Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

DoD Procurement – Starter Packet – Index
***AFFIRMATIVE*** DoD Procurement – Starter Packet – Index..........................................................................................................................1 DoD Procurement – 1AC......................................................................................................................................................2 DoD Procurement – 1AC......................................................................................................................................................3 DoD Procurement – 1AC......................................................................................................................................................4 DoD Procurement – 1AC......................................................................................................................................................5 DoD Procurement – 1AC......................................................................................................................................................6 DoD Procurement – 1AC......................................................................................................................................................7 DoD Procurement – 1AC......................................................................................................................................................8 DoD Procurement – 1AC......................................................................................................................................................9 DoD Procurement – 1AC....................................................................................................................................................10 DoD Procurement – 1AC....................................................................................................................................................11 Topicality – Incentives........................................................................................................................................................12 Inherency - DoD Energy Consumption Increasing.............................................................................................................13 Inherency - Attitudes...........................................................................................................................................................14 Oil Hurts Readiness – Resupply Chains.............................................................................................................................15 Oil Hurts Readiness – Military Budgets.............................................................................................................................16 Oil Hurts Readiness – Supply Disruptions.........................................................................................................................17 Extend – Hegemony Good..................................................................................................................................................18 Extend – Hegemony Good..................................................................................................................................................20 Extend – Hegemony Good..................................................................................................................................................21 Alternative Increase Readiness – Resupply........................................................................................................................22 Alternative Increase Readiness – Supply Disruptions.......................................................................................................23 Alternative Increase Readiness – Military Budgets ...........................................................................................................24 Solvency – Spillover...........................................................................................................................................................25 Solvency - Biofuels.............................................................................................................................................................26 Solvency – Bases................................................................................................................................................................27 They Say “Green Procurement now”..................................................................................................................................28 They Say “Military will get Priority in a Crisis”................................................................................................................30 They Say “Small Percentage”.............................................................................................................................................31 They Say “Solvency Long Term”.......................................................................................................................................32 They Say “DoD can’t Change”...........................................................................................................................................33 They Say “Alternate Causalities”.......................................................................................................................................34 ****NEGATIVE****.........................................................................................................................................................35 Topicality – 1NC.................................................................................................................................................................36 Inherency – 1NC.................................................................................................................................................................37 Extend – DoD Green Procurement Increasing Now...........................................................................................................38 Hegemony Bad...................................................................................................................................................................39 Hegemony Bad...................................................................................................................................................................40 Hegemony Bad...................................................................................................................................................................41 Solvency – 1NC..................................................................................................................................................................42 Solvency – 1NC..................................................................................................................................................................43 Extend – No Spillover.........................................................................................................................................................44 Extend – Small Percentages................................................................................................................................................45 Extend – Long Time Frame................................................................................................................................................46 Extend – Alternate Causalities............................................................................................................................................47 Extend – Procurement Fails................................................................................................................................................48 Biofuels Solvency Responses.............................................................................................................................................49 Bases Solvency Responses.................................................................................................................................................50 Political Capital Links........................................................................................................................................................51 Obama Good Links.............................................................................................................................................................52

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DoD Procurement – 1AC
Observation One – Inherency Military energy consumption will increase with expanding the War on Terror
Eileen Westervelt, U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, 2005 [September Energy Trends and Implications for U.S. Army Installations, http://static.cbslocal.com/station/wcco/news/ specialreports/projectenergy/06_0420_projectenergy_energytrendsreportfromarmycorps.pdf] Energy Trends Figure 1 and Table 1 show current demand, supply, and proportionate distribution of energy for the world, nation, and Army. Table 2 lists world reserves. The Army and the nation’s heavy use of oil and natural gas is not “in synch” with the nation’s or the earth’s supplies. The relative fuel shares of energy use vs. energy reserves underscores our need to supplement oil and natural gas as our staple fuels. The domestic supply and demand imbalance would lessen if coal and/or nuclear energy were made more environmentally acceptable or if the renewable share of our energy portfolio were to increase. Worldwide energy consumption is expected to increase by 2.1 percent/yr and domestic energy consumption by 1.4 percent per year. This will exacerbate global energy competition for existing supplies. Army energy consumption is dominated by facilities consumption. Facilities consumption may decrease in both total quantity and in intensity basis—but not without an aggressive energy program with careful planning, diligent monitoring, and prudent investment. The closure of European installations and relocation of troops onto domestic installations will make this outcome especially challenging. The energy consumption associated with Army mobility (tactical and nontactical vehicle consumption) is expected to remain constant, but may potentially increase depending of future phases of the Global War on Terror and on geopolitical tensions resulting from the world energy situation.

The Current DoD energy policy fails – it is uncoordinated and does not emphasize alternative energies
Gregory Lengyel, 21st Century Defense Initiative of the Brookings Institution 2007 [Department of Defense Energy Strategy Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks August http://www.brookings.edu/~/media /Files/rc/papers/ 2007/08 defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf Despite these trends there is no existing formal Department of Defense Energy Strategy and no single individual or organization responsible for energy issues within the Department. The DOD Annual Energy Management Report for FY 2006 lists the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) as the DOD Senior Energy Official responsible for meeting the goals of Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) and Executive Order (EO) 13123, Greening the Government through Efficient Energy Management.22 However, this position has been vacant for several years and does not satisfy the need for a comprehensive Senior Energy Official for the Department. This is not to say the DOD is unconcerned with energy issues. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Services have recently conducted or sponsored numerous studies focusing on energy, many of which have been invaluable information sources for this paper: MITRE Corporation JASON Project, Reducing DOD Fossil Fuel Dependence (2006); Defense Science Board, More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden (2001), and soon to be released Energy Strategy (2006-2007); OSD Energy Security Integrated Product Team (2006); Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Technology Options for Improved Air Vehicle Fuel Efficiency (2006); Navy Research Advisory Council, Study on Future Fuels (2005); Army Corps of Engineers, Energy Trends and Their Implications for US Army Installations (2005); and Defense Advanced Research Projects, Petroleum-Free Military Workshop (2005), to name a few. Common recommendations include making fuel efficiency a more significant factor in determining new mobility platforms (e.g. miles per gallon for ground vehicles, nautical miles/pound (lb.) fuel/lb. payload for aircraft and ships) and creating incentives for energy efficiency throughout the DOD. However, none of the studies offered anything other than liquid hydrocarbons as the best fuel for DOD mobility platforms for at least the next 25 years. Impressive groups of energy experts have produced many of these studies, but they are all either Service specific or temporary in nature, meaning the group of experts dispersed after writing the study’s final report. The lack of a full-time energy advocate within the DOD leaves a void in follow-up actions to study recommendations, or creation of directive guidance on energy issues within the Department.

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DoD Procurement – 1AC
Observation Two – Hegemony DoD dependence on Fossil Fuels is increasing and that kills hegemony – it depends on unstable areas, makes long term planning difficult and holds our military hostage to fluctuating oil prices
Thomas Crowley Logistics Management Institute 2007 [april transforming the way dod looks at energy an approach to establishing an energy strategy http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_ 404_F T602T1 _Transformi ng%20the%20Way%20DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy _Final%20 Report.pdf.] Over the past several decades, the United States has become increasingly reliant on imported energy, primarily from petroleum. The Energy Information Agency (EIA) forecasts that U.S. dependence on petroleum imports will increase to 68 percent by 2025. DoD, the largest U.S. consumer of energy, also relies on foreign supplies of crude oil and the finished transportation fuels (such as military jet fuel) that are derived from it. Fuel represents more than half of the DoD logistics tonnage and more than 70 percent of the tonnage required to put the U.S. Army into position for battle. The Navy uses millions of gallons of fuel every day to operate around the globe, and the Air Force—the largest DoD consumer of fuel— uses even more. DoD’s heavy operational dependence on traditional fuel sources creates a number of decidedly negative effects: DoD shares the nation’s reliance on foreign energy sources, which effec- tively forces the country to rely on potential adversaries to maintain its economy and national security. DoD’s energy dependence exposes the department to price volatility, forc- ing it to consume unplanned resources that could be used to recapitalize an aging force structure and infrastructure. The availability of traditional energy supplies beyond 25 years is difficult to project. Because of the 8- to 20-year time frame of future operational concepts and a similarly long, or longer, capital asset replacement cycle for DoD platforms, DoD must begin now to address its uncertain energy future. The United States bears many costs associated with the stability of the global oil market and infrastructure. The cost of securing Persian Gulf sources alone comes to $44.4 billion annually. DoD receives little support from other consuming nations to perform this mission although they share in the benefits due to the global nature of the oil market. Through 2004, members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries alone have earned $4 trillion in oil revenue. Some portion of that oil revenue has likely gone toward efforts inimical to U.S. national security interests.

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DoD Procurement – 1AC
Reliance on Fossil fuels tethers our forward deployed forces – it undermines mobility and flexibility because it relies on the resupply chain
Thomas Crowley Logistics Management Institute 2007 [april transforming the way dod looks at energy an approach to establishing an energy strategy http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_ 404_F T602T1 _Transformi ng%20the%20Way%20DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy _Final%20 Report.pdf.] Operational Disconnect The security and military strategies for DoD require an energy-intense posture for conducting both deterrence and combat operations. The strategies rely on persis- tent presence globally, mobility to project power and sustain forces, and dominant maneuver to swiftly defeat adversaries. These current and future operating con- cepts tether operational capability to high-technology solutions that require con- tinued growth in energy sources. Current consumption estimates, although based on incomplete data, validate these increasing fuel requirements and the implica- tions for future operations. Clearly, the skill of our logistics forces in providing fuel has grown significantly since World War II. Still, we must be mindful of the operational implications of logistics requirements. The stalling of General Patton’s Third Army following its campaign across France in August and September 1944 is a telling example of the fuel “tether.” Despite the heroic efforts of logistics forces, the wear and tear on supply trucks and the strategic priority for fuel and logistics support in other areas of operations limited Patton to local operations for nearly 2 months. The Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) estimates that 20,000 soldiers are employed to deliver fuel to operations (and spending $1 million per day to trans- port petroleum, which does not include fuel costs for contractor-provided combat support). The delivery of fuel poses such an operational and tactical risk that in July 2006, Maj. Gen. Richard Zilmer, the highest-ranking Marine Corps officer in Iraq’s Anbar Province, characterized the development of solar and wind power capabilities as a “joint urgent operational need.” General Zilmer cited reductions in often dangerous fuel transportation activities as the main motivation for this request: “By reducing the need for [petroleum-based fuels] at our outlying bases, we can decrease the frequency of logistics convoys on the road, thereby reducing the danger to our Marines, soldiers, and sailors.” Operational capability is always the most important aspect of force development. However, it may not be possible to execute operational concepts and capabilities to achieve our security strategy if the energy implications are not considered. Cur- rent planning presents a situation in which the aggregate operational capability of the force may be unsustainable in the long term.

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DoD Procurement – 1AC
Oil Dependence kills US hegemony – it undermines coalitions, emboldens enemies, deters free markets and increases military vulnerability to supply disruptions
Gregory Lengyel, 21st Century Defense Initiative of the Brookings Institution 2007 [Department of Defense Energy Strategy Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks August http://www.brookings.edu/~/media /Files/rc/papers/ 2007/08 defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf The lack of sustained attention to energy issues is undercutting US foreign policy and US national security. Major energy suppliers – from Russia to Iran to Venezuela – have been increasingly able and willing to use their energy resources to pursue their strategic and political objectives. Major energy consumers – notably the United States, but other countries as well – are finding that their growing dependence on imported energy increases their strategic vulnerability and constrains security objectives.19 Foreign Policy issues are daily concerns for the White House and the Department of State, but the DOD is typically the department called upon when Foreign Policy goes awry. In his article, Energy Security: The New Threats in Latin America and Africa, David L. Goldwyn, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argues current US energy dependency challenges US power in five ways. First, many nations dependent on consuming imported oil are reluctant to join coalitions led by the United States to combat weapons proliferation, terrorism or aggression. Examples are the French, Russian and Chinese resistance to sanctions on Iran; Chinese resistance to sanctions against Sudan; and US tolerance of Middle East repression that would otherwise be sanctioned were it to occur in any other non-oil-producing part of the world.20 Secondly, high oil revenues in the hands of oil exporting nations allow governments to act with impunity against their own people, their neighbors, and the United States. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, Latin America’s loudest anti-American cheerleader, has used oil revenue to build support for his economic vision by providing subsidized oil to neighboring countries and gain leverage over them by purchasing bonds to finance their debt. Russian President Vladimir Putin has renationalized the energy sector, restricted foreign access to Russia’s pipeline system, and demanded open access to Europe. Iran has reduced its international debt and increased foreign reserves to prepare of possible sanctions. “Even Saudi Arabia’s economic reform movement, born in the days of $10 oil in 1998, evaporated when oil reached $30 per barrel in 2000. Enrichment of America’s competitors or adversaries harms US security interests in every part of the globe”.21 The third problem is that the global oil market is far from being a free market system. Governments which do not allow free market access to develop, exploit and expand supplies control most of the world’s major oil reserves. Most free market commodities allow the market supply to expand to meet demand. As oil prices rise, many governments are less receptive to foreign investment, preventing supply from responding to demand and driving prices even higher. 22 An increased price of imported goods increases the US trade deficit and exports wealth to foreign lands. In 2005, imported oil accounted for one-third of the country’s $800 billion trade deficit.23 A fourth problem created by the highly competitive world oil market is the political gamesmanship that undermines the fluidity and fairness of the market for available supplies. “New competitors like China and India are trying to negotiate long term contracts (at market prices) to ensure they have supplies in the event of a crisis or supply disruption…From an economic point of view it may not matter if China lends Angola $3 billion at low interest to gain part of an exploration project as long as the oil is produced. But China gains an enormous geopolitical advantage by this act.”24 A fifth problem oil dependency creates for America and directly impacts the DOD is vulnerability to price volatility that result from supply and demand shocks.25 From the fall of 2005 until gasoline prices started to decline in fall 2006, the “price of gasoline” had replaced “the weather” as every American’s favorite subject of conversation with a stranger. The price of standard crude oil on NYMEX was under $25 per barrel in September 2003, but by August 11, 2005, increased to over $60 per barrel, and topped out at a record price of $78.40 per barrel on July 13, 2006.26 Experts attributed the spike in prices to a variety of factors, including war in Iraq, North Korea's missile launches, the crisis between Israel and Lebanon, Iranian nuclear brinkmanship, and Hurricane Katrina. None of these factors, except for war in Iraq, could be controlled by the US government. The global energy infrastructure built over the last century is quite fragile and was not designed with any vision of terrorist attacks or computer hackers. The DOD must accept the fact that vulnerabilities exist and that bad actors will eventually exploit these vulnerabilities if corrective measures are not taken.

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Military Readiness is key to hegemony
Donnelly, 2003---Resident Scholar at AEI (Thomas, Resident Scholar at AEI, 2/1. ttp://www.aei.org/publications /pubID.15845/pub_detail.asp) The preservation of today's Pax Americana rests upon both actual military strength and the perception of strength. The variety of victories scored by U.S. forces since the end of the cold war is testament to both the futility of directly challenging the United States and the desire of its enemies to keep poking and prodding to find a weakness in the American global order. Convincing would-be great powers, rogue states, and terrorists to accept the liberal democratic order--and the challenge to autocratic forms of rule that come with it--requires not only an overwhelming response when the peace is broken, but a willingness to step in when the danger is imminent. The message of the Bush Doctrine--"Don't even think about it!"--rests in part on a logic of preemption that

underlies the logic of primacy.

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DoD Procurement – 1AC
US leadership solves every major impact—European, Asian, Middle-eastern wars, economic collapse, nuclear proliferation and use
Khalilzad 1995 – RAND, Ambassador to Afghanistan (Washington Quarterly, Spring) Realistically and over the longer term, however, a neo-isolationist approach might well increase the danger of major conflict, require a greater U.S. defense effort, threaten world peace, and eventually undermine U.S. prosperity. By withdrawing from Europe and Asia, the United States would deliberately risk weakening the institutions and solidarity of the world's community of democratic powers and so establishing favorable conditions for the spread of disorder and a possible return to conditions similar to those of the first half of the twentieth century.
In the 1920s and 1930s, U.S. isolationism had disastrous consequences for world peace. At that time, the United States was but one of several major powers. Now that the United States is the world's preponderant power, the shock of a U.S. withdrawal could be even greater. What

might happen to the world if the United States turned inward? Without the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), rather than cooperating with each other, the West European nations might compete with each other for domination of East-Central Europe and the Middle East. In Western and Central Europe, Germany -- especially since unification -- would be the natural leading power. Either in cooperation or competition with Russia, Germany might seek influence over the territories located between them. German efforts are likely to be aimed at filling the vacuum, stabilizing the region, and precluding its domination by rival powers. Britain and France fear such a development. Given the strength of democracy in Germany and its preoccupation with absorbing the former East Germany, European concerns about Germany appear exaggerated. But it would be a mistake to assume that U.S. withdrawal could not, in the long run, result in the renationalization of Germany's security policy. The same is also true of Japan. Given a U.S. withdrawal from the world, Japan would have to look after its own security and build up its military capabilities. China, Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia already fear Japanese hegemony. Without U.S. protection, Japan is likely to increase its military capability dramatically -- to balance the growing Chinese forces and still-significant Russian forces. This could result in arms races, including the possible acquisition by Japan of nuclear
weapons. Given Japanese technological prowess, to say nothing of the plutonium stockpile Japan has acquired in the development of its nuclear power industry, it could obviously become a nuclear weapon state relatively quickly, if it should so decide. It could also build long-range missiles and carrier task forces. With the shifting balance of power among Japan, China, Russia, and potential new regional

powers such as India, Indonesia, and a united Korea could come significant risks of preventive or proeruptive war. Similarly, European competition for regional dominance could lead to major wars in Europe or East Asia. If the United States stayed out of such a war -- an unlikely prospect -- Europe or East Asia could become dominated by a hostile power. Such a development would threaten U.S. interests. A power that achieved such dominance would seek to exclude the United States from the area and threaten its interests-economic and political -- in the region. Besides, with the domination of Europe or East Asia, such a power might seek global hegemony and the United States would face another global Cold War and the risk of a world war even more catastrophic than the last. In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination. Iran and Iraq have, in the past, both sought regional hegemony. Without U.S. protection, the weak oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would be unlikely to retain their independence. To preclude this development, the Saudis might seek to acquire, perhaps by purchase, their own nuclear weapons. If either Iraq or Iran controlled the region that dominates the world
supply of oil, it could gain a significant capability to damage the U.S. and world economies. Any country that gained hegemony would have vast economic resources at its disposal that could be used to build military capability as well as gain leverage over the United States and other oilimporting nations. Hegemony over the Persian Gulf by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle

East under its influence and domination because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply and the peace process would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risk of war between the Arabs and the Israelis. The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf would harm the economy of the United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard of living. Turmoil in Asia and Europe would force major economic readjustment in the United States, perhaps reducing U.S. exports and imports and jeopardizing U.S. investments in these regions. Given that total imports and exports are equal to a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product, the cost of necessary adjustments might be high. The higher level of turmoil in the world would also increase the likelihood of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means for their delivery. Already several rogue states such as North Korea and Iran are seeking nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. That danger would only increase if the United States withdrew from the world. The result would be a much more dangerous world in which many states possessed WMD capabilities; the likelihood of their actual use would 7

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter
increase accordingly. If this happened, the security of every nation in the world, including the United States, would be harmed.

DoD Procurement – 1AC
Therefore we offer the following plan: The United States Federal Government will increase the procurement of renewable energies for the military. The Department of Defense will require the use of biofuels for aviation and renewable sources for military bases in the US.

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DoD Procurement – 1AC
Observation Three – Solvency The Military can lead the US into energy security – their example raises the public’s awareness, and defense contracts increase partnerships with industry
Scott Buchanan, Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation 2006 [Energy and Force Transformation Joint Force
Quarterly http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i42/17-JFQ42%20Buchanan%20Pg%2051-54.pdf

Enabling the rapid adaptation of new energy technologies to civilian use is required for the Nation’s long-term physical and economic security. n Energy efficiency will not adversely affect military capability. Stimulate Private Industry. Beyond making DOD more efficient and capable of executing future operations, adapting new energy technologies for civilian use may have a larger strategic impact. The Defense Department can lead or stimulate the culture change—required at all levels of the Nation—to recognize the hidden costs of fuel oil and move strategically to less foreign energy dependence. Only then can the United States become better positioned economically and more secure in a future environment with less volatile energy supplies. Partnering with industry will perhaps stimulate the development of effective energy technologies, develop expertise, and accelerate the acceptance of new technologies by the military and the public. Elements such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency could begin this partnering effort by sponsoring a private-sector “prize program” to encourage new ideas and approaches and demonstrate DOD interest. Partnering would mitigate some industry risk and could potentially: n accelerate engineering breakthroughs to adapt current technologies to military vehicles and other civilian uses n lead to developing and proving the advanced manufacturing processes required for new energy technologies n create procurement strategies that support new industry and manufacturing plants until private demand can sustain them n stimulate interest and investment in energy efficiency n make U.S. industries more competitive in the future oildependent energy environment.

DoD Procurement of Biofuels will decrease dependence on imported oil and spur investment in biofuel infrastructure.
Felicia French, Army Environmental Policy Institute 2005 [ April 5, How the Army Can Be An Environmental Paragon Through Energy, http://www.aepi.army.mil/internet/how-army-can-be-energy-paragon.pdf] Biofuels convert biomass to liquid fuel for transportation needs and contain oxygen resulting in cleaner combustion and less toxic emissions than fossil fuels. Although biofuels release the global warming gas carbon dioxide when combusted; carbon dioxide is also absorbed from plants grown for biofuels. This in essence recycles the carbon dioxide and ultimately is a neutral carbon net exchange (33: NP). Unlike fossil fuel oil spills or leaks, a biofuel spill would not be deleterious to the environment and would more easily biodegrade into the soil or water. Biomass derived ethanol and biodiesel can be mixed with or directly replaced for gasoline and diesel, respectively. At present, these are the only two alternative liquid fuels available that can be substituted for the two thirds of all petroleum used in the U.S. for transportation and of which 50 percent is imported. (33: NP). Increasing our production and use of biofuels will drastically decrease our dependence on imported oil. Thus biomass and biofuel have significant economic, health, environmental, and security benefits. Ethanol is an alcohol produced from the fermentation of carbohydrates and predominantly used for a fuel additive (up to 85 percent mixture) to decrease smog emissions such as carbon monoxide (26: NP). The overall research on whether or not it requires more BTUs to produce ethanol than what BTUs are actually yielded from ethanol is inconclusive. Biodiesel combines alcohol, and either clean or recycled vegetable oil, animal fats, or cooking grease. It can also be added to current fuels (about 20 percent) to decrease smog emissions or alone in diesel engines (26: NP) In relatively minimal time, the Army can start supplementing our fuel requirements with biofuel in most of if not all of its vehicles. Since a number of our vehicles currently run on diesel fuel, we can convert them over to biodiesel. It would even be possible to sell or turn in our mess hall cooking grease to recycle into biodiesel fuel for our own use. Through the Army’s increased purchase of biofuels, we could begin to influence the increase in production and with it the infrastructure to produce greater supplies of biofuel. This will leave our country less vulnerable to near term and future oil interruptions. With the Nation’s aging petroleum oil refineries at or near maximum capacity, building biofuel refineries to replace them would be the most prudent and economically feasible course of action. However, using biofuel is primarily an interim action as it has the potential to remove food from the Third World. 9

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

DoD Procurement – 1AC
DoD procurement of renewable energy enhances military readiness – it reduces the need for resupply, improves military health, reduces costs and drives innovation. Current Military renewable use is not enough – the military should be the model
Felicia French, Army Environmental Policy Institute 2005 [ April 5, How the Army Can Be An Environmental Paragon Through
Energy, http://www.aepi.army.mil/internet/how-army-can-be-energy-paragon.pdf]

Using some, all, or a combination of the renewable energies discussed in this chapter will further facilitate the Army’s meeting the six goals of The Army Strategy for the Environment. Expressly: Foster a Sustainability Ethic by embracing the fact that current energy resources are exhaustible and substituting them for renewable resources; Strengthen Army Operations by reducing unhealthy heat, noise, and waste emissions and decreasing our logistical tail; Meet Test, Training, and Mission Requirements by sustaining the land, water, and air at our training sites; Minimize Impacts and Total Ownership Costs through the use of on site domestic renewable energy; Enhance Well-being by sustaining our natural resources and protecting human health through the use of clean and less raw material intensive renewable energy; Drive Innovation by accelerating the transfer of fossil fuel to renewable energy technology to meet present and future requirements. Conclusions This paper demonstrates the need for an Army Energy Strategy that supports the new Army Strategy for the Environment six goals. This analysis indicates that currently the Army has an energy program that is insular, fragmented and needs an integrated approach. This is not to say that the Army is not already making an effort toward conserving energy and using renewable energy in a number of sites and areas. However, because of the Army’s limited resources, it needs to make a concerted effort to focus and prioritize against the Army’s Strategy for the Environment until it is expanded into our everyday life and on every Army installation and operation. Just as it is not advisable to put all of ones money into one stock or only into a savings account, it is not advisable to depend on only one source of energy or conservation of energy alone. Whether one wants to argue the validity or dubiousness of fossil fuel combustion’s contribution to global warming or climate change, there are a variety of other compelling reasons to reduce and eliminate our need for fossil fuel. The cost benefits of energy conservation and use of renewable energy are vast and have profound and numerous positive repercussions to our quality of life. Our national security, health, economy, and environment are all affected by our use of energy making it imperative that we take every possible action to ameliorate our energy policies and usage. As the Army is a defender of freedom, it in turn also defends our quality of life. This is why the Army should be at the vanguard of an energy transition to renewable energy and restorative conservation.

Increasing alternative energy is necessary for future military readiness – it is critical to mobility, deterrence and persistence of forward deployed forces
Thomas Crowley Logistics Management Institute 2007 [april
transforming the way dod looks at energy an approach to establishing an energy strategy http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_ 404_F T602T1 _Transformi ng%20the%20Way%20DoD%20Looks %20at%20Energy _Final%20 Report.pdf.]

Recent experience indicates that the nature of the threat facing the United States is changing. Today, we cannot be sure in advance of the location of future conflicts, given the threat of dispersed, small-scale attacks inherent in warfare with rogue nations and insurgent forces. In addition, the U.S. military must be prepared to defend against single strikes capable of mass casualties. This complex security environment—an environment in which a wide range of conventional and uncon- ventional attacks can come from unpredictable regions of the world and the risk of a single attack is high—requires the United States not only to maintain a force that is forward and engaged on a daily steady-state basis, but also to ensure that it is ready for quick, surge deployments worldwide to counter, and deter, a broad spectrum of potential threats. Theme 1. Our forces must expand geographically and be more mobile and expeditionary so that they can be engaged in more theaters and prepared for expedient deployment anywhere in the world. Theme 2. We must transition from a reactive to a proactive force posture to deter enemy forces from organizing for and conducting potentially catastrophic attacks. Theme 3. We must be persistent in our presence, surveillance, assistance, and attack to defeat determined insurgents and halt the organization of new enemy forces. To carry out these activities, the U.S. military will have to be even more energy intense, locate in more regions of the world, employ new technologies, and man- age a more complex logistics system. Considering the trend in operational fuel consumption and future capability needs, this “new” force employment construct will likely demand more energy/fuel in the deployed setting. Simply put, more miles will be traveled, both by combat units and the supply units that sustain them, which will result in increased energy consumption. Therefore, DoD must apply new energy technologies that address alternative supply sources and effi- cient consumption across all aspects of military operations. 10

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

DoD Procurement – 1AC
Military procurement of alternatives increases military readiness by increasing basing options – our Army would become a better neighbor
Felicia French, Army Environmental Policy Institute 2005 [ April 5, How the Army Can Be An Environmental Paragon Through Energy, http://www.aepi.army.mil/internet/how-army-can-be-energy-paragon.pdf] Another way the Army can reduce waste and encourage recycling is through the practices and procedures used in the procurement of goods. We can stipulate from those we purchase from that they must provide us with “extended product responsibility” or cradle-to-cradle service (1: 14). This is a way of holding manufactures responsible for the production process, quality and recycling of their products. By doing so, the Army can reduce our own and encourage the reduction of waste such as electronic appliances (i.e. computers, monitors, washers, dryers, and refrigerators) as well as carpets, flooring and roofs. These products end up in garbage dumps leaching toxic chemicals into the ground. Purchase and installation of all energy efficient rated appliances would save energy and reduce green house gas emissions. Home appliances account for 30 percent of electrical consumption and 12 percent of green house gas emissions in the U.S. (40: NP). By reducing our footprint on the community environment, we make ourselves more attractive and desirable to have as tenants and neighbors than a land developer with possibly little or no regard and consideration for the environment. The Army will be viewed as providing environmental stewardship as well providing jobs for the local economy. Conserving and reducing our requirements for energy by applying the principles mentioned in this chapter will facilitate the Army’s meeting all the goals of The Army Strategy for the Environment. Construction of Green buildings and using reusable products is completely in line with fostering a sustainable ethic. Sharing facilities with other AC and RC units strengthens Army operations and minimizes impacts and total ownership costs. Green installation design enhances the well being of Army families and our communities. Procurement and use of micropower and distributed energy will facilitate meeting our testing, training, and mission requirements and will help drive innovation in the private and public sector. Using reusable products will foster a sustainability ethic, and minimize impacts and total ownership costs.

Prioritizing alternative energy in the DoD is essential to military readiness – minor investments in development projects can have enormous operational impacts
Scott Buchanan, Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation 2006 [Energy and Force Transformation Joint Force
Quarterly http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i42/17-JFQ42%20Buchanan%20Pg%2051-54.pdf

The actual level of DOD investment may be higher because research within other program elements may include platformspecific energy concerns. Nevertheless, even if the level is doubled or tripled, it would be a small investment compared to the investment in other strategic initiatives such as missile defense. More important, an investment in energy-efficiency R&D and, ultimately, oil independence may have a far greater impact on the strategic balance. An inherent tension exists within the tiered-system approach that DOD takes to science and technology (S&T). On one hand, wide-ranging S&T investment provides a mechanism for discovering new knowledge and developing things that would not otherwise exist. On the other hand, most successfully fielded military S&T is directed toward operational and programmatic needs. While at least seven different fuel cell efforts are under way, the low level of investment in energy efficiency R&D may indicate that energy efficiency is not being pursued with urgency or an overarching strategic view toward transforming the way we plan, operate, and fight. The following areas may provide a basis for such an overarching DOD energy strategy. Invest Strategically in Energy Technology. By significantly increasing its R&D investments, DOD can improve the efficiency and capability of the current force. These investments will require the establishment of a strategic transformational mandate for significant near-term energy-efficiency improvements (such as retrofit of existing platforms that will be part of the force for several years), reduced logistics force requirements, and long-term military and national energy independence from foreign energy sources (including new efficient platforms powered by alternate energy sources). The technologies considered should be far-reaching, with the specific view of their potential both to provide the lethal force required in the execution of military operations and to provide that force more effectively and efficiently. In other words, although recent operations have demonstrated the usefulness of heavy forces, a smaller, more responsive, and more affordable force might better meet capability demands than a larger, slower force that is more expensive to operate. 11

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Topicality – Incentives
[ ] DoD procurement policies are incentives – they encourage the military to buy green products
Inside Defense 2006 [ September 15, http://www.military.com/features/ 0,15240,1135 99,00.html ,DoD Pushes Biobased Fuels] In his January State of the Union address, President Bush said the United States is “addicted to oil,” and called for “more reliable alternative energy sources.” The event this week follows on the heels of an Aug. 17 memo from Defense Department acquisition chief Kenneth Krieg that encourages DOD leaders to promote the purchase of biobased products, as the Pentagon prepares to implement a federal law that is expected to change the way the armed services buy items ranging from hand sanitizers to fuel additives. Biobased products utilize plant, animal and marine or forestry materials, according to DOD's Green Procurement Program Strategy, a 2004 document that describes Pentagon policy on acquiring environmentally friendly products.

[ ] DoD procurement policies are incentives – they encourage the military to buy green products
Military.com 2006 [DoD Pushes Biobased Fuels September 15, http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,11 3599,00.html In his January State of the Union address, President Bush said the United States is “addicted to oil,” and called for “more reliable alternative energy sources.” The event this week follows on the heels of an Aug. 17 memo from Defense Department acquisition chief Kenneth Krieg that encourages DOD leaders to promote the purchase of biobased products, as the Pentagon prepares to implement a federal law that is expected to change the way the armed services buy items ranging from hand sanitizers to fuel additives. Biobased products utilize plant, animal and marine or forestry materials, according to DOD's Green Procurement Program Strategy, a 2004 document that describes Pentagon policy on acquiring environmentally friendly products.

[ ] Military procurement of renewable energy is an Incentive for private use of alternatives
Felicia French, Army Environmental Policy Institute 2005 [ April 5, How the Army Can Be An Environmental Paragon Through Energy, http://www.aepi.army.mil/internet/how-army-can-be-energy-paragon.pdf] This paper will examine the use and conservation of energy for both army mobility and facility operations. The military has been on the forefront of many social, medical and technological changes; therefore we can use our credibility and resources to be the vanguard of change to renewable energy into mainstream society. As a voracious consumer of energy, it will be financially and politically feasible for the army to decrease dependence on fossil fuel. To do so would facilitate use of alternative energy by the public and private sector. Additionally, it is more conducive to a positive public image of being environmentally and fiscally responsible consequentially allowing greater access to local training sites-further decreasing our requirement for mobility fuel. The presentation offers recommendations for alternative and renewable energy to be used by the army and the numerous positive consequences of this transformation to include: diminishing US dependence on Middle Eastern oil, decreased dependence on one source of energy, halt the catastrophic effects of global warming, and ameliorate the deleterious health effects of fossil fuel combustion.

12

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Inherency - DoD Energy Consumption Increasing
[ ] DoD dependence on oil is increasing primarily due to aviation fuel
Thomas Crowley Logistics Management Institute 2007 [april transforming the way dod looks at energy an approach to establishing an energy strategy http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_ 404_F T602T1 _Transformi ng%20the%20Way%20DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy _Final%20 Report.pdf.] Mobility Energy Use Mobility energy is the fuel used to power DoD weapons platforms, tactical equipment, and all other types of vehicles. In contrast with facility energy, mobil- ity energy consists almost entirely of petroleumbased products and accounts for 94 percent of DoD’s petroleum consumption. The categories of fuel used for mobility are jet fuel, gasoline, distillates and diesel, ship’s bunkers, and residuals. As illustrated in Figure 2-2, about 75 percent of the mobility fuel used by DoD is jet fuel. Distillates and diesel follow with 17 percent. Many DoD platforms are multifuel capable, so it is not appropriate to consider these percentages as directly attributable to air, land, and sea platforms. JP-8, used primarily for air operations, makes up about 56 percent of the total pe- troleum purchased by DoD. The continued use of JP-8 as the fuel of choice for operations is testament to the U.S. military doctrine that relies heavily on air power as an integral part of the joint force across the whole spectrum of operations. The agility, mobility, and speed that this doctrine provides have been effec- tive, but it comes at a high cost and further reliance on liquid petroleum. A recent Los Angeles Times article noted that the U.S. military is consuming about 2.4 million gallons of fuel every day in Iraq and Afghanistan. The data, provided by the U.S. Central Command, show that DoD is using approximately 57,000 barrels a day, at a cost of about $3 million per day. This equates to about 16 gallons per soldier per day. This is significantly more than the 2005 consump- tion rate of 9 gallons per soldier. These numbers make it clear that energy con- sumption for military operations has increased dramatically in the last 15 years. In Desert Storm, consumption was 4 gallons per soldier per soldier, and in World War II, consumption was only 1 gallon per day per soldier. Appendix A contains additional detail about DoD’s mobility fuel use.

[

] The Army is too dependent on fossil fuels because consumption is high
Felicia French, Army Environmental Policy Institute 2005 [ April 5, How the Army Can Be An Environmental Paragon Through Energy, http://www.aepi.army.mil/internet/how-army-can-be-energy-paragon.pdf] The Army does not have the luxury of ignoring its dependence on fossil fuel. Along with the rest of the Nation, it is almost completely dependent on fossil fuel to accomplish its mission. The Department of Defense (DoD) bill for mobility and installation energy was over $8.2 billion in fiscal year 2004 (27: NP). DoD is the largest single consumer of the total U.S. energy consumed. The Army uses about 6 percent of DoD mobility fuels (gas, diesel and jet fuel) to power tactical and utility vehicles, and weapons platforms to include M1 Abrams tanks and all helicopters (9: 4). However, this does not account for the fuel used by Air Force planes and Navy ships in transporting Army personnel and equipment in peacetime and especially in wartime. Fuel logistics for the Army accounts for 70 percent of all tonnage hauled when the Army mobilizes. The transportation of that same fuel from base to projection platform comprises 8 percent of the cost (21: 85). The Army also pays $3.2 billion annually to 20,000 active duty and 40,000 reserve component personnel to transport this fuel (21: 88). The Army could have more “teeth” and less “tail” if we weren’t so dependent upon this fuel. This logistical behemoth impedes deployment, maneuverability, and increases our personnel and equipment requirements and diverts troops from combat arms. Additionally, in 2003 it costs $769 million in energy bills for the Army to maintain over 4,100 installations and sites (about two-thirds of all DoD installations) including Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and overseas facilities. This totaled 896 million square feet in 158,690 buildings (10: 1).

13

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Inherency - Attitudes
[ ] The Military doesn’t focus on alternative energies because it doesn’t see the connection between efficiency and performance
Kristine Blackwell Lt Colonel USAF 2007 [June 15 The Department of Defense: Reducing Its Reliance on FossilBased Aviation Fuel – Issues for Congress http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34062.pdf.] In 2000, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) directed the Defense Science Board (DSB) to form a task force to examine how DOD could improve the fuel efficiency of their weapons systems. The task force would also identify institutional barriers that impeded the department’s understanding of and ability to capture the full advantages of more fuel efficient systems. The task force was not asked to look at possible sources of alternative fuel and they did not address that topic in their report. They reported five significant findings. Finding #1: Although significant warfighting, logistics and cost benefits occur when weapons systems are more fuelefficient, these benefits are not valued or emphasized in the DOD requirements and acquisition processes. When buying new weapons, DOD placed performance as its highest priority and seemed to overlook how fuel efficiency could result in improved performance. Furthermore, when developing new systems the department did not seem to take into account how the fuel use of a particular system could have far-reaching effects on the total force (e.g., a system’s logistical requirements may create a vulnerable delivery chain). Finding #2:The DOD currently prices fuel based on the wholesale refinery price and does not include the cost of delivery to its customers. This prevents a comprehensive view of fuel utilization in DOD’s decision-making, does not reflect the DOD’s true fuel costs, masks energy efficiency benefits, and distorts platform design choices. The DSB pointed out that overlooking the true cost of fuel also masks the real benefits of fuel efficiency. As a consequence, fuel efficiency is not regarded as a relevant factor in the acquisition of weapon systems or in other logistics related decisions. For example, in 1997, using an average fuel price of 97 cents, the Air Force estimated that re-engining the B-52H would generate a savings of just under $400 million over 40 years. Based on that calculation, the service concluded that retrofitting was not costeffective. The DSB reworked the equation using an average fuel cost of $1.50 per gallon (the board estimated that 10% of the fuel would be delivered via aerial refueling at a cost of $17.50 per gallon) and calculated a savings of $1.7 billion. Finding #3: DOD resource allocation and accounting processes (the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System(PPBS), DOD Comptroller) do not reward fuel efficiency or penalize inefficiency. The task force found that DOD interest in fuel efficiency had been mainly limited to meeting goals established by legislation or executive order. Since those goals mainly applied to installations, including their non-warfighting vehicles, there was little incentive to improve the fuel efficiency of weapon systems. Additionally, the department had no way to quantify–and therefore value–the benefits of conserving fuel.

14

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Oil Hurts Readiness – Resupply Chains
[ ] Limited fuel resources reduce readiness of the military
Scott Buchanan, Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation 2006 [Energy and Force Transformation Joint Force Quarterly http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i42/17-JFQ42%20Buchanan%20Pg%205154.pdf The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) can learn from the Royal Navy’s pre–World War I energy transformation. Like the Royal Navy a century ago, DOD is faced with the problem of limited resources due in large part to our energy infrastructure. Fuel represents more than half of the DOD logistics tonnage and over 70 percent of the tonnage required to put the U.S. Army into position for battle.3 The Navy uses millions of gallons of fuel every day to operate newest platforms demand. Because of our tremendous logistics capability, the Armed Forces can be successfully deployed and employed anywhere in the world for both deterrence and combat operations. However, that capability comes at a high price: a tremendous energy demand. The energy consumption rates of our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, is four times what it was in World War II and twice that of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.8 The logistics tail now consists largely of the fuel required to execute and sustain operations.

[

] Dependence and resupply undermine military readiness
Energy Bulletin. 2007[May 21 US military energy consumption- facts and figures http://www.energy bulletin.net/29925.html FACT 14: Delivering fuel to consumers is not limited to logistics pains. Over 70 percent of the tonnage required to position today's U.S. Army into battle is fuel. The Air Force spends approximately 85 percent of its fuel budget to deliver, by airborne tankers, just 6 percent of its annual jet fuel usage." [18] Of the top 10 battlefield guzzlers in the U.S. Army, only 2 are combat vehicles (the Abrams tank and the Apache helicopter). The other eight carry fuel and supplies. Over half of the fuel transported to the battlefield is consumed by support vehicles, not vehicles engaged in frontline combat. The logistics costs to deliver fuel include people, training, platforms (for example, oilers, trucks, and tanker aircraft), and other hardware and infrastructure. Those costs can be tens and sometimes hundreds of times the cost of the fuel itself, depending on how it is delivered.[19] The Army has 40,000 troops involved in either the distribution or movement of energy.[20]

[

] Delivery of fuel increases costs and limits readiness of armed forces
Scott Buchanan, Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation 2006 [Energy and Force Transformation Joint Force Quarterly http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i42/17-JFQ42%20Buchanan%20Pg%205154.pdf Delivering fuel where and when it is needed is a significant and increasing burden on the Services. The logistics costs to deliver fuel include people, training, platforms (for example, oilers, trucks, and tanker aircraft), and other hardware and infrastructure. Those costs can be tens and sometimes hundreds of times the cost of the fuel itself, depending on how it is delivered. However, the exact costs are unknown because acquisition and operational decision processes neither fully quantify those costs nor consider alternatives to the “logistics systems” that platform acquisition and perhaps operational decisions will dictate.12 It is likely that actual costs of delivering fuel for operations are dramatically higher than decisionmakers realize. Until now, the methods for acquiring military platforms, both combat and support, and accounting for the costs of fuel to operate and sustain them have been sufficient.

15

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Oil Hurts Readiness – Military Budgets
[ ] Fossil fuel dependence constrains our military – it makes transportation and electricity grids vulnerable and diverts money from readiness into rising fuel costs
Gregory Lengyel, 21st Century Defense Initiative of the Brookings Institution 2007 [Department of Defense Energy Strategy Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks August http://www.brookings.edu/~/media /Files/rc/papers/ 2007/08 defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf The Department of Defense is the single largest consumer of energy in the United States3. The United States has built the mightiest military in world history, but has done so with little regard to the huge burden that comes with an insatiable appetite for energy. DOD energy issues cannot be viewed in isolation. They are a subset of the larger national problem. Reducing dependence on imported energy is a critical national issue that must be addressed without delay. First, the DOD needs to recognize the problem from a military perspective: energy is the key enabler of US military combat power. With that comes huge consumption of mostly imported petroleum based fuels, a command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) structure dependent on the civilian electrical grid, and rising costs to support the military’s energy needs. Despite those key elements, DOD has no comprehensive strategy for energy or organizational structure to implement an energy strategy. Second, the DOD must recognize that energy security makes the military vulnerable in several ways. DOD operations require assured access to large amounts of fuel for combat platforms and electricity for DOD installations from a vulnerable electrical grid. Recent cost increases and higher projected costs for energy take defense dollars away from other key budget areas. Energy requirements are directly related to combat effectiveness, and the infrastructure required to transport and distribute energy to the battlefield is extremely expensive and diverts resources away from combat. Combat forces are limited by a “tether of fuel” that needs to be lengthened. Third, energy must be managed like other combat enablers, such as intelligence, acquisition, and logistics. Present DOD fuel costs represent only a 2.5 – 3% fraction of the national defense budget. That may seem small, but in a fiscally constrained wartime environment where DOD and Service budgets have been cut again and again – every dollar is already committed. The forecast is for more of the same. An already huge national debt, federal budget deficits, a looming fiscal storm of rising national health care costs and a potential Social Security crisis make fiscally constrained times appear permanent for the US Government. Fourth, the DOD must have a long-term Energy Strategy and “energy chain of command”, based on a comprehensive National Energy Strategy and a long-term vision of energy security 50 years from now and beyond. Ideally, America will reach a clean, carbon-neutral, domestically controlled, abundant, and affordable energy solution. No one really knows which technology or energy source will provide the fork in the road away from a largely petroleum dependent economy and military. The DOD’s Energy Strategy must also look at what can be done today and for the next 20- years to use energy more efficiently and more environmentally friendly. The strategy must diversify energy sources, increase physical security, and ensure access. This near-term strategy will buy time for research and technology to help America reach a long-term vision. This paper will focus on the more near-term, or the next 20-years.

[

] Energy Price increases consume an enormous portion of the DoD budget.
Gregory Lengyel, 21st Century Defense Initiative of the Brookings Institution 2007 [Department of Defense Energy Strategy Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks August http://www.brookings.edu/~/media /Files/rc/papers/ 2007/08 defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf Energy not come cheap. The DOD spent approximately $13.55 billion on energy as a commodity in FY 2006. Of that, DOD spent roughly $10 billion on mobility fuels and $3.5 billion on facilities and infrastructure. A $10 per barrel increase in the cost of fuel increases DOD operating costs by roughly $1.3 billion per year, which roughly equates to the entire 2007 procurement budget for the United States Marine Corps.10 Those numbers alone are staggering, and as illustrated in Figure 3, are clearly trending upward. The DOD bill for jet fuel in FY 2006 was $7.9 billion. This represents a 73% increase from the FY 2000 cost of $2.2 billion, even though consumption only rose 12%, largely attributable to the Global War on Terror. However, fuel costs for budgeting and resource planning have traditionally been based on the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) standard price, which does not reflect the cost of the fuel logistics system required to deliver fuel to the war fighter. The standard price of fuel represents only a fraction of the true cost. 16

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Oil Hurts Readiness – Supply Disruptions
[ ] Energy Dependence crushes the military because it makes them vulnerable to supply disruptions – the Military must lead on diversifying energy sources
Gregory Lengyel, 21st Century Defense Initiative of the Brookings Institution 2007 [Department of Defense Energy Strategy Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks August http://www.brookings.edu/~/media /Files/rc/papers/ 2007/08 defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf The United States has a National Security problem, energy security, in which the Department of Defense has a unique interest. The United States imports 26% of its total energy supply and 56% of the oil it consumes. The DOD is the largest single consumer of energy in the United States and energy is the key enabler of US military combat power. Huge energy consumption, increased competition for limited energy supplies, ever increasing energy costs, and no comprehensive Energy Strategy or oversight of energy issues in the DOD have created vulnerabilities. These include potential fuel and electricity supply disruptions as well as foreign policy and economic vulnerability. The DOD needs a comprehensive Energy Strategy and organizational structure to implement a strategy to improve National Security by decreasing US dependence on foreign oil, ensure access to critical energy requirements, maintain or improve combat capability, promote research for future energy security, be fiscally responsible to the American tax payer, and protect the environment. This strategy can be implemented through leadership and culture change, innovation and process efficiencies, reduced demand, and increased/diversified energy sources.

[

] Vulnerability to supply disruptions undermines US military readiness
Gregory Lengyel, 21st Century Defense Initiative of the Brookings Institution 2007 [Department of Defense Energy Strategy Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks August http://www.brookings.edu/~/media /Files/rc/papers/ 2007/08 defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf Implications of the Problem- Vulnerability Vulnerability: The susceptibility of a nation or military force to any action by any means through which its war potential or combat effectiveness may be reduced or its will to fight diminished. Strategic vulnerability: The susceptibility of vital instruments of national power to being seriously decreased or adversely changed by the application of actions within the capability of another nation [or non-state actor] to impose. Strategic vulnerability may pertain to political, geographic, economic, informational, scientific, sociological, or military factors. Joint Publication 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms US dependence on huge amounts of oil and electricity to power our economy and our military creates much vulnerability. It would not be wise to publish a detailed list of vulnerabilities of US and global energy critical infrastructure and key resources; however, it is no big secret that vulnerabilities exist. Terrorists or common vandals in either the United States or around the globe have already attempted all of the open source referenced scenarios described in this chapter. Potential Oil Supply Disruptions “Our nation’s dependence on imported oil leaves it dangerously vulnerable to attack. A single well-designed attack on the petroleum infrastructure in the Middle East could send oil to well over $100 per barrel and devastate the world’s economy.”1

[

] Dependence kills readiness - Supply disruptions will cripple forward deployed forces.
Gregory Lengyel, 21st Century Defense Initiative of the Brookings Institution 2007 [Department of Defense Energy Strategy Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks August http://www.brookings.edu/~/media /Files/rc/papers/ 2007/08 defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf Deployed operational forces are particularly vulnerable to supply disruptions. Fuel is delivered by convoy to Iraq from Jordan, Kuwait, and Turkey. In FY 2006, over 156 million gallons of fuel were delivered to US/coalition forces in western Iraq. In the north, over 103 million gallons of fuel were delivered through Turkey.5 In July 2006, USMC Major General Richard Zilmer, commander of the multi-national force in western Iraq, submitted a priority request for a self-sustainable energy solution to reduce the number of fuel logistics convoys in Iraq that are increasingly vulnerable to attack.6

17

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Extend – Hegemony Good
[ ] Decline in U.S. primacy creates a global power vacuum—this collapses every institution of global stability and causes spreading nuclear wars
Ferguson, 2004 – Professor of History at New York University's Stern School of Business and Senior fellow at the Hoover Institution (Niall, “A world without power,” Foreign Policy 143, p. 32-39, July-August)

Critics of US. global dominance should pause and consider the alternative. If the United States retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it? Not Europe, not China, not the Muslim world- and certainly not the United Nations. Unfortunately, the alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia but the anarchic nightmare of a new Dark Age. We tend to assume that power, like nature, abhors a vacuum. In the history of world politics, it
seems, someone is always the hegemon or bidding to become it. Today, it is the United States; a century ago, it was the United Kingdom. Before
that, it was France, Spain, and so on. The famed nineteenth-century Gennan historian Leopold

von Ranke, doyen of the study of statecraft, portrayed modem European history as an incessant struggle for mastery,

in which a balance of power was possible only through recurrent conflict. The influence of economics on the study of diplomacy only seems to confirm the notion that history is a competition between rival powers. In his best-selling 1987 work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Yale University historian Paul Kennedy concluded that, like all past empires, the U.S. and Russian superpowers would inevitably succumb to overstretch. But their place would soon be usurped, Kennedy argued, by the rising powers of China and Japan, both still unencumbered by the deadweight of imperial military commitments. In his 2001 book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, University of Chicago political scientist John J. Mearsheimer updates Kennedy's account. Having failed to succumb to overstretch, and having survived the German and Japanese challenges, he argues, the United States must now brace itself for the ascent of new rivals. "A rising China is the most dangerous potential threat to the United States in the early twenry-first century," contends Mearsheirner. "The United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead." China is not the only threat Mearsheimer foresees. The European Union (E.u.) too has the potential to become "a formidable rival." Power, in other words,

is not a natural monopoly: the struggle for mastery is both perennial and universal. The "unipolarity" identified by some commentators following the Soviet collapse cannot last much longer, for the simple
reason that history hates a hyperpower. Sooner or later, challengers will emerge, and back we must go to a multipolar, multipower world. But

what if these esteemed theorists are all wrong? What if the world is actually heading for a period when there is no hegemon? What if, instead of a balance of power, there is an absence of power? Such a situation is not unknown in history. Although the chroniclers of the past have long been preoccupied with
the achievements of great powers- whether civilizations, empires, or nation-states- they have not wholly overlooked eras when power receded.

Unfortunately, the world's experience with power vacuums (eras of "apolarity," if you

will) is hardly encouraging. Anyone who dislikes U.S. hegemony should bear in mind that. Rather than a multipolar world of competing great powers, a world with no hegemon at all may be the real alternative to US. primacy. Apolarity could turn out to mean an anarchic new Dark Age- an era of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world's forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization's retreat into a
few fortified enclaves.

Continues…
The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony--its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier--its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity--a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder 18

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

19

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Extend – Hegemony Good
[ ] Asian, European and Middle Eastern stability all depend on US leadership
Schmitt, 2006– Resident scholar and director of the Program on Advanced Strategic Studies at the American Enterprise Institute (Gary, “Is there any alternative to U.S. primacy?” The Weekly Standard, Books & Arts, Vol. 11 No. 22, February, Lexis) In the case of Europe, after examining both the sources of tension and cooperation in current transatlantic relations, Lieber argues that Europe has no choice but to depend on American leadership and power. Europe's lack of unanimity over foreign policies, and its own lack of hard power, leave it with little choice but to rely on the United States when it comes to maintaining the world's security blanket. As for the Middle East, after making the case for going to war with Saddam's Iraq--a case that ultimately hinges on the risks of not acting--Lieber notes that it still remains the case that "only the U.S." can deter regional thugs, contain weapons proliferation to any degree, keep the Arab-Israeli peace process afloat, and keep the oil supplies flowing to us and our allies. And in Asia, it is the United States that "plays a unique stabilizing role . . . that no other country or organization can play." Absent America's presence, the region's key actors would face a dramatically different set of security concerns, in which more overt, "great power" competition would likely become the norm.

[ ] Even if hegemony might be tangentially harmful to some, a world of U.S. hegemony still has significantly less violence than one without
Kagan, 98 – Alexander Hamilton Fellow at American University (Robert, “The benevolent empire,” Foreign Policy, Iss. 111, pg. 24-35, Summer, Proquest) And neither of them, one suspects, is very seriously intended. For the truth about America's dominant role in the world is known to most clear-eyed international observers. And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world's population. It is certainly a better international arrangement than all realistic alternatives. To undermine it would cost many others around the world far more than it would cost Americans-and far sooner. As Samuel Huntington wrote five years ago, before he joined the plethora of scholars disturbed by the "arrogance" of American hegemony: "A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country shaping global affairs."

20

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Extend – Hegemony Good
[ ] U.S. leadership deters conflict and solves all their impacts—collapse results in cascading great power wars
Thayer 2006 [Bradley A., Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, The National Interest, November -December, “In Defense of Primacy”, lexis]

countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater
A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had

U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the
so many allies. the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its

You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like
charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions

Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting
of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States

Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose
today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington

U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned-and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests

a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more
are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the

With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created
Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it

the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War-and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the
provides. Fourth and finally, planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical

American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the
reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg. THERE IS no other state, group of states or international organization that can provide these global benefits. None even comes close. The United Nations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on salient issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems. Does anyone expect Russia or China to take

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Let's face it: for the time being, American primacy remains humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills.
up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities.

Alternative Increase Readiness – Resupply
[ ] Alternative energy is critical for forward deployed forces – it reduces vulnerability of fuel resupply
Boston Globe , 2006 [ October 2, Military wants a more fuel-efficient Humvee Pentagon makes an energy push; http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/10/02/military_wants_a_ more_fuel _efficient_humvee/] The pressure for renewable energy sources is driven from the front lines. On July 25 , Major General Richard Zilmer of the Marine Corps, who is in charge of the force in Anbar, Iraq, wrote a priority request, saying that his supply convoys on Iraq's roads were increasingly at risk. As much as 70 percent of the convoys are carrying fuel, according to studies. Zilmer wanted alternative-energy sources brought to his base, such as solar and renewable battery systems, as substitutes for fuel used to power generators. The Pentagon also is taking note of the cost of delivering the fuel to far-flung areas of Iraq. James Woolsey, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency and currently an energy adviser to the Defense Department, has estimated that getting gas to a tank in Iraq could cost as much as $100 a gallon, considering the cost of supply lines, tanker vehicles, and protection of the tankers.

[

] DoD alternative energies are necessary to sustain forward deployment
Eileen Westervelt, U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, 2005 [September Energy Trends and Implications for U.S. Army Installations, http://static.cbslocal.com/station/wcco/news/ specialreports/projectenergy/06_0420_projectenergy_energytrendsreportfromarmycorps.pdf] The energy situation is highly uncertain–for the Army, the Nation, and the world. Now is the time to consider both short and long-term issues to develop enduring energy policies and solutions for our military installations to discern an effective and viable path for the Army’s energy future. To sustain its mission and ensure the capability to project and support the forces, the Army must insulate itself from the economic and logistical energy-related problems coming in the near- to mid-future. This requires a transition to modern, secure, and efficient energy systems and to building safe, environmentally friendly technologies. This is both a supplyside and demand-side challenge requiring integrated solutions and thoughtful planning and execution. Primary issues affecting energy options are: availability, affordability, sustainability, and security. Any review of these issues must take a global perspective since resources are unevenly distributed around the world. Further, the impacts of energy consumption have global reach from both an environmental and political perspective.

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Alternative Increase Readiness – Supply Disruptions
[ ] Studies prove that increasing alternative energy use can reduce DoD vulnerability to fossil fuel disruptions
Kristine Blackwell Lt Colonel USAF 2007 [June 15 The Department of Defense: Reducing Its Reliance on FossilBased Aviation Fuel – Issues for Congress http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34062.pdf.] The Pentagon’s Office of Force Transformation and Resources contracted LMI to develop an approach for the creation of a new DOD energy strategy. LMI identified three areas where DOD’s current practices were not aligned with its stated energy goals, recommended three main actions that DOD needed to take in order to address the misalignments, and provided other energy related options that could enable DOD to improve their corporate energy related processes. The three areas of strategic, operational, and fiscal considerations LMI identified where DOD’s practices and stated energy goals produced some friction and limitations were as follow. 1. Strategic: DOD’s dependence on foreign supplies of fuel limits its flexibility in dealing with certain producer nations; 2. Operational: DOD seeks greater mobility, persistence, and agility for its forces but the energy requirements of its forces limits the department’s ability to attain those things; and 3. Fiscal: DOD seeks to reduce the operating costs of its forces and of future procurements but increased energy consumption and increased prices are causing energy associated operating costs to grow. The three actions LMI recommended DOD take to address the areas noted above were as follow. 1. Incorporate energy considerations (energy use and energy logistics support requirements ) in the department’s key corporate decision making: strategic planning, analytic agenda, joint concept and joint capability development, acquisition, and planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE); 2. Establish a corporate governance structure with policyand resource oversight to focus the department’s energy efforts; and 3. Apply a new framework to promote energy efficiency, including alternate energy sources, to those areas consuming the most fuel (aviation forces), requiring the most logistics support (forward land forces and mobile electric power), or having the most negative effect on the warfighter (individual warfighter burden).

[ ] DoD procurement of renewables is essential for future readiness because it decreases dependence
Thomas Crowley Logistics Management Institute 2007 [april transforming the way dod looks at energy an approach to establishing an energy strategy http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_ 404_F T602T1 _Transformi ng%20the%20Way%20DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy _Final%20 Report.pdf.] In an environment of uncertainty about the price and availability of traditional en- ergy sources, DoD is facing increasing energy demand and support requirements that it must meet if it is to achieve its broader strategic goals— notably, establish- ment of a more mobile and agile force. However, recent technological advances in energy efficiency and alternative energy technologies offer a unique opportunity for DoD to make progress toward reconciling its strategic goals with its energy requirements through reduced consumption of fuel—especially foreign fuel. To capitalize on this opportunity, DoD needs to implement an energy strategy that encompasses the development of innovative new concepts and capabilities to re- duce energy dependence while maintaining or increasing overall warfighting ef- fectiveness. Recognizing that DoD must change how it views, values, and uses energy—a transformation that will challenge some of the department’s most deeply held assumptions, interests, and processes—the Office of Force Transfor- mation and Resources, within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, asked LMI to develop an approach to establishing a DoD energy strategy. LMI identified three areas of disconnect between DoD’s current energy consump- tion practices and the capability requirements of its strategic goals: Strategic. DoD seeks to shape the future security environment in favor of the United States. But, our dependence on foreign supplies of fuel limits our flexibility in dealing with producer nations who oppose or hinder our goals for greater prosperity and liberty. Operational. DoD’s operational concepts seek greater mobility, persistence, and agility for our forces. But, the energy logistics requirements of these forces limit our ability to realize these concepts. Fiscal. DoD seeks to reduce operating costs of the current force to procure new capabilities for the future. But, with increased energy consumption and increased price pressure due to growing global demand for energy, energy-associated operating costs are growing. 23

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Alternative Increase Readiness – Military Budgets
[ ] Savings from reduced fossil fuel consumption will be spent on improving readiness
U.S. Government Agency News, 2001 [May 3, Defense Unveils Plan to Reduce Electricity Demand in California, http://usgovinfo.about.com/blagencyrelease03.htm] This initiative augments ongoing energy conservation efforts within the Department that have resulted in a 23 percent decrease in energy consumed per square foot in DoD buildings nationwide since 1985. "The Services have been resolute in reducing their energy consumption over the years. These savings have been spent on readiness and quality of life, and improving the environment," said Rumsfeld. "This success story, however, makes the new power reduction initiative all the more difficult, since the less difficult solutions have been implemented already. The Services will need to be innovative, aggressive and tenacious to meet our goals for California." To achieve these goals, the Department will redirect $32 million in fiscal 2001 to implement the Services' demand reduction and power generation plans, and for investments such as lighting upgrades, updated controls, improvements to heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems, and installation of demand meters, to meet later goals. An additional $19 million will be added to the fiscal 2002 budget to achieve fully the initiative's long-term goals. "The Services have pulled out all stops in developing innovative strategies to meet these goals," said Ray DuBois, deputy under secretary of Defense for installations and environment. "Some measures include hiring specialists to develop regional peak load reduction strategies, such as integrated schedules for high power-consuming equipment, and installing thermal energy storage units to shift the cooling load to off-peak times." Non-fossil fuel generation plays an important role in the Services' plans including wind power, fuel cells and photovoltaic arrays. "One of the more innovative concepts involves buying power from the owner of an existing wind generation plant located adjacent to a military base who has been unable to sell power to the commercial grid economically because of high transmission and distribution charges," said DuBois. While implementing this initiative will cost DoD additional money up front, these investments in energy efficiency and demand reduction are sound business decisions. The more than $50 million DoD investment will leverage almost $290 million in private sector investment for infrastructure improvements and generation capability, and will ultimately yield annual energy cost savings in excess of $25 million. Future savings will pay back initial investments, be used for additional energy savings measures and housing and quality of life upgrades.

[ ] Reducing fossil fuel use is key to the DoD because high costs distort budgets and undermine resupply
Paul Dimotakis, The MITRE Corporation, 2006 [December 09, 2006, Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/fossil.pdf] JASON finds compelling reasons for the DoD to minimize fuel use, both overall and in individual vehicles and carriers. Fuel, even if it is currently a relatively small portion of the overall budget is accompanied by large multipliers – it takes fuel to deliver fuel – and is accompanied by high costs in both infrastructure (O&M) and, in the battlefield, in lives. Price uncertainties compound budget planning, and fuel costs may rise to represent a moresignificant factor for the DoD in the future, even though current projections may indicate otherwise. More importantly, the impacts of delivering fuel are evident in dictating tactics, operations costs, maintenance costs, and military capabilities.

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Solvency – Spillover
[ ] DoD procurement will set an example for all energy consumers
Waste News June 11, 2007 [DOD links environment, energy, mission Lexis] Executive Order 13423, signed by President Bush and published in the Federal Register in January, will help the Defense Department incorporate sustainability into its operations, Beehler said. The executive order incorporates goals for all federal agencies in the areas of energy efficiency, renewable energy, water conservation, green purchasing, pollution prevention, green building, fleet purchases and electronic stewardship. Ed Pinero, the federal environmental executive, told conference attendees that the executive order took goals outlined in five previous executive orders and two memoranda of understanding and consolidated them into one executive order. In addition, Executive Order 13423 updates outdated goals contained in some of the previous executive orders. Combining energy and environmental goals into one order should make it easier for federal employees to view them as part of an overall sustainability effort, Pinero said. ``I'm very sensitive to our environmental footprint and the economic footprint we have as the government,'' Pinero said. ``We're the single biggest purchaser of pretty much anything there is out there.'' And that gives the federal government the ability to influence availability and public awareness of green products, he said. ``The taxpayers want to see the government lead by example,'' Pinero said.

[

] Military procurement boosts renewable companies, making them profitable
Financial Times December 18, 2007 [US Navy funding bolsters Ocean Power Lexis] Further funding from the US Navy helped Ocean Power Technologies lift first-half revenues from Dollars 861,000 to Dollars 2.2m (Pounds 1.1m). The Aim-listed renewable energy company, which took a secondary listing on Nasdaq in May, reported operating losses up from Dollars 5.3m to Dollars 7.1m for the six months to October 31. The increase in the pre-tax loss to Dollars 4.3m (Dollars 4m) was held back by a jump in interest received from Dollars 723,000 to Dollars 2.8m following the raising of Dollars 90m at Dollars 20 a share on Nasdaq. The company has a long-standing deal with the US Navy for installing its buoys - which are designed to harness wave motion in order to generate electricity - off the naval base in Hawaii. In October it was awarded another Dollars 1.9m of naval funding. In addition, it received Dollars 500,000 from PNCG Power, the Oregon utility, for the installation of a 150kW buoy, which will be used to demonstrate the potential of the Pacific as an energy resource. The secondary fundraising was carried out partly to fund development of the more powerful buoys. During the half development spending rose Dollars 1m to Dollars 3.8m. Losses per share fell from 77 to 42 cents, reflecting the increased share capital.

[ ] Military funding of alternative energy can set a model for all of society – the internet and aviation empirically prove
The Washington Post, 2002 [May 2, 2002 Thursday, Biotech Companies See a Big New Customer at the Pentagon] The U.S. military became a high-tech fighting force over the years by integrating advances in science and math to track enemies, communicate in remote areas and build more powerful weapons. Now, it wants to tap biotechnology to make stronger materials, enhance soldiers' performance and develop alternative energy sources. More than 350 biotech entrepreneurs, government contractors and military officials met at a conference this week sponsored by the Washington-based Biotechnology Industry Organization and the Defense Department. Thirty-six biotech companies pitched potential products with such varied applications as wound healing, memory enhancement and environmental decontamination. The Defense Department has a record of developing leading-edge technologies that eventually reach consumers. Much of modern aviation and telecommunications systems can be traced to technology developed for military purposes. Perhaps the most successful example of this transfer is the Internet, which was developed as an internal communications network by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in the 1960s. "By solving unique military problems, it advanced the state of the science to new thresholds and spun off all sorts of commercial products and services that ultimately benefited the average American citizen and our economy," said Col. Jerry Warner, who heads the Defense Department's Office of Net Assessment.

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Solvency - Biofuels
[ ] Biofuels are a viable option to reduce the DOD’s dependence on fossil fuels
Paul Dimotakis, The MITRE Corporation, 2006 [December 09, 2006, Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/fossil.pdf] For comparison, the production of liquid fuels from non-fossil energy sources will now be discussed. Biomass is the most oftcited route for such purposes because, in principle, biomassderived fuels could be widely available. Additionally, biofuels could be, at least to some extent, sustainable and renewable. Of concern, therefore, is not only the relative cost of the biofuel with respect to the cost of crude-oil-based fuels, or FT-derived fuels, but the suitability of bio-derived fuels for the DoD mission and whether the production of such fuels stems from a renewable process, e.g., the fraction of sunlight energy stored in the final fuel product, as well as the result of a full account of all other energy and other inputs required to produce the biofuel.

[

] DoD use of biofuels would increase military security by decreasing dependency
Inside Defense 2006 [ September 15, http://www.military.com/features/ 0,15240,1135 99,00.html ,DoD Pushes Biobased Fuels] Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England is calling for increased use of biobased products by the Defense Department to help wean the U.S. military off its dependence on fossil fuels that come from unstable areas of the globe. “Many of these [biobased materials] are substitutes for products based on nonrenewable natural resources like oil and natural gas, so when we have substitutes, it supports the president's initiatives and . . . national interests to reduce our dependence on foreign sources of energy [and make] our nation more secure,” he said Sept. 12 at the Pentagon, during an event to bring manufacturers of biobased products and defense officials together. “Biobased products are . . . an essential part of our strategic approach to national security,” he added.

[

] Biofuels are cleaner because they are carbon neutral
Kristine Blackwell Lt Colonel USAF 2007 [June 15 The Department of Defense: Reducing Its Reliance on FossilBased Aviation Fuel – Issues for Congress http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34062.pdf.] Biodiesel is a synthetic fuel made from vegetable oils or animal fats. B20, the commonly used mix of 20% biodiesel and 80% petroleum-based diesel fuel–works in any diesel engine with few or no modifications. DOD began using biodiesel in 2000 and is now the nation's top purchaser of B20, buying over 15 million gallons annually. All military departments use B20 in a variety of non-tactical vehicles. Biofuel. Biofuels are a number of synthetic fuel products that use biological matter as a feedstock: ethanol, produced mainly from corn; cellulosic biofuel, ethanol made from cellulosic plants such as fast-growing trees, prairie grass, and agricultural waste; and biodiesel. Pros. Many cite as one of the advantages of biofuel that the feedstocks are renewable. Also, unlike synthetic fuel from coal and natural gas, biofuel can theoretically be “carbon neutral.” That is the carbon dioxide emitted during the burning of biofuel is offset by the carbon dioxide consumed during the feedstocks’ growth. However, current production methods involve the use of some carbon emitting sources, which detracts from the claim of carbon neutrality.

[

] DoD use of biofuels would increase military security
Military.com 2006 [DoD Pushes Biobased Fuels September 15, http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,113599,00.html Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England is calling for increased use of biobased products by the Defense Department to help wean the U.S. military off its dependence on fossil fuels that come from unstable areas of the globe. “Many of these [biobased materials] are substitutes for products based on nonrenewable natural resources like oil and natural gas, so when we have substitutes, it supports the president's initiatives and . . . national interests to reduce our dependence on foreign sources of energy [and make] our nation more secure,” he said Sept. 12 at the Pentagon, during an event to bring manufacturers of biobased products and defense officials together. “Biobased products are . . . an essential part of our strategic approach to national security,” he added. 26

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Solvency – Bases
[ ] Using renewables for military bases would decrease energy costs and replace fossil fuels
Felicia French, Army Environmental Policy Institute 2005 [ April 5, How the Army Can Be An Environmental Paragon Through Energy, http://www.aepi.army.mil/internet/how-army-can-be-energy-paragon.pdf] The DoD Instruction for Installation Energy Management Number 4170.11 dated October 13, 2004 directs the: Development of programs that shall result in facilities that are designed, operated, and maintained to achieve optimum performance and maximize energy efficiency in accordance with sustainable design principles. Since about 33 percent of energy used today is used to maintain the climate and lighting in buildings, constructing energy efficient (green or sustainable) buildings, would impact energy and cost (4: 27). Green or sustainable buildings use material, energy, water and land more efficiently and on average use 30 percent less energy than conventionally constructed buildings (18: 19). Many Army facilities, specifically housing areas and barracks, are aging and either in the process of being (or slated to be) renovated. This is an opportune time for the Army to simultaneously improve the quality of life for soldiers and their families and also incorporate its sustainability strategy by making these new facilities energy efficient and self-sustaining. Considering that operating cost over the lifetime of most buildings is significantly greater than the initial construction cost, the Army can save money over the long term by putting up front money into constructing the most energy self sustaining buildings in the first place. Another way to conserve energy is by reducing the size of buildings as the more spacious a building the more energy is required to light, heat, and cool it. Over the decades, the average American home has increased in size to double the average homes in Japan or Europe and over 25 times the size of the average African home (40: NP). Preexisting buildings can be retrofitted with energy efficient applications. Such as installing thermal paned windows with coatings to keep heat from escaping but allow light to enter and thereby drastically reduce the energy demand to heat and cool a building. Other efforts would be to replace incandescent lighting with more energy efficient compact fluorescent lighting, add reflective backings in the light housing to increase illumines of the bulbs, and add solar tubes or sky lights to lighten rooms naturally during daylight hours. Natural lighting and cleaner air contributes to a healthier working, living and learning environment (18: 19). Construct buildings for maximum use of passive and active solar energy by properly orienting them to the sun and insulating with recycled energy efficient material. Installing solar heating and solar energy devices on all new buildings will allow water to be heated directly by the sun and electricity provided through photovoltaic panels. Constructing energy self-sustaining facilities with a clean renewable energy micropower plant would eliminate the need for the installation to be connected to the local power grid. This will also decrease the energy bill and the threat of a blackout-whether the cause is due to nature or man. While we are in transition to distributed energy, we can send any excess energy to installation buildings that are not yet modified with micropower or send the excess energy to the community electric grid and receive credit on the electric bill.

[

] The military can utilize geothermal energy on its domestic bases
Felicia French, Army Environmental Policy Institute 2005 [ April 5, How the Army Can Be An Environmental Paragon Through Energy, http://www.aepi.army.mil/internet/how-army-can-be-energy-paragon.pdf] Geothermal Heat Pumps Geothermal heat pump systems are made of a ground heat exchanger, heat pump, and ductwork to deliver the air. The heat exchanger consists of pipes (a loop) buried under the ground close to a building. Water or water plus antifreeze flows through the heat exchanger pipes absorbing heat (in the winter) and giving up heat (in the summer) through the ground. This heated air (relative to the outside ambient air) from the heat exchanger is pumped into the indoor ductwork to heat buildings in the winter. In the summer the heat pump extracts the heated indoor air into the heat exchanger in the ground. This heated air can also serve to heat water at no extra cost. This process saves energy, money and does not create any air pollutants (26: NP). Geothermal heat pumps have great potential application for the Army. They can be used in regions where solar systems are not advantageous as in the Northwestern and Northeastern United States and they can also be used to supplement and backup solar or other energy systems. They can also be used under street and sidewalk surfaces to melt snow.

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They Say “Green Procurement now”
[ ] The DoD has a green procurement policy – it needs education and monitoring to implement it
Inside The Pentagon, 2006 [September 14, 2006, Pentagon Pushing 'Buy Biobased' Message To Reduce Dependency On Oil ebsco] DOD officials have submitted comments on implementation to the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council, which is crafting a rule on the matter, the source said. Once the implementation guidelines are announced, DOD and other agencies will have to establish biobased procurement preference programs, craft an agency-wide “promotion” campaign and submit an annual review to Congress on the effort’s progress, according to the law. Creating effective methods of monitoring purchases of biobased products for reporting purposes is an issue the Agriculture Department is tackling, Marvin Duncan, a senior agriculture economist with the department, told ITP last week. The Pentagon is interested in moving forward with increasing procurement of biobased products by educating officials on options in the market before the law is implemented, the defense source said. “Pending the finalization of [Agriculture Department] implementing guidance, DOD activities are encouraged to purchase and use biobased alternative products and to initiate projects [that] further demonstrate the value and utility of these materials in DOD applications,” Krieg wrote in the Aug. 17 memo.

[ ] Current energy policies won’t provide the security needed for changing military needs
Thomas Crowley Logistics Management Institute 2007 [april transforming the way dod looks at energy an approach to establishing an energy strategy http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_ 404_F T602T1 _Transformi ng%20the%20Way%20DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy _Final%20 Report.pdf.] The demands placed on the armed forces have changed significantly since their current capabilities were designed and fielded and the plans and concepts for their employment were developed. The security challenges of the 21st century require a force structure that is more expeditionary, agile, and responsive. Such a force structure will consume increasing amounts of energy if current trends continue. Building this future force structure requires the application of resources, yet budgets will be increasingly constrained by operational energy demands. We call the misalignments between energy policies and strategic objectives “disconnects,” and they exist along three lines: strategic, operational, and fiscal. In recognition of the political factors associated with increasing energy consumption and some al- ternative energy solutions, we also identified a fourth disconnect—environmental. Table 2-1 defines the disconnects, and the following subsections discuss them in more detail. Strategic Ability to shape the future security environment favorably to support our na- tional interests, principles, freedoms, and way of life. Requires reduced reli- ance on foreign energy resources. Operational Ability to counter projected threats, which entails increased operational mobil- ity, persistence, and agility. Requires developing efficient technologies that can support the asymmetric combat capability needed for future operations without increased fuel consumption or logistics and support limitations. Fiscal Ability to procure new capabilities, which requires efficient energy consump- tion. Inability to control increased energy costs from fuel and supporting infra- structure diverts resources that would otherwise be available to procure new capabilities. Environmental Ability to conduct DoD operations and activities in a manner that protects the environment while supporting national security objectives and maintaining operational readiness.

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They Say “Military will get Priority in a Crisis”
[ ] Even If the military won’t have their oil cut off, renewables are an important solution to fluctuating oil prices
Paul Dimotakis, The MITRE Corporation, 2006 [December 09, 2006, Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/fossil.pdf] In light of an increasing U.S. dependence on foreign oil, as well as rising fuel costs for the U.S. and the DoD, and implications with regard to national security and national defense, JASON was charged in 2006 by the DDR&E to assessing pathways to reduce DoD’s dependence on fossil fuels. The key conclusions of the study are that, barring unforeseen circumstances, availability concerns are not a decision driver in the reduction of DoD fossil-fuel use at present. However, the need to improve logistics requirements and military capabilities, and, secondarily, the need to reduce fuel costs, as well as providing a prudent hedge against a foggy future, especially in the Middle East and South America, argue for a reduction in fuel use, in general.

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They Say “Small Percentage”
[ ] Even if the DoD uses a small percentage of oil, reducing its use is still important to reduce military fuel costs and energy vulnerabilities
Paul Dimotakis, The MITRE Corporation, 2006 [December 09, 2006, Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/fossil.pdf] 6. Even though fuel is only a relatively small fraction of the total DoD budget, there are several compelling reasons to minimize DoD fuel use: a. Fuel costs represent a large fraction of the 40-50 year life-cycle costs of mobility aircraft and non-nuclear ships. Note that this is consistent with the life-cycle costs of commercial airliners. b. Fuel use is characterized by large multipliers and co-factors: at the simplest level, it takes fuel to deliver fuel. c. Fuel use imposes large logistical burdens, operational constraints and liabilities, and vulnerabilities: otherwise capable offensive forces can be countered by attacking more-vulnerable logistical-supply chains. Part of this is because of changes in military doctrine. In the past, we used to talk of the “front line”, because we used to talk of the line that was sweeping ahead, leaving relatively safe terrain behind. This is no longer true. The rear is now vulnerable, especially the fuel supply line. d. There are anticipated, and some already imposed, environmental regulations and constraints. Not least, because of the long life of many DoD systems, e. uncertainties about an unpredictable future make it advisable to decrease DoD fuel use to minimize exposure and vulnerability to potential unforeseen disruptions in world and domestic supply.

[

] Oil price instability hurts the DoD despite small percentages of consumption
Paul Dimotakis, The MITRE Corporation, 2006 [December 09, 2006, Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/fossil.pdf] Instability in the price of oil provides an important budgetary impact of fossil-fuel use on DoD. While present fuel costs represent a small part of the overall DoD budget, at current consumption rates, for every $10/bbl rise in price, DoD requires an additional $1.5B in its annual budget. There are, in general, two ways to deal with this issue. One is to reduce DoD demand, which is discussed below. The second is to attempt to beat the commercial market price at any one time incurring some market risk by entering into long-term contracts, or hedging against future prices of crude oil on the world market.

[ ] The DoD’s 1% of US consumption is an Enormous amount of energy relative to other Countries
Energy Bulletin. 2007[May 21 US military energy consumption- facts and figures http://www.energy bulletin.net/29925.html FACT 1: The DoD's total primary energy consumption in Fiscal Year 2006 was 1100 trillion Btu. It corresponds to only 1% of total energy consumption in USA. For those of you who think that this is not much then read the next sentence. Nigeria, with a population of more than 140 million, consumes as much energy as the U.S. military. The DoD per capita[2] energy consumption (524 trillion Btu) is 10 times more than per capita energy consumption in China, or 30 times more than that of Africa. Total final energy consumption (called site delivered energy by DoD) of the DoD was 844 trillion Btu in FY2006.

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They Say “Solvency Long Term”
[ ] The DoD should begin now, even if solvency is long term – it must act to set an example and to move toward a new energy Vision for the military
Thomas Crowley Logistics Management Institute 2007 [april transforming the way dod looks at energy an approach to establishing an energy strategy http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_ 404_F T602T1 _Transformi ng%20the%20Way%20DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy _Final%20 Report.pdf.] DoD energy transformation must begin in the near term, addressing current prac- tices and legacy forces, while investing for long-term changes that may radically alter future consumption patterns. We recommend a time-phased approach to re- duce our reliance on fossil and carbon-based fuels. This approach includes the following: Organizational and process changes that can be implemented immediately Engineered solutions, to improve the efficiency of current forces and those nearing acquisition Invention of new capabilities, employed in new operational concepts, for those forces yet to be developed. Applying this approach to the three focus areas will give DoD an opportunity to develop portfolios of solutions that can reduce energy use and dependence. The coordinating body can evaluate these portfolios to against the energy disconnects to identify optimal solutions across the services, broader department objectives, and U.S. government strategic objectives and energy efforts. The coordinating body can then focus technology development as required to achieve the desired solutions. For the energy transformation to be successful, DoD’s senior leaders must articu- late a clear vision for the change and must ensure—through their sustained com- mitment and active participation—that it becomes engrained in the organization’s ethos. We propose the following vision: DoD will be the nation’s leader in the effective use of energy, signifi- cantly reducing DoD’s dependence on traditional fuels and enhancing operational primacy through reduced logistics support requirements. Establishing a goal for mobility energy efficiency will provide near-term objec- tives in support of the vision, enhance operational effectiveness by reducing logis- tics support requirements, and free resources for recapitalization of the force. Our estimates show that implementing a 3 percent reduction per year until 2015 could result in savings of $43 billion by 2030 based on Energy Information Agency ref- erence case price projections, without including any multiplier effects. In view of the long period required to develop and populate the force with new concepts and capabilities, DoD should begin now to shape the force for an uncer- tain energy future.

[

] Incremental solutions to DoD energy security are Necessary for hegemony
Gregory Lengyel, 21st Century Defense Initiative of the Brookings Institution 2007 [Department of Defense Energy Strategy Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks August http://www.brookings.edu/~/media /Files/rc/papers/ 2007/08 defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf The Department of Defense can lead the way in transforming the way in which the United States consumes and produces energy. In the 1985 movie, Back to the Future, scientist Dr. Emmett Brown returns from the year 2015 with a 1980’s vintage vehicle modified with a “Mr. Fusion” device creating huge amounts of energy from organic material found in common household garbage. The year 2015 is only 8 years away and there is no evidence Mr. Fusion, or any other major scientific breakthrough making oil obsolete, is going to happen inside the next 30 years. Mr. Fusion represents the unlikely event of a game winning home run with bases loaded and a full count. In reality there are few home runs to reduce the United States’ addiction to foreign oil. Improving energy security must be done using a steady, incremental approach not tied to individual personalities, specific military leaders or partisan political administrations. Securing the energy future of the Department of Defense is a prerequisite to ensuring the United States remains the world’s preeminent global power.

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They Say “DoD can’t Change”
[ ] The DoD can change its culture – it already recognizes the need for change – alternatives can lead that change
Thomas Crowley Logistics Management Institute 2007 [april transforming the way dod looks at energy an approach to establishing an energy strategy http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_ 404_F T602T1 _Transformi ng%20the%20Way%20DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy _Final%20 Report.pdf.] In this environment of uncertainty about the availability of traditional fuel sources at a reasonable cost, DoD is facing increasing energy demand and support re- quirements that it must meet if it is to achieve its broader strategic goals— notably, establishment of a more mobile and agile force. However, recent techno- logical advances in energy efficiency and alternative energy technologies offer a unique opportunity for DoD to make progress toward reconciling its strategic goals with its energy requirements through reduced consumption of fuel— especially foreign fuel. To capitalize on this opportunity, DoD needs to imple- ment an energy strategy that encompasses the development of innovative new concepts and capabilities to reduce energy dependence while maintaining or increasing overall warfighting effectiveness. Recognizing that DoD must change how it views, values, and uses energy—a transformation that will challenge some of the department’s most deeply held as- sumptions, interests, and processes—the Office of Force Transformation and Re- sources, within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Policy, asked LMI to develop an approach to establishing a DoD energy strategy. Spe- cifically, it asked LMI to develop a process for identifying, evaluating, and im- plementing new energy-saving and -replacement technologies and techniques and to identify possible energy governance structures that would enable DoD to gain a system view of energy consumption, support requirements, efficiency, and costs.

[

] Leadership is necessary to change the energy culture of the DoD
Gregory Lengyel, 21st Century Defense Initiative of the Brookings Institution 2007 [Department of Defense Energy Strategy Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks August http://www.brookings.edu/~/media /Files/rc/papers/ 2007/08 defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf Leadership and Culture Change “Leadership is about vision, inspiration, values, and culture. Management is about systems, processes, resources, and policies. Organizational structure can, by itself, preclude success, it cannot, by itself, ensure success.”2 True culture change of any large organization must start at the top. Edgar H. Schein is Sloan Fellows Professor of Management Emeritus and a senior lecturer at the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In his book, Organizational Culture and Leadership, he tackles the complex question of how an existing culture can be changed – one of the toughest challenges of leadership. According to Schein, as an organization matures, it develops a positive ideology and a set of myths about how it operates. The organization continues to operate by the shared tacit assumptions that have worked in practice, “and it is not unlikely that the espoused theories, the announced values of the organization come to be, to varying degrees, out of line with the actual assumptions that govern daily practice.”3 In the case of DOD energy use, this assumption would be the assumption that energy is cheap, plentiful, and for someone else to worry about. Where these differences exist, scandal and myth explosion become relevant as mechanisms of culture change. Left to themselves, change will not occur “until the consequences of the actual operating assumptions create a public and visible scandal that cannot be hidden, avoided, or denied.”4 Recent examples include changes in NASA’s safety culture following the Challenger and Columbia disasters or the Army’s recent health care shakeup following the exposure of substandard administrative handling of wounded soldiers and conditions at certain Walter Reed Army Medical Center facilities. The DOD cannot afford to wait for an energy related scandal before initiating change. Schein proposes that leaders can systematically set out to change how a large, mature organization operates recognizing such change may involve varying degrees of culture change. In short, it involves unlearning old behaviors and relearning new behaviors, and cannot be done unless some sense of threat, crisis, or dissatisfaction is present to create the motivation to start the process of unlearning and relearning.5 “The change goal must be defined concretely in terms of the specific problem you are trying to fix, not as a ‘culture change’…Culture change is always transformative change that requires a period of unlearning that is psychologically painful.”6

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They Say “Alternate Causalities”
[ ] DoD incentives for Alternative energies are necessary to solve our military’s vulnerability to energy shocks – alternate causalities are not a reason to reject the plan because incremental solutions are critical
Gregory Lengyel, 21st Century Defense Initiative of the Brookings Institution 2007 [Department of Defense Energy Strategy Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks August http://www.brookings.edu/~/media /Files/rc/papers/ 2007/08 defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf In the Foreword of Amory Lovins’ book, Winning the Oil Endgame, former Secretary of State George P. Shultz uses a baseball analogy to describe how the US needs to rely on a steady, incremental approach to move forward on reducing the United States’ addiction to foreign oil and securing the energy future. The solution for the Department of Defense is no different. Energy Strategy Although there are many intelligent energy experts residing within the Department of Defense and many outstanding efforts underway contributing to improve energy security, the DOD does not currently have a permanent organizational focal point or advocate for energy issues or a written long-term Energy Strategy. The DOD needs both - an organizational structure to serve as the focal point for energy issues and an Energy Strategy that: • Improves National Security by decreasing US dependence on foreign oil • Ensures access to critical energy requirements • Maintains or improves combat capability • Promotes Research for future energy security • Is fiscally responsible to the American tax payer • Protects the environment Decreasing US dependence on foreign oil in a meaningful way can only be done by looking at the wide array of ways the DOD can consume less petroleum based fuel through efficiencies, smarter processes, and diversification of fuel sources to include alternatives other than petroleum. Domestically controlled production of alternative fuels will also help assure access to critical energy requirements. Additionally, the DOD must ensure resiliency of installation electricity supply through increased on-site renewable energy production, reduced dependence on the commercial electric grid, and the capability to operate at 100% capacity in the event of a commercial grid blackout. Efficiency effects will improve combat capability and lengthen the “tether of fuel.” Reduced energy costs for logistics requirements will allow assets and funds to be available for combat needs. Lastly, reduced consumption and increased alternative and renewable energy production will help preserve the environment through reduced carbon emissions and more efficient use of natural resources.

[

] Incremental solutions to DoD energy security are Necessary for hegemony
Gregory Lengyel, 21st Century Defense Initiative of the Brookings Institution 2007 [Department of Defense Energy Strategy Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks August http://www.brookings.edu/~/media /Files/rc/papers/ 2007/08 defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf The Department of Defense can lead the way in transforming the way in which the United States consumes and produces energy. In the 1985 movie, Back to the Future, scientist Dr. Emmett Brown returns from the year 2015 with a 1980’s vintage vehicle modified with a “Mr. Fusion” device creating huge amounts of energy from organic material found in common household garbage. The year 2015 is only 8 years away and there is no evidence Mr. Fusion, or any other major scientific breakthrough making oil obsolete, is going to happen inside the next 30 years. Mr. Fusion represents the unlikely event of a game winning home run with bases loaded and a full count. In reality there are few home runs to reduce the United States’ addiction to foreign oil. Improving energy security must be done using a steady, incremental approach not tied to individual personalities, specific military leaders or partisan political administrations. Securing the energy future of the Department of Defense is a prerequisite to ensuring the United States remains the world’s preeminent global power.

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****NEGATIVE****

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Topicality – 1NC
A. Definition – Incentives must be voluntary, not mandatory.
Kernerman English Multilingual Dictionary 2006 [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/incentive incentive [inˈsentiv] noun something that encourages etc

B. Violation – the Plan Fiats that the Military buys renewables – it doesn’t give them a voluntary incentive to. There is a contextual difference between mandatory regulations and voluntary incentives
Sam Schoofs, Calvin College, 2004,[ 6 August 2004 A federal Renewable Portfolio Standard: Policy Analysis and Proposal, http://www.wise-intern.org/ journal/2004/WISE2004-SamSchoofsFinalPaper.pdf.] D. Renewable Energy Policy Overview There are two main categories of renewable energy policies. The first category gives some financial incentives to encourage renewable energy that includes tax incentives, grants, loans, rebates, and production incentives [13]. Tax incentives cover personal, sales, property, and corporate taxes and they help to reduce the investment costs and to reward investors for their support of renewable energy sources [12], [13]. As an example, 24 states currently have some form of grant program in place that ranges from as small as $500 up to $1,000,000 [13]. The second category of renewable energy policies is called rules and regulations, which mandate a certain action from an obligated entity. Included within this category are renewable portfolio standards, equipment certification, solar/wind access laws, and green power purchasing/aggregation polices [13]. As an example, equipment certification allows the states to regulate the performance criteria that equipment is required to meet in order to be eligible for financial incentives [12]. Seven states currently have equipment certification programs in place

C. Superior Interpretation – 1. Precision – our evidence draws a clear distinction between regulations and incentives. Precision is critical to all other standards because without precision, you would never know where to draw the limits 2. Ground – The affirmative captures core negative ground – the mandatory counterplan, and artificially improves plan solvency D. Topicality is a jurisdictional voting issue to preserve clash and education

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Inherency – 1NC
1. No inherency – the military and the Executive are already emphasizing green procurement by the DoD
Inside The Pentagon, 2006 [September 14, 2006, Pentagon Pushing 'Buy Biobased' Message To Reduce Dependency On Oil ebsco] Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England is calling for increased use of biobased products by the Defense Department to help wean the U.S. military off its dependence on fossil fuels that come from unstable areas of the globe. “Many of these [biobased materials] are substitutes for products based on nonrenewable natural resources like oil and natural gas, so when we have substitutes, it supports the president’s initiatives and . . . national interests to reduce our dependence on foreign sources of energy [and make] our nation more secure,” he said Sept. 12 at the Pentagon, during an event to bring manufacturers of biobased products and defense officials together. “Biobased products are . . . an essential part of our strategic approach to national security,” he added. In his January State of the Union address, President Bush said the United States is “addicted to oil,” and called for “more reliable alternative energy sources.” The event this week follows on the heels of an Aug. 17 memo from Defense Department acquisition chief Kenneth Krieg that encourages DOD leaders to promote the purchase of biobased products, as the Pentagon prepares to implement a federal law that is expected to change the way the armed services buy items ranging from hand sanitizers to fuel additives. Biobased products utilize plant, animal and marine or forestry materials, according to DOD’s Green Procurement Program Strategy, a 2004 document that describes Pentagon policy on acquiring environmentally friendly products. Sens. Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Tom Harkin (D-IA), along with Rep. Marcy Kaptur (D-OH) and Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns, also spoke at the Pentagon event, dubbed “Biobased: Enhancing DOD’s Mission, Protecting the Environment.”

2. High energy prices have driven U.S. military to use less fossil fuels
Wall Street Abstracts January 9, 2007 [MILITARY SEEKS OIL SAVINGS Lexis] Surging energy prices and volatility in oil-producing regions drive US military's efforts to curb its use of oil and other fuels through conservation, increased fuel efficiency and greater use of alternative energy; Pentagon plans to spend more than $2 billion over next five years on energy initiatives; military is estimated to have spent $13 billion on fuel for year ending Sept 30; graphs (M)

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Extend – DoD Green Procurement Increasing Now
[ ] No inherency – Federal regulations already require green purchasing
The Defense Logistics Agency 2007 [ July, http://www.p2sustainabilitylibrary .mil/issues/ emerge jul2007/index.html, Green Purchasing] "Green Purchasing" or "Green Procurement" is now a major buzzword in the Federal Government. However, Green Purchasing is not a new concept. Requirements for Green Purchasing have been integrated into Federal regulations and Executive Orders since 1976 with the goal of integrating environmental considerations into all stages of the Federal purchasing process. Environmental requirements in these statutes impact much more than just "Environmental Operations," many of them direct Federal agencies to incorporate environmental considerations into decisions of personnel who define requirements, place orders, make purchases, or contract for products and services in their daily operations. The August 2004 Memorandum for the Establishment of the Department of Defense (DoD) Green Procurement Program (GPP) stipulates that the DoD goal is to achieve 100 percent compliance with mandatory Federal Green Purchasing Programs (GPP) in all acquisition transactions, from major systems programs to individual unit supply and service requisitions. The Memorandum states that the responsibility for implementing DoD's GPP is not the responsibility of any single organization or operation, but it is the responsibility of every person involved in the procurement process to ensure DoD complies fully with all Federal procurement preference requirements. To improve the implementation of green purchasing and other "Greening the Government" initiatives, Executive Order (EO) 13423: Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management, was issued in January 2007. Green purchasing is a major aspect of this EO and it mandates specific green purchasing requirements as part of the important sustainable environmental practices that are, and will be, required for all Federal Agencies.

[ ] Current DoD policy has reduced consumption and set up the infrastructure for increases in alternative energy
Gregory Lengyel, 21st Century Defense Initiative of the Brookings Institution 2007 [Department of Defense Energy Strategy Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks August http://www.brookings.edu/~/media /Files/rc/papers/ 2007/08 defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf The good news that is most of the energy expertise already exists in various functional areas of OSD and the Services, and parts of a comprehensive Energy Strategy are already in place. The Air Force recently published an Energy Strategy, focused on optimizing energy use, reducing demand, and expanding supply options. These issues will be targeted primarily through initiatives in aviation, and infrastructure and vehicles.23 The DOD already has an outstanding installations and facility energy management program led by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment that in many ways is a model for the federal government. Facility Energy Management Policy Statement: The Department of Defense (DOD) occupies over 620,000 buildings and structures worth $600 billion comprising more than 400 installations on 25 million acres in the United States and spent over $3.5 billion on facility energy consumption in Fiscal Year (FY) 2006. DOD is the largest single energy consumer in the Nation representing approximately 78% of the federal sector, and a significant (and sometimes the largest) energy user in many local metropolitan areas. Conserving energy and investing in energy reduction measures makes good business sense and allows limited resources to be applied to readiness and modernization. The Department has already reduced its facility energy consumption significantly; by FY 2005 the Department had already achieved a reduction in energy consumption by 28.3 percent as compared to a FY 1985 baseline. Due to the Energy Policy Act of 2005 in FY 2006 the baseline was reset to FY 2003. DOD achieved a 5.5% reduction in goal facilities for FY 2006. Despite this success, the Department must make greater strides in energy efficiency and consumption reduction in order to meet the Departmental vision of providing reliable and cost effective utility services to the Warfighter. Dramatic fluctuations in the cost of energy significantly impact already constrained operating budgets, providing even greater incentives to conserve and seek ways to lower energy consumption. These include investments in cost-effective renewable energy sources, energy efficient construction designs, and aggregating bargaining power among regions and Services to get better energy deals.24

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Hegemony Bad
[ ] US hegemony is ill defined – it will continue to expand dangerously and entangle the US in foreign conflicts
Conry, 97 (Barbara, Foreign Policy Analyst at Cato Institute. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-267es.html) "Global leadership" has gained increasing prominence as a guiding principle for American foreign policy. Yet the concept itself remains largely unexamined. Although "leadership" sounds benign, today's proponents of global leadership envision a role for the United States that resembles that of a global hegemon--with the risks and costs hegemony entails. Global political and military leadership is inadequate, even dangerous, as a basis for policy. The vagueness of "leadership" allows policymakers to rationalize dramatically different initiatives and makes defining policy difficult. Taken to an extreme, global leadership implies U.S. interest in and responsibility for virtually anything, anywhere. Global leadership also entails immense costs and risks. Much of the $265 billion defense budget is spent to support U.S. aspirations to lead the world, not to defend the United States. There are also human costs. Moreover, it is an extremely risky policy that forces U.S. involvement in numerous situations unrelated to American national security.

[

] These entanglement wars risk nuclear conflict
Layne, 97 (Christopher, Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing” International Security, Summer) The insurance argument advanced by the strategy of preponderance’s advocates is also problematic. Great power war is rare because it is always an uncertain undertaking: war is to some extent its own deterrent. It is, however, an imperfect deterrent: great power wars do happen, and they will happen in the future. In a world where nuclear weapons exist the consequences of U.S. involvement could be enormous. The strategy of preponderance purports to insure the United States against the risk of war. If extended deterrence fails, however, the strategy actually ensures that America will be involved in war at its onset. As Californians know, there are some risks (earthquakes, for example) for which insurance is either prohibitively expensive or not available at any price because, although the probability of the event may be small, if it occurred the cost to the insurer would be catastrophic. Offshore balancing has the considerable advantage of giving the United States a high degree of strategic choice and, unlike the strategy of preponderance, a substantial measure of control over its fate.

[

] Interventions on behalf of the liberal order perpetuate endless war
Layne, 98 (Christopher, Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, World Policy Journal, “Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century?” Volume 15, Issue 2, Summer, Proquest) Indochina and Bosnia demonstrate how the strategy of preponderance expands America's frontiers of insecurity. The posited connection between security and economic interdependence requires the United States to impose order on, and control over, the international system. To do so, it must continually enlarge the geographic scope of its strategic responsibilities to maintain the security of its already established interests. As the political scientist Robert H. Johnson observes, this process becomes self-sustaining because each time the United States pushes its security interests outward, threats to the new security frontier will be apprehended: "Uncertainty leads to self-extension, which leads in turn to new
uncertainty and further self-extension." 16 Core and periphery are interdependent strategically; however, while the core remains constant, the turbulent frontier in the periphery is constantly expanding. One does not overstate in arguing that this expansion is potentially limitless. Former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski recently has suggested, for example, that NATO expansion is just the first step toward creating an American-dominated "Trans Eurasian Security System" [TESS], that ultimately will embrace Russia, China, Japan, India, and other countries--a security structure "that would span the entire [Eurasian] continent." 17 There is a suggestive parallel between late Victorian Britain and the United States today. The late-nineteenth-cenury British statesman Lord Rosebery, clearly

recognized that economic interdependence could lead to strategic overextension: Our commerce is so universal and so penetrating that scarcely any question can arise in any part of the world without involving British interests. This consideration, instead of widening, 39

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

rather circumscribes the field of our actions. For did we not strictly limit the principle of intervention we should always be simultaneously engaged in some forty wars. 18

Hegemony Bad
[ ] U.S. Unilateral preemption Threatens Global Security and Increases Global Terrorism
Pape, 2005 (Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, Summer, International Security LexisNexis) The Bush administration's rhetoric is not limited to Iraq, but seeks to legitimate preventive war as a "normal" tool of U.S. statecraft. Now that the United States has actually acted on the Bush preventive war strategy, other countries will have to include in their calculations the possibility that it may do so again. For other major powers, the main threat to their security stems not from the risk that the United States will eventually pose a direct threat to attack their homelands, but that the U.S. policy of preventive war is likely to unleash violence that the United States cannot fully control and that poses an indirect threat to their security. As a result, even though the United States means them no harm, other major

states must still contend with the spillover effects of U.S. unilateral uses of force. These indirect effects are especially pronounced for U.S. military adventures in the Middle East, which could stimulate a general rise in the level of global terrorism targeted at European and other major states. As the French foreign policy adviser Bruno Tertrais explains: "The implementation of the U.S. strategy [of preventive war] tends to favor, rather than reduce, the development of the principal threats to which it is addressed: terrorism and proliferation . . . . The Al Qaeda organization . . . has now reached the shores of Europe, as shown by the [terrorist attacks] in Turkey (December 2003) and Spain (March 2004). The campaign conducted by the United States has strengthened the Islamists' sense of being totally at war against the rest of the world."n44

[

] Extinction
Alexander, 2003---professor and director of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies (Yonah , Washington Times, 8/28) Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.

40

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Hegemony Bad
[ ] Even if their Hegemony Good args could be true, they assume pre-9/11 hegemony – currently, racist nationalism is corrupting US leadership and causing Imperialism
Lieven, 6 (Anatol, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment in the Global Policy Program, Demon in the Cellar, Carnegie, Prospect Magazine, March http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications /index.cfm?fa=vi ew&id=14

Because of a deep-rooted (and partly justified) belief in American exceptionalism, and the decline of the study of history, Americans are not used to studying their nationalism in a western historical context. It is important that they begin to do so. Nobody looking at the history of nationalist Europe in the century or so before 1945 would suggest that the US should follow such a path. In particular, American nationalism is beginning to conflict with any enlightened or even rational version of American imperialism: that is to say, with the interests of the US as world hegemon. A relatively benign version of indirect American imperial dominance is by no means unacceptable to many people round the world - both because they often have neighbours whom they fear more than America, and because
their leaders are increasingly integrated into a global capitalist elite whose values are largely defined by those of America. But American imperial power in the service of narrow American and Israeli nationalism is a very different matter, and an unstable base for hegemony. It involves power over the world without any responsibility for global problems and without any responsiveness to others' concerns. This is not a matter of sentimental or naive liberal humanism. The US, as unquestioned king of the international order, has a truly vital national and imperial interest in preserving and strengthening it with new rules and conventions. The us is in part simply an old European state which avoided the catastrophes that nationalism brought upon Europe in the 20th century. Its nationalism thus retains an intensity which Europeans have had kicked out of them by history. 72 per cent of Americans say they are "very proud" of their nationality, compared to 49 per cent of Britons, 39 per cent of Italians and just 20 per cent of the Dutch. But the dangers of unreflective

nationalist sentiments remain all too obvious. Nationalism thrives on irrational hatreds, and the portrayal of other nations or ethno-religious groups as irredeemably wicked and hostile. Yesterday this was true of the attitudes of many American
nationalists to the Soviet Union. Today it risks becoming the case with regard to the Arab and Muslim worlds, or to any country which defies American wishes. The run-up to the war in Iraq saw an astonishing explosion of chauvinism directed against France and Germany.

[

] This means they don’t get the turns, but it feeds our impacts
Francis Fukuyama, School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, 2006 (February 19, “After Neoconservatism,” The New York Times, online) More than any other group, it was the neoconservatives both inside and outside the Bush administration who pushed for democratizing Iraq and the broader Middle East. They are widely credited (or blamed) for being the decisive voices promoting regime change in Iraq, and yet it is their idealistic agenda that in the coming months and years will be the most directly threatened. Were the United States to retreat from the world stage, following a drawdown in Iraq, it would in my

view be a huge tragedy, because American power and influence have been critical to the maintenance of an open and increasingly democratic order around the world. The problem with neoconservatism's agenda lies not in its ends, which are as American as apple pie, but rather in the overmilitarized means by which it has sought to accomplish them. What American foreign policy needs is not a return to a narrow and cynical realism, but rather the formulation of a "realistic Wilsonianism" that better matches means to ends.

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Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Solvency – 1NC
1. No Spill Over - The DoD is not a key model for alternative energy – it is too small of a market and has different energy needs than the civilian sector
Paul Dimotakis, The MITRE Corporation, 2006 [December 09, 2006, Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/fossil.pdf] 2. The 2006 DoD fossil-fuel budget is, approximately, 2.5-3% of the national-defense budget, the range dependent on what is chosen as the total national-defense budget. Larger (percentage) fuel costs are borne by families and many businesses, for example, and fuel costs have only relatively recently become noticeable to the DoD. 3. At present, there is a large spread between oil-production cost and crude-oil prices. Many projections, however, including that of the U.S. Energy Information Agency, indicate that crude oil prices may well decrease to $40$50/barrel within the next few years, as production and refining capacity increases to match demand. 4. DoD is not a sufficiently large customer to drive the domestic market for demand and consumption of fossil fuel alternatives, or to drive fuel and transportation technology developments, in general. Barring externalities, e.g., subsidies, governmental and departmental directives, etc., non-fossil-derived fuels are not likely to play a significant role in the next 25 years. 5. DoD fuel consumption constraints and patterns of use do not align well with those of the commercial sector. Most commercial-sector fuel use, for example, is in ground transportation, with only 4% of domestic petroleum consumption used for aviation. In contrast, almost 60% of DoD fuel use is by the Air Force, with additional fuel used in DoD aviation if Naval aviation consumption is included. Options for refueling ships at sea are more limited (or nonexistent) compared to those for commercial vehicles in urban areas. Options for DoD use of electrical energy on ground vehicles are limited, since one can not expect to plug into the grid in hostile territory, for example, to refuel/recharge an electric vehicle. Furthermore, drive cycles for DoD ground vehicles differ significantly from EPA drive cycles that, as a consequence, provide poor standards for fuel consumption.

2. Small Percentages - Oil costs won’t substantially affect the military – they are too small of a percentage of overall DoD spending, and aviation fuel costs will decline
Paul Dimotakis, The MITRE Corporation, 2006 [December 09, 2006, Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/fossil.pdf]
B. DoD fuel costs DoD fuel costs have become visible only relatively recently. Even at present, they represent only 2.5-3% of the nationaldefense budget, the spread depending on what is chosen as the denominator for total national-defense costs. While uncertainties and the recent large increase in fuel costs present DoD budget planners with formidable challenges, representing a (much-larger) fraction of non-fixed (“discretionary”) spending, JASON must conclude that fuel costs, per se, while not negligible, cannot be regarded as a primary decision driver, at present. The largest fraction (~ 62%) of DoD fuel use is expended in CONUS. Continuous progress has been made by DoD in recent years to decrease energy and fuel use. However, because weapons systems have very long life-cycles, fuel represents a significant fraction of life-cycle costs for U.S. Air Force mobility carriers (~ 40%) and conventionally fueled Navy ships (~ 30%). JASON also notes that expected reductions in the U.S. Air Force tactical inventory (number and type of aircraft on active duty), as discussed on pages 76 and 77, will, perforce, decrease future consumption of aviation fuel, which represents the largest single DoD fuel-use component.

3. Long Time Frame - The military doesn’t face an oil crisis any time soon – there is time for renewables to evolve naturally
Sohbet Karbuz, Assoc of Mediterranean Energy Companies 2006 [July 13, Energy Bulletin, Pentagon and Peak Oil: A Military Literature Review, http://www.energybulletin.net/newswire.php?id=13199] Another Air Force Colonel, Richard Fullerton[9], concentrating on Peak Oil, argues that energy’s future in the Air Force will look much like its recent past: “For the foreseeable future, oil will continue to be a primary energy source.” He argues that Peak Oil doomers are wrong because according to the best estimates [referring to the EIA] we will reach peak by 2037. The world has still a lot of oil” His conclusion is: “Energy independence is a myth as long as we consume oil, and our fuel prices will remain inextricably tied to the global oil market….the transition to new energy sources will take a evolutionary (become economical) rather than a revolutionary path.” 42

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Solvency – 1NC
4. Alternate Causalities - Many things are necessary for DoD energy security – Alternatives are only one small part of it
Thomas Crowley Logistics Management Institute 2007 [april transforming the way dod looks at energy an approach to establishing an energy strategy http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_ 404_F T602T1 _Transformi ng%20the%20Way%20DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy _Final%20 Report.pdf.] From our research, we concluded that DoD has the opportunity to address the four disconnects by fundamentally changing how it views, values, and uses energy. Many actions are required to implement this transformation, but the highest-level requirements are straightforward: Incorporate energy considerations (energy use and energy logistics support requirements) in the department’s key corporate processes: strategic plan- ning, analytic agenda, joint concept and joint capability development, ac- quisition, and planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) Establish a corporate governance structure with policy and resource over- sight to focus the department’s energy efforts Apply a structured framework to address energy efficiency, including al- ternate energy sources, to the department’s greatest energy challenges— those areas consuming the most fuel, requiring the most logistics support, or having the most negative impact on the warrior. The following are some options for energy actions related to DoD’s corporate processes: Apply the energy-efficiency requirements of Executive Order 13423 (3 percent reduction per year, or 30 percent reduction by 2015 from 2003 baseline) to mobility forces Analyze current and projected energy and energy logistics required to support operational plans and capability-based planning and incorporate findings in other corporate processes Assess the role of information in reducing energy requirements through improved operational and logistics effectiveness and reduced in-theater personnel requirements Incorporate energy considerations (energy use and energy logistics support requirements) in all future concept development, capability development, and acquisition actions Make energy a top research and development priority Improve the incentives for investment in energy efficiency

5. Procurement Fails - No solvency DOD constantly violates procurement policies
Army Times, 2007 [January 18, DoD procurement laws routinely broken, IG says, http://www.armytimes.com/news/2007/01/dfnProcurement070118/] The U.S. military spends so much money hiring contractors that it must pay other agencies to help move the cash out the door, the acting Pentagon inspector general told senators Jan. 17. In the process, procurement laws are routinely violated, “price reasonableness,” competitive awards and contractor oversight are abandoned, and millions of dollars are wasted, IG Thomas Gimble told the Senate Armed Services subcommittee on readiness. The Pentagon spent $141 billion in 2005 to hire private companies to perform services for the U.S. military — everything from renting office space for counterintelligence personnel to buying armor for military vehicles. The number of contracts involved is so enormous the Pentagon pays to more than a half dozen other agencies to help spend its money. Four agencies alone — the General Services Administration, Interior Department, Treasury and NASA — awarded 54,022 Defense Department contracts in 2005 worth $5.4 billion. Audits of 352 of those contracts found them replete with violations, Gimble said. “Of 131 GSA purchases and 49 Department of Interior purchases reviewed, we found only one instance where a Defense Department organization documented that using a non-DoD agency to award the contract was in the best interest of the government,” he said.

6. Even if there is a supply cutoff, the military will have priority for fuel
Gregory Lengyel, 21st Century Defense Initiative of the Brookings Institution 2007 [Department of Defense Energy Strategy Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks August http://www.brookings.edu/~/media /Files/rc/papers/ 2007/08 defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf Additionally, in the event of a catastrophic shut down of world oil flow, our government will ensure that the DOD has priority access to domestic oil production and the 700-1000 million barrels of oil in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. However, scenarios of supply disruptions to DOD installations via the US oil and gas transmission pipeline system or to deployed operational forces via fuel logistics distribution networks are not completely far fetched. 43

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Extend – No Spillover
[ ] Military consumption is not enough to make alternatives viable economically
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report 2006 [Oct 5,Pentagon Striving To Find Fuel Alternatives, Conserve Energy ebsco Sega also pointed out that a recent test-flight of a B-52 Stratofortress, in which two of the bomber's eight engines used a fuel that was almost 50 percent synthetic, was a first for the Air Force. Young said one of the keys to developing a viable synthetic fuel program would be for that industry to build a commercial market. The Pentagon only accounts for 1 percent of U.S. energy consumption, he said. It's commercial consumption that will make synthetic fuel a truly viable option.

[ ] DoD procurement of renewables will hurt commercialization throughout society – the alternative technologies will be too specific to military needs which will divert attention from commercial demands
Virinder Singh, Renewable Energy Policy Project, 1998 [ Government Procurement To Expand PV Markets, http://www.repp.org/repp_pubs/pdf/pv4.pdf] C. Consider the Needs of the Private Market A good government procurement program for renewables should take into account the needs of the private market. The creation of a government market for renewables that bears no relationship to the private market eliminates the indirect, but potentially enormous economic development and environmental benefits of commercializing renewables in the private market. Too often policy efforts to create a government market have resulted in submarkets reflective of governments’ unique needs and procedures. For many PV firms, devoting substantial staff time to government contracts may detract significantly from efforts oriented to the larger private market.14 Emerging industries like PV cannot afford to maintain separate sales and maintenance staffs. Orienting these staffs to an insulated government purchasing program will hinder important marketing efforts in the private market. Making product developers choose to operate in either the public or the private market also defers the benefits which are known to accompany higher production levels.

[

] Although a large consumer, the DoD cannot drive the market
Thomas Crowley Logistics Management Institute 2007 [april transforming the way dod looks at energy an approach to establishing an energy strategy http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_ 404_F T602T1 _Transformi ng%20the%20Way%20DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy _Final%20 Report.pdf.] Although DoD is highly dependent on petroleum and is the largest single petroleum user, it cannot by itself, drive the market. However, because DoD’s operations (the capabilities, costs, and the strategy that define them) rely so heavily on the petroleum market, they are vulnerable to the price and supply fluctuations affecting the petroleum market. Examining the impact of the future energy environment on DoD, and the options available to react to this environment, requires an understanding of the DoD energy consumption profile (how and where is energy being consumed).

[

] The DOD is not a large enough consumer to drive the market
Kristine Blackwell Lt Colonel USAF 2007 [June 15 The Department of Defense: Reducing Its Reliance on FossilBased Aviation Fuel – Issues for Congress http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34062.pdf.] Finding #3: The Department of Defense uses less than 2% of the oil consumed in the United States and is therefore not a large enough consumer to drive the market for conventional or alternative fuels. JASON and others have suggested that finding substitutes for fossil fuels must be a national endeavor. According to DOD it uses roughly 340,000 barrels of oil a day whereas the daily consumption rate for the United States is approximately 21 million barrels. DOD agrees that it plays a significant role in testing, certification, and demonstrating the use of synthetic jet fuel but is not a large enough consumer to drive the market. 44

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Extend – Small Percentages
[ ] DoD oil consumption is too small to be vulnerable to supply disruptions – we could make it up with domestic sources
Paul Dimotakis, The MITRE Corporation, 2006 [December 09, 2006, Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/fossil.pdf] C. DoD fossil energy perspective 1. U.S. production and DoD consumption The figures on pages 10 and 14 indicate that the U.S. Government consumes 1.9% of the oil consumed by the rest of the country. Furthermore, the DoD accounts for 93% of the U.S. Government consumption. For reference, DoD consumed 0.36 Mbbl/day in FY05, or 133 Mbbl that year. DoD fuel use both in the continental U.S. (CONUS) and abroad (out of CONUS, or, OCONUS), as reported by the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC), is a relatively small fraction of the total domestic current crude-oil production rate (cf. figure on p. 12). The annual DoD crude oil consumption can be covered by the total annual production of two Gulf of Mexico oil platforms (Thunderhorse and Atlantis), or by a small fraction of California and Alaska production, at present. Thunderhorse is a platform that cost ~$3B, sized for a 0.25 Mbbl/day production, and which is presently producing, approximately, 90 Mbbl/year. If there were real supply issues for the DoD, the department could, in principle, purchase a Gulf oil platform for an assured supply for many years, at an amortized production cost of under $30/bbl, as is done by the large commercial oil production firms at present, even though that is hardly advisable. In this context, the total deep water Gulf of Mexico production is 1.5 Mbbl/day. Production from the North Slope of Alaska is, approximately, 1 Mbbl/day. Hence, total DoD needs could be provided from a portion of the production of just one of these regions of the U.S. Thus, even though 63% of US oil consumption is derived from imports, it does not follow that a domestic-supply supply shortage for DoD is inevitable. In fact, present-day DoD requirements are relatively modest when compared not only to the present national-consumption rate but also when compared with the present domestic-production rate.

[

] The DoD consumes a tiny fraction of total US energy consumption.
Gregory Lengyel, 21st Century Defense Initiative of the Brookings Institution 2007 [Department of Defense Energy Strategy Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks August http://www.brookings.edu/~/media /Files/rc/papers/ 2007/08 defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf Our Energy Problems Demand It is difficult to appreciate the scale in which energy is consumed on planet Earth. Current world consumption of oil averages 82.5 million barrels per day, which would fill 5,347 Olympic sized swimming pools.1 The United States consumes roughly 25% of that, or 20.7 million barrels per day,2 with the government consuming roughly 1.9%, and the DOD accounting for 93% of government use.3

45

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Extend – Long Time Frame
[ ] Fuel shortages will not affect the DOD in a negative way for decades
Paul Dimotakis, The MITRE Corporation, 2006 [December 09, 2006, Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/fossil.pdf] Some key findings and recommendations are summarized below. 1. Based on proven reserves, estimated resources, and the rate of discovery of new resources, no extended world-wide shortage of fossil-fuel production is reasonably expected over, approximately, the next 25 years. While the possibility of shortterm shortages of refined gasoline or diesel product exists, depending on domestic refining capacity relative to domestic petroleum demand, there is not a strong basis to anticipate sustained global shortages of crude oil in the next 25 year (or more) time frame. In addition, there is no basis to anticipate shortages in petroleum available to the DoD, especially considering that present DoD fuel consumption is less than 2% of the total U.S. domestic fuel consumption – a demand that can be met by only a few domestic supply sources, at present – even though likely decreases in domestic-oil production will make the future domestic-coverage margin smaller. This finding is premised on the assumption of no major upheavals in the world, in general, and in the major oil-producing nations and regions, and oil-transportation corridors, in particular, over the next 25-year period.

[

] Transitioning the military to alternative fuels will take decades
Energy Bulletin. 2007[May 21 US military energy consumption- facts and figures http://www.energy bulletin.net/29925.html Pentagon's this new environmentalism, however, is not shortsighted and does not much the realities. For instance, all Air Force's future aircrafts under procurement (F-22 Raptor, F-35 as well as new aerial refueling tanker KC-X etc) run on oil. They will remain in service at least until 2030. There can never be a petroleum free military until 2030. This may sound an exaggeration but just think of current fleet (of Navy, Air Force and Army), replacing it with petroleum-free one, all problems in logistics chain, and money required. The bad news is in 2030 we will be already in Post-Peak Oil era.

[

] There are at least 40 more years worth of oil reserves
Paul Dimotakis, The MITRE Corporation, 2006 [December 09, 2006, Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/fossil.pdf] The present situation is assessed with respect to known, socalled “proven”, reserves and resources of fossil energy, globally. As indicated in the left figure on page 4, the world has approximately 41 years of proven reserves at this time, if the 2005 consumption rate is maintained. Less, of course, is assured if consumption increases. The inference, however, should not be drawn that the world will run out of oil in 40 years, or so. The world increased its oil reserves from somewhat beyond 30 years to over 40 years (reserves-toproduction ratio), following the events in the early 1980s in the Middle East, in spite of substantial increases in total consumption.1 Oil producers will not invest to secure reserves on a time scale longer than ~40 years. The net present value of such an investment would be small compared to the (cost of) capital required to explore and prove such additional reserves. On the other hand, the data also indicate that present U.S. oil reserves, extracted at present production rates, will be depleted in the next 12 years. Whether this will be altered by new domestic discoveries during this period depends not only on whether they exist within the U.S., but also on whether the production cost differential between foreign oil sources and potential future U.S. resources warrants economic domestic production.

46

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Extend – Alternate Causalities
[ ] Changing military technology isn’t enough – the DoD needs to completely overhaul how it plans for energy security
Thomas Crowley Logistics Management Institute 2007 [april transforming the way dod looks at energy an approach to establishing an energy strategy http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_ 404_F T602T1 _Transformi ng%20the%20Way%20DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy _Final%20 Report.pdf.] Chapter 3 Assessing Energy Options The strategic, operational, fiscal, and environmental disconnects described in the preceding chapter illustrate the drawbacks of DoD’s current energy profile, but the disconnects alone do not point toward a solution. Our survey of the energy technology environment identified many technologies that could affect DoD’s energy dependence, but technology alone provides little investment insight. To focus a change in how DoD views, values, and uses energy, DoD must address the use of energy in specific applications as well as larger corporate issues. Arriv- ing at a solution requires identifying energy challenges; selecting viable techno- logical, organizational, and process options; and developing potential solution sets—the combinations of technologies and resources that best address the dis- connects, that will most benefit DoD, and that DoD can effectively implement.

[ ] Procuring more alternative energy alone won’t solve – the Military does adequately monitor its energy use
Waste News June 11, 2007 [DOD links environment, energy, mission Lexis] Alex Beehler, assistant deputy undersecretary of defense for the environment, echoed his boss' comments about integrating energy and environmental concerns into all facets of Defense Department operations. ``Basically, what I've observed is islands of excellence and innovation and really stepping forward,'' Beehler said. ``That is good. But, of course, what really needs to happen is the islands need to be brought together and form continents.'' In an effort to help measure energy use and conservation, the Defense Department has undertaken a project to install energy meters on individual structures at military installations - a feature that until recently was missing. ``If you don't know how much you are using of something, you certainly have very little appreciation of the value connected with it,'' Beehler said.

[ ] The plan is insufficient – lack of technology isn’t the problem – the military needs to change its values and data collection to implement alternatives
Kristine Blackwell Lt Colonel USAF 2007 [June 15 The Department of Defense: Reducing Its Reliance on FossilBased Aviation Fuel – Issues for Congress http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34062.pdf.] Finding #4: Operational and logistics wargaming involving fuel requirements are not cross-linked to the Service requirements development or acquisition program processes. The task force found that in DOD combat simulation exercises, each military service emphasized mission execution while adequate fuel supplies were considered a constant. DSB asserted that doing so left DOD unaware of the potential effects of fuel efficiency on combat operations and of the vulnerability of the fuel supply chain. Furthermore, with no model of efficient or inefficient fuel use, DOD could not analyze fuel related logistical requirements as part of the acquisition process. Finding #5: High payoff, fuel-efficient technologies are available now to improve warfighting effectiveness in current weapon systems through retrofit and in new systems acquisition. The task force found that there were existing technologies that could increase weapon systems’ fuel efficiency. However, without the tools to analyze the collective benefits of fuel efficiency to warfighting capability, the value of improvements could be misjudged and not fully appreciated.

47

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Extend – Procurement Fails
[ ] DOD contracts often violate Federal Acquisition Regulations
Army Times, 2007 [January 18, DoD procurement laws routinely broken, IG says, http://www.armytimes.com/news/2007/01/dfnProcurement070118/] For example, the Pentagon used the Interior Department to buy $592 million in goods and services and paid Interior more than $23 million in surcharges. But the purchases “could have been routinely handled by junior DoD contracting personnel” at no extra cost to the Pentagon, Gimble said. And “DoD often paid surcharges for GSA and the Interior Department to purchase low-cost military equipment or commercial items that could have been obtained from existing DoD contracts,” he said. Gimble said his office examined GSA purchases made without competitive bidding and found that nearly half of the time, those purchases violated Federal Acquisition Regulations. “GSA did not justify sole-source contracts,” he said. The problem was even more prevalent among sole-source Interior Department contracts, he said. And when the agencies took a stab at meeting the requirement for competition, “it was generally satisfied by obtaining a minimum of three bids by posting the solicitation on e-Buy,” Gimble said. EBuy is a GSA web site for soliciting price quotes. The list of other violations is long. Among them: • The Pentagon uses other federal agencies to “bank” or “park” money that it has not spent during a given fiscal year. The money should be returned to the Treasury because authority to spend it has expired, but receiving agencies, including GSA and Interior, spend it anyway, Gimble said. The Pentagon parked $1 billion to $2 billion at GSA and $400 million at Interior at the end of 2005, Gimble said. • The Army used the GSA to spend $44 million worth of operations and maintenance money — money intended to pay for the Iraq war, among other things — to build two two-story office buildings at Fort Belvoir, Va. When questioned, the Army argued that “construction did not occur,” even though “no building existed at the site prior to the contract,” Gimble said.

[ ] No solvency – military procurement rarely achieves its goals due to inefficiency and contractor failures
CongressDaily, 2006 [9/7/2006, Subcommittee Questions DOD Procurement Practices, MasterFILE Premier, Ebsco] Facing a steady escalation of costs for weapons and services, the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee today laced into an array of Pentagon officials with a familiar list of complaints about the "volatility" and apparent lack of control over the Defense Department's acquisition practices. With help from GAO Comptroller General David Walker, the panel lurched through a litany of examples of how the cost of fighting wars and developing new weapons has spiraled upward, while asking why there could be shortages of such items as armored vests when actual combat gets under way. Walker, who has been tilting with the Pentagon for years over its contracting policies, noted anew that "acquisition and contracting in the Department of Defense faces a number of systemic and longstanding challenges that have yet to be effectively addressed." At the same time, with a gentle knock at Congress, Walker acknowledged that it is not all the DOD's fault. Congress, the defense contracting industry, and the military services all contribute to the problem, he said. He recalled many instances of "the tendency [of contractors] to overpromise, then down the road, to fail to deliver [on the promises]," as well as low-balling on initial bids in order to get the job. Defense Appropriations Subcommittee ranking member John Murtha, D-Pa., expressed his "great concern over the problem of incremental funding. We [in Congress] put in money for a ship, for example, in the short-term, then in the long term we don't have enough money to pay for it." Walker sighed and said, "There have been frequent mismatches between wants, needs, affordability and sustainability" of weapons, along with "unrealistic and continually changing requirements" that add to the length and cost of development and testing programs. Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman C.W. (Bill) Young, R-Fla., admonished defense officials for lapses in their acquisition systems and said, "We want to save taxpayers as much as we can, while getting the needed resources to our war-fighters, with assets that are better than anybody else's."

48

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Biofuels Solvency Responses
[ ] Bio aviation fuels are not developed to operate correctly with the DOD’s needs
Kristine Blackwell Lt Colonel USAF 2007 [June 15 The Department of Defense: Reducing Its Reliance on FossilBased Aviation Fuel – Issues for Congress http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34062.pdf.] Cons. In its present state of technological development, the energy density of biofuel is too low to make it a suitable substitute for jet fuel. Ethanol’s energy density is approximately 25% lower than that of conventional aviation fuel and is therefore not suitable for jets’ turbine engines. Furthermore, ethanol cannot operate at the extreme temperatures–both high and low–at which military aviation fuel is needed to perform. However, in 2006, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) awarded a contract for the development of a synthetic fuel from “oil-rich crops produced by either agriculture or aquaculture (including but not limited to plants, algae, fungi, and bacteria) and which ultimately can be an affordable alternative to petroleum-derived JP-8”

49

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Bases Solvency Responses
[ ] Military bases are already increasing renewable energy use
Energy Bulletin. 2007[May 21 US military energy consumption- facts and figures http://www.energy bulletin.net/29925.html FACT 15: The Pentagon maybe does not care about the environment, but it's quietly leading the quest for renewable energy under the banner of finding alternatives to oil. The Navy is studying alternate propulsion systems as well as proposals for an all-nuclear Navy.[21] Nellis Air Force Bace (NV) awarded a contract on July 31, 2006 to build the world's largest photovoltaic array in the world. The array will be a minimum of 15 MW and provide approximately one third of the base's power needs. U.S. Nany is operating the largest wind/diesel hybrid plant in the world (guess where? Navy Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) the two largest Federal photovoltaic systems in the United States. Today, almost 9% of the electricity used by military facilities comes from renewable energy sources, and the Pentagon plans to raise that to 25% by 2025.

50

Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Political Capital Links
[ ] Plan will require political capital to overcome barriers to renewables
Virinder Singh, Renewable Energy Policy Project, 1998 [ Government Procurement To Expand PV Markets, http://www.repp.org/repp_pubs/pdf/pv4.pdf] E. Establish Solid Political Leadership The primacy of “least-cost” in the procurement culture is detrimental to PV and other renewable energy alternatives. Overcoming this barrier will require concerted leadership that clearly communicates to government purchasing agents that political leaders are willing to accept the higher price of renewable energy purchases. Overall, effective political leadership requires an explicit commitment to purchase renewable energy, as well as a comprehensive revision of the existing government procurement system to remove imbedded barriers (e.g., payback periods shorter than effective system life). Past experience with federal executive orders suggests that procedural barriers can prevail over the “bully pulpit” due to their longevity and routinization within the procurement system.16

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Michigan 2008 DoD Starter

Obama Good Links
[ ] Plan is a win for Bush – he supports expanding Green Procurement
Inside The Pentagon, 2006 [September 14, 2006, Pentagon Pushing 'Buy Biobased' Message To Reduce Dependency On Oil ebsco] Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England is calling for increased use of biobased products by the Defense Department to help wean the U.S. military off its dependence on fossil fuels that come from unstable areas of the globe. “Many of these [biobased materials] are substitutes for products based on nonrenewable natural resources like oil and natural gas, so when we have substitutes, it supports the president’s initiatives and . . . national interests to reduce our dependence on foreign sources of energy [and make] our nation more secure,” he said Sept. 12 at the Pentagon, during an event to bring manufacturers of biobased products and defense officials together. “Biobased products are . . . an essential part of our strategic approach to national security,” he added. In his January State of the Union address, President Bush said the United States is “addicted to oil,” and called for “more reliable alternative energy sources.” The event this week follows on the heels of an Aug. 17 memo from Defense Department acquisition chief Kenneth Krieg that encourages DOD leaders to promote the purchase of biobased products, as the Pentagon prepares to implement a federal law that is expected to change the way the armed services buy items ranging from hand sanitizers to fuel additives. Biobased products utilize plant, animal and marine or forestry materials, according to DOD’s Green Procurement Program Strategy, a 2004 document that describes Pentagon policy on acquiring environmentally friendly products. Sens. Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Tom Harkin (D-IA), along with Rep. Marcy Kaptur (D-OH) and Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns, also spoke at the Pentagon event, dubbed “Biobased: Enhancing DOD’s Mission, Protecting the Environment.”

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] Bush is pushing for compliance to and use of renewable energy mandates
Kristine Blackwell Lt Colonel USAF 2007 [June 15 The Department of Defense: Reducing Its Reliance on FossilBased Aviation Fuel – Issues for Congress http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34062.pdf.] DOD, like other federal agencies, has had to comply with a series of mandates to decrease energy use through efficiencies in facilities and increase the use of renewable forms of energy. President Bush signed the EnergyPolicy Act in August 2005, and issued Executive Order 13423 in January 2007 both of which update and generally make more stringent existing energy conservation measures for installations and non-tactical vehicles such as passenger sedans. For more information see CRS Report RL33302 Energy Policy Act of 2005: Summary and Analysis of Enacted Provisions, by Mark Holt et al. Prior to August 2005, there had been some sporadic attention given the topic of reducing fuel use in operational systems, but relatively little action was taken in the area. See U.S. Department of Defense, More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden: The Defense Science Board Task Force on Improving Fuel Efficiency of Weapons and Platforms. Washington, 2001. (January 2001, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acqusition, Technology, and Logistics).

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