nat’l Lab, from the

4 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Proceedings of “Global 2003,”

ANS Winter Meeting, New Orleans, November 16–20, http://www.nationalcenter.org/LWRStanford.pdf] At present the nuclear fuel cycle is “open”—that is, the spent fuel that is now considered waste still contains most of the energy it started with. Current U.S. policy is to use the fuel once and then throw it away, along with more than 95% of its original energy. In addition, a huge amount of energy is latent in the depleted-uranium residue from military and civilian enrichment activities. In a fully closed cycle, essentially all of the energy in the mined uranium would be exploited, with only the real waste— the fission products— left over for disposal. The fuel cycle cannot be closed with today’s thermal reactors by themselves, even with recycling.* It can be done, however, by supplementing them with fast reactors, which can use as fuel the heavy, fissionable isotopes that accumulate in thermal-reactor fuel. Lightfoot, et al 2006 [H Douglas, Global Environmental Climate Change Center; Wallace Manheimer, Naval Research Lab; Daniel Meneley, Engineer Emeritus, AECL; George Stanford, Argonne Nat’l Lab; September 12, “Nuclear Fission Fuel is Inexhaustible,” http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0609lightfoot.pdf] The first ever electricity produced by nuclear fission came from the EBR-1 fast reactor in the U.S. in 1951. However, today the vast majority of nuclear power is produced by thermal reactors. Several countries (U.S., Britain, France, Russia, Japan) have built and operated fast reactors of early design. Only two fast reactors are generating power today – Russia’s BN-600, which has been producing electricity since 1981 [Adamov, 2004], and France’s Phenix started in 1974. Bodansky 06 [David, emeritus prof physics- U of WA, Physics Today; Dec2006, Vol. 59 Issue 12, p80-81] To date, the dominant reprocessing method has been the PUREX (plutonium and uranium recovery by extraction) process, which has been used in the US and other weapons programs and in commercial programs abroad. It is an aqueous process in which nitric acid dissolves the spent fuel. The U and Pu are extracted and the remaining constituents--the fission products and minor actinides--are left as wastes. The separated Pu, which goes into new fuel elements, is in its own product stream. A different aqueous separation process under development in the US, the UREX+ (uranium extraction) process, is intended as a proliferation-resistant alternative to PUREX. The GNEP, which seeks to further nuclear power in the US and worldwide, has adopted UREX+ development as one of its major goals. Again, acid dissolves the fuel. The U is extracted for disposal as low-level waste or use in fuel, and Cs and Sr may also be removed. The remainder is separated into the fission products, which become the high-level wastes, and the Pu and other transuranics, which can be incorporated in new reactor fuel. The minor actinides are kept with the Pu, raising the heat output and radioactive emission rates of the Pu product stream.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Hester / Bormann / Stevenson Stanford ’03 [George, nuclear physicist, ret Argonne Nat’l Lab, from the

5 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Proceedings of “Global 2003,”

ANS Winter Meeting, New Orleans, November 16–20, http://www.nationalcenter.org/LWRStanford.pdf] Giving top priority to implementing the aqueous reprocessing technology that has been established in Europe, and has been at the center of policy debates in the United States, would be likely to galvanize antinuclear activists. While the technology proposed for the MOX program is really advanced aqueous and not traditional Purex, that will be a fine distinction when the battle lines are drawn. With plutonium separation, which occurs when MOX is recycled for LWRs, it will be hard to distinguish that fuel cycling program from what the country turned away from twenty-five years ago. MOX is a “me-too” technology, and choosing it will send a message abroad that will give other countries more latitude to pursue plutonium separation (unless, perhaps, we package it with an ambitious proposal for managing the international fuel supply). International leadership and long-term considerations should be influential in making technology decisions: what seems technically expedient today might be counterproductive in the long run. In the end, the decision may be that MOX for civilian plutonium would be desirable, but that case is far from made.
Stanford ’03 [George, nuclear physicist, ret Argonne Nat’l Lab, from the

Proceedings of “Global 2003,” ANS Winter Meeting, New Orleans, November 16–20, http://www.nationalcenter.org/LWRStanford.pdf] The U.S. government has decided to implement the MOX strategy for disposing of weapons plutonium, under a Fissile Materials Disposition Program run by the Department of Energy. The program pays commercial reactor owners to accept and use the MOX fuel. On the surface, that would seem to lay the foundation for following up with a similar strategy for civilian plutonium (as in the weapons plutonium program, the transuranics will be owned by the federal government). However, the weapons program only has to handle some 35 tons of weapons plutonium over a couple of decades. Operations at that scale will have no impact on management of the civilian plutonium, which is currently accumulating in spent fuel at a rate of about 20 tons per year in the United States (worldwide, the plutonium inventory is headed toward 2,000 tons by 2010 or so). Further, because it lacks the intense external radiation of the plutonium discharged from LWRs, weapons-grade plutonium is much easier to handle. There will be interesting lessons from the current disposition program, but as a model for closing the fuel cycle it has little obvious relevance.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Hester / Bormann / Stevenson Stanford ’03 [George, nuclear physicist, ret Argonne Nat’l Lab, from the

6 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Proceedings of “Global 2003,”

ANS Winter Meeting, New Orleans, November 16–20, http://www.nationalcenter.org/LWRStanford.pdf] Closing the nuclear fuel cycle in the United States will require some modification of the national nonproliferation policy, regardless of the option that is ultimately chosen. The Purex/MOX route, no matter how it is approached, will require separation and some storage of civilian plutonium, as well as open-ended storage of minor actinides. This reality cannot be changed by blending a token amount of neptunium into the fuel. Neptunium would add no measurable proliferation resistance, nor would it reduce the cost of safeguarding the fresh fuel. It would, however, greatly increase the cost of fabrication and fuel handling, because there is no experience with manufacturing MOX when operation, maintenance, and quality assurance have to be accomplished completely by remote control. Also, power-generation companies might not be willing to accept the fuel, because handling it in the plant would be more difficult. If the LWR MOX route is selected, the overriding concern should be producing the fuel that would be most acceptable to the power producers. Nonproliferation issues would then have to be resolved through appropriate policy governing safeguards, security, and export control. * The small particles are impelled by the recoil when an alpha particle is emitted. ** The regular fuel from ALMRs also has to be handled remotely, but the logistics are much simpler because collocation permits the radioactive actinides to be transferred and processed without ever leaving the shielded facility.

Hylko 08 [James, an integrated safety management specialist for Paducah Remediation Services LLC, Power; Apr2008, Vol. 152 Issue 4, p44] Dozens of intrinsically safe Generation III+ reactors are expected to be deployed in the U.S. in the coming years. Today, scientists already are looking over the horizon to Generation IV reactors that will be capable of producing hydrogen and process heat as well as electricity while generating much less radioactive waste. In any technology-based business, after its scientists unlock nature's secrets, its engineers use that knowledge to design new products that we eventually can't live without. Without scientists, there are no technical advances. Without engineers, there are no products. One of the greatest challenges for a technology-based company is to focus its R&D investments in areas with the greatest potential payoff. Such is the case for the U.S. nuclear power industry. This article summarizes the relative merits of several nuclear power systems that are under development and competing for attention and investment. To get a sense of how stiff the competition is, consider this comparison: Last year, Microsoft spent over $7 billion in R&D to stay competitive in the burgeoning market for online services, with the expectation of earning many times that sum in the future; the DOE's total budget for "science & technology" for this fiscal year is $3.9 billion.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Hester / Bormann / Stevenson

7 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] Since the IFR has so much going for it, research should be steaming full speed ahead, right? Wouldn't you think so? Nevertheless, at the Clinton administration's urging, Congress terminated the research on October 1, 1994. The Senate voted to continue it, but the House prevailed in conference. Well, I suppose at least we saved some of the taxpayers' money. Wrong. Termination cost as much over the ensuing four years as finishing the research would have done, especially since the Japanese were all set to chip in $60 million. You're kidding. Why would our government do what it did? Combination of factors, but the main one is plain misunderstanding of the facts I have just explained to you. Well-meaning but ill-informed people claiming to be experts confused pyroprocessing with PUREX, and convinced so many administrators and legislators that the IFR was a proliferation threat that the project was killed. Till, 1997 [Dr. Charles, nuclear physicist, Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/interviews/till.html] Q: Then its future is in the documentation at this point? A: The future, I think, can be said quite honestly that the future of the IFR in this country is nonexistent. Q: But in some other country? A: I think the chances are very good that the IFR concepts will be adopted by others. They are, after all, very sound. Stanford 06 [George, PhD, retired nuclear physicist, interview with Ann Curtis, August 8,
http://www.cross-x.com/vb/showthread.php?s=1ad707180b7b85158aece8f58d80116a&p=1600390#post1600390] 7. Why was the IFR facility at Argonne abandoned by Congress?

Proliferation worries. Congress had no collective grasp of the relevant technicalities, and enough of the senators were convinced by the Administration that the reprocessing involved in the IFR would make the spread of nuclear weapons more likely that they voted to terminate the program. It was a vain attempt to keep reprocessing technology from spreading to other countries.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Hester / Bormann / Stevenson Stanford ’03 [George, nuclear physicist, ret Argonne Nat’l Lab, from the

8 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Proceedings of “Global 2003,”

ANS Winter Meeting, New Orleans, November 16–20, http://www.nationalcenter.org/LWRStanford.pdf] Like France, the United States has a large fleet of LWRs that generate spent fuel, and therefore using MOX fuel in tandem with a large reprocessing capacity and an expanding fleet of LWRs might seem to be a logical next step in closing the fuel cycle. After all, as a part of the disarmament agreement with Russia, the United States has already committed to dispose of some 35 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium by irradiating it as MOX in commercial nuclear reactors. On the accumulation of separated civilian plutonium, however, the United States is more restrictive than most other heavily industrialized nations, and its policy will need to be modified.
Stanford ’03 [George, nuclear physicist, ret Argonne Nat’l Lab, from the

Proceedings of “Global 2003,” ANS Winter Meeting, New Orleans, November 16–20, http://www.nationalcenter.org/LWRStanford.pdf] Following separation, closing the fuel cycle requires preparing the 18 kg of fission products for permanent disposal, storing most of the 473 kg of unused uranium (0.8% enrichment) until it is needed as fuel,** and recycling the 6 kg of transuranics (along with a similar amount of the uranium), to consume them while producing energy. There are a number of ways to do this. The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) and Generation-IV (Gen-IV) programs envision exhaustive investigation of a variety of alternative technologies that are not yet fully developed. However, a logical start to the process of closing the U.S. fuel cycle would be to consider the technologies that have already been established. IV. MOX TECHNOLOGY There are no international examples of fully closed systems, although reprocessing, using mixed plutoniumuranium oxide, is performed by several countries. Some of them have taken sporadic steps toward closure, most prominently France, but none has yet completed the job. Mixed-oxide technology is well developed. The UK and Russia have been reprocessing reactor fuel for half a century. The United States operated several reprocessing facilities until President Carter banned the practice in 1977. France has established a large reprocessing capacity (~2000 metric tons of heavy metal per year) to service both domestic and international customers. Japan is embarking on a similar program. The technology is based on the aqueous Purex*** technique. France has made large strides in producing compact waste forms (an achievement not duplicated by the U.S. Department of Energy in producing its weapons plutonium). With this capacity up and running, France has been accumulating separated plutonium at a fairly brisk rate. Some of the plutonium is used in MOX by the nation’s large fleet of LWR power plants, but France can separate more plutonium than can currently be absorbed by facilities that can utilize it. Because reprocessing is an international business in France, some plutonium is returned to the countries of origin. Worldwide as well, the capacity to produce MOX does not yet match the rate at which plutonium is separated—for a number of reasons, the most basic being that there are not enough power plants that can use the fuel. Because the accumulation of separated plutonium is considered a serious national problem, France is developing ambitious schemes for multiple recycle. If implemented, those schemes would eventually lead to an equilibrium amount of plutonium in commerce within the country. However, France does not yet have even a design for a geologic repository, so that the specific requirements for form and composition of the high-level waste are not confirmed. Thus the minor actinides are now being treated as waste—they are stored temporarily, along with the fission products.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Hester / Bormann / Stevenson

9 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Inherency – Energy Policy Act of 2005 Fails
Current incentives under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 will not adequately incent the further construction of nuclear reactors in the US Nuclear Energy Institute 06 [Nuclear Energy Institute. ‘Emerging Nuclear Revival’ Requires Action by
Federal Government, NEI Leader Tells House Panel. September 13, 2006. http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/actionfederal/ Accessed: July 17, 2008 10:45 AM] WASHINGTON—Challenges requiring action by the federal government confront the nuclear energy industry as it proceeds with the engineering and licensing work that could lead to the construction of as many as 30 new nuclear power plants over the next 20 years, an industry leader told Congress today. Action needed by the federal government to facilitate this “emerging nuclear revival” lies in the areas of construction finance, congressional oversight of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s new-plant licensing process, and centralized interim storage of used nuclear fuel pending development of the Yucca Mountain, Nev., repository, said Frank L. “Skip” Bowman, the Nuclear Energy Institute’s president and chief executive officer. Bowman testified before the U.S. House Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development.“The industry’s major priority is the immediate imperative to address the significant challenges facing construction of the next nuclear plants in the United States,” Bowman said. “The industry is investing well over $1.5 billion in design and engineering work, licensing and procurement of long-lead equipment like reactor pressure vessels and steam generators.” To meet a projected increase in electricity demand of 45 percent by 2030, 12 companies or groups of companies are developing federal construction and operating license applications, and four companies already have filed applications for early site permits with the NRC.“The first wave of these plants could begin site preparation by the end of 2008, move in to full-scale construction in 2010 when they receive their construction and operating licenses, and be ready for commercial operation in the 2014 to 2015 time frame,” Bowman said.In the area of new nuclear plant finance, he called for congressional oversight of the federal regulations being developed to implement investment stimulus provisions in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.The Department of Energy recently published initial guidelines, developed jointly with the Office of Management and Budget, under which it will implement the Energy Policy Act provisions that authorized loan guarantees for up to 80 percent of the cost of “innovative technologies” that “avoid, reduce or sequester air pollutants or anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.”“The guidelines are so restrictive and so conditional that they would not support financing of a nuclear power plant,” Bowman said. “The nuclear industry urges the Congress to exercise the oversight necessary to ensure this essential program operates as intended by Congress through credible, workable regulations.”He also voiced concern over “extensive, substantive changes” to NRC regulations that govern licensing for new reactors.“This approach places the industry in the difficult situation of attempting to develop new plant license applications while NRC is rewriting the rules and regulatory guidance governing those applications. Active and continuing oversight by the committees of Congress will be essential to ensure that the NRC maintains schedules, and produces timely, high-quality regulations and regulatory guidance,” Bowman said.

Nuclear Power 2010 is for Generation III reactors (steam- and light water-cooled) Holton 05 [W. Conard. Power Surge: Renewed Interest in Nuclear Energy. Environmental Health Perspectives VOLUME
113, NUMBER 11. November 2005. <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=2&hid=5&sid=30e1385f-b329-45a5-8eda418c5d7adbb3%40sessionmgr8> Accessed: July 16, 2008 5:26 PM]

Finally, the act funds a central nuclear energy program of the Bush administration: Nuclear Power 2010. The program was unveiled in 2002 as a government–industry cost-sharing plan to identify three sites for new nuclear power plants, develop Generation III reactors, and develop a single-license process with the NRC for approval of both plant construction and operation, thereby removing much of the delay and uncertainty for investors.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Hester / Bormann / Stevenson

10 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Lack of bipartisan support for nuclear R&D has resulted in an erratic and ineffective level of funding for nuclear R&D. Bengelsdorf & McGoldrick 07 [Harold D. Bengelsdorf, consultant, formerly held top
positions with US Atomic Energy Commission, US Department of Energy, former Senior office director in the Department of State for dealing with international nuclear and non-proliferation negotiations, and Fred McGoldrick, principal associate in global consulting firm Bengelsdorf, McGoldrick and Associates, LLC. Has held senior positions in the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency. THE U.S. DOMESTIC CIVIL NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE AND U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY. May 2007. American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness. <http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/images/COUNCIL_WHITE_PAPER_Final.pdf> Accessed: July 17, 2008 4:50 PM]

The U.S. National Laboratories and affiliated research institutions have constituted an important component of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure. However, starting in the late 1970s, bipartisan support for nuclear R&D started to erode. This led to an erratic degree of support from the U.S. Government for nuclear R&D as the U.S. has moved from one Administration to another. For example, during the 1978 to 1981 period civilian nuclear R&D received 34% of the total DOE budget for energy R&D. During the 1991 to 1995 period this figure dropped to as low as 16% and there was an effort during the 1990s to terminate all Federal funding for civilian R&D related to the advancement of nuclear power. The theory, in part, was that the light water reactor was a proven, commercially established technology that did not require any further Federal support. While this decision has since been reversed, the DOE budget that had been requested for civilian nuclear R&D for fiscal year 2007 still represented only 8 % of the total DOE budget for energy R&D. While this proportion is expected to increase if GNEP moves forward, that has not yet occurred and DOE’s funding requests for the program for fiscal year 2007 were cut by about one-third as DOE has moved to implement the Joint Funding Resolution that was passed to fund most government agencies for fiscal year 2007.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Hester / Bormann / Stevenson

11 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Nuclear power is a real alternative to the fuel crisis.
Campbell, July 9, 08 (Colin, Ph.D at Oxford, Trustee of the Oil Depletion Analysis Centre,
http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?TheComingOilCrisis, The coming oil crisis, July 17) Nuclear power will always remain expensive because its health and security requirements make it complex: This is either a lie or a misconception. Nuclear power does produce electricity at around 3 cts/kWh or even less (see http://www.platts.com/Nuclear/Resources/News%20Features/nukeinsight/); currently only coal is cheaper, but not by much. The main cost is that of the power plant, nuclear fuel is very cheap compared to that, even if uranium prices rise. Sure, a nuke plant is complex, but 3000 wind mills aren't exactly simple, either. The security and health problems already figure into these numbers, though the regulations are completely blown out of proportion. (Some scrap metal is considered nuclear waste, even though it is not more radioactive than scrap metal from the non-nuclear industry. Coal plants spread(!) more radioactivity than nuke plants and nobody gives a shit. An estimated 30,000 people die every year from coal fumes, a feat that could also be achieved by blowing up two(!) nuke plants every year using many tons of high explosives.) There's fuel for tens of thousands of years, assuming the deployment of breeder reactors. Really, there are real world reasons for choosing nuclear power, not just a stupid conspiracy.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Hester / Bormann / Stevenson

12 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Inherency/Solvency – Investors not ready
Investors are not willing to build new reactors without better investment security. Bellemare 07 [Bob. New Nuclear Plants Coming to the United States? January 17, 2007. Utilipoint IssueAlert.
<http://www.utilipoint.com/issuealert/article.asp?ID=2789> Accessed: July 17, 2008 3:36 PM] Restarting the U.S. nuclear industry will not be easy. Meeting the 2008 deadline and getting all the necessary approvals is not quick or cheap. The process for securing what is called a Construction and Operating License (COL) from the NRC can cost $50 million. And despite the incentives provided in [the Energy Policy Act of 2005], Wall Street is not eager to pony up the billions of dollars it will likely take to construct the first U.S. nuclear unit in decades without more assurances on cost recovery from state regulators. Because nuclear plants are so cost intensive, they will need low-cost financing if they are to be competitive. To get low-cost financing, investors need “security,” but with the actual cost of a new nuclear plant in the U.S. being uncertain, how do you create a “secure” investing environment? Such is the challenge for utilities, regulators, and policy makers.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Hester / Bormann / Stevenson

13 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Domestic Inevitability
Schultz 07 [Max, sr fellow – Manhattan Institute, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/12/19/AR2007121902075.html] Nuclear power is on the verge of a renaissance in the United States. Though there hasn't been a new nuclear plant licensed and built in over 30 years, the nation's de facto ban on nuclear power expansion is coming to an end. The nuclear industry reports there are 17 companies and consortiums pursuing licenses to build more than 30 new nuclear reactors. Construction on the first of these could begin within a few years.
NUCLEAR POWER IS INEVITABLE

Campbell 6 [Scott L., president of the American Council on Nuclear Competitiveness, http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/documents.html : American Council President Scott Campbell’s remarks to ICAPP 06 accessed July 17, 2008] June 8 2006 Winston Churchill once said that “the farther backward you can look the farther forward you can see.” As I look back at my experiences over the years, it has become clear to me that Americans have arrived at a turning point, or if not quite the turning point, certainly the tipping point in nuclear energy. We are in a totally new environment: A new, expensive plateau for oil and natural gas prices,the risks posed by global climate change, the dearth of adequate, near term alternative energy sources, growing dependence on oil from volatile regions of the world, terrorism in and directed at Middle East oil producing states, the explosive rise of oil consuming mega economies, China and India, the vagaries of a new hurricane cycle. All have combined to create a “perfect energy policy storm” where almost everyone is taking a harder, more realistic look at our energy future and at the inevitability, the indispensability, of nuclear power. Are we on the verge of a nuclear renaissance in the US? Yes, but perhaps not in the way you may imagine.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Hester / Bormann / Stevenson

14 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William, Gerald, and George – retired nuclear physicists from Argonne Nat’l Lab, January 2, http://www.nationalcenter.org/PurexPyro.html]

Inevitably, nuclear power will supply a growing fraction of the growing global energy requirements. Although currently there is no shortage of uranium, continuing the profligate practice of treating spent fuel from thermal reactors as waste -- throwing away more than 98 percent of the energy in the mined uranium -- will swamp the waste-disposal facilities and exhaust the reserves of low-cost uranium. Fast reactors can run happily on that "waste," meeting the growing energy demand for decades before any more mining or milling of uranium is needed -- and enrichment will never be needed. The basic technology is now in hand. Those who would restrict the growth of nuclear power in the United States would deprive it of the ability to help set the guidelines and structure within which the spread occurs -- an important recent example being the sale of Chinese reactors to Pakistan.

Stanford ’03 [George, nuclear physicist, ret Argonne Nat’l Lab, from the

Proceedings of “Global 2003,” ANS Winter Meeting, New Orleans, November 16–20, http://www.nationalcenter.org/LWRStanford.pdf] Much of today’s fuel cycle program in the United States is inherited from the Advanced Accelerator Application (AAA) program. When this program started, the fundamental premise was an expected phase-out of nuclear energy, with accelerator-driven fast-fission systems consuming the transuranics left from the nuclear era, thereby eliminating most of the radiological risk to future generations. Now, however, that objective has been abandoned, and the current Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) recognizes that if there is to be affordable electricity and plentiful hydrogen for transportation, increasing use of nuclear power is inevitable.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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15 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

SQ incentives are spurring nuclear power Farivar 07 [Cyrus, November 13, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/startups/news/2007/11/nuclear_economics] A recent application to build the first American nuclear power plant in nearly 30 years has the nuclear community aglow with talk of possible industry resurgence. In September 2007, NRG Energy filed a proposal with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to build a nuclear power plant in Texas. Last month, NuStart, a nuclear consortium, also filed an application. These represent the leading edge of a wave of renewed interest in domestic nuclear energy. "We are expecting an additional three (applications) before the end of this calendar year," said Scott Burnell, an NRC spokesman, who said another 16 applications, some for multiple power plants, are likely by the end of 2009. "If all of these applications were approved, we would end up with a total of 32 new reactors in the United States," Burnell said. Currently 104 reactors are spread across the United States -- approximately 20 percent of domestic-energy output. Assuming all goes well, the first plants could come online as early as 2015, according to Burnell.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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16 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

NP is inevitable Nuclear Power is expanding in the United States Lake o6 [James A., Associate Director for the Nuclear Program, The Idaho National Laboratory,
http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/July/20060706173216SAikceinawz0.2218897.html, 07/14/08] We stand at the verge of a renaissance of nuclear energy, founded in the continued safe and economical operation of America’s 103 nuclear power plants, and signaled by the expected near-term announcements of several orders for new nuclear power plants to be constructed and operated in the next 10 years. In the longer term, our national laboratories are working with the nation’s universities, U.S. industry, and the international community to develop the next generation of advanced nuclear power systems that will be even more economical, safer, and sustainable with a closed fuel cycle that burns up substantially more of the nuclear fuel to extract much more of its energy potential while minimizing the quantities of nuclear waste. Nuclear power has an important place in America’s energy future, safely providing electricity and transportation fuel products that are economical, clean, and sustainable.

Nuclear Power is inevitable in the United States Lake o6 [James A., Associate Director for the Nuclear Program, The Idaho National Laboratory,
http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/July/20060706173216SAikceinawz0.2218897.html, 07/14/08] As we close out the second era of nuclear power, the era of financial and safety recovery, nuclear power is poised to contribute even more to U.S. and world energy needs. This recovery will be fueled in part by growing national energy security concerns and rising costs of imported fossil fuels; substantial demand growth for energy to fuel our economic prosperity; increased attention to eliminating environmental threats associated with burning fossil fuels and substituting emissions-free nuclear power; and an electricity market very favorable to inexpensive nuclear power.

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17 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Countries Part of the Kyoto Protocol Will Inevitably Switch to Nuclear Power Bilefsky, January 10th, 2007 [Dan, New York Times Reporter, International Herald Tribune http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=4162614 Accessed July 15, 2008]
The European Union will not succeed in meeting global targets to limit climate change unless more countries, including Germany, embrace nuclear energy, the German economics minister warned Wednesday.Signaling his desire for Germany to reverse a government pledge to phase out nuclear power, the minister, Michael Glos, said the EU would not be able to meet the objectives of the Kyoto

Protocol unless Germany and others reconciled themselves to nuclear energy. Under the protocol, agreed to in 1997 in Kyoto, 39 industrialized nations agreed to cut emissions of 6 greenhouse gases to an average of 5.2 percent below 1990 levels by the period 2008-2012."It is impossible to fulfill the Kyoto objectives without using nuclear energy," he said. "If we simply switch off nuclear plants in Germany, it will be impossible to meet objectives that the
European Commission has set out and that we have accepted." Glos's call for Germany to embrace nuclear energy could threaten an already fragile coalition between the Christian Democrat party of Chancellor Angela Merkel and the Social Democrats. The Social Democrats oppose nuclear power and regard Merkel's agreement to phase out reactors as a key tenet of the coalition agreement. Glos acknowledged that reorienting German policy to accept nuclear energy would be difficult. But he added that politicians needed to catch up with the public's changing attitudes. "We in Germany have divided opinions on nuclear energy," he said. "We have no majority in Parliament to alter our policy, but public opinion in Germany is shifting. There is a change of mentality among the voters." Opposition to nuclear energy has a long history in Germany. During the Cold War, opposition was linked to deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in West Germany. While German proponents contend that soaring energy needs, climate change and fears of energy-supply disruption make the use of nuclear power more vital than ever, skeptics counter that it is too costly and dangerous to be viable. Merkel has vowed to uphold a government pledge to phase out nuclear energy, including shutting down all the country's reactors within the next 14 years. But the debate about the wisdom of a such a phase-out has been reignited by the current dispute between Russia and Belarus that has resulted in Moscow's suspension of oil deliveries to Europe. On Tuesday, Merkel said the confrontation with Russia illustrated the need for a "comprehensive, balanced energy mix in Germany." Proponents of nuclear energy in Germany and elsewhere received a boost Wednesday when the European Commission published a report saying that nuclear power was a key for Europe to combat climate change and improve its energy independence. It called for an analysis of nuclear energy in Europe and a strategy to increase its use. Nuclear energy is seen as satisfying 30 percent of Europe's energy needs by 2050. Nuclear energy

has been making a global comeback in recent years, partly because it produces virtually no greenhouse gases, considered to be a key factor in climate change. Twenty-four reactors are currently under construction, most of them in Asia,
where vast populations are demanding cheap energy. China plans to add 32 reactors to its existing 11 by 2020, while India, which currently operates 14 plants, aims to triple its reactor capacity over the next 6 years. Japan, South Korea, Russia, Argentina and Ukraine are all adding new nuclear capacity.Separately, Glos said Germany would use its EU presidency to champion the euro amid a backlash against the EU's single currency. In recent months, the EU's newest members from the East have backed away from previous targets to join the euro. At the same time, leading French politicians have criticized the European Central bank, saying it is keeping interest rates too high and hampering growth. Glos, who will help shape the agenda at meetings of the EU's 27 economic and finance ministers during Germany's six-month EU presidency, said it was imperative to increase the emotional ties between the euro and European citizens. He also said the independence of the European Central Bank was sacrosanct and that it was essential to avoid altering key rules meant to assure the euro's stability, including a so- called stability pact that imposes strict limits on the economies of countries that want to join the single currency . "It wasn't easy for Germans to give up the Deutsche mark," he said. "It came after the collapse of World War II and formed an important part of German identity. We were able to tell our people that the euro would be as strong and stable as the Deutsche mark, so we are in favor of criteria that assures that."

Till ’06 [Charles, nuclear physicist, Argonne Nat’l Lab, Int’l Jrnl of Nuclear Governance, Economy, and Ecology,
vol.1 #2, pp212-221]

The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) was a concept that promised inexhaustible, clean, safe, proliferation-resistant energy, with waste that needed isolation for only hundreds of years rather than tens of thousands. The development of the IFR was abandoned by the US government in 1994, as it neared completion, because too many in the US Congress and Administration did not understand its potential to help control the spread of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the deployment of a fast-fission technology with the general characteristics of the IFR is inevitable because the growing global demand for clean energy cannot be satisfied by today's thermal reactors.

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18 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

India is researching FBRs Hore-Lacy 08 [Ian. Director for Public Communications at the World Nuclear Association. “Advanced nuclear power reactors”
February 12, 2008 World Nuclear Association http://www.eoearth.org/article/Advanced_nuclear_power_reactors . Accessed 7/17/08]

Research continues in India; at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research, a 40 MWt fast breeder test reactor has been operating since 1985. In addition, the tiny Kamini reactor at the Centre is employed to explore the use of thorium as nuclear fuel by breeding fissile uranium-233 (233U). In 2004, construction of a 500 MWe prototype fast breeder reactor started at Kalpakkam. The unit is expected to be operating in 2010, fuelled with uranium-plutonium carbide (the reactor-grade Pu being from its existing PHWRs) and with a thorium blanket to breed fissile 233U. This will take India's ambitious thorium program to stage 2, and set the scene for eventual full utilization of the country's abundant thorium resources as fuel for nuclear reactors.

Japan has developed FBRs Hore-Lacy 08 [Ian. Director for Public Communications at the World Nuclear Association. “Advanced nuclear power reactors”
February 12, 2008 World Nuclear Association http://www.eoearth.org/article/Advanced_nuclear_power_reactors . Accessed 7/17/08]

Japan plans to develop FBRs, and its Joyo experimental reactor which has been operating since 1977 is now being boosted to 140 MWt. The 280 MWe Monju prototype commercial FBR was connected to the grid in 1995, but was subsequently shut down due to a sodium leak.

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19 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Advantage – US Leadership
Internationally, nuclear is inevitable - but PUREX recycling will cause the potential for rampant proliferation Hannum, Marsh and Stanford 07 [William H, Gerald E, and George S. Stanford is a renowned nuclear
physicist recognized for his work on the IFR. “Recycling Nuclear Waste.” American Physical Society Special Session on Nuclear Reprocessing, Nuclear Proliferation, and Terrorism, 15 April, http://www.gemarsh.com/wpcontent/uploads/Recycling_APS_07.pdf. Accessed 7/15/08] Nuclear power will be rapidly expanding worldwide for the foreseeable future—and plans and policies announced by China, India, Japan, France, and other nations make it clear that recycle of nuclear fuel will be a growing part of the picture. The growth of nuclear power will displace much of the demand for fossil resources, and will relieve much of the concern over release of CO2 to the atmosphere. However, the growing use of nuclear power around the world contains the prospect of de facto acceptance of PUREX type reprocessing. The French model is considered to be successful—it allows distinct waste management advantages in terms of engineered waste forms, a modest resource extension, and at least a partial recovery of waste management costs from plutonium recycle. However, it will lead to expanded inventories of and commerce in separated plutonium, complicating the already challenging safeguards problem.

US leadership on advancing IFR technology is key to preventing proliferation-prone conventional fuel recycling techniques from being employed internationally. Hannum, Marsh and Stanford 07 [William H, Gerald E, and George S. Stanford is a renowned nuclear
physicist recognized for his work on the IFR. “Recycling Nuclear Waste.” American Physical Society Special Session on Nuclear Reprocessing, Nuclear Proliferation, and Terrorism, 15 April, http://www.gemarsh.com/wpcontent/uploads/Recycling_APS_07.pdf. Accessed 7/15/08] The choice facing us in the United States is stark: participate or not. Our country is still the single most important economy, and continues to have by far the most important political voice in the world. We need to be a leader both in the technology of nuclear power, and in the diplomatic initiatives to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. None of the international structures set up since WW-II would exist if it were not for the United States. Without strong U.S. participation, the needed international structures will not be developed, and the unrestricted spread of technology that can be subverted to bombmaking is assured. Widespread nuclear power—properly managed, and made feasible by the advent of effective recycle technology—will provide a major economic benefit, will have a huge, positive environmental impact, and will be a major part of a successful counter-proliferation strategy.

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20 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

If America fails to go nuclear, it will lose political and technological competitiveness to address issues such as proliferation and climate change. Campbell - President of American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness, Energy Strategies International, LLC, Former Director, Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis, U.S. Department of Energy 2006
(Scott L., Remarks, “The Nuclear Renaissance Seizing the Historic moment”, http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/images/ANS_Remarks_Nov_2006_Campbell.pdf) 7/17/08 by Au-Yeung

Does it matter if American companies are no longer in the nuclear business?
In short, it matters greatly…because nations that are engaged in the nuclear energy business sit at the nonproliferation table, have the technology to address global climate change, have the keys to combating global poverty and failed states, and hold the catalyst to advances in science and technology. Having American companies competing in the global nuclear energy market will deliver more revenue and better paying jobs to America, and will, thus, help improve American competitiveness. It’s no secret that nuclear power in the United States was almost knocked out by its opponents. No orders for new nuclear plants have been made for thirty years. U.S. companies that once dominated the design and manufacture of nuclear reactors have largely disappeared or been sold to foreign companies. Former administrations halted reprocessing and eventually cut nuclear R&D funding to zero. Increasingly, the U.S. has been out of the nuclear game and now it is largely in the hands of foreign, state owned or directed companies. While the United States argued about its nuclear future (and that argument finally has turned markedly pro-nuclear recently), the rest of the world recognized nuclear energy’s benefits and moved aggressively forward. We see this in France, Japan, Russia and China. Countries all across the globe are looking to expand their use of nuclear energy and this is, of course, an exciting development. But the United States can’t flounder in indecision and inaction anymore. The world is going nuclear and we must too or fall sadly, irrevocably behind.

Engaging in the nuclear industry and its related arena will promote U.S. leadership. Spencer – staff writer for the Heritage Foundation, Research Fellow, Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic
Policy Studies, experts on Ballistic and Theater Missile Defense, National Security, Energy Security, and Nuclear Energy – 2007 (Jack, The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/wm1658.cfm) 7/17/2008 by Au-Yeung Many nations are waiting to join the CSC until the United States joins. Without U.S. participation, CSC would be meaningless, since 104 of the world's approximately 440 power reactors operate within the United States. Failure to engage in the commercial nuclear market risks undermining U.S. leadership on related issues, such as nonproliferation. Other nations will simply work amongst themselves to achieve their nuclear objectives. Countries such as Russia, France, and China will fill the policymaking void left by the United States. The United States once led the world in commercial nuclear technology but has ceded that capability to countries such as France, Japan, Great Britain, and Russia over the past three decades. A more competitive American industry would provide opportunities for the United States to re-emerge as a leader in the global commercial nuclear market. Furthermore, CSC implementation will signal that the U.S. government is committed to the expansion of nuclear power. This commitment by the federal government is essential to attracting the massive private investment required to rebuild the domestic capabilities needed to support America's growing commercial nuclear activities.

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21 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Global nuclear efforts still focused on PUREX – US pyroprocessing leadership needed Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William H, Gerald, and George – nuclear physicists retired from Argonne Nat’l Laboratory, Scientific American, December, http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0512hannum.pdf] Both India and China have recently announced that they plan to extend their energy resources by deploying fast reactors. We understand that their first fast reactors will use oxide or carbide fuel rather than metal-a less than optimum path, chosen presumably because the PUREX reprocessing technology is mature, whereas pyroprocessing has not yet been commercially demonstrated. It is not too soon for the U.S. to complete the basic development of the fast reactor pyroprocessing system for metallic fuel. For the foreseeable future, the hard truth is this: only nuclear power can satisfy humanity's long-term energy needs while preserving the environment. For large-scale, sustainable nuclear energy production to continue, the supply of nuclear fuel must last a long time. That means that the nuclear power cycle must have the characteristics of the ALMR and pyroprocessing. The time seems right to take this new course toward sensible energy development. US will be modeled Stanford 06 [George, PhD, retired nuclear physicist, interview with Ann Curtis, August 8,
http://www.cross-x.com/vb/showthread.php?s=1ad707180b7b85158aece8f58d80116a&p=1600390#post1600390]

6. If the US were to embrace the IFR, would other countries follow the lead? Only if the U.S.-developed technology were shown convincingly to be superior (which I think it is). Already India, China, France, Japan, and other countries are proceeding with their own development programs. We abandoned leadership in the field with the termination of the IFR program in 1994, and are now starting to feel the consequences.

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22 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Energy Independence critical to restoring US Hegemony Di Stefano 7/11/08 [George, founder – Capital Source Partners, http://www.ecommercetimes.com/rsstory/63695.html?welcome=1216317401] It's hard for us Americans to understand that we no longer have the hegemony -- the clout -- that we once had throughout the world. This means that we must absolutely readjust our energy goals to take this loss of clout into effect. Therefore, the need for us to take alternative energy sources more seriously is absolutely critical, if for no other reason than our national security. The U.S. needs to be a leader in nuclear technologies. Watson 08 (Ben, BS from UC Irvine and a doctorate at Georgia Tech's interdisciplinary GVU Center/Senior
member, IEEE, http://www.philosophicalgeek.com/2008/05/23/we-need-more-growth-of-nuclear-power/, July 17 08) Nuclear power has gotten a bad rap in the US and other parts of the world for a long time. I think the attitudes are changing, but not quickly enough. At what point will the benefits outweigh the risks in most minds? I think that point is almost upon us. We can’t wait for others to do these things–we need to do them. Our country needs to get in on the act at a higher level of commitment than ever. We can’t wait for these technologies to become perfected, either–that will happen over time. As we use a technology more, we will learn new techniques, ways to improve efficiency, and how to lower costs further. There is no excuse for the US not to be a leader in this area–we have one of the largest energy demands, the most capital, the most to gain by investing in it, and the most to lose by not doing it.

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23 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Energy key to US and global competitiveness Owens 08 [ Jim, Chairman and CEO of Caterpillar <http://www.compete.org/news/entry/513/presidential-candidates-urged-to-discuss-questionskey-to-us-energy-securit1/> 7/17/08- date accessed]
WASHINGTON—As the 2008 presidential campaign shifts to the general election, a coalition of business, labor and university leaders dedicated to boosting American economic growth and prosperity have renewed their call for the presidential candidates to discuss how each would advance a comprehensive strategy for global energy security, productivity and sustainability. The effort is a part of the Council on Competitiveness initiative on Energy Security, Innovation & Sustainability (ESIS). Though finding solutions to the energy challenge is fundamental to the economic and national security of the United States, ESIS leaders noted

If the United States is to remain competitive, we know that we must secure access to adequate energy supplies, increase the nation’s energy productivity, maximize the economic value of each unit of energy consumed, and minimize the environmental impact of energy choices. Yet there
that, during the campaign to date, there has not been a commensurate intensive focus on a comprehensive energy policy. has been comparatively little discussion about the role of government in creating the environment for progress toward global energy security. Likewise, there has been limited debate about how to create the conditions necessary to stimulate innovation in the energy arena, nor about how to ensure an energy workforce adequate to meet the needs of the 21st century. ESIS leaders have urged a focus on three key questions for the presidential candidates: As president, what will be the first steps you will take to advance a comprehensive energy security and sustainability strategy for the United States? What federal policies would you put into place to create the conditions necessary to stimulate U.S. energy innovation, including enhancing energy productivity to get the maximum economic value out of each unit of energy consumed? What steps would you take to ensure that the United States has the energy workforce necessary for the 21st century?

As ESIS leaders point out, energy security cannot be achieved without a comprehensive national strategy. This certainly includes reducing U.S. dependence on foreign oil, but an energy
strategy must encompass more. Redundancy of supply and diversity of source are essential if the United States is not to be overly dependent on any one energy source or supplier in the marketplace. The match-up of appropriate energy source to sector of use must be optimized—whether supplying energy to heat homes, transport goods, light cities or power business enterprises. Each of these elements must be supported by innovation: technological innovation, policy innovation and innovative global collaboration. Recognizing the urgency of the 21st century energy challenge, the Council launched the ESIS Initiative in 2007. The Initiative provides a privatesector-led forum to drive sustainable energy solutions and to enhance U.S. energy security and global competitiveness. The ESIS Initiative co-chairs are James Owens, chairman & CEO of Caterpillar Inc., Shirley Ann Jackson, Ph.D., president of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and Michael Langford, national president of the Utility Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO. Deborah Wince-Smith is president of the Council on Competitiveness. In February they released the first report, Define. The Energy–Competitiveness Relationship, based on a dialogue among leaders from business, labor, and academia. Each of the co-chairs have added their perspective on the urgency of the energy security challenge: James Owens, chairman & CEO of Caterpillar: “The private sector recognizes the opportunities and challenges presented by current energy use, and we’re moving to secure the benefits of a new energy future today.”

our way out of this problem, we must innovate our way out. The exponential demand for energy worldwide—and the link to climate change—presents extraordinary geopolitical challenges and offers extraordinary economic opportunities, magnifying the need for a comprehensive energy roadmap. This nation has a tremendous capacity to rise to great challenges, but it will require strong national leadership to spark a new generation of innovation to put us on the pathway to global energy security and sustainability.”
Shirley Ann Jackson, president of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute: “We cannot just drill Michael Langford, national president of the Utility Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO: “America’s workforce is the critical underpinning of our energy system. Our investments in technology and infrastructure must be matched by investments in training and education.” And, from Deborah Wince-Smith, president of the Council:

“Energy is the cornerstone of U.S. productivity and global competitiveness—and this has not been adequately articulated in the presidential campaign thus far, even though this will be one of the central challenges the next administration must face.”

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Hester / Bormann / Stevenson Alternative energy is essential for nations go gain power

24 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Salazar 07 [Ken, US Senator, <http://www.asianinfo.org/asianinfo/issues/gogreen.htm> 7/17/08- date accessed]
The world is moving into a new era, the Go Green Revolution (GGR). This means that everyone, not only environmental activists, has to go green because of the earth's current global warming and rising seas. Environmental changes are not only damaging to our economy, but are now to the point of threatening human life itself. It is no longer acceptable to solely use fossil fuels to run the economy while damaging the environment.Many countries now realize there is a problem and are actively trying to change their economic system to become more earth friendly. Germany is an example of this, they have placed a cap on their CO2 emissions to reduce their greenhouse gas contribution. In Brazil, they have taken charge and started the process of changing to ethanol. They have already changed 40% of their fuel to ethanol, so they are no longer dependant on foreign imported oils.In the United States, the Bush administration has in the past five years been spending 29 billion dollars in research and development of renewable energy sources and energy tax incentives. What is more interesting is that Congress and the Senate are both controlled by the Democratic Party. This is significant in that there is a presidential election next year and if a Democrat wins the presidency, there will be a huge shift toward green energy policies. The Democratic Party has many environmental supporters. It’s also possible that there could be more pressure put on the oil and gas companies to invest in renewable energy sources. If this were to happen, it's possible a tremendous amount of money would be invested in renewable sources of energy.Americans, in general, already acknowledge failure with the Iraq War. They are realizing more and more their dependence on oil and that they must change to renewable sources of energy. After a new administration is brought in, many countries will have to change their energy policies if the U.S. decides to join the Kyoto treaty with the condition that all developing nations join (including China and India).The United Nation's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) already warns us of the seriousness of global warming. Dr. Achim Steiner, Exec. Direc UN Environmental Program, says that “It matters whether or not you are born in Africa…..societies are affected in different ways.” No longer is there debate about our direct involvement in global warming. We, humans, are responsible for the warming of the earth and all nations accept this result without doubt. How does this global change affect us? It's very clear that our future has to change dramatically soon. This is bad news for those nations that are not prepared. The future

competitiveness of a nation depends on its energy security. Whoever develops the initial green energy source, will elevate their nation to become a major power in the future. A new revolution means new opportunities for all industrial nations. It can be solar, wind, water, biomass, or any type of renewable energy source for all different nations. It is a matter of survival and the fittest will come out on top with innovative energy developments. The 19th century had the Industrial Revolution, the 20th century had the IT revolution and now the Go Green Revolution is for the 21st century.

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25 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

The US must become the leaders in the nuclear energy industry to reclaim leadership Baker 08 [Howard, co-chairman American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness, <http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/aboutthecouncil.html> 7/17/08- date accessed]
Nuclear energy is a carbon-free energy resource which can provide energy security for generations to come. Thus far much of the support for new nuclear build has centered on the substantial environmental benefits offered by nuclear energy. This is important, but it’s not the whole story. What has been missing from the discussion is a recognition of potential economic and national security benefits that can accrue if the U.S. recaptures a large share of the nuclear manufacturing business. The United States greatly benefited from an initial wave of commercial nuclear power plant construction from the 1970s to the early 1990s. At that time, U.S. firms dominated the global market. The renewed interest in the global use of nuclear energy represents a perishable opportunity for U.S. industry to reclaim its nuclear energy leadership. In the ever-expanding global markets, it is essential that a reinvigorated U.S. industry be able to compete and supply nuclear energy systems at home and abroad from a dominant, preferred supplier position. A nuclear energy revival is long overdue. In order for the United States to prosper we can not become complacent and view
the growth of the nuclear industry as “business-as-usual.” The Unites States invented nuclear energy, and unless the domestic outlook for nuclear energy design, manufacturing, service and supply improves, our country will have to buy the bulk of its nuclear technology from overseas and forgo multibillion-dollar opportunities. Therefore, the Council is working to promote a revived domestic nuclear design, manufacturing, service and supply industry that will result in: the creation or retention of American jobs and factories; improved American economic competitiveness and shareholder returns; and greater leverage for the U.S. in dealing with global proliferation concerns. Nuclear energy represents not just business opportunities but employment opportunity — more than one million jobs could be

created in the United States if American firms capture a significant share of the growing global nuclear energy market.
The Council also encourages policymakers to pay close attention to the ability of the U.S. educational system to meet the anticipated demand for reactor designers and operators, as well as the trained construction, manufacturing, and maintenance workers who will be needed to build, operate, and service new nuclear plants in the U.S. The Council encourages greater education on these issues along with a restoration of American leadership in nuclear energy--urging our nation’s political, industry, financial and labor leaders to adapt and support policies and programs that will help ensure America’s nuclear leadership is restored.

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26 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Global Nuclear Competitiveness
US COMPETITIVENESS WILL BE IMPAIRED IF AMERICAN COMPANIES CANNOT DEVEILOP NUCLEAR POWER
ACGNC 6 [The American

Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness, http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/documents.html : Council Position on the Proposed US/Russian 123 Agreement, accessed July 17, 2008] December 2006 A global nuclear renaissance is underway. Many billions, even trillions of dollars will be spent on nuclear energy products and services over the coming decades. The American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness believes that U.S. economic competitiveness and national security will be impaired if American companies fail to become leading suppliers in this rapidly growing market.The President and Congress have taken bold steps to dramatically improve the outlook for nuclear energy in the U.S. Construction of new nuclear power plants now enjoys broad, bi-partisan support. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 contains a variety of incentives – including loan guarantees, production tax incentives, and risk insurance – to promote the construction of new plants in the U.S. Over the next few years, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission expects to receive applications for construction of as many as thirty or more new reactors. The U.S. is not alone in planning a widespread expansion in its use of nuclear energy. Countries such as China, India, and many others are looking to nuclear energy as a way of meeting growing electricity demand while holding down emissions from the burning of fossil fuels. According to the World Nuclear Association, there are 250 reactors under construction, on order, planned, or proposed for construction across the globe

NUCLEAR ENERGY CAN BRING BILLIONS OF DOLLARS AND HIGH-PAYING JOBS INTO THE US
ACGNC 6 [The American

Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness, http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/documents.html : Council Position on the Proposed US/Russian 123 Agreement, accessed July 17, 2008] December 2006 Nuclear energy represents a multi-billion dollar business opportunity that the U.S. can either seize or squander. The ongoing nuclear renaissance offers the promise of stimulating our plant design and engineering and heavy manufacturing sectors and restoring U.S. leadership in global nuclear energy markets. Many billions of dollars in revenue and hundreds of thousands of high-paying jobs could be created in the U.S. if American firms capture a significant share of the growing U.S. and global nuclear energy markets. This is not just speculation. The initial wave of commercial nuclear power plant construction, which peaked in the 1970’s and 1980’s, resulted in more than 400 plants being built across the globe. These plants generate about 16 percent of the world’s electricity without emitting air pollutants or greenhouse gases. U.S. firms dominated this global market. From reactor design to fuel and component fabrication to plant construction and service, U.S. firms led the way. The U.S. also dominated the market for enriched uranium, which was supplied by two U.S.-owned enrichment plants. The Council is preparing an assessment of these economic and employment benefits. Based on our preliminary findings, we believe the rebirth of a robust nuclear construction and manufacturing industry in the U.S. could result in the creation of more than one million American jobs. This figure could – and almost certainly would – be even higher as rejuvenated U.S. firms secured contracts to supply American-made nuclear products and services across the globe.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Hester / Bormann / Stevenson

27 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

In order to advance its nonproliferation agenda, the US must increase nuclear plant orders, maintain itself as a global supplier, continue nuclear R&D, and resolve the issue of nuclear waste. Bengelsdorf & McGoldrick 07 [Harold D. Bengelsdorf, consultant, formerly held top positions with US Atomic Energy
Commission, US Department of Energy, former Senior office director in the Department of State for dealing with international nuclear and non-proliferation negotiations, and Fred McGoldrick, principal associate in global consulting firm Bengelsdorf, McGoldrick and Associates, LLC. Has held senior positions in the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency. THE U.S. DOMESTIC CIVIL NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE AND U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY. May 2007. American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness. <http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/images/COUNCIL_WHITE_PAPER_Final.pdf> Accessed: July 17, 2008 4:50 PM]

The U.S. has and should continue to be able to influence the nonproliferation regime as a superpower in the years ahead. However, a policy that significantly strengthens the U.S. civil nuclear infrastructure will not only help the United States to build new nuclear power plants, but will also enhance its ability to advance its nonproliferation agenda. The U.S. will need to actively pursue several key objectives [1.] New Nuclear Plant Orders Consumer countries are likely to turn for support and assistance to those states possessing the most vigorous domestic nuclear power programs that are placing new power plant orders, extending international fuel cycle services, and maintaining leadership roles in supporting innovative improvements in advanced technologies. This suggests that the influence of the United States internationally could be enhanced significantly if the U.S. is able to achieve success in its Nuclear Power 2010 program and place several new orders in the next decade and beyond. Conversely, if the 2010 initiative falters, or if U.S. companies only are given subordinate roles
in processing new plant orders, then this can only further weaken the U.S. nuclear infrastructure as well as the stature of the U.S. in the international nuclear community. Experts believe that the U.S. nuclear infrastructure is capable of sustaining the goals of the 2010 program, but this will require the resolution of a number of formidable problems, including arrangements for the acquisition of long lead time components and coping with anticipated shortages of experienced personnel. [2.] Maintaining the U.S. as a Significant Global Supplier The

health of the U.S. civil nuclear infrastructure will also be crucial to the success of U.S. efforts to play a significant role as a nuclear supplier and to advance its nonproliferation objectives. There is [an] clear and compelling upsurge of interest in nuclear power in various parts of the world that is independent of U.S. policy and prerogatives. As a consequence, if the U.S. aspires to participate in these programs and to shape them in ways that are most conducive to nonproliferation, it will need to promote the health and viability of the American nuclear infrastructure. Perhaps more importantly, if it wishes to exert a positive influence in shaping the nonproliferation policies of other countries, it can do so more effectively by being an active supplier to and partner in the evolution of those programs. Concurrent with the prospective growth in the use of nuclear
power, the global nonproliferation regime is facing some direct assaults that are unprecedented in nature. International confidence in the effectiveness of nuclear export controls was shaken by the disclosures of the nuclear operations of A.Q. Khan. These developments underscore the importance of maintaining the greatest integrity and effectiveness of the nuclear export conditions applied by the major suppliers. They also underscore the importance of the U.S. maintaining effective policies to achieve these objectives. Constructive U.S. influence will be best achieved to the extent that the U.S. is perceived as a major technological leader, supplier and partner in the field of nuclear technology. As the sole superpower, the U.S. will have considerable, on-going influence on the international nonproliferation regime, regardless of how active and successful it is in the nuclear export market. However, if the U.S. nuclear infrastructure continues to erode, it will weaken the ability of the U.S. to participate actively in the international nuclear market. If the U.S. becomes more dependent on foreign nuclear suppliers or if it leaves the international nuclear market to other suppliers, the ability of the U.S. to influence nonproliferation policy will diminish. It is, therefore, essential that the United States have vibrant nuclear reactor, uranium enrichment, and spent fuel storage and disposal industries that can not only meet the needs of U.S. utilities but will also enable the United States to promote effective safeguards and other nonproliferation controls through close peaceful nuclear cooperation other countries. The U.S. should establish a high priority goal to rebuild an indigenous

nuclear industry and support its growth in domestic and international markets. U.S. nuclear exports can be used to influence other states’ nuclear programs through the nonproliferation commitments that the U.S. requires. The U.S. has so-called consent rights over the enrichment, reprocessing and alteration in form or content of the nuclear materials that it has provided to other countries, as well as to the nuclear materials that are produced from the nuclear materials and equipment that the U.S. has supplied. The percentage of nuclear materials, including separated plutonium, that are subject to U.S. consent rights will diminish over time as new suppliers of nuclear materials and facilities take a larger share of the international nuclear market. Unless the U.S. is able to compete effectively in the international market as a supplier of nuclear fuels, equipment and technology, the quantity of the nuclear materials around the globe that the U.S. has control over will diminish significantly in the future. This may not immediately weaken the effectiveness of the nonproliferation regime since all the major
suppliers have adopted the export guidelines of the Nuclear Supplier Group. However, only the U.S., Australia and Canada have consent rights over enrichment and reprocessing of the nuclear materials subject to their agreements. Consequently

, if there is a major decline in the U.S. share of the international nuclear market, the U.S. may not be as effective as it has been in helping to ensure a rigorous system of export controls. ↓ CONTINUTED BELOW, NO TEXT REMOVED ↓

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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28 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

↓ CONTINUED FROM ABOVE, NO TEXT REMOVED ↓ [3.] Nuclear R&D Further, the revitalization of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure will depend on the U.S. ability to provide sustained bipartisan support for nuclear R&D programs in order that they can be sustained from one
administration to another. The ability of the United States to continue to make significant contributions to the improvement of safeguards, physical protection and proliferation resistance of nuclear systems is dependent, at least in part, on the continued health of the U.S. technological base. This assumes close collaboration between industry and the national laboratories, which could be increased through greater use of Cooperative Agreements between U.S. firms and national laboratories. GNEP contains some important new ideas that could advance U.S. nonproliferation objectives. Envisioned within both GNEP and the U.S.-led Generation IV Initiative is the development and deployment of nextgeneration nuclear power plant designs that, if completed, could help restore a U.S. competitive edge in nuclear system supply. As the U.S.

Government expends taxpayer funds on the Nuclear Power 2010 program, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, the Generation IV initiative and other programs, it should consider the benefit to the U.S. industrial base and the benefit to U.S. non-proliferation posture as criteria in project design and selection where possible. [4.] Importance of Resolving the Nuclear Waste Issue In this connection, one the of the most severe challenges facing the nonproliferation regime in the years ahead is to prevent the spread of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as enrichment and reprocessing plants. The goal of establishing fuel leasing or cradle-tograve programs by the U.S. is an important component of GNEP, and, if achieved, it could prove to be far more effective than other approaches in discouraging the spread of enrichment and reprocessing facilities. The countries that are likely to have the greatest interest in a cradle-to-grave program will be those with small or modest-size nuclear power programs that would likely face serious technical, economic and political problems in managing their spent fuel or disposing of their nuclear wastes. The ability of the United States to offer nuclear fuel leasing or cradleto grave fuel cycle services to other states on a broad basis faces formidable hurdles. The U.S. Government is already in breach of

its contract with domestic owners and operators of nuclear power plants to have begun acceptance of their commercial spent nuclear fuel in 1998 in fulfillment of its obligations under the National Waste Policy Act. The Yucca Mountain Project continues to face formidable legal, regulatory and budgetary obstacles that must be overcome if spent fuel is ever to be shipped to that site for disposal. In addition, the statutory limit that was established by
Congress of 70,000 metric tons of uranium for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository is significantly less than the amount of spent fuel that will be discharged by the nuclear power plants that are presently operating in the U.S. during their lifetimes. Materially reducing the

volume of waste that will have to be disposed of in the U.S. has been one of the major motivating forces behind the R&D objectives of GNEP to develop new advanced closed fuel cycles. However, even though Yucca
Mountain may have the physical capacity to store more than 130,000 tons of spent fuel, Congress must take a separate action to authorize it to go beyond its present statutory limit. Aside from capacity limits, there remain numerous legal, technical and regulatory issues that must be resolved before the Yucca Mountain repository will become operational even for domestic spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste. In the absence of legislative changes by Congress, the present statutory capacity of Yucca Mountain will be fully utilized to accommodate domestic civilian and government spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste. All this suggests that the ability of the United States

to resolve its own difficulties in managing its spent fuel and nuclear wastes will be crucial to maintaining the credibility of the U.S. nuclear power program and will be vital to implementing important new nonproliferation initiatives designed to discourage the spread of sensitive nuclear facilities to other countries.

Inherenccy – Lack of Incentives for FR causing US to fall behind in global energy policy Lightfoot, et al 2006 [H Douglas, Global Environmental Climate Change Center; Wallace Manheimer, Naval Research Lab; Daniel Meneley, Engineer Emeritus, AECL; George Stanford, Argonne Nat’l Lab; September 12, “Nuclear Fission Fuel is Inexhaustible,” http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0609lightfoot.pdf] If fast reactors have such a large fuel economy advantage over thermal reactors, why are there not more fast reactors in use today? The answer has three parts. First, uranium is so inexpensive today that there is little incentive to use it more fuel efficiently, and storage of the unused uranium and other nuclear waste is manageable in the short term. Second, thermal reactors were first to be introduced commercially and have been continually improved. And third, in the early 1990s energy supply was perceived to be secure and the Integrated Fast Reactor Program at Argonne National Laboratory in the U.S. was cancelled in 1994 [r¡ll, 2005]. It was considered the most advanced fast reactor research program in the world at that time. Concern about secure energy supply is now generating renewed interest in developing modern, commercially available fast reactors. For example, in order to extend their nuclear energy resources, India [Rodriguez, 2000] and China recently declared that they will invest heavily in fast reactors, as will Japan.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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29 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

In order to effectively support international non-proliferation, the US must work to protect its civilian nuclear power industry. Bengelsdorf & McGoldrick 07 [Harold D. Bengelsdorf, consultant, formerly
held top positions with US Atomic Energy Commission, US Department of Energy, former Senior office director in the Department of State for dealing with international nuclear and non-proliferation negotiations, and Fred McGoldrick, principal associate in global consulting firm Bengelsdorf, McGoldrick and Associates, LLC. Has held senior positions in the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency. THE U.S. DOMESTIC CIVIL NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE AND U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY. May 2007. American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness. <http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/images/COUNCIL_WHITE_PAPER_Final.pdf> Accessed: July 17, 2008 4:50 PM]

In summary, the U.S. has historically played a key role in the evolution of the international nonproliferation regime. This has involved participation in a wide range of activities, including support of the IAEA safeguards system and the NPT. Over the years the U.S. has also worked hard to (i) strengthen the nuclear export controls of all supplier states, (ii) promote the effective protection of nuclear materials and facilities, (iii) constrain the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies, and (iv) incorporate guarantees and consent rights in its agreements for cooperation concerning the civil uses of nuclear energy. Presently, the U.S. continues to be at the forefront in meeting the challenges facing the nonproliferation regime. It has, among other things, worked with the UK and the IAEA to persuade Libya to dismantle its programs of weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. has also collaborated with its European allies as well as Russia and the PRC in crafting UN Security Council resolutions that imposed sanctions on Iran and called upon that government’s leaders to suspend its sensitive nuclear activities. At the same time the U.S. has supported the diplomatic efforts of the European Union and others to offer Iran economic and energy incentives if Tehran agrees to forego its enrichment and reprocessing activities and the construction of its heavy water production reactor. The United States worked with the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (i.e., South Korea) to persuade the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (i.e., North Korea) to freeze its nuclear activities and to allow IAEA inspectors into North Korea in return for energy and economic assistance. The U.S. also led initiatives to provide the states of the former Soviet Union with financial and technical assistance in strengthening the material accountancy, control and protection measures of nuclear weapons and materials at risk. If the United States hopes to continue to exercise strong and specific influence internationally in nonproliferation matters in the future, it can best achieve this objective by remaining an active player in international nuclear affairs by providing advanced nuclear power systems, uranium enrichment services and nuclear fuel to other countries; and by maintaining its ability to develop and apply advanced nuclear technologies. A revival of nuclear power in the United States with new nuclear power plant orders should greatly help enhance U.S. power and influence in international nuclear affairs, but we must also seek to once again be a major supplier of nuclear power technology and equipment world-wide. Conversely, if the U.S. nuclear power program starts to diminish significantly through the retirement of old nuclear power plants without new replacements, then its voice in civil nuclear matters and nonproliferation will decline internationally, even though the U.S. may remain a superpower on the political level. It is easy to exaggerate the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation associated with the use of civil nuclear power programs and peaceful nuclear cooperation. States with civil nuclear power programs could divert nuclear material to nuclear weapons; they could exploit a civil nuclear power program as a cover for acquiring materials, equipment and technology for a nuclear weapons program; they could also try to use peaceful nuclear cooperation as a means of acquiring skills for developing nuclear weapons. There have been instances in which states have misused civil nuclear programs and peaceful nuclear cooperation in these ways. However, these abuses of peaceful nuclear power programs have been few in number, while the vast majority of states have adhered faithfully to their nonproliferation obligations.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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30 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Energy Leadership Good
US nuclear energy leadership will improve the economy and stop proliferation American Council on Global Nuclear Competiveness, 08 [http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/,
07/17/08] A nuclear energy revival is long overdue. In order for the United States to prosper we can not become complacent and view the growth of the nuclear industry as “business-as-usual.” The Unites States invented nuclear energy, and unless the domestic outlook for nuclear energy design, manufacturing, service and supply improves, our country will have to buy the bulk of its nuclear technology from overseas and forgo multibillion-dollar opportunities. Therefore, the Council is working to promote a revived domestic nuclear design, manufacturing, service and supply industry that will result in: the creation or retention of American jobs and factories; improved American economic competitiveness and shareholder returns; and greater leverage for the U.S. in dealing with global proliferation concerns. Nuclear energy represents not just business opportunities but employment opportunity — more than one million jobs could be created in the United States if American firms capture a significant share of the growing global nuclear energy market.

US energy leadership is key to solve for economic environmental and security threats around the world Brown 06 [ Charles J., The Republican Eagle/ Citizens for Global solutions, http://www.globalsolutio
ns.org/in_the_news/news_we_need_energy_leadership_not_energy_isolationism, 07/17/08] The real issue is not whether we can end our dependence on imported oil, but rather whether we can reverse the disastrous global economic, environmental and security consequences of the world’s continued reliance on carbon-producing forms of energy. To do so will require seeking freedom from fossil fuels, not just for the U.S., but for the world. As the world’s largest consumer of energy, we have both a unique opportunity and a real responsibility to shape the world’s energy future. We should be pushing the world to work together to make the transition to new technologies. We should be calling for new international mechanisms that can help us face the challenge of climate change without leaving the world’s poor behind. Imagine what would have happened 65 years ago if, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt had announced that our response would be to isolate ourselves from the rest of the world. Today, the challenge may not be as immediate or as stark, but the potential damage could be as great. If we pursue a policy of energy isolationism, saving ourselves at the cost of the suffering of others, we will only increase our vulnerability to the very dangers we hope to avoid. Like a child closing his bedroom door to keep the monsters out, we will find that we are alone in the dark, and the monsters are still under the bed.

US energy leadership will spread alternate energy across the globe and improve the economy and foreign policy Brown 06 [ Charles J., The Republican Eagle/ Citizens for Global solutions, http://www.globalsolutio
ns.org/in_the_news/news_we_need_energy_leadership_not_energy_isolationism, 07/17/08] If the United States stopped importing oil tomorrow, conflicts over oil wouldn’t end. Billions of people would still struggle to get by without electricity. Global competition for limited resources would still be a major challenge. The rest of the world would remain addicted to oil. And neither our economy nor what passes as our foreign policy these days would be freed from oil’s pernicious influence. Ending our dependence on foreign oil will do nothing to stop global warming. For governments whose citizens are living in poverty, economic development — most likely fueled by oil and coal — remains their top priority. If the United States turns inward for its energy solutions, we would do nothing to help these governments avoid the same mistakes we’ve made. And we would do nothing to prevent new greenhouse gas emissions or pollution that such fossil fuel-driven development generate. For far too long, the United States has abdicated its leadership on climate change. We need our government to be a shining example for the rest of the world, not only cutting our own emissions but also helping to design international norms that everyone can support. Doing so will make it much more likely that other governments will follow our lead — especially if we share the technologies that will allow their economies to grow without putting either the environment or their own citizens’ health at risk.

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31 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Substantial Incentives can restore US nuclear leadership ACGNC ’07 [American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness, “An Assessment of the Economic, Employment, Environmental and National Security Benefits of New Nuclear Facility Construction in the USA,” http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/documents.html] A restoration of American leadership in nuclear energy is clearly in the economic interests of our country. We urge our nation’s political, industry, financial, and labor leaders to adapt and support policies and programs that will help ensure America’s nuclear leadership is restored. Recommendations To help reap the benefits set forth in the Oxford Economics report, the American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness [we] makes the following recommendations:

Congress should recognize the contributions that nuclear energy can make to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution, and should not discriminate against nuclear energy when enacting policies designed to address global warming; The Administration should make an expressed commitment to restore the competitive position of the U.S. nuclear industry. DOE should consider the health of the domestic industry when deciding how to allocate funding for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, Nuclear Power 2010, the Next Generation Nuclear Plant and other programs; and DOE should ensure that loan guarantee program rules allow applications by projects beyond new reactors that will restore the domestic nuclear energy design, manufacturing, service and supply industry.

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32 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Till, 1997 [Dr. Charles, nuclear physicist, Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/interviews/till.html] Q: What about the rest of the world? What will it do for energy? A: Well, parts of the rest of the world are very much powered by nuclear electricity today. France, of course, is the principal example. But all of the Western European countries. Japan will continue an orderly increase in the amount of nuclear power. There's no question about that. There will be a tremendous increase in China and in Asia of both the use of coal and the use of nuclear energy. I hope that most of it's nuclear. Q: So the United States economically, by foreclosing the nuclear future, will foreclose that part of its economic policy too, its economic competition. A: I think that this policy will have unintended consequences that will be serious. But I recognize also that any man's opinion is as good as anyone else's on that. But one thing sure is that nuclear energy is going to be needed, is needed today as an energy source. It will be developed around the world. It will be developed by highly intelligent people, every bit as intelligent as we are. They will make the intelligent choices. They will develop the forms of nuclear energy that are best. Our nation will be best served by trying to lead, in my view, or at least be a responsible part of it. I think that best serves the interest. U.S. rejection of plutonium fuel has reduced its global nuclear hegemony Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy
Division, and Zachary S., International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08] A counter-argument is that U.S. rejection of plutonium fuel has diminished its nuclear nonproliferation influence throughout the world. Gregg Renkes, majority staff director of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, believes that the U.S. policy not to reprocess is anachronistic and detrimental to American interests. In a panel discussion before the American Nuclear Society he argued:

U.S. modeling won’t solve because we do not have technological authority Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy
Division, and Zachary S., International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08] U.S. non-proliferation policy is not having an impact on nuclear programs in other nations.... The rest of the world will not turn away from plutonium as an energy source. Reprocessing is an international fact; the U.S. policy has simply not worked. What is worse is that reduced involvement in the technology reduces the impact the U.S. can have on international control regimes and nonproliferation technology development.

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33 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

International Cooperation
US has already committed to develop FR prototype US DOE 08 [US Federal News Service, Feb 1, US DOE news release] The U.S Department of Energy (DOE), the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) and Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) today expanded cooperation to coordinate Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor Prototype development through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by DOE Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy Dennis R. Spurgeon, CEA Chairman Alain Bugat and JAEA President Toshio Okazaki. The MOU establishes a collaborative framework with the ultimate goal of deploying sodium-cooled fast reactor prototypes. A sodium-cooled fast reactor uses liquid sodium to transfer heat, burning the plutonium and other transuranic elements in the process producing clean, safe nuclear power, less waste and increasing non-proliferation goals. The U.S., France and Japan currently cooperate within the framework of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) which seeks to expand the use of clean and affordable nuclear energy, as well as in the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) which furthers the research and development of future nuclear energy systems. The sodium-cooled fast reactor technology is one of the most advanced nuclear technologies being researched to date and could potentially be used as an advanced recycling reactor, one of the key components of GNEP. A prototype reactor is the first step to demonstrate the feasibility of the sodium-cooled fast reactor technology to accomplish GNEP objectives and to test advanced technologies that would allow these reactors to be built and operated by private industry on a large scale. US DOE 08 [US Federal News Service, Feb 1, US DOE news release] "This MOU supports the nuclear expansion and non-proliferation goals of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership by expanding the signatory parties' cooperation on a technology that has shown great promise for the next generation of nuclear reactors", said Assistant Secretary Dennis Spurgeon. "This agreement highlights the continued cooperation between the United States, France and Japan in expanding civilian nuclear energy in a safe, secure and environmentally sustainable manner."The three countries will work together to establish design goals and highlevel requirements for sodium-cooled fast reactor prototypes; identify common safety principles and key technical innovations to reduce capital, operating and maintenance costs. This cooperation will enable important discussion on power levels, reactor types, fuel types and an appropriate timetable for the potential deployment of prototype facilities. In addition, the participants plan to pursue joint infrastructure development activities to leverage existing, refurbished and new facilities to support development of the prototype reactors. This could include facilities used for component or safety testing, fuel development, or irradiation and evaluation of materials. There also exists the potential for additional countries to participate in this cooperation. AT: MOU requires cooperation – MOU requires individual development US DOE 08 [US Federal News Service, Feb 1, US DOE news release] In signing the MOU, each of the parties affirms its intent to develop advanced fast reactor prototypes according to its respective national program's objectives, and recognizes that each country's individual development of sodium-cooled fast reactor technology should not be duplicative.

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34 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

US does lots of international nuclear power R&D co-op US DOE 08 [US Federal News Service, Feb 1, US DOE news release] DOE has engaged with several international partners through bilateral agreements to advance research in proliferation-resistant technologies. In September 2007 China, France, Japan, Russia and the United States hosted the second GNEP Ministerial in Vienna, Austria where 35 countries and three intergovernmental organizations attended the meeting and 16 nations signed the Statement of Principles to become GNEP partner countries. Since the ministerial, Italy, Canada and the Republic of Korea, have become official partners by signing the GNEP Statement of Principles, which serves as the framework for the Partnership. Co-op w/ Russia uniquely beneficial
ACGNC 6 [The American

Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness, http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/documents.html : Council Position on the Proposed US/Russian 123 Agreement, accessed July 17, 2008] December 2006 As a result, each country has things to learn from and offer to the other, and thus advanced reactor cooperation between the U.S. and Russia could be of great mutual benefit.

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35 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Advantage – Emissions/Pollution
Nuclear power is key to preventing air pollution Lightfoot, et al 2006 [H Douglas, Global Environmental Climate Change Center; Wallace Manheimer, Naval Research Lab; Daniel Meneley, Engineer Emeritus, AECL; George Stanford, Argonne Nat’l Lab; September 12, “Nuclear Fission Fuel is Inexhaustible,” http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0609lightfoot.pdf] Fossil fuels burn in air to provide heat that is used to generate electricity, and to provide energy for transportation and for residential, industrial and commercial applications. Burning fossil fuels generates carbon dioxide and pollutants of various kinds. Nuclear fission provides heat for all of these applications, but without emissions of carbon dioxide, sulfur, mercury, nitrogen oxides, etc. IFR’s emit zero carbon dioxide and no atmospheric pollutants Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] And of course, in common with all nuclear reactors, IFRs emit no carbon dioxide. Do they put out any atmospheric pollutants? None worth mentioning. Then there some that aren't worth mentioning? Extremely small amounts of radioactive gas. How small? So small that there's a lot more radioactivity from coal-burning plants. You're pulling my leg. No I'm not. In coal there are trace amounts of radium and uranium, for instance, that come out of the smokestacks. Then there's dangerous radiation from coal plants? No, there isn't. It's far below natural background levels. But nuclear plants put out even less. Coal plants emit radiation daily – they are much greater threat than nuclear power Till, 1997 [Dr. Charles, nuclear physicist, Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/interviews/till.html] Q: In terms of day-to-day operation, which puts more radiation into the atmosphere: a coal plant or a nuclear plant? A: Coal plants, by a large margin. Q: What's the form of the radiation? A: The radiation is from the contaminants in the coal, the radioactive contaminants in the coal, and they go right up the stack. Q: Which are? A: Well, thorium. Q: Uranium? A: Uranium as well. Yeah, sure. And, well, I mean, it's ridiculous. It's a large source of pollution.

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36 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Advantage – Uranium Market
IFR efficiency massively decreases the need for uranium Lightfoot, et al 2006 [H Douglas, Global Environmental Climate Change Center; Wallace Manheimer, Naval Research Lab; Daniel Meneley, Engineer Emeritus, AECL; George Stanford, Argonne Nat’l Lab; September 12, “Nuclear Fission Fuel is Inexhaustible,” http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0609lightfoot.pdf] The contribution of the price of uranium (yellow cake, UrOr) at US$7O/kg to the cost of electricity from thermal reactors is US$0.0015/kwh. Fast reactors use virtually all of the nuclear fuel, and are more than 100 times as fuel efficient as thermal reactors. Therefore, with fast reactors, the price of uranium can increase by about 200 times, to the current price of gold at US$14,000/kg, and yet contribute less than US$0.003/kw h to the price of electricity. Even with minimal amounts of uranium IFR’s can create energy for 10,000 years Lightfoot, et al 2006 [H Douglas, Global Environmental Climate Change Center; Wallace Manheimer, Naval Research Lab; Daniel Meneley, Engineer Emeritus, AECL; George Stanford, Argonne Nat’l Lab; September 12, “Nuclear Fission Fuel is Inexhaustible,” http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0609lightfoot.pdf] Insensitivity to the cost of fuel allows very high prices for mined uranium. For all practical purposes, very low grade ores become economically viable and the supply of uranium then becomes inexhaustible. lt is likely there is enough uranium available to power the world for as far into the future as today is from the dawn of civilization more than 10,000 years ago. Uranium’s Price Will Remain Stable Berkeley’s Department of Nuclear Engineering, September 08 [University of Berkeley, Accessed July 15, 2008 http://www.nuc.berkeley.edu/designs/ifr/anlw.html ]
There is sufficient fuel to power IFR type facilities for well over 100 thousand years. This results because the IFR is a breeder reactor which can utilize uranium 238. Today's reactors only use uranium 235 which is less than 1% of the uranium found in nature. The IFR, with its fuel reprocessing capability, can use all the uranium. There is enough uranium that has been mined and placed in barrels (uranium 238) for IFR-type plants to provide all the electricity for the United States for over 500 years -- without mining. Also, the IFR can likely reprocess the spent fuel from today's reactors, and use the recovered materials for fuel. Uranium is as abundant in the earth as many of the commonly used materials such as bismuth, cadmium, mercury, silver, etc. In fact the uranium in a typical 1 ton block of granite (concentration of about 5 ppm) is the energy equivalent (if used in the IFR) of 10 tons of coal! The abundance of uranium suggests that its price will likely not increase as a fuel material for the foreseeable future.

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37 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

FRs solve storage problems
Stanford ’03 [George, nuclear physicist, ret Argonne Nat’l Lab, from the

Proceedings of “Global 2003,” ANS Winter Meeting, New Orleans, November 16–20, http://www.nationalcenter.org/LWRStanford.pdf] The capacity of Yucca Mountain has been shown to be adequate for directly disposing of the spent fuel from the present fleet of nuclear power plants. Therefore, if nuclear electricity is to be phased out, the fuel cycle does not need to be closed—the ultimate reason to close it is to permit substantial growth of nuclear energy. In a long-term growth scenario, fast reactors are both desirable and necessary. At some point, they will be needed for responsible management of the uranium resources. With only thermal reactors, if nuclear power grows globally at even 2% per year, all currently known and speculative uranium reserves will be depleted by mid-century.[7] If a fast reactor infrastructure is established as part of an economical waste-management system with a closed fuel cycle, the transition to widespread deployment of fast reactors, and therefore sustained nuclear development, will be much more feasible. In comparison with the present once-through fuel cycle, fast-spectrum actinide burners will extract more than 100 times as much energy from each pound of original uranium.

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38 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Advantage – Future Energy Supply
Replacing current reactors with IFR’s is essential to guarantee long-term energy supplies Lightfoot, et al 2006 [H Douglas, Global Environmental Climate Change Center; Wallace Manheimer, Naval Research Lab; Daniel Meneley, Engineer Emeritus, AECL; George Stanford, Argonne Nat’l Lab; September 12, “Nuclear Fission Fuel is Inexhaustible,” http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0609lightfoot.pdf] The uncertainty of long term fossil fuel supply is a good reason to proceed expeditiously with development and commissioning of nuclear fast reactors. We must be ready with a source of fuel that is rare enough to displace fossil fuels because they comprise 85% of the world's fuel supply and are directly related to people's wellbeing [Hoffert, 19971]. Replacing the current thermal reactors which use about O.7% of the uranium fuel with fast breeder reactors that consume virtually all of the uranium will assure long term energy supply, much-reduced waste management problems and better proliferation resistance [wade, 2000]. Developing fast reactors now is critical to avert the inevitable energy crisis when we runout of oil Lightfoot, et al 2006 [H Douglas, Global Environmental Climate Change Center; Wallace Manheimer, Naval Research Lab; Daniel Meneley, Engineer Emeritus, AECL; George Stanford, Argonne Nat’l Lab; September 12, “Nuclear Fission Fuel is Inexhaustible,” http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0609lightfoot.pdf] Many of the most serious problems facing human society have an important energy component. We do not know when peak production for fossil fuels will come, but we know that it will eventually arrive. Considering the importance of energy to humanity, it would be prudent to have a substantial program for the development and commissioning of fast nuclear fission reactors under way now in order to be adequately prepared.

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39 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Advantage – Accidents
The Liquid metal cooling of IFR’s is vital to prevent nuclear accidents Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William H, Gerald, and George – nuclear physicists retired from Argonne Nat’l Laboratory, Scientific American, December, http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0512hannum.pdf] 'Water cannot be employed in a fast reactor to carry the heat from the core it would slow the fast neutrons. Hence, engineers typically use a liquid metal such as sodium as a coolant and heat transporter. Liquid metal has one big advantage over water. 'Water-cooled systems run at very high pressure, so that a small leak can quickly develop into a large release of steam and perhaps a serious pipe break, with rapid loss of reactor coolant. Liquid-metal systems, however, operate at atmospheric pressure, so they present vastly less potential for a major release. IFR’s are safe – the one accident proves they pose no risk Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William H, Gerald, and George – nuclear physicists retired from Argonne Nat’l Laboratory, Scientific American, December, http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0512hannum.pdf] Nevertheless, sodium catches fire if exposed to water, so it must be managed carefully. Considerable industrial experience with handling the substance has been amassed over the years, and management methods are well developed. But sodium fires have occurred, and undoubtedly there will be more. One sodium fire began in 1995 at the Monju fast reactor in Japan. It made a mess in the reactor building but never posed a threat to the integrity of the reactor, and no one was injured or irradiated. Engineers do not consider sodium's flammability to be a major problem.

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40 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Advantage – Hydrogen Economy
FRs facilitate hydrogen economy Hylko 08 [James, an integrated safety management specialist for Paducah Remediation Services LLC, Power; Apr2008, Vol. 152 Issue 4, p44] Another feature of many of Gen IV reactors is their ability to produce hydrogen as a by-product. Realizing this potential could make the use of fuel cells for transportation and power generation more economic and environmentally benign while reducing America's dependence on imported oil. Sufficient quantities of hydrogen for commercial use would be produced during off-peak periods, improving the operating economics of nuclear baseload plants. A long-term objective would require dedicated Gen IV nuclear plants, operating at higher temperatures, to produce hydrogen at a steady rate for storage and subsequent use by large (>1,000-MW) banks of fuel cells to address daily peak demand. Nuclear Power is the only way to start a U.S. hydrogen economy
Amory B. Lovins 23 August 2003 (Research Director at Rocky Mountain Institute, http://www.rmi.org/images/PDFs/Energy/E03-07_H2EconNotDiff.pdf, Nature, 7/15/08) A recent survey article1 rebuts Paul Grant’s widely publicized conclusion2 that a U.S. hydrogen economy would be impractical, at least without a 4¥ expansion of nuclear power. Such nuclear advocates’ hope of salvation via H2 is mistaken: fuel cells, far from reviving nuclear power by needing it to make H2, will speed its market-driven extinction by delivering cheaper energy services. And far from requiring “staggeringly abundant” fossil fuels, “enormous” capital outlay, and “a significant area of set-aside land,” an orderly H2 transition would need1 significantly less capital3, probably no more natural gas4, less oil and coal, and probably less total land5 than oil-based business-as-usual.

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41 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Russia
Russia’s FBR is its most efficient plant- it plans to reconfigure it so it can burn weapons grade plutonium from Russia’s stockpiles Hore-Lacy 08 [Ian. Director for Public Communications at the World Nuclear Association. “Advanced nuclear power reactors”
February 12, 2008 World Nuclear Association http://www.eoearth.org/article/Advanced_nuclear_power_reactors . Accessed 7/17/08]

The Russian BN-600 fast breeder reactor has been supplying electricity to the grid since 1981 and has the best operating and production record of all Russia's nuclear power units. It uses a uranium oxide fuel and the sodium coolant delivers 550°C at little more than atmospheric pressure. The BN-350 FBR operated in Kazakhstan for 27 years and about half of its output was used for water desalination. Russia plans to reconfigure the BN-600 to burn plutonium from its military stockpiles. Construction has started at Beloyarsk on the first BN-800, a new larger (880 MWe) FBR from OKBM with improved features including fuel flexibility—U+Pu nitride, MOX, or metal—and with breeding ratio up to 1.3. It has much enhanced safety and improved economy with operating costs expected to be only 15% more relative to VVER. It is capable of burning 2 tonnes of plutonium per year from dismantled weapons and will test the recycling of minor actinides in the fuel. However, industry spokesmen have warned the government that Russia's world leadership in FBR development is threatened due to lack of funding for completion of BN-800.

Russian fast reactor breeds no plutonium Hore-Lacy 08 [Ian. Director for Public Communications at the World Nuclear Association. “Advanced nuclear power reactors”
February 12, 2008 World Nuclear Association http://www.eoearth.org/article/Advanced_nuclear_power_reactors . Accessed 7/17/08]

Russia has experimented with several lead-cooled reactor designs, and has used lead-bismuth cooling for 40 years in nuclear reactors for its 7 Alfa class submarines. Lead-208 (208Pb) (54% of naturally-occurring lead) is transparent to neutrons. A significant new Russian design is the BREST fast neutron reactor, of 300 MWe or more with lead as the primary coolant, at 540°C, and with supercritical steam generators. It is inherently safe and uses a high-density U+Pu nitride fuel with no requirement for high enrichment levels. No weapons-grade plutonium can be produced—since there is no uranium blanket, all breeding occurs in the core. The initial cores can comprise Pu and spent fuel. Subsequently, any surplus plutonium can be used in the cores of new reactors. Spent fuel can be recycled indefinitely, with on-site reprocessing and associated facilities. A pilot unit is being built at Beloyarsk and 1200 MWe units are planned.

Disposing of plutonium stores is key to cooperation with Russia If we don’t dispose of our plutonium stores Russia won’t either If MOX is rejected Russia won’t cooperate Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division, and Zachary S.,
International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08]

On January 14, 1997, the Department of Energy (DOE) released a Record of Decision for disposing of U.S. surplus weapons-usable plutonium. It recommended converting an unspecified quantity into mixed oxide fuel (MOX), which would be "burned" in domestic commercial reactors, and immobilizing at least eight tons in glass (vitrification) or a ceramic compound. The purpose of the plan is to demonstrate U.S. commitment to irreversible nuclear disarmament and ensure that Russia begins disposing of its excess plutonium as well. DOE is requesting $80 million in FY1998 for the plutonium disposal program. The two-track plan has since become the center of much debate within Congress and the nuclear community. Some argue that the decision to burn MOX fuel threatens to reverse a 20-year U.S. policy against using plutonium fuel in civilian reactors. This has led many to conclude that the United States should pursue only immobilization. Others believe that if the MOX option, which is Russia's preferred choice, is rejected, the United States will be less able to influence Russia's plutonium disposition policies. There is also some concern that a near-term decision on permanent disposal may be premature. Many intermediary steps must occur between weapons dismantlement and geological disposal that are still hindered by political, economic, technical, and international uncertainties. Until these factors are settled, long-term storage may be the de facto outcome.

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42 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Current reprocessing techniques do not produce weapons grade material Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division, and Zachary S.,
International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08]

Burning" as nuclear reactor fuel. Plutonium from nuclear weapons can be blended with uranium to make "mixed oxide" (MOX) fuel for commercial nuclear power plants. Most of the original plutonium nuclei would be irreversibly fragmented (fissioned) over the course of several years in a nuclear reactor, although a small amount of new plutonium would be created at the same time. After removal from a reactor, the spent fuel containing radioactive fission products that make it difficult to use its plutonium in weapons could be sent to a deep underground repository for permanent disposal.

Russia could use the MOX process to increase their plutonium stockpile Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division, and Zachary S.,
International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08]

If Russia uses plutonium separated from commercial reactors, it is questionable whether U.S. objectives of decreasing Russian stockpiles and discouraging the use of separated plutonium in reactors can be met. Russia may also wish to use a MOX fuel fabrication plant to sell plutonium-based fuel on the global market. Given Russian support for reprocessing spent fuel to separate plutonium and uranium, construction of such a plant may actually lead to increased quantities of separated plutonium in Russia. It is also undetermined whether Russia would dispose of spent fuel from MOX in a geologic repository after a once-through fuel cycle, as is the stated plan of the United States. If Russia instead reprocesses its MOX fuel, it could recover unfissioned weapons plutonium along with newly created plutonium. As a result, the Russian plutonium stockpile could grow while the U.S. stockpile was diminishing. A further complication is that Russia has not yet declared the size of its existing stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium, making it difficult to estimate comparable reductions for both sides

Russia’s stockpile is not secure and could be stolen for terrorist purposes Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy
Division, and Zachary S., International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08] Unlike the United States, Russia has not made a specific declaration of excess plutonium. Unclassified sources estimate Russian holdings of approximately 200 tons, with 30 tons separated for civilian purposes and never designated for weapons use.l6 To achieve equal levels of military plutonium stockpiles, a goal the United States and Russia share, Russia will need to declare more than 100 tons of weapons plutonium surplus as well as the 30 tons of civilian material, according to DOE.l7 Russia currently stores plutonium at a number of sites, many with inadequate security systems. A Russian military prosecutor who investigated the theft of fuel rods from a Russian naval facility observed that "even potatoes are sometimes better protected nowadays than radioactive materials....' 18 There is concern that if security at these facilities is not improved, fissile materials may be diverted to unauthorized states or terrorist organizations.l9

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Due to nuclear disarmament, Russia now has excess plutonium stockpiles Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy
Division, and Zachary S., International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08] With the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia have dramatically reduced their nuclear arsenals and are dismantling hundreds of nuclear warheads each year. As a result, both nations possess growing stockpiles of excess plutonium, a key nuclear weapons material. Although the U.S. government is confident about the security of its own plutonium stockpile, the Russian stockpile could pose significant risks until it is disposed of.

Stockpiling ensures that Russia’s nuclear arsenal could be easily rebuilt Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy
Division, and Zachary S., International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08] Indefinite secure storage. Secure storage of weapons plutonium could minimize the risk of theft or diversion, although the likelihood of establishing secure long-term storage in Russia is uncertain. Moreover, the continued existence of plutonium stockpiles would make it easier for the United States and Russia to rebuild their nuclear arsenals.

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44 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

MOX fuel is burned in conventional reactors. The process does not consume all of the plutonium and even creates more Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy
Division, and Zachary S., International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08] The second preferred option is to convert surplus plutonium into mixed oxide fuel (MOX). MOX is a blend of uranium dioxide (UO2) and plutonium dioxide (PuO2) that produces a fuel suitable for use in nuclear reactors. This fuel would be used in existing commercial, domestic light water reactors on a once-through fuel cycle, in which the spent fuel would be disposed of without reprocessing. It is technically straightforward to substitute MOX fuel for about one-third of the uranium fuel used in conventional light water reactors operating in the United States. 23 MOX fabricated from commercial spent fuel is considered technologically mature in Europe, but fabrication and use of MOX fuel has never been tested on a large scale with weapons-grade plutonium. There are no reactors in the United States currently using or licensed to burn MOX fuel. The United States does not have an operational MOX fuel fabrication plant. Two MOX fabrication facilities were constructed at Hanford to supply the canceled Clinch River Breeder Reactor, but they were never operated and it is unlikely they could be reopened to comply with modern safety and environmental standards. 26 A dedicated MOX facility is being considered for either the Savannah River Site, Hanford, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, or Pantex. About 70 percent, or 35 tons, of the plutonium declared surplus appears to be suitable for MOX fuel, which would contain from three to seven percent plutonium. After a once-through fuel cycle, the spent fuel would still contain a substantial amount of unburned plutonium, plus newly produced reactor-grade plutonium.

Russia considers its plutonium a valuable energy resource and favors the MOX method Use of plutonium could lead to its diversion to weapons Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy
Division, and Zachary S., International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08] The Russian government, which considers plutonium to be a valuable national energy resource, has expressed interest primarily in reactor-based disposal options, such as use as MOX fuel. Within the United States there have been some reservations about this form of disposal, primarily because of concern that widespread use of plutonium fuel could create increase opportunities for diversion of fissile material for nuclear weapons programs. In September 1996, a joint U.S.-Russian task force concluded that using weapons-grade plutonium to fuel commercial nuclear reactors was the most technically mature option, followed by the option of blending the plutonium with highly radioactive waste.

U.S. hopes that modeling will solve its non-proliferation goals Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy
Division, and Zachary S., International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08] The stated goal of the dual-track plan is to support U.S. nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy by reducing global stockpiles of excess fissile materials so that they may never again be used in weapons. The program is designed to demonstrate the United States' commitment to its nonproliferation goals, as specified in the President's Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy of 1993, and to stimulate similar action by other nations such as Russia, where stockpiles of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials may be less secure from potential theft or diversion than those in the United States. 4

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U.S. use of MOX will undermine its anti-proliferation message- hurting its ability to encourage states to dispose of plutonium stocks Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy
Division, and Zachary S., International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08] Many arms control and environmental groups are concerned that use of MOX will be seen as encouragement for other states to continue reprocessing spent fuel. A memorandum from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to former Secretary of Energy O'Leary stated: A U.S. decision to support the hybrid option would. . . undermine our efforts to discourage proliferation-prone closed fuel cycles [i.e., spent fuel reprocessing] not only in Russia but also in countries such as South Korea. If the hybrid option is chosen, these countries would hear only one message for the next 25 years: that plutonium use for generating commercial power is now being blessed by the United States. Various European firms experienced in MOX fuel fabrication have indicated an interest in providing their technology to the United States. Incorporation of European equipment would enable the U.S. to begin burning MOX fuel sooner than if only indigenous equipment is utilized. 52 Contracting with European firms, however, may be viewed by some as violating U.S. nonproliferation policy. Considering that those firms are state controlled enterprises that promote plutonium fuel cycles, contracting with them may be counter to the U.S. policy of not encouraging the use of plutonium in civilian reactors.

The U.S. will not take the first step- Russia must begin the disposal process Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy
Division, and Zachary S., International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08] The United States is not planning to dispose of its surplus plutonium unilaterally. Before disposal operations begin, reciprocal action is expected by Russia, which could be pursuant to a plutonium disposal treaty or other formal agreements. Russia's continued production of weapons-usable plutonium could complicate the matter. Russia also may require financing of the necessary facilities to implement its plutonium disposal program. Given these obstacles, it may be a number of years before final disposal plans are fully developed.

MOX is the status quo solution for plutonium stockpiles Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy
Division, and Zachary S., International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08] On January 14, 1997, the Department of Energy (DOE) released a Record of Decision for disposing of U.S. surplus weapons-usable plutonium. It recommended converting an unspecified quantity into mixed oxide fuel (MOX), which would be "burned" in domestic commercial reactors, and immobilizing at least eight tons in glass (vitrification) or a ceramic compound. The purpose of the plan is to demonstrate U.S. commitment to irreversible nuclear disarmament and ensure that Russia begins disposing of its excess plutonium as well. DOE is requesting $80 million in FY1998 for the plutonium disposal program.

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46 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Reactor grade plutonium could be used in weapons Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy
Division, and Zachary S., International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08] The plutonium within the spent MOX fuel undergoes a shift in isotopic composition from weaponsgrade to reactor-grade. This shift has been cited as one of the advantages of reactor based options. Reactor-grade plutonium, however, can still be used in a nuclear explosion. Yet, according to the National Academy of Sciences, which conducted an in depth study of plutonium disposition: The main goal. . . is not so much to destroy the plutonium by fissioning the plutonium atoms or transmuting them into other elements as to contaminate it with highly radioactive fission products, requiring difficult processing before it could be used in weapons.

MOX fuel poses serious waste management concerns Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy
Division, and Zachary S., International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08] Plutonium must be in a relatively pure form for use as MOX fuel.35 This requires separating plutonium from alloying materials found in the pits. Residual levels of the alloying element gallium in separated plutonium may complicate its use in MOX fuel. Gallium chemically attacks the metal zirconium, a major material in the metal tubes containing nuclear reactor fuel. A study by experts at Los Alamos National Laboratory found that "the presence of excessive gallium in spent MOX fuel could. . . cause [fuel tube] deterioration and hence possibly cause waste management problems."

Russia and other states have the technology to extract plutonium from nuclear wastes Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy
Division, and Zachary S., International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08] Both of DOE's preferred disposal options burning in reactors and immobilization for direct disposal are intended to meet the "spent fuel standard." That is, to render surplus plutonium as inaccessible for weapons use as the much larger and growing quantity of unseparated reactor-grade plutonium existing in spent nuclear fuel from commercial power reactors.38 Reactor-grade plutonium is viewed as inefficient by weapon designers, although explosive devices can be made with it. Plutonium is produced in varying quantities in virtually all operating nuclear reactors. Spent fuel from most commercial reactors consists of about 1% plutonium of various isotopes. Unlike weapons plutonium, however, plutonium in spent fuel is mixed with highly radioactive fission products that make it very dangerous to handle. Extracting the plutonium for use in nuclear explosives is still possible; the United States, Russia, and many other states have the technology to do so.

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Without MOX the U.S. will have no leverage to encourage Russian plutonium stockpile disposal - U.S. leadership is key to Russian Stockpile disposal Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy
Division, and Zachary S., International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08] Despite the tentative Russian agreement to accept differing plutonium disposal programs, concerns have been raised that Russia would reject any U.S. plan to immobilize all its surplus plutonium without destruction, because the plutonium would still be retrievable in weapons-grade form. The U.S. delegation to the Joint Study, for example, argued in a letter to President Clinton: There is much reason to think that the Russians will not eliminate their plutonium stockpiles at all if the United States implements only immobilization, leaving all U.S . plutonium weapons-grade_the Russians might then merely store their stockpile of weapons indefinitely, which is what we should most wish to avoid. The letter also asserted that without the MOX option, the United States would: lose any leverage we might have had over the conditions and safeguards accompanying the use of Russian plutonium in their reactors. It is critically important for the United States to play a leadership role in an international effort to implement the reactor option in Russia, and this will be extremely difficult to do if we reject the reactor option for our own plutonium."

Russia will not cooperate because it sees plutonium as an asset, not as a liability Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy
Division, and Zachary S., International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08] Secretary O'Leary stressed that the two-track approach to plutonium disposal would provide the needed flexibility and leverage to ensure Russia begins reducing its stockpile of excess weapons plutonium.68 Ensuring Russian cooperation, however, remains troublesome. To date, Russia has been reluctant to accommodate U.S. preferences in the handling and storage of plutonium. This has much to do with the different perspective each country has for the material. Unlike the United States, which regards plutonium as a liability, Russia sees its stockpile as a national asset to be exploited for financial and energy benefits.

U.S. Russia agreement to end plutonium production is key to reducing plutonium stockpiles Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy
Division, and Zachary S., International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08] Before any disposition agreement can take place, the United States will likely require additional assurances from Russia that weapons-grade plutonium is no longer being separated, and that verifiable safeguards protecting against diversion are in place. Howard Canter, acting director of DOE's Office of Fissile Material Disposition, has commented that unless a solid agreement with Russia is reached, "I don't think we'll do anything with our plutonium other than store it. . . because we'll never be able to sell up on the Hill spending a lot of money to do something with ours unilaterally."59 Russian officials are expected to insist on comparable verifiability arrangements at U.S. facilities as well.

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Russia continues to produce weapons grade plutonium. It is a byproduct of their reactors Johnson and Davis 97 [Craig M., Research Assistant. Environment and Natural Resources Policy
Division, and Zachary S., International Nuclear Policy Specialist. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.” CRS Report for Congress. May 22, 1997 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/97 564.htm. Accessed 7/17/08] A complicating factor is Russia's continued production of weapons-grade plutonium. Three reactors in Russia, two at Seversk (Tomsk-7) and one at Zeleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26), which generate electricity and heat for neighboring communities in Siberia, also produce weapons-grade plutonium.60 To prevent corrosion of the spent nuclear fuel discharged from those reactors, it must be reprocessed to separate the plutonium, uranium, and other elements. The separated plutonium is increasing Russia's stockpile of un safeguarded, weapons-grade plutonium by about 1.5 tons each year.61 Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomydrin signed an agreement June 23, 1994, requiring the shutdown of these reactors by 2000.

Russia’s plutonium stockpile has not been reduced Bunn and Wier 04. [Matthew. Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom.
Anthony. Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom Master of Public Affairs and a Master of Arts in Russian. “Securing the Bomb: Agenda for Action”. Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. http://www.nti.org/e_research/analysis_cnwmupdate_052404.pdf. Accessed 7/17/08]

Fraction accomplished. Years of effort and hundreds of millions of dollars of investment have been focused

on laying the groundwork for disposition of excess weapons plutonium. But the program is not yet at the point where any substantial amounts of excess weapons plutonium have been used as reactor fuel or otherwise transformed into forms unsuitable for weapons use. Hence, the fraction accomplished to date in actually reducing the stockpile is zero. Rate of progress. To date, the annual rate of progress in reducing excess plutonium stockpiles is also zero. The year 2003 was a difficult one for this effort as well, with the
liability dispute leading to the expiration of the 1998 U.S.-Russian technical cooperation agreement, and blocking efforts to move toward construction of U.S. and Russian facilities to make reactor fuel from excess weapons plutonium. Since the 2000 Plutonium Disposition and Management Agreement has no liability provisions, the technical cooperation agreement was only agreement in force that provided the liability provisions and other details necessary for contracts for joint research and development of plutonium disposition technologies. Work can continue under contracts signed before the technical cooperation agreement expired, but no new contracts can be placed until the liability issue is resolved. The U.S. government is seeking a multilateral agreement on funding Russian plutonium disposition that would include liability and other relevant provisions, and could provide the basis for actual construction and operation of the large facilities required—but progress toward resolving these issues in that negotiation have been slow. The liability dispute

has blocked even early steps that could be taken before an overall financing and management arrangement for Russian plutonium disposition is in place—including the transfer to Russia of the key design
information for the plutonium fuel fabrication facility, which is to be a Russianized version of the U.S. design. As a result, construction of the U.S. and Russian plutonium fuel fabrication facilities has been pushed back by a year; in early 2004 DOE predicted that if the result was not resolved by April 2004, another year would be lost—but program officials now believe that they can avoid losing another year if the dispute is resolved by June or July of 2004.148 Efforts are still underway to pull together an international financing package. Despite the inclusion of plutonium disposition as one of the priorities in the $20 billion G-8 Global Partnership, total pledges for the effort are still far below the roughly $2 billion estimated cost of disposition of the 34 tons of Russian weapons plutonium covered by the 2000 agreement (let alone the larger cost of disposition of a much larger fraction of Russia’s weapons plutonium, which would be necessary if the effort was to make a significant difference in reducing the nuclear theft and rearmament threats this material poses) It seems clear that the decision to rely on an international funding approach, rather than paying for this effort with U.S. funds and allowing other nations to fund other priorities, has already delayed progress and will likely result in a more complex and less responsive management structure, reporting to multiple governments, in the future. Because of the uncertainties in internationalfinancing, DOE does not now even project a target date when the Russian plutonium disposition program might be finished.

Russian nuclear piles are being stolen—Russian plutonium security fails Bunn 00 [Matthew, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom. “Plutonium at the
Summit.” April 26, 2000 The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1019/plutonium_at_the_summit.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F1664%2Fxiang_xu. Accesed 7/17/08]

The hard part of making a nuclear bomb is getting the plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). The entire global structure for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is built around controlling these materials. But in the former Soviet Union, these materials are being stolen. As recently as 1998, conspirators at one of Russia's largest nuclear-weapons facilities tried to steal 40 pounds of weaponsusable material — enough for a nuclear bomb. A nuclear-security system designed for a single state

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with a closed society, closed borders, and well-paid nuclear workers has been splintered among multiple states with open societies, open borders, unpaid nuclear workers, and rampant corruption.

Russia’s plutonium stockpiles are not secure and terrorist theft threat is growing Bunn and Wier 04. [Matthew. Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom.
Anthony. Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom Master of Public Affairs and a Master of Arts in Russian. “Securing the Bomb: Agenda for Action”. Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. http://www.nti.org/e_research/analysis_cnwmupdate_052404.pdf. Accessed 7/17/08]

The Russian government and economy have stabilized, nuclear workers and guards are now being paid a living wage on time, and the most glaring security deficiencies have largely been fixed. But serious security problems remain. Experts who visit Russia’s nuclear sites continue to report broken intrusion detectors, nuclear-material accounting systems never designed to detect the theft of nuclear material, and “security culture” problems ranging from guards turning off detectors when they are annoyed by the false alarms to security gates propped open for convenience. The security manager at Seversk, one of Russia’s largest nuclear-material processing facilities, reports that guards routinely patrol without ammunition in their guns, to avoid accidental firing. At the same time, threats to these facilities appear to be growing: Russian official sources report four incidents of terrorist reconnaissance on Russian nuclear warheads from 2001 to 2002; the Russian state newspaper reports that the 41 heavily armed terrorists who seized hundreds of hostages at a Moscow theater in October 2002 first considered seizing a Moscow site with enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for dozens of nuclear weapons; and a 2003 criminal case revealed that a Russian businessman had been offering $750,000 for stolen weapon-grade plutonium for sale to a foreign client—and had succeeded in making contact with residents of the closed nuclear weapon city of Sarov, to attempt to arrange the purchase.

Nuclear terror fueled by materials stolen from Russian stocks is the biggest concern for national security Helfand et. Al. 02 [Ira, chief, emergency medicine section, Lachlan Forrow, associate professor of medicine, and Jaya Tiwari, research
a b

director. “Nuclear Terrorism”. 2/9/02. http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1122278. Accessed 7/17/08]

There is clear evidence that some terrorist groups have been trying to obtain nuclear materials, primarily from the enormous stockpiles of the former Soviet Union. In December 1994 Czech police seized 4 kg of highly enriched uranium. During that same year German police seized more than 400 g of plutonium.6 In October 2001 Turkish police arrested two men with 1.16 kg of weapons grade uranium.7 Also in October 2001 the Russian Defence Ministry reported two recent incidents when terrorist groups attempted to break into Russian nuclear storage sites but were repulsed.8 Since 1993 the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported 175 cases of nuclear trafficking, 18 involving highly enriched uranium or plutonium.9 Even more alarming are reports that small fully built nuclear weapons are missing from the Russian arsenal. In 1996 the Russian general Alexander Lebed claimed that 40 of these so called suitcase weapons were unaccounted for. He subsequently retracted the claim but in a manner that failed to reassure many experts.8 Even before the attack on the World Trade Center, the threat of nuclear terrorism was well recognised by the US Department of Energy, which warned: “The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons useable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home.”10

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Terrorism
Nuclear terrorism is a real danger-unsecured nuclear material in the world amounts to thousands of bombs. Bunn and Wier 04. [Matthew. Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom.
Anthony. Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom Master of Public Affairs and a Master of Arts in Russian. “Securing the Bomb: Agenda for Action”. Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. http://www.nti.org/e_research/analysis_cnwmupdate_052404.pdf. Accessed 7/17/08]

A continuing global danger. An attack using an actual nuclear explosive—either a stolen nuclear weapon or an improvised terrorist bomb made from stolen nuclear material—would be among the most difficult types of attack for terrorists to accomplish. But the danger is real. This report debunks in detail a series of myths, listed in the table below, that have led policy-makers around the world to downplay the danger. The facts are that the amount of inadequately secured bomb material in the world today is enough to make thousands of nuclear weapons; that terrorists are actively seeking to get it; and that with such material in hand, a capable and well-organized terrorist group plausibly could make, deliver, and detonate at least a crude nuclear bomb capable of incinerating the heart of any major city in the world. Securing the vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials around the world is an essential priority—for nonproliferation, for counter-terrorism, and for homeland security. If the world’s existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials can be reliably secured, nuclear terrorism can be reliably prevented: no terrorist access to material means no bomb.

Terrorists could use plutonium stocks to produce bombs Bunn and Wier 04. [Matthew. Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom.
Anthony. Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom Master of Public Affairs and a Master of Arts in Russian. “Securing the Bomb: Agenda for Action”. Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. http://www.nti.org/e_research/analysis_cnwmupdate_052404.pdf. Accessed 7/17/08]

An attack using an actual nuclear explosive—either a stolen nuclear weapon that terrorists had succeeded in getting and detonating, or a bomb they made themselves, with stolen plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU)—would be among the most difficult types of attack for terrorists to accomplish. But the danger is real. As discussed in the next chapter, numerous studies have concluded that a capable and well organized terrorist group might well be able to make at least a crude nuclear bomb if they could get stolen HEU or plutonium. And enough of these materials to make many thousands of nuclear weapons, scattered in hundreds of buildings in dozens of countries, remains dangerously insecure.

Even a crude nuclear bomb-the type terrorists could build- would kill half a million and cost over 1 trillion dollars Bunn and Wier 04. [Matthew. Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom.
Anthony. Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom Master of Public Affairs and a Master of Arts in Russian. “Securing the Bomb: Agenda for Action”. Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. http://www.nti.org/e_research/analysis_cnwmupdate_052404.pdf. Accessed 7/17/08]

The destructive power of even the crude sort of nuclear bomb that terrorists might be able to produce is terrifying. As we detailed in a report last year, a bomb with the explosive power of 10,000 metric tons of TNT (smaller than the Hiroshima bomb), if set off in midtown Manhattan on a typical workday, could kill half a million people and cause over $1 trillion in direct economic damage.2 It is worth remembering just how awesome the power of nuclear weapons is: 10,000 metric tons of TNT is over 20 million pounds of high explosive—enough to fill a cargo train a hundred cars long. America and its way of life would never be the same again.

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Nuclear terrorism is a global threat-an attack on the U.S. would devastate the world economy Bunn and Wier 04. [Matthew. Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom.
Anthony. Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom Master of Public Affairs and a Master of Arts in Russian. “Securing the Bomb: Agenda for Action”. Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. http://www.nti.org/e_research/analysis_cnwmupdate_052404.pdf. Accessed 7/17/08]

As recent bombings in Madrid and Moscow make clear, moreover, America is not the only possible target of such an attack: the potential for terrorist acquisition of a nuclear bomb is a threat to every nation in the world. Indeed, even if it were New York or Washington that was attacked, the economic reverberations, many times those of the 9/11 attacks, would devastate economies around the globe. As a result, insecure nuclear material anywhere is a threat to everyone, everywhere. Every nation has a common interest in blocking this threat—which is why a global partnership to address it could be successful.

If even a tenth of the 300 unsecured tons were stolen the world would face catastrophe Bunn and Wier 04. [Matthew. Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom.
Anthony. Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom Master of Public Affairs and a Master of Arts in Russian. “Securing the Bomb: Agenda for Action”. Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. http://www.nti.org/e_research/analysis_cnwmupdate_052404.pdf. Accessed 7/17/08]

But for the more than 300 tons of material for which neither rapid nor comprehensive upgrades have been completed, the United States and the world have neither transparency nor confidence that the material is secured from theft; the world is relying on the security improvements Russia has chosen to implement on it own since the Soviet Union collapsed. (See “Nuclear Security in Russia Today,” p. 31.) If even a tenth of one percent of this material were to be stolen, the world could face an unparalleled catastrophe. If progress continued at last year’s rate of 35 tons per year, it would take 13 years to finish the job—just for the material in the former Soviet Union, leaving aside the insecure stockpiles in dozens of other countries throughout the world. Comprehensive security upgrades have been completed for an even smaller fraction of Russia’s nuclear warhead sites, including sites that store readily transportable tactical weapons that may not be equipped with modern, difficult-to bypass electronic locks to prevent unauthorized use.

Terrorist organizations are actively seeking nuclear weapons now—laundry list Bunn and Wier 04. [Matthew. Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom.
Anthony. Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom Master of Public Affairs and a Master of Arts in Russian. “Securing the Bomb: Agenda for Action”. Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. http://www.nti.org/e_research/analysis_cnwmupdate_052404.pdf. Accessed 7/17/08]

Osama bin Laden has publicly said that he is seeking nuclear weapons. Al Qaeda has repeatedly attempted to acquire stolen nuclear weapons or nuclear material, and has repeatedly attempted to recruit nuclear expertise to help them build a bomb.10 Documents seized from al Qaeda safehouses in Afghanistan reveal a significant effort to pursue nuclear weapons.11 Russian officials have acknowledged that terrorists carried out reconnaissance four times in 2001–2002 on Russian nuclear warhead storage sites and transport trains, the very locations of which are supposed to be state secrets in Russia.12 The Russian state newspaper has reported that the 41 heavily armed terrorists who seized a theater and hundreds of hostages in Moscow in October 2002 first considered seizing the Kurchatov Institute, a Moscow facility with hundreds of kilograms of HEU, enough for dozens of nuclear weapons.13 In 2003, a Russian criminal case revealed that a Russian businessman had been offering $750,000 for stolen weapon-grade plutonium for sale to a foreign client.14 The IAEA has documented 18 cases of seizure of stolen HEU or plutonium since 1992, confirmed by the states involved

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Al Qaeda may possess 20 suitcase bombs Helfand et. Al. 02 [Ira, chief, emergency medicine section,

a Lachlan Forrow, associate professor of medicine,b and Jaya Tiwari, research director. “Nuclear Terrorism”. 2/9/02. http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1122278. Accessed 7/17/08]

The efforts of the al-Qaeda network to obtain nuclear weapons or weapons grade nuclear materials are particularly worrying. Al-Qaeda agents have tried to buy uranium from South Africa, and have made repeated trips to three central Asian states to try to buy weapons grade material or complete nuclear weapons.9 Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a leading Pakistani nuclear engineer, made repeated visits to the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar between 1998 and 2001, leading the Pakistan government to place him and two other nuclear scientists under house arrest.11 More recently there have been speculative reports that al-Qaeda has purchased 20 of the Russian suitcase weapons from Chechen sources for a reported $30m plus two tonnes of opium.11 In addition, Russian nuclear experts have raised concerns that terrorists could gain control of a Russian nuclear missile facility and initiate an attack against the United States using strategic nuclear missiles (B Blair, remarks delivered to National Press Club, 14 Nov 2001).

A nuclear explosion in NYC would kill hundreds of thousands and overwhelm medical infrastructure Helfand et. Al. 02 [Ira, chief, emergency medicine section, Lachlan Forrow, associate professor of medicine, and Jaya Tiwari, research
a b

director. “Nuclear Terrorism”. 2/9/02. http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1122278. Accessed 7/17/08]

Using the CATS (Consequences Assessment Tool Set) software created by the US Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, we have calculated the expected casualties from a 12.5 kiloton nuclear explosion at ground level in New York City. We placed the explosion in the port area to reflect concerns that a nuclear device could most easily enter a US city smuggled in a commercial cargo container. The blast and thermal effects of such an explosion would kill 52 000 people immediately, and direct radiation would cause 44 000 cases of radiation sickness, of which 10 000 would be fatal. Radiation from fallout would kill another 200 000 people and cause several hundred thousand additional cases of radiation sickness. In the wake of such an attack the ability to aid survivors would be very limited. About 1000 hospital beds would be destroyed by the blast, and 8700 more would be in areas with radiation exposures high enough to cause radiation sickness.12 The remaining local medical facilities would quickly be overwhelmed, and even with advance preparation outside help would be delayed. After the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan, in which 6500 died and 34 900 were injured, there were long delays before outside medical assistance arrived,13 and this disaster had few of the complicating factors that would accompany a nuclear attack with extensive radioactive contamination.

Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William, Gerald, and George – retired nuclear physicists from Argonne Nat’l Lab, January 2, http://www.nationalcenter.org/PurexPyro.html]

With the notable exception of land and air transportation, virtually all energy demands could be satisfied with non-fossil sources, with electricity as the main means of delivery. That includes ocean transport, for which well-managed nuclear power is ideally suited, as the U.S. navy has amply demonstrated. Pending break-throughs in battery technology or in the generation and management of hydrogen, land and air transportation will continue to depend mainly on oil. But in the longer term, given the needed technology, even there nuclear power can help change our dependence on a near-monopoly energy source that we do not control. Removing this issue, and the gluttonous demands of the U.S. economy for imported oil, would reduce both the motivations for terrorism, and the resources to support it.

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Solvency – Incentives
Increasing federal tax-credits and subsidies will kickstart the nuclear industry Farivar 07 [Cyrus, November 13, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/startups/news/2007/11/nuclear_economics] This resurgence of commercial attention to nuclear power is coming about for several reasons. The increased attention on greenhouse gases and their effects on the global climate is spurring interest in carbon-neutral power-generation technologies, including nuclear power. Improved technologies make new nuclear plants safer and more reliable, supporters say. And federal tax credits and subsidies (.pdf) tucked into the Energy Policy Act of 2005 have kick-started a oncedormant industry. Loan guarantees and other federal incentives will increase nuclear production Dyer. July 15, 2008. [R.A, journalist for McClatchy Newspapers, July 15, 2008,
http://www.bdcnetwork.com/articleXml/LN792689715.html] With eight power plants on the drawing board, Texas could lead the way in an American renaissance of nuclear power, according to industry leaders and some policymakers. Four power companies _ New Jersey-based NRG Energy, Amarillo Power, Dallas-based Luminant and Chicago-based Exelon _ have proposed building nuclear plants in Texas. That would increase the reactors in the state from four to 12, and more than triple its nuclear output. It's likely that some of the plants will never get built, and the permit process and construction would take about a decade. But whether Texas ends up with two more reactors or eight, it is clear that a nuclear awakening is under way. Largely spurred by new loan guarantees and other federal incentives, plus a new regulatory scheme in Washington, companies are floating plans and partnering with overseas firms on construction and design. This reawakening is also evidenced by a spate of licensing and operating applications at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, a development all the more startling given that these applications are the first since the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. "Nobody has
built a plant in 28 years, and all the manufacturing capacity is in France and Japan," said Steve Winn, chief executive officer for nuclear development at NRG. "So rebuilding the U.S. labor force is going to be a challenge and we're working with the state and federal government to work with a plan for labor training. ... But the financial community and the general population are more open to nuclear power now than they have been in a long time." Serious questions remain. For instance, no solution has been found for the radioactive byproducts of nuclear energy, which can remain hazardous not for just hundreds of years, but for thousands or even tens of thousands. The construction costs can also be daunting. Already, detractors are warning that the new plants would be much more expensive than advertised. While utilities reportedly have priced the cost of a kilowatt of nuclear power at $3,000 to $4,000, Moody's Investors Services said in October that a more realistic price would be $5,000 to $6,000. That puts the cost of a 1,500-megawatt nuclear plant at about $9 billion, according to reports. And another renaissance might be in the offing _ that of the anti-nuclear movement. "We think that nuclear power is the wrong way to go and we're certainly going to be opposing these new nuclear power reactors," said Ken Kramer, director of the Lone Star chapter of the Sierra Club. Texas is home to four nuclear reactors at two sites _ two at Luminant's Comanche Peak site at Glen Rose, and two at NRG's South Texas Project, in Matagorda County. The Comanche Peak reactors came on line in 1990 and 1993; the South Texas reactors came on line in 1988 and 1999. Collectively, the NRG and Luminant plants produce about 13.4 percent of the annual output on the Texas power grid and have a combined generating capacity of 5,000 megawatts of electricity, enough for about 3.5 million homes. Under current plans, Luminant and NRG would more than double their nuclear output by building two more reactors apiece adjacent to their current facilities. NRG submitted its federal application in September 2007 for what the company says will be an $8 billion project. "The catalyst has been the (federal) Energy Policy Act, which provided loan guarantees and production tax credits," said Dave Knox, a spokesman for NRG. "It was needed to kick-start the nuclear industry. After we stopped building nuclear, most of the infrastructure had gone overseas to France and Japan. ... The loan guarantees

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New federal incentives can spur new nuclear activity throughout the United States
Holt 2007. July 12. [Mark, specialist in Energy Policy,sefora.org, July 15, 2008,
http://sharp.sefora.org/issues/nuclear-energy-policy/]
The Bush Administration has called for an expansion of nuclear power. For Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear energy research and development and infrastructure, the Administration is requesting $801.7 million for FY2008, a nearly 30% increase from the FY2007 appropriation. The request would boost funding for the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) from $167.5 million in FY2007 to $395.0 million in FY2008 as the primary component of the Administration’s Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). The House Appropriations Committee recommended cutting AFCI to $120.0 million while providing a total funding level of $835.2 million (H.R. 2641, H.Rept. 110185). The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $242.0 million for AFCI and $795.5 million for nuclear energy overall (S. 1751, S.Rept. 110-127). Significant incentives for new commercial reactors are included in the Energy Policy Act of

2005 (P.L. 109-58), signed by the President on August 8, 2005. These include production tax credits, loan guarantees, insurance against regulatory delays, and extension of the Price-Anderson Act nuclear liability system. Together with higher fossil fuel prices and the possibility of greenhouse gas controls, the federal incentives for nuclear power have helped spur renewed interest by utilities and other potential reactor developers. Plans for about 30 reactor license applications have been announced, although no commitments have been made to build the plants. No reactor has been ordered in the United States since 1978, and all orders since 1973 were subsequently canceled.

Incentives from the USFG attract nuclear power utilities Whitehead 2005. July 30 [John, writer for Environmental Economics, env-econ.com, http://www.envecon.net/2005/07/new_incentives_.html, July 15, 2008.] The Energy Policy Act of 2005, expected to be signed soon by President Bush, contains $2 billion in subsidies to the first 6 energy companies that build a nuclear power plant. Chances are good that NC will get at least one of these: The massive energy bill approved by Congress on Friday could nudge North Carolina's two publicly traded utilities to build the nation's first nuclear reactors in more than a decade. The bill, passed by the U.S. Senate and expected to be signed into law by President Bush, contains provisions for loan guarantees and risk insurance for utilities that gamble on nuclear plants. ... Building a new nuclear plant has been regarded as political nonstarter and economic liability for a quarter-century since the partial meltdown at Three Mile Island in 1979. In recent months, however, rising oil prices and calls for energy independence
from Middle Eastern imports have emboldened utilities, including Progress Energy in Raleigh and Duke Energy in Charlotte, to advocate the revival of nuclear power in this country. ... Duke, which has filed a preliminary inquiry with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, will decide by the end of this year whether to generate electricity with plutonium, or instead use a traditional fuel such as natural gas. Progress Energy officials have said they will make a decision within two years. Duke serves 2.1 million customers in the Carolinas, and Progress Energy serves 2.9 million in the Carolinas and Florida. The

federal energy legislation includes $2 billion in risk insurance for construction delays of the country's first six new power plants. The money is intended to address matters such as security issues or legal challenges. "It would certainly give us an incentive to think harder about being in the first six," Johnson [COO of Progress
Energy] said. But what about the nuclear waste? Nothing: But the bill is silent on the biggest challenge facing the nuclear industry: a permanent disposal solution for radioactive waste, which remains lethal for tens of thousands of years. ... In the coming decades, nuclear plants are going to start running out of room to store radioactive waste. Meanwhile, North Carolina utility customers have paid $1.1 billion -second only to Illinois -- into the federal Nuclear Waste Fund, set up to pay for final disposal of radioactive waste. "The big gaping hole [of the energy bill] is the failure of the government to address the long-term storage of spent fuel," De May [vice president for energy and environmental policy at Duke Energy] said. Hmmmm, 'nuff said? Or should I mention that it would not be irresponsible to address the negative externality (i.e. pollution) in some way at some time?

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The plan is key to removing uncertainty which will lead to the needed investment necessary to develop and construct fast reactors. Stanford 06 [George, PhD, retired nuclear physicist, interview with Ann Curtis, August 8,
http://www.cross-x.com/vb/showthread.php?s=1ad707180b7b85158aece8f58d80116a&p=1600390#post1600390]

2a. What policy action could/should be taken by the federal government to allow the IFR to play a significant role in the production of energy? First, the government should remove the delays and uncertainties that have plagued nuclear power plant (NPP) construction in the past, so that investors will be willing to finance the construction of new plants. Since fast reactors are not yet quite ready for prime time, the next reactors to be built will be thermal for the most part -- but that's snot at all incompatible with the deployment of fast reactors later. It would rejuvenate the U.S. nuclear industry, and hasten the transition to a large-scale, environmentally benign energy supply. Second, it must enable the development and construction of fuel-processing facilities for extracting fast-reactor fuel from the spent fuel now coming out of thermal NPPs. That means reversing a long-standing U.S. stance against all forms of reprocessing. Loan guarantees are critical to the development of new nuclear plants
Larry Parker and Mark Holt, March 9, 2007, Specialists in Energy Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Divi sion, Congressional Research Service, Nuclear Power: Outlook for New U.S. Reactors, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R L33442.pdf Because it is generally believed that Wall Street continues to view new commercial reactors as financially risky, the availability of federal loan guarantees [is] a key element in attracting funding for such projects and reducing f inancing costs. The federal government would bear most of the risk, facing potentially large losses if borrower s defaulted on reactor projects that could not be salvaged. Loan guarantees may be especially important for n uclear projects undertaken by deregulated generating companies as opposed to traditionally regulated utilitie s, which can recover their regulator-approved capital costs from ratepayers.Even for regulated utilities, “loan g uarantees are critically important to new nuclear plant financing,” the Nuclear Energy Institute contended in Septem ber 2006 testimony.

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Solvency – First Mover Incentive
First mover tax credit will provide a key incentive for the development of new nuclear power plants MIT Faculty Group 2003 (distinguished team of researchers from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Harvard released today what co-chair Dr. John Deutch calls "the most comprehensive, interdisciplinary study ever conducted on the future of nuclear energy, Chapter 3) http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/ We believe the government should step in and increase the likelihood of practical demonstration of nuclear power by providing financial incentive to first movers.4 We propose a production tax credit of up to $200 per kWe of the construction cost of up to ten “first mover” plants. This ben-efit might be paid out at 1.7 cents per kWe-hr, over a year and a half of full-power plant operation, since the annual value of this production credit for a 1000 MWe plant operating at 90% capacity factor is $134 million. The $200 per kWe government subsidy would provide $200 million for a 1000 MWe nuclear plant, about 10% of the historically-based total construction cost estimate; accordingly the total outlay for the program could be up to $2 billion paid out over several years. We prefer the production tax credit mechanism because it offers the greatest incentives for projects to be completed and because it can be extended to other carbon free electricity technologies, for example renewables (such as wind which currently enjoys a 1.7 cents per kWe-hr tax credit for ten years) and coal with carbon capture and sequestration. The credit of 1.7 cents per kWe-hr is equivalent to a credit of $70 per avoided metric ton of carbon if the electricity were to come from coal plants, (or $160 from natural gas plants). Of course the carbon emission reduction would continue after the public assistance ended for the plant life (perhaps 60 years for nuclear).

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Solvency – General/Catch-all IFR Good Developing IFR’s is critical to averting the waste, safety, and proliferation problems associated with the current global expansion of nuclear power Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William H, Gerald, and George – nuclear physicists retired from Argonne Nat’l Laboratory, Scientific American, December, http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0512hannum.pdf] Despite long-standing public concern about the safety of nuclear energy, more and more people are realizing that it may be the most environmentally friendly way to generate large amounts of electricity. Several nations, including Brazil, China, Egypt, Finland, India, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea and Vietnam, are building or planning nuclear plants. But this global trend has not as yet extended to the U.S., where work on the last such facility began some 30 years ago. If developed sensibly, nuclear power could be truly sustainable and essentially inexhaustible and could operate without contributing to climate change. In particular, a relatively new form of nuclear technology could overcome the principal drawbacks of current methods – namely, worries about reactor accidents, the potential for diversion of nuclear fuel into highly destructive weapons, the management of dangerous, longlived radioactive waste, and the depletion of global reserves of economically available uranium. This nuclear fuel cycle would combine two innovations: pyrometallurgical processing (a high-temperature method of recycling reactor waste into fuel) and advanced fastneutron reactors capable of burning that fuel. With this approach, the radioactivity from the generated waste could drop to safe levels in a few hundred years, thereby eliminating the need to segregate waste for tens of thousands of years. IFR’s are key to protecting the biosphere – they are safe and solve uranium mining, warming, and nuclear waste Berkeley Dept of Nuclear Engineering ’03 [July 25, “Introduction to Argonne Nat’l Lab’s IFR Program,” http://www.nuc.berkeley.edu/designs/ifr/anlw.html] The IFR story is important to the world because the very foundation of an industrial society depends on inexpensive and abundant energy. The IFR can provide the base energy supplies needed,
and with very little impact on the environment. Mining of fuel for the IFR is not needed for several hundred years. The IFR does not produce gases or other effluents that would harm the biosphere. The long-term waste problem, of concern today, no longer is a problem with the IFR. In addition, the IFR should be economic and a safe, easy to operate plant. These features make the IFR the candidate for the next generation

nuclear power plant.

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IFR’s solve all the problems associated with current forms of nuclear power Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] Do we need a new kind of reactor? What's wrong with what we have now? IFRs could reduce or eliminate significant difficulties that beset thermal-reactor fuel cycles - problems or concerns with: * production and build-up of plutonium * short-term management of plutonium * disposition and long-term management of plutonium * plutonium in national and international commerce * other proliferation concerns * long-term waste management * environmental effects * resource conservation * long-term energy supply * safety IFR’s are vital to ensure long-term energy supplies without a nuclear waste problem Till, 1997 [Dr. Charles, nuclear physicist, Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/interviews/till.html]
The reuse of recycled fuel in the IFR is where the potential great benefits lie, in the solution of the waste problem, in the sense that the waste is much easier to get rid of. And then the plants don't have to, as they do today, simply build up the spent fuel in pools and wonder what on earth are they going to do with it. There's nobody today who can tell you how much it's going to cost to get rid of that spent fuel. The utility today, because of agreements, can give it to the Department of Energy, and at a very low price, if they can convince the Department of Energy to take it. And it seems to me they will succeed and are succeeding in doing that. But now the Department of Energy has got a problem. And how much that will cost the nation there's no way of predicting. The IFR gets at those problems. But really the powerful argument for nuclear is not whether it's necessary today. It produces 20% of our nation's electricity. That's a lot of electricity. That's a lot of benefit. But the real benefit of it is in the decades and the centuries to come, where you [could] have an energy source that you can count on, and not to wonder, you know, whether we have ten more years of reserves or 50 more years of reserves or whatever. It takes away that problem entirely. Now, in having done that, to do that in a way that the reactors are safe, that they don't contribute to proliferation, and that they have a fairly easily disposable waste product, in my view, that's a wonderful thing. And that was the promise and is the promise.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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59 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Solvency – Argonne IFR Program
Real world testing proves IFR’s are commercially viable, safe, and superior to all current forms of nuclear power Berkeley Dept of Nuclear Engineering ’03 [July 25, “Introduction to Argonne Nat’l Lab’s IFR Program,” http://www.nuc.berkeley.edu/designs/ifr/anlw.html] The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) program was the nation's premier research and development effort focused on the basic design concepts and testing the next generation nuclear power plant. The IFR development work provides solutions in the areas of concern for today's nuclear plants. These solutions are integrated into a single, coherent nuclear plant concept. The work at Argonne included real-world testing, not just computer simulation, so that the results are not open to question. This was being done to allow larger, commercial plants to be built with confidence. The IFR work included research and development in plant safety, waste, transportation, economics, prevention of the diversion of nuclear materials, and includes a plant for which the fuel is so plentiful that fuel costs cannot reasonably outrun inflation. These important areas of focus are all included in the IFR, hence the name "Integral". The objective for this work was to determine the best approach for the design of the next generation nuclear plant -- to build on the excellent record of today's nuclear plant, but to simplify, integrate, and take maximum advantage of natural phenomenon for protection and operation. A system has been worked out in which a new fuel type has allowed major advances in improving safety, economics, and minimizing the need for waste storage. It is now clear that the IFR effort would have resulted in a "new and improved" nuclear plant -- one that can serve as the electric power source of choice for an energy hungry, but environmentally aware and concerned world.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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60 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

FYI – IFR types Current nuclear power is Generation 2 technology from the 70’s – the IFR would be far superior Hylko 08 [James, an integrated safety management specialist for Paducah Remediation Services LLC, Power; Apr2008, Vol. 152 Issue 4, p44] Three generations of nuclear power systems, derived from designs originally developed for naval use beginning in the late 1940s, are operating worldwide today (Figure 1). The first generation consisted of early prototype reactors from the 1950s and '60s, such as Shippingport (1957-1982), Dresden-1 (1960-1978), and Calder Hall-1 (1956-2003) in the UK. There are only two commercial Generation I (Gen I) plants still operating: Oldbury nuclear power station, owned by the British Nuclear Group and scheduled for closure this year, and Wylfa nuclear power station in Wales, scheduled for closure in 2010. The Gen II systems began operation in the 1970s and comprise the bulk of the world's 400+ commercial pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and boiling water reactors (BWRs). These reactors, typically referred to as light-water reactors (LWRs), use traditional "active" safety features involving electrical or mechanical operations available on command. Some engineered systems still operate passively (for example, using pressure relief valves) and function without operator control or loss of auxiliary power. Few Generation 3 reactors have been built – the Generation 4 IFR is key to solve Hylko 08 [James, an integrated safety management specialist for Paducah Remediation Services LLC, Power; Apr2008, Vol. 152 Issue 4, p44] A few Gen III plants have already been built. The most visible is an advanced BWR that entered service in Japan in 1996. None are in service today in the U.S., although the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) lists more than two dozen in its certification queue. All of the proposed reactor designs being scrutinized by the NRC are considered Generation III+ designs: Areva's evolutionary pressurized water reactor or EPR, GE's enhanced simplified BWR or ESBWR, Westinghouse's APR1000 as amended, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' advanced PWR or ABWR. The only examples of a Gen III reactor design in operation are six ABWRs, including four in Japan. Hitachi carefully honed its construction processes during the building of the Japanese units. For example, Kashiwazaki Kariwa Unit 7 broke ground on July 1, 1993, went critical on November 1, 1996, and began commercial operation on July 2, 1997 — four years and a day after the first shovel of dirt was turned. If the U.S. nuclear power industry were to adopt Hitachi's construction techniques (for details, see POWER, May 2007, p. 43) in coming years, many billions of dollars and years of time could be saved.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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61 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

The economic benefits of previous nuclear power systems prove our empirical solvency Hylko 08 [James, an integrated safety management specialist for Paducah Remediation Services LLC, Power; Apr2008, Vol. 152 Issue 4, p44] There's no denying that the first three generations of nuclear reactors have been economically successful, after enduring the usual reliability growing pains early in their lives. According to the Nuclear Energy Institute, U.S. nuclear power plants in 2006 supplied the second-highest amount of electricity in the industry's history while achieving a record-low average production cost of 1.66 cents/kWh. In fact, average production costs have been below 2 cents/kWh for the past eight years while capacity factors have remained higher than 90%. What's more, efficiency improvements to operations over the past decade have yielded the equivalent of some 20 new nuclear plants. The Gen III and Gen III+ systems began development in the 1990s by building on the operating experience of the American, Japanese, and Western European LWR fleets. Perhaps their most significant improvement over second-generation designs is the incorporation of "passive" safety features that do not require active controls or operator intervention; instead, they rely on gravity or natural convection to mitigate the impact of abnormal events. This feature, among others, will help expedite the reactor certification review process and thus shorten construction schedules. Once plants using the Gen III and Gen III+ reactors come on-line, they are expected to achieve higher fuel burn-up (reducing fuel consumption and waste production (see sidebar) and operate for up to 60 years. Generation 4 Reactors like the IFR will support the hydrogen economy while consuming nuclear wast Hylko 08 [James, an integrated safety management specialist for Paducah Remediation Services LLC, Power; Apr2008, Vol. 152 Issue 4, p44] Nuclear scientists have left implementation of the Gen III+ designs in steel and concrete to the engineers and moved on to developing the "generation after next" nuclear alternatives — commonly called Gen IV. Conceptually, Gen IV reactors have all of the features of Gen III+ units plus the ability to support hydrogen production, thermal energy off-taking, and perhaps even water desalination. In addition, these designs include advanced actinide management. An actinide is an element with an atomic number between 89 (actinium) and 103 (lawrencium); the term is usually applied to elements heavier than uranium, which are also called transuranics. Actinides are radioactive, typically have long half-lives, and constitute a significant portion of the spent fuel wastes from LWRs.

DOE support is key to develop Generation 4 nuclear technology

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62 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Hylko 08 [James, an integrated safety management specialist for Paducah Remediation Services LLC, Power; Apr2008, Vol. 152 Issue 4, p44] The DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) has taken responsibility for developing the science required for five different Gen IV technologies. The table summarizes the characteristics and operating parameters of six Gen IV reactor system alternatives, including the molten salt reactor, which is included for the sake of comprehensiveness even though the U.S. is not currently researching it. Each of the technology concepts has been prioritized to reflect its technology development status and its potential to meet the program's and national goals. In general, Gen IV systems include full actinide recycling and on-site fuel cycle facilities based on either advanced aqueous, pyrometallurgical, or other dry processing options. On-site reprocessing minimizes the transportation of nuclear materials, which increases the chance of their proliferation. The DOE has expanded its coordinating activities to include a number of national and international entities (see sidebar) and formed the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which emphasizes fast reactors and fuel reprocessing. IFR’s produce more efficient fission Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] And what do you mean by "fissile" and "fertile?"
An isotope is called "fertile" when the addition of a neutron changes it into a fissile isotope - one that, like U-235, has a very high probability of undergoing fission when exposed to thermal neutrons. Both fissile and fertile isotopes are fissionable - it's just that fertile ones require a high-energy neutron to make them split.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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63 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Advantage – prolif
Nuclear power is here to stay - now is the key time to exercise international leadership in the nuclear energy field Marsh '07 [Gerald, physicist at Argonne National Laboratory and consultant to the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations on strategic nuclear policy and technology. “Can the clash of civilizations produce alternative energy sources?” January, USA Today, http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0701marsh.pdf, accessed 7/17/08.] Despite longstanding public concern, nuclear power is by far the most ecologically sound way to generate large amounts of electricity. The environmental impact of nuclear power since its inception (and this includes the Chernobyl and Three Mile Island disasters) has been far less than that from the burning of fossil fuels for an equivalent amount of energy. Nuclear power is going to spread globally whether the U.S. plays a role or not. China brought six new reactors on-line between 2m2-M, and plans at least another 30 in the next 15 years. India is planning for 3O with seven due to come on-line by 2008. For nuclear power to spread through the developing world beyond these two counties without the threat of additional proliferation of nuclear weapons, we need a new model, hopefully one fashioned by the U.S. with its ability to structure the necessary international framework

An international solution for the problem of plutonium waste management is needed to address proliferation concerns
Stanford '01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html, accessed 7/17/08.] What about a 1994 report by the National Academy of Sciences ? The Washington Post said that the NAS report "denounces the idea of building new reactors to consume plutonium."That characterization of the report is a little strong, but it is true that the members of the NAS committee seem not to have been familiar with the plutonium-management potential of the IFR. They did, however, recognize the "plutonium mine" problem. They say (Executive Summary, p.3): "Because plutonium in spent fuel or glass logs incorporating high-level wastes still entails a risk of weapons use, and because the barrier to such use diminishes with time as the radioactivity decays, consideration of further steps to reduce the long-term proliferation risks of such materials is required, regardless of what option is chosen for [near-term] disposition of weapons plutonium. This global effort should include continued consideration of more proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycles, including concepts that might offer a long-term option for nearly complete elimination of the world's plutonium stocks." [Emphasis added.] The IFR, obviously, is just such a fuel cycle - a prime candidate for "continued consideration."

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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64 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Proliferation Inherency & Solvency
The US, while still a global non-proliferation leader, does not exert its former nonproliferation influence. Bengelsdorf & McGoldrick 07 [Harold D. Bengelsdorf, consultant, formerly held top positions with
US Atomic Energy Commission, US Department of Energy, former Senior office director in the Department of State for dealing with international nuclear and nonproliferation negotiations, and Fred McGoldrick, principal associate in global consulting firm Bengelsdorf, McGoldrick and Associates, LLC. Has held senior positions in the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency. THE U.S. DOMESTIC CIVIL NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE AND U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY. May 2007. American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness. <http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/images/COUNCIL_WHITE_PAPER_Final.pdf> Accessed: July 17, 2008 4:50 PM]

The health of the U.S. civil nuclear infrastructure can have an important bearing in a variety of ways on the ability of the United States to advance its nonproliferation objectives. During the Atoms for Peace Program and until the 1970s, the U.S. was the dominant supplier in the international commercial nuclear power market, and it exercised a strong leadership role in shaping the global nonproliferation regime. In those early days, the U.S. also had what was essentially a monopoly in the nuclear fuel supply market. This capability, among others, allowed the U.S. to promote the widespread acceptance of nonproliferation norms and restraints, including international safeguards and physical protection measures, and, most notably, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The United States concluded agreements for cooperation in peaceful nuclear energy with other states, which require strict safeguards, physical protection and other nonproliferation controls on their civil nuclear programs. Today due to its political, military and economic position in the world, the United States continues to exercise great weight in nonproliferation matters. However, the ability of the United States to promote its nonproliferation objectives through peaceful nuclear cooperation with other countries has declined. The fact that no new nuclear power plant orders have been placed in over three decades has led to erosion in the capabilities of the U.S. civil nuclear infrastructure. Moreover, during the same period, the U.S. share of the global nuclear market has declined significantly, and several other countries have launched their own nuclear power programs and have become major international suppliers in their own right. It is highly significant that all but one of the U.S. nuclear power plant vendors and nuclear fuel designers and manufactures for light water reactors have now been acquired by their nonU.S. based competitors. Thus, while the U.S. remains a participant in the international market for commercial nuclear power, it no longer enjoys a dominant role as it did four decades ago. To the extent that U.S. nuclear plant vendors and nuclear fuel designers and manufacturers are able to reassert themselves on a technical and commercial basis, opportunities for U.S. influence with respect to nuclear nonproliferation can be expected to increase. However, the fact that there are other suppliers that can now provide plants and nuclear fuel technology and services on a competitive commercial basis suggests that the U.S. will have to work especially hard to maintain and, in some cases, rebuild its nuclear infrastructure, if it wishes to exercise its influence in international nuclear affairs.

In order to regain its position as a global non-proliferation leader, the US must restore its nuclear reactor, enrichment services, and spent fuel disposal industries. Bengelsdorf & McGoldrick 07 [Harold D. Bengelsdorf, consultant, formerly held top positions with US Atomic Energy Commission, US Department of Energy, former
Senior office director in the Department of State for dealing with international nuclear and non-proliferation negotiations, and Fred McGoldrick, principal associate in global consulting firm Bengelsdorf, McGoldrick and Associates, LLC. Has held senior positions in the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency. THE U.S. DOMESTIC CIVIL NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE AND U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY. May 2007. American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness. <http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/images/COUNCIL_WHITE_PAPER_Final.pdf> Accessed: July 17, 2008 4:50 PM]

Further, the ability of the U.S. to develop improved and advanced nuclear technologies will depend on its ability to provide consistent and vigorous support for nuclear R&D programs that will enjoy solid bipartisan political support in order that they can be sustained from one administration to another. As the U.S. Government expends taxpayer funds on the Nuclear Power 2010 program, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, the Generation IV initiative and other programs, it should consider the benefit to the U.S. industrial base and to U.S. non-proliferation posture as criteria in project design and source selection where possible. Finally, the ability of the United States to resolve its own difficulties in managing its spent fuel and nuclear wastes will be crucial to maintaining the credibility of the U.S. nuclear power program and will be vital to implementing important new nonproliferation initiatives designed to discourage the spread of sensitive nuclear facilities to other countries.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Hester / Bormann / Stevenson

65 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Proliferation Solvency
In order to regain its position as a global non-proliferation leader, the US must restore its nuclear reactor, enrichment services, and spent fuel disposal industries. Bengelsdorf & McGoldrick 07 [Harold D. Bengelsdorf, consultant, formerly held top positions with US Atomic Energy Commission, US Department of Energy, former
Senior office director in the Department of State for dealing with international nuclear and non-proliferation negotiations, and Fred McGoldrick, principal associate in global consulting firm Bengelsdorf, McGoldrick and Associates, LLC. Has held senior positions in the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency. THE U.S. DOMESTIC CIVIL NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE AND U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY. May 2007. American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness. <http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/images/COUNCIL_WHITE_PAPER_Final.pdf> Accessed: July 17, 2008 4:50 PM]

As the sole superpower, the U.S. will have considerable, on-going influence on the international nonproliferation regime, regardless of how active and successful it is in the nuclear export market. However, the erosion of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure has begun to weaken the ability of the U.S. to participate actively in the international nuclear market. If the U.S. becomes more dependent on foreign nuclear suppliers or if it leaves the international nuclear market to other suppliers, the ability of the U.S. to influence nonproliferation policy will diminish. It is, therefore, essential that the United States have vibrant nuclear reactor, enrichment services, and spent fuel storage and disposal industries that can not only meet the needs of U.S. utilities but will also enable the United States to promote effective safeguards and other nonproliferation controls through close peaceful nuclear cooperation with other countries. U.S. nuclear exports can be used to influence other states’ nuclear programs through the nonproliferation commitments that the U.S. requires. The U.S. has so-called consent rights over the enrichment, reprocessing and alteration in form or content of the nuclear materials that it has provided to other countries, as well as to the nuclear materials that are produced from the nuclear materials and equipment that the U.S. has supplied.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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66 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

An effective non-proliferation regime requires constructive engagement and cooperation between partner states. Bengelsdorf & McGoldrick 07 [Harold D. Bengelsdorf, consultant, formerly held top positions
with US Atomic Energy Commission, US Department of Energy, former Senior office director in the Department of State for dealing with international nuclear and non-proliferation negotiations, and Fred McGoldrick, principal associate in global consulting firm Bengelsdorf, McGoldrick and Associates, LLC. Has held senior positions in the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency. THE U.S. DOMESTIC CIVIL NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE AND U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY. May 2007. American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness. <http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/images/COUNCIL_WHITE_PAPER_Final.pdf> Accessed: July 17, 2008 4:50 PM]

The years since the initiation of the Atoms for Peace Program have shown the vital connection between the conduct of peaceful international nuclear trade and the fostering of nonproliferation norms and legal commitments. Nuclear trade has enabled some governments -- especially the United States -- to lay the basis for an effective nonproliferation regime. During the 1950s and 1960s, the United States used the influence stemming from its position as a dominant supplier of nuclear technology to forge various elements of today's nonproliferation regime. Indeed there have been two important principles underlying the current approach to nonproliferation. First, there has been a widespread recognition that international nuclear cooperation is unlikely to occur unless it is based on a solid foundation of safeguards, assurances of peaceful use, effective physical protection, and other controls designed to prevent the diversion of civil nuclear programs to explosive purposes. Secondly, an effective nonproliferation regime cannot be based solely on a system of denials, constraints and controls. It must also involve constructive engagement with, and promotion of peaceful nuclear programs in cooperating partner states. Perhaps the main achievement of the Atoms for Peace Program is that

states pledged to forego nuclear weapons and to accept international inspections of their nuclear programs in return for receiving technical assistance and other forms of peaceful nuclear cooperation. Acceptance of international inspections was an unprecedented
intrusion on national sovereignty and a truly revolutionary development in international politics. Indeed, states would never have been willing to forego the manufacture of nuclear weapons and to accept such infringements on their sovereignty, unless they had sufficient incentives to do so. Non-nuclear-weapon

states would never have accepted international safeguards and no-explosive use pledges without receiving the quid pro quo contained in Article IV of the NPT, which affirms the “inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty” ….. and affirms that, “All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”

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67 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Proliferation - SQ Fails
Existing plutonium is ripe for proliferation - but IFRs can eliminate this concern Stanford '01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory,
http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html, accessed 7/17/08.] Does the plutonium now existing and being produced by thermal reactors raise any proliferation concerns for the long term. It certainly does. As I said earlier, burying the spent fuel from today's thermal reactors creates geological deposits of plutonium whose desirability for weapons use is continually improving. Some 30 countries now have thermal-reactor programs, and the number will grow. To conceive of that many custodial programs being maintained effectively for that long is a challenge to the imagination. Since the IFR can consume plutonium, it can completely eliminate this long-term concern.

The status quo is a recipe for disaster. A lack of safeguards and the inevitable spread of PUREX reprocessing creates a dangerous environment for proliferation Stanford '01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html, accessed 7/17/08.]
You mentioned safeguards a while ago. Are you saying that IFRs need to be safeguarded? Of course. Any kind of nuclear fuel cycle needs safeguards procedures, the most important job being to make sure that a power reactor is not operated so as to produce high-quality plutonium. The IFR is no exception, although it might be more easily safeguarded than other cycles. Are there now any reactors that are not safeguarded? Unfortunately, yes. A number of countries, such as India, Pakistan, and Israel, have not yet signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and do not permit all of their reactors to be inspected by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). Why should there be IFRs if a country could expel the inspectors and make bombs? Because a country could do that with any kind of reactor, and overall the IFR is by far the most proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycle. Better than the thermalreactor throw-away cycle? Near-term, it's comparable - quite possibly better. But when you factor in the long term (no plutonium mines), it's the clear winner. And the IFR is far better than anything involving PUREX - which will inevitably be used increasingly in at least some countries, unless they go to IFRtype reactors.

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68 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Strong US civil nuclear capabilities allow the US to control nonproliferation discussions on an international scale. Bengelsdorf & McGoldrick 07 [Harold D. Bengelsdorf, consultant, formerly held top positions with
US Atomic Energy Commission, US Department of Energy, former Senior office director in the Department of State for dealing with international nuclear and nonproliferation negotiations, and Fred McGoldrick, principal associate in global consulting firm Bengelsdorf, McGoldrick and Associates, LLC. Has held senior positions in the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency. THE U.S. DOMESTIC CIVIL NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE AND U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY. May 2007. American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness. <http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/images/COUNCIL_WHITE_PAPER_Final.pdf> Accessed: July 17, 2008 4:50 PM]

In the early days of the nuclear era, the U.S. essentially had a monopoly in the nuclear fuel supply market. This capability, among others, allowed the U.S. to promote the widespread acceptance of nonproliferation norms and restraints, including international safeguards and physical protection measures, and, most notably, the NPT. The United States concluded agreements for cooperation in peaceful nuclear energy with other states, which require strict safeguards, physical protection and other nonproliferation controls on their civil nuclear programs. Moreover, the strength of U.S. civil nuclear capabilities gave it an important seat at the international table, not only in negotiating the norms that should govern the conduct of civil nuclear power programs to protect against their misuse or diversion to nuclear weapons, but also in shaping the key elements of the global nonproliferation regime. In addition domestic U.S. nuclear programs have enabled the United States to make important contributions to achieving technical improvements in international safeguards, physical protection, and nuclear detection systems. However, the challenges now confronting the international nonproliferation regime come at a time when the U.S. commercial share of the global nuclear market has declined and when there are serious concerns about the health of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure.

The US’ shift away from closed-cycle fuel processing has resulted in a forfeit of technical leadership in reprocessing…to the FRENCH. Bengelsdorf & McGoldrick 07 [Harold D. Bengelsdorf,
consultant, formerly held top positions with US Atomic Energy Commission, US Department of Energy, former Senior office director in the Department of State for dealing with international nuclear and non-proliferation negotiations, and Fred McGoldrick, principal associate in global consulting firm Bengelsdorf, McGoldrick and Associates, LLC. Has held senior positions in the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency. THE U.S. DOMESTIC CIVIL NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE AND U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY. May 2007. American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness. <http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/images/COUNCIL_WHITE_PAPER_Final.pdf> Accessed: July 17, 2008 4:50 PM]

During the late 1970s the U.S. made a notable change in its policies toward the back end of the fuel cycle and advanced nuclear reactor technology. Like a few other countries, the U.S. had earlier visualized the ultimate deployment of the closed fuel cycle, i.e., reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to extract usable nuclear fuel for recycling in fast reactors that can more effectively use the recovered nuclear fuel. However, in 1976 the U.S. Government terminated all work on reprocessing and elected to proceed with the once-through fuel cycle (i.e., spent nuclear fuel is permanently disposed of without reprocessing). The Government took the position that this was the preferable way to proceed from a nonproliferation and economic perspective. In fact, it undertook a major effort to induce other advanced fuel cycle states, including France, Japan and the UK to abandon their own plans for spent fuel reprocessing. However, while most countries have not proceeded with reprocessing programs, several countries that employ nuclear energy extensively have continued with a closed fuel cycle approach that is centered around the use of mixed oxide (MOX) fuels. France and the UK offer commercial reprocessing services and MOX fabrication for other countries. Japan has recently begun operation of a commercial scale reprocessing facility, plans the wide-scale use of MOX fuel, and has a long-term plan to commercialize the fast reactor. The U.S. has no commercial reprocessing or MOX fuel fabrication plant. Much of the technological leadership in reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication is now in France, and French technology is even being used in the MOX fuel fabrication plant being constructed at Savannah River for the disposition of excess U.S. weapons plutonium.

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69 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Proliferation - Carter Repro Ban
U.S. prohibitions on spent fuel reprocessing have not been modeled elsewhere in the international community Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford '05 [William H, Gerald, and George – nuclear physicists retired from
Argonne Nat'l Laboratory. “Smarter use of nuclear waste.” Scientific American, December, http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0512hannum.pdf, accessed 7/17/08.] Nuclear-weapons designers require plutonium with a very high plutonium 239 isotopìc content, whereas plutonium from commercial p6wer plants usually contains substantial quantities of the other isotopes of plutonium, making it difficult to use in a bomb. Nevertheless, use of plutonium from spent fuel in weapons is not inconceivable. Hence, President Jimmy Carter banned civilian reprocessing of nuclear fuel in the U.S. in 1977- He reasoned that if plutonium were not rècovered from spent fuel it could not be used to make bombs. Carter also wanted America to set an example for the rest of the world. France, Japan, Russia and the U.K. have not, however, followed suit, so plutonium reprocessing for use in power plants continues in a number of nations.

IFR technology makes Carter’s fuel reprocessing ban obsolete Stanford '01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory,
http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html, accessed 7/17/08.] How does the IFR square with U.S. policy of discouraging plutonium production, reprocessing and use? It is entirely consistent with the intent of that policy - to render plutonium as inaccessible for weapons use as possible. The wording of the policy, however, is now obsolete. How so? It was formulated before the IFR's pyroprocessing and electrorefining technology was known - when "reprocessing" was synonymous with PUREX, which creates plutonium of the chemical purity needed for weapons. Since now there is a fuel cycle that promises to provide far-superior management of plutonium, the policy has been overtaken by events.

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70 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Proliferation - IFRs Solve
The IFR utilizes a unique form of fuel reprocessing that eliminates the potential for proliferation Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford '05 [William H, Gerald, and George – nuclear physicists retired from
Argonne Nat'l Laboratory. “Smarter use of nuclear waste.” Scientific American, December, http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0512hannum.pdf, accessed 7/17/08.] WHEN THE BAN was issued, "reprocessing" was synonymous with the PUREX (for plutonium uranium extraction) method; a technique developed to meet the need for chemically pure plutonium for atomic weapons. Advanced fast-neutron reactor technology however, permits an alternative recycling strategy that does not involve pure plutonium at any stage. Fast reactors can thus minimize the risk that spent fuel from energy production would be used for weapons production, while providing a unique ability to squeeze the maximum energy out of nuclear fuel.

IFR’s solve for proliferation - convention reactors cannot Hannum, Wade, McFarlane and Hill 97[W.H., D.C., H.F., R.N. “Nonproliferation and safeguard aspects of
the IFR (abstract). Progress in Nuclear Energy, Volume 31, #1, http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/01491970/1997/00000031/00000001/art00012. Accessed 7/17/08] The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) has declared that the large and growing stocks of plutonium from weapons dismantlement in the U.S. and the former Soviet Union FSU are a ''clear and present danger'' to peace and security. Moreover, the opinion of some experts that plutonium of any isotopic blend is a proliferation threat (Mark, 1993) has been well publicized, heightening the concern that plutonium produced in the civilian fuel cycle is itself a proliferation threat. Assuring that separated plutonium, from dismantled warheads as well as from civilian power programs, is under effective control has (again) become a high priority of U.S. diplomacy. One pole of the debate on how to manage this material is to declare it to be a waste, and to search for some way to dispose of it safely, securely, and permanently. The other pole is to view it as an energy resource and to safeguard it against diversion, putting it into active use in the civilian power program. The ultimate choice cannot be separated from the long-term strategy for use of peaceful nuclear power. Continued use of a once-through fuel cycle will lead to an ever-increasing quantity of excess plutonium--requiring safeguarding. Alternatively, recycling the world's stocks of plutonium in fast reactors, contrary to common misconception, will cap the world supply of plutonium and hold it in working inventories for generating power. Transition from the current-generation light water cooled reactors (LWRs) to a future fast-reactor-based nuclear energy supply under international safeguards would, henceforth, limit world plutonium inventories to the amount necessary and useful for power generation, with no further excess production. The IFR offers complete recycle of plutonium, and indeed, of all transuranics, with essentially no transuranics sent to waste, so the need for perpetual safeguards of Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) waste is eliminated. The pyro-recycle process is more proliferation resistant than the current plutonium-uranium extraction process (PUREX) because at every step of the IFR recycle process the materials meet the ''spent-fuel standard.'' The scale of IFR recycle equipment is compatible with colocation of power reactors and their recycle facility, eliminating off-site transportation and storage of plutonium-bearing materials. Self-protecting radiation levels are unavoidable at all steps of the IFR cycle, and the resulting limitation of access contributes to making covert diversion of material from an IFR very difficult to accomplish and easy to detect. Material diverted either covertly or overtly from the IFR fuel cycle would be difficult (relative to material available by other means, such as LWR spent fuel) to process into weapons feedstock.

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71 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

The fuel recycling method utilized in the IFR uniquely addresses nuclear proliferation concerns Stanford '01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory,
http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html, accessed 7/17/08. You mentioned the best argument against the IFR. What is the best argument for it? Proliferation prevention. Near-term, the IFR makes PUREX illegitimate and plutonium inaccessible. Long term, it relieves future generations of the responsibility to guard the plutonium mines, and of the risks of not guarding them adequately. There's another huge benefit, of course. If nothing better comes along, the IFR can supply the world with pollution-free energy for thousands of years. What's so important about plutonium? High-quality plutonium is the preferred bomb material for a sophisticated nuclear weapons program. It is even possible to make a nuclear explosive with low-quality plutonium, such as is found in power reactors. If you're going to talk about "PUREX" and "plutonium mines" you should say what they are. First, what's PUREX? It [is] a chemical process developed for the nuclear weapons program, to separate plutonium from everything else that comes out of a reactor. Weapons require very pure plutonium, and that's what PUREX delivers. The pyroprocess used in the IFR is very different. It not only does not, it cannot, produce plutonium with the chemical purity needed for weapons. Why do you keep referring to "chemical" purity? Because chemical and isotopic quality are two different things. Plutonium for a weapon has to be pure chemically. Weapons designers also want good isotopic quality - that is, they want at least 93% of their plutonium to consist of the isotope Pu-239. A chemical process does not separate isotopes. I see. Now, what about the "plutonium mines?" When spent fuel or vitrified reprocessing waste from thermal reactors is buried, the result is a concentrated geological deposit of plutonium. As its radioactivity decays, those deposits are sources of raw material for weapons, becoming increasingly attractive over the next 100,000 years and more (the half-life of Pu-239 being 24,000 years).

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72 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Proliferation - IFRs Solve
IFRs eradicate supplies of weapons-grade plutonium, preventing proliferation Stanford '01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory,
http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html, accessed 7/17/08. You listed, back at the beginning, some problems that the IFR would ameliorate. A lot of those problems are obviously related to proliferation of nuclear weapons. Definitely. For instance, although thermal reactors consume more fuel than they produce, and thus are not called "breeders," they inescapably are prolific breeders of plutonium, as I said. And that poses serious concerns about nuclear proliferation. And proliferation concerns are even greater when fuel from thermal reactors is recycled, since the PUREX method is used. IFRs have neither of those drawbacks. Why does it seem that there is more proliferation-related concern about plutonium than about uranium? Can't you make bombs from either? Yes. The best isotopes for nuclear explosives are U-235, Pu-239, and U-233. Only the first two of those, however, have been widely used. All the other actinide isotopes, if present in appreciable quantity, in one way or another complicate the design and construction of bombs and degrade their performance. Adequate isotopic purity is therefore important, and isotopic separation is much more difficult than chemical separation. Even so, with plutonium of almost any isotopic composition it is technically possible to make an explosive (although designers of military weapons demand plutonium that is at least 94% Pu-239), whereas if U-235 is sufficiently diluted with U-238 (which is easy to do and hard to undo), the mixture cannot be used for a bomb. High-quality plutonium is the material of choice for a large and sophisticated nuclear arsenal, while highly enriched uranium would be one of the easier routes to a few crude nuclear explosives. Where is the best place for plutonium? Where better than in a reactor plant - particularly an IFR facility, where there is never pure plutonium (except some, briefly, when it comes in from dismantled weapons), where the radioactivity levels are lethal, and where the operations are done remotely under an inert, smothering atmosphere? Once enough IFRs are deployed, there never will need to be plutonium outside a reactor plant - except for the then-diminishing supply of plutonium left over from decades of thermal-reactor operation.

The IFR’s fuel recycling methods make plutonium extraction an impossibility Stanford '01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory,
http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html, accessed 7/17/08.] Why is the IFR better than PUREX? Doesn't "recycling" mean separation of plutonium, regardless of the method? No, not in the IFR - and that misunderstanding accounts for some of the opposition. The IFR's pyroprocessing and electrorefining method is not capable of making plutonium that is pure enough for weapons. If a proliferator were to start with IFR material, he or she would have to employ an extra chemical separation step. But there is plutonium in IFRs, along with other fissionable isotopes. Seems to me that a proliferator could take some of that and make a bomb. Some people do say that, but they're wrong, according to expert bomb designers at Livermore National Laboratory. They looked at the problem in detail, and concluded that plutonium-bearing material taken from anywhere in the IFR cycle was so ornery, because of inherent heat, radioactivity and spontaneous neutrons, that making a bomb with it without chemical separation of the plutonium would be essentially impossible - far, far harder than using today's reactor-grade plutonium. So? Why wouldn't they use chemical separation? First of all, they would need a PUREX-type plant - something that does not exist in the IFR cycle. Second, the input material is so fiendishly radioactive that the processing facility would have to be more elaborate than any PUREX plant now in existence. The operations would have to be done entirely by remote control, behind heavy shielding, or the operators would die before getting the job done. The installation would cost millions, and would be very hard to conceal. Third, a routine safeguards regime would readily spot any such modification to an IFR plant, or diversion of highly radioactive material beyond the plant. Fourth, of all the ways there are to get plutonium - of any isotopic quality - this is probably the all-time, handsdown hardest.

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73 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Proliferation - IFRs Solve
Combined with safeguards, IFRs would drastically reduce opportunities for rogue state proliferation Stanford '01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory,
http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html, accessed 7/17/08.] But suppose a country wanted to make some bombs, and had nothing but an IFR? If their IFR plants were safeguarded, the material in the processing stream would be highly undesirable, as I explained earlier, and their chances of diverting it undetected would be slim indeed. If not safeguarded, they could do what they could do with any other reactor - operate it on a special cycle to produce good quality weapons material. But in either case, most likely they would do what everyone else has done: construct a special production facility. Detecting such a clandestine facility is probably the main, immediate challenge facing international safeguards, and has nothing to do with whether a country has IFRs or LWRs.

IFRs readily address nuclear proliferation and terrorism concerns Hannum, Marsh and Stanford 07 [William H, Gerald E, and George S. nuclear physicists retired from
Argonne Nat'l Laboratory. "Recycling Nuclear Waste." American Physical Society Special Session on Nuclear Reprocessing, Nuclear Proliferation, and Terrorism, 15 April, http://www.gemarsh.com/wpcontent/uploads/Recycling_APS_07.pdf. Accessed 7/15/08] There are technologies available that will allow recycle of nuclear fuel without producing separated plutonium. These technologies also resolve concerns over its disposal by converting what is otherwise a highly controversial waste into a major energy resource. They will lead to a modest but significant reduction in the threats of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, by dramatically reducing the stockpiles of material subject to diversion.

The IFR eliminates the market for plutonium commerce Stanford '01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html, accessed 7/17/08.]
You explained why the IFR is "fast." Now, why is it "integral?” "Integral" refers to the fact that the fuel processing facility can be an integral part of the IFR plant. Is that important? Very, if you are concerned about shipments of plutonium and spent fuel - if you want to minimize national and international commerce in plutonium.I think it is U.S. policy to discourage commerce in plutonium.Yes, it is. And these days there certainly is commerce in plutonium - witness the controversial shipment of plutonium from France to Japan a few years ago, and the current controversy in England over a reprocessing plant at Sellafield. For the foreseeable future, and beyond, there will be no plutonium shipped out of IFR plants. The only shipments will be into them, from dismantled weapons and thermal reactors. Those are not extra shipments, but ones that otherwise would be to repositories. Thus the IFR all but eliminates commerce in plutonium. How can that be? An IFR plant will be a "sink" for plutonium: plutonium to be disposed of is shipped in, and there it is consumed, with on-site recycling as needed. Only trace amounts ever come out.

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74 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Proliferation - IFRs Solve
IFRs can swallow up entire stocks of massive nuclear weapons Till, 1997 [Dr. Charles, nuclear physicist, Argonne National Laboratory,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/interviews/till.html, accessed 7/17/08.] Q: So when you say the source is the waste, you're saying you don't have to mine any more uranium for a while. What could you use? Can you use weapons material? Can you use waste from reactors?A: You could use any and all of those things. [If] the weapons stocks are being reduced, as they are today, an ideal way to use that plutonium would be in an IFR. If the policy of the nation were to allow recycling of spent fuel that is a problem now for present day plants, it would be a wonderful [fuel for IFRs]. If in fact IFRs use uranium so effectively, my guess is, you could probably make a few parts per million in sea water. It really does allow an energy source that is unlimited. Q: Now, what about the issue of proliferation, the issue of making plutonium available to terrorists? A: The object in the IFR demonstration was to invent, if you like, a process that did not allow separations of pure plutonium that would be necessary for weapons. In order to recycle, you need some kind of a chemical process. And the chemical process that was invented here at Argonne used quite different principles than present processes do. It allows the separation of that group of things that are useful, but not one from the other, so that you cannot separate plutonium purely from uranium and the other things. You can separate uranium, plutonium, and the other useful things from the fission products. So it does exactly what you want it to do. It gives you the new fuel, and it separates off the waste product, but it doesn't allow careful distinguishing between the materials that are useful, such that you could use one or another of those materials for weapons.Q: So it would be very difficult to handle for weapons, would it? A: It's impossible to handle for weapons, as it stands. It's highly radioactive. It's highly heat producing. It has all of the characteristics that make it extremely, well, make it impossible for someone to make a weapon.

Politicians don’t understand nuclear technology - IFRs don’t increase proliferation Till, 1997 [Dr. Charles, nuclear physicist, Argonne National Laboratory,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/interviews/till.html, accessed 7/17/08. Q: The argument most put on the Senate floor was that the IFR increases the risks of proliferation. A: Yes. Well, it doesn't. As simply as that. There's no technical reason why one would make that argument. In order to produce weapons, you have to produce pure plutonium. The IFR process will not do that. The only possible argument that would hold any water whatsoever was that when showing people that plutonium is not the demon substance that it's been advertised as being, that, in fact, it's quite a workaday material, that in some way or other, the familiarity of it could be used to say that it doesn't hold the terrors that it's supposed to hold, and so, perhaps, more tempting in some way for someone to try to misuse it. But I mean, that's a far-out kind of argument, it seems to me, compared to the unquestioned benefits from simply using this stuff to produce energy.Q: But they were arguing that this made the world less safe. Would you say the opposite, or what? A: No, I would say completely the opposite. Modern society runs on energy. This gives a wonderful, clean form of energy. Its possibility for misuse for weapons goes against the history of the development of nuclear energy over the last 50 years. If weapons are going to be produced, they're going to be produced by making plutonium in facilities that specifically make weaponsgrade plutonium, because that's the kind that the weapon designer needs. The IFR doesn't do that.

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75 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Proliferation - IFRs Solve
IFRs can power a hub-and-spoke rental system to further reduce the potential for proliferation Lightfoot, et al 2006 [H Douglas, Global Environmental Climate Change Center; Wallace Manheimer, Naval
Research Lab; Daniel Meneley, Engineer Emeritus, AECL; George Stanford, Argonne Nat'l Lab; September 12, "Nuclear Fission Fuel is Inexhaustible," http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0609lightfoot.pdf, accessed 7/17/08.] It has been suggested that the threat of proliferation can be further reduced by means of a 'hub-spoke" arrangement. Under one variant, there would be secure energy parks where fast breeders or a fusion/fission hybrid would use uranium or thorium to generate fuel for small, plug-and-play "battery" reactors, 10 MWe and up, whose cores would be rented as sealed units to countries needing electric generators. After a lifetime of 15-30 years the core would be traded to the energy center for another. The reactors could be multi-purpose-for process heat and desalination, as well as generating electricity [Manheimer, 1999] [Wade, 20001 [Feiveson, 2001].

Nuclear proliferation is not possible from reactors. World Nuclear Association 07 (safeguards against nuclear proliferation,http://www.worldnuclear.org/why/safeguards.html, July 15) A nuclear reactor is not a potential bomb, and its fuel is not an explosive. The raw material in nuclear weapons can only be made by a substantial military project. Nine nations have developed nuclear weapons. More that 190 governments have committed not to develop such weapons - and have accepted IAEA inspections designed to detect a nuclear weapons project. All nuclear material requires rigorous care. But the use of nuclear energy to make electricity has not contributed to the danger of nuclear weapons or to their proliferation.

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76 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Misc FRs reduce prolif risk
Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William, Gerald, and George – retired nuclear physicists from Argonne Nat’l Lab, January 2, http://www.nationalcenter.org/PurexPyro.html]

Any nation that is determined to acquire nuclear weapons can and will do so, regardless of U.S. recycle policy. What the U.S. can and must do is promote an international environment that reduces the incentive to proliferate and enforces international safeguards. Safeguards involve physical protection, technical steps, and information control, including intelligence measures. This discussion is limited to technical matters. It is perhaps legitimate to ask whether the technical aspects of various recycle technologies should be classified, but that is beyond the scope of this discussion (anyway, it may already be too late). The current IAEA approach to controlling nuclear terrorism is inadequate. The system is based on international verification of the signatory states' compliance and rigid commitments of intent. There are vast quantities of weapons-usable materials spread around the world, and in some cases these materials are under very lax controls. Even obtaining estimates of the quantities of such materials, let alone their location and security, is almost impossible. The most credible nuclear terrorist threat, a dirty bomb, requires only access to spent nuclear fuel, and the controls on this material in various parts of the world are minimal. Thus we are seriously dependent on additional information from intelligence and surveillance. The advanced separation technologies that have been studied and shown to be feasible present a minimal increase in risk. Such technologies constitute a considerably smaller proliferation or terrorism threat than the centrifuge. While they could be used by a well-funded and well-protected terrorist organization in doing part of the separation of plutonium from spent fuel, the facilities required for such a separation would be complex. The terrorists or proliferators would need, for example, to have a reasonably well shielded facility with remote manipulators (depending on how willing the operators were to accept high radiation doses). They also would need a staff with expertise in chemical separations. To produce weapons-usable materials, the facility would have to have equipment for complex chemical separations that would not be present in a recycle application, whether it contained an aqueous separations unit or not. Even if the recycle system included an aqueous unit for the initial separation, the operating parameters for extracting weapons-useable plutonium would have to be significantly different, and therefore detectable under a suitable verification regime.

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77 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William, Gerald, and George – retired nuclear physicists from Argonne Nat’l Lab, January 2, http://www.nationalcenter.org/PurexPyro.html]

With fast-reactor recycle there will be better accounting for, and ultimately a reduction in, inventories of spent nuclear fuel; there will be a rethinking of technical safeguards approaches; and there will be a much greater incentive to have rigorous accounting of all nuclear materials. There will be dramatic reductions in the toxicity of wastes to be disposed of. Best current estimates are that fast-reactor recycle will reduce net long term toxicity by something like two orders of magnitude. The final wastes can easily be tailored to an appropriate form for optimum security: long-lived isotopes in a metallic waste form (which can be highly corrosion resistant in the repository), shorter lived materials in ceramic waste forms. Radioactivity in a repository will reach background levels in less than 500 years. With recycle integrated within a power generation complex, there will be a substantial reduction in transportation of nuclear fuel, both fresh and spent, with a concomitant reduction in opportunities for theft and sabotage. There will be no need for uranium mining or milling for the foreseeable future. No enrichment needed, ever. (Possession of a plant for isotopic separation, centrifuge or otherwise, would be ipso facto evidence of intention to proliferate.) Residues of depleted uranium from previous weapons programs become valuable resources, not waste that is difficult to handle and dispose of.

Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William, Gerald, and George – retired nuclear physicists from Argonne Nat’l Lab, January 2, http://www.nationalcenter.org/PurexPyro.html]

Since the matter comes up over and over again, we now consider the weapons usefulness of reactor grade plutonium. In policy circles, one of the great fears about nuclear power is its supposed connection to the spread of nuclear weapons. The usual statement is that "all plutonium is weapons usable," encouraging the inference that all plutonium is equally dangerous as a material for making nuclear weapons, which is incorrect.

Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William, Gerald, and George – retired nuclear physicists from Argonne Nat’l Lab, January 2, http://www.nationalcenter.org/PurexPyro.html]

While it is possible, using very sophisticated nuclear weapon designs, to get an explosive yield from reactor-grade plutonium, no country seeking nuclear weapons would use such material. As mentioned above, it is extremely difficult to design a weapon with reactor-grade plutonium. One problem, for example, is that so much heat is generated by that plutonium that when it is surrounded with high explosive to make a bomb, the explosive will decompose unless the assembly is equipped with very elaborate heat-removal features. Unsophisticated designers would not succeed. Furthermore, even with such problems solved, weapons made from reactorgrade plutonium have a yield that is highly unpredictable -- they would be very likely to "fizzle," producing no mushroom cloud at all. Thus their usefulness as a military weapon is questionable to say the least, and even as a terrorist weapon that will definitely fizzle, they are technically beyond the reach of subnational terrorist organizations.

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78 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William, Gerald, and George – retired nuclear physicists from Argonne Nat’l Lab, January 2, http://www.nationalcenter.org/PurexPyro.html]

To our knowledge, a test carried out by the United States in 1962 is the only one ever performed that incorporated reactor grade plutonium. Unfortunately the details of that test are still classified. We are not told, for example, what fraction of the bomb's fissile content was "reactor grade," nor are we told the isotopic composition of the "reactor grade plutonium," nor the fabrication complexities. The government has stated only that the yield was less than 20 kilotons. It could have been very much less. This information is almost useless, since neither the actual yield nor the yield to be expected with high-quality plutonium has been revealed. Without at least the ratio of those two quantities, one cannot determine the degradation in yield due to using reactor grade plutonium rather than weapons grade. Furthermore, the importance of heat generation in the assembly tested is unknown, but probably it was finessed in some way rather than handled as would be necessary in a real-life weapon that used only reactor grade plutonium. In short, we are denied the information that would let one evaluate the practical difficulties. In his 1993 paper, J. Carson Mark wrote: "The difficulties of developing an effective design of the most straightforward type are not appreciably greater with reactor-grade plutonium than those that have to be met for the use of weapons-grade plutonium."[4] That was based on his calculations, and on his apparent opinion that the heat problem is trivial. However, to our knowledge no weapons program, anywhere, ever, has made another attempt to produce an explosion with reactor-grade plutonium. It is extremely likely that the 1962 test demonstrated that reactor grade plutonium is lousy material for making bombs, and that no nation, given the data from that test, would want to use the stuff. While the difference in weapons potential is one of degree rather than principle, that difference is huge. The point is not that it can't be done, but rather that a would-be proliferator has far easier routes to nuclear weapons. All reactors and all plutonium should be safeguarded, but reactor-grade material will be used only when all routes to higher fissile quality (uranium or plutonium) are cut off.

Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William, Gerald, and George – retired nuclear physicists from Argonne Nat’l Lab, January 2, http://www.nationalcenter.org/PurexPyro.html]

By the way, it has sometimes been asserted that the chemically impure plutonium produced by the pyrometallurgical process could be used to make a bomb without further separation. This has been convincingly refuted in an unpublished investigation by Livermore National Laboratory (1994),which concluded that the transuranic impurities render the material far too hot (thermally and radioactively), and with far too many spontaneous neutrons, to make it at all feasible.

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79 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William, Gerald, and George – retired nuclear physicists from Argonne Nat’l Lab, January 2, http://www.nationalcenter.org/PurexPyro.html]

No technology that involves the handling of nuclear materials, including the current oncethrough fuel cycle, can be totally immune to misuse. Regarding the current and short-term threat of nuclear terrorism, the status quo is not optimum. Relying solely on the current IAEA verification approach is adequate for controlling neither the inventory of nuclear materials nor any of the recycle technologies, current or advanced. Rigorous safeguards, including monitoring, surveillance, and accountancy, are necessary. The advanced recycle technologies offer no net additional potential for terrorist or proliferator, and appear to be adaptable to rigorous safeguards. Since before the invention of fire, a new technology has always meant new risks. The genie, to be trite, cannot be put back in the bottle. In each case, society has learned to live with the risks in order to realize the benefits. All things considered, recycle of spent nuclear fuel to fast reactors will make a minimal contribution to the short-term risk of terrorism, provided that appropriate safeguards are instituted as an integral part of the process. In the longer term, recycle will significantly reduce the terrorist threat. Surely there can be no greater contribution to our national security than to lessen the tensions inherent in the world's massive dependence on oil.

Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William, Gerald, and George – retired nuclear physicists from Argonne Nat’l Lab, January 2, http://www.nationalcenter.org/PurexPyro.html]

Fast reactors have advantages in addition to a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle. They can consume plutonium and other long-lived actinides, reducing to less than 500 years the required isolation time for waste in a repository, postponing indefinitely the need for more repositories. They can get more than 100 times as much energy from uranium as the profligate once-through fuel cycle, and more than 50 times as much as thermal reactors with aqueous recycle.

Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William, Gerald, and George – retired nuclear physicists from Argonne Nat’l Lab, January 2, http://www.nationalcenter.org/PurexPyro.html]

The Union of Concerned Scientists, an eminent public-interest group, has issued the following statement: "UCS calls upon the Bush administration to pull the plug on reprocessing and encourage U.S. allies to do the same." However, advances in fast-reactor technology have made it inappropriate to use the word "reprocessing" generically, as though fuel cycles based on PUREX and pyroprocessing have equivalent proliferation potential. They don't. Continuing to prohibit recycling in the United States only aggravates the disposal problem and encourages the profligate waste of uranium resources. We therefore suggest that, to be consistent with its goals and values, UCS should modify its position to the following: "UCS calls on the Bush administration to pull the plug on aqueous reprocessing and encourage U.S. allies to do the same. Further, UCS also calls for initiating deployment of proliferation-resistant fast reactors, since they can consume virtually 100 percent of the low-quality plutonium produced by thermal reactors, along with the high-quality plutonium from weapons."

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80 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William, Gerald, and George – retired nuclear physicists from Argonne Nat’l Lab, January 2, http://www.nationalcenter.org/PurexPyro.html]

We all agree that the threat of nuclear terrorism is a matter of serious national and international concern. Today, any group with sufficient resources, along with access to current technology and to readily available materials, can make any of a variety of nuclear terrorist devices. There is also a wide range of terrorist threats involving WMD that are far more credible than nuclear terrorism. (We use the term "WMD" in its popular, all-inclusive sense, realizing nevertheless that the only true weapons of mass destruction are atomic bombs -- the others, including radiological weapons, being more properly characterized as "weapons of mass terror.") The relevant question is this: Is technology available that can reduce the threat of nuclearterrorism, or that can improve our energy posture or environment, without increasing the threat of nuclear terrorism or of nuclear-weapons proliferation? Note that this question is posed as a comparison, not an absolute. Any claim that a particular technology can guarantee that there will be no future nuclear terrorism threat or no potential for proliferation of nuclear weapons to more countries is either disingenuous or terribly naive.A well-conceived program of nuclear recycle can reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism without significantly affecting the potential for nuclear proliferation. It can greatly improve our energy independence, and drastically reduce the environmental challenges involved in energy production. The most notable benefit is in waste management: only the true waste will be left, whose activity will be below background in less than 500 years. It is important to realize that the nuclear fuel cycle can be "closed" (essentially all of the energy in the mined uranium exploited) only by consuming the actinides (uranium and transuranics) in a fast neutron spectrum.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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81 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William, Gerald, and George – retired nuclear physicists from Argonne Nat’l Lab, January 2, http://www.nationalcenter.org/PurexPyro.html]

Nuclear terrorism could involve dirty bombs or even nuclear weapons. Presumably they would be rather basic devices, unless the terrorists got more sophisticated weapons from a new or established nuclear- weapons state. Each possibility should be considered. Dirty Bombs. To many, dirty bombs are the most likely nuclear terrorist threat, even though they can do little physical damage. A dirty bomb could trigger panic, and could cause significant economic disruption due to the need to clean up the resultant contamination. To the extent that large-scale recycle would affect this threat, it would reduce it. Spent nuclear fuel would have economic value (perhaps minimal, at first)[1], which would provide the basis for improved accounting for spent fuels. Today, such accounting is unreliable, even worse than the world-wide accounting of more sensitive nuclear materials. Very significant is the fact that fast-reactor recycle would, in the long run, dramatically reduce the stores of old spent fuel, which, although only mildly selfprotecting, would still be disruptive if used in a dirty bomb. Terrorist Atomic Bombs. For a terrorist trying to construct a basic nuclear bomb, one of the main challenges is to acquire the weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. Enriched uranium is a serious concern because of the availability of centrifuge technology, even if the potential for subnational groups to use this technology is remote. Recycle (other than for consumption of excess weapons quality uranium) is irrelevant for a uranium-based device. The prospect of a terrorist group constructing a plutonium-based bomb is even more remote, because of the task's complexity. Nevertheless the possibility cannot be ignored. As Carson Mark points out, use of a poor grade of plutonium could well result in a "fizzle," but even this would be an effective terrorist weapon. Consequently the stewardship of nuclear materials in general, including recycle activity, must be subject to appropriate safeguards. This is discussed below.

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82 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Prolif Impacts
Proliferation ensures nuclear war and extinction Utgoff 2002 (Victor A., Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, Survival Vol 44 No 2 Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions, p. 87-90)
Many readers are probably wilting to accept that nuclear proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it needs to be

First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent's nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. Second, as the world approaches complete proliferation, the hazards posed by nuclear weapons today will be magnified many times over. Fifty or more nations capable of launching nuclear weapons means that the risk of nuclear accidents that could cause serious damage not only to their own populations and environments, but those of others, is hugely increased. The chances of such weapons falling into the hands of renegade military units or terrorists is far greater, as is the number of nations carrying out hazardous manufacturing and storage activities. Increased prospects for the occasional nuclear shootout Worse still, in a highly proliferated world there would be more frequent opportunities for the use of nuclear weapons. And more frequent opportunities means shorter expected times between conflicts in which nuclear weapons get used, unless the probability of use at any opportunity is actually zero. To be sure, some theorists on nuclear deterrence appear
established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And, for many reasons, it is not. to think that in airy confrontation between two states known to have reliable nuclear capabilities, the probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero." These theorists think that such states will be so fearful of escalation to nuclear war that they would always avoid or terminate confrontations between them, short of even conventional war. They believe this to be true even if the two states have different cultures or leaders with very eccentric personalities. History and human nature, however, suggest that they are almost surely wrong. History includes instances in which states known to possess nuclear weapons did engage in direct conventional conflict. China and Russia fought battles along their common border even after both had nuclear weapons. Moreover, logic suggests that if states with nuclear weapons always avoided conflict with one another, surely states without nuclear weapons would avoid conflict with states that had them. Again, history provides counter-examples. Egypt attacked Israel in 1973 even though it saw Israel as a nuclear power at the time. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and fought Britain's efforts to take them back, even though Britain had nuclear weapons. Those who claim that two states with reliable nuclear capabilities to devastate each other will not engage in conventional conflict risking nuclear

But history provides unhappy examples of states whose leaders were ready to choose suicide for themselves and their fellow citizens. Hitler tried to impose a 'victory or destruction' policy on his
war also assume that any leader from any culture would not choose suicide for his nation. people as Nazi Germany was going down to defeat.} And Japan's war minister, during debates on how to respond to the American atomic bombing, suggested 'Would it not be wondrous for the

, use of nuclear weapons in any particular instance may not be likely, but its probability would still be dangerously significant. In particular, human nature suggests that the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons is not a reliable guarantee against a disastrous first use of these weapons. While national leaders and their advisors everywhere are usually talented and experienced people, even their most important decisions cannot be counted on to be the product of well-informed and thorough assessments of all options from all relevant points of view. This is especially so when the stakes are so large as to defy assessment and there are substantial pressures to act quickly, as could be expected in intense and fast-moving crises between nuclear-armed states.' Instead, like other human beings, national leaders can be seduced by wishful thinking. They can misinterpret the words or actions of
whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower''- If leaders are willing to engage in conflict with nuclear-armed nations opposing leaders. Their advisors may produce answers that they think the leader wants to hear, or coalesce around what they know is an inferior decision because the group urgently needs the confidence or the sharing of responsibility that results from settling on something. Moreover, leaders may not recognise clearly where their personal or party interests diverge from those of their citizens They can refuse to believe that the worst could really happen, oversimplify the problem at hand, think in terms of simplistic analogies and play hunches. The intuitive rules for how individuals should respond to insults or signs of weakness in an opponent may too readily suggest a rash course of action. Anger, fear, greed, ambition and pride can all lead to bad decisions. The desire for a decisive solution to the problem at hand may lead to an unnecessarily extreme course of action. We can almost hear the kinds of words that could flow from discussions in nuclear crises or war. 'These people are not willing to die for this interest'. 'No sane person would actually use such weapons'. 'Perhaps the opponent will back down if we show him we mean business by demonstrating a willingness to use nuclear weapons'. 'If I don't hit them back really hard, I am going to be driven from office, if not killed'. Whether right or wrong, in the stressful atmosphere of a nuclear crisis or war, such words from others, or silently from within, might resonate too readily with a harried leader. Thus, both history and human nature suggest that nuclear deterrence can be expected to fail from time to time, and we are fortunate it has

. Under great stress, human beings can lose their ability to think carefully.

Once a conflict reaches the point where nuclear weapons are employed, the stresses felt by the leaderships would rise enormously. These stresses can be expected to further
not happened yet. But the threat of nuclear war is not just a matter of a few weapons being used. It could get much worse. degrade their decision-making. The pressures to force the enemy to stop fighting or to surrender could argue for more forceful and decisive military action, which might be the right thing to do in

. And the horrors of the carnage already suffered may be seen as justification for visiting the most devastating punishment possible on the enemy.' Again, history demonstrates how intense conflict can lead the combatants to escalate violence to the
the circumstances, but maybe not maximum possible levels. In the Second World War, early promises not to bomb cities soon gave way to essentially indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980's led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other's cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants beforehand.' Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such

proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.
anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread

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Prolif increases the risk of accidental wars that risk nuclear conflict SAGAN 2003, Stanford political science professor,
[Scott D., ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons’, p.79-80] First, some emergent nuclear powers lack the organizational and financial resources to produce adequate mechanical safety devices and safe weapons design features. Although all countries may start with “crude nuclear arsenals,” in Waltz’s terms, the weapons of poorer states will likely be more crude, and will remain so for a longer period of time. Evidence supposing this prediction can be found in the case of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, as United Nations inspectors discovered soon after the 1991 Persian Gulf War: The inspectors found out one other thing about the Iraqi bomb [design] - it is highly unstable. The design calls for cramming so much weapons-grade uranium into the core, they say, that the bomb would inevitably be on the verge of going off - even while sitting on the workbench. “It could go off if a rifle bullet hit it,” one inspector says, adding: “I wouldn’t want to be around it if it fell off the edge of this desk.”75 Second, the “opaque (or covert) nature of nuclear proliferation in the contemporary world exacerbates nuclear weapons safety problems. Fearing the international diplomatic consequences of a public crossing of the nuclear threshold, most new proliferants have developed weapons capabilities in a secret manner. Israel, India (until 1998), South Africa, Pakistan (until 1998) and possible North Korea fit this pattern. There are, however, both organizational and technical reasons to believe that this opaque path to nuclear weapons status is inherently less safe. Organizationally, the secrecy and tight compartmentalization of such programs suggests that there will not be thorough monitoring of safety efforts, and the lack of public debate about nuclear issues in such states increases the likelihood that narrow bureaucratic and military interests will not be challenged. (For example, even in the case of India - a very democratic state - the nuclear weapons complex is not thoroughly monitored and supervised by political leaders.76) Finally, an important technical constraint exacerbates the safety problems in such states: the inability to have full-scale nuclear weapons tests hinders the development of effective safety designs. For example, when the South African weapons engineers examined their first untested nuclear device, they considered it to be based on “an unqualified design that could not meet the rigid safety, security, and reliability specifications then under development.”77 The third reason why new nuclear states will be accident prone is that their tightcoupling problem will be significantly worse at the beginning of this experience with nuclear weapons, since they are in closer proximity to their expected adversaries than were the United States and the Soviet Union. At the start of the cold war, during the strategic bomber era, the super-powers had many hours to determine whether warning were real of false; later, in the 1960s, they had approximately thirty minutes to react to reports of ICBM attacks; and only after many years of experience with nuclear arsenals did they have to face less than ten minutes of warning time, once missile submarines were deployed off the coasts in the 1970s. New and potential future nuclear rivals - Iran and Iraq, India and Pakistan, North and South Korea will immediately have very small margins of error at the outset of nuclear rivalries, since they have contiguous borders with their adversaries. Moreover, the poorer of these states are likely to have less reliable warning systems trying to operate successfully in this more challenging environment. Fourth, the risk of an accidental nuclear war will be particularly high if the leader of a government of a new nuclear power, fearing a “decapitation attack” (an attack against the central leadership) by an enemy, delegates the authority to use nuclear weapons to lower level commanders. Proliferation optimists argue that this will not happen because they assume that the leaders of new proliferators would never delegate authority for the use of nuclear weapons to subordinate officers due to fears of coups or insubordination. Although we lack detailed information about nuclear predelegation decisions with new nuclear states, the evidence concerning predelegation of biological and chemical weapons authority in Iraq during the Gulf War supports a more alarming view that predelegation is likely and that it can produce serious risks of accidental war due to responses to false warnings.

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Nuclear deterrence fails – prolif leads to escalation and nuclear conflict Trachtenberg 2002, UCLA political science professor, [Marc, National Interest, Fall, lexis,]
Waltz does not approach the problem this way. For him, wars are started by one side or another. There is an attacker and a defender; with nuclear weapons, the attacker is deterred and war is avoided. "Where nuclear weapons threaten to make the cost of wars immense", he asks, "who will dare to start them?" The Soviet Union would have been deterred by any state that might have been able to deliver one or two simple fission bombs on Moscow. Indeed, he argues, "with nuclear weapons, any state will be deterred by another state's second-strike forces." "A nation", he says, "will be deterred from attacking even if it believes there is only a possibility that its adversary will retaliate." There is no doubt in Waltz's mind about this; for him, the deterrent effect is absolute: no one will start a war, and wars-at least major wars, wars in which nuclear weapons will be used-will simply not happen. In the real world, however, wars are often not simply "started" by one side, and the distinction between defender and attacker can be very problematic. In 1914, for example, who "started" the First World War? Germany, by invading Belgium and attacking France? Or Russia, by ordering general mobilization a few days earlier, knowing full well that such action made war virtually inevitable? Who was the "defender"? Austria, supported by Germany, for trying to prevent Serbia from serving as a base for terrorist activities directed against the Habsburg Monarchy? Or Russia, supported by the Western powers, for trying to defend Serbian sovereignty and maintain its own political position in the Balkans? And if all the major powers had been armed with nuclear weapons at the time, is it clear who exactly would have been deterred? Or take the case of the coming of World War II in 1939. If both Britain and Germany had been nuclear powers at the time, again, is it clear who would have been deterred? Waltz thinks that Germany would have backed off: Hitler would not have "started" a war that would destroy the Third Reich. But Hitler did not intend to "start" a war with Britain at that point; his aim was to get Britain to back down in the confrontation over Poland. Nor did Britain intend to start a war with Germany. War broke out not because either side wanted war in late 1939, but rather because neither was willing to give way-and because each was hoping that the other would. Once we get away from the idea that wars are simply "started" by one side and that the "attacker" can be readily identified, the whole problem appears in an entirely different light. If war is seen as the outcome of a process in which two sides interact, it makes no sense to focus simply on the calculations of just one side. Instead, the calculations of both sides, and especially their calculations about each other, have to be taken into account. Each side may be trying to deter the other-to get its way without war if it can. Each side might be afraid of escalation, but those fears are balanced by the knowledge that one's adversary is also afraid, and his fears can be exploited. In the case of a conflict between two nuclear powers, if either side believed that Waltz's analysis was correct-if either side believed that its adversary would give way rather than run any risk of nuclear attack, as long as his vital interests were not threatened-there would be no reason for that country not to take advantage of that situation. That side could threaten its adversary with nuclear attack if its demands were not met in the firm belief that its opponent was bound to give way, and that it would therefore not be running any risk itself. That belief might turn out to be correct, but if it were not-if its rival was unwilling to allow it to score such an easy victory-there could be very serious trouble indeed. And if both sides were convinced by Waltz's arguments, and both adopted strong deterrent strategies, the situation would be particularly dangerous. Each side would dig in its heels, convinced that when confronted with the risk of nuclear war, the other side would ultimately back down. Such a situation could quickly get out of hand. As Dean Rusk pointed out in 1961, "one of the quickest ways to have a nuclear war is to have the two sides persuaded that neither will fight."

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Nuclear Deterrence fails – Waltz is wrong – it will lead to nuclear conflict Trachtenberg 2002, UCLA political science professor, [Marc, National Interest, Fall, lexis,]
This is an extreme case, but it illustrates the problem. In the real world, states will not be so sure that their opponent "will be deterred" by the prospect of nuclear war and that they can therefore go as far as they like in a political dispute-say, in the Cold War case, in a dispute over Cuba or Berlin. Nor will they themselves, in all probability, be absolutely deterred by the threat of nuclear war. They would be under a certain competitive pressure to play the same game as their rivals; their rivals could not be allowed to profit so easily from a simple threat-making strategy while themselves running no real risk at all. Each side would be afraid of escalation, but each side would in the final analysis also be willing to run a certain risk. Each side would know that its adversary was also worried about what would happen if things got out of hand, and that an unwillingness to run any risk at all would remove that element of restraint and give the adversary too free a hand. Each side would know that its adversary was probably also willing to run a certain risk for the same reason, which is why each side could not be sure that its opponent would be deterred in a confrontation. In such situations, it is impossible to say how all these calculations would sort themselves out. Deterrence cuts in more than one way, and it for this reason that in a nuclear world, no one can know how far things will go before a conflict is resolved, or whether it even can be resolved before nuclear weapons are actually used. Each side may calculate that if it is just a bit tougher, its opponent may back down. Having gone so far, wouldn't it make sense to go further still? And there is no natural end-point to that process. For Waltz, if deterrence fails, "a few judiciously delivered warheads are likely to produce sobriety in the leaders of all of the countries involved and thus bring rapid deescalation." But it is just as likely that if a few bombs are exploded, the country that had been targeted would choose to retaliate in kind. It might even choose to escalate the conflict. A political dispute can thus become a gigantic poker game, with each side raising the stakes in the hope that its opponent, frightened by the prospect of nuclear war, will fold before things go too far. Conflicts in such a world, as Thomas Schelling argued years ago, would become "contests in risk-taking." The side with the greater resolve, the side morewilling to run the risk of nuclear war, has the upper hand and will prevail in a showdown. In the pre-nuclear world, more or less objective factors-above all, the balance of military power-played a key role in determining how political conflicts ran their course. The weak tended to give way to the strong; in an admittedly rough and imperfect way, the military balance gave some indication as to how a dispute would be worked out. But in a world of invulnerable nuclear forces, as Waltz points out, the military balance counts for little. Subjective factors, like will and resolve, would play the key role in determining how political conflicts are worked out. The result is that in such a world there would be a great premium on resolve, on risk-taking, and perhaps ultimately on recklessness. In international politics, as in other areas of life, what you reward is what you get. Resolve would tend to harden, and the parties involved would tend to dig in their heels. A reputation for toughness would be of fundamental importance, since one has to worry not just about the present but about the future, and this would provide further incentive to take a tough stand. And as each side hardens its position, its rival is also led by competitive pressure to do the same. Why would anyone think that a world of that sort, where political outcomes are up for grabs and victory goes to the side with the strongest nerves, would be particularly stable?

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Prolif will cause regional nuclear wars that will escalate globally

The Cold War was unique – new proliferation risks miscalc and extinction

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Prolif undermines US hegemony, encourages rogue nations to become aggressive, and risks accidental war

Prolif increases nuclear terrorism

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Nuclear terrorism will cause a US/Russia war leading to extinction

Nuclear proliferation geometrically increases the probability of nuclear war

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Prolif outweighs – it risks extinction

Prolif creates multiple scenarios for nuclear war

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Even if prolif constrains some countries will encourage others to become aggressive – this makes nuclear war inevitable

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The magnitude of nuclear conflict makes proliferation to deadly to risk

Proliferation can never be safe enough to justify the magnified risk of nuclear war

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Reprocessing

Bodansky 06 [David, emeritus prof physics- U of WA, Physics Today; Dec2006, Vol. 59 Issue 12, p80-81] The world's first large nuclear reactors were built in the US during World War II to obtain plutonium-239 for nuclear weapons. Fueled with natural uranium, they produced Pu by neutron capture in 238U followed by two beta decays. The steps taken to recover the Pu and other selected components from the spent fuel constitute reprocessing. Although reprocessing is intrinsic to a weapons program, it is optional for the commercial nuclear-power fuel cycle. The US decided in the mid-1970s against reprocessing in the commercial nuclear program, largely due to concerns about weapons proliferation. France, Japan, Russia, and others did not follow that example, and recently Congress and the US Department of Energy have shown a revived interest in reprocessing. That shift, embodied in DOE's Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative and the more recently promulgated Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), and the weapons ambitions of North Korea and Iran have thrust the topic more into the spotlight.

Bodansky 06 [David, emeritus prof physics- U of WA, Physics Today; Dec2006, Vol. 59 Issue 12, p80-81] Without reprocessing, the spent fuel becomes nuclear waste. Spent-fuel nuclides fall into two main categories: actinides and fission products. The great majority of the fission products have half-lives of less than 10 years. Notable exceptions are cesium-137 and strontium-90, both with half-lives of roughly 30 years. Cesium-137 is a strong gamma-ray emitter; the resulting high radiation levels help to protect the spent fuel against theft. The transuranic actinides present the main long-term challenge in waste handling because many have moderately long half-lives. They are produced primarily through neutron capture and radioactive decay. Chief among them is Pu, but reactors also produce significant amounts of neptunium, americium, and curium, the socalled minor actinides. The Pu--mainly 239pu, but with a large admixture of 240pu and heavier isotopes--is termed reactor-grade to distinguish it from weapons-grade, which is more than 90% 239 pu. Given sufficient expertise, a bomb can be made with reactor-grade Pu although the yield may be "only" about 1 kiloton. That danger argues against a reprocessing method that creates a pure Pu stream vulnerable to theft or diversion.

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Bodansky 06 [David, emeritus prof physics- U of WA, Physics Today; Dec2006, Vol. 59 Issue 12, p80-81] The renewed US interest in reprocessing is associated with an anticipated increase in nuclear power use. With a tripling of nuclear capacity, for example, and no changes in waste handling practices, a repository with Yucca Mountain's original 70 000-tonne statutory capacity might be required every decade or so. Although constructing those repositories appears technologically and economically possible, the option is politically unattractive. Reprocessing can reduce the demands on a repository by removing U and transuranics for recycling as fuel in reactors. Such a step both greatly reduces the long-term radioactivity of the remaining waste and extends U supplies. If the Cs and Sr are also extracted, the initial heat load is reduced, which allows a potentially denser packing of the waste.

Bodansky 06 [David, emeritus prof physics- U of WA, Physics Today; Dec2006, Vol. 59 Issue 12, p80-81] On the negative side, the spread of reprocessing could lower the barriers against the theft or diversion of Pu, and the need to handle large amounts of highly radioactive materials creates some risks. Further, reprocessing probably will add slightly to the cost of nuclear power. Building a reprocessing plant, moreover, is likely to face its own political problems.

Bodansky 06 [David, emeritus prof physics- U of WA, Physics Today; Dec2006, Vol. 59 Issue 12, p80-81] Another proliferation-resistant method, pyrochemical reprocessing, was a key part of the Integral Fast Reactor program. Originally developed at Argonne National Laboratory, the IFR program was terminated in the mid-1990s. In recent years DOE has revived support for aspects of the program, including the development of the pyrochemical process and new fast reactors. As Pu breeders, fast reactors offer the prospect of an almost unlimited supply of energy. With a different arrangement of the fuel, they can take advantage of the relatively high fast-neutron cross sections for actinide fission and serve effectively as actinide burners. The pyrochemical process is particularly suited for use with the metallic fuel that the Argonne fast reactor program has favored, although it could be adapted for use with other fuels. The spent fuel is fed into a bath of chloride salts at a temperature high enough to melt the fuel. Electrorefining separates the spent fuel into three streams as in the UREX + process: U, transuranics, and fission products. Proliferation resistance is achieved by having the fuel-cycle facilities in close proximity and by keeping the minor actinides with the Pu.

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Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William H, Gerald, and George – nuclear physicists retired from
Argonne Nat’l Laboratory, Scientific American, December, http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0512hannum.pdf]

The fast-reactor system with pyroprocessing is remarkably versatile. It could be a netconsumer or net producer of plutonium, or it could be run in a break-even mode. Operated as a net producer, the system could provide start-up materials for other fast-reactor power plants. As a net consumer, it could use up excess plutonium and weapons materials. If a break-even mode were chosen, the only additional fuel a nuclear plant would need would be a periodic infusion of depleted uranium (uranium from which most of the fissile uranium 235 has been removed) to replace the heavy-metal atoms that have undergone fission.

Stanford ’03 [George, nuclear physicist, ret Argonne Nat’l Lab, from the Proceedings of “Global 2003,” ANS Winter Meeting, New Orleans, November 16–20, http://www.nationalcenter.org/LWRStanford.pdf]

The obvious downside of the MO X alternative is that it only delays facing up to the real repository issues. Fundamentally, MOX recycle to LWRs amounts to a storage option that puts off for a decade or two the need to deal effectively with the transuranics. In the end, fast-fission systems will have to be deployed. They must constitute at least 20% of the total nuclear capacity if they are to eliminate enough of the plutonium and minor actinides to have a substantial impact on the repository. The delay would be purchased at considerable cost, some of it incurred early on, and the rest when the time arrived to use the residue in fast reactors: If the delay is not needed, the entire MOX-handling infrastructure is unnecessary.

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PUREX Bad

Pyroprocessing distinct from PUREX Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William H, Gerald, and George – nuclear physicists retired from
Argonne Nat’l Laboratory, Scientific American, December, http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0512hannum.pdf]

Thus, unlike the current PUREX method, the pyroprocess collects virtually all the transuranic elements (including the plutonium), with considerable carryover of uranium and fission products. Only a very small portion of the transuranic component ends up in the final waste stream, which reduces the needed isolation time drastically. The combination of fission products and transuranics is unsuited for weapons or even for thermal-reactor fuel. This mixture is, however, not only tolerable but advantageous for fueling fast reactors.

Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William, Gerald, and George – retired nuclear physicists from Argonne Nat’l Lab, January 2, http://www.nationalcenter.org/PurexPyro.html]

At that time, "reprocessing" meant PUREX. PUREX works well for thermal-reactor fuel, but it is not well suited for a fast-reactor fuel cycle, and it is very expensive. Consequently, a "dry" (nonaqueous) pyrometallurgical method was developed -- a process that cannot by itself produce plutonium of weapons-quality purity. With pyrometallurgical processing it's a new ball game.

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Increasing civilian PUREX doesn’t solve Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William H, Gerald, and George – nuclear physicists retired from
Argonne Nat’l Laboratory, Scientific American, December, http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0512hannum.pdf]

Some people are advocating that the U.S. embark on an extensive program of PUREX processing of reactor fuel, making mixed oxides of uranium and plutonium for cycling back into thermal reactors. Although the mixed oxide (MOX) method is currently being used for spoiling excess weapons plutonium so that it cannot be employed in bombs-a good idea-we think that it would be a mistake to deploy the much larger PUREX infrastructure that would be required to process civilian fuel. The resource gains would be modest, whereas the long-term waste problem would remain and the entire effort would delay for only a short time the need for efficient fast reactors.

Current US GNEP strategy focuses on proliferation-prone PUREX fuel refabrication. UCS 07 [Union of Concerned Scientists, “UCS Comments on the Department of Energy’s Notice of Intent to
Prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.” June 4, http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/nuclear_terrorism/ucs-comments-on-GNEP-PEIS.html, Accessed 7/17/08] UCS finds the revamped GNEP program to be even more objectionable than the initial GNEP proposal. In particular, what began as a research and development program into so-called “proliferation-resistant” reprocessing, fuel fabrication and burner reactor technologies has transmuted into a much more extensive program involving the near-term construction of industrialscale reprocessing and plutonium-based fuel fabrication plants and fast neutron reactors, all based on conventional, proliferation-prone PUREX technology or minor variants thereof. Although UCS does not believe that the technologies proposed for development under GNEP would actually be proliferation-resistant in any meaningful sense, UCS did appreciate DOE’s acknowledgment that the growing stockpiles of separated plutonium around the world produced by ongoing reprocessing activities presents a major proliferation threat. However, the new GNEP proposal would undermine efforts to get those stockpiles under control. The conventional facilities DOE is now planning under GNEP would commence operation before completion of R&D on the “proliferation-resistant” alternatives, and would somehow be later modified to utilize those alternatives. In the interim period, which could last for several decades, these conventional facilities would separate, store, transport and process vast quantities of vulnerable, direct-use nuclear weapon materials, of which only a small fraction would actually be utilized in reactor fuel and irradiated to a self-protecting state. The net outcome would be a major increase in the risk of diversion or theft of weapon-usable materials and an associated risk of nuclear terrorism.

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LWR/PUREX BAD
Light water reactors create the potential for clandestine proliferation via PUREX reprocessing Gilinski, Miller, and Hubbard 04 [Victor, Marvin, and Harmon, The Nonproliferation Policy Education
Center. “A fresh examination of the proliferation dangers of light water reactors.” October 22, http://www.npecweb.org/Essays/20041022-GilinskyEtAl-LWR.pdf, accessed 7/17/08] Countries that can support LWRs would generally be capable of building small scale clandestine reprocessing plants. The consensus US view, since the Ford and Carter administrations, has been that the once-through cycle is both cheaper and safer in terms of proliferation to one involving the reprocessing and recycle of plutonium.6 That remains a sound position. A commercial reprocessing plant provides ready access to weapons-useable plutonium, and can also provide convenient cover for acquiring the technology and masking the emissions of a smaller clandestine plant. But the consensus view has taken the argument further to say that LWRs by themselves, in the absence of commercial reprocessing and recycle, are a pretty safe proposition for siting just about anywhere. It is this extended proposition that we question here on the basis of a reexamination of the possibilities of small, difficult-to-detect, clandestine fuel facilities to extract near-weapons grade plutonium from spent LWR fuel. If such a plant could be built and hidden, and operated to obtain significant bomb quantities of plutonium before the international inspection system had time to react, it would reduce the proliferation safety margin between the oncethrough fuel cycle and the one involving plutonium recycle. In these circumstances the stand-alone LWR would not be nearly so safe a proposition as it has been made out to be. Thus, the fundamental question that needs to be addressed is whether a country with a modest industrial base and a nuclear infrastructure sufficient to operate an LWR can build and operate a clandestine plant to reprocess diverted LWR fuel using the PUREX process. Since all non-nuclear weapons states are now parties to the NPT, we assume that all their declared nuclear facilities, in particular, the LWR and spent fuel storage, are safeguarded, and that the state has also agreed to implement the Additional Protocol, INFCIRC/540. The most credible evidence that such a country could build a small clandestine reprocessing plant is: • First, the record of such states on building and operating PUREX-type reprocessing plants; • Second, the existence of detailed commercial designs of small PUREX plants, that although not built and operated, were engineered to commercial specifications using conventional technology to reprocess LWR fuel; • Third, the simplified designs of small “quick and dirty” PUREX plants that utilize unconventional technology and were designed to support particular points of view with regard to nonproliferation policy Plants that reprocess low burnup spent fuel to extract plutonium for weapons have been built and operated by many countries, e.g., North Korea; plants that reprocess LWR spent fuel for the same purpose differ in several respects from the former, but could also be built and operated successfully by, e.g., North Korea and Iran.

The proliferation of weapons-grade plutonium via PUREX reprocessing is a dangerously credible possibility Gilinski, Miller, and Hubbard 04 [Victor, Marvin, and Harmon, The Nonproliferation Policy Education
Center. “A fresh examination of the proliferation dangers of light water reactors.” October 22, http://www.npecweb.org/Essays/20041022-GilinskyEtAl-LWR.pdf, accessed 7/17/08] Conclusion: small-scale clandestine reprocessing is a credible possibility in countries seeking nuclear weapons. It is credible that states that operate nuclear reactors could also build and operate small PUREX reprocessing plants to extract militarily significant quantities of plutonium from LWR spent fuel. It is also credible that they could extract such quantities before detection by the IAEA or by national intelligence. The clandestine reprocessing of old spent fuel— that has been in storage for many years—is particularly worrisome because its lower radiation level makes it easier to divert, transport, and reprocess, and more difficult to detect. Krypton-85, the most detectable signature for reprocessing plant operation decays with a ten year half-life. These considerations underline the fact that the once through fuel cycle is not a panacea for preventing proliferation, and cast doubt on current proposals to lessen the IAEA inspection effort at LWRs, at least without further assessment.

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PUREX technology is not only easy to access but provides a method for pursuit of nuclear proliferation that produces plutonium from highly radioactive components. Ferguson 04 [Charles. Scientist-in-Residence. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Risks of Civilian Plutonium
Programs. http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_52b.html] If it were the only reprocessing technique in use, pyroprocessing would not reduce the risk of proliferation to zero. Nations trying to obtain the bomb could operate a clandestine PUREX reprocessing plant in parallel to the pyroprocessing facility. PUREX stands for plutonium-uranium reduction extraction and as the name implies, this method extracts or separates plutonium from the highly radioactive components of spent fuel. It is presently employed in all commercial reprocessing plants. The knowledge of this technique is widespread. Thousands of people throughout the world are familiar with the chemistry and engineering required for PUREX.

PUREX facilities ruin the environment by releasing radioactive gas into the air that eventually flush into nearby water supplies. Gerber 2002 [Michele S. PhD. Hanford Site Historian. The Hanford Site: Washington’s Largest Battlefield
and its Lessons http://www.wshs.org/wshs/columbia/articles/0102-a1.htm] When the Cold War ended in 1991, it left the Hanford Site temporarily confused and reeling. Missions central to the site's identity ended in rapid succession. The Department of Energy (DOE), Hanford's controlling federal agency, issued formal deactivation orders to the mighty PUREX (plutonium-uranium extraction) Plant in 1992 and to N-Reactor in 1995. Other key Hanford defense production facilities, standing as stark, gray reminders of past defense imperatives, also closed. The passage of these old workhorse facilities into obsolescence was met with a wide range of emotions, depending on one's perspective. Workers saluted and cried at ceremonies marking the end of the PUREX Deactivation Project in June 1997, recalling a lifetime of camaraderie and proud service to the "Gray Lady." At the end of the B-Plant Deactivation Project, Portland's Oregonian wrote: "Although it [B-Plant] fulfilled its purpose of recovering plutonium from reactor fuel, it wreaked havoc with the environment at Hanford, releasing radioactive gases into the air and flushing contaminated process water directly onto the ground, creating open atomic ponds."

PUREX does not facilitate any economical viability, increases waste disposal, and can produce a stockpile to create near 30,000 nuclear bombs.

Townsend 2006 [Patricia Professor of Molecular Biology. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel: Funds for Nuclear
Reprocessing Set Off Debate. http://nucnews.net/nucnews/2006nn/0601nn/060102nn.txt] The recent signing of a bill by President Bush that provides $50 million for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel has rekindled a highly charged debate on how to deal with nuclear waste. Reprocessing exacerbates the problem of nuclear proliferation, is not economical and does not solve the problem of waste disposal, said Allison Macfarlane, a research associate in the Program in Science Technology and Society at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In the meantime, new technology for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel is being developed at a research center that is co-directed by a University of Wisconsin-Madison professor. However, it will take at least five years to innovate a new process for dealing with spent nuclear fuel. And then industry will need time to develop the process, said Michael Corradini, a professor of engineering physics at UW- Madison. Some are contending that Congress appears to have put the cart before the horse in appropriating $50 million for reprocessing. The legislation states that the money is for selecting spent fuel recycling sites by 2007 and for beginning construction of one or more facilities by 2010."I am nervous about any near-term plans to reprocess," said Harold Feiveson, a senior research analyst and co-director of the science and global security program at Princeton University. The existing reprocessing technique, known as PUREX, short for plutonium and uranium recovery by extraction, creates a plutonium stockpile

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that can be used to make nuclear weapons, Macfarlane said. The stockpile is enough to make the equivalent of 30,000 nuclear bombs.

Advantage – Waste/Mining
1. FRs end uranium mining Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford '05 [William H, Gerald, and George – nuclear physicists retired from Argonne Nat'l Laboratory, Scientific American, December, http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0512hannum.pdf]

As today's thermal reactors reach the end of their lifetimes, they could be replaced by fast reactors. Should that occur, there would be no need to mine any more uranium ore for centuries and no further requirement, ever, for uranium enrichment. For the very long term, recycling the fuel of fast reactors would be so efficient that currently available uranium supplies could last indefinitely. 2. Uranium is not Energy Efficiency Stanford 06 [George, PhD, retired nuclear physicist, interview with Ann Curtis, August 8, http://www.crossx.com/vb/showthread.php?s=1ad707180b7b85158aece8f58d80116a&p=1600390#post1600390] 5. How long could the existing supply of uranium generate electricity, without mining more? The uranium on hand (U.S. only) has supplied us with, very roughly, 4,000 reactor years of power, at a fuel utilization efficiency of less than 1%. Thus the uranium on hand contains enough energy for 400,000 reactor-years. If we had 1,000 reactors -- ten time as many as today -- the already-mined uranium would therefore last for 400 years.

3. Uranium is radioactive for thousands of years while still not energy-efficient Lightfoot, et al 2006 [H Douglas, Global Environmental Climate Change Center; Wallace Manheimer, Naval Research Lab; Daniel Meneley, Engineer Emeritus, AECL; George Stanford, Argonne Nat'l Lab; September 12, "Nuclear Fission Fuel is Inexhaustible," http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0609lightfoot.pdf]

A thermal reactor requires the mining of a large amount of uranium from which a relatively small amount of useful energy is extracted. Many materials produced in fission are radioactive but decay to extremely low levels in a few hundred years. However, some of the heavy elements produced by neutron capture remain radioactive for thousands of years after being discharged from the reactor. These are the bothersome elements that are responsible for the prolonged controversy over the licensing of the Yucca Mountain repository.

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4. FRs more than 100X better than TRs for nuclear waste Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford '05 [William H, Gerald, and George – nuclear physicists retired from Argonne Nat'l Laboratory, Scientific American, December, http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0512hannum.pdf]

THE OPERATING CAPABILITIES of thermal and fast reactors are similar in some ways, but in others the differences are huge [see box on next page]. A 1,000-megawatt-electric thermalreactor plant, for example, generates more than 100 tons of spent fuel a year. The annual waste output from a fast reactor with the same electrical capacity in contrast, is a little more than a single ton of fission products, plus trace amounts of transuranics. Waste management using the ALMR cycle would be greatly simplified. Because the fast-reactor waste would contain no significant quantity of long-lived transuranics, its radiation would decay to the level of the ore from which it came in several hundred years, rather than tens of thousands. 5. .FRs solve for SQ waste and storage harms
Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford '05 [William H, Gerald, and George – nuclear physicists retired from Argonne Nat'l Laboratory, Scientific American, December, http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0512hannum.pdf]

IF ADVÁNCED FAST REACTORS COME into use, they will at first burn spent thermalreactor fuel that has been recycled using pyroprocessing. That waste, which is now "temporarily" stored on site, would be transported to plants that could process it into three output streams. The first, highly. radioactive, stream would contain most of the fission products, along with unavoidable traces of transuranic elements. It would be transformed into a physically stable form-perhaps a glasslike substance and then shipped to Yucca Mountain or some other permanent disposal site. The second stream would capture virtually all the transuranics, together with some uranium and fission products. It would be converted to a metallic fast-reactor fuel and then transferred to ALMR-type reactors. The third stream, amounting to about 92 percent of the spent thermal reactor fuel, would contain the bulk of the uranium, now in a depleted state. It could be stashed away for future use as fast-reactor fuel. Such a scenario cannot be realized overnight, of course. If we were to begin today, the first of the fast reactors might come online in about 15 years. Notably that schedule is reasonably comparable with the planned timetable for shipment of spent thermal-reactor fuel to Yucca Mountain. It could instead be sent for recycling into fast-reactor fuel.

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6. Waste Management is Easy with FRs Lightfoot, et al 2006 [H Douglas, Global Environmental Climate Change Center; Wallace Manheimer, Naval Research Lab; Daniel Meneley, Engineer Emeritus, AECL; George Stanford, Argonne Nat'l Lab; September 12, "Nuclear Fission Fuel is Inexhaustible," http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0609lightfoot.pdf]

Waste management is much easier with fast reactors because almost all of the long-lived nuclear waste products associated with thermal reactors are split by the fast neutrons. The radioactive materials remaining are of concern for less than 500 years. 7. FRs do not pose an environmental risk. Stanford '01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html]
What are the environmental considerations? We already mentioned waste management. In addition, it can be argued that the

major environmental problems with nuclear power are the consequences of the mining and milling operations. Because IFRs can use, not only the surplus plutonium, but also the uranium (including U238) that has already been mined and milled, they can eliminate for centuries any further need for mining or milling. 8. FRs give unlimited energy without an environmental consequence Till, 1997 [Dr. Charles, nuclear physicist, Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/interviews/till.html]
Q: But the advantages of this concept are, one, that you don't waste energy, and two, that you get round this very long life toxicity problem? A: Yes. The advantages, then, of our concept ... at

one stroke you have given yourself almost unlimited energy and you have then done it by using the waste product that otherwise would be a nuisance. So that you have a very long-term energy source, and you've got a waste product that won't last nearly as long. 9. Atomic waste from uranium is a terrorist threat to our country. Parenti, 08 [Christian, May 12, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080512/parenti] Since 1978 the Energy Department has been studying Yucca Mountain in Nevada as a possible permanent repository for atomic waste. But intense opposition has held up those efforts. In the
meantime, the partially burned uranium is stored at the old power plants, in pools of water called "spent fuel pools."

Lying near great cities, on crucial river systems, in small rural towns, these pools are potentially a far greater risk than a reactor meltdown. Scenarios for how terrorists might

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attack and drain them range from driving a truck bomb to crashing an explosive-laden plane into them.

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Mining Bad - Indigenous Nations Impacts Native Americans are subjected to institutional racism as a result of uranium mining and waste dumping LaDuke, 99 [Winona, member of the Women’s national hall of fame and author, All Our Relations: Native
Struggles for Land Rights and Life,p2-3, 07/15/08] While Native peoples have been massacred and fought, cheated, and robbed of their historical lands, today their lands are subject to some of most invasive industrial interventions imaginable. According to the Worldwatch Institute, 317 reservations in the United States are threatened by environmental hazards, ranging from toxic wastes to clearcuts. Reservations have been targeted as sites for 16 proposed nuclear waste dumps. Over 100 proposals have been floated in recent years to dump toxic waste in Indian communities. Seventyseven sacred sites have been disturbed or desecrated through resource extraction and development activities. The federal government is proposing to use Yucca Mountain, sacred to the Shone, a dumpsite for the nation's high-level nuclear waste

Uranium mining is built on the institutional racism of Native Americans Bullard, 02 [Robert D., PhD Environmental Justice Resource Center Clark Atlanta University, http://www.ejrccau
.edu/PovpolEj.html#26end, 071508] Radioactive colonialism operates in energy production (mining of uranium) and disposal of wastes on Indian lands. The legacy of institutional racism has left many sovereign Indian nations without an economic infrastructure to address poverty, unemployment, inadequate education and health care, and a host of other social problems.

Native peoples lands have been contaminated by uranium mining for nuclear power NIRS, 2000 [Nuclear Information Resource Service, http://www.nirs.org/alerts/10-24-2000/1, 07,15,08]
Since the advent of the nuclear era, Native peoples have suffered disproportionately more than other populations from this atomic power and atomic energy technologies. Native peoples and territories have been contaminated with radiation from uranium mining and milling (such as the Serpent River First Nation on the North Shore of Lake Huron), atomic testing and in isolated communities like Point Hope, Alaska, have served as guinea pigs for the federal government in its radiation experiments. Now Native lands serve as potential sites for radioactive waste dumps.

Uranium mining for nuclear power devastates Native Lands The New Zealand Herald 07 [http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docv
iew/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T4169593908&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&r esultsUrlKey=29_T4169593912&cisb=22_T4169593911&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=257912&docNo=2, 07/15/08] In 2003, the Bush Administration approved a controversial project to expand its nuclear arsenal with "low-yield" mini-nukes. At the same time the nuclear energy industry, exploiting the demand for clean energy as a means of reducing the nation's carbon footprint [although CO2 is produced when uranium is processed into fuel], hopes to build new reactors. The result has been a uranium boom. Global demand has fuelled a steep climb in ore prices, from $3US.15 ($4) a kilogram in 2000 to $32US.4 a kg last year. While mining companies operate throughout the West, the crown jewel for prospectors is the Navajo reservation. Texas-based Uranium Resources calls it the "the Saudi Arabia of uranium". To the Navajo the nuclear lobby's demands are an unwelcome echo of events started six decades ago, when the world's first atomic bomb was detonated at White Sands, New Mexico, in 1945. The mushroom cloud ushered in the Cold War arms race, the nuclear industry of power "too cheap to meter," and a uranium bonanza that brought prospectors to Indian land .Between 1944 and 1986 private companies supplied the US Government with 3.9 million tonnes of uranium [4.7 million tonnes of easily extractable ore are known to exist worldwide], mined from the 69,929 km reservation .Last November, the Los Angeles Times said more than 1000 uranium mines and four processing mills had bequeathed a lethal legacy of radioactive debris and

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contaminated aquifers, despite Washington's promise that Navajo land would be returned in "as good condition as received".

Misc Mining
Stanford ’03 [George, nuclear physicist, ret Argonne Nat’l Lab, from the

Proceedings of “Global 2003,” ANS Winter Meeting, New Orleans, November 16–20, http://www.nationalcenter.org/LWRStanford.pdf] Nuclear waste, in whatever form, is quite compact, so its physical volume has only a minor influence on how efficiently the repository is utilized. The important factor is heat generation: the maximum waste loading in a repository like Yucca Mountain is determined by various temperature limits. Numerous analyses have been performed to determine the maximum acceptable temperatures in the Yucca Mountain design. There are several temperature limits, including the centerline temperature of the waste package, the temperature of the container, and the temperature of the wall of the drift (the emplacement tunnel), but the controlling limit in the present design is the temperature between drifts. For direct disposal of used fuel, the inter-drift temperature reaches its peak some thousand years after the waste is emplaced. That is determined by the long-term heat source. * In a thermal reactor the neutrons are thermalized (slowed down, or “moderated”). Reactors moderated by ordinary water are called light-water reactors (LWRs). Other commonly used moderators are heavy water and graphite. In the United States, virtually all the power reactors in operation today are LWRs. —mainly the transuranic elements* in the spent fuel. Although plutonium is the most abundant of the transuranics, long-term heat production is dominated by americium and neptunium—which, along with curium, are known as the “minor actinides.” The minor actinides also dominate the long-term radiotoxicity of the waste, so managing them appropriately is also key to reducing the potential for harm to individuals many generations from now. Substantial improvement in the utilization of the repository, therefore, requires removing the transuranics from the waste—a conclusion reached by every study that has addressed the question. The best-known study, performed by the National Academy of Sciences,[1] concludes that eliminating most of the transuranics improves the utilization of a repository by about a factor of five. Most of the various schemes for separating and managing fission products are of second-order importance. In principle, however, a further order-ofmagnitude improvement could be achieved by removing from the waste stream the two elements supplying the highest heat load— cesium and strontium. Further development work would be needed to confirm that the additional step is economically justified.[2] With a fully closed fuel cycle, the waste for disposal consists of fission products with only trace amounts of actinides. As a result, the radiotoxicity of the contents of a repository will be below that of the original ore in well under a thousand years— which should allay any perception of hazard from long-term leakage or geologic instability.

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YUCCA MOUNTAIN ADVANTAGE
1. CONVENTION NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN RISKS NUCLEAR VOLCANOES

New Scientist, 8/24/2002, “Yucca Mountain could become nuclear volano.”
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg17523571.300-yucca-mountain-could-becomenuclear-volcano.html
IF A volcano ever erupted beneath the planned nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada it could cause a devastating explosion that sent high-level nuclear waste spewing into the atmosphere. Yucca Mountain lies about 145 kilometres north-west of Las Vegas, within an active volcanic field. An eruption at the site is considered extremelyunlikely, but it is possible. There are six craters within 20 kilometres of the site, including Lathrop Wells volcano, which formed by eruptions just 80,000 years ago. A study in 2000 estimated that there was a 1 in 1000 chance of an eruption at the site during the 10,000 years it will take for the radioactivity of the waste stored there to dissipate. And a recent report suggests that a more active cluster of volcanoes 100 kilometres to the north could be an even bigger threat . Now Andrew Woods of the BP Institute at the University of Cambridge and his colleagues have found that if an eruption occurred beneath the site, a rising sheet of magma could burst into the proposed storage tunnels 200 to 300 metres below the surface. The pressure in the hollow tunnels would be much lower than in the surrounding rock, so once the magma broke through it would gush into the tunnels at tens or hundreds of metres per second. The heat would be enough to deform and rupture the 7-centimetrethick walls of the waste canisters in just 20 minutes, the researchers say. Worse, if the storage tunnels were open to the main access tunnel, this could act as an easy escape route for the magma to reach the surface, sending nuclear waste several miles skyward in an explosive eruption. According to Woods's model, even if the tunnels were blocked, the magma could still build up enough pressure to break through to the surface. The study, which was funded by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, is published in Geophysical Research Letters.

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2. THE IMPACT IS EXTINCTION - THIS MUST COME FIRST BECAUSE OF MAGNITUDE

Comarow, 2001 Yucca Mountain: Time to Think the Unthinkable Testimony presented at US Department of Energy
Public Hearing 12-8-2001 by David Comarow http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-energy/issues/yucca-mountain-testimony-

comarow_2001-12-08.htm

None of that is impossible, and therefore none of that is unthinkable. We are not talking about the short-term or even long-term economic prosperity of Las Vegas. We are talking about nothing less than the survival of the human race. Lest you dismiss this as just more fanatic hyperbole, let this be a reality check: Yucca Mountain will hold all of the high level nuclear waste ever produced from every nuclear power plant in the US - with about 10% additional defense waste -- some 77,000 tons. The danger of getting it here aside for a moment, the amount of radioactivity and energy to be stored in one place, under that relatively tiny little bump in the desert is easily enough to contaminate and sterilize the entire biosphere. Is that unthinkable? No. If it is possible, it is thinkable. When you are talking about these types of risks, risks that can endanger entire segments of our population, let alone the entire earth, then the risk analysis must go into higher gear. It is not enough to merely calculate the risks as "extremely low" - because there is no "low enough" when the consequences are so cataclysmic. We accept certain risks, which are relatively high - 50,000 traffic deaths per year for example. But, as terrible as those deaths and injuries are, they do not imperil our culture, our nation or the survival of the human race. We are less willing to accept such risks when the consequences happen all at once -- plane crashes for example. That is our human nature. We are willing to spend much more to lower the risk of death in groups than chronic deaths spread out over time and space. As a people, as caretakers for future people, we cannot create unnecessary catastrophic risks like biosphereicide, the agonizing death of billions.

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IFR’S SOLVE YUCCA MOUNTAIN - IT CAN RECYCLE BOTH ITS OWN WASTE AND EXISTING WASTES TO THE POINT WHERE RADIOACTIVITY BECOMES NEGLIGIBLE

Ockert, Carl E., retired nuclear engineer. “Energy Alternative”. The Washington Times, May 7, 2006.
Although dangerous, atomic power has the best safety record of any U.S. industry. That is because we have from the beginning designed each such power plant with triple redundant safety features. The

biggest problem we have had is the safe and efficient disposal of the spent fuel. However that problem was solved over 12 years ago at the Argonne National Laboratory in Chicago.
Their final design, called the

Integral Fast Reactor, essentially burns up the portion of the spent fuel elements that require permanent storage. It not only eliminates almost all its own long storage waste, it can efficiently extract power from existing waste fuel produced by the current generation of pressurized water cooled nuclear reactors. In addition to solving the fuel storage problem, the IFR introduces passive safety features such that under any conceivable circumstance, even with a total loss of electrical power and a total disablement of the reactor operators, the reactor will safely shut itself down.
Stanford ’03 [George, nuclear physicist, ret Argonne Nat’l Lab, from the

Proceedings of “Global 2003,” ANS Winter Meeting, New Orleans, November 16–20, http://www.nationalcenter.org/LWRStanford.pdf] The overriding reason for closing the fuel cycle sooner rather than later is to make the most efficient use of the Yucca Mountain repository—to maximize the amount of nuclear electricity that can be produced before the repository’s capacity to accommodate high-level waste is exceeded. Other reasons include controlling costs, minimizing risk to future generations, using resources efficiently, and implementing a safe operating strategy for the repository.

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Advantage:Fossil Fuels Causes Mass Extinction
Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William, Gerald, and George – retired nuclear physicists from Argonne Nat’l Lab, January 2, http://www.nationalcenter.org/PurexPyro.html]

In today's economy, energy is used primarily for transportation, space heating, electricity, and industrial processes. In the United States, transportation is almost totally dependent on oil; heating is done largely by natural gas (along with some oil and coal); and electricity comes mainly from burning coal, with contributions from nuclear power (~20%), natural gas (~18%), and rivers and miscellaneous (including oil) (~11%). Industry is powered by all of the above. Fossil fuel emissions cause the next mass extinction Greenpeace, ’07. [National Earth activist group, http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/press-center/releases2/globalwarming-impacts-hit-poo, July 15, 2008] Greenpeace is calling for global emissions to peak by 2020 and fall rapidly thereafter ensuring at least a 50 percent reduction from 1990 levels by the year 2050 globally, and eliminate fossil fuel emissions before the end of the 21st century. This platform is outlined in its ‘Global Energy Scenario’ which is available at: Governments must begin negotiations towards these targets at the UNFCCC Ministerial Climate Summit in Bali at the end of November this year and agree to conclude these negotiations by the end of 2009 at the latest to ensure that the Kyoto Protocol can continue. (1) Key findings of the report indicate that: It is likely that climate change will induce the mass extinction of species within 60-70 years and that the scale of risk is larger than most of the five major extinction events that have occurred in the earth’s history; Over the next decades the number of people at risk of water scarcity is likely to rise from tens of millions to billions. Steadily decreasing water availability is projected for India and other parts of South Asia and Africa and while the poorest parts of the world will be hit the hardest, countries such as Australia and nations in Southern Europe are also on the front line.

Renowned scientist Dr. James Lovelock, says world will soon come to an end due to global heating caused by emissions. Lovelock ’07. [B.Sc. in Chemistry from Manchester University, Ph.D. in medicine from London School of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicene, D.sc. in Biophysics from London University, Companion of Honor by the Queen, from the speech “Climate Change on a Living Earth”, July 15, 2008] In defense of my friends at the Hadley Centre, I have to say that almost everyone concerned with climate change in 2004, and that included me before the visit, had this detached approach to climate research. We were worried, but there was no sense of pressing urgency. I must add that this was what we all perceived was the correct and objective way to speak. When I looked at the IPCC report again - it was with a new sense of awareness - I now saw it as the scariest official document I have ever read. It was all too clear that the message from climate scientists was not reaching the public and especially not in the USA, this of course was before Al Gore presented his book and film. I now take an apocalyptic view of the future because I see 6 to 8 billions of humans faced with ever diminishing supplies of food and water in an increasingly intolerable climate. You may well ask how we scientists have let this potentially disastrous future steal up on us unaware. There are several reasons: among them is our success at solving the important but more manageable problem of stratospheric ozone depletion; I suspect that it has given us false confidence in our ability to deal with the far greater and more complex danger of global heating. Another reason for the slow recognition of the threat of adverse climate change is the division of Science into almost unconnected specialties. If you look back at the writings of Earth scientists 40 years ago you will find them confident that the composition and climate of our planet were completely explicable from chemistry and physics and that life was just a passenger. Life scientists of the same time were equally confident that organisms evolved according to Darwin's great vision and adapted to the Earth described by their Earth science colleagues in the building across the campus. This harmful and irrational division of science is slowly fading but it still persists and has led to the deplorable separation of the assessment of global change between two different international bodies: one based on physical science, the IPCC, and the other on biology, the Millennium

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Ecology Assessment Commission. The Earth is not so divided and so long as we treat it as two separate entities, the geosphere for the material Earth and the biosphere for life, we will fail to understand our planet.

Mass “warmings” caused by green house gases have been known to cause mass extinctions, research shows these “warmings” are happening again to this Earth, due to fossil fuels.
ScienceDaily ’07. [Science news search engine, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/10/071024083644.htm, July 16, 2008] Matching data sets of marine and terrestrial diversity against temperature estimates, evidence shows that global biodiversity is relatively low during warm ‘greenhouse’ phases and extinctions relatively high, while the reverse is true in cooler ‘icehouse’ phases. Moreover, future predicted temperatures are within the range of the warmest greenhouse phases that are associated with mass extinction events identified in the fossil record. The research, published in the latest issue of Proceedings of the Royal Society B., was carried out by University of York student Gareth Jenkins, together with his supervisor, Dr Peter Mayhew, and University of Leeds Professor Tim Benton, both of whom are population ecologists.Dr Mayhew says: "Our results provide the first clear evidence that global climate may explain substantial variation in the fossil record in a simple and consistent manner. If our results hold for current warming — the magnitude of which is comparable with the long-term fluctuations in Earth climate — they suggest that extinctions will increase."Of the five mass extinction events¹, four — including the one that eliminated the dinosaurs 65 million years ago — are associated with greenhouse phases. The largest mass extinction event of all, the end-Permian, occurred during one of the warmest ever climatic phases and saw the estimated extinction of 95 per cent of animal and plant species."The long-term association has not been seen before, as previous studies have largely been confined to relatively short geological periods, limited geographical extents and few groups of organisms," says Professor Benton. "But the evidence is striking."

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CO2 based warming leads to methane gas release - which is empirically proven to causes extinction - Stop ping methane is a moral imperative
Monbiot- Author of The Age of Consent2003- of extinction - Only six degrees separate our world from the cataclysmic end of an ancient era - G eorge Monbiot Tuesday July 1, 2003- The Guardian – Online- ://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,988380,00.html The events that brought the Permian period (between 286m and 251m years ago) to an end could not be clearly determined until the mapping of the key geological sequences had been completed. Until recently, palaeontologists had assumed that the changes that took place then were gradual and piecemeal. But three years ago a precise date for the end of the period was established, which enabled geologists to draw direct comparisons between the rocks laid down at that time in different parts of the world. Having done so, they made a shattering discovery. In China, South Africa, Australia, Greenland, Russia and Svalbard, the rocks record an almost identical sequence of events, taking plac e not gradually, but relatively instantaneously. They show that a cataclysm caused by natural processes almost brought life on earth to an en d. They also suggest that a set of human activities that threatens to replicate those processes could exert the same effect, within the lifet imes of some of those who are on earth today. As the professor of palaeontology Michael Benton records in his new book, When Life Nea rly Died, the marine sediments deposited at the end of the Permian period record two sudden changes. The first is that the red or green or gre y rock laid down in the presence of oxygen is suddenly replaced by black muds of the kind deposited when oxygen is absent. At the same tim e, an instant shift in the ratio of the isotopes (alternative forms) of carbon within the rocks suggests a spectacular change in the concentration of atmospheric gases. On land, another dramatic transition has been dated to precisely the same time. In Russia and South Africa, gently dep osited mudstones and limestones suddenly give way to massive dumps of pebbles and boulders. But the geological changes are minor in com parison with what happened to the animals and plants. The Permian was one of the most biologically diverse periods in the earth's histor y. Herbivorous reptiles the size of rhinos were hunted through forests of tree ferns and flowering trees by sabre-toothed predators. At sea, ma ssive coral reefs accumulated, among which lived great sharks, fish of all kinds and hundreds of species of shell creatures. Then suddenly th ere is almost nothing. The fossil record very nearly stops dead. reefs die instantly, and do not reappear on earth for 10 million years. All t he large and medium-sized sharks disappear, most of the shell species, and even the great majority of the toughest and most numerous organi sms in the sea, the plankton. Among many classes of marine animals, the only survivors were those adapted to the near-absence of oxygen. On land, the shift was even more severe. Plant life was almost eliminated from the earth's surface. The four-footed animals, the category to w hich humans belong, were nearly exterminated: so far only two fossil reptile species have been found anywhere on earth that survived the en d of the Permian. The world's surface came to be dominated by just one of these, an animal a bit like a pig. It became ubiquitous because not hing else was left to compete with it or to prey upon it. Altogether, Benton shows, some 90% of the earth's species appear to have been wi ped out: this represents by far the gravest of the mass extinctions. The world's "productivity" (the total mass of biological matter) collapsed. Ecosystems recovered very slowly. No coral reefs have been found anywhere on earth in the rocks laid down over the following 10 million y ears. One hundred and fifty million years elapsed before the world once again became as biodiverse as in the Permian. So what happened? Some scientists have argued that the mass extinction was caused by a meteorite. But the evidence they put forward has been undermined by f urther studies. There is a more persuasive case for a different explanation. For many years, geologists have been aware that at some point dur ing or after the Permian there was a series of gigantic volcanic eruptions in Siberia. The lava was dated properly for the first time in the early 1990s. We now know that the principal explosions took place 251 million years ago, precisely at the point at which life was almost extinguis hed. The volcanoes produced two gases: sulphur dioxide and carbon dioxide. The sulphur and other effusions caused acid rain, but would hav e bled from the atmosphere quite quickly. The carbon dioxide, on the other hand, would have persisted. By enhancing the greenhouse effec t, it appears to have warmed the world sufficiently to have destabilised the superconcentrated frozen gas called methane hydrate, loc ked in sediments around the polar seas. The release of methane into the atmosphere explains the sudden shift in carbon isotopes. Methane is an even more powerful greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide. The result of its release was runaway global warming: a rise in tempera ture led to changes that raised the temperature further, and so on. The warming appears, alongside the acid rain, to have killed the plants. Starvation then killed the animals. Global warming also seems to explain the geological changes. If the temperature of the surface waters n ear the poles increases, the circulation of marine currents slows down, which means that the ocean floor is deprived of oxygen. As the plants on land died, their roots would cease to hold together the soil and loose rock, with the result that erosion rates would have greatly increased. So how much warming took place? A sharp change in the ratio of the isotopes of oxygen permits us to reply with some precision: 6C. Benton does not make the obvious point, but another author, the climate change specialist Mark Lynas, does. Six degrees is the upper estimate produ ced by the UN's scientific body, the intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC), for global warming by 2100. A conference of some o f the world's leading atmospheric scientists in Berlin last month concluded that the IPCC's model may have underestimated the problem: the upper limit, they now suggest, should range between 7 and 10 degrees. Neither model takes into account the possibility of a partial melting of the methane hydrate still present in vast quantities around the fringes of the polar seas. Suddenly, the events of a quarter of a billion years ago begin to look very topical indeed. One of the possible endings of the human story has already been told. Our principal political effort must now be to ensure that it does not become set in stone.

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As opposed to Co2 global warming, methane based global warming happens extremely quickly and dangerously Hydrogen Journal- 2000- Issue 3- Article 2- Runaway Methane, http://www.hydrogen.co.uk/h2_now/journal/articles/3_Methane.htm From these records it appears that there have been short periods of only a few hundred years in the geological past when rapid increases of the Earth's temperature have occurred superimposed on top of the rise and fall of average temperatures over the longer term. For these short periods temperature rises of up to 8 degrees centigrade appear to have occurred on top of existing long term rises of 5 to 7 degrees to give temperatures up to 15 degrees centigrade warmer than today. Temperatures then fell back to the long term trend, the whole rise and fall only lasting a few hundred years. The most likely cause of this rapid global warming over such a short period is the release of methane into the atmosphere. Methane is 60 times more powerful than CO2 as a greenhouse gas but only remains in the atmosphere for about ten years and so looses it's greenhouse effect quickly compared to CO2 which remains in the atmosphere for 100 years. CO2 would not be available in sufficient quantities to achieve the rapid warming and if CO2 was the cause then the raised temperatures would last a lot longer. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------A methane gas release would be 10,000 more powerful than the entire worlds supply of nuclear weapons, and it can happen again BigSurf.Com- 2003- Methane thought to be responsible for mass extinction http://www.brightsurf.com/news/aug_03/EDU_news_082803.php What caused the worst mass extinction in Earth's history 251 million years ago? An asteroid or comet colliding with Earth? A greenhouse effect? Volcanic eruptions in Siberia? Or an entirely different culprit? A Northwestern University chemical engineer believes the culprit may be an enormous explosion of methane (natural gas) erupting from the ocean depths. In an article published in the September issue of Geology, Gregory Ryskin, associate professor of chemical engineering, suggests that huge combustible clouds produced by methane gas trapped in stagnant bodies of water and suddenly released could have killed off the majority of marine life and land animals and plants at the end of the Permian era -- long before dinosaurs lived and died. The mechanism also might explain other extinctions and climate perturbations (ice ages) and even the Biblical flood, as well as be the cause of future catastrophes. Ryskin calculated that some 10,000 gigatons of dissolved methane could have accumulated in water near the ocean floor under high pressure. If released quickly, perhaps triggered by an earthquake, the resulting cloud of methane would have an explosive force about 10,000 times greater than the world's entire stockpile of nuclear weapons. The huge conflagrations plus flooding and overturned oceans would cause the extinctions. (Approximately 95 percent of marine species and 70 percent of land species were lost.) "That amount of energy is absolutely staggering," said Ryskin. "As soon as one accepts this mechanism, it becomes clear that if it happened once it could happen again. I have little doubt there will be another methane-driven eruption -- though not on the same scale as 251 million years ago -- unless humans intervene." ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------A Methane releases would destroy all plant life on earth and it would literally blows up life on earth while also blocking out the sun Ryskin 2004- Gregory - January/February 2004- Sea web Ocean Update - Could Oceanic Methane Eruptions Cause Mass Extinctions? Online- http://www.seaweb.org/resources/74update/methane.html As the paper vividly describes, the "consequences of a methane-driven oceanic eruption for marine and terrestrial life are likely to be catastrophic. Figuratively speaking, the erupting region "boils over," ejecting a large amount of methane and other gases into the atmosphere, and flooding large areas of land. Whereas pure methane is lighter than air, methane loaded with water droplets is much heavier, and thus spreads over the land, mixing with air in the process (and losing water as rain). The air-methane mixture is explosive at methane concentrations between 5% and 15%; as such mixtures form in different locations near the ground and are ignited by lightning, explosions, and conflagrations destroy most of the terrestrial life, and also produce great amounts of smoke and of carbon dioxide. Firestorms carry smoke and dust into the upper atmosphere, where they may remain for several years; the resulting darkness and global cooling may provide an additional kill mechanism. Conversely, carbon dioxide and the remaining methane create the greenhouse effect, which may lead to global warming. The outcome of the competition between the cooling and the warming tendencies is difficult to predict."

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Rising coal prices causes global economic downturn- Only nuclear power can generate necessary electricity without producing environmental impacts Steven Mufson and Blaine Harden- Washington Post Staff Writers- 03/20/08; A01- Coal Can't Fill World's Burning Appetite, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/19/AR2008031903859_pf.html The consequences of tight supplies are being felt throughout the region and are not limited to developing countries. Rising coal prices are squeezing Japan and South Korea, which depend largely on imports for energy. Hardest hit, so far, are steel companies. It takes about 1.5 tons of coking coal to make a ton of steel. Steel makers, in turn, are raising prices for carmakers and other manufacturers, who at some point will pass some of the costs on to customers. Japan's Nippon Steel and JFE Holdings, and South Korea's Posco agreed last month to a 65 percent increase in coal prices, paying Brazilian mining giant Vale $78.90 a ton, up from $47.81. It was the industry's first major deal of the year and could set a global benchmark for material to make steel; a day after the deal was announced, Japanese Industry Minister Akira Amari announced that he was worried about the country's growth. Japanese steel makers were also buying on the spot market last month, purchasing U.S. coking coal for the first time since 2005, according to Nihon Keizai Shimbun, a Japanese business paper. It reported that mills were paying about $350 a ton for U.S. coal, which is about three times the price of coal purchased from Australia last year. Nippon Steel has said it plans to raise prices for steel sheet and plate by 10 to 20 percent, reflecting the higher costs of iron ore and coal. Shipbuilders have been passing higher steel costs on to their customers. And in the construction machinery industry, Shin Caterpillar Mitsubishi and Kobelco Construction Machinery raised prices across the board in January, citing higher materials costs. Jackpot for Mining Firms For coal mining companies, the coal crisis is a bonanza. The price hike has revived long-neglected mines in Hokkaido, a region in northern Japan that has been producing coal for more than a century. As global coal prices have more than doubled, the Japanese mines have suddenly become competitive and they are attracting the attention of utilities and companies that use coal for power. Hokkaido Electric Power Company this year doubled its coal order from the Hokkaido mines, from 500,000 to 1 million tons. The mines cannot produce enough coal to meet new requests. In the United States, it is getting harder to license and borrow money to build new coal plants. But Peabody Energy's chief executive Gregory H. Boyce says foreign demand will sustain mining output. "Coal is the sustainable fuel best able to close the gap of growing demand vs. scarce and expensive alternatives," he said at a conference last month. Khani, the FBR analyst, said that "coal use has expanded beyond steam and steel into coal-to-liquids in China and coal-to-chemicals," which he said would[linking] coal prices to oil as well as natural gas. Given recent oil price levels, that could mean higher prices for coal too. That could slow U.S. and worldwide economic growth and contribute to a renewed bout of stagflation. Rising commodity prices are "producing real limits on the future of economic growth in the U.K. and overseas," said Shaun Chamberlin, a specialist in energy and climate change at the Lean Economy Connection, an research institute in London. "In terms of industry, [they're] running out of ways of generating energy. We've jumped around from one energy source to another, and now we're running out." All this is especially bad news for those worried about climate change. Germany, for example, is caught between its pledge to eliminate nuclear power and its pledge to slash carbon emissions. Because nuclear energy accounts for a quarter of the country's electricity needs, utilities have filed applications for permits to build two dozen coal-fired plants over the next few years. "You reach a point where people say you have to stop burning coal," said Per Nicolai Martens, director of the Institute of Mining Engineering at the Aachen Technical University in Germany. "But when you reach that point, you are forced to ask the question of what happens when you shut it off?"

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Advantage – Transportation

Hannum, Wade, McFarlane, & Hill, 97 [W.H. French Atomic Energy Commission Siege CEA http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/01491970/1997/00000031/00000001/art00012, Progress in Nuclear Energy, Volume 31, Number 1, 7/14/08- date accessed]
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) has declared that the large and growing stocks of plutonium from weapons dismantlement in the U.S. and the former Soviet Union FSU are a ''clear and present danger'' to peace and security. Moreover, the opinion of some experts that plutonium of any isotopic blend is a proliferation threat (Mark, 1993) has been well publicized, heightening the concern that plutonium produced in the civilian fuel cycle is itself a proliferation threat. Assuring that separated plutonium, from dismantled warheads as well as from civilian power programs, is under effective control has (again) become a high priority of U.S. diplomacy. One pole of the debate on how to manage this material is to declare it to be a waste, and to search for some way to dispose of it safely, securely, and permanently. The other pole is to view it as an energy resource and to safeguard it against diversion, putting it into active use in the civilian power program. The ultimate choice cannot be separated from the long-term strategy for use of peaceful nuclear power.Continued use of a once-through fuel cycle will lead to an ever-increasing quantity of excess plutonium--requiring safeguarding. Alternatively, recycling the world's stocks of plutonium in fast reactors, contrary to common misconception, will cap the world supply of plutonium and hold it in working inventories for generating power. Transition from the current-generation light water cooled reactors (LWRs) to a future fast-reactor-based nuclear energy supply under international safeguards would, henceforth, limit world plutonium inventories to the amount necessary and useful for power generation, with no further excess production.The IFR offers

complete recycle of plutonium, and indeed, of all transuranics, with essentially no transuranics sent to waste, so the need for perpetual safeguards of Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) waste is eliminated. The pyro-recycle process is more proliferation resistant than the current plutonium-uranium extraction process (PUREX) because at every step of the IFR recycle process the materials meet the ''spent-fuel standard.'' The scale of IFR recycle equipment is compatible with colocation of power reactors and their recycle facility, eliminating off-site transportation and storage of plutonium-bearing materials. Self-protecting radiation levels are unavoidable at all steps of the IFR cycle, and the resulting limitation of access contributes to making covert diversion of material from an IFR very difficult to accomplish and easy to detect. Material diverted either covertly or overtly from the IFR fuel cycle would be difficult (relative to material available by other means, such as LWR spent fuel) to process into weapons feedstock.

FRs end plutonium commerce Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William H, Gerald, and George – nuclear physicists retired from Argonne Nat’l Laboratory, Scientific American, December, http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0512hannum.pdf] If fast reactors were used exclusively transportation of highly radioactive materials would occur only under two circumstances- when the fission product waste was shipped to Yucca Mountain or an alternative site for disposal and when start-up fuel was shipped to a new reactor. Commerce in plutonium would be effectively eliminated.

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IFR general/FYI

Lightfoot, et al 2006 [H Douglas, Global Environmental Climate Change Center; Wallace Manheimer, Naval Research Lab; Daniel Meneley, Engineer Emeritus, AECL; George Stanford, Argonne Nat’l Lab; September 12, “Nuclear Fission Fuel is Inexhaustible,” http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0609lightfoot.pdf] Fast reactors get their name from the fact that the neutrons released in the fission reaction are not slowed down as in a thermal reactor. Fast reactors contain a minimum of moderating material. Under these conditions, fission neutrons are absorbed at quite high energy to sustain the chain reaction. A fast reactor can be configured to produce either more or fewer fissile atoms than it uses to sustain the chain reaction. In other words, it can be a net producer or a net consumer of plutonium. Because of its ability to produce more fuel than it uses, fast reactors are often called "fast breeder reactors". In Europe fast reactors are known as "liquid metal reactors" (LMR). A major advantage of this design stems from the fact that more neutrons are emitted during highenergy fission than during low-energy fission. These extra neutrons convert more of the fertile nuclei to fissile nuclei as the chain reaction proceeds. The result is that fast reactors can convert all of the fertile material to fissile plutonium if external reprocessing and fabrication facilities are provided to remove the true waste and recycle the remainder. Eventually a fast reactor can split almost all fertile and fissile nuclei to yield more than 100 times the energy from the original mined uranium than do thermal reactors. Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] O.K., what was the IFR? IFR stands for Integral Fast Reactor. It was a power-reactor-development program, built around a revolutionary concept for generating nuclear power - not only a new type of reactor, but an entire new nuclear fuel cycle. The reactor part of that fuel cycle was called the ALMR - Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor. In what many see as an ill-conceived move, proof-of-concept research on the IFR/ALMR was discontinued by the U.S. government in 1994, only three years before completion.You might soon see references to the AFR, which stands for "Advanced Fast Reactor." It's a concept very similar to the IFR, with some improvements thrown in.

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Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] How was the IFR idea different from the concepts underlying traditional nuclear-power fuel cycles? All of those fuel cycles were derived from technologies developed to meet special military needs: naval propulsion, uranium enrichment, weapons-plutonium production, and plutonium separation. Waste disposal has been approached as "someone else's problem." The IFR concept is directed strictly to meeting the needs of civilian power generation. It is an integrated, weaponsincompatible, proliferation-resistant cycle that is "closed" - it encompasses the entire fuel cycle, including fuel production and fabrication, power generation, reprocessing and waste management. Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] What is a fuel cycle? What fuel cycles are there? "Fuel cycle" refers to all the steps involving nuclear fuel that are needed to generate electricity: mining, milling, enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactor operation, reprocessing and waste management. Depending on the fuel cycle, some of those steps might not be needed. The three major fuel cycles of current interest are: thermal without reprocessing ("once-through," or "throw-away"), thermal with reprocessing and IFR. The IFR will eliminate the need for mining, milling and enrichment. Till, 1997 [Dr. Charles, nuclear physicist, Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/interviews/till.html] Q: Was recycling part of this dream? A: Yes, of course it was ... If nuclear energy was to provide the amount of energy that the dream said it would, the vision said it would, then you'd have to recycle it in order to use the resource in effect over and over again. Q: What do you mean when you say "close the fuel cycle"? A: Simply that once the fuel has been used, and used to the maximum extent it can, which generally takes about three years, that you take it out and process it in a manner that allows you to take all of the useful elements out of it and recycle them back into the reactor bed. Simple as that. Till, 1997 [Dr. Charles, nuclear physicist, Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/interviews/till.html] Q: What is the concept of the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR), and how [does] it address the issue of waste and of using energy and so forth?

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A: Well, the IFR was a concept that we worked on for some ten years. And it was an outgrowth really of the studies that were caused by the Carter administration in the late '70s, where we looked at all the various kinds of reactors, types of fuel, processes for dealing with the waste, and so on. And it became obvious to us that one could put a total reactor concept together that would at the same time give you safety of a kind that reactors today don't have, that would allow complete recycling of the fuel, and thus extension of the ability to produce energy (very roughly, by a factor of 100), and also a waste product that did not contain the most dangerous elements. So with one concept you attack all of the principal real issues that there are for the use of nuclear energy. Q: Take us through the fuel cycle, as it refers to the IFR. A: The way the fuel cycle is done now is: you mine uranium; you purify the metal; you convert it to oxide; you put it in a reactor in the form of pellets; it stays in there for about three years; you take it out, and you try to find someplace to put it. The way the IFR fuel cycle would work would be: you could start with mined uranium, or you could start with fuel for present day reactors. Either one would do perfectly well. It's left in the metal form because metal is a particularly easy thing to fabricate. And so you cast it into uranium. They're put in steel jackets and loaded into the reactor. They stay in there about three to four years, and when they come out, they're put through a very simple process. One step separates out the useful materials. And then cast the metal again back into fuel that go right back into the reactor. The material that's left behind is the true, the natural waste. Q: The fission products. A: Fission products. But none of the long-lived toxic elements like plutonium and americium or curium, the so-called manmade elements. They're the long-lived toxic ones. And they're recycled back into the reactor ... and work every bit as well as plutonium. Q: So they go in, and then those are broken into fission products, or some of it is. Right? A: Yes. Q: And you repeat the process. A: Eventually, what happens is that you wind up with only fission products, that the waste is only fission products that have, most have lives of hours, days, months, some a few tens of years. There are a few very long-lived ones that are not very radioactive. And those are put in either metallic [matrix], a metallic container, or in a ceramic, very much like the ceramic in a sink so that the form of the waste, then, is something very impermeable to any kind of dissolution or anything like that, that will certainly last long enough to take care of the radioactive lives of materials that it's asked to contain.

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Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] What else can IFRs use for fuel, besides plutonium? Their fast spectrum permits IFRs to burn any and all actinides - elements with atomic number 89 (actinium) and greater. This is because, in a fast neutron spectrum, all the actinide isotopes have roughly comparable fission probability ("fission cross section"). The most important actinide elements are uranium (atomic number 92), plutonium (94) and, to a lesser extent, thorium (90). Since currently there is a growing glut of plutonium, continuing to pile up from nuclear weapons and from thermal-reactor operations worldwide, the first IFRs will undoubtedly be fueled primarily with some of that plutonium. Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] What in the world are "transuranic actinides?" They are the elements beyond uranium - that is, their atomic number is 93 or greater: neptunium, plutonium, americium, curium and more. All of them are man-made elements, since they are so radioactive that the naturally created ones have long since decayed away in our little bit of the universe. They are also called higher actinides.

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ALMRs
Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] Who was working on the IFR? How far along was it? The idea of the IFR originated at Argonne National Laboratory, which was about three years from finishing a study that was expected to establish firmly the technical and economic practicality of the concept. Progress had been spectacular. Design of the ALMR was being done at General Electric, San Jose, California. However, construction of a full-size prototype was not to be approved until Argonne's research study had been completed and a current need was demonstrated. Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] What sort of reactor was the ALMR? The ALMR was to be a "fast" reactor (one in which the chain reaction is maintained by highenergy neutrons) - so called because the energy spectrum of the neutrons is said to be fast.

Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] We were talking about inherent safety features. Are there any others? The ALMR core sits in a pool of liquid sodium. In combination with the low heat content of the metal fuel rods, this means that, if there were to be loss of control power, the core would be cooled passively by convection. Is this different than for other liquid-metal-cooled reactors? Almost all the earlier fast reactors were of the "loop type" - relying more heavily on forced coolant flow - and also had oxide fuel, making passive cooling more problematic. Wasn't passive cooling tested in a prototype ALMR? Yes, it was. All control power for the operating reactor was cut off. Coolant pumps stopped, control rods did not move, and the operators did nothing. The core temperature rose slightly, causing the reactor to go subcritical and shut itself down without incident. Unassisted convective cooling then prevented overheating.

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Sodium Cooled Reactors GIF ’07 [Generation IV International Forum, December 5, http://www.gen4.org/Technology/systems/sfr.htm] The Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) system features a fast-spectrum, sodium-cooled reactor and a closed fuel cycle for efficient management of actinides and conversion of fertile uranium. The SFR is designed for management of high-level wastes and, in particular, management of plutonium and other actinides. Important safety features of the system include a long thermal response time, a large margin to coolant boiling, a primary system that operates near atmospheric pressure, and intermediate sodium system between the radioactive sodium in the primary system and the power conversion system. Water/steam and carbon-dioxide are being considered as the working fluids for the power conversion system in order to achieve high-level performances in thermal efficiency, safety and reliability. With innovations to reduce capital cost, the SFR can serve markets for electricity. The fuel cycle employs a full actinide recycle with three major options. The first option is a large size (600 to 1,500 MWe) loop-type sodium-cooled reactor using mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuel, supported by a fuel cycle based upon advanced aqueous processing at a central location serving a number of reactors. The second option is an intermediate size (300 to 600 MWe) pooltype reactor and the third a small size (50 to 150MWe) modular-type sodium-cooled reactor employing uranium-plutonium-minor-actinide-zirconium metal alloy fuel, supported by a fuel cycle based on pyrometallurgical processing in facilities integrated with the reactor. The outlet temperature is approximately 550 degrees celsius for all the three concepts. The SFR's fast spectrum also makes it possible to use available fissile and fertile materials (including depleted uranium) considerably more efficiently than thermal spectrum reactors with once-through fuel cycles. Hylko 08 [James, an integrated safety management specialist for Paducah Remediation Services LLC, Power; Apr2008, Vol. 152 Issue 4, p44] The sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR). The primary development goals of the SFR (Figure 6) program are actinide management, reduction of waste products, and more-efficient uranium consumption. Future, lower-cost designs are expected to not only produce electricity but also supply thermal energy, produce hydrogen, and possibly enable desalination as well. The SFR's fast neutron spectrum could make the use of available fissile and fertile materials, including depleted uranium, much more efficient than it is in today's LWRs. In addition, the SFR system may not require as much design research as other Generation IV systems. A Gen IV technical readiness and operating experience comparison of the GFR, LFR, and SFR systems led to the selection of the SFR as the primary fast-reactor Gen IV candidate for near-term deployment. The decision was based on more than 300 reactor-years' experience with fast neutron reactors in eight countries. Important safety features of the SFR system include a long thermal response time (the reactor heats up slowly), a large margin between operating temperatures and the boiling temperatures of coolants (less chance of accidental boiling), a primary system that operates near atmospheric pressure, and an intermediate sodium system between the radioactive sodium in the primary system and the water and steam in the power plant.

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Supercritical Water Cooled Reactors
GIF ’08 [Generation IV International Forum, May 30, http://www.gen4.org/Technology/systems/scwr.htm] The Supercritical-Water-Cooled Reactor (SCWR) system is a high-temperature, high-pressure water-cooled reactor that operates above the thermodynamic critical point of water (374 degrees Celsius, 22.1 MPa, or 705 degrees Fahrenheit, 3208 psia). The supercritical water coolant enables a thermal efficiency about one-third higher than current light-water reactors, as well as simplification in the balance of plant. The balance of plant is considerably simplified because the coolant does not change phase in the reactor and is directly coupled to the energy conversion equipment. The reference system is 1,700 MWe with an operating pressure of 25 MPa, and a reactor outlet temperature of 510 degrees Celsius, possibly ranging up to 550 degrees Celsius. The fuel is uranium oxide. Passive safety features are incorporated similar to those of simplified boiling water reactors. The SCWR system is primarily designed for efficient electricity production, with an option for actinide management based on two options in the core design: the SCWR may have a thermal or fast-spectrum reactor; the second is a closed cycle with a fastspectrum reactor and full actinide recycle based on advanced aqueous processing at a central location.

Hylko 08 [James, an integrated safety management specialist for Paducah Remediation Services LLC, Power; Apr2008, Vol. 152 Issue 4, p44] The supercritical water-cooled reactor (SCWR). The SCWR (Figure 7) promises significant economic advantages for two reasons: the plant simplification that it makes possible and its increased thermal efficiency. The main mission of the SCWR is to generate electricity at low cost by combining two proven technologies: conventional LWR technology and supercritical fossil fuel-fired boiler technology. Design studies predict plant thermal efficiencies about one-third higher than those of today's LWRs. As the figure shows, an SCWR's balance-of-plant systems and passive safety features, similar to those of a BWR, are much simpler because the coolant does not change phase in the reactor. The supercritical water drives the turbine directly without any secondary steam system. An international effort, with Japan in the lead, aims to resolve the most pressing materials and system design uncertainties needed to demonstrate the technical viability of the SCWR.

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Lead Fast Reactors
GIF ’07 [Generation IV International Forum, Nov 28, http://www.gen4.org/Technology/systems/lfr.htm] The Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor (LFR) system features a fast-spectrum lead or lead/bismuth eutectic liquid-metal-cooled reactor and a closed fuel cycle for efficient conversion of fertile uranium and management of actinides. The system has a full actinide recycle fuel cycle with central or regional fuel cycle facilities. Options include a range of plant ratings, including a small transportable battery* of 10-100 MWe that features a very long refueling interval, a medium-sized reactor rated at about 600 MWe. The fuel is metal or nitride-based, containing fertile uranium and transuranics. The LFR is cooled by natural convection with a reactor outlet coolant temperature of 550 degrees celsius, possibly ranging up to 800 degrees celsius with advanced materials. The higher temperature enables the production of hydrogen by thermochemical processes. The LFR battery is a small factory-built turnkey plant operating on a closed fuel cycle with very long refueling interval (15 to 20 years) cassette core or replaceable reactor module. Its features are designed to meet market opportunities for electricity production on small grids and for developing countries that may not wish to deploy an indigenous fuel cycle infrastructure to support their nuclear energy systems. The battery system is designed for distributed generation of electricity and other energy products, including hydrogen and potable water. The system is fissile self-sufficient, operated in an autonomous load-following mode, simple to operate, reliable, transportable, and passively safe. Power conversion into electricity is estimated to be around 44% with the use of a supercritical carbon dioxide brayton cycle power converter. A large scale LFR system is also in development, intended for central power generation and radioactive waste transmutation. This system is of a pool type, with removable components in the reactor pressure vessel. Hylko 08 [James, an integrated safety management specialist for Paducah Remediation Services LLC, Power; Apr2008, Vol. 152 Issue 4, p44] The lead-cooled fast reactor (LFR). The LFR (Figure 4) is a fast neutron spectrum reactor designed for electricity and hydrogen production as well as actinide management. Three key technical aspects of the LFR are its use of lead for cooling, a long cartridge-core life (15 to 20 years), and its modularity and small size (potentially suiting it for deployment on small grids or at remote locations). The LFR envisioned by DOE-NE's Generation IV program would be based on the small secure transportable autonomous reactor (SSTAR) concept. The main mission of SSTAR development is to provide incremental energy generation to match the needs of developing nations and remote communities lacking a grid connection. LFR technologies have already been successfully demonstrated internationally. A prime example is Russia's BREST fast "breeder" reactor, which both consumes reactor-grade plutonium as fuel and produces it as raw material. BREST technology builds on Russia's 40 years of experience with lead-bismuth cooling of the reactors powering its Alfa-class submarines.

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Gas-Cooled Fast Reactors GIF ’07 [Generation IV International Forum, Nov 28, http://www.gen4.org/Technology/systems/gfr.htm] The Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor (GFR) system features a fast-neutron-spectrum, helium-cooled reactor and closed fuel cycle. The high outlet temperature of the helium coolant used in the GFR system makes it possible to deliver electricity, hydrogen, or process heat with high efficiency. The reference reactor is a 1200-MWe helium-cooled system operating with an outlet temperature of 850 degrees Celsius using a direct Brayton cycle gas turbine for high thermal efficiency. Several fuel forms are candidates that hold the potential to operate at very high temperatures and to ensure an excellent retention of fission products: composite ceramic fuel, advanced fuel particles, or ceramic-clad elements of actinide compounds. Core configurations may be based on prismatic blocks, pin- or plate-based assemblies. The GFR reference has an integrated, on-site spent fuel treatment and refabrication plant. The GFR uses a direct-cycle helium turbine for electricity generation, or can optionally use its process heat for thermochemical production of hydrogen. Through the combination of a fast spectrum and full recycle of actinides, the GFR minimizes the production of long-lived radioactive waste. The GFR's fast spectrum also makes it possible to use available fissile and fertile materials (including depleted uranium) considerably more efficiently than thermal spectrum gas reactors with once-through fuel cycles.

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Hylko 08 [James, an integrated safety management specialist for Paducah Remediation Services LLC, Power; Apr2008, Vol. 152 Issue 4, p44] The gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR). The GFR (Figure 2) is primarily designed for electricity production and actinide management, but it may be able to support hydrogen production as well. The reference GFR system features a fast neutron spectrum, a Brayton-cycle helium-cooled reactor, a closed fuel cycle for actinide reprocessing, and a plant efficiency of 48%. In November 2006, the GFR System Arrangement was signed by the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), France, Japan, and Switzerland.The several forms of fuel (ceramics, fuel particles, and ceramic-clad elements) being considered for the GFR have one thing in common: They will allow the reactor to operate at very high temperatures yet ensure excellent containment of fission products. Core configurations will be either pin- or plate-based fuel assemblies or prismatic blocks. Performance enhancement possibilities still being researched include the use of materials with superior resistance to fast neutron fluence (flux integrated over time) at very high temperatures, and the development of a helium-cooled turbine capable of super-efficient electricity production. Target values of some key parameters, such as power density and fuel burn-up, are sufficient for reasonable performance of a first-generation technology. Two GFR projects have been constructed in the U.S. The first — Peach Bottom 1, in York County, Pa. — was a 40-MW experimental helium-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor that operated from 1967 to 1974. The other was the Fort Saint Vrain Generating Station in Colorado; it operated from 1979 to 1989, burned uranium-thorium fuel at a high temperature, and was capable of producing 330 MW. Fort Saint Vrain's fuel elements had a hexagonal cross section, and their energy density was low enough that losing the primary coolant did not result in an immediate overheating of the reactor core. Operators had several hours to shut down the reactor before incurring damage to the core. The Fort Saint Vrain site was converted to a natural gas combined-cycle plant in 1996. Other ongoing demonstrations of GFR technology include Japan's graphite-moderated hightemperature test reactor (HTTR), which reached its full power of 30 MWth in 1999. It uses long hexagonal fuel assemblies, unlike competing particle-bed reactor (PBR) designs. Testing has shown that the core can reach temperatures sufficient for hydrogen production. Separately, a 300MWth pebble-bed modular reactor (PBMR) using a closed-cycle gas turbine power conversion system is being designed for deployment by the South African utility Eskom. Finally, a consortium of Russian institutes is designing a 300-30 MWth gas turbine-modular helium reactor (GT-MHR) in cooperation with General Atomics. The entire GT-MHR plant (Figure 3) is essentially contained in two interconnected pressure vessels enclosed by a below-ground concrete containment structure. The GT-MHR core is being designed to use any of a wide variety of fuels (including thorium/high-enriched uranium and Th/U-233); it may even be able to convert weapons-grade or reactor-grade plutonium fuel to electrical energy.

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Molten Salt Reactor
Hylko 08 [James, an integrated safety management specialist for Paducah Remediation Services LLC, Power; Apr2008, Vol. 152 Issue 4, p44] The molten salt reactor (MSR). The MSR (Figure 5) is a liquid-fueled reactor that can be used for actinide burning and production of electricity, hydrogen, and fissile fuels. In this system, the molten salt fuel flows through graphite core channels. The heat generated in the molten salt is transferred to a secondary coolant system through an intermediate heat exchanger, and then through another heat exchanger to the power conversion system. Actinides and most fission products form fluorides in the liquid coolant. The homogenous liquid fuel allows for the addition of actinide feeds without requiring fuel fabrication. During the 1960s, the U.S. developed a molten salt breeder reactor as the primary back-up option for a conventional fast breeder reactor. Recent work has focused on lithium and beryllium fluoride coolants with dissolved thorium and U-233 fuel. The DOE plans to continue its cooperative work with Euratom MSR programs in the future.

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SQ reactor research
Recent U.S. ALMR plans were rejected by the NRC, but a Generation IV facility is undergoing development Hore-Lacy 08 [Ian. Director for Public Communications at the World Nuclear Association. “Advanced nuclear power reactors”
February 12, 2008 World Nuclear Association http://www.eoearth.org/article/Advanced_nuclear_power_reactors . Accessed 7/17/08]

In the USA, GE was involved in designing a modular 150 MWe liquid metal-cooled inherently-safe reactor—PRISM. GE and Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) have also been developing an advanced liquid-metal fast breeder reactor (ALMR) of over 1400 MWe, but both designs at an early stage were withdrawn from NRC review. No US fast neutron reactor has so far been larger than 66 MWe and none has supplied electricity commercially. The Super-PRISM is a GE advanced reactor design for compact modular pool-type nuclear reactors with passive cooling and radioactive decay heat removal. Modules are 1000 MWt and operate at a higher temperature—510°C—than the original PRISM. The pooltype modules contain the complete primary system with sodium coolant. The plutonium (Pu) and depleted uranium (DU) fuel can be oxide or metal, but minor actinides are not removed in reprocessing so that even fresh fuel is intensely radioactive and hence resistant to misappropriation. The fission products are removed in reprocessing and resultant wastes are shorter-lived than usual. Fuel stays in the reactor six years, with onethird removed every two years. The commercial plant concept uses six reactor modules to provide 2280 MWe, and the design meets Generation IV criteria including generation cost of under 3 cents/kWh.

Proton-accelerator reactors are under research. These reactors operate below critical masswhen the accelerator is shut off the reaction stops. This technology could also burn waste products Hore-Lacy 08 [Ian. Director for Public Communications at the World Nuclear Association. “Advanced nuclear power reactors”
February 12, 2008 World Nuclear Association http://www.eoearth.org/article/Advanced_nuclear_power_reactors . Accessed 7/17/08]

A recent development has been the merging of accelerator and fission reactor technologies to generate electricity and transmute long-lived radioactive wastes. A high-energy proton beam hitting a heavy metal target produces neutrons by spallation. The neutrons cause fission in the fuel, but unlike in a conventional nuclear reactor, the fuel is sub-critical, and fission ceases when the accelerator is turned off. The fuel may be uranium, plutonium or thorium, possibly mixed with long-lived wastes from conventional reactors. Many technical and engineering questions remain to be explored before the potential of this concept can be demonstrated.

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Generations of reactor technology
Hore-Lacy 08 [Ian. Director for Public Communications at the World Nuclear Association. “Advanced nuclear power reactors”
February 12, 2008 World Nuclear Association http://www.eoearth.org/article/Advanced_nuclear_power_reactors . Accessed 7/17/08]

The nuclear power industry has been developing and improving reactor technology for almost five decades and is preparing for the next generations of nuclear power reactors to fill orders expected in the next five to twenty years. Several generations of reactors are commonly distinguished. Generation I reactors were developed in 1950-60s and outside the UK none are still running today. Generation II reactors are typified by the present US fleet and most in operation elsewhere. Generation III are the Advanced Reactors discussed in this paper; the first are in operation in Japan and others are under construction or ready to be ordered. Generation IV reactor designs are still on the drawing board and will not be operational before 2020 at the earliest. About 85% of the world's nuclear electricity is generated by reactors derived from designs originally developed for naval use. These and other second-generation nuclear power units have been found to be safe and reliable, but they are being superseded by better designs. Reactor suppliers in North America, Japan, Europe, Russia and South Africa have a dozen new nuclear reactor designs at advanced stages of planning, while others are at a research and development stage. Fourthgeneration reactors are at concept stage.

Generation II fast reactors do not incorporate passive or inherent safety technology that are critical in preventing malfunctions Hore-Lacy 08 [Ian. Director for Public Communications at the World Nuclear Association. “Advanced nuclear power reactors”
February 12, 2008 World Nuclear Association http://www.eoearth.org/article/Advanced_nuclear_power_reactors . Accessed 7/17/08]

The greatest departure from second-generation designs is that many third-generation reactors incorporate passive or inherent safety features that require no active controls or operational intervention to avoid accidents in the event of malfunction, and may rely on gravity, natural convection or resistance to high temperatures. Traditional nuclear reactor safety systems are 'active' in the sense that they involve electrical or mechanical operation on command. Some engineered systems operate passively, e.g., pressure relief valves. Both require parallel redundant systems. Inherent or full passive safety depends only on physical phenomena such as convection, gravity or resistance to high temperatures, not on functioning of engineered components. Many are larger than their predecessors.

Both the ABWR and the PWR have met and exceeded standards of safety magnitude and are ready for commercialization or already are being commercialized. Hore-Lacy 08 [Ian. Director for Public Communications at the World Nuclear Association. “Advanced nuclear power reactors”
February 12, 2008 World Nuclear Association http://www.eoearth.org/article/Advanced_nuclear_power_reactors . Accessed 7/17/08]

In the USA, the federal Department of Energy (DOE) and the commercial nuclear industry in the 1990s developed four advanced reactor types. Two of them fall into the category of large "evolutionary" designs which build directly on the experience of operating light water reactors in the USA, Japan and Western Europe. These reactors are in the 1300 megawatt range. One is an advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR), four examples of which are in commercial operation in Japan, with another under construction there and two in Taiwan. Four more are planned in Japan and another in the USA. The other type, System 80+, is an advanced pressurized water reactor (PWR), which was ready for commercialization but is not now being promoted for sale. Eight System 80 reactors in South Korea incorporate many design features of the System 80+, which is the basis of the Korean Next Generation Reactor program, specifically the APR-1400, which is expected to be in operation soon after 2010 and marketed worldwide. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) gave final design certification for both in May 1997, noting that they exceeded NRC "safety goals by several orders of magnitude". The ABWR has also been certified as meeting European requirements for advanced reactors (see below).

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Thermal vs Fast Reactors
Thermal distinct from Fast Reactor Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] Is there a slow reactor? Yes, in concept, but it's not called "slow," it's called thermal. Almost exclusively, current reactors are of the thermal variety: their chain reaction relies on thermal (slow) neutrons. In most of the thermal-spectrum reactors, the neutrons are moderated (slowed) by light water. Such reactors are called LWRs. Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] What is the most important difference in capabilities? Probably this one: Inherently, thermal reactors are copious producers of plutonium, while IFRs can consume plutonium. In fact, two IFRs could consume the plutonium output of five LWRs of the same size, while generating electricity and bringing in revenue. Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] How is that different from thermal reactors? In a thermal neutron spectrum, many of the fission products and actinide isotopes absorb neutrons readily without undergoing fission (they have a high "capture cross section"), and the chain reaction is "poisoned" if too much of such material is present. Thus a thermal reactor cannot be a net burner of transuranic actinides. The main starting fuel for thermal reactors is a mixture of the fissile isotope U-235 (Pu-239 can also be used), along with the fertile isotope U238. Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] What is a "breeder?" A breeder is a reactor that is configured so as to produce more fissile material than it consumes. A fast reactor can be designed and operated to be either a net breeder or a net burner. A thermal reactor is a net burner of nuclear fuel, but - and this is very important - all thermal reactors are prolific breeders of plutonium.

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Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] What do you mean? A thermal reactor starts out with no plutonium at all, and soon has a lot of it. In the process, though, it burns more fuel (mainly uranium) than it gives back as plutonium, and therefore is not called a breeder. Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] If IFRs can be either breeders or burners, why do some people insist on calling them breeders? Partly for historical reasons (originally, fast reactors were investigated because of their potential to breed), partly because of genuine confusion, and partly for the emotional impact, since "breeder" carries the subliminal connotation of runaway plutonium production. The central fact that those people are missing is that with IFRs you can choose not to breed plutonium, whereas with thermal reactors you make plutonium whether you want it or not. Then it is today's reactors that are runaway producers of plutonium, and IFRs could put a stop to it. Exactly.

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VHTRs are thermal reactors GIF ’07 [Generation IV International Forum, November 28, http://www.gen4.org/Technology/systems/vhtr.htm] The Very-High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR) is a graphite-moderated, helium-cooled reactor with a thermal neutron spectrum. The VHTR is designed to be a high-efficiency system, which can supply electricity and process heat to a broad spectrum of high-temperature and energyintensive processes. The reference reactor is a 600 MWth core connected to an intermediate heat exchanger to deliver process heat. The reactor core can be a prismatic block core or a pebble-bed core according to the fuel particles assembly. Fuel particles are coated with successive material layers, high temperature resistant, then formed either into fuel compacts embedded in graphite block for the prismatic block-type core reactor, or formed into graphite coated pebbles. The reactor supplies heat with core outlet temperatures up to 1,000 degrees Celsius, which enables such applications as hydrogen production or process heat for the petrochemical industry. As a nuclear heat application, hydrogen can be efficiently produced from only heat and water by using thermochemical iodine-sulfur process, or high temperature electrolysis process or with additional natural gas by applying the steam reformer technology. Thus, the VHTR offers a high-efficiency electricity production and a broad range of process heat applications, while retaining the desirable safety characteristics in normal as well as off-normal events. Solutions to adequate waste management will be developed. The basic technology for the VHTR has been well established in former High Temperature Gas Reactors plants, such as the US Fort Saint Vrain and Peach Bottom prototypes, and the German AVR and THTR prototypes. The technology is being advanced through near- or medium-term projects lead by several plant vendors and national laboratories, such as: PBMR, GT-HTR300C, ANTARES, NHDD, GT-MHR and NGNP in South Africa, Japan, France, Republic of Korea and the United States. Experimental reactors: HTTR (Japan, 30 MWth) and HTR-10 (China, 10 MWth) support the advanced concept development, and the cogeneration of electricity and nuclear heat application.

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Hylko 08 [James, an integrated safety management specialist for Paducah Remediation Services LLC, Power; Apr2008, Vol. 152 Issue 4, p44] The very high temperature reactor (VHTR)/next-generation nuclear plant (NGNP). The main mission of the VHTR/NGNP (Figure 8) is to produce both electricity and hydrogen. The reference system consists of a helium-cooled, graphite-moderated, thermal neutron reactor. Electricity and hydrogen are produced using an indirect cycle in which intermediate heat exchangers supply a hydrogen production demonstration facility and a gas turbine generator. Process heat also could be provided for applications such as coal gasification and cogeneration. The VHTR gets high economic marks for its high hydrogen production efficiency and high safety and reliability grades due to the inherent safety features of the fuel and reactor. It also gets good ratings for proliferation resistance and physical protection, and a neutral rating for sustainability because of its open or once-through fuel cycle. Although the VHTR/NGNP requires R&D advances in fuel performance and high-temperature materials, it should benefit from earlier GFR, GT-MHR, and PBMR advancements. The VHTR/NGNP is expected to be available for near-term deployment as early as 2015. The DOE-NE program's objective is to have the other Gen IV systems available for deployment by about 2030, when many of the world's nuclear plants' operating licenses will be at or near their expiration dates. Like the Gen III+ program, the Gen IV program coordinates with the DOE's Nuclear Power 2010 Program — to ensure that the results of all efforts complement the agency's new risk-based and technology-neutral licensing approach. The VHRR/NGNP is also special for another reason. Although the DOE is subsidizing research into several reactor concepts, the VHTR/NGNP has top priority because it was singled out in Sections 641 through 645 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. There, $1.25 billion was earmarked for the design and construction of a prototype NGNP project at the Idaho National Laboratory by no later than 2021. This prototype is expected to have a thermal efficiency of 48%, produce hydrogen as well as power, and make process heat with a zero carbon footprint available to a broad range of applications such as syngas production and the conversion of coal to liquid fuels.

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Answers to Economic Arguments
No Link – Traditional analysis doesn’t apply to IFRs EMWG ’07 [Economic Modeling Working Group of the Generation IV Int’l Forum, September 26, http://www.gen-4.org/Technology/horizontal/EMWG_Guidelines.pdf]
The economic goals of Generation IV nuclear energy systems, as adopted by the GIF, are (1) to have a life cycle cost advantage over other energy sources and (2) to have a level of financial risk comparable to other energy projects. In addition, it is expected that Generation IV systems will be deployed in international energy markets that may be highly competitive. An Integrated Nuclear Energy Economic Model is central to standardized and credible economic evaluation of Generation IV nuclear energy systems. The innovative nuclear systems considered within Generation IV require new tools for their economic assessment because their characteristics differ significantly from those of current Generation II and III nuclear energy plants.

Till, 1997 [Dr. Charles, nuclear physicist, Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/interviews/till.html] Q: Curiously, a number of the people in utilities haven't been especially supportive. They say the thing is just too expensive. Why aren't they ordering IFRs? A: Well, I think that there's really two different cases to be made. It's very easy, I think, for those who simply oppose nuclear energy outright, to if you like, soften their statements to the [innocent ear] by saying, "Well, really it's too expensive," without having any sound basis for making any assessment [to] whether it's too expensive or not. The price of nuclear energy today, if the plants were properly built and properly run, would be perfectly competitive with coal and gas. If the plants cost far too much in the building, even through regulatory or inefficient management or whatever, then the price of that would [increase]. But there's no intrinsic reason why nuclear in general, even today, should not be very competitive.

Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William H, Gerald, and George – nuclear physicists retired from Argonne Nat’l Laboratory, Scientific American, December, http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0512hannum.pdf] The overall economics of any energy source depend not only on direct costs but also on what economists call "externalities," the hard-to-quantify costs of outside effects resulting from using the technology. When we burn coal or oil to make electricity for example, our society accepts the detrimental health effects and the environmental costs they entail. Thus, external costs in effect subsidize fossil-fuel power generation, either directly or via indirect effects on the society as a whole. Even though they are difficult to reckon, economic comparisons that do not take externalities into account are unrealistic and misleading.

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Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William, Gerald, and George – retired nuclear physicists from Argonne Nat’l Lab, January 2, http://www.nationalcenter.org/PurexPyro.html]

Ehrman et al. have calculated that LWR spent fuel could be processed to supply LMRs at no cost to the government -- the cost being covered by the (competitive) busbar cost of power from the LMRs. [C. S. Ehrman et al,"Design Considerations for a Pyroprocess Recycle Facility," Global '95 Fuel Cycle Conference, Versailles, France,September 11-14, 1995].

Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William H, Gerald, and George – nuclear physicists retired from Argonne Nat’l Laboratory, Scientific American, December, http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0512hannum.pdf] Business studies have indicated that this technology could be economically competitive with existing nuclear power technologies [see the Dubberly paper in "Morè to Explore," on this page].

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ACGNC ’07 [American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness, “An Assessment of the Economic, Employment, Environmental and National Security Benefits of New Nuclear Facility Construction in the USA,” http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/documents.html] United States firms dominated this global market. From reactor design to fuel and component fabrication to plant construction and service, United States firms led the way. The United States also dominated the market for enriched uranium, which was supplied by the United States government’s two enrichment plants. Over the past decade or more, the United States nuclear manufacturing infrastructure has been allowed to atrophy. Yet the renewed, global interest in the use of nuclear energy represents an opportunity for American companies to recapture a large share of the world market for nuclear products and services. American workers can benefit from the restoration of high-paying jobs in reactor design and construction, component fabrication, reactor operation and maintenance, and other fields. Resurgence in the construction of nuclear power plants could also have important environmental and national security benefits for the United States. Nuclear power plant operations do not result in carbon emissions, so U.S. greenhouse gas emissions could be reduced substantially by displacing coal and natural gas-fired electricity with nuclear power. Nuclear energy can also contribute to our nation’s effort to reduce oil imports and thus increase our national security. The public debate over the expanded use of nuclear energy has, until now, not included a realistic estimate of these potential economic, environmental and national security benefits. The American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness arranged for the economic modeling experts at Oxford Economics to prepare the attached analysis to help quantify the benefits that could accrue if the United States were to engage in a new wave of nuclear energy infrastructure construction. In conducting the evaluation, the market for new nuclear energy products and services was considered in two major segments. The first is for the design, construction and operation of new nuclear power reactors. The next few years could see the construction of several new, large light water reactors in the United States. This is the type of reactor used in most of the world’s nuclear power plants. Plans have already been announced to build more than 30 of these reactors in the U.S. starting in the next ten years. In the analysis, Oxford Economics and the Council have assumed that fifty of these plants will be in operation or under construction by 2030.

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ACGNC ’07 [American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness, “An Assessment of the Economic, Employment, Environmental and National Security Benefits of New Nuclear Facility Construction in the USA,” http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/documents.html] By about the year 2020, these large light water reactors could be joined by so-called Generation IV reactors such as high-temperature gas-cooled reactors and fast spectrum reactors. Compared with today’s reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors (HTGRs) offer a high degree of versatility due to their higher outlet temperatures. Their ability to serve as a high temperature heat source for hydrogen or synthetic fuel production should be appealing to many nations seeking to reduce their reliance on oil imports. In addition, their robust fuel cladding contributes to their excellent safety and security characteristics. Fast spectrum reactors are needed to efficiently use recycled nuclear fuel from today’s reactors and thus capture the full benefits of the coming fuel recycling system. Both HTGRs and fast-spectrum reactors are not yet in widespread commercial use, so a system of suppliers will have to be created to provide the needed materials and components. In the analysis, Oxford Economics and the Council have assumed that 20 HTGRs and 12 fast spectrum reactors will be in operation or under construction by 2030; if Generation IV reactors are not ready for wide-scale deployment in the next two decades, additional advanced light-water reactors could be constructed and would result in essentially the same level of benefits. The second market segment is the design, construction and operation of fuel cycle facilities, particularly those for the enrichment of uranium and for the recycle of used fuel. New fuel cycle facilities will have to be constructed in the United States and abroad to support a wide-spread expansion of nuclear energy. In the analysis, Oxford Economics and the Council have assumed that three nuclear fuel recycling facilities (each with 1200 metrics tons/year of recycle capacity) will be in operation in the U.S. by 2030. The Oxford Economics report draws from several studies and sources to provide an integrated estimate of the economic and employment benefits that could accrue if the United States were to capture large shares of these three market segments. The report is intended to provide estimates that can help inform the public debate over investment incentives, research funding, or other policies that would assist in the restoration of American leadership in the global nuclear energy market. ACGNC ’07 [American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness, “An Assessment of the Economic, Employment, Environmental and National Security Benefits of New Nuclear Facility Construction in the USA,” http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/documents.html] Based on the studies and sources cited in the Oxford Economics report, they have estimated that the construction of light-water reactors, high-temperature gas reactors, fast-spectrum reactors and used fuel recycle facilities in the United States could result in the generation of: • • • More than 75,000 manufacturing jobs; Upwards of 100,000 construction and operations jobs; More than 100,000 indirect jobs related to the nuclear power industry; and

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Another 150,000 induced jobs in non-nuclear industries throughout the country.

ACGNC ’07 [American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness, “An Assessment of the Economic, Employment, Environmental and National Security Benefits of New Nuclear Facility Construction in the USA,” http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/documents.html] The construction value alone of these new nuclear facilities would be more than $100 billion. The retail value of the electricity produced by the new reactors would be more than $30 billion dollars per year. The electricity produced would avoid the emission of 430 million tons (390 million metric tons) of carbon per year by 2030 and would reduce oil imports by $41 billion per year. Fast Neutron Reactors would be economically viable if prices of Uranium were to increase to pre 1980 values Hore-Lacy 08 [Ian. Director for Public Communications at the World Nuclear Association. “Advanced nuclear power reactors”
February 12, 2008 World Nuclear Association http://www.eoearth.org/article/Advanced_nuclear_power_reactors . Accessed 7/17/08]

Natural uranium contains about 0.7% 235U and 99.3 % 238U. In any reactor, the 238U component is turned into several isotopes of plutonium during its operation. Two of these, plutonium-239 (239Pu) and 241Pu, then undergo fission in the same way as 235U to produce heat. In a fast neutron reactor, this process is optimized so that it can 'breed' fuel, often using a depleted uranium blanket around the core. FBRs can utilize uranium at least 60 times more efficiently than a normal reactor. They are, however, expensive to build and could only be justified economically if uranium prices were to rise to pre-1980 values, well above the current market price. For this reason, research work on the 1450 MWe European FBR has almost ceased. Closure of the 1250 MWe French Superphenix FBR after very little operation over 13 years also set back developments.

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*Economic Add-On
ACGNC ’07 [American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness, “An Assessment of the Economic, Employment, Environmental and National Security Benefits of New Nuclear Facility Construction in the USA,” http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/documents.html] The ongoing nuclear renaissance offers the promise of spurring new nuclear power plant construction in the United States. New plant construction, in turn, could stimulate our heavy manufacturing sector and restore United States leadership in global nuclear energy markets. Many billions of dollars in revenue and hundreds of thousands of high-paying jobs could be created in the United States if American firms capture a large share of the growing United States and global nuclear energy markets. This is not just speculation. The initial wave of commercial nuclear power plant construction, which peaked in the 1970s and 1980s, resulted in more than 400 plants being built across the globe. These plants generate about 16 percent of the world’s electricity without emitting air pollutants or greenhouse gases. ACGNC ’07 [American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness, “An Assessment of the Economic, Employment, Environmental and National Security Benefits of New Nuclear Facility Construction in the USA,” http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/documents.html] All told, the rebirth of a robust nuclear construction and manufacturing industry in the United States could result in the creation of more than 400,000 jobs. This figure could – and almost certainly would – be even higher as rejuvenated United States firms secured contracts to supply American-made nuclear and products and services across the globe. Must do Plan to accrue economic benefits ACGNC ’07 [American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness, “An Assessment of the Economic, Employment, Environmental and National Security Benefits of New Nuclear Facility Construction in the USA,” http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/documents.html] If no new nuclear reactors are constructed in the United States, the United States will not accrue many of these economic benefits. We will also find ourselves increasing our trade deficit and weakening our international nuclear policy and non-proliferation position by allowing other nations to be the predominant nuclear suppliers to the world.

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*Poverty Add-on
NUCLEAR POWER CAN PULL ENTIRE NATIONS OUT OF POVERTY ACGNC 7 [The American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness, http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/images/ACGNC_Press_Release_062107_FINAL_2_.pdf accessed July 17, 2008] June 21, 2007 “Congress has an opportunity to act to increase the energy security of our nation by approving the President’s budget for nuclear energy initiatives,” said Scott Campbell, Council president. “The United States is on the verge of a nuclear renaissance and the Council believes it is essential for our country to take the lead in moving the nuclear energy industry forward to ensure U.S. energy security and improve American economic competitiveness.” With the recent renewed global interest in alternative energy resources, the Council urges Congress and the American public to embrace nuclear energy as a viable solution in addressing the U.S. domestic energy supply and diminishing the effects of climate change. The use of advanced reactors across the globe will not only significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions but also provide the energy needed to pull entire nations out of poverty, a step that is vital in the global war on terror. Increased nuclear development can be translated into billions of dollars of revenue and more than 1 million jobs for U.S. designers, manufacturers and suppliers. Through spearheading industry-wide research and development efforts such as promoting advanced, recyclable technologies, the Council believes the United States can reclaim its role as the principal global nuclear energy supplier and innovator.

Nuclear power only way to address global poverty Marsh ’07 [Gerald, nuclear physicist, January, USA Today, http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0701marsh.pdf] Yet, if the grinding poverty that most people in the developing world are living under is to end through development along the Western model----and no alternative model has been shown to be viable- the required energy has to come from somewhere. There is only one practical answer that is known today: nuclear power coupled with the long-term development of a hydrogen economy based on nuclear energy.

Poverty is the Biggest Impact Ever--This Systemic Impact is Bigger and More Probable Than Any War or Genocide
Gilligan 2000 [James, Department of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, Violence: Reflections on Our Deadliest Epidemic, p. 195-196] The 14 to 18 million deaths a year caused by structural violence compare with about 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. Comparing this frequency of deaths from structural violence to the frequency of those caused by major military and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million military and civilian deaths, including those caused by genocide--or about eight million per year, 1935-1945), the Indonesian massacre of 1965-1966 (perhaps 575,000 deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two million, 1954-1973), and even a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R (232 million), it was clear that even war cannot begin to compare with structural violence, which continues year after year. In other word, every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide, perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world.

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Politics – Plan is Popular
Americans widely support new types of nuclear power, and believe incentives should be given to build them Reuters ’08
(Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS220561+25-Apr-2008+PRN20080425, 07/15/08) WASHINGTON, April 25 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ -- Nearly 80 percent of Americans endorse the use of federal financial incentives to help promote development of carbon-free energy technologies, including new nuclear power plants, according to a new national survey of 1,000 adults. The survey shows that 79 percent of Americans approve of providing tax credits "as an incentive to companies to build solar, wind and advanced-design nuclear power plants." Only 20 percent do not approve. The number of Americans "strongly approving" of tax credits exceeded the number of Americans "strongly disapproving" by the same four-to-one margin (37 percent vs. 9 percent). Support was nearly identical when Americans were asked about providing federal loan guarantees to companies that build solar, wind, advanced-design nuclear power plants "or other energy technology that reduces greenhouse gases to jump-start investment in these critical energy facilities." Seventy-seven percent of those surveyed approve, while only 22 percent do not approve. The new telephone survey was conducted April 10-13 by Bisconti Research Inc. with GfK NOP, and has a margin of error of plus or minus three percentage points. Eighty-four percent of Americans agree that the nation should take advantage of all low-carbon energy sources, including nuclear, hydro and renewable energy, to produce electricity while limiting greenhouse gas emissions. Sixtyseven percent associate nuclear energy "a lot" or "a little" as a climate change solution. Eighty-two percent believe that nuclear energy will be "very" or "somewhat" important in meeting the nation's electricity needs in the years ahead. A majority of Americans now rank economic growth as a top concern, ahead of the threat of climate change and the need for energy security, the survey found. Asked to choose which of four issues seem "most important," 57 percent of Americans named economic growth among the top two concerns, while 47 percent named global warming as a first or second choice and 46 percent named energy security first or second. Air pollution was ranked first or second by 43 percent of respondents. This is a sharp change from the results of a Bisconti Research survey in October 2007, when Americans ranked the threat of climate change and air pollution as the top energy-related concerns. Economic growth ranked at the bottom of the four choices. "These numbers do not mean that the public is less worried about global climate change than they were last year; economic growth is simply a greater concern at this time," said Bisconti Research President Ann Bisconti. "There is still a clear public mandate for climate change solutions, including government assistance for carbon-free energy technologies." The survey found that public support for preparing for and building new nuclear power plants remains strong. Seventy-eight percent of Americans agree that electric companies should prepare now so that new nuclear plants could be built if needed within the next decade. In the survey conducted last October, 75 percent agreed. In the new survey, [And] 59 percent of Americans agree "we should definitely build more nuclear power plants." Two-thirds of those surveyed (66 percent) said that, if a new power plant were needed to supply electricity, it would be acceptable to add a new reactor at the site of the nearest nuclear power plant that is already operating.

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Stanford 06 [George, PhD, retired nuclear physicist, interview with Ann Curtis, August 8,
http://www.cross-x.com/vb/showthread.php?s=1ad707180b7b85158aece8f58d80116a&p=1600390#post1600390] 4. How should the government address the small volume of unusable waste generated by the IFR?

Be aware that the repository volume needed is not determined by the volume of the waste, but by the heat that it generates. The buried waste must be dispersed widely enough that the neighboring soil or rock does not get too hot. The waste from the fast reactor consists almost entirely of fission products, and for the first couple of centuries the heating is dominated by only two isotopes -- Cs-137 and Sr-90, both of which have a half-life of approximately 30 years.. The GNEP plan is to separate the cesium and strontium, and hold them in temporary surface storage for a few half-lives before burying them. This should make more repositories unneeded for at least 100 years. This is probably the best solution that is politically acceptable.
WNN ’08 [World Nuclear News, June, http://www.world-nuclearnews.org/nwsltrdisplay.aspx?id=18056]

An April survey of US citizens (N=1000) found that overall 82% said nuclear power will be important in meeting the nation’s electricity needs in the years ahead. In a change since last October, most now put economic growth ahead of climate change and energy security as a prime concern, with air pollution trailing in a list of four. Public support for building new nuclear power plants strengthened three points to 78% since October, and 55% of respondents selfidentified as environmentalists. The survey also showed clear public support for government incentives to reduce CO2 emissions - 79% approve of providing tax credits "as an incentive to companies to build solar, wind and advanced-design nuclear power plants," and 37% strongly approve. Only 20% do not approve. When asked about providing federal loan guarantees to companies that build solar, wind, advanced-design nuclear power plants "or other energy technology that reduces greenhouse gases, to jump-start investment in these critical energy facilities" 77% approved.

Stanford 06 [George, PhD, retired nuclear physicist, interview with Ann Curtis, August 8,
http://www.cross-x.com/vb/showthread.php?s=1ad707180b7b85158aece8f58d80116a&p=1600390#post1600390]

8. In the current political climate, as many are focused on a desire to decrease dependence on foreign energy sources, would a policy to use fast reactors be politically popular in Congress? Your guess is as good as mine. All I can say is that it better be, or we and the world will find ourselves in deep doo-doo on down the road. The word needs to be gotten out to the public. Parenti, 08 [Christian, May 12, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080512/parenti] All the major environmental groups oppose nuclear power. But the campaign is having some impact at the grassroots: the online environmental journal Grist found that 54 percent of its readers are ready to give atomic energy a second look; 59 percent of Treehugger.com readers feel the same way. In other words, people who understand climate change are feeling downright desperate.

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Politics – Dems supporting Nuclear Power
Schultz 07 [Max, sr fellow – Manhattan Institute, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/12/19/AR2007121902075.html] If any of these plants actually gets built and the nuclear revival comes to pass, no small part of the credit will be due an unlikely source: liberal Democrats. The recent push for nuclear power couldn't have occurred if not for a softening of the reflexive opposition to nuclear power that has long been a staple of liberal and Democratic political orthodoxy. Schultz 07 [Max, sr fellow – Manhattan Institute, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/12/19/AR2007121902075.html] The attitude toward nuclear power in leftwing quarters has changed in a relatively short time. The 1984 Democratic Party platform, for instance, "strongly oppose[d] the Reagan Administration's policy of aggressively promoting" nuclear power. The 2004 party platform, on the other hand, limited its comment merely to opposing the siting of a nuclear waste dump in Nevada. Meanwhile prominent Democrats of all stripes are expressing openness to the possibility that nuclear power should play a significant role in the nation's energy future. The moderate Democratic Leadership Committee issued a report praising nuclear power's "great potential to be an integral part" of America's diversified energy portfolio. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, California Senator Dianne Feinstein, and presidential candidates Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama and Chris Dodd have each made cautious statements favorable to nuclear power. Even Al Gore, though hardly a proponent, makes sure to signal that he is "not reflexively antinuclear." Schultz 07 [Max, sr fellow – Manhattan Institute, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/12/19/AR2007121902075.html] So what accounts for the breakdown in the once-unified Democratic front against atomic energy? There are two answers, one obvious, the other less explicit. The first is climate change. As the Democratic Party rallies around global warming as a signature issue, it gets harder to ignore the only technology capable of generating large volumes of baseload power while producing no greenhouse gas emissions. The second factor is a growing recognition, if not exactly acknowledged, that the renewable energy sources prized by liberals are incapable of meeting a significant portion of America's future energy needs, especially if projected increases in demand pan out. Despite billions of dollars in government subsidies for wind and solar power over nearly four decades, these technologies produce less than one percent of America's electricity. Worse, electricity from these sources is intermittent and unreliable. Windmills and solar panels might improve from "negligible" to "marginal" in terms of their contribution to future energy production, but they won't supplant heavy hitters like coal, natural gas and nukes.

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General opposition is not the same as opposing specific plants Schultz 07 [Max, sr fellow – Manhattan Institute, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/12/19/AR2007121902075.html] Not every major Democratic officeholder is on board the nuclear train. New York Governor Eliot Spitzer has come out against the re-licensing of the two reactors at Indian Point, a nuclear plant about 30 miles north of Manhattan. The governor claims the facility is vulnerable to terrorist attack and incapable of withstanding potential earthquakes. Moreover, he says, there is no clear evacuation plan for the millions of residents who live nearby in the event of a catastrophe. It should be pointed out, however, that the plant has operated safely and without incident since its 1974 opening, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency approved a post-9/11 evacuation plan in 2003. The final say rests with the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which will take two years to decide. Still, the call to close Indian Point would seem to put Governor Spitzer in something of a bind. It is one thing to espouse a general opposition to nuclear power -- as many Democrats still do -- but quite another to oppose an existing nuclear plant while bearing some responsibility for providing credible replacements to make up for the lost power.

The ‘70’s are over – Democrats warming to nuclear power Schultz 07 [Max, sr fellow – Manhattan Institute, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/12/19/AR2007121902075.html] This is no longer the 1970s, when the fashion was to shout slogans and protest nuclear power plants in a bid to close them. With his opposition to Indian Point, Governor Spitzer, leader of what is arguably the most important state in the Union, looks increasingly anachronistic compared to fellow Democrats who are warming to nuclear energy's potential. Let's hope more Democrats resist the temptation to follow Spitzer and turn back the clock on nuclear power.

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Elections
Plan does not contradict Obama energy policy Parenti, 08 [Christian, May 12, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080512/parenti] Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama says he opposes any more relicensing of old nuclear plants. His rival Hillary Clinton has stopped just short of saying that. However, as was reported by the New York Times, Obama has close ties to the nuclear industry, particularly the Illinois-based Exelon, which has contributed at least $227,000 to his campaigns. Two of his top advisers have links to the firm, including his chief strategist, David Axelrod, who was a consultant for Exelon. Obama voted yes on the 2005 Energy bill, which lavished subsidies on oil, coal, ethanol and nukes; Senator Clinton, like almost half the Senate Democrats, voted against it. The Obama campaign says that as President he would not cut nuclear subsidies, only that he would boost subsidies for green power.

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Answers to Terrorist Attack Nuclear Plants GIF ’06 [The Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Evaluation Methodology Expert Group of the Generation IV Int’l Forum, November 30, http://www.gen4.org/Technology/horizontal/PRPPEM.pdf]
Unlike P[roliferation] R[esistance], P[hysical] P[rotection] is not unique to the nuclear industry. Although the assets to be protected, consequences of a successful attack, and means to detect, delay, and respond to an attack may differ, the same basic principles are applied to protect a facility against sabotage or theft, whether it is an NES, petrochemical infrastructure, water treatment plant, financial center, or military site. Consequently, early development of methods for assessing PP predates the nuclear industry. Although probably not recognized as such in early times, scenario analysis has been used for centuries to plan defenses. With the advent of modern analytical techniques, the evaluation of PP has become structured and formalized.

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Solvency – Catch All IFR creates safer and smaller amounts of waste
AAEA, no date given [African American Environmentalist Association, http://groups.msn.com/AAEA/ifr.msnw, 7/14/08- date accessed] The IFR metal fuel rods used in the reactor since 1986 have reached an atomic burnup - the percentage of fuel that is consumed - of 19.3 percent. Conventional nuclear power plants use ceramic fuel and normally only consume 3 or 4 percent of their fuel before it must be replaced. That fuel is stored as waste. The IFR's uranium, plutonium and zirconium metal fuel was designed to reach 15 percent burnup, and researchers are predicting it may reach 22 percent. When IFR fuel rods reach their maximum burnup, the fuel will be reprocessed in the Fuel Cycle Facility (FCF) located next to the reactor. Fuel recycling at the reactor site is a key IFR feature. The IFR's fuel recycling recovers the fuel that is not burned in its first cycle in the reactor. That fuel is formed into new rods, placed in fuel cladding and returned to the reactor. This process is repeated until essentially all of the fuel is used to produce electricity.

Fuel recycling greatly reduces the amount of the radioactive wastes that must be buried in geologic repositories. After 300 to 400 years, IFR waste - the products of fissioning - are as safe as the natural ore the fuel came from. It isn't renewable in the sense that you can plant seeds in the ground and grow nuclear fuel from them. However, as a "breeder" reactor, it does make plutonium 239, which can be used as nuclear fuel, from uranium 238, which cannot be used as a nuclear fuel.
The IFR uses a combination of metal fuel and a liquid sodium coolant rather than the ceramic oxide fuel and water coolant used in most existing reactors. The liquid sodium coolant carries away the heat. Even without pumps driving sodium through the core, natural convection current in the pool are sufficient to cool the reactor.

New fuel need never be shipped in, nor waste shipped out, during the plant's operating life. This minimizes the risk of environmental damage or unauthorized diversion of radioactive materials. Unlike coal-burning power plants, nuclear power plants emit no carbon dioxide which could contribute to the greenhouse effect, and no oxides of sulfur or nitrogen which produce acid rain.

Stanford ’03 [George, nuclear physicist, ret Argonne Nat’l Lab, from the

Proceedings of “Global 2003,”

ANS Winter Meeting, New Orleans, November 16–20, http://www.nationalcenter.org/LWRStanford.pdf] There are sound reasons for U.S. policymakers to expedite the development of a closed nuclear fuel cycle. The most compelling goal is the ability to expand the use of environmentally friendly nuclear energy without having to begin planning immediately for a second geologic repository. Eventually other motivations, such as managing resources responsibly and limiting the net production of plutonium, come into play, but the criteria for deciding whether and how to close the fuel cycle have to be consistent with efficient waste management.

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Fast Nuclear Reactors are very safe, economically feasible, and can rid the world of nuclear waste. World Nuclear Association 08 (Fast Neutron Reactors, http://www.worldnuclear.org/info/inf98.html 7/14/08)
The Russian BN-600 fast breeder reactor - Beloyarsk unit 3 (a fast breeder reactor) - has been supplying electricity to the grid since 1980 and is said to have the best operating and production record of all Russia's nuclear power units. It uses chiefly uranium oxide fuel, some enriched to over 20%, with some MOX in recent
years. The sodium coolant delivers 550°C at little more than atmospheric pressure. Russia plans to reconfigure the BN-600 by replacing the fertile blanket around the core with steel reflector assemblies to burn the plutonium from its military stockpiles and to extend its life beyond the 30 year design span. The BN-350 prototype FBR generated power in Kazakhstan for 27 years to 1999 and about half of its 1000 MW(thermal) output was used for water desalination. It used uranium enriched to 17-26%. Its design life was 20 years, and after 1993 it operated on the basis of annual licence renewal. Russia's BOR-60 was a demonstration model preceding it.

Construction has started on Beloyarsk-4 which is the first BN-800, a new, more powerful (880 MWe) FBR, which is actually the same overall size as BN-600. It has improved features including fuel flexibility - U+Pu nitride, MOX, or
metal, and with breeding ratio up to 1.3. However, during the plutonium disposition campaign it will be operated with a breeding ratio of less than one. It has much enhanced safety and improved economy - operating cost is expected to be only 15% more than VVER. (And) It is capable of burning up to 2 tonnes of plutonium per year from dismantled weapons and will test the recycling of minor actinides in the fuel. Further BN-800 units are planned. Industry spokesmen had warned the government that Russia's world leadership in FBR development was threatened due to lack of funding for completion of BN-800, but this now seems to be resolved. Russia has experimented with several lead-cooled reactor designs, and has used lead-bismuth cooling for 40 years in reactors for its Alfa class submarines. Pb-208 (54% of naturally-occurring lead) is transparent to neutrons. A significant new Russian design is the BREST fast neutron reactor, of 300 MWe or more with lead as the primary coolant, at 540°C, and supercritical steam generators. It is inherently safe and uses a U+Pu nitride fuel. No weapons-grade Pu can be produced (since there

is no uranium blanket), and spent fuel can be recycled indefinitely, with on-site facilities. A pilot unit is being built at Beloyarsk and 1200 MWe units are planned.
A smaller and newer Russian design is the Lead-Bismuth Fast Reactor (SVBR) of 75-100 MWe. This is an integral design, with the steam generators sitting in the same Pb-Bi pool at 400-480°C as the reactor core, which could use a wide variety of fuels. The unit would be factory-made and shipped as a 4.5m diameter, 7.5m high module, then installed in a tank of water which gives passive heat removal and shielding. A power station with 16 such modules is expected to supply electricity at lower cost than any other new Russian technology as well as achieving inherent safety and high proliferation resistance. (Russia built 7 Alfa-class submarines, each powered by a compact 155 MWt Pb-Bi cooled reactor, and 70 reactoryears operational experience was acquired with these.) In the UK, the Dounreay Fast Reactor started operating in 1959 using sodium-potassium coolant. This was followed there by the much larger Prototype Fast Reactor which operated for 20 years until the government withdrew funding. Japan, India, China A significant part of Japanese energy policy has been to develop FBRs in order to improve uranium utilisation dramatically. From 1961 to 1994 there was a strong commitment to FBRs, but in 1994 the FBR commercial timeline was pushed out to 2030, and in 2005 commercial FBRs were envisaged by 2050. In 1999 Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) initiated a program to review promising concepts, define a development plan by 2005 and establish a system of FBR technology by 2015. The parameters are: passive safety, economic competitiveness with LWR, efficient utilisation of resources (burning transuranics and depleted U), reduced wastes, proliferation resistance and versatility (include hydrogen production). Utilities are also involved. Phase 2 of the study focused on four basic reactor designs: sodium-cooled with MOX and metal fuels, helium-cooled with nitride and MOX fuels, lead-bismuth eutectic-cooled with nitride and metal fuels, and supercritical water-cooled with MOX fuel. All involve closed fuel cycle, and three reprocessing routes were considered: advanced aqueous, oxide electrowinning and metal pyroprocessing (electrorefining). This work is linked with the Generation IV initiative, where Japan is playing a leading role with sodium-cooled FBRs. Japan's Joyo experimental reactor which has been operating since 1977 is now being boosted to 140 MWt. The 280 MWe Monju prototype FBR reactor started up in April 1994, but a sodium leakage in its secondary heat transfer system during performance tests in 1995 meant that it was shut down and has not operated since. It produced 246 MWe when it was operating. Its oversight has passed to JNC, and the Minister for Science & Technology has said that its early restart is a key aim. A Supreme court decision in May 2005 cleared the way for restarting it, probably in 2008. Japan's LSPR is a lead-bismuth cooled reactor design of 150 MWt /53 MWe. Fuelled units would be supplied from a factory and operate for 30 years, then be returned. Concept intended for developing countries. A small-scale design developed by Toshiba Corporation in cooperation with Japan's Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI) and funded by the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) is the 5 MWt, 200 kWe Rapid-L, using lithium-6 (a liquid neutron poison) as control medium. It would have 2700 fuel pins of 40-50% enriched uranium nitride with 2600°C melting point integrated into a disposable cartridge. The reactivity control system is passive, using lithium expansion modules (LEM) which give burnup compensation, partial load operation as well as negative reactivity feedback. As the reactor temperature rises, the lithium expands into the core, displacing an inert gas. Other kinds of lithium modules, also integrated into the fuel cartridge, shut down and start up the reactor. Cooling is by molten sodium, and with the LEM control system, reactor power is proportional to primary coolant flow rate. Refuelling would be every 10 years in an inert gas environment. Operation would require no skill, due to the inherent safety design features. The whole plant would be about 6.5 metres high and 2 metres diameter. The Super-Safe, Small & Simple - 4S 'nuclear battery' system is being developed by Toshiba and CRIEPI in Japan in collaboration with STAR work in USA. It uses sodium as coolant (with electromagnetic pumps) and has passive safety features, notably negative temperature and void reactivity. The whole unit would be factory-built, transported to site, installed below ground level, and would drive a steam cycle. It is capable of three decades of continuous operation without refuelling. Metallic fuel (169 pins 10mm diameter) is uraniumzirconium or U-Pu-Zr alloy enriched to less than 20%. Steady power output over the core lifetime is achieved by progressively moving upwards an annular reflector around the slender core (0.68m diameter, 2m high). After 14 years a neutron absorber at the centre of the core is removed and the reflector repeats its slow movement up the core for 16 more years. In the event of power loss the reflector falls to the bottom of the reactor vessel, slowing the reaction, and external air circulation gives decay heat removal. Both 10 MWe and 50 MWe versions of 4S are designed to automatically maintain an outlet coolant temperature of 510°C - suitable for power generation with high temperature electrolytic hydrogen production. Plant cost is projected at US$ 2500/kW and power cost 5-7 cents/kWh for the small unit - very competitive with diesel in many locations. The design has gained considerable support in Alaska and and toward the end of 2004 the town of Galena granted initial approval for Toshiba to build a 4S reactor in that remote location. A pre-application NRC review is being sought with a view to a demonstration unit operating by 2012. Its design is sufficiently similar to PRISM - GE's modular 150 MWe liquid metal-cooled inherently-safe reactor which went part-way through US NRC approval process for it to have good prospects of licensing. The L-4S is Pb-Bi cooled version of 4S. In India, research continues. At the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research a 40 MWt fast breeder test reactor (FBTR) has been operating since 1985. In addition, the tiny Kamini there is employed to explore the use of thorium as nuclear fuel, by breeding fissile U-233. In 2002 the regulatory authority issued approval to start construction of a 500 MWe prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam and this is now under construction by BHAVINI. It is expected to be operating in 2010, fuelled with uranium-plutonium oxide (the reactor-grade Pu being from its existing PHWRs) and with a thorium blanket to breed fissile U-233. This will take India's ambitious thorium program to stage 2, and set the scene for eventual full utilisation of the country's abundant thorium to fuel reactors. Four more such fast reactors have been announced for construction by 2020. Initial Indian FBRs will be have mixed oxide fuel but these will be followed by metallic-fuelled ones to enable shorter doubling time. In China, a 65 MWt fast neutron reactor - the Chinese Experimental Fast Reactor (CEFR) - is under construction near Beijing and due to achieve criticality in 2008. There has been some Russian assistance in its development. R&D on fast neutron reactors started in 1964. A 600 MWe prototype fast reactor is envisaged by 2020 and there is talk of a 1500 MWe one by 2030.

CNNC expects the technology to become predominant by mid century.

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Fast Neutron Reactors are possible, in fact, there are more than 20 operating in the world today World Nuclear Association 08 (Fast Neutron Reactors, http://www.worldnuclear.org/info/inf98.html 7/14/08)
About 20 Fast Neutron Reactors have already been operating, some since the 1950s, and some supply electricity commercially. Over 300 reactor-years of operating experience have been accumulated. These more deliberately use the uranium-238 as well as the fissile U-235 isotope used in most reactors. If they are designed to produce more plutonium than they consume, they are called Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR). If they are net consumers of plutonium they are sometimes called "burners". Several countries have research and development programs for improved Fast Neutron Reactors, and the IAEA's INPRO program involving 22 countries (see later section) has fast neutron reactors as a major emphasis, in connection with closed fuel cycle. For instance one scenario in France is for half of the present nuclear capacity to be replaced by fast neutron reactors by 2050 (the first half being replaced by 3rd-generation EPR units).

The development and deployment of fast reactors are important to the sustainability, reliability, and security of the world’s long-term energy supply. American Nuclear Society 08 (Fast Reactor Technology:A Path to Long-Term Energy Sustainability,
http://www.ans.org/pi/ps/docs/ps74.pdf 7/14/08)

The American Nuclear Society believes that the development and deployment of advanced
nuclear reactors based on fast-neutron fission technology is important to the sustainability, reliability, and security of the world’s long-term energy supply. Of the known and proven energy technologies, only nuclear fission can provide the large quantities of energy required by industrial societies in a sustainable and environmentally acceptable manner. Natural uranium mined from the earth's crust is composed primarily of two isotopes: 99.3% is U238, and 0.7% is the fissile U-235. Nearly all current power reactors are of the “thermal neutron” design, and their capability to extract the potential energy in the uranium fuel is limited to less than 1% of that available. The remainder of the potential energy is left unused in the spent fuel and in the uranium, depleted in U-235, that remains from the process of enriching the natural uranium in the isotope U-235 for use in thermal reactors. With known fast reactor technology, this unutilized energy can be harvested, thereby extending by a hundred-fold the amount of energy extracted from the same amount of mined uranium. Fast reactors can convert U-238 into fissile material at rates faster than it is consumed making it economically feasible to utilize ores with very low uranium concentrations and potentially even uranium found in the oceans.1–3 A suitable technology has already been proven on a small scale.4 Used fuel from thermal reactors and the depleted uranium from the enrichment process can be utilized in fast reactors, and that energy alone would be sufficient to supply the nation’s needs for several hundred years. Fast reactors in conjunction with fuel recycling can diminish the cost and duration of storing and managing reactor waste with an offsetting increase in the fuel cycle cost due to reprocessing and fuel refabrication. Virtually all long-lived heavy elements are eliminated during fast reactor operation, leaving a small amount of fission product waste that requires assured isolation from the environment for less than 500 years.4 Although fast reactors do not eliminate the need for international proliferation safeguards, they make the task easier by segregating and consuming the plutonium as it is created. The use of onsite reprocessing makes illicit diversion from within the process highly impractical. The combination of fast reactors and reprocessing is a promising option for reasons of safety, resource utilization, and proliferation resistance.

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Solvency – Safety

FRs superior to TRs Lightfoot, et al 2006 [H Douglas, Global Environmental Climate Change Center; Wallace Manheimer, Naval Research Lab; Daniel Meneley, Engineer Emeritus, AECL; George Stanford, Argonne Nat’l Lab; September 12, “Nuclear Fission Fuel is Inexhaustible,” http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0609lightfoot.pdf] Safety features in design and operation of fast reactors are mostly similar to those of thermal reactors. Differences are relatively small, tend to favor fast reactors and the engineering solutions are in hand. Waste management is much easier with fast reactors because almost all of the longlived nuclear waste products associated with thermal reactors are split by the fast neutrons. The radioactive materials remaining are of concern for less than 500 years. In fission reactors using uranium, the process of "burning" nuclear fuel involves production and consumption of plutonium. In a thermal reactor, perhaps 30% of the useful energy comes from fissioning of plutonium. A fast reactor, on the other hand, derives almost all of its energy from plutonium. current procedures for security and safe handling of the many varieties of radioactive materials are equally applicable to fast reactors. In addition to the atomic energy regulators of many countries, a section of the united Nations is dedicated to coordinating these procedures and ensuring they are followed world-wide. Nuclear power has been accepted as a safe alternative to fossil fuels worldwide Perino. June 21, 2007. [Dana, US Press Secretary, White House Fact Sheet,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070621.html, July 15, 2008.] Today, Nuclear Power Provides Almost Twenty Percent Of The United States' Electricity. In addition, nuclear power provides 78 percent of the electricity for France, 50 percent of the electricity for Sweden, and 30 percent of the electricity for the entire European Union. China has nine nuclear plants in operation, and plans to build many more. Nuclear Power Is Clean Domestic Energy. Nuclear energy produces no air pollution or greenhouse gases. Without its use, carbon dioxide emissions would have been 28 percent greater in the electricity industry in 2005 - an increase nearly equal to the annual emissions from all 136 million passenger cars in the U.S. Nuclear Power Is Safe. The nuclear sector is one of the safest industries in the United States, and advances in science, engineering, and plant design have made nuclear plants even safer than the last generation of plants. Plant workers and managers focus on safety and security above all else, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspectors stationed full-time at plants provide daily inspections to ensure safety and security requirements are being met. Nuclear Power Is Affordable And Reliable. Once a nuclear plant is constructed, fuel and operating costs are among the cheapest forms of energy available. In addition, the cost of electricity from a nuclear power plant is stable and reliable - the cost does not fluctuate like natural gas, and the flow of power is not intermittent like wind.

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Nuclear power is the safest form of alternative energy to date Helen Suzman Foundation. July 15, 2008. [Helen Suzman Foundation,
http://www.hsf.org.za/publications/focus-issues/issues-31-40/issue-36/nuclear-power-safe-clean-and-efficient/, July 15, 2008.] Nuclear power is the safest, cleanest source of electricity in existence. Most leading democracies rely on it for a large proportion of their electricity, and it has a far better safety record than any other energy source. The worst nuclear power station accident in the western world, at Three Mile Island in the USA in 1979, killed no one. Chernobyl, the single fatal nuclear accident, was caused primarily by a reactor design that would not have been allowed in the West. The only environmental concern is radiation – but about 87 per cent of the radiation we get comes from nature (the sun, rocks, soil and water); about 12 per cent is medical. Less than 0,1 per cent comes from the nuclear industry. Every energy source creates long-lasting waste. Solar power units use lead batteries to store electricity, but lead is a deadly toxin that causes brain damage in children. This is not an argument against solar power – we are perfectly capable of handling lead safely. The same is true of nuclear waste: it is easy to store safely so that it presents no danger either now or in the future. If we want to avoid greenhouse gas emissions, nuclear power is the best energy technology. Furthermore, independent studies by reputable organisations such as the US National Cancer Institute have found no increase in cancer in people living near, or working in, nuclear power plants. The connection between nuclear power stations and nuclear weapons is extremely slight. Natural uranium contains only 0,7 per cent uranium 235. To create a bomb, this must be enriched to 90 per cent. The uranium used at Koeberg, by contrast, is enriched only to 3,5 per cent. Enrichment is difficult, expensive and conspicuous. Nuclear weapons have never been made from nuclear power plant waste. Nuclear power is also economical. Wind and solar power, while good for small-scale applications, are hopelessly unreliable and expensive for the bulk electricity demands of an industrial economy. The cost of wind electricity is more than double that of nuclear, gas or coal, and on a windless day one still needs an alternative power source. Solar power is even more expensive. The two biggest problems with nuclear power are public perceptions and high capital costs, both of which can be blamed largely on existing reactor designs. Now South Africa is designing a better nuclear power station – the pebble bed modular reactor (PBMR). The PBMR is small, simple, cheap and inherently safe. Neither uncontrolled fission reaction, which caused the Chernobyl accident, nor damage to the fuel from over-heating, which happened at Three Mile Island, is possible with a PBMR. And because the uranium fuel comes in small pellets that are encased in graphite balls or ‘pebbles’ which provide extremely durable containment, the waste is even easier to store than Koeberg’s. The PBMR has been reviewed favourably by experts at MIT. We need new power stations. Our gas fields are too small, and wind and solar power are impractical. Coal, which now supplies 92 per cent of our power, will continue to dominate, but it must be augmented by cleaner nuclear power. Countries around the world need more generating capacity and are showing increasing interest in South Africa’s PBMRs. None of the 27 nuclear power plants currently being built in Asia, Europe and South America are as economic or as safe as the PBMR. The PBMR offers a potentially huge export market for South Africa. Nuclear power is the safest and cleanest large-scale source of electricity we know, and in many countries, the most economical. The use of nuclear power as a source of electricity began fifty years ago. It now provides 17 per cent of the world’s electricity. Most of the world’s leading democracies, such as Sweden, France, Japan, Canada, Germany and the USA, rely on nuclear power for a large share of their electricity. The huge advantages of nuclear power come not from man but from nature. Nuclear energy is so concentrated that it can easily be controlled and causes minimum disruption to the environment. The safety record of nuclear power is far, far better than that of any energy source. The worst ever nuclear power station accident in the western world was at Three Mile Island in the USA in 1979. It killed nobody, injured nobody and had no ill health effects afterwards. More people can be killed in one weekend in South Africa by paraffin stoves than have been killed in the whole Western world in the entire history of nuclear power. The Paul Scherrer Institute, looking at the full energy cycle, including mining, fuel
preparation, operation, decommissioning and waste disposal, counted the number of accidents in energy that killed five people or more between 1969 and 1996. The result is shown in Graph One. (LPG: liquid petroleum gas) The single fatal nuclear accident was

Chernobyl, caused primarily by a crazy reactor design that would not be allowed in the West. Since 1996 there have been no such accidents in nuclear but many in other energy sources, including the natural gas accident in China last December that killed 233 people. The only environmental concern about nuclear power is radiation.
But radiation is part of nature. From the beginning of life on Earth billions of years ago, all living things have been bathed in radiation thousands of times greater than you would get from a local nuclear power station. A Rem (Roentgen Equivalent Man) is a measure of both radiation dose and its danger to man. A milliRem (mRem) is a thousandth of a Rem. No harm to human beings has ever occurred at a radiation dose of below 10 000 mRem a year (imagine this equivalent to the height of Table Mountain). Natural background radiation gives you about 250 mRem a year (an eight-storey block of flats). A nuclear power station close by will give you less than 0,25 mRem a year (a matchbox). A coal station gives you more radiation than a nuclear one but it is still utterly insignificant. About 87 per cent of the radiation we get comes from nature (from the sun, rocks, soil and water, from the food we eat and from our own tissues). About 12 per cent is medical (X-

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rays, radiation diagnosis and radiotherapy). Much less than 0,1 per cent comes from the nuclear industry. Radiation is very easy to measure, so you cannot have large radiation releases without somebody noticing them. Every source of energy for generating electricity gives rise to long-lasting waste. Solar power units, for example, have a lead battery to store electricity when the sun is not shining. Lead is a deadly toxin that remains dangerous for billions of years, indeed forever, and causes foetal damage and permanent brain damage in children. Is this a serious argument against solar power? Of course not. Mankind is perfectly capable of handling lead safely. But still less is the question of nuclear waste a serious argument against nuclear power. Nuclear waste is solid, stable and tiny in size. It is very easy to store safely so that in presents no danger to man or the environment, now and in the future. The same cannot be said for coal waste, which contains not only gaseous pollutants but also heavy metal toxins that last forever, such as mercury, arsenic and cadmium; toxins that are simply scattered into the environment. If you want to avoid greenhouse gas emissions, nuclear power is the best energy technology. Nuclear power releases no greenhouse gases in operation and over the full energy cycle, including construction, fuel preparation, operation and decommissioning. Nuclear power releases among the lowest, if not the lowest, quantity of greenhouse gases per kilowatt-hour (kWh) of any energy source. Massive studies by reputable, independent institutions such as the US National Cancer Institute and the UK Office of Population Censuses and Surveys have found no increase in cancer in populations living near nuclear installations or in nuclear workers. (Indeed the cancer rate in nuclear workers is usually lower than in the population at large.) The connection between nuclear weapons and nuclear power stations is slight, almost as slight as the connection between the lead in batteries and bullets. An atomic bomb requires either 90 per cent Uranium-235 or Plutonium-239. Since natural uranium contains only 0,7 per cent U-235, you have to enrich it, which is difficult, expensive and conspicuous. Koeberg only has enrichment to 3,5 per cent, which is why it is impossible for it to explode like a bomb. The apartheid government enriched uranium to over 90 per cent and made several atomic bombs at Valindaba near Pretoria. To say that Koeberg was a front for the bomb programme is rather like saying a nunnery is a front for a brothel: the two activities are so different it would have fooled no one. The plutonium in Koeberg’s waste is next to useless for weapons, and none have ever been made from such reactors. Now that apartheid has gone and we have joined the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear power without nuclear weapons fits in perfectly with our new democracy, as it does in Sweden, Finland and Japan. Nuclear power is economical. Even in Britain, which has it own gas and whose nuclear power programme has been poorly managed, the Royal Academy of Engineers estimates the cost of electricity in pence/kWh as follows. Coal: 2,5; gas: 2,2; nuclear: 2,3; wind without stand-by generation: 3,7; wind with stand-by generation: 5,4. In Japan nuclear

is the cheapest source of electricity. In the USA the production costs of nuclear are lower than coal, oil and gas. Finland, needing another power station, decided last year on nuclear because it was the cheapest. Renewable energy, such as wind and solar, is good for small scale applications (such as I saw last month on a farm in the
remote Northern Cape). For bulk electricity, which South Africa requires for its industrial economy, renewable energy is hopelessly unreliable and expensive. The fuel is free but it is very dilute and intermittent. The sun does not shine at night

and the wind often does not blow when you need it. If you want reliable electricity you have to install alternative power of the same capacity every time you erect a wind turbine. No bulk electricity from renewable energy is economically possible without huge operating subsidies. The costs of wind electricity around the world average over 6 Euro/kWh, more than double the operating costs of nuclear, gas or coal. Solar is even more expensive. To generate the same amount of electricity as Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, you would need over five thousand wind turbines, each about 90 metres high (the height of the Statue of Liberty). The electricity would be at least twice as expensive as Koeberg’s and on a still day you would not get one watt. In Europe, wind turbines are furiously resented by local residents, who consider them an environmental blight. They cause property values to fall. Last year, readers of Country Life magazine voted wind farms the worst eyesores in Britain.

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Farivar 07 [Cyrus, November 13, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/startups/news/2007/11/nuclear_economics] "The performance record from an operational point of view is extraordinary," said David Crane, the CEO of NRG Energy, of the next-generation plants currently operating in other, more nuclear-friendly countries such as Japan, China and France. "The U.S. has missed two generations of design that's been carried out in other countries -- they're simpler to maintain." Further, he adds, among the 104 reactors currently online in the United States, none have had any disasters since the infamous Three Mile Island incident in 1979. IFR is safe because of its sodium liquid metal processor and its coolant that works under the atmospheric pressure M. Ragheb - College of Engineering at University of Illinois – 2004
(Magdi, research on nuclear power, “INHERENTLY SAFE REACTORS DESIGNS”, https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/mragheb/www/NPRE%20402%20ME%20405%20Nuclear%20Power%20Engineering/Inhe rently%20Safe%20Reactor%20Designs.pdf) 7/15/08 by Au-Yeung The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) concept builds on the experience acquired from the successful operation of the experimental Breeder Reactor (EBR II), a 40 MW research reactor operated over 25 years by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL). It was sited at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) near Idaho Falls, Idaho in the USA. The experience of EBR II is the basis of other international effort in fast reactors including The Phenix and the Super Phenix in France. The concept also builds on the experience gained in the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) at Hanford in the state of Washington, where the mixed oxide fuel (MOX) as a mixture of UO2 and PuO2 was tested. The IFR offers the advantage of fast reactors in their ability of breeding new fissile fuel, as the old fissile fuel is being consumed. This extends the available supplies of nuclear fissile fuels practically indefinitely. It offers a large degree of inherent safety from two perspectives: 1. The core of the reactor is immersed in a large pool of sodium liquid metal possessing a large thermal inertia, and capable of absorbing the heat generated by the fuel under any credible accident condition. 2. The coolant is operated at atmospheric pressure and is not pressurized like in the gas or water cooled designs. In the case of sudden depressurization of a pressurized coolant it is lost to the system. In the case of water as a coolant, it flashes into steam and is lost. This cannot happen in the case of the IFR since the coolant is operated at atmospheric pressure. If the coolant pumps fail, the reactor naturally shuts itself off, without the need for human intervention. If the secondary steam system shuts off, the reactor shuts itself off even without any control rod movements or actions on the part of the reactor operators. One technical difficulty remains in that the liquid metal is chemically reactive with air and water. Thus, the coolant must be covered with an inert gas atmosphere, and double walled heat exchangers tubing must be used to avoid contact between the liquid metal and water. The IFR program devised an ingenious way of using metallic fuels effectively. The use of metallic fuels has been replaced by the use of ceramics as metal oxides to avoid a swelling problem and consequent rupturing of the cladding in earlier metallic fuels. The IFR uses a method for electrorefining the fuel onsite solving two problems at once. It is quicker and cheaper than in traditional fuel reprocessing, and the produced new fuel could be immediately loaded into the reactor core.

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IFR system is safe. While passive safety ensures reactor’s stability. Facilities can be collocated and waste products are destroyed in the reaction process. Bodansky - Chairman of Department of Physics from 1976-1984 and chairmen of the American Physical Society
Panel on Public Affairs from 1992-1996 University of Washington - 2004 (David, “Nuclear Energy: Principles, Practices and Prospects”, “Section 16.5: The Integral Fast Reactor System”, http://books.google.com/books?id=qBqbr8uV9c8C&pg=PA467&lpg=PA467&dq=Integral+Fast+Reactor+safe&sou rce=web&ots=X-GmX602uL&sig=YbA580tJDmPIIZyiXaALyH73dw&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result) 7/15/08 by Au-Yeung In the IFR fuel cycle, the spent fuel from the reactor is reprocessed and the separated actinides, including plutonium and uranium, are fabricated with fresh uranium into new fuel elements that are returned to the reactor. The overall IFR system had four components: the reactor, a reprocessing plant for spent fuel, a facility to fabricated new fuel elements, and facilities for waste handling. Although the IFR project has been discontinued, some of its central ideas remain pertinent and figure prominently in the Generation IV program. These IFR components included the following: Separation of chemical elements. Spent fuel from the reactor is divided into different output streams through a series of chemical and electrorefining steps, some at high temperatures, in an overall process called pyroprocessing. The actinides can be separated out, leaving a fission product waste stream from which most of the long-lived components in the spent fuel have been removed. Actinide burning. The fuel cycle is closed, with actinides returned to the reactor in new fuel elements. Most of the actinides are destroyed by fission in the fast-neutron flux of the LMR, thereby removing them from the long-term waste inventory. Breeding fuel cycle. Breeder reactions offer the prospect of virtually unlimited uranium resources. the IFR program incorporated a sodium-cooled LMR called the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor (ALMR) Passive safety. The ALMR had passive features designed to make it unusually safe. These features were explored in extensive safety tests at the Experimental Breeder Reactor (EBR II). Some of the conclusions are discussed briefly in Section 16.5.2 because of their relevance to future liquid metal reactors Collocation of facilities, The reactor and fuel reprocessing and fabricating facilities were located in close physical proximity in the IFR system. Hence, the name “integral.” The collocated facilities make plutonium diversion difficult

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IFR’s passive safety systems has worked perfectly in the past Greenman – Physicist at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory - 1997
(Gregory, Online Forum between physicist and scientists, “Re: dispersed Plutonium”, http://yarchive.net/nuke/ifr.html) 7/15/08 by Au-Yeung Dennis, Even fast reactors have a significant fraction of their neutron spectrum in the resonance region. The peak of the neutron spectrum of a fast reactor is a few hundred keV. When I was at Argonne, we designed the IFR to be passively safe - that is any excursion had to be terminated by the physics of the core and not by engineered safeguards like control rods. The dominant inherent shutdown mechanism for the IFR fast reactor was Doppler broadening! It was thermal and radiation damage to the fuel elements of EBR-1 which caused their expansion and bowing, changing the reactivity, and causing a partial meltdown of core #2. Quite correct; the EBR-1 fuel elements were restrained at both top and bottom. When a power excursion occured and the core heated up and the elements tried to expand longitudinally - the only way they could do so was to bow inward, thus increasing reactivity. EBR-II and IFR have elements that are restrained only at the bottom. In a temperature excursion, the fuel elements are allowed to "free-flower", i.e bow outward at the top to decrease reactivity. One of my projects at Argonne was to write the computer code which calculated the reactivity feedback due to bowing of fuel elements! And remember, in order to be economical the fuel must breed more fuel. This requires a fast reactor with a hard neutron spectrum. To achieve this you must run the reactor "dry," i.e. the water (moderator) to fuel (U) ratio must be low, and this doesn't give a lot of margin to play with. With little water to start with the voiding is not especially effective in reducing reactivity, especially if the internal components have already begun to rearrange themselves. Breeder reactors are inherently more dangerous and less controllable than thermal neutron reactors. The safest reactor designs are also the least efficient designs. Fast reactors fueled by plutonium have a smaller effective delayed neutron fraction, and hence have less of a margin between critical and prompt critical. Also, fast reactors have a smaller effective neutron lifetime, so they ramp up in power faster for a given amount of excess reactivity. Be that so, it doesn't mean that you can't design an inherently safe fast reactor. IFR is such a design. In 1986, about 2 weeks before Chernobyl, Argonne did a test with the IFR prototype. They locked out the control rods, the emergency cooling system and other emergency safeguards. They then cutoff the main coolant pumps! The reactor behaved as calculated. Doppler broadening and other inherent mechanisms worked to shutdown the reactor. Because of the large thermal inertia (heat capacity) of IFR's pool-type design (the reactor is immersed in a large pool of liquid sodium), the temperature excursion terminated before there was any danger of melting or damaging the fuel elements! The reactor was inherently safe. (Film footage of this test is part of Bill Kurtis' "The New Explorers" episode on IFR which aired on A&E).

IFR is safe because of its sodium liquid metal processor and its coolant that works under the atmospheric pressure M. Ragheb - College of Engineering at University of Illinois – 2004
(Magdi, research on nuclear power, “INHERENTLY SAFE REACTORS DESIGNS”, https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/mragheb/www/NPRE%20402%20ME%20405%20Nuclear%20Power%20Engineering/Inhe rently%20Safe%20Reactor%20Designs.pdf) 7/15/08 by Au-Yeung] The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) concept builds on the experience acquired from the successful operation of the experimental Breeder Reactor (EBR II), a 40 MW research reactor operated over 25 years by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL). It was sited at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) near Idaho Falls, Idaho in the USA. The experience of EBR II is the basis of other international effort in fast reactors including The Phenix and the Super Phenix in France. The concept also builds on the experience gained in the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) at Hanford in the state of Washington, where the mixed oxide fuel (MOX) as a mixture of UO2 and PuO2 was tested. The IFR offers the advantage of fast reactors in their ability of breeding new fissile fuel, as the old fissile fuel is being consumed. This extends the available supplies of nuclear fissile fuels practically indefinitely. It offers a large degree of inherent safety from two perspectives: 1. The core of the reactor is immersed in a large pool of sodium liquid metal possessing a large thermal inertia, and capable of absorbing the heat generated by the fuel under any credible accident condition. 2. The coolant is operated at atmospheric pressure and is not pressurized like in the gas or water cooled designs. In the case of sudden depressurization of a pressurized coolant it is lost to the system. In the case of water as a coolant, it flashes into steam and is lost. This cannot happen in the case of the IFR since the coolant is operated at atmospheric pressure. If the coolant pumps fail, the reactor naturally shuts itself off, without

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the need for human intervention. If the secondary steam system shuts off, the reactor shuts itself off even without any control rod movements or actions on the part of the reactor operators.

FR tech uniquely safe M. Ragheb - College of Engineering at University of Illinois – 2004
(Magdi, research on nuclear power, “INHERENTLY SAFE REACTORS DESIGNS”, https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/mragheb/www/NPRE%20402%20ME%20405%20Nuclear%20Power%20Engineering/Inhe rently%20Safe%20Reactor%20Designs.pdf) 7/15/08 by Au-Yeung] One technical difficulty remains in that the liquid metal is chemically reactive with air and water. Thus, the coolant must be covered with an inert gas atmosphere, and double walled heat exchangers tubing must be used to avoid contact between the liquid metal and water. The IFR program devised an ingenious way of using metallic fuels effectively. The use of metallic fuels has been replaced by the use of ceramics as metal oxides to avoid a swelling problem and consequent rupturing of the cladding in earlier metallic fuels. The IFR uses a method for electrorefining the fuel onsite solving two problems at once. It is quicker and cheaper than in traditional fuel reprocessing, and the produced new fuel could be immediately loaded into the reactor core.

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Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] How safe are IFRs? While the safety record of commercial reactors of Western design is superb, Three Mile Island notwithstanding, it would be desirable to have reactors that rely more on inherent safety features and less on engineered ones. ALMRs do that. What is an "inherent safety feature?" A safety mechanism that does not depend on human or mechanical intervention. For instance, ALMRs use metallic fuel rods, whereas LWRs use oxide fuel (as the Clinch River Breeder Reactor [CRBR] would have done). Why are metallic fuel rods an inherent safety feature? Metal is a good heat conductor, while oxide is a poor one. That means the interiors of the metal rods stay much cooler, which means that there is far less heat stored in an operating ALMR, which means that if there were a loss of coolant flow there would be much less heat present to raise the temperature of the fuel, which means that the consequences of a hypothetical accident would be much less severe. Why is that? Briefly, there,s a phenomenon called the "resonance Doppler effect," which causes the reactivity to change somewhat with temperature. Because in an ALMR the temperature does not change much in a hypothetical accident, the reactor is much more stable. O.K. What else? ALMRs use liquid sodium for cooling and heat transfer, which makes the system intrinsically safer than one that uses water. That is because the molten sodium runs at atmospheric pressure, which means that there is no internal pressure to cause the type of accident that has to be carefully designed against in an LWR: a massive pipe rupture followed by "blowdown" of the coolant. Also, sodium is not corrosive like water is. But doesn't sodium burn in air and react violently with water? Yes it does, and this of course requires prudent design, involving inert atmospheres and multiple barriers.

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Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] Not so fast! Seems to me there was a serious sodium leak and fire at a Japanese fast reactor. You're right. In December, 1995, at the Monju reactor, a temperature sensor broke and sodium leaked from a secondary sodium loop and caught fire. The plant was shut down, and has not yet been restarted. How many people were hurt? None. Was radioactivity released? No. Was the reactor damaged? No. Was there any damage at all? Yes. Some minor damage was caused by the burning sodium, and combustion products were spread through a portion of the building; cleaning them up took almost a year. The accident was classified as Category 1 on the international scale of 0 to 7 (with 0 being the least serious) by a committee of independent specialists. So the sodium isn't so safe after all. When you think about it, it is pretty safe. There have been sodium fires, and undoubtedly there will be more. The Monju fire was a public-relations disaster, but did not even come close to being a public health threat. There is a great deal of industrial experience with liquid sodium, and there have been very few problems. Well, I suppose that's a risk we can tolerate, since we need electricity. I think so.

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Till, 1997 [Dr. Charles, nuclear physicist, Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/interviews/till.html] Q: The other aspect of the integral fast reactor is that it's one of a type of what's called passive reactors. What does this mean? A: Well, the IFR has characteristics that are really quite different and superior to any other reactor that has yet been tried, because in the very nature of the materials that are used, it does not allow the reactor to be harmed in any way by the kinds of accidents that typically can happen to reactors, or indeed any other large plant. The electricity-producing plant reactor has a lot of valves, a lot of pumps, a lot of mechanical things that can go wrong. And the thing that you don't want to happen is to have the coolant, at once cooling the reactor and also then acting as the source of heat for steam to produce electricity. You don't want that flow to stop. That's what happened at TMI. That's what happened at Chernobyl. And if it does stop, then what happens? And in the IFR what happens is, the reactor just shuts itself down. There's no mechanical devices needed to do that. There's no operator interaction. There isn't anything. It's just in the nature of materials. When the coolant flow stops, the reaction stops. That's remarkable. Q: So it's inherently safe. A: So it's inherently safe. It's a remarkable feature. Till, 1997 [Dr. Charles, nuclear physicist, Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/interviews/till.html] Q: And you in fact ran an experiment that was comparable to what happened at Chernobyl? A: Yes, yes. Let me go on a little bit about that, because it is a rather dramatic characteristic. The Chernobyl accident happened in April 26 of 1986. Earlier that month, the first week in April, with our test reactor in Idaho, in fact the same reactor control room where we're now sitting, we performed a demonstration of that characteristic, where if you cut off the coolant from the reactor, what would happen? And there are two ways to cut off the coolant. One is that simply the pumps that are pumping the reactor stop. The reactor just shut itself down. And in the afternoon, we brought the reactor back up to full power again and did an accident situation where the reactor's unable to get rid of the heat it produces, because the heat normally is taken away by the electrical system, and so we isolated the electrical system from the plant, and the reactor then has to deal with the heat it produces itself. Again, another real accident situation. Again, the reactor just quietly shut itself down. Now, later that month, the Chernobyl accident happened. And the first of those scenarios that I described, where the cooling pumps were shut off, is exactly what happened at Chernobyl. The public was privileged to witness what happened there, over a period of weeks. What happened here was, the reactor just quietly shut itself down. That was the basis of the story in The Wall Street Journal, when some very alert science reporter realized the similarity of the two events, and the nonaccident in one case and the terrible accident in the other.

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Solvency – Efficiency
Fast breeder reactors use uranium and plutonium isotopes and are more efficient than conventional reactors Hore-Lacy 08 [Ian. Director for Public Communications at the World Nuclear Association. “Advanced nuclear power reactors”
February 12, 2008 World Nuclear Association http://www.eoearth.org/article/Advanced_nuclear_power_reactors . Accessed 7/17/08]

Several countries have research and development programs for improved Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR), which are a type of Fast Neutron Reactor. These use the uranium-238 (238U) in reactor fuel as well as the fissile uranium-235 (235U) isotope used in most nuclear reactors. About 20 liquid metalcooled FBRs have already been operating, some since the 1950s, and some supply electricity commercially. About 290 reactor-years of operating experience have been accumulated. Natural uranium contains about 0.7% 235U and 99.3 % 238U. In any reactor, the 238U component is turned into several isotopes of plutonium during its operation. Two of these, plutonium-239 (239Pu) and 241Pu, then undergo fission in the same way as 235U to produce heat. In a fast neutron reactor, this process is optimized so that it can 'breed' fuel, often using a depleted uranium blanket around the core. FBRs can utilize uranium at least 60 times more efficiently than a normal reactor. They are, however, expensive to build and could only be justified economically if uranium prices were to rise to pre-1980 values, well above the current market price. For this reason, research work on the 1450 MWe European FBR has almost ceased. Closure of the 1250 MWe French Superphenix FBR after very little operation over 13 years also set back developments.

Hannum, Marsh, & Stanford ’05 [William H, Gerald, and George – nuclear physicists retired from Argonne Nat’l Laboratory, Scientific American, December, http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0512hannum.pdf] Fast reactors can extract more energy from nuclear fuel than thermal reactors do because their rapidly moving (higher energy) neutrons cause atomic fissions more efficiently than the slow thermal neutrons do. This effectiveness stems from two phenomena. At slower speeds, many more neutrons are absorbed in nonfission reactions and are lost. Second, the higher energy of a fast neutron makes it much more likely that a fertile heavy metal atom like uranium 238 will fission when struck. Because of this fact, not only, are uranium 235 and plutonium 239 likely to fission in a fast reactor, but an appreciable fraction of the heavier transuranic atoms will do so as well.

Lightfoot, et al 2006 [H Douglas, Global Environmental Climate Change Center; Wallace Manheimer, Naval Research Lab; Daniel Meneley, Engineer Emeritus, AECL; George Stanford, Argonne Nat’l Lab; September 12, “Nuclear Fission Fuel is Inexhaustible,” http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0609lightfoot.pdf] The uranium already on hand constitutes a very large energy resource, since probably less than one percent of its energy, overall, has been extracted. Approximately 2 million tonnes of uranium have been mined so far WEC, 200f ]- equivalent to almost two-thirds of the current uranium reserves reported by the USGS, based on US$80/kg, Line 1, Table 2. Since much of its fissile isotope 2359 has been consumed in reactors, the vast bulk of the energy in the uranium already on hand is unavailable to thermal reactors. However, fast reactors can extract essentially all of that energy. In principle, this uranium could meet the world's energy needs for the next 15,200 years.

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Lightfoot, et al 2006 [H Douglas, Global Environmental Climate Change Center; Wallace Manheimer, Naval Research Lab; Daniel Meneley, Engineer Emeritus, AECL; George Stanford, Argonne Nat’l Lab; September 12, “Nuclear Fission Fuel is Inexhaustible,” http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0609lightfoot.pdf] The uranium already on hand constitutes a very large energy resource, since probably less than one percent of its energy, overall, has been extracted. Approximately 2 million tonnes of uranium have been mined so far WEC, 200f ]- equivalent to almost two-thirds of the current uranium reserves reported by the USGS, based on US$80/kg, Line 1, Table 2. Since much of its fissile isotope 2359 has been consumed in reactors, the vast bulk of the energy in the uranium already on hand is unavailable to thermal reactors. However, fast reactors can extract essentially all of that energy. In principle, this uranium could meet the world's energy needs for the next 15,200 years.

Lightfoot, et al 2006 [H Douglas, Global Environmental Climate Change Center; Wallace Manheimer, Naval Research Lab; Daniel Meneley, Engineer Emeritus, AECL; George Stanford, Argonne Nat’l Lab; September 12, “Nuclear Fission Fuel is Inexhaustible,” http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0609lightfoot.pdf] The hundred-fold fuel efficiency advantage over thermal reactors brings a third benefìt-a big one. It is obvious that a mineral deposit becomes an "ore" only when the valuable material can be recovered at an acceptable cost. If we increase uranium's unit value to society by more than one hundred times, then the number of deposits that can be classified as economically recoverable is vastly increased [Meneley, 1995]. Herein lies the fundamental reason for building fast reactors they are electricity producers in their own right, but they are also “fuel factories" that extend uranium resources well beyond our foreseeable horizon and into the millennia beyond.
Stanford ’03 [George, nuclear physicist, ret Argonne Nat’l Lab, from the

Proceedings of “Global 2003,”

ANS Winter Meeting, New Orleans, November 16–20, http://www.nationalcenter.org/LWRStanford.pdf] The nuclear fuel cycle can be truly closed by supplementing today’s thermal reactors with fast reactors, which can use as fuel the heavy, fissionable isotopes that accumulate in thermal-reactor fuel. In a fully closed cycle, the waste for disposal consists only of fission products with trace amounts of actinides. Eliminating the transuranics reduces the heat load in the repository, increasing its capacity by about a factor of five. This permits the expanded use of LWRs to produce pollution-free electricity and reduce dependence on foreign oil. Cycling back to LWRs amounts to an expensive storage option that puts off for maybe a decade or two the need to deal effectively with the transuranics. That delay is bought at the cost of implementing and operating the thermal-recycle infrastructure, with extra expense later on because the resulting spent fuel would significantly complicate fast-reactor processing.

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Actinide Management Hylko 08 [James, an integrated safety management specialist for Paducah Remediation Services LLC, Power; Apr2008, Vol. 152 Issue 4, p44] Actinide management, common to all the Gen IV alternatives, would reduce the volume of nuclear waste in the mid-term and provide assurance of nuclear fuel availability in the long term. This mission overlaps a national responsibility addressed in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, namely, the disposition of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. The mid-term (30 to 50 years) actinide management mission consists primarily of limiting or reversing the buildup of the inventory of spent nuclear fuel from current and near-term nuclear plants. Actinides may be a waste product for an LWR, but they are fissionable in a fast reactor. As mentioned earlier, a transuranic is a very heavy element with a higher atomic number than uranium (92); it is formed artificially by neutron capture and possibly by subsequent beta decays. Extracting these longlived radionuclides from spent fuel and irradiating them in a closed fuel cycle using fast reactors does more than generate electricity. It also transmutes the long-lived radionuclides that would otherwise require isolation in a geologic repository such as Yucca Mountain into shorter-lived radionuclides. Transmutation changes atoms of one element into those of another by neutron bombardment that causes neutron capture and/or fission. In the longer term, the actinide management mission can beneficially produce excess fissionable material, currently supplied through mining and the enrichment of natural uranium, for use in systems optimized for other energy missions. FRs are unique in actinide management Hylko 08 [James, an integrated safety management specialist for Paducah Remediation Services LLC, Power; Apr2008, Vol. 152 Issue 4, p44] Fast reactors play a unique role in the actinide management mission because they operate with higher-energy neutrons than LWRs and thus are more effective in fissioning the actinides and transuranics recovered from an LWR's spent fuel. Theoretically, a fast reactor can recycle all of the uranium and transuranic radionuclides. In contrast, thermal reactors, such as LWRs, use lower-energy neutrons and extract energy primarily from fissile isotopes. The only naturally occurring fissile isotope is U-235, which has only 0.7% natural uranium; enrichment increases this natural concentration of U-235 to about 3% to 5%, which is enough to enable operation of an LWR. But because LWRs cannot be used for complete recycling, over 99% of the uranium initially mined ends up in their spent fuel and in the residue from the enrichment process. Fast reactors maximize the use of uranium because they support multiple fuel recycles that make all of the fuel's heat content usable.

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Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] Then I won't worry. How do IFRs help conserve natural resources? Thermal reactors are incredibly profligate with the earth's endowment of potential nuclear fuel. The once-through, "throw-away" cycle in favor in the U.S. uses less than a hundredth of the energy potential of the mined uranium. Even with recycle, less than 2% can be extracted. IFRs can use over 99%.

Stanford ’01 [George, Ph.D., nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html] Wait a minute - less than 2% with recycle? I thought you could get almost all of the energy that way. Sorry, but you can't. After two or three passes through a reactor, the fuel has gotten so contaminated with isotopes heavier than Pu-239 that reactor performance is seriously degraded. The only way to consume all of it is in a flux of fast neutrons. I'll be darned! Well anyway, with uranium so cheap, why do we care about conservation? For the same reason we care (or should) about conserving petroleum, even though oil is now cheap. The current world-wide glut of reactor fuel is strictly temporary. Particularly with the U.S. throw-away cycle, the economically available U-235 is not predicted to last much longer than the petroleum reserves - a few decades. Thermal reactors with reprocessing would do at least a little better. Recycling (it would be with the PUREX process, or an equivalent) could stretch the U-235 supply another few decades - but remember the consequences: growing stockpiles of plutonium, pure plutonium streams in the PUREX plants, and the creation of 100,000-year plutonium mines.

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Solvency: Better than other alternatives
Nuclear power is superior to all alternatives- It uses less space than alternative energy Osman Kemal Kadiroglu3/16/2006Prof. Nuclear Engineering Department, North-West Uni. Potchefstroom South A frica- Nuclear Power vs. Coal burning- - Ask an expert- Online- http://en.allexperts.com/q/Nuclear-Power-2462/Nuc lear-Power-vs-Coal.htm Nuclear power is one of the cheapest ways of producing electric power. The overall generation cost ($/kW h) is less then all other electricity generation technologies. do not compare nuclear power with hydraulic pow er. One can build a nuclear reactor to any place they want but a coal fired plant must be close to coal mines and one can only build a dam to a very specific place at a river basin. The cost of generation includes capital cost (ve ry large for nuclear powerr plants and dams) including the interest paid for the load, operaton and maintanc e cost (similar for fossile fired plant and a nuclear power plant) and the fuel cost including the decommissi on (nuclear has the cheapest fuel where as fossile fueled plants has the largest). Nuclear power plants use less l and then other alternatives. (Solar or wind need many times more land to generate similar power) The ex haust gases from fossile fired plants contain CO2 and there is no way to get rid of them. This gas is contrib uting to the temperature increase of the atmosphere. Coal has some degree of sulphur and when burned SO2 is c reated. This gas causes acid rains. of the sulphor can be scrubed from the coal while or after the combustion but i t increses the cost of electricity. If the burners operate at high temperatures, like in gas turbines and diesel engin es, nitrogen oxides are generated. This gas is one of the contributers of the ozone depletion in the atmospher e. Ash from a fossile fired plant accumulates around the power plant as ash mountains and it contains tox ic elements like cadmium and radioactive elements like uranium and thorium. Nuclear power generates v ery little amount of highly radioactive waste. The toxicidity of this waste dimishes with time. a very long ti me teh activity of the nuclear waste will be same as earths surface. (This time is very very long) Nuclear power gives energy independence to a nation.Considering the strings attached to gas and petroleum sales in the i nternational markets, nations that do not dependent of foreign energy resources have free hand in diplom acy.

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Solvency – USFG action key
Till, 1997 [Dr. Charles, nuclear physicist, Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/interviews/till.html] Q: The current situation on the IFR, do you have any hope that it can be saved? A: I don't think that the administration will support further work in nuclear energy. And without the administration's support, there is little chance that a successful development program could proceed. That must be a policy of the nation, as enunciated by the administration. And for good reason or not, that is not the policy of this administration. So without administration support, there is no real hope of proceeding with the IFR.

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Solvency: US Key
ACGNC 6 [The American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness,
http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/documents.html : Council Position on the Proposed US/Russian 123 Agreement, accessed July 17, 2008] December 2006 While the U.S. has not yet shown the same commitment to advanced reactor development, the U.S. is still the repository of much of the world’s sodium-cooled reactor knowledge base. The Experimental Breeder Reactor-II had one of the most successful operating histories of any fast reactor in the world. The U.S. has also continued in the development of pyroprocessing, an advanced fuel recycle technology that has been optimized for fast reactor fuel.

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Topicality – Alternative Energy
It’s “renewable” Lightfoot, et al 2006 [H Douglas, Global Environmental Climate Change Center; Wallace Manheimer, Naval Research Lab; Daniel Meneley, Engineer Emeritus, AECL; George Stanford, Argonne Nat’l Lab; September 12, “Nuclear Fission Fuel is Inexhaustible,” http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0609lightfoot.pdf] Nuclear fission energy is as inexhaustible as those energies usually termed "renewable", such as hydro, wind, solar, and biomass. But, unlike the sum of these energies, nuclear fission energy has sufficient capacity to replace fossil fuels as they become scarce. Replacement of the current thermal variety of nuclear fission reactors with nuclear fission fast reactors, which are 100 times more fuel efficient, can dramatically extend nuclear fuel reserves. The contribution of uranium price to the cost of electricity generated by fast reactors, even if its price were the same as that of gold at US$14,000, would be us$0.003/kwh of electricity generated. At that price, -economically viable uranium reserves would be, for all practical purposes, inexhaustible. Uranium could power the world as far into the future as we are today from the dawn of civilization-more than 10,000 years ago. Fast reactors have distinct advantages in siting of plants, product transport and management of waste. Lightfoot, et al 2006 [H Douglas, Global Environmental Climate Change Center; Wallace Manheimer, Naval Research Lab; Daniel Meneley, Engineer Emeritus, AECL; George Stanford, Argonne Nat’l Lab; September 12, “Nuclear Fission Fuel is Inexhaustible,” http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0609lightfoot.pdf] In 1983, Bernard L. Cohen [Cohen, 1983] showed quantitatively that uranium as nuclear fission fuel is, for all practical purposes, inexhaustible, given the use of fuel efficient breeder reactors. This idea had also been suggested earlier by others [Lewis, lgOB]. The aim of this paper is to support this claim ãnd show that technology is close at hand to take full advantage of this endless resource. When energy sources such as hydro, wind, solar, biomass and geothermal are termed "renewable", what is really meant is that they are inexhaustible. If, for all practical purposes, nuclear fission fuel is inexhaustible, then it too is one of the "renewables". Moreover, nuclear fission has much greater capacity to provide energy than all of the other "renewable" energies put together.

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Nuclear power is a real alternative energy which will last for billions of years.
Nuclear Science and Technology 08
(http://www.aboutnuclear.org/view.cgi?fC=Electricity,Benefits_%5E_Effects, July 17) The future of civilization will depend upon the indefinite supply of electricity. Clearly, there is a limit to the supply of fossil fuels. The most optimistic estimates have fossil fuel lasting no more than 100 years; however, they may become economically undesirable in much less time. Obviously wind, solar, and renewable energy sources (such as ethanol) can sustain our world with power indefinitely. However, the power generation potential from even a small amount of uranium is so great, even nuclear fuel can be included on this list. In the right configuration, nuclear power can provide electricity for generations. The right configuration is in the "Breeder Reactor." The design of the breeder reactor is such that even as fuel is consumed, new fuel is created as a byproduct. Only a few breeder reactor plants have been built. Since plutonium - a material used in nuclear weapons is created in these plants, governments have been hesitant to allow their construction. Nonetheless, applying the breeder concept can reduce fuel prices so low that even the extraction of uranium from the worlds oceans would not be an overly expensive endeavor. In an article printed in the American Journal of Physics (vol. 51, Jan. 1983, B. Cohen), there is enough uranium in all the worlds oceans and the earths crust under the oceans to last 5 billion years (assuming that 6500 metric tons of uranium is removed annually). For all practical purposes, this is a reliable power source for all time

Uranium can be mined from the ocean through safe and economically feasible methods.
Seko, Katakai 03 (Shin Hasegawa, Masao Tamada, Noboru Kasai, Hayato Takeda, Takanobu Sugo, Kyoichi
Saito)(Noriaki, Akio, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, http://www.ans.org/pubs/journals/nt/va-144-2-274278, July 15) The total amount of uranium dissolved in seawater at a uniform concentration of 3 mg U/m3 in the world's oceans is 4.5 billion tons. An adsorption method using polymeric adsorbents capable of specifically recovering uranium from seawater is reported to be economically feasible. A uranium-specific nonwoven fabric was used as the adsorbent packed in an adsorption cage 16 m2 in cross-sectional area and 16 cm in height. We submerged three adsorption cages in the Pacific Ocean at a depth of 20 m at 7 km offshore of Japan. The three adsorption cages consisted of stacks of 52 000 sheets of the uranium-specific non-woven fabric with a total mass of 350 kg. The total amount of uranium recovered by the nonwoven fabric was >1 kg in terms of yellow cake during a total submersion time of 240 days in the ocean.

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T- Incentives include Insurance Coverage

WNA ’08 [World Nuclear Association, May, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf67.html] The USA takes a somewhat different approach, and is not party to any international nuclear liability convention. Here, the Price Anderson Act - the world's first comprehensive nuclear liability law - has since 1957 been central to addressing the question of liability for nuclear accident. It now provides $10 billion in cover without cost to the public or government and without fault needing to be proven. It covers power reactors, research reactors, and all other nuclear facilities. It was renewed for 20 years in mid 2005, with strong bipartisan support, and requires individual operators to be responsible for two layers of insurance cover. The first layer is where each nuclear site is required to purchase US$ 300 million liability cover which is provided by two private insurance pools. The second layer is jointly provided by all US reactor operators. It is funded through retrospective payments if required of up to $96 million per reactor per acident* collected in annual instalments of $15 million (and adjusted with inflation). Combined, the total provision comes to over $10 billion paid for by the utilities. (The Department of Energy also provides $10 billion for its nuclear activities.) Beyond this cover and irrespective of fault, Congress, as insurer of last resort, must decide how compensation is provided in the event of a major accident. * plus up to 5% if required for legal costs. More than $200 million has been paid by US insurance pools in claims and costs of litigation since the Price- Anderson Act came into effect, all of it by the insurance pools. Of this amount, some $71 million related to litigation following the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires all licensees for nuclear power plants to show proof that they have the primary and secondary insurance coverage mandated by the Price-Anderson Act. Licensees obtain their primary insurance through American Nuclear Insurers. Licensees also sign an agreement with NRC to keep the insurance in effect. American Nuclear Insurers also has a contractual agreement with each of the licensees to collect the retrospective premiums if these payments become necessary. A certified copy of this agreement, which is called a bond for payment of retrospective premiums, is provided to NRC as proof of secondary insurance. It obligates the licensee to pay the retrospective premiums to American Nuclear Insurers if required. American Nuclear Insurers is a pool comprised of investor-owned stock insurance companies. About half the pool's total liability capacity comes from foreign sources such as Lloyd's of London. The average annual premium for a single-unit reactor site is $400,000. The premium for a second or third reactor at the same site is discounted to reflect a sharing of limits. The nuclear operators' mutual arrangement is Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL) which is well funded (a $5 billion surplus) and cooperates closely with the American Nuclear Insurers pool. It was founded in 1980 and insures operators for any costs associated with property damage, decontamination and related nuclear risks. The Price Anderson Act has been represented as a subsidy to the US nuclear industry. If considered thus, the value of the subsidy is the difference between the premium for full coverage and the premium for $10 billion in coverage. On the basis of data obtained from two studies - one conducted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the other by the Department of Energy (DOE) - the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the subsidy probably amounts to less than 1 percent of the levelized cost for new nuclear capacity.

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T- Argonne is part of USFG
Argonne National Laboratory and GNEP are part of the federal government -- they are part of the DOE
Hardin 2007 (Angela, November 27, EurekAlert) http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2007-11/dnl-ane112607.php The U.S. Department of Energy’s Argonne National Laboratory is taking its nuclear energy research into new territory – virtual territory that is. With the recent arrival of the new IBM Blue Gene/P and the lab’s development of advanced computer models, Argonne has a critical role in making it possible to burn repeatedly nuclear fuel that now sits as waste, thus closing the nuclear fuel cycle and reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation. The move toward greater reliance on computer simulation and modeling to conduct nuclear energy research is a progressive trend seen in other areas of scientific research supported by DOE. "High-speed supercomputers are increasingly tackling difficult problems that could once be addressed only in a laboratory setting," Argonne Director Robert Rosner said. "The traditional approach to developing nuclear energy technologies is to do a bunch of experiments to demonstrate a process or reaction," said Mark Peters, deputy to the assistant laboratory director of applied science and technology and Argonne’s program manager for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. "What Argonne is doing is creating a set of integrated models that demonstrate and validate new technologies, using a smaller number of experiments." Moreover, "advanced simulation can greatly reduce facilities' costs by allowing us to better identify and target the physical experiments which underlie their design," said Andrew Siegel, a computational scientist at Argonne and the lab’s nuclear simulation project leader. Siegel and a team of Argonne computational scientists are in the throes of refining computer codes that will eventually be used to conduct the underlying scientific research that will support the development of next generation nuclear systems such as advanced fast reactors, Siegel said. "We will use advanced simulation to improve and optimize the design and safety of advanced fast reactors," he said. The Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) design, which was born at Argonne, is a key part of President Bush’s Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, a strategy that will significantly reduce the radioactivity and volume of waste requiring disposal and reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. SFR designs are safe, capable of reducing the volume and toxicity of nuclear waste, and economically competitive with other electricity sources.

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The plan is US federal government action – National Laboratories like Argonne are part of the Department of Energy Wikipedia May 28, 2008 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Energy_National_Laboratories#National_Laboratories The United States Department of Energy National Laboratories and Technology Centers are a system of facilities and laboratories overseen by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) for the purpose of advancing science and helping promote the economic and defensive national interests of the United States of America. Most of the DOE national laboratories are actually federally funded research and development centers administered, managed, operated and staffed by private corporations and academic universities under contract to DOE. List of DOE National Laboratories and Technology Centers National Laboratories Argonne National Laboratory* at DuPage County, Illinois Brookhaven National Laboratory* at Upton, New York Idaho National Laboratory* between Arco and Idaho Falls, Idaho Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory* at Berkeley, California Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory* at Batavia, Illinois National Renewable Energy Laboratory* at Golden, Colorado Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory* at Livermore, California Los Alamos National Laboratory* at Los Alamos, New Mexico Oak Ridge National Laboratory* at Oak Ridge, Tennessee National Energy Technology Laboratory** at Albany, Oregon, Fairbanks, Alaska, Morgantown, West Virginia, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Tulsa, Oklahoma Pacific Northwest National Laboratory* at Richland, Washington Sandia National Laboratories* at Albuquerque, New Mexico and Livermore, California Savannah River National Laboratory* at Aiken, South Carolina Technology Centers Ames Laboratory* at Ames, Iowa New Brunswick Laboratory**, at Argonne National Laboratory Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education* at Oak Ridge, Tennessee Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory* at Princeton, New Jersey Radiological & Environmental Sciences Laboratory** Savannah River Ecology Laboratory* Stanford Linear Accelerator Center* at Menlo Park, California Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility* at Newport News, Virginia

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Misc FRs feasible/Solvency
Stanford ’03 [George, nuclear physicist, ret Argonne Nat’l Lab, from the

Proceedings of “Global 2003,”

ANS Winter Meeting, New Orleans, November 16–20, http://www.nationalcenter.org/LWRStanford.pdf] A technology that fully closes the fuel cycle must consume the plutonium and minor actinides almost completely. Currently, at least, that can only be done in a fast-neutron spectrum. Under the present schedule, the United States is putting off the decision as to whether to close its fuel cycle until the year 2030.[3] That decision could be made much sooner, however. Technologies that can do the job have already been established or are close to being demonstrated. Of potential fast-neutron systems, the one that is closest to commercial viability is the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor (ALMR; PRISM), developed by General Electric with support from Argonne National Laboratory, [3] and converted by GE to a larger design called Super-PRISM (SPRISM).[4] The reactor uses metallic fuel and a liquidmetal coolant (sodium), and is passively safe. It operates in conjunction with a pyrometallurgical reprocessing facility that is part of the reactor complex,* thereby minimizing the need to transport plutonium and spent fuel. The pyroprocess is non-aqueous and exceptionally proliferation resistant—its plutonium is sequestered in an inert atmosphere in very radioactive surroundings, never has the chemical purity needed nor the isotopic purity desirable for weapons, and never leaves the complex during the plant’s lifetime (except for possible shipment of startup fuel for a new plant, when spent fuel from thermal reactors is no longer available). The details of a feasible system for integrating the thermal- and fast-reactor cycles have been presented by Dubberly et al.[5] Ehrman et al. have shown that LWR spent fuel can be processed to supply LMRs at no cost to the government— the cost being covered by the (competitive) busbar cost of power from the LMRs.[6] In 1994 a consortium headed by General Electric proposed to design, construct, and test a functioning prototype ALMR in less than fifteen years. Such a project could be initiated immediately, while optimization studies for future systems proceed in parallel under Gen-IV.

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Berkeley Dept of Nuclear Engineering ’03 [July 25, “Introduction to Argonne Nat’l Lab’s IFR Program,” http://www.nuc.berkeley.edu/designs/ifr/anlw.html]

The IFR gains safety advantages through a combination of metal fuel (an alloy of uranium, plutonium, and zirconium), and sodium cooling. By providing a fuel which readily conducts heat from the fuel to the coolant, and which operates at relatively low temperatures, the IFR takes maximum advantage of expansion of the coolant, fuel, and structure during off-normal events which increase temperatures. The expansion of the fuel and structure in an off-normal situation causes the system to shut down even without human operator intervention. In April of 1986, two special tests were performed on the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II), in which the main primary cooling pumps were shut off with the reactor at full power (62.5 Megawatts, thermal) - By not allowing the normal shutdown systems to interfere, the reactor power dropped to near zero within about 300 seconds. No damage to the fuel or the reactor resulted. This test demonstrated that even with a loss of all electrical power and the capability to shut down the reactor using the normal systems, the reactor will simply shut down without danger or damage. The same day, this demonstration was followed by another important test. With the reactor again at full power, flow in the secondary cooling system was stopped. This test caused the temperature to increase, since there was nowhere for the reactor heat to go. As the primary (reactor) cooling system became hotter, the fuel, sodium coolant, and structure expanded, and the reactor shut down. This test showed that an IFR type reactor will shut down using inherent features such as thermal expansion, even if the ability to remove heat from the primary cooling system is lost. Events such as the loss of water to the steam system would cause a condition such as the test demonstrated. Another major feature of the IFR concept is that the reactor uses a coolant, sodium, which does not boil during normal operation nor even in overpower transients such as described above. This means that the coolant is not under significant pressure. When coolant is not under pressure, the reactor can be placed in a "pool" of coolant, contained in a double tank, so that there is no real possibility for a loss of coolant. Even if the normal pumps are lost, some coolant flow through the reactor occurs due to natural convection. The features described above allow for greater simplification of a nuclear plant, resulting in cost savings, greater ease in operation, and a safety system that relies on natural phenomenon that cannot be defeated by human error.

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Berkeley Dept of Nuclear Engineering ’03 [July 25, “Introduction to Argonne Nat’l Lab’s IFR Program,” http://www.nuc.berkeley.edu/designs/ifr/anlw.html]

Discussions on waste, nearly unlimited fuel supply, transportation, and a nearly diversion-proof fuel all hinge on the fuel type and the fuel reprocessing scheme. To describe the waste advantages, fuel reprocessing will first be described. Reprocessing of fuel is a key requirement of the IFR. However, IFR reprocessing is very different from processes which have been proposed or which are in use in other countries. Basically, reprocessing IFR fuel consists of two simple steps: 1. fission fragments are removed from the fuel, and 2. unused fuel is recovered, along with the transuranic elements (sometimes called actinides). Normally, the transuranic elements would go to the waste stream with the fission products, but in the IFR, they are kept with the fuel and sent back to the reactor to also serve as fuel. In the above description, note that the waste stream consists of only the fission products. The result is that instead of a waste that remains radioactive for many thousands of years, as would be the case if the transuranic elements were present, the radioactivity in the waste will decay to a value less than that of the original uranium ore in about 200 years. An additional advantage to the waste side of the IFR operation is that the IFR plant produces less low-level waste than today's nuclear plants. The sodium coolant used in the IFR does not corrode the piping or structure, and, as a result, there are no radioactive corrosion products to remove from the primary system and send to a low-level radioactive waste repository. The fission product waste from an IFR type plant will amount to about 1700 pounds of waste per year for a plant of about 1000 megawatts electric output. This is in contrast to the waste from an equivalent coal plant of about 1,275,000 tons per year. These figures are for a plant that operates about 70 percent of the year.
Berkeley Dept of Nuclear Engineering ’03 [July 25, “Introduction to Argonne Nat’l Lab’s IFR Program,” http://www.nuc.berkeley.edu/designs/ifr/anlw.html]

Today, there is concern about the safety of shipping radioactive substances over the nation's highways. Whether the concern is warranted, based on comparisons to other hazardous materials that are shipped in huge quantities, will not be discussed here. It appears that the public perception is that radioactive shipments should be minimized. The IFR reactor is a breeder reactor, that is, during operation, it can convert materials (such as uranium 238) which cannot be used in today's reactors for fuel, to a very good fuel, plutonium 239. The conversion takes place in the reactor. In the fuel recycle process, plutonium is separated from the fission products and returned to the reactor (along with other transuranic elements) where it is fissioned to produce power. (NOTE: all reactors create some plutonium, today's reactors receive about 30% of their power from plutonium created and then fissioned within the reactor) The breeding process reduces the requirement for fissile materials being transported to the plant. Only the original fuel loading must be shipped in, and a quantity of uranium 238 -- which is not a fissile material. These shipments are made at the beginning life of the IFR plant, and no further fuel shipments into the plant need be made for the entire plant lifetime, approximately 60 years. The uranium 238 necessary to fuel the plant for its lifetime would make a cube of less than 6 feet per side. Shipment of waste is also reduced. The volume is such that the radioactive waste can be stored at the plant site for the entire life of the plant, and then shipped at one time to a waste repository.

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173 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Berkeley Dept of Nuclear Engineering ’03 [July 25, “Introduction to Argonne Nat’l Lab’s IFR Program,” http://www.nuc.berkeley.edu/designs/ifr/anlw.html]

For a new power source to be viable, the cost of power must be competitive with today's power systems. The proof of costs in any project only comes when full- sized systems are built and operated. Although no full-sized IFR plant has been built, several facts suggest that the IFR will be very economic. Costs of today's nuclear plants are just slightly above that of coal as a national average. Several nuclear plants have operated with costs significantly below that of coal however. A new IFR should cost less than either a new nuclear (typical of today's technology) or coal plant based on the following. The IFR does not require some of the complex systems that today's reactors require. Examples include the low level radwaste cleanup station, the emergency core cooling system, and fewer control rod drives and control rods for comparable power. Because of the low pressure in the sodium systems, less steel is required for the plant piping and reactor vessel. There are studies that suggest that the reactor containment will be less massive. Other cost savings will be made because the IFR does not require the services of the Isotopic Separation Plants for fuel enrichment. Additional costs to the IFR include the integral fuel reprocessing capability, and a secondary sodium system (but the IFR fuel process costs are somewhat offset by the extremely low cost for raw fuel and the improved waste product). Some studies have been done which indicate that an IFR would be very economical and competitive to build, own, and operate, but the final proof of economics can only come in the construction and operation of a commercial sized plant.
Berkeley Dept of Nuclear Engineering ’03 [July 25, “Introduction to Argonne Nat’l Lab’s IFR Program,” http://www.nuc.berkeley.edu/designs/ifr/anlw.html]

The diversion of nuclear fuel for the purpose of making bombs has been a concern, although presently the handling and destruction of nuclear weapons material is the primary issue. In the IFR, the nature of the fuel reprocessing is such that the fuel remains highly radioactive at all times. Fuel can only be handled in shielded cells or transported in casks weighing many tons. In addition, because the fuel recycle facility is located on-site, there is no transportation of nuclear which could create an opportunity for diversion. In any event, IFR fuel is not suitable for weapons without extensive processing in very expensive facilities. The potential also exists for the IFR to use weapons material for fuel, thus eliminating it, while producing electricity.

Berkeley Dept of Nuclear Engineering ’03 [July 25, “Introduction to Argonne Nat’l Lab’s IFR Program,” http://www.nuc.berkeley.edu/designs/ifr/anlw.html]

There is sufficient fuel to power IFR type facilities for well over 100 thousand years. This results because the IFR is a breeder reactor which can utilize uranium 238. Today's reactors only use uranium 235 which is less than 1% of the uranium found in nature. The IFR, with its fuel reprocessing capability, can use all the uranium. There is enough uranium that has been mined and placed in barrels (uranium 238) for IFR-type plants to provide all the electricity for the United States for over 500 years -- without mining. Also, the IFR can likely reprocess the spent fuel from today's reactors, and use the recovered materials for fuel. Uranium is as abundant in the earth as many of the commonly used materials such as bismuth, cadmium, mercury, silver, etc. In fact the uranium in a typical 1 ton block of granite (concentration of about 5 ppm) is the energy equivalent (if used in the IFR) of 10 tons of coal! The abundance of uranium suggests that its price will likely not increase as a fuel material for the foreseeable future.

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174 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

AT: Author Indicts
Hannum Argonne News 99 [edited by Dave Jacque, “Hannum to oversee security, Cohen takes ESH/QA reigns.”
Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.anl.gov/Media_Center/Argonne_News/news99/an991220.html. Accessed 7/17/08] William H. Hannum has been appointed Argonne's security advisor. Hannum will oversee all of the laboratory's security-related functions, coordinate development of security policy, and advise the laboratory director on strategic planning on security issues. The new position is a response to a greatly increased level of concern about security matters in the DOE system, said Interim Laboratory Director Yoon Chang, and will assure that Argonne's response to security concerns and issues is well coordinated, effective and efficient.

Marsh Greenwood Publishing, No Date [author bio, “Gerald E. Marsh.” Site copyright thru 2008.
http://www.greenwood.com/catalog/author/M/Gerald_E._Marsh.aspx. Accessed 7/17/08] GERALD E. MARSH, a physicist at Argonne National Laboratory, was a consultant to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations on strategic nuclear policy and technology for many years.

Stanford APS 06 [Forum on Physics and Society of The American Physical Society, “Nuclear power and proliferation.”
Volume 35, Issue 1, January, http://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/2006/january/article2.html, accessed 7/17/08] George S. Stanford is a physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory. B.Sc. with Honours, Acadia University; M.A.,Wesleyan University; Ph.D. in experimental nuclear physics, Yale University. He is a member, American Nuclear Society, and a past member of the American Physical Society. He has served on the National Council of the Federation of American Scientists. Co-author: Born Secret: The HBomb, the Progressive Case, and National Security (Pergamon, 1981), and Nuclear Shadowboxing: Contemporary Threats from Cold-War Weaponry (Fidlar Doubleday, 2004). His technical publications have pertained mainly to experiments in nuclear physics, reactor physics, and fast-reactor safety."

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175 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

The George Stanford Email
Stanford 06 [George, PhD, retired nuclear physicist, interview with Ann Curtis, August 8,
http://www.cross-x.com/vb/showthread.php?s=1ad707180b7b85158aece8f58d80116a&p=1600390#post1600390]

Two years ago I did a short interview over email with George Stanford (nuclear reactor physicist, now retired from Argonne National Laboratory after a career of experimental work pertaining to power-reactor safety) over Integral Fast Reactors, which he helped to develop at ANL. I thought you all might like to read it since the topic is Alt Energy. I removed all the e-mail addresses to avoid spamming and the subsequent messages where I forwarded it to others (which accounts for the "13 messages"). I will forward it to you if you want the entirety, though. I thought it was a great experience to learn a little from a real expert, incidentally and was so grateful to get such a warm response from Dr. Stanford. Stanford 06 [George, PhD, retired nuclear physicist, interview with Ann Curtis, August 8,
http://www.cross-x.com/vb/showthread.php?s=1ad707180b7b85158aece8f58d80116a&p=1600390#post1600390] Sat, Aug 5, 2006 at 6:25 PM Reply-To: ==== To: ==== Dr. Stanford, I have been researching the Integral Fast Reactor as a project for my college debate team. I was wondering if I could conduct an email interview with you to tie up some loose ends in my research. I have read much of the ample literature about the advantages in the design of the IFR, but I am concerned now with how Congress or the President could proceed to make clean, abundant energy a reality. If you would be willing to help me out, I would greatly appreciate it. My questions are (please answer in complete sentences): 1. Can nuclear energy produced by the IFR be considered "renewable"? 2a. What policy action could/should be taken by the federal government to allow the IFR to play a significant role in the production of energy? 2b. How would such a policy be implemented? 3. How much of the electricity generated in the US (by, for example, coal-fired plants) could be produced by IFR facilities? 4. How should the government address the small volume of unusable waste generated by the IFR? 5. How long could the existing supply of uranium generate electricity, without mining more? 6. If the US were to embrace the IFR, would other countries follow the lead? 7. Why was the IFR facility at Argonne abandoned by Congress? 8. In the current political climate, as many are focused on a desire to decrease dependence on foreign energy sources, would a policy to use IFRs be politically popular in Congress? Finally, can you suggest others who might be able to help with this project? Thank you for any help you can provide, Annaleigh Curtis Washburn University George Stanford <====> Tue, Aug 8, 2006 at 11:24 AM To: ==== Cc: ====, ====

Aug. 8, 2006 Dear Ms. Curtis: You have compiled an excellent set of questions. I will try to give you some concise answers, with a few links to information in more depth. The two documents that Jerry Marsh sent you are very relevant. Please note that the IFR was a variant on the fast-reactor theme -- an excellent idea with some big advantages, but not the only possible fast-reactor design. In my responses I will use the generic "fast reactor" where it applies. In case you haven't already seen it, you might find this paper helpful: < http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html> Since you have done such a good job of formulating questions that will resonate with many citizens, may I have your permission to distribute the "interview" below, perhaps in modified form? With or without attributing the questions to you?

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176 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

NEG: Nuclear Power Not Inevitable NP is not inevitable
Nuclear Power is a high business risk and unlikely to be a viable energy solution Roques, Nuttal, Newberry, and Neufville 5 [Fabien A, William J, David M, and Richard de, Judge Business School,
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, Cambridge, Engineering Systems Division, MIT, 08 November,

http://ardent.mit.edu/real_options/Real_opts_papers/Roques%20Energy%20Journal%20final.pdf, 07/14/08] With its capital intensity and cautionary experiences of engineering difficulties and regulatory creep during construction, new nuclear build is likely to require a substantial risk premium over competing technologies. Rothwell (2006) uses a real options model to compute the risk premium arising from the uncertain profitability of a new plant, using historical construction costs, capacity factors, and electricity price data for an Advanced Boiling Water Reactor in Texas. He estimates a risk premium of 5.2%, implying a real cost of capital of 12%. This is consistent with the real discount rates of 12.5% assumed in the two studies of merchant financing in Table 1. Tolley et al. (2004) estimated that the risk premium required by bond and equity holders for financing new nuclear plants is around 3% higher than for other technologies. Similarly, Deutch et al. (2003) assume that merchant financing of nuclear power would require a 15% nominal return on equity (as compared to a 12% nominal return on equity for gas and coal), and a 50% equity share of financing (as compared to only 40% equity financing for gas and coal).

Nuclear Power will only expand with government support. It is not inevitable Roques, Nuttal, Newberry, and Neufville 5 [Fabien A, William J, David M, and Richard de, Judge Business School,
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, Cambridge, Engineering Systems Division, MIT, 08 November,

http://ardent.mit.edu/real_options/Real_opts_papers/Roques%20Energy%20Journal%20final.pdf, 07/14/08] Despite recent revived interest in nuclear power, the prospects for merchant nuclear investment in liberalized industries without government support do not seem promising. The reason is relatively simple: quite apart from overcoming any regulatory and public opinion difficulties, the economic risks of nuclear power have been adversely affected by liberalization. High capital cost, uncertain construction cost, and potential construction and licensing delays are likely to lead private investors to require a substantial risk premium over coal and gas fired power plants to finance at least the first new nuclear units. Couching the debate over the economics of nuclear power in terms of the expected levelized cost fails to capture these concerns adequately. Recent cost estimates reveal both the large underlying nuclear cost uncertainties and different interpretations of the impact of liberalization on the cost of finance and hence investment choices.

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177 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

NP is not inevitable
Nuclear Power is not inevitable. It faces too many obstacles Bradford, 05 [ Peter A, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commision, http://www.npecweb.org/Essays/Essay050131%20NPT%20Bradford%20Nuclear%20Powers%20Prospects.pdf,

07/14/08]

As competitive power supply markets and improved governance processes spread inexorably throughout the world, the closed processes through which nuclear power was chosen, with an assurance that the customers would pay for uneconomic decisions, is receding. For nuclear power to succeed in the new environment, it must achieve major cost cuts, avoid even one serious accident, resolve the waste storage and disposal issue in an enduring way, sever its remaining links to proliferation of nuclear weapons and get the benefit of its status as a lower carbon-emitting power source. Even if all of these things occur over the next decade, success is not assured. In particular, the cost of a nuclear station spent instead on energy efficiency would free up more energy and produce more of every other societal benefit than would a nuclear unit. None of the studies extolling an immediate rush to nuclear construction come to terms with this fact, but – as has happened before – the real commercial world has a way of bringing it on.

Success of Nuclear Power is dependent on the government. It is not guaranteed Bradford, 05 [ Peter A, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, http://www.npecweb.org/Essays/Essay050131%20NPT%20Bradford%20Nuclear%20Powers%20Prospects.pdf, 07/14/08]
In short, nuclear power’s asserted comeback rests not on a newfound competitiveness in power plant construction, but on an old formula: subsidy, tax breaks, licensing shortcuts, guaranteed purchases with risks borne by customers, political muscle, ballyhoo and pointing to other countries (once the Soviet Union, now China) to indicate that the U.S. is somehow “falling behind”. Climate change has replaced oil dependence as the bogeyman from which nuclear power will save us.

Nuclear power is not inevitable. It needs government support to expand Bradford, 05 [ Peter A, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commision, http://www.npecweb.org/Essays/Essay050131%20NPT%20Bradford%20Nuclear%20Powers%20Prospects.pdf,

07/14/08]

Seen in the light of the history of the U.S. nuclear program, the premises underlying the current “revival” forecasts for nuclear power seem more like a confession of failure. After building 112 power plants and canceling as many more, after benefiting from incalculable government support in military programs as well as research, tax incentives and charges to customers, after “streamlining” the most prolific nuclear licensing process in the world to the point that no serious points of skeptical intervention remain, after a decades long effort to shoehorn the spent fuel into Nevada, what exactly does the U. “revival” consist of? Do we have the “mature” industry whose years of experience have been used to justify regulatory curtailments of many sorts stepping forward to say that this same maturity has persuaded private capital to back new nuclear units in competitive power supply markets? Not exactly. The “revival” rests on the following pillars: 1) DOE will share half of the expenses of obtaining the necessary site permits and reactor licenses; 2) proposed construction financing guarantees; 3) proposed tax deductions of 20% on the cost of building new reactors; 4) a proposed tax credit of 1.8 cents per kWh for all electricity actually generated; 5) $1.8 billion dollars earmarked to assist the construction of “advanced” reactor designs; 6) The NRC licensing process will not permit the need for the power from the new plants to be challenged and will also exclude all challenge based on the uncertainty of the waste situation.

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178 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

NEG: No Inherency – AFCI Solves
2008 DOE budget increases funding for Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative DOE 08 [Department of Energy. Department of Energy Budget Highlights: Section 1. Energy Security
Nuclear Energy. 2008. http://www.ne.doe.gov/budget/budgetpdfs/fy08NuclearEnergyBudgetHighlights.pdf Accessed: July 17, 2008 3:50 PM]

Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (FY 2007 $243.0; FY 2008 $395.0).........................+$152.0 Increase reflects enhanced R&D activity to support separations technology development (+$14.0); significant enhancement in systems analysis and advanced computing and simulation (+$59.0); expansion of conceptual design activities for process equipment design and nuclear safety for the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (+$10.0); consolidation of all technology development activities supporting the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility, Advanced Burner Reactor, and Recycling Demonstration projects into the GNEP Technology Development program as well as the initiation of the small reactors initiative and GNEP related international collaborations with other fuel cycle states (+$65.0); and the continuation of NERI grants (+$4.0).

No uniqueness – Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative Solves in the squo DOE 08 [Department of Energy. Department of Energy Budget Highlights: Section 1. Energy Security
Nuclear Energy. 2008. http://www.ne.doe.gov/budget/budgetpdfs/fy08NuclearEnergyBudgetHighlights.pdf Accessed: July 17, 2008 3:50 PM]

The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative, the technology development element of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) is requesting $395 million in FY 2008. This research and development program is focusing on methods to reduce the volume and long-term toxicity of high-level waste from spent nuclear fuel, reduce the long-term proliferation threat posed by civilian inventories of plutonium in spent fuel, and provide for proliferation-resistant technologies to recover the energy content in spent nuclear fuel. Advanced recycling technologies can extract highly radioactive elements of commercial spent nuclear fuel and use that material as fuel in fast spectrum reactors to generate additional electricity. The extracted material, which includes all transuranic elements (e.g., plutonium, neptunium, americium and curium), would be consumed by fast reactors to reduce significantly the quantity of material requiring disposal in a repository and to produce power. With the transuranic materials separated and used for fuel, the volume of waste that would require disposal in a repository would be reduced by 80 percent. Improving the way spent nuclear fuel is managed will facilitate the expansion of civilian nuclear power in the United States and encourage civilian nuclear power internationally to evolve in a more proliferation-resistant manner. The United States and other countries having the established infrastructure could arrange to supply nuclear fuel to countries seeking the energy benefits of civilian nuclear power, and the spent nuclear fuel could be returned to partner countries for eventual disposal in international repositories. In this way, foreign countries could obtain the benefits of nuclear energy without needing to design, build, and operate uranium enrichment or recycling technologies to process and store the waste.

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179 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

NEG-States CP States support and provide incentives for nuclear power plants Kosich. Tuesday , 18 Sep 2007. [Dorothy, writer for InfoMine, a natural resource updating website, Mineweb.com,
http://www.mineweb.com/mineweb/view/mineweb/en/page38?oid=27202&sn=Detail, July 15, 2008]

A Standard & Poor's report published Monday revealed that, as many U.S. utility companies consider building new nuclear generating plants, the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission and individual states are supporting new construction and improving the prospects for cost recovery for the new facilities. S&P Primary Credit Analyst Dimitri Nikas wrote that "a number of states, particularly in the Southeast, acutely aware of the need for new generation and the need to comply with environmental standards, have passed legislation that provides a framework for utilities to recover capital costs involved in building new base loads plants, including nuclear units." Legislation in these states permits recovery of preconstruction and development costs for a new nuclear plant-whether or not the plant is built-and recovery of financing costs during construction. The ability to recover costs for nuclear plants will be particularly important to electric companies "as a realistic alternative to their resources mix," according to Nikas. "Standard & Poor's views such effort as supporting utility companies' credit quality because such legislation can provide a transparent framework for cost recovery, reduce uncertainty, and provide some financial return on a current basis for completed construction (instead of necessitating capitalization of the financing costs and recovery upon completion)," he said. Florida and South Carolina have both enacted legislation supporting new nuclear generation and the ability to recover predevelopment costs, according to S&P's analysis. Meanwhile, North Carolina has enacted legislation giving explicit authority to the North Carolina Utility Commission to review the prudence of new base load generation including nuclear power. "Given the current regulatory and competitive landscape, Standard & Poor's anticipates that other states will adopt similar measures or enhance existing arrangements in place to provide their utilities with a cost recovery framework that complements federal incentives," Nikas forecast.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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180 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

NEG: Offset CP

Stanford ’03 [George, nuclear physicist, ret Argonne Nat’l Lab, from the

Proceedings of “Global 2003,”

ANS Winter Meeting, New Orleans, November 16–20, http://www.nationalcenter.org/LWRStanford.pdf] Before DOE undertakes development of technologies for thermal recycle, the viability of forgoing it altogether should be carefully assessed— it might turn out to be an impediment rather than a necessity. Since there is no need in the long term for such an infrastructure, the energy and dollars needed to implement it might be better spent on wrapping up the development fast reactors and their fuel cycle. It is not too early to embark seriously on a program to deploy pyroprocessing and fast reactors, for ultimate closure of the fuel cycle and optimal long-term utilization of the Yucca Mountain repository.

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181 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

NEG- Answers to prolif

Bodansky 06 [David, emeritus prof physics- U of WA, Physics Today; Dec2006, Vol. 59 Issue 12, p80-81] In its January 2003 report to Congress on the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative, DOE suggests that the effects of the minor actinides make the Pu "unusable for weapons applications" and, in weaker words, "relatively unattractive to potential proliferaters." Other assessments vary. Some analysts say that a 1-kiloton weapon could be made, but others conclude that a bomb is not feasible. Of course, as the difficulty of making a Pu bomb increases, bomb aspirants may turn to an easier route using enriched U.

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182 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

NEG – Long Time Frame for FRs
Time frame is longer than hoped for fast reactors to be truly useful American Nuclear Society 05 (Fast Reactor Technology:A Path to Long-Term Energy Sustainability,
http://www.ans.org/pi/ps/docs/ps74.pdf 7/14/08)
Reaping the full benefits of fast reactor technology will take a decade or more for a demonstration reactor, followed by buildup of a fleet of operating power stations. For now the intermediate-term future, the looming short-term energy shortage must be met by building improved, proven thermal-reactor power plants. To assure longer-term energy sustainability security, the American Nuclear Society sees a need for cooperative international efforts with goal of building a fast reactor demonstration unit with onsite reprocessing of spent fuel.

Fast reactors may be necessary for the future, but the energy crisis today calls for thermal reactors American Nuclear Society 05 (Fast Reactor Technology:A Path to Long-Term Energy
Sustainability, http://www.ans.org/pi/ps/docs/ps74.pdf 7/14/08)
Reaping the full benefits of fast reactor technology will take a decade or more for a demonstration reactor, followed by buildup of a fleet of operating power stations. For now the intermediate-term future, the looming short-term energy shortage must be met by building improved, proven thermal-reactor power plants. To assure longer-term energy sustainability security, the American Nuclear Society sees a need for cooperative international efforts with goal of building a fast reactor demonstration unit with onsite reprocessing of spent fuel.

Till, 1997 [Dr. Charles, nuclear physicist, Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/interviews/till.html] Q: So the need is based on a very long-term vision. A: Yes, but not long-term by the lifetime of man. You know, I sincerely hope that you live 80-90 years. On a scale of 80 or 90 years, nuclear power is going to be a very necessary thing, and in large amounts. Not only in the rest of the world is my guess. It will be very necessary here, as well. Bodansky 06 [David, emeritus prof physics- U of WA, Physics Today; Dec2006, Vol. 59 Issue 12, p80-81] The US is probably at least a few decades away from the large-scale implementation of either UREX + or pyrochemical processing. The figure shows a possible fuel cycle that uses both methods. In early 2006 DOE anticipated that within 20-25 years a commercial-scale demonstration of a fuel cycle with reprocessing would be under way. Later in the year, it began exploring a faster UREX + schedule, a move that elicited warnings against premature decisions.

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183 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

NEG – No Nuclear Renaissance (not inevitable)
Bidwai, 08 [Praful political analyst, 6-29-08 http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1174326] Going by the rhetoric of nuclear energy supporters, the world is witnessing a nuclear renaissance as the grim reality of climate change dawns on it. On this view, nuclear fission will displace coal, gas and other fossil fuels and save us from disastrous global warming. President Bush lent weight to this rhetoric by announcing lavish subsidies and loan guarantees for the nuclear industry, and set aside $18.5 billion in appropriations last year. However, in place of the 30 atomic stations the Nuclear Regulatory Commission expected to be built, not one has been fully licensed. Two have already been cancelled. The American nuclear industry has still not recovered from past disasters, and hasn’t ordered a single new nuclear reactor since 1973. In other OECD countries, the situation isn’t much better. More than 110 of their reactors will retire within a decade, and less than a quarter of that number are planned. Several European countries are phasing out nuclear power because of its high economic costs and environmental problems. Parenti, 08 [Christian, May 12, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080512/parenti] Humanity's Faustian bargain with atomic power is a story still in its early stages. No one knows how long nuclear facilities will last or what will happen to them during future social upheavals-and there are bound to be a few of those during the next 10,000 years. This much seems clear: a handful of firms might soak up huge federal subsidies and build one or two overpriced plants. While a new administration might tighten regulations, public safety will continue to be menaced by problems at new as well as older plants. But there will be no massive nuclear renaissance. Talk of such a renaissance, however, helps keep people distracted, their minds off the real project of developing wind, solar, geothermal and tidal kinetics to build a green power grid. Bidwai, 08 [Praful political analyst, 6-29-08 http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1174326] Yet, it’s unlikely that nuclear power’s global contribution will be maintained at the present low level of under 6 percent of primary energy and 16 percent of electricity. A few environmentalists likes James Lovelock advocate nuclear power. But they don’t represent the broader ecological movement, which remains focused on nuclear energy’s intractable problems - radiation, potential for catastrophic accidents, and wastes, which remain dangerous for thousands of years, and which science hasn’t found a way of storing safely, leave alone disposing.

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184 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Parenti, 08 [Christian, May 12, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080512/parenti] The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) expects up to thirty applications to be filed to build atomic plants; five or six of those proposals are moving through the complicated multi-stage process. But no new atomic power stations have been fully licensed or have broken ground. And two newly proposed projects have just been shelved. The fact is, nuclear power has not recovered from the crisis that hit it three decades ago with the reactor fire at Browns Ferry, Alabama, in 1975 and the meltdown at Three Mile Island in 1979. Then came what seemed to be the coup de grâce: Chernobyl in 1986. The last nuclear power plant ordered by a US utility, the TVA's Watts Bar 1, began construction in 1973 and took twenty-three years to complete. Nuclear power has been in steady decline worldwide since 1984, with almost as many plants canceled as completed since then.

Parenti, 08 [Christian, May 12, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080512/parenti] If you listen to the rhetoric, nuclear power is back. Smashing atoms will replace burning carbonbased coal, gas and oil. In the face of a disaster movie-like future of runaway climate change-bringing drought, floods, famine and social breakdown--carbon-free nukes are cast as the deus ex machina to save us at the last minute. Even a few greens support nuclear power--most famously James Lovelock, father of the Gaia theory. In the popular press, discussion of nuclear energy is dominated by its boosters, thanks in part to sophisticated industry PR.

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185 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

NEG: Solvency – Incentives Fail
SQ already increasing incentives Parenti, 08 [Christian, May 12, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080512/parenti] In an effort to jump-start a "nuclear renaissance," the Bush Administration has pushed one package of subsidies after another. For the past two years a program of federal loan guarantees has sat waiting for utilities to build nukes. Last year's appropriations bill set the total amount on offer at $18.5 billion. And now the Lieberman-Warner climate change bill is gaining momentum and will likely accrue amendments that will offer yet more money. Parenti, 08 [Christian, May 12, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080512/parenti] "Wall street doesn't like nuclear power," says Arjun Makhijani of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research. The fundamental fact is that nuclear power is too expensive and risky to attract the necessary commercial investors. Even with vast government subsidies, it is difficult or almost impossible to get proper financing and insurance. The massive federal subsidies on offer will cover up to 80 percent of construction costs of several nuclear power plants in addition to generous production tax credits, as well as risk insurance. But consider this: the average tworeactor nuclear power plant is estimated to cost $10 billion to $18 billion to build. That's before cost overruns, and no US nuclear power plant has ever been delivered on time or on budget. Parenti, 08 [Christian, May 12, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080512/parenti] Sixty years ago, the technology was swathed in manic space-age optimism--its electricity was going to be "too cheap to meter." While that wasn't true, nuclear power did serve a key role in the cold war: spent nuclear fuel rods are refined for weapons-grade plutonium and enriched uranium. That fact aside, rarely has so much money, scientific know-how and raw state power been marshaled to achieve so little. By some estimates, an investment of several hundred billion dollars has led to a US nuke industry of 104 operating plants--about a quarter of the global total-that produces a mere 19 percent of our electricity. In fact, the sputtering decline of nuclear power has been one of the greatest industrial failures of modern times. In 1985 Forbes called the nuke industry "the largest managerial disaster in history." Parenti, 08 [Christian, May 12, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080512/parenti] That project, like many others, drowned in the financial riptides of rising interest rates that were the central feature of the "Volcker recession" of the early '80s. (That was when Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker smashed inflation by jacking the Fed's interest rate from 8 percent in 1979 to more than 16 percent in 1982.) But nukes were also killed by the corruption and incompetence that so often plague large state projects, like Boston's Big Dig, the New Orleans levees, spacebased weapons systems and Iraq's reconstruction. Parenti, 08 [Christian, May 12, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080512/parenti] None of this has stopped the Bush Administration and Congress from channeling more money toward nukes. The current push to build nukes began in 2002, when the Administration launched its Nuclear Power 2010 program, which sought to spur construction of at least three major nuclear power plants. Then came the US Energy Policy Act of 2005, which offered three major forms of subsidy. New nuclear power plants could get production tax credits, federal loan guarantees and construction insurance against cost overruns and delays--together worth $18.5 billion.

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186 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Parenti, 08 [Christian, May 12, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080512/parenti] But even the Oz-like magic of corporate spin, public subsidies and presidential speechifying have their limits. In late December the man whose name is synonymous with sound money turned his back on nuclear power. Warren Buffett's MidAmerican Nuclear Energy Company scrapped plans to build a plant in Payette, Idaho, because no matter how many times its managers ran the numbers (and they spent $13 million researching it), they found that it simply made no sense from an economic standpoint. South Carolina Electric and Gas has also suspended its two planned reactors, citing costs as the key factor. Farivar 07 [Cyrus, November 13, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/startups/news/2007/11/nuclear_economics] Despite the incentives, experts point out that new nuclear construction may still be prohibitively expensive. NRG Energy says its two proposed units, which would produce a total of 2,700 megawatts, or enough to power 2 million homes, would cost $6 billion to build. A conventional natural-gas plant of the same size would cost $2 billion, according to Jeremy Carl, a research fellow and PhD candidate at the Center for Environmental Science and Policy at Stanford University. "To make money back you've got to charge a pretty high price for your power and it's not clear that the market will support that," Carl said. Farivar 07 [Cyrus, November 13, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/startups/news/2007/11/nuclear_economics] However, industry analysts and scholars are not quite as bullish as industry representatives seem to be, and don't see a nuclear renaissance at all. "We really see it as essentially a number of companies are getting in line for a set of significant taxpayer subsidies," said Geoffrey Fettus, a senior attorney with the National Resources Defense Council. "At this point we're years away from commitments from any of these companies to build."
Bidwai, 08 [Praful political analyst, 6-29-08 http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1174326]

Nuclear power is super-expensive. An MIT study finds it 30 to 60 per cent costlier than coal or gas-based electricity. Dieter Helm, Oxford’s leading economic expert on energy, says nuclear power will never pass the market test.

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187 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

NEG: Solvency – NP not solve warming
Bidwai, 08 [Praful political analyst, 6-29-08 http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1174326] It’s specious to hold that nuclear power can counter global warming. Electricity generation accounts for only 9 percent of global greenhouse emissions. Even if all power plants were to turn nuclear, GHG reductions would be negligible in relation to the cuts needed to prevent climate change. The alternative isn’t fossil fuels, but renewable sources and energy efficiency. India has 10 times more untapped mini- and micro-hydropower than indigenous uranium can generate. India’s wind-turbines have more than twice the capacity as nuclear power. Solar power is coming of age and is already competitive in remote villages most starved of energy. That’s where we need to concentrate if we’re ecologically responsible and economically sound. Parenti, 08 [Christian, May 12, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080512/parenti] Even if a society were ready to absorb the high costs of nuclear power, it hardly makes the most sense as a tool to quickly combat climate change. These plants take too long to build. A 2004 analysis in Science by Stephen Pacala and Robert Socolow, of Princeton University's Carbon Mitigation Initiative, estimates that achieving just one-seventh of the carbon reductions necessary to stabilize atmospheric CO2 at 500 parts per billion would require "building about 700 new 1,000-megawatt nuclear plants around the world." That represents a huge wave of investment that few seem willing to undertake, and it would require decades to accomplish.

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188 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Nuclear Power Plants are both too costly and time consuming due to the constant attempts to make new, different designs. Joseph Romm, June 2, 2008 (http://climateprogress.org/2008/07/16/some-thoughts-on-testifying-in-front-ofcongress/#more-3365, 7-17-08, executive director and founder of the Center for Energy and Climate Solutions) If power plants take 6 to10 years to build, that is because the industry has failed to develop and standardize a limited set of simple, modular, failsafe reactor designs that could tap into economies of scale from mass production. In the American market there at least five new designs. Delays are not due to U.S. red tape. Nuclear plants face similar delays in other countries. Why? Quality problems. The first advanced reactor design built in the West — in Finland — is already 25 percent over budget and two years behind schedule because of QUOTE “flawed welds for the reactor’s steel liner, unusable water-coolant pipes, and suspect concrete in the foundation.”

Nuclear Power is not cost competitive Joseph Romm, June 2, 2008 (http://climateprogress.org/2008/07/16/some-thoughts-on-testifying-in-front-ofcongress/#more-3365, 7-17-08, executive director and founder of the Center for Energy and Climate Solutions) once touted as “too cheap to meter,” nuclear power simply became QUOTE “too costly to matter,” as the Economist put it back in 2001. Yet today, nuclear power is triple the price it was back in 2001. An industry trade magazine headlined a recent article, “For some utilities, the capital costs of a new nuclear power plant are prohibitive.” Nuclear economics expert Jim Harding e-mailed me that his current “reasonable estimate for levelized cost range … is 12 to 17 cents per kilowatt hour lifetime” - much higher than current U.S. electric rates. Last August, AEP CEO Michael Morris said he was not planning to build any new nuclear plants: QUOTE: “I’m not convinced we’ll see a new nuclear station before probably the 2020 timeline.” So much for being a near-term solution. In October, Florida Power and Light testified that two units totaling 2,200 megawatts would cost up to $18 billion, which is $8,000 per kilowatt . Progress Energy told Florida regulators that twin 1,100-megawatt plants would cost $14 billion, which “triples estimates the utility offered little more than a year ago.” Its 200 mile transmission project will add $3-billion more. Total cost again nearly $8,000 a kilowatt. Nuclear plants are now so expensive Duke Power refused to reveal cost estimates for a proposed plant in the Carolinas. A recent California Public Utility Commission study puts the cost of power from new nuclear plants at 15 cents per kWh. Energy efficiency, wind and, solar all beat that price

Nuclear Energy does not help the environment in the short term
Charles Ferguson, April 18, 2008 (Nuclear Power Will Not Play Major Near-Term Role in Countering Climate Change, Concludes New Council Report, http://www.cfr.org/publication/13125/nuclear_power_will_not_play_major_nearterm_role_in_countering_climate_c hange_concludes_new_council_report.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F10786%2F, 7-17-08) Nuclear energy is unlikely to play a major role in the coming decades in countering the harmful effects of climate change or in strengthening energy security, concludes a new Council Special Report authored by Charles D. Ferguson, Council fellow for science and technology. To significantly combat climate change in the near term, the “nuclear industry would have to expand at such a rapid rate as to pose serious concerns for how the industry would ensure an adequate supply of reasonably inexpensive reactor-grade construction materials, well-trained technicians, and rigorous safety and security measures,” says the report.

Nuclear not the answer Charles Ferguson, April 18, 2008 (Nuclear Power Will Not Play Major Near-Term Role in Countering Climate
Change, Concludes New Council Report, http://www.cfr.org/publication/13125/nuclear_power_will_not_play_major_nearterm_role_in_countering_climate_c hange_concludes_new_council_report.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F10786%2F, 7-17-08) Ferguson also argues against the United States increasing funding and subsidies for nuclear energy. While it is true that nuclear energy emits fewer greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, the conventional wisdom “oversells the contribution nuclear energy can make to reduce global warming and strengthen energy security while downplaying the dangers associated with this energy source,” he says.

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189 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Solvency- IFR Technology Not Feasible
1. TURN- IFR Technology is plagued with technical problems that cause danger to workers making the fuel.
Public Citizen’s Energy Program, 2002 [Public Citizen, “Fast Reactors Leave a Legacy of Waste.” http://www.tradewatch.org/documents/FastReactors.pdf Accessed July 14, 2008.
Although possible in theory, the selective conversion of long-lived waste into shorter-lived material – a process also known as transmutation – is in practice plagued by difficulties. For example, plutoniumactinide fuel causes problems in operating reactors. Other important technical issues have also not been resolved, such as low rates of conversion, conflicting conversions, unproven fuel fabrication systems, and dangers to workers making the fuel. The proposed systems would also leave fission products in the waste, including the long-lived and highly dangerous radionuclides technicium-99 and iodine-129, and the shorter-lived but high heat generating strontium-90 and cesium-137. Even if these problems were addressed, however, and the technology fully developed and operated optimally and economically, fastneutron reactors would not eliminate the need for a repository. The fundamental danger of the waste would remain, and it would still be hazardous for a very long time—1,000 to 10,000 years.

2. TURN- The lack of development in IFR Tech Increase the Risk of Proliferation.
Public Citizen’s Energy Program, 2002 [Public Citizen, “Fast Reactors- Security and Proliferation Risk.” http://www.tradewatch.org/documents/FastReactors.pdf Accessed July 14, 2008.
Fast neutron reactors would also require reprocessing, which would contribute to the waste problem and bring increased risks of proliferation. The only proven reprocessing technology (PUREX) is an aqueous technology, which increases the volume of radioactive material and makes it more difficult to manage. This process also results in separated plutonium and in environmental contamination. The two large-scale reprocessing plants in Britain and France both have met with serious opposition from other western European countries because of this pollution. Neither of the reprocessing technologies that DOE is researching (UREX+ and pyroprocessing) is truly “proliferation resistant,” as DOE claims, because plutonium can be still be separated out of the mixtures. Pyroprocessing (a non-aqueous technology) for separating waste from fast neutron reactors has never been used beyond a laboratory scale demonstration, and would still produce high-level salt waste, contributing further to the waste problem.

3. Fast Reactors are Still Unsafe after Years of Experiments
Public Citizen’s Energy Program, 2002 [Public Citizen, “Fast Reactors- Security and Proliferation Risk.” http://www.tradewatch.org/documents/FastReactors.pdf Accessed July 14, 2008
In the push for nuclear power, proponents of fast neutron reactors have portrayed this design as a new, promising technology that could resolve the question of managing long-lived radioactive waste. But the idea of fast neutron reactors is not a new one. Ever since the first experimental fast neutron reactor generated electricity in 1951,1 governments around the world have made huge investments into their development, but the return has been minimal. After decades of research and experimentation, fast neutron reactors remain unsafe, uneconomical, and unable to address the problems of nuclear power. Fast neutron reactors, however, have a terrible track record in safety and economics, and are not capable of solving the waste problem.

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190 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

Fast Reactor fail empirically Lyman 06 [Dr Edwin; Senior Staff Scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists,
is an expert on nuclear weapons. “Concerns About Fast-Neutron Reactors.” Energy Biz Online, March-April 2006, policyhttp://energycentral.fileburst.com/EnergyBizOnline/2006-2-mar-apr/Concerns0306.pdf, accessed 7/14/08] Dr. Edwin Lyman, senior staff scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, raised some concerns about the proposed technology. The authors (of the previous article) rely on unproven technology that has had no success in the past. Fast neutron reactors have uniformly been extremely expensive to build, challenging to operate, and marred by serious safety problems. The Superphénix fast reactor in France operated with a capacity factor of only 15 percent, for example. The Monju reactor in Japan experienced a serious sodium fire in 1995 and has not yet resumed operation.

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191 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

IFR Bad - Fuel Reprocessing
Pyroprocessing is science fiction - waste concerns won’t go away Lyman 06 [Dr Edwin; Senior Staff Scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists,
is an expert on nuclear weapons. “Concerns About Fast-Neutron Reactors.” Energy Biz Online, March-April 2006, policyhttp://energycentral.fileburst.com/EnergyBizOnline/2006-2-mar-apr/Concerns0306.pdf, accessed 7/14/08] The “pyroprocessing” technology promoted in the article has been failure. A program at Argonne National Laboratories to use this technology to process a small amount of spent fuel from a defunct experimental breeder reactor in Idaho has performed so poorly that the Energy Department is actively seeking cheaper, safer alternatives. Even if the fast reactors and pyroprocessing plants worked as advertised, extracting plutonium and other actinides and fissioning them with a degree of efficiency well beyond what has been demonstrated, the plan would be unworkable. To achieve the increase in repository capacity claimed by the authors, the process would have a price tag of more than $300 billion (according to DOE and National Academy of Sciences estimates), and would require a sustained commitment for more than a century.

The IFR uses pyroprocessing Ackerman, Johnson, and Laidler 94 [J.P., T.R., and J.J. Argonne National Laboratory
Chemical Technology Division. “WASTE REMOVAL IN PYROCHEMICAL FUEL PROCESSING FOR THE INTEGRAL FAST REACTOR” Feb 27, http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/10115692dW1dM6/native/10115692.pdf, accessed 7/15/08] The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) concept includes a passively safe, metal-fueled fast reactor and a pyrochemical fuel reprocessing scheme for recovering nearly all of the transuranic (TRU) elements - Pu, Np, Am, and Cm -in spent fuel and transferring fission products to acceptable waste forms. The TRU elements are incorporated in fresh fuel and returned to the reactor for consumption [1,2].

Fuel recycling is a panacea - solving for the most radioactive elements would be ridiculously expensive and take over a century to become feasible Alvarez 08 (Robert. Senior energy adviser for the Clinton administration. “Nuclear Recycling Fails the Test”.
Foreign Policy in Focus, July 7, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5351. Acessed 7/15/08 As a senior energy adviser in the Clinton administration, I recall attending a briefing in 1996 by the National Academy of Sciences on the feasibility of recycling nuclear fuel. I'd been intrigued by the idea because of its promise to eliminate weapons-usable plutonium and to reduce the amount of waste that had to be buried, where it could conceivably seep into drinking water at some point in its multimillion-year-long half-lives. But then came the Academy's unequivocal conclusion: the idea was supremely impractical. It would cost up to $500 billion in 1996 dollars and take 150 years to accomplish the transmutation of plutonium and other dangerous long-lived radioactive toxins. Ten years later the idea remains as costly and technologically unfeasible as it was in the 1990s. In 2007 the Academy once again tossed cold water on the Bush administration’s effort to jump start nuclear recycling by concluding that “there is no economic justification for going forward with this program at anything approaching a commercial scale.” Meanwhile, the client base for Areva, the French nuclear recycling company, has shrunk to one new contract for a relatively small amount of spent fuel from the Netherlands. Most revealing is that its main customer, the French utility, Electricité de France, is balking at doing further business unless the price goes down – something that Areva says it can’t do. It appears that even the French may be starting to say no instead of oui.

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192 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

IFR Bad - Prolif/Terrorism
Fast Reactors are prone to proliferation and terrorism. Lyman 06 [Dr Edwin; Senior Staff Scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists,
is an expert on nuclear weapons. “Concerns About Fast-Neutron Reactors.” Energy Biz Online, March-April 2006, policyhttp://energycentral.fileburst.com/EnergyBizOnline/2006-2-mar-apr/Concerns0306.pdf, accessed 7/14/08] Our chief concerns are the nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation risks associated with any process that separates plutonium and circulates it in commercial facilities. The claims that pyroprocessing or other reprocessing technologies under study at the DOE are “proliferation-resistant” are not accurate. Any system that separates plutonium from highly radioactive fission products such as cesium-137, which is the case with pyroprocessing, poses unacceptable proliferation and terrorism risks by making plutonium easier to handle, steal, and process into a nuclear weapon. The safest thing to do with spent nuclear fuel from a proliferation perspective is to store it under strict safeguards until it can be responsibly disposed of in a geologic repository.

Fuel reprocessing is prohibitively expensive and creates opportunity for proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Browne 91 [Malcomn. NY Times Staff Writer. “Modern Alchemists Transmute Nuclear Waste.” October 29,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CE6D9163AF93AA15753C1A967958260&sec=&spon=& pagewanted=all, accessed July 14 2008) The plants that would carry out transmutation and processing of radioactive waste in the United States would be costly; experts said in interviews that it would cost $10 billion to $20 billion to create the kind of nuclear reprocessing capacity in the United States that several countries, notably France, have already built. Reprocessing is also mired in debate; some experts argue that high-level nuclear waste should be processed before deep permanent burial, while others maintain that such schemes create new problems, including the proliferation of plutonium that might be stolen by nuclear terrorists, and would merely delay the inevitable and urgent permanent burial.

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193 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

NEG: Nuclear Power Too Costly
Parenti, 08 [Christian, May 12, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080512/parenti] Another reason atomic energy is so expensive is that its accidents are potentially catastrophic, and activists have forced utilities to build in costly double and triple safety systems. Right-wing champions of atom-smashing blame prohibitive costs on neurotic fears and unnecessary safety measures. They have a point in that safety is expensive, but safety is hardly excessive--details on that in a moment. More important is the fact that nuclear fission is a mind-bogglingly complex process, a sublime, truly Promethean technology. Let's recall: it involves smashing a subatomic particle, a neutron, into an atom of uranium-235 to release energy and more neutrons, which then smash other atoms that release more energy and so on infinitely, except the whole process is controlled and used to boil water, which spins a turbine that generates electricity. In this nether realm, where industry and science seek to reproduce a process akin to that which occurs inside the sun, even basic tasks--like moving the fuel rods, changing spare parts--become complicated, mechanized and expensive. Atom-smashing is to coal power, or a windmill, as a Formula One race-car engine is to the mechanics of a bicycle. Thus, it costs an enormous amount of money.

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194 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

NEG: Pro-Nuclear Propaganda & Lies
Parenti, 08 [Christian, May 12, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080512/parenti] The notion that nukes make sense and are the version of green preferred by grown-ups is being conjured by a slick PR campaign. The Nuclear Energy Institute--the industry's main trade group--has retained Hill and Knowlton to run a greenwashing campaign. Part of their strategy involves an advocacy group with the grassroots-sounding name the Clean and Safe Energy Coalition. At the center of the effort are former EPA chief Christine Todd Whitman and former Greenpeace co-founder turned corporate shill Patrick Moore. (Moore is also a huge champion of GMO crops, which are notorious for impoverishing farmers in developing economies and using massive amounts of pesticides.) The industry also places ghostwritten op-eds under the bylines of scientists for hire. Parenti, 08 [Christian, May 12, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080512/parenti] "The NRC falls all over itself to facilitate the industry," says Ray Shadis, a consultant who has worked for both environmental groups and on NRC panels and research projects. The Project on Government Oversight and other watchdog groups point to a revolving door between the commission's staff and the nuclear industry. To take just one example, in 2007 former commissioner Jeffrey Merrifield joined the Shaw Group after spending his last months on the commission pushing to ease restrictions for precisely the type of construction activities that were the Shaw Group's specialty.

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195 Nuclear Power Aff Supplement

NEG: Uranium Industry Econ
URANIUM MINING INDUSTRY COLLAPSE COULD LOSE THOUSANDS OF HIGH-PAYING JOBS
ACGNC 6 [The American

Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness, http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/documents.html : Council Position on the Proposed US/Russian 123 Agreement, accessed July 17, 2008] December 2006 In negotiating the Agreement, it is imperative that the government not make commitments within or external to the agreement that undermine the re-emerging U.S. uranium industry. Dramatically increased Russian uranium imports could destabilize the existing U.S. market and undermine the deployment of domestic sources of enriched uranium. This, in turn, could jeopardize thousands of high-paying American jobs in uranium exploration, mining, conversion and enrichment. The issue of Russian uranium imports must be handled by the government in a manner that protects a vital domestic capability and American jobs while also providing benefits to U.S. utilities and electricity consumers. While the Council is supportive of a 123 Agreement with Russia, it
is imperative that the government not make commitments within or external to the agreement that undermine the re-emerging U.S. uranium industry. As mentioned earlier, employment in the U.S. uranium industry is only about three percent of levels in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. Yet the situation is starting to improve. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration: “The U.S. uranium production industry's turnaround continues for a second year through 2005 for drilling, mining, concentrate production, employment and expenditures…Mines produced an estimated 3.0 million pounds of uranium oxide (U3O8), 24 percent more than in 2004, with two new underground mines and one new in-situ leach mine commencing operations in 2005. Estimated U.S. uranium concentrate (yellowcake) production in 2005

was 2.7 million pounds U3O8, 18 percent above the 2004 level…Estimated employment in the U.S. uranium production industry was 638 person-years, an increase of 52 percent from the 2004 total. Total drilling, production, land, and other expenditures were an estimated $134 million in 2005, 54 percent more than in 2004.” The prospects for new nuclear build in the U.S. have fueled this impressive growth in the domestic uranium production industry. The dramatically improved outlook for nuclear energy in the U.S. has also led companies to invest in new uranium enrichment capability. For example, USEC Inc., the operator of the U.S.’s sole uranium enrichment facility, has launched the American Centrifuge project. The project uses advanced centrifuge technology developed and then abandoned by the U.S. government when the U.S. nuclear industry went into retrenchment in the 1980’s. USEC plans to begin construction of the American Centrifuge Plant in 2007, begin uranium enrichment operations in 2009, and reach an initial annual production capacity of 3.5 million separative work units in 2011. The Advanced Centrifuge plant will be built in Piketon, Ohio. The plant will create approximately 1,000 contract jobs in manufacturing the centrifuge machines and in constructing the plant, and approximately 500 operations jobs when the full plant is built. The centrifuges will be manufactured and the balance-of-plant will be constructed by U.S. firms, including ATK, Boeing, Honeywell and Fluor. Thus, in addition to the operations jobs in Ohio, USEC’s American Centrifuge plant will employ hundreds of Americans in highpaying manufacturing and technology jobs in states such as West Virginia and Tennessee. A second centrifuge enrichment plant is also planned for construction in the U.S. Louisiana Energy Services (LES) plans to build a plant near Eunice, New Mexico. LES is a consortium owned entirely by Urenco (a consortium including the United Kingdom, Holland, Germany, and most recently France) with the participation of U.S. energy companies Duke Power, Entergy and Exelon. The $1.5 billion project will provide nearly 300 full-time and contract jobs— and more than 1,000 construction jobs—to southeast New Mexico. However, unlike the American Centrifuge project, the centrifuges to be used in the LES plant will be manufactured in Europe for export to the U.S. While the uranium production and enrichment industries have been enjoying a resurgence, Russia and U.S. nuclear utilities have
been pushing the Commerce Department to end its restrictions on the importation of enriched uranium from Russia. The U.S.’s sole uranium enrichment company is concerned that a dramatic increase in Russian uranium imports could destabilize the existing U.S. market and undermine the deployment of domestic sources of enriched uranium. This, in turn, could jeopardize thousands of high-paying American jobs in uranium exploration, mining, conversion and enrichment. Clearly, this issue must be handled by the government in a manner that protects a vital domestic capability and U.S. jobs while also providing benefits to U.S. utilities (and thus U.S. electricity consumers).

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