Michigan ‘08 MILITARY AFF – MICHIGAN ‘08

military aff – michigan ‘08.................................1 =====1ac=====................................................5 1ac – military aff.................................................5 1ac – military aff.................................................6 1ac – military aff.................................................7 1ac – military aff.................................................8 1ac – military aff.................................................9 1ac – military aff...............................................10 1ac – military aff...............................................11 1ac – military aff...............................................12 1ac – military aff...............................................13 1ac – military aff...............................................14 1ac – military aff...............................................15 1ac – military aff...............................................16 1ac – military aff...............................................18 1ac – military aff...............................................19 1ac – military aff...............................................20 =====solvency=====......................................21 requirement key................................................21 solvency – requirement solves..........................22 solvency – incentives solve...............................23 solvency – incentives solve...............................24 solvency – effective technology........................25 solvency – effective technology........................26 ---modeling---...................................................27 modeling – USFG.............................................27 =====inherency / uniqueness=====...............28 ---about the plan---............................................28 DOD not doing enough.....................................28 SQ renewables insufficient...............................29 SQ fuel efficiency insufficient..........................30 military fossil fuel use high now.......................31 =====hegemony advantage=====..................32 ---general---.......................................................32 plan solves hegemony.......................................32 renewables boost hegemony.............................33 fossil fuel use undermines hegemony...............34 fossil fuel use undermines hegemony...............35 fossil fuel use undermines warfighting.............36 fossil fuel use undermines warfighting.............37 at: no tech available..........................................38 at: can develop tech later...................................39 ---costs---...........................................................40 renewables solve oil costs.................................40 at: retrofitting expensive...................................41 costs will rise.....................................................42 costs high..........................................................43 ---iraq---............................................................44 fossil fuel use undermines iraq effort................44 ---impacts---......................................................45 impact – global nuclear war..............................45 impact – global nuclear war..............................46 impact – global nuclear war..............................47

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hegemony sustainable.......................................48 intervention inevitable......................................49 at: balancing......................................................50 at: overstretch....................................................51 =====private sector spillover advantage=====52 plan solves economy.........................................52 plan causes spillover.........................................53 plan causes spillover.........................................54 plan causes spillover.........................................55 ---airlines---.......................................................57 2ac – airlines add-on.........................................57 2ac – airlines add-on.........................................58 plan spills over..................................................59 airlines key to economy....................................60 ---auto---............................................................62 2ac – auto add-on..............................................62 2ac – auto add-on..............................................63 efficiency key to auto sector.............................64 efficiency key to auto sector.............................65 efficiency key to auto sector.............................66 auto sector collapsing........................................67 ---trucking---.....................................................68 2ac – trucking add-on........................................68 military spillover solves trucking......................69 ---peak oil advantage---.....................................70 1ac – peak oil advantage...................................70 =====recapitalization advantage=====..........71 1ac – recapitalization advantage.......................71 1ac – recapitalization advantage.......................72 1ac – recapitalization advantage.......................73 1ac – recapitalization advantage.......................74 1ac – recapitalization advantage.......................75 1ac – recapitalization advantage.......................76 solvency – recapitalization................................77 costs prevent recapitalization............................78 ---air force---.....................................................79 fuel costs hurt air force.....................................79 recapitalization key...........................................80 at: aging takeouts..............................................81 ---f-22---............................................................82 ext – f-22 key to economy................................82 f-22 key to air power.........................................83 f-22 key to air power.........................................84 f-22 deters china................................................85 f-22 works / at: tech problems..........................86 at: air power resilient........................................87 at: 183 is enough...............................................88 at: jsf solves.......................................................89 at: f-15s solve....................................................90 at: we can just buy f-22s later...........................91 impact – north korea.........................................92 impact – prolif / terrorism.................................93 =====soft power advantage=====..................94 1ac – soft power advantage...............................94 1ac – soft power advantage...............................95 1ac – soft power advantage...............................96

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1ac – soft power advantage...............................97 plan solves – soft power....................................98 plan solves – soft power....................................99 plan solves – terror cooperation......................100 energy key.......................................................101 energy key.......................................................102 environment key..............................................103 military solves.................................................104 impact – terrorism...........................................105 impact – hegemony.........................................106 ---europe---......................................................107 renewables key................................................107 environment key..............................................108 impact – economy / hegemony.......................109 impact – bio-terror..........................................110 =====environmental leadership advantage=====......................................................................................112 2ac – enviro leadership add-on.......................112 plan solves enviro leadership..........................113 leadership spills over.......................................114 =====counterplans=====..............................115 ---cap and trade cp from packet---..................115 2ac – cap and trade cp.....................................115 2ac – cap and trade cp.....................................116 2ac – cap and trade cp.....................................117 2ac – cap and trade cp.....................................118 ext – cap hurts economy..................................119 at: economy da links to aff..............................120 ---mechanism counterplans---.........................121 at: exclude the requirement.............................121 requirement key – soft power.........................122 at: exempt something cp.................................123 ---fuel counterplans---.....................................124 fuel efficiency – expensive.............................124 2ac – ethanol counterplan...............................125 2ac – synfuel counterplan...............................126 ext – synfuel hurts environment......................127 =====disads=====........................................128 CMR – no link................................................128 2ac – DOD trade off disad..............................129 2ac – DOD trade off disad..............................130 2ac – DOD trade off disad..............................131 trade off – case turns disad..............................132 trade off – at: iraq / afghanistan get cut..........133 trade off – at: turns recapitalization................134 2ac – oil disad.................................................135 2ac – oil disad.................................................136 oil – no link.....................................................137 oil – no link to middle east..............................138 =====politics=====......................................139 ---plan popular---............................................139 plan bipartisan.................................................139 plan popular – green hawks............................140 ---plan unpopular---........................................141 plan partisan....................................................141 at: environmental lobby support.....................142 ---elections---..................................................143

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plan popular – ohio.........................................143 plan popular – nevada.....................................144 ---misc---.........................................................145 military spending unpopular...........................145 =====topicality=====...................................146 2ac – must affect substantial consumption.....146 plan affects a lot of consumption....................147

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=====1AC=====

1AC – MILITARY AFF CONTENTION ONE: HEGEMONY FIRST -- ENERGY COSTS ARE INCREASING BUT THE PENTAGON WILL NOT INTRODUCE RENEWABLE REQUIREMENTS ON MOBILITY FORCES.
Gregory J. Lengyel, Colonel, United States Air Force, “Department of Defense Energy Strategy: Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks,” Brookings Institute, August 2007 (http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/08defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf) The DOD’s Current Energy Strategy Despite these trends there is no existing formal Department of Defense Energy Strategy and no single individual or organization responsible for energy issues within the Department. The DOD Annual Energy Management Report for FY 2006 lists the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) as the DOD Senior Energy Official responsible for meeting the goals of Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) and Executive Order (EO) 13123, Greening the Government through Efficient Energy Management.22 However, this position has been vacant for several years and does not satisfy the need for a comprehensive Senior Energy Official for the Department. This is not to say the DOD is unconcerned with energy issues. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Services have recently conducted or sponsored numerous studies focusing on energy, many of which have been invaluable information sources for this paper: MITRE Corporation JASON Project, Reducing DOD Fossil Fuel Dependence (2006); Defense Science Board, More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden (2001), and soon to be released Energy Strategy (2006-2007); OSD Energy Security Integrated Product Team (2006); Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Technology Options for Improved Air Vehicle Fuel Efficiency (2006); Navy Research Advisory Council, Study on Future Fuels (2005); Army Corps of Engineers, Energy Trends and Their Implications for US Army Installations (2005); and Defense Advanced Research Projects, Petroleum-Free Military Workshop (2005), to name a few. Common recommendations include making fuel efficiency a more significant factor in determining new mobility platforms (e.g. miles per gallon for ground vehicles, nautical miles/pound (lb.) fuel/lb. payload for aircraft and ships) and creating incentives for energy efficiency throughout the DOD. However, none of the studies offered anything other than liquid hydrocarbons as the best fuel for DOD mobility platforms for at least the next 25 years. Impressive groups of energy experts have produced many of these studies, but they are all either Service specific or temporary in nature, meaning the group of experts dispersed after writing the study’s final report. The lack of a full-time energy advocate within the DOD leaves a void in follow-up actions to study recommendations, or creation of directive guidance on energy issues within the Department. The good news that is most of the energy expertise already exists in various functional areas of OSD and the Services, and parts of a comprehensive Energy Strategy are already in place. The Air Force recently published an Energy Strategy, focused on optimizing energy use, reducing demand, and expanding supply options. These issues will be targeted primarily through initiatives in aviation, and infrastructure and vehicles.23 The DOD already has an outstanding installations and facility energy management program led by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment that in many ways is a model for the federal government. Facility Energy Management Policy Statement: The Department of Defense (DOD) occupies over 620,000 buildings and structures worth $600 billion comprising more than 400 installations on 25 million acres in the United States and spent over $3.5 billion on facility energy consumption in Fiscal Year (FY) 2006. DOD is the largest single energy consumer in the Nation representing approximately 78% of the federal sector, and a significant (and sometimes the largest) energy user in many local metropolitan areas. Conserving energy and investing in energy reduction measures makes good business sense and allows limited resources to be applied to readiness and modernization. The Department has already reduced its facility energy consumption significantly; by FY 2005 the Department had already achieved a reduction in energy consumption by 28.3 percent as compared to a FY 1985 baseline. Due to the Energy Policy Act of 2005 in FY 2006 the baseline was reset to FY 2003. DOD achieved a 5.5% reduction in goal facilities for FY 2006. Despite this success, the Department must make greater strides in energy efficiency and consumption reduction in order to [Continues Next Page -- No Text Removed]

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meet the Departmental vision of providing reliable and cost effective utility services to the Warfighter. Dramatic fluctuations in the cost of energy significantly impact already constrained operating budgets, providing even greater incentives to conserve and seek ways to lower energy consumption. These include investments in cost-effective renewable energy sources, energy efficient construction designs, and aggregating bargaining power among regions and Services to get better energy deals.24 In November 2005, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), Mr. Phil Grone, published a memo to the Services and Directors of Defense Agencies to provide facility energy management goals consistent with current legislation, Executive Orders, and DOD direction. “The Department of Defense will strive to modernize infrastructure, increase utility and energy conservation and demand reduction, and improve energy flexibility, thereby saving taxpayer dollars and reducing emissions that contribute to air pollution and global climate change.”25 Applicable goals from Mr. Grone’s memo to the Services: • Greenhouse Gases (GHG) Reduction: Through life-cycle cost-effective measures, each Defense component shall reduce its greenhouse gas emissions attributed to facility energy use by 30% by 2010 (compared to 1990 levels). [Note: Kyoto Protocol GHG reduction goals for the United States was 7%] • Reduce Energy: Through lifecycle cost-effective measures, each Defense component shall reduce energy consumption per gross square foot of its facilities. o All facilities: Reduce consumption by 2 percent/year relative to 2003 baseline. o Facility Energy Audits: Conduct energy and water audits at 10% of facilities each year. • Renewable Energy Procurement: Each Defense component shall strive to expand the use of renewable energy within its facilities and in its activities by implementing renewable energy projects and by purchasing electricity from renewable sources. Renewable Goals (when life-cycle cost-effective): o 3% of their total electricity demand in FY 2007-2009 o 5% in FY 2010-2012 o 7.5% in 2013 o 25% by 2025 • Petroleum Use: Through life-cycle cost-effective measures, each Defense Component shall reduce the use of petroleum within its facilities. Components may accomplish this reduction by switching to a less GHG-intensive, non-petroleum energy source, such a natural gas or renewable energy sources; by eliminating unnecessary fuel use; or by other appropriate methods. The $3.5 billion the DOD spent on facilities and infrastructure energy does have an oversight structure in place. By contrast, the $10 billion spent on fuel, countless billions spent on force structure, fuel logistics and research and acquisition lacks such a structure. This must be corrected with a comprehensive strategy, oversight, and energy advocate in the department.

FUEL COSTS ARE ESCALATING -- MOBILITY FORCES ARE THE PROBLEM
Gregory J. Lengyel, Colonel, United States Air Force, “Department of Defense Energy Strategy: Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks,” Brookings Institute, August 2007 (http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/08defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf) Energy not come cheap. The DOD spent approximately $13.55 billion on energy as a commodity in FY 2006. Of that, DOD spent roughly $10 billion on mobility fuels and $3.5 billion on facilities and infrastructure. A $10 per barrel increase in the cost of fuel increases DOD operating costs by roughly $1.3 billion per year, which roughly equates to the entire 2007 procurement budget for the United States Marine Corps.10 Those numbers alone are staggering, and as illustrated in Figure 3, are clearly trending upward. The DOD bill for jet fuel in FY 2006 was $7.9 billion. This represents a 73% increase from the FY 2000 cost of $2.2 billion, even though consumption only rose 12%, largely attributable to the Global War on Terror. However, fuel costs for budgeting and resource planning have traditionally been based on the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) standard price, which does not reflect the cost of the fuel logistics system required to deliver fuel to the war fighter. The standard price of fuel represents only a fraction of the true cost.

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Michigan ‘08 1AC – MILITARY AFF THESE COSTS ARE UNSUSTAINABLE -- WILL UNRAVEL AMERICAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP
Michael T Klare, Professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, “An oil-addicted ex-superpower,” Asia Times Online, 5-10-2008 (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/JE10Dj05.html)
The fact is, America's wealth and power has long rested on the abundance of cheap petroleum. The United States was, for a long time, the world's leading producer of oil, supplying its own needs while generating a healthy surplus for export. Oil was the basis for the rise of the first giant multinational corporations in the US, notably John D Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company (now reconstituted as Exxon Mobil, the world's wealthiest publicly traded corporation). Abundant, exceedingly affordable petroleum was also responsible for the emergence of the American automotive and trucking industries, the flourishing of the domestic airline industry, the development of the petrochemical and plastics industries, the suburbanization of America, and the mechanization of its agriculture. Without cheap and abundant oil, the United States would never have experienced the historic economic expansion of the postWorld War II era. No less important was the role of abundant petroleum in fueling the global reach of US military power. For all the talk of America's growing reliance on computers, advanced sensors, and stealth technology to prevail in warfare, it has been oil above all that gave the US military its capacity to "project power" onto distant battlefields like Iraq and Afghanistan. Every Humvee, tank, helicopter, and jet fighter requires its daily ration of petroleum, without which America's technology-driven military would be forced to abandon the battlefield. No surprise, then, that the US
Department of Defense is the world's single-biggest consumer of petroleum, using more of it every day than the entire nation of Sweden. From the end of World War II through the height of the Cold War, the US claim to superpower status rested on a vast sea of oil. As long as most of our oil came from domestic sources and the price remained reasonably low, the American economy thrived and the annual cost of deploying vast armies abroad was relatively manageable. But that sea has been shrinking since the 1950s. Domestic oil production reached a peak in 1970 and has been in decline ever since - with a growing dependency on imported oil as the result. When it came to reliance on imports, the United States crossed the 50% threshold in 1998 and now has passed 65%. Though few fully realized it, this represented a significant erosion of sovereign independence even before the price of a barrel of crude soared above $110. By now, we are transferring such staggering sums yearly to foreign oil producers, who are using it to gobble up valuable American assets, that, whether we know it or not, we have essentially abandoned our claim to superpowerdom. According to the latest data from the US Department of Energy, the United States is importing 12-14 million barrels of oil per day. At a current price of about $115 per barrel, that's $1.5 billion per day, or $548 billion per year. This represents the single largest contribution to America's balance-of-payments deficit, and is a leading cause for the dollar's ongoing drop in value. If oil prices rise any higher - in response, perhaps, to a new crisis in the Middle East (as might be occasioned by US air strikes on Iran) - our annual import bill could quickly approach three-quarters of a trillion dollars or more per year. While our economy is being depleted of these funds, at a moment when credit is scarce and economic growth has screeched to a halt, the oil regimes on which we depend for our daily fix are depositing their mountains of accumulating petrodollars in "sovereign wealth funds" (SWFs) - state-controlled investment accounts that buy up prized foreign assets in order to secure non-oil-dependent sources of wealth. At present, these funds are already believed to hold in excess of several trillion dollars; the richest, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), alone holds $875 billion. The ADIA first made headlines in November 2007 when it acquired a $7.5 billion stake in Citigroup, America's largest bank holding company. The fund has also made substantial investments in Advanced Micro Systems, a major chip maker, and the Carlyle Group, the private equity giant. Another big SWF, the Kuwait Investment Authority, also acquired a multibillion-dollar stake in Citigroup, along with a $6.6 billion chunk of Merrill Lynch. And these are but the first of a series of major SWF moves that will be aimed at acquiring stakes in top American banks and corporations. The managers of these funds naturally insist that they have no intention of using their ownership of prime American properties to influence US policy. In time, however, a transfer of economic power of this magnitude cannot help but translate into a transfer of political power as well. Indeed, this prospect has already stirred deep misgivings in Congress. "In the short run, that they [the Middle Eastern SWFs] are investing here is good," Senator Evan Bayh (D-Indiana) recently observed. "But in the long run it is unsustainable. Our power and authority is eroding because of the amounts we are sending abroad for energy ..." No summer tax holiday for the Pentagon Foreign ownership of key nodes of our economy is only one sign of fading American

superpower status. Oil's impact on the military is another. Every day, the average GI in Iraq uses approximately 27 gallons of petroleum-based fuels. With some 160,000 American troops in Iraq, that amounts to 4.37 million gallons in daily oil usage, including gasoline for vans and light vehicles, diesel for trucks and armored vehicles, and aviation fuel for helicopters, drones, and fixed-wing aircraft. With US forces paying, as of late April, an average of $3.23 per gallon for these fuels, the Pentagon is already spending approximately $14 million per day on oil ($98 million per week, $5.1 billion per year) to stay in Iraq. Meanwhile, our Iraqi allies, who are expected to receive a windfall of $70 billion this year from
the rising price of their oil exports, charge their citizens $1.36 per gallon for gasoline. When questioned about why Iraqis are paying almost a third less for oil than American forces in their country, senior Iraqi government officials scoff at any suggestion of impropriety. "America has hardly even begun to repay its debt to Iraq," said Abdul Basit, the head of Iraq's Supreme Board of Audit, an independent body that oversees Iraqi governmental expenditures. "This is an immoral request because we didn't ask them to come to Iraq, and before they came in 2003 we didn't have all these needs." Needless to say, this is not exactly the way grateful clients are supposed to address superpower patrons. "It's totally unacceptable to me that we are spending tens of billions of dollars on rebuilding Iraq while they are putting tens of billions of dollars in banks around the world from oil revenues,"

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said Senator Carl Levin (D-Michigan), chairman of the Armed Services Committee. "It doesn't compute as far as I'm concerned." Certainly, however, our allies in the region, especially the Sunni kingdoms of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that presumably look to Washington to stabilize Iraq and curb the growing power of Shi'ite Iran, are willing to help the Pentagon out by supplying US troops with free or deeply-discounted petroleum. No such luck. Except for some partially subsidized oil supplied by Kuwait, all oil-producing US allies in the region charge us the market rate for petroleum. Take that as a striking reflection of how little credence even countries whose ruling elites have traditionally looked to the US for protection now attach to our supposed superpower status. Think of this as a strikingly clear-eyed assessment of American power. As far as they're concerned, we're now just another of those hopeless oil addicts driving a monster gas-guzzler up to the pump - and they're perfectly happy to collect our cash which they can then use to cherry-pick our prime assets. So expect no summer tax holidays for the Pentagon, not in the Middle East, anyway. Worse yet, the US military will need even more oil for the future wars on which the Pentagon is now doing the

planning. In this way, the US experience in Iraq has especially worrisome implications. Under the military "transformation" initiated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2001, the future US war machine will rely less on "boots on the ground" and ever more on technology. But technology entails an ever-greater requirement for oil, as the newer weapons sought by Rumsfeld (and now Secretary of Defense Robert Gates) all consume many times more fuel than those they will replace. To put this in perspective: The average GI in Iraq now uses about seven times as much oil per day as GIs did in the first Gulf War less than two decades ago. And every sign indicates that the same ratio of increase will apply to coming conflicts; that the daily cost of fighting will skyrocket; and that the Pentagon's capacity to shoulder multiple foreign military burdens will unravel. Thus are superpowers undone.

INDEPENDENTLY, OIL USE CREATES A HOST OF BATTLEFIELD PROBLEMS THAT UNDERMINE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS Carns and Schlesinger ‘08
(General Michael Carns, United States Air Force (Retired), Dr. James Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense, “More Fight – Less Fuel,” Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, February 2008 http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-02-ESTF.pdf)

The Task Force found that combat and combat related systems generally are inefficient in their use of fuel. This represents a major constraint on the operational effectiveness of U.S. forces and translates directly into poor endurance and persistence in the battlespace. Platforms are forced to use time transiting to fuel sources instead of residing on station, and more of them are needed to maintain a continuous presence. Improvements in the efficiency of platforms therefore would enable U.S. forces to increase their in-theater effectiveness by spending more time on station relative to transit, and by allocating fewer of their assets to sustain a given number at that station. Platform inefficiency affects operational effectiveness in other ways as well. Moving and protecting fuel through a battlespace requires significant resources. It constrains freedom of movement by combat forces, makes them more vulnerable to attack, and compels them to redirect assets from combat operations to protection of supply lines. Thus, the need to move and protect fuel detracts from combat effectiveness in two ways; by adding to sustainment costs and by diverting and endangering in-theater force capability. The payoff to DoD from reduced fuel demand in terms of mission effectiveness and human lives is probably greater than for any other energy user in the world. More efficient platforms would enhance range, persistence and endurance. They also would reduce the burden of owning, employing, operating and protecting the people and equipment needed to move and protect fuel from the point of commercial purchase to the point of use. An important implication is that increased energy efficiency of deployed equipment and systems will have a large multiplier effect. Not only will there be direct savings in fuel cost, but combat effectiveness will be increased and resources otherwise needed for resupply and protection redirected. Truck drivers and convoyprotectors can become combat soldiers, increasing combat capability while reducing vulnerabilities caused by extensive convoys. In short, more efficient platforms increase warfighting capability.

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American leadership is vital to preventing global nuclear conflicts in every region of the world Kagan, 07 - senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History”, 7/19, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/07/end_of_dreams_return_of_histor.html)
This is a good thing, and it should continue to be a primary goal of American foreign policy to perpetuate this relatively benign international configuration of power. The unipolar order with the United States as the predominant power is unavoidably riddled with flaws and contradictions. It inspires fears and jealousies. The United States is not immune to error, like all other nations, and because of its size and importance in the international system those errors are magnified and take on greater significance than the errors of less powerful nations. Compared to the ideal Kantian international order, in which all the world's powers would be peace-loving equals, conducting themselves wisely, prudently, and in strict obeisance to international law,

the unipolar system is both dangerous and unjust. Compared to any plausible alternative in the real world, however, it is relatively stable and less likely to produce a major war between great powers. It is also comparatively benevolent, from a liberal perspective, for it is more conducive to the principles of economic and political liberalism that Americans and many others value. American predominance does not stand in the way of progress toward a better world, therefore. It stands in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world. The choice is not between an American-dominated order and a world that looks like the European Union. The future international order will be shaped by those who have the power to shape it. The leaders of a post-American
world will not meet in Brussels but in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington. The return of great powers and great games If the world is marked by the persistence of unipolarity, it is nevertheless also being shaped by the reemergence of competitive national ambitions of the kind that have shaped human affairs from time immemorial. During the Cold War, this historical tendency of great powers to jostle with one another for status and influence as well as for wealth and power was largely suppressed by the two superpowers and their rigid bipolar order. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been powerful enough, and probably could never be powerful enough, to suppress by itself the normal ambitions of nations. This does not mean the world has returned to multipolarity, since none of the large powers is in range of competing with the superpower for global influence. Nevertheless, several large powers are now competing for regional predominance, both with the United States and with each other. National ambition drives China's foreign policy today, and although it is tempered by prudence and the desire to appear as unthreatening as possible to the rest of the world, the

Chinese are powerfully motivated to return their nation to what they regard as its traditional position as the preeminent power in East Asia. They do not share a European, postmodern view that power is passé; hence their now two-decades-long military buildup and
modernization. Like the Americans, they believe power, including military power, is a good thing to have and that it is better to have more of it than less. Perhaps more significant is the Chinese perception, also shared by Americans, that status and honor, and not just wealth and security, are important for a nation. Japan, meanwhile, which in the past could have been counted as an aspiring postmodern power -- with its pacifist constitution and low defense spending -- now appears embarked on a more traditional national course. Partly this is in reaction to the rising power of China and concerns about North Korea 's nuclear weapons. But it is also driven by Japan's own national ambition to be a leader in East Asia or at least not to play second fiddle or "little brother" to China. China and Japan are now in a competitive quest with each trying to augment its own status and power and to prevent the other 's rise to predominance, and this competition has a military and strategic as well as an economic and political component. Their competition is such that a nation like South Korea, with a long unhappy history as a pawn between the two powers, is once again worrying both about a "greater China" and about the return of Japanese nationalism. As Aaron Friedberg commented, the East Asian future looks more like Europe's past than its present. But it also looks like Asia's past. Russian foreign policy, too, looks more like something from the nineteenth century. It is being driven by a typical, and typically Russian, blend of national resentment and ambition. A postmodern Russia simply seeking integration into the new European order, the Russia of Andrei Kozyrev, would not be troubled by the eastward enlargement of the EU and NATO, would not insist on predominant influence over its "near abroad," and would not use its natural resources as means of gaining geopolitical leverage and enhancing Russia 's international status in an attempt to regain the lost glories of the Soviet empire and Peter the Great. But Russia, like China and Japan, is moved by more traditional great-power considerations, including the pursuit of those valuable if intangible national interests: honor and respect. Although Russian leaders complain about threats to their security from NATO and the United States, the Russian sense of insecurity has more to do with resentment and national identity than with plausible external military threats. 16 Russia's complaint today is not with this or that weapons system. It is the entire post-Cold War settlement of the 1990s that Russia resents and wants to revise. But that does not make insecurity less a factor in Russia 's relations with the world; indeed, it makes finding compromise with the Russians all the more difficult. One could add others to this list of great powers with traditional rather than postmodern aspirations. India 's regional ambitions are more muted, or are focused most intently

on Pakistan, but it is clearly engaged in competition with China for dominance in the Indian Ocean and sees itself, correctly, as an
emerging great power on the world scene. In the Middle East there is Iran, which mingles religious fervor with a historical sense of superiority and leadership in its region. 17 Its nuclear program is as much about the desire for regional hegemony as about defending Iranian territory from attack by the United States. Even the European Union, in its way, expresses a pan-European national ambition to play a significant role in the world, and it has become the vehicle for channeling German, French, and British ambitions in what Europeans regard as a safe supranational direction. Europeans seek honor and respect, too, but of a postmodern variety. The honor they seek is to occupy the moral high ground in the world, to exercise moral authority, to wield political and economic influence as an antidote to militarism, to be the keeper of the global conscience, and to be recognized and admired by others for playing this role. Islam is not a nation, but many Muslims express a kind of religious nationalism, and the leaders of radical Islam, including al Qaeda, do seek to establish a theocratic nation or confederation of nations that would encompass a wide swath of the Middle East and beyond. Like national movements elsewhere, Islamists have a yearning for respect, including self-respect, and a desire for honor. Their national identity has been molded in defiance against stronger and often oppressive outside powers, and also by memories of ancient superiority over those same powers. China had its "century of humiliation." Islamists have more than a century of humiliation to look back on, a humiliation of which Israel has become the living symbol, which is partly why even Muslims who are neither radical nor fundamentalist proffer their sympathy and even their support to violent extremists who can turn the tables on the dominant liberal West, and particularly on a dominant America which implanted and still feeds the Israeli cancer in their midst. Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its

is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally
position as the predominant global power, it

prefer their global place as "No. 1" and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system.

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Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying -- its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the
role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve

struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples
but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe 's stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could

step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American
predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that 's not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order,

Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China 's neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene -- even if it remained the world's most powerful nation -- could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of
of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world's great powers.

confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe -- if it adopted what some

call a strategy of "offshore balancing" -- this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, "offshore" role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays
in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more "even-handed" policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel 's aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the

Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn't change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region,
particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn 't changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to "normal" or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.

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Michigan ‘08 1AC – MILITARY AFF CONTENTION TWO: SPILLOVER Military investment in alternative energy spills over -- catalyzes a movement to commercial use Eggers, Director for combating terrorism at the National Security Council, Naval Commander serving on the Joint Staff, 2008
[Commander Jeffrey W, “The fuel gauge of national security,” Armed Forces Journal, May, http://www.afji.com/2008/05/3434573]
At first glance, the military’s slice of demand may not be the intuitive place to focus effort. The military’s use of oil constitutes about 2 percent of total U.S. oil consumption, or about the same as a major U.S. airline. And if there is one sector of consumption where we should gladly pay a premium for high-octane liquid fuel, it is our national security apparatus. So it is fair to argue that attention is best placed on the civilian side of usage, where 98 percent of demand lies. There are many near-term solutions that promise to make a dent in this 98 percent, on the demand and supply sides. Plug-in hybrids, sustainable bio-fuels, broad-based conservation efforts and general “greenness” are gaining considerable political traction. But none offers a long-term silver bullet, and each has limitations. In addition to pulling consumption toward “ready” technologies, work must be done in parallel to advance high-risk and transformative solutions. And one of the most successful models for doing so is the military wing of research and development. Focusing on the 2 percent of military consumption is important not only because it safeguards the flow, and mitigates risk, to the 98 percent. The exploration of new sources of energy for our military fighting machinery will directly sustain future defense readiness and buttress military power and, more significantly, will indirectly catalyze a revolution in civilian transportation technology and innovation. DUAL DEPENDENCIES Most transportation energy sources can be
divided into four basic groups (see table): those that convert chemical bonds into heat (carbon) or electricity (hydrogen) and those that convert mass into heat (nuclear) or electricity (solar). The first group has historically dominated locomotion requirements for reasons of stability of storage, ease of transport and low cost. And among the carbon fuels, we are nearly exclusively reliant on oil for transportation due to an unmatched energy density, even with abysmal efficiencies of 10 percent to 20 percent. For instance, fuel oil has roughly 24 thousand British Thermal Units (kBTU) per pound, whereas “good” coal and ethanol are half that, and wood has one quarter of oil’s rich density of energy. Yet isolated hydrogen, as a fuel, has roughly two to three times the energy density of oil. Nuclear fuel, accounting for the spent material created, has an “energy equivalence” of about 500,000 kBTU per pound. And if you could bottle sunlight, in the form of protons (which technically have no mass), it would have the equivalence of about 100 trillion kBTU per pound. So outside of the carbon grouping, oil is actually relatively heavy. But for most of the last century, it was cheap and plentiful, so like the rest of society, we built our military infrastructure, and many of the associated strategies, around oil. The Air Force’s B-2 bomber carries three to four times as much fuel, by weight, as it does bombs. A 2001 study by the Defense Science Board (DSB) concluded that fuel now constitutes 70 percent of the weight of moving our Army into battle. A CENTURY OF OIL-BASED TRANSPORTATION Oil’s grip on our military is exemplified by the simple fact that we use it for all applications, even where there is a wide divergence of engineering requirements and alternatives are available. And this has been the case for nearly 80 years. The Navy’s most modern warship, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, is powered by the same basic engine as Air Force One and the Air Force’s C-5 transport. A popular photo in Army circles is an M1 Abrams tank firing its gun in midair after “jumping” a hill at high speed. In pursuit of weight savings and acceleration, the Pentagon revolutionized the M1 to be the only tank in the world powered by a gas turbine jet engine, yet our flying main battle tank has such poor gas mileage that it has to be trucked to the front lines. Unlike a normal diesel, these engines burn nearly the same amount of fuel at idle as they do at 30 miles per hour, thus their fuel consumption is generally measured by gallons per hour instead of miles per gallon, or gallons per mile in the case of the M1. This thirst for fuel is sometimes cited as the reason that the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division raced into Iraq in 2003 — to make optimal use of the precious fuel they were carrying. In pursuit of performance, our modern fighter aircraft burn fuel at such a high rate and have such a short endurance that they would be useless without a capability for aerial refueling. In February, the Pentagon announced a $40 billion contract, one of the largest in history, with Northrop Grumman and EADS for the next generation of airborne tankers, as aerial refueling is now another indispensable element in our oil supply lines. The airborne tankers, like most aircraft, are designed so they can take off fully loaded, but they must be significantly lighter to land. So when a tanker does not refuel enough fighters during a mission, it must adjust weight (dump fuel) prior to landing. This design is so pervasive that most modern aircraft are built with a capability for fuel dumping. Even modern warships burn oil at such high rates that they are dependent on frequent refueling, either in port or while underway by the trusty oiler. Because our warships are essentially tethered to a port or an oiler, a good captain pays more attention to the gas gauge than the armory levels. A military that operates normally by throwing fuel away and designs systems for speed over fuel efficiency reveals an infrastructure and a strategy built around oil as if it were a fundamental constant. Yet the military is realizing we can no longer take this lifeblood for granted, particularly when there are lives are on the line to feed our oil hungry services. A 2006 memo from U.S. leadership in Iraq to the Pentagon requested that alternative sources of energy be identified to power the American presence in Iraq. The oil expenditures in Iraq, per soldier, are 16 times what they were in World War II. The entire U.S. footprint in Iraq and Afghanistan is essentially powered by diesel-fueled generators, requiring 9 gallons of fuel per soldier per day. The war in Iraq alone requires 40,000 barrels of oil per day. The coalition bases rely on a constant supply of fuel trucked in by military convoys which are vulnerable to attacks given the long hours on the road. The memo argued that without assistance, U.S. forces would “remain unnecessarily exposed” and would “continue to accrue preventable ... serious and grave casualties.” Attention to these vulnerabilities has been mounting since before the invasion of Iraq. The 2001 DSB report found that “although significant war fighting, logistics and cost benefits occur when weapons systems are made more fuel-efficient, these benefits are not valued or emphasized.” The report made key recommendations to re-emphasize the importance of fuel efficiency that were not fully implemented by the Pentagon. With fuel costs up 47 percent in the last year, memos requesting alternative energy from Iraq and a persistent beating of the national security drum, there are signs that the calls for reform are becoming heard. A February 2008 DSB report on energy strategy applauds several Pentagon initiatives in the last two years to bring energy usage into the mainstream and shed the cultural dogma, as stated by the chair of the 2001 report and a former head of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, that “fuel efficiency is for sissies.” Principally, the most recent DSB report finds that the Pentagon has taken steps, not yet fully institutionalized, to make fuel efficiency a “key performance parameter” and to establish a “fully burdened cost of fuel” for acquisition programs. In March, the Air Force hosted a major conference on Energy Security for the 21st Century, illuminating many of the dark corners of cutting-edge technologies and research. These are encouraging steps forward. It is now time to convert this awareness to action. OIL’S ASCENDANCY AND PETRO-IMPERIALISM Oil’s rise in status

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to become a strategic military commodity occurred when the British Royal Navy made the risky and unlikely shift from coal to oil as the fuel of choice for its warships in the years leading up to World War I. While oil offered some conveniences and had twice the energy density, England had an abundance of coal and no domestic oil supply. Lord Selborne, the First Lord of the British Admiralty, protested in 1904 that “the substitution of oil for coal is impossible, because oil does not exist in this world in sufficient quantities. It must be reckoned only as a most valuable adjunct.” Nonetheless, Winston Churchill took the leap and decided in 1912 that the Queen Elizabeth-class battleships would burn oil exclusively and soon thereafter converted the entire Royal Navy. The birth of the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., a joint British-Iranian venture, guaranteed the Brits a reliable supply of oil after they had committed their fleet to a resource they did not possess. Today’s British Petroleum is the legacy of this decision, as is the Western presence in the Middle East By World War II, liquid fuels had replaced coal as the secret lifeblood of battle. In 1944, Gen. George Patton’s Third Army was speeding across southern France in his race to be the first commander to Germany. Patton eventually outpaced his supply lines and his tanks literally ran out of gas, stalled on the battlefield. His solution was the ethanol he found in the tanks of captured German tanks — an energy innovation born out of military necessity. Before the war, Hitler’s military ambitions had been criticized because Germany had little indigenous petroleum. Undeterred, Hitler had begun assembling a large industrial complex to manufacture synthetic petroleum from Germany’s abundant coal supplies. Hitler’s secret, the Fischer-Tropsch process, was developed by the oil-deprived Germans in the 1920s to convert coal into liquid fuel (CTL) and this basic process is the basis for all CTL efforts today. Churchill’s visionary decision to shift the entire British Navy to oil flew in the face of convention wisdom but was a key factor in the outcome of the Great War. In a similar attempt nearly 100 years later, Congress has sought to force the Pentagon’s hand in adopting greater use of nuclear power for U.S. warships. The 2007 Defense Authorization Act pushed the Navy to power all surface combatants with the same nuclear methods that currently power all submarines and carriers. The rationale was multifaceted but was essentially a cost-savings measure, “given the recent increase in the cost of crude oil, which cannot realistically be expected to improve over the long term.” The Navy’s rationale of staying the course with oil has been similarly driven primarily by cost. A 2007 study by the Navy Nuclear Reactors office, conducted in response to the nudge by Congress, estimated the cost break-even point for converting our amphibious fleet to nuclear power to be $70 a barrel and the break-even point to convert the cruisers and destroyers at $180 per barrel. Yet oil prices, and therefore costs, show a firm defiance to reliable projection. The most recent official U.S. government outlook on oil prices projected $72 for a barrel of crude in 2030. With oil now hovering around $100 per barrel, we see not only the newfound volatility in a previously stable market but also our inability to accurately project future prices, even in the short run. Even without the realization of “peak oil” in the next decade, it is conceivable that we soon might be well past the financial break-even point for nuclear powered cruisers — considerably sooner than it would take to design and transition the fleet even if a decision to do so was made tomorrow. The conversion of subs and carriers to nuclear power took decades. The Navy’s combat submarine force became entirely nuclear powered in 1990 and the carrier force did not become entirely nuclear powered until just this year. The British Navy rapidly and riskily embraced oil, and the U.S. Navy has been slow to let go. Then-Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan, before Hurricane Katrina, cautioned that policy should not interfere with the market and instead should allow elevated prices and naturally reduced demand to drive increased innovation in alternative energy markets. In 2006, after Katrina and facing sharp increases in prices, Greenspan testified before Congress that “the buffer between supply and demand is much too small to absorb shutdowns of even a small part of the world’s production. ... Oil users judge they need to be prepared for the possibility that at some point a raid will succeed, with a devastating impact on supply.” And the price of oil has increased more than $30 a barrel since that speech. The ability of market forces to force an adjustment of demand and spur technological innovation is now eclipsed by market volatility and supply vulnerability. The growing national security consequences of our dependence underscore the imperative for action. Oil’s ascendancy to a strategic commodity was through the military; the military should also be the source of its demise. The British Navy’s shift from coal to oil and the U.S. Navy’s pioneering research in nuclear power suggest that military requirements and innovation are well-poised to push difficult or innovative solutions. For starters, U.S. warships are one of the few places where nuclear power might reduce the transportation sector’s dependence on liquid fuels. Thus the maritime sector has the luxury of being poised for transformation to alternative methods if and when oil spikes to prices considered inconceivable today. Similarly, land-based transportation is arguably close to viable jumping points to new foundational technologies, possibly through electric or hydrogen power. It is significantly less clear what non-liquid or non-carbon technology the airline industry might choose. While there are alternatives on the horizon for shipping and wheeled transportation, there is no resource so optimized in ease of storage and power density as good old petroleum. And given that jet fuel constitutes the Defense Department’s largest single energy expenditure, improvements in this field would not only close the widest gap in civil transportation requirement, they would simultaneously make the largest improvement in defense propulsion vulnerabilities. At the International Maritime Propulsion Conference in May, scientists and researchers will debate the viability of crude oil alternatives and will likely conclude that CTL processes offer the most feasible short-term solution. Similar studies in Europe have concluded that hydrogen and biofuels are unlikely short-term successors. Hydrogen is an energy storage option, not a source, and current generation biofuels are competing with food supplies — the principal reason that a gallon of milk still costs more than a gallon of gasoline. While CTL is costeffective now, the process of liquefying coal requires significant amounts of water and produces significant carbon emissions, two sensitive areas that need to be addressed hand-in-hand with energy needs, not at the expense of one another. Climate change and associated political pressures mean that proposed solutions must increasingly utilize a comprehensive well-to-wheel analysis, not only in terms of cost, but also in terms of environmental consequences. National security has always held the trump card over environmental factors, and this is unlikely to change, but the bar for playing this hand is rising. As we begin to capture more of the hidden costs of energy, cheap solutions will become harder to find, further emphasizing the need for expanded research. In military consumption of oil, aircraft account for 73 percent, ground vehicles 15 percent, ships 8 percent and ground installations 4 percent. So while there has been significant attention to conserving energy on military installations and converting warships to nuclear power, these two together account for less than one-fifth of aviation’s thirst for oil. The Air Force has aggressively explored the use of biofuels in the B-52 bomber and other aircraft with recent success, yet it is not clear that biofuels could be a long-term path to reduced vulnerability for aviation. In 2006, the U.S. airline industry consumed about 20 billion gallons of fuel, yet the U.S. produces slightly more than 4 billion gallons of ethanol annually, and that level of production is beginning to be problematic, as evidenced by the rising price of corn and milk. At the levels of intractability we face, real solutions must be not only scaleable, but utilize the strictest “full cost burden” methods of accounting. None of this has gone unnoticed by the Pentagon. In 2006, before the prodding by Congress, the Defense Department sponsored several symposiums to look at reducing the dependence. The Energy Conversation, a nonprofit consortium of private and public sector entities, was born out of close collaboration with the Pentagon to connect the “best ideas, innovations, resources and people — all of which will be needed to create a sustainable energy future.” Attempting to lead from the front, the Pentagon has begun to reduce its consumption of oil, now down to about 300,000 barrels a day. The bad news is that costs are clearly skyrocketing. At current prices, the Pentagon will spend more than $8 billion this year on oil. But cost savings and incremental reductions in military consumption are not the real opportunity here. Rather, a renewed and expanded investment in military energy research and development will catalyze

methods and improvements that would become diffused throughout industry. This pattern has played out many times before. There have been many tangible benefits to society from a long history of technological exploration and innovation by the military. Now taken for granted for their civilian uses, radar, microwaves, the Internet and GPS were initially sponsored and funded by military research. Most relevant here, military requirements have also been key drivers of energy innovation.

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Michigan ‘08 1AC – MILITARY AFF TECH WON’T BE USED UNTIL THERE IS A CULTURE CHANGE -- ONLY THE PLAN CAUSES WIDESPREAD USE OF ALTERNATIVE FUELS
Scott C. Buchanan, Strategist in the Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation, “Energy and Force Transformation,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 2006 (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i42/17-JFQ42%20Buchanan%20Pg%2051-54.pdf)
Stimulate Private Industry. Beyond making DOD more efficient and capable of executing future operations, adapting new energy technologies for civilian use may have a larger strategic impact. The Defense Department can lead or stimulate the culture change—required at all levels of the Nation—to recognize the hidden costs of fuel oil and move strategically to less foreign energy dependence. Only then can the United States become better positioned economically and more secure in a future environment with less volatile energy supplies. Partnering with industry will perhaps stimulate the development of effective energy technologies, develop expertise, and accelerate the acceptance of new technologies by the military and the public. Elements such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency could begin this partnering effort by sponsoring a private-sector “prize program” to encourage new ideas and approaches and demonstrate DOD interest. Partnering would mitigate some industry risk and could potentially: ▪ accelerate engineering breakthroughs to adapt current technologies to military vehicles and other civilian uses ▪ lead to developing and proving the advanced manufacturing processes required for new energy technologies ▪ create procurement strategies that support new industry and manufacturing plants until private demand can sustain them ▪ stimulate interest and investment in energy efficiency ▪ make U.S. industries more competitive in the future oildependent energy environment.

THIS SPILLOVER BOOSTS AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS ACROSS THE BOARD AND RESTORES TECH LEADERSHIP
Michael Hornitschek, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force, “War Without Oil: A Catalyst for True Transformation,” Air War College Report, 2-17-2006 (http://www.nps.edu/cebrowski/Docs/sustainability/other%20articles/War%20Without%20Oil.pdf)
Energy research & development – The final required element in the DoD’s quest for foreign oil independence is the recreation of R&D accomplishments on the scale that allowed America’s aerospace engineers to send Neil Armstrong to the moon. After decades of successful innovation since Apollo, President Bush and others have stated that today America’s global innovation leadership position is under attack by the effects of globalization. On the positive side, U.S. companies can significantly reduce costs by outsourcing both menial and intellectual work for pennies on the dollar in a globalized world. On the negative side, the growing lack of interest (and ability) on the part of American students to pursue engineering and science degrees, coupled with a reverse brain-drain of R&D talent back to new renaissance countries like India and China, has left the U.S. with a quickly aging science and engineering community and the prospect of losing its position of science and technology leadership in the world. To illustrate, last year in
Germany 36 percent of undergraduate students earned degrees in math and science, in China 59 percent, and in Japan 66 percent–in the US the figure was only 32 percent124. In 2004, China graduated over 600,000 engineers, India 350,000, and America only about 70,000.125 Underscoring the President’s acknowledgement of this problem in his 31 January 2006 State of the Union Address126, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy of the 21st Century best articulates the alarm in their 2005 report, Rising Above the Gathering Storm, in which they state: It is easy to be complacent about the US competitiveness and pre-eminence in S&T. We have led the world for

decades, and we continue to do so in many research fields today. But the world is changing rapidly, and our advantages are no longer unique. Without a renewed effort to bolster the foundations of our competitiveness, we can expect to lose our privileged position. For the first time in generations, the nation’s children could face poorer prospects than their parents and grandparents did.” The report continues, “The US faces enormous challenges because of the disadvantage it faces in labor costs. S&T provides the opportunity to overcome this disadvantage by creating scientists and engineers with the ability to create entirely new industries
(emphasis added)—much as has been done in the past.127 In response to their alarm, the committee identified two challenges tightly coupled to scientific and engineering prowess: creating high quality jobs for Americans and responding to the nation’s need for clean, affordable, and reliable energy.128 The

NAS identifies a nexus of opportunity that simultaneously strengthens the economy and national security while simultaneously solving America’s looming energy crisis—the intense application of an R&D commitment that promises intellectual and financial reward for those Americans already inspired, and those yet to be inspired in the sciences. With a DoD commitment to lead its own energy revolution, the U.S could create an entirely new, leading-edge, commercial sector for the global market; a sector that could propel the U.S. economy for decades and turn this nation into a new energy or energy technology exporter, much like the U.S. achieved in the 1940’s and 50’s when it dominated the export of petroleum development
technology.

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The economic gains outweigh any costs Lovins et al 2004 (Amory Lovins, cofounder and CEO of Rocky Mountain Institute, former advisor to the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense, Winning the Oil End Game, pg. 159-161) The new industrial cluster would bring national benefits far beyond military prowess and budget savings. It would create a significant number of high-technology manufacturing jobs, which we estimate to be roughly analogous to the labor intensity of the chemicals sector (2.3 jobs per million dollars of annual revenue using the narrowest definition and excluding all multipliers). The 2025 carbon-fiber demand mentioned above would fetch ~$8 billion per year, creating ~20,000 new direct jobs." For our projected State of the Art vehicle production volume, these jobs may either go to the steel sector for new lightweight steel or to the polymer composite sectors, or to some mixture; market competition will sort that out, but either way, it means good jobs." There are probably many times more jobs, too, in converting raw carbon fiber into cars than in making the fiber. Looking forward to the hydrogen economy, which ultralight vehicles can help accelerate (pp. 233-234), several studies on fuel-cell manufacturing predict on the order of hundreds of thousands of new jobs.680 Clearly, this cluster of new automotive-and-energy-related technologies could be an important engine of economic growth. It is indeed plausible that jobs lost in, say, petroleum refining and petrochemicals would be more than offset by new jobs that apply broadly similar skills to polymer manufacturing and application----especially as mass-produced fuel cells, too, switch their materials to molded and roll-to-roll polymers. The national benefits that will grow out of the new advanced-materials industrial cluster go far beyond the direct jobs it creates. These new technologies have the potential to be as pervasive and transformative as plastics were in the 1960s. Advanced polymer composites have already entered boatmaking, military and civilian airplanes, bicycles, and sporting goods, and are now poised to enter the automotive sector and beyond. Lightweight steel also has the potential to extend steel usage well beyond the realm of traditional applications. Whichever advanced light material comes to dominate future automobile construction (most likely a diverse mix, each used to do what it does best), the materials applications throughout society will extend far beyond their originally intended mobility applications.

THE IMPACT IS GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR.
Walter Russell Mead, Senior Fellow in American Foreign policy @ the Council on Foreign Relations, World Policy Institute, 1992 What if the global economy stagnates – or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: North against South, rich against poor. Russia, China, India – these countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to the world than Germany and Japan did in the ‘30s.

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Plan: The United States federal government should require that thirty percent of Department of Defense energy use come from alternative energy by 2020 and considerably increase investment in alternative energy for use in Department of Defense systems.

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Michigan ‘08 1AC – MILITARY AFF THE PLAN TRANSFORMS THE D.O.D.’s APPROACH TO ENERGY. THIS MOBILIZES THE PENTAGON TO PRODUCE AN EFFECTIVE PORTFOLIO OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOLUTIONS, SOLVING THE CASE.
Thomas D. Crowley, et. al., President, L. E. Peabody & Associates, Inc., “Transforming the Way DOD Looks at Energy,” LMI Research Institute Report Commissioned by the Pentagon, April 2007 (http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_404_FT602T1_Transforming%20the%20Way%20 DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy_Final%20Report.pdf)
To implement an effective, long-term energy strategy, DoD must include energy considerations in its corporate processes, guidance, and governance structure. The addition of energy concerns to the organization’s key processes will raise the level of awareness about DoD’s energy issues and focus the organization on identifying solutions. The following steps highlight changes that could be made in the key processes—strategic planning, analytic agenda, joint concept and joint capability development, acquisition, and PPBE—to support an energy strategy: Apply the energy efficiency requirements of Executive Order 13423 (3 percent reduction per year, or 30 percent reduction by 2015 from 2003 baseline) to mobility forces (which are currently exempted). Establish a corporate governance structure to provide strategic energy direction. A strong governance structure will help ensure the continued alignment of the DoD energy efforts. Coordinate the energy efforts of DoD components. Establish metrics and monitoring and reporting requirements in support of energy efficiency goals. Monitor and enforce compliance. Incorporate energy strategy, energy use, and energy logistics in DoD’s corporate processes. Analyze current and projected energy and energy logistics required to support operational plans and capability-based planning. Evaluate the aggregate impact of energy and energy logistics requirements for the joint force in an operational environment, and quantify operational and fiscal impacts. Assess the role of information-based technologies to reduce energy dependence through the multiplier effect of unmanned systems and sensors, enhanced operational information to the warfighter, and improved energy information in operational logistics, particularly where in-theater personnel requirements can be reduced. Evaluate whether an immediate, focused action is required to develop a new Capstone Concept for Joint Operations and alternate energy supplies due to unforeseen magnitude of vulnerability. Incorporate energy considerations (energy use and energy logistics support requirements) in all future concept development, capability development, and acquisition actions. Examine, and quantify where possible, energy considerations in concept and capability analysis and experimentation. Implement the use of fully burdened fuel costs in capabilities and acquisition analysis of system life-cycle costs. Require energy efficiency as a KPP and Milestone B exit criterion for those capabilities with significant energy consumption or energy logistics support requirements. Make energy a top R&D priority. Invest in S&T to provide potential breakthrough opportunities for energy efficiency or alternative energy sources, particularly those opportunities that may significantly reduce the reliance on fossil fuels. Coordinate service R&D initiatives to ensure focused efforts and avoid duplication. Qualify commercially developed alternative energy products for use in DoD systems. Improve the incentives for investment in energy efficiency. Identify and allocate the costs of energy and energy support requirements to capability programs. Develop mechanisms to allow the services to retain a portion of the benefits from fuel efficiency efforts. Work with the executive branch and Congress to increase incentive authority and funding for energy efficiency investment programs (ECIP and ESCP). Increase global efforts to enhance the stability and security of oil infrastructure, transit lanes, and markets. Coordinate with the Department of State to promote international cooperation in these areas. Direct the combatant commanders to leverage military-to-military relationships in these areas. Make reducing energy vulnerability a focus area of the next strategic planning cycle and QDR. The next step in the strategy definition process is to identify specific changes to be made to energysupported processes and technology. A survey of the emerging energy technology landscape reveals that the department has a wide range of options for addressing energy efficiency and alternate sources of energy. In order for any strategy to fully leverage changes to processes or technological advances, the energy challenges to be addressed must be defined to enable evaluation of the options, based on their ability to respond to the stated challenges. One method that can be used to outline the energy challenges is to consider the greatest fuel use (aviation forces), greatest logistic difficulty (forward land forces and mobile electric power), and greatest warrior impact (individual warfighter burden). Other categories may be worthy of investigation to address specific areas of DoD concern. Whatever categories are used, this step must be completed to enable a thorough evaluation of candidate change options. With energy challenges identified, the next step is to identify and select potential solutions. Some solutions are easily implemented with little or no investment in technology, but produce only limited energy savings. Other solutions may require a larger investment in either time or money to produce more substantial savings. Therefore, it is unlikely that a single solution will deliver all of the desired energy- reduction benefits. Satisfying the need for immediate savings, as well as longer-term, large-scale, sustainable reductions in energy consumption, will require a portfolio of solutions.

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Michigan ‘08 1AC – MILITARY AFF
The following framework can be used to identify a range of solution options available for reducing energy consumption: Identify organizational and process changes that can be implemented immediately Identify engineered solutions to improve the efficiency of current forces and those nearing acquisition using existing technology Invent new capabilities, employed in new operational concepts, for those technologies yet to be developed. Under the guidance of a coordinating body, DoD can begin a structured analysis of how to apply organizational, process, and technology changes to execute a strategy to reduce energy dependence. Establishment of a coordinating body with policy and resource oversight authority would enable integration of energy efforts across the services and DoD. The coordinating body can evaluate the identified portfolios against the energy disconnects to identify optimal solutions across the services, broader department objectives, and U.S. government strategic objectives and energy efforts. The coordinating body can then focus technology development as required to achieve the desired goals. In evaluating the approach to implementing an energy strategy against a model for public-sector change management developed by RAND (see Figure 7-1), one can see that the proposed changes, if implemented, address the necessary attributes to prepare for and support change. We believe that an empowered corporate energy body, supported by senior DoD leadership, will provide the necessary governance to achieve successful execution of this transformation. BENEFITS OF ENERGY TRANSFORMATION A successful transformation in how DoD views, values, and uses energy will provide a powerful catalyst for 21st century operations at all levels of the department. The 2005 DoD National Defense Strategy and the 2006 QDR call for increasing U.S. military presence globally, rather than locating en masse at static operating bases. This theme represents a “new global posture” in which smaller, joint bases, including joint expeditionary sea bases and cooperative security locations, are distributed globally and can reposition with ease in response to threats. Establishing such a posture requires forces in more regions of the world, employs new technologies, and creates a more complex logistics burden. Under current consumption patterns, such a strategy will be even more energy intensive at a time when availability of traditional energy resources is becoming increasingly questionable. The application of new operational concepts and energy technologies that address efficient use of energy and alternative supply sources increases the opportunity to achieve the vision of the National Defense Strategy. Increasing the energy efficiency of DoD operations has the potential to increase operational flexibility by reducing logistics support requirements, while freeing resources currently dedicated to energy and associated support for recapitalization purposes. The proposed option to expand the energy consumption mandates for federal facilities to mobility operations presents opportunities for significant savings. Our analysis, described in Appendix G, indicates that this move could result in cumulative savings to DoD of roughly $43 billion by 2030 based on Energy Information Agency reference case price projections (with a range between $26 billion and $73 billion for “low” and “high” price cases). This estimate does not include the secondary savings from the multiplier effects of reducing energy consumption. While investment would likely be required to achieve these savings, the investment would be offset by the multiplier effect, which is typically larger than the associated fuel cost. An energy transformation that leverages process change in the short term and technological innovation in the mid to long terms will provide DoD the opportunity to address the strategic, operational, fiscal, and environmental disconnects inherent in its current energy use and policies. Energy transformation will enable DoD to target its greatest energy challenges and focus change efforts on addressing them. Incorporating new energy-efficient concepts and technologies increases the potential to enhance operational effectiveness through increased reach and agility while reducing the logistics dependence of the force. From a fiscal perspective, reduction in the energy use profile will allow DoD to redirect resources formerly spent on fuel to increase investment in warfighting capability. Improved energy efficiency will also reduce DoD’s fiscal vulnerability to supply and price shocks in the energy market. More efficient use of energy and the choice of alternative energy options which minimize or mitigate environmental impact will garner the support of the public while acting in concert with national environmental goals.

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Michigan ‘08 1AC – MILITARY AFF THE REQUIREMENT IS KEY
Gregory J. Lengyel, Colonel, United States Air Force, “Department of Defense Energy Strategy: Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks,” Brookings Institute, August 2007 (http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/08defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf)
True culture change of any large organization must start at the top. Edgar H. Schein is Sloan Fellows Professor of Management Emeritus and a senior lecturer at the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In his book, Organizational Culture and Leadership, he tackles the complex question of how an existing culture can be changed – one of the toughest challenges of leadership. According to Schein, as an organization matures, it develops a positive ideology and a set of myths about how it operates. The organization continues to operate by the shared tacit assumptions that have worked in practice, “and it is not unlikely that the espoused theories, the announced values of the organization come to be, to varying degrees, out of line with the actual assumptions that govern daily practice.”3 In the case of DOD energy use, this assumption would be the assumption that energy is cheap, plentiful, and for someone else to worry about. Where these differences exist, scandal and myth explosion become relevant as mechanisms of culture change. Left to themselves, change will not occur “until the consequences of the actual operating assumptions create a public and visible scandal that cannot be hidden, avoided, or denied.”4 Recent examples include changes in NASA’s safety culture following the Challenger and Columbia disasters or the Army’s recent health care shakeup following the exposure of substandard administrative handling of wounded soldiers and conditions at certain Walter Reed Army Medical Center facilities. The DOD cannot afford to wait for an energy related scandal before initiating change. Schein proposes that leaders can systematically set out to change how a large, mature organization operates recognizing such change may involve varying degrees of culture change. In short, it involves unlearning old behaviors and relearning new behaviors, and cannot be done unless some sense of threat, crisis, or dissatisfaction is present to create the motivation to start the process of unlearning and relearning.5 “The change goal must be defined concretely in terms of the specific problem you are trying to fix, not as a ‘culture change’…Culture change is always transformative change that requires a period of unlearning that is psychologically painful.”6 President Bush has addressed dependence on foreign oil as a National Security issue in his 2006 and 2007 State of the Union addresses. Unfortunately, every President since Richard Nixon has had some initiative to improve energy security without much success. Any perceived threat was either not threatening enough or not enduring enough to induce an American culture change with regard to energy. Perhaps the current threat to energy security is different. The United States is
more dependent than ever on foreign oil. US relations with the Middle East are strained, and China and India are booming economically with a corresponding need for energy. An excellent way to demonstrate a DOD need for change is for the

Secretary of Defense to deliver a high-profile speech on Energy security at a public venue, such as a Service academy graduation, supporting the President’s energy initiatives, highlighting the importance of DOD energy security, and announcing the goals of a new comprehensive DOD Energy Strategy and the establishment of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy Security. There should be no doubt in anyone’s mind that the leadership at the highest levels is behind the transformation towards energy security. The Secretary should challenge leaders at all levels in the department to create incentives, remove disincentives, and seek out bold and innovative ways to reduce energy consumption, improve processes and efficiencies, and diversify energy sources as a matter of National Security. The Secretary should also make it absolutely clear that showy, knee jerk solutions such as lowering the thermostats in the winter and forcing people to wear jackets in their offices, will not be tolerated as acceptable methods of reducing energy use. There is little current incentive for DOD personnel to reduce energy consumption. In fact, there are disincentives in place. Most military leaders quickly learn that a ‘can do without’ attitude is a sure way to lose money or personnel. The Air Force Flying Hour Program serves as an example. A flying squadron commander who allocated 8,000 flying hours to conduct his mission and keep his aircrews properly trained and manages to complete his task in 7,600 hours can expect a cut in his allocation the next year. Instead of being rewarded for saving taxpayers dollars, units perceive the cuts as a punishment. The commonly accepted solution is to find a way to fly the hours at the end of the fiscal
year rather than falling short of the allocation. This is a “use it or lose it” culture. It is difficult to save energy if you don’t know how much you are using. Most military bases today do not measure energy consumption at each building. The Energy Policy Act of 2005, Section 103, directs federal agencies to meter electricity use in all (to the maximum extent practical) federal buildings by 1 October 2012, using advanced meters or metering devices that provide data at least daily. The DOD has a plan to meet this requirement, but under the “maximum extent practical” caveat many older buildings will never be metered.7 Commanders should monitor energy consumed at their facilities and set goals for reduction. Energy savings should be rewarded, and excessive consumption should be investigated and corrected. The first step towards culture change occurs by educating personnel and providing incentives

and rewards to commanders who find ways to conduct their mission, properly train their personnel, and still save flight hours (read energy). The DOD will have affected a culture change when commanders instinctively know they are accountable for energy consumption, they know efficiency is its own “effect” in increasing combat capability, and they continually strive to improve efficiency because energy is a consideration in all military activities and operations. Only then will energy efficiency be a defining characteristic of DOD operations and facilities.

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Michigan ‘08 1AC – MILITARY AFF INCENTIVES SOLVE -- CATALYZES TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE THAT OTHERWISE WON’T BE ADOPTED
Scott C. Buchanan, Strategist in the Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation, “Energy and Force Transformation,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 2006 (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i42/17-JFQ42%20Buchanan%20Pg%2051-54.pdf)
New Technology Vectors Historically, the Department of Defense has invested in transformational technologies— such as nuclear power, missile defense initiatives, and intercontinental ballistic missiles— with the potential to alter the strategic balance. DOD should do the same now to balance its scarce energy resources. New technologies to improve fuel efficiency (weight, drag, engine efficiency, system efficiency, and auxiliary power needs) and to develop alternative energy sources have the potential to transform the force, remove operational limits that are built into our plans, and provide the capabilities that forces need. The business case for investing in new technologies, however, is difficult to
build because current costing methods do not make the actual end-to-end costs of fueling the force visible to decisionmakers. In Winning the Oil Endgame, Amory Lovins identifies some key technology investments in various stages of development that could significantly improve military weapon system efficiency and operational performance. 13 Investing in these technologies gains energy efficiency and explores alternative fuels and energy sources. About $250 million (0.4 percent) of the DOD fiscal year 2006 research and development (R&D) budget can be tracked to energy-related projects to include: ▪Army: Propulsion and Energetics Program, University Research Initiative Fuel Cell R&D, Advanced Propulsion Research, Combat Vehicle and Automotive Technology (includes numerous projects on fuel cells, lightweight materials, and reengineering of vehicles), and Services Combat Feeding Technology Demonstration ▪Navy: Navy Energy Program, Mobility Fuels/Fuel Cells, Integrated Fuel Processor/Fuel Cell System, Solid Oxide Fuel Cell, Commercial Off-the-Shelf Carbon Filter Qualification, and Energy and Environment Technologies (fuel cell and methane hydrate technologies) ▪Air Force: Integrated High Performance Turbine Engine Technology Program (to double the 1987 state-of-the-art turbine engine thrust-to-weight ratio) and Dual Use Science and Technology (fuel efficiency is an explicit area of interest but is a small part of overall project) ▪DOD: Vehicle Fuel Cell Programs, Fuel Cell Locomotives (congressionally added programs), Advanced Power and Energy Program, Weapon and Energy Sciences (includes research on energy and fuel), Syntroleum Project (to convert natural gas into liquid fuels), and Hydrogen Fuel Cell Electric Hybrid Vehicle. The actual level of

DOD investment may be higher because research within other program elements may include platformspecific energy concerns. Nevertheless, even if the level is doubled or tripled, it would be a small investment compared to the investment in other strategic initiatives such as missile defense. More important, an investment in energy-efficiency R&D and, ultimately, oil independence may have a far greater impact on the strategic balance. An inherent tension exists within the tiered-system approach that DOD takes to science and technology (S&T). On one hand, wide-ranging S&T investment provides a mechanism for discovering new knowledge and developing things that would not otherwise exist. On the other hand, most successfully fielded military S&T is directed toward operational and programmatic needs. While at least seven different fuel cell efforts are under way, the low level of investment in energy efficiency R&D may indicate that energy efficiency is not being pursued with urgency or an overarching strategic view toward transforming the way we plan, operate, and fight. The following areas may provide a basis for such an overarching DOD energy strategy. Invest Strategically in Energy Technology. By significantly increasing its R&D investments, DOD can improve the efficiency and capability of the current force. These investments will require the establishment of a strategic transformational mandate for significant near-term energy-efficiency improvements (such as retrofit of existing platforms that will be part of the force for several years), reduced logistics force requirements, and long-term military and national energy independence from foreign energy sources (including new efficient platforms powered by alternate energy sources). The technologies considered should be far-reaching, with the specific view of their potential both to provide the lethal force required in the execution of military operations and to provide that force more effectively and efficiently. In other words, although recent operations have demonstrated the usefulness of heavy forces, a smaller,
more responsive, and more affordable force might better meet capability demands than a larger, slower force that is more expensive to operate. Revisit an Energy Accounting Process. As noted in both a Defense Science Board study and Winning the Oil Endgame, providing fuel to military forces has many costs that are hidden from current planning, acquisition, and investment processes.14 As a result, inefficient and capability-limiting practices have persisted. To rectify these shortfalls, these studies suggest that the Defense Department must transform its culture of treating energy as essentially a “free” good both in operational planning and in acquisition. Specifically, they recommend that DOD identify and fully consider all the costs associated with providing fuel to the force and use this information in modeling and wargaming. Practically speaking, this could mean that DOD would need to develop and implement tools to: ▪account for all energy-related costs (procurement and delivery) ▪analyze life-cycle costs with actual energy costs and make them explicit in acquisition and R&D investment decisions ▪model and wargame actual logistics requirements and limitations as part of the analysis to support operational planning. In general, a DOD energy strategy could provide the incentive mechanisms for

the Services to begin showing a return on investment within a given timeframe.

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REQUIREMENT KEY THE REQUIREMENT IS KEY -- OTHERWISE ENERGY WILL BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED Carns and Schlesinger ‘08
(General Michael Carns, United States Air Force (Retired), Dr. James Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense, “More Fight – Less Fuel,” Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, February 2008 http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-02-ESTF.pdf)

The Task Force found that the key barrier to implementing actions such as these is people taking the availability of energy for granted. Overcoming this will require a campaign linking saved energy to national security and strong leadership attention focused on strategy, metrics and accountability. It will require inculcating energy considerations into business processes, fitness and performance reports, education and training programs and incentive programs. The challenge is now greater than it was in the 70s and 80s and the consequences of failure even greater. Creating both incentives and awareness at all levels will focus people’s attention and make

THE REQUIREMENT IS KEY -- CULTURE CHANGE IS THE MOST DIFFICULT PART OF SOLVING THE AFF Carns and Schlesinger ‘08
(General Michael Carns, United States Air Force (Retired), Dr. James Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense, “More Fight – Less Fuel,” Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, February 2008 http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-02-ESTF.pdf)

Recommendation #5: Identify and exploit near-term opportunities to reduce energy use through policies and incentives that change operational procedures. Since WWII, energy has been abundant and cheap, with the exceptions of two short periods during the 1970s and 1980s, and very recently. During WWII, tankers moving fuel to U.S. forces were attacked, and the response was to devise ways to avoid using tanker ships, such as building pipelines to mitigate the risk. During Korea and Vietnam, energy security was not a concern. Changing a culture that considers energy cheap and abundant is one of the most difficult challenges facing the Department and the nation. The business changes recommended by the Task Force will take time to show results, but changing operational practices to conserve energy can show immediate results.

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Michigan ‘08 SOLVENCY – REQUIREMENT SOLVES THE REQUIREMENT SOLVES -- THE D.O.D. CAN MEET THE TARGET
Gregory J. Lengyel, Colonel, United States Air Force, “Department of Defense Energy Strategy: Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks,” Brookings Institute, August 2007 (http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/08defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf) The DOD is one of the major leaders of the federal government in renewable energy, receiving about 9% of electricity from renewable sources in FY 2005 (national average is 6%) and has a goal of 25% of electricity from renewable sources by 2025.44 Why not a more aggressive goal? DOD should set a goal of being a net-zero energy consumer at its facilities by 2030. The path to net-zero energy consumption is through expanded production of renewable, and possibly nuclear, energy sources at or near DOD installations. Several DOD installations are already exceeding the existing 25% renewable goal. Dyess AFB, TX is operating 100% on renewable energy, with Minot AFB and Fairchild AFB not far behind with 95.7% and 99.6% respectively. Other energy saving or renewable energy projects are already established or underway at many DOD installations. At Nellis AFB, NV, the Air Force recently awarded a contract to build the largest photovoltaic solar farm in the world, on track to generate 18MW in late 2008.45 A 2004 Sandia National Laboratory study concluded that nearly all DOD installations have potential for one or more economically viable solar energy project with potential savings of 10% in electricity and 14% in natural gas.46 Geothermal energy has been a success story for the Navy. Geothermal energy is found in underground pockets of steam, hot water, and hot dry rocks. Steam and hot water can be extracted from underground reservoirs to power steam turbines, which drive generators and produce electricity. Lower intensity geothermal resources are used for direct-use applications such as space heating and cooling. The Navy has four privately built, owned, and operated geothermal power plants at Naval Air Warfare Center China Lake, CA,47 and is building another at Naval Air Station Fallon, NV. The private company sells the electricity to a utility company and pays the Navy. The Navy has received an average of $14.7 million annually from 1987-2003. The navy spent about two-thirds of its geothermal revenues on energy conservation projects, including solar energy systems. About onethird of the revenues funded the overhead costs of the Navy’s Geothermal Program Office. The geothermal plant at China Lake has been producing 345,000 MWh of electricity per year since 1990.48 The DOD has identified four additional installations as good candidates for geothermal power generation that might be commercially viable, third party funded, producers of an average of 40 MW annually (MWa) of electricity. Six to eight additional installations have hot water potential and will be researched further.49 Geothermal heat pumps are similar to ordinary heat pumps, but use the ground instead of outside air to provide heating, air conditioning and, in most cases, hot water. Because they use the earth's natural heat, they are among the most efficient and comfortable heating and cooling technologies currently available. The Services have installed a total of 10,356 geothermal heat pumps among 24 different installations since 1993.50 In 2005, Naval Station Guantanamo Bay brought online the world’s largest wind farm/diesel hybrid power system. The plant is rated at 3.8 MW, is improving installation grid reliability, providing 25% of the base’s power requirements, and saving the Navy $1.2 million annually.51 Since 1997, the Air Force has installed five wind generation facilities producing 8400 KW of electricity. The Army has two small wind facilities, generating 335 KW, and the Navy has one wind facility at San Clemente Island, CA, rated at 675 KW.52 The DOD has identified an additional 109 facilities with the potential to produce an additional 70 MWa in wind energy.53 Renewable energy production at DOD facilities is growing and must continue to grow in order to assure access to critical energy requirements. Renewable energy diversifies energy sources and provides cost effective, environmentally responsible energy to DOD facilities.

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Michigan ‘08 SOLVENCY – INCENTIVES SOLVE Incentives solve -- military R&D is the best way to develop alternative energy tech Eggers, director for combating terrorism at the National Security Council, Naval Commander serving on the Joint Staff, 2008
[Commander Jeffrey W, “The fuel gauge of national security,” Armed Forces Journal, May, http://www.afji.com/2008/05/3434573]
At first glance, the military’s slice of demand may not be the intuitive place to focus effort. The military’s use of oil constitutes about 2 percent of total U.S. oil consumption, or about the same as a major U.S. airline. And if there is one sector of consumption where we should gladly pay a premium for high-octane liquid fuel, it is our national security apparatus. So it is fair to argue that attention is best placed on the civilian side of usage, where 98 percent of demand lies. There are many near-term solutions that promise to make a dent in this 98 percent, on the demand and supply sides. Plug-in hybrids, sustainable bio-fuels, broad-based conservation efforts and general “greenness” are gaining considerable political traction. But none offers a long-term silver bullet, and each has limitations. In addition to pulling consumption toward “ready” technologies, work must be done in parallel

to advance high-risk and transformative solutions. And one of the most successful models for doing so is the military wing of research and development. Focusing on the 2 percent of military consumption is important not only because it safeguards the flow, and mitigates risk, to the 98 percent. The exploration of new sources of energy for our military fighting machinery will directly sustain future defense readiness and buttress military power and, more significantly, will indirectly catalyze a revolution in civilian transportation technology and innovation. [Continues later on] None of this
has gone unnoticed by the Pentagon. In 2006, before the prodding by Congress, the Defense Department sponsored several symposiums to look at reducing the dependence. The Energy Conversation, a nonprofit consortium of private and public sector entities, was born out of close collaboration with the Pentagon to connect the “best ideas, innovations, resources and people — all of which will be needed to create a sustainable energy future.” Attempting to lead from the front, the Pentagon has begun to reduce its consumption of oil, now down to about 300,000 barrels a day. The bad news is that costs are clearly skyrocketing. At current prices, the Pentagon will spend more than $8 billion this year on oil. But cost savings and incremental reductions in military consumption are not the real opportunity here. Rather, a renewed and expanded investment in military energy

research and development will catalyze methods and improvements that would become diffused throughout industry.
This pattern has played out many times before. There have been many tangible benefits to society from a long history of technological exploration and innovation by the military. Now taken for granted for their civilian uses, radar, microwaves, the Internet and GPS were initially sponsored and funded by military research. Most relevant here, military requirements have also been key drivers of energy innovation. Perhaps the most significant and widely underreported example of military requirements forcing energy innovation was the Navy’s pioneering research in the use of nuclear power before the advent of the Manhattan Project. In 1937, Rear Adm. Stanford Hooper, as director of the Navy’s Technical Division, explored the concept of nuclear energy at Johns Hopkins University’s physics department, ultimately resulting in a Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) meeting with physicist Enrico Fermi in 1939 and the launching of the Navy’s nuclear energy research, not to build a bomb, but to power a submarine. The NRL made considerable progress in the key challenge of uranium isotope separation, and the Navy’s methods were ultimately adopted by the Manhattan Project. After World War II, Capt. Hyman Rickover, a Navy electrical engineer, realized the importance of uranium to harness the atom to drive submarines, culminating in the first nuclear-powered vehicle, the Nautilus, launched in 1955. Today, retired Navy nuclear power officers now operate a good majority of the 103 operating nuclear power plants in the U.S. The most famous arm of military R&D is the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA. This small group of scientists brought the country stealth technology and the Internet. Congress passed a bill in fall 2007 to create a new energy research agency in DARPA’s image called the Advanced Research Projects Agency — Energy (ARPA-E), with the goal of reducing foreign oil imports, improving efficiency and reducing emissions. The concept of ARPA-E is a well-intended step forward, but implementation has been stalled by debates over structure and funding. In the interim, a parallel strategy for improved innovation toward energy security is not only

to pursue R&D through “DARPA-like” agencies but through DARPA itself, particularly given the military’s own intractable addiction to oil. Federal funding for classic military research entities, to include others such as NRL, the home of nuclear power, should be significantly expanded and re-prioritized around high-risk basic science and applied energy research. President Eisenhower created DARPA 51 years ago after U.S. R&D failures were illuminated by the Sputnik debacle. He sought to create a “unifying force” for military R&D that would eliminate stovepipes and improve collaboration. The success and efficacy of his vision has also derived from the fact that the military’s implementation arm is attached to the same body as the R&D arm, so that the research feeds a ready and waiting industry in an efficient model. Commercialization challenges can be resolved under the pressures of military requirements, thereby reducing the eventual barriers to market. Given the rhetoric about energy security today, the energy research budget of the U.S. government is still modest, about $3.5 billion annually compared with $8.8 billion for missile-defense research in fiscal 2009. And by any normalized metric, by gross domestic product or per capita, the U.S. spends less on energy research than either Japan or the European Union. The administration’s continued expansion of the budget for the Office of Science Research at the Energy Department should be applauded, yet the defense research agencies should see a similar first-tier priority of investment, specifically targeted at energy innovation for the supply and demand sides of the energy consumption equation. Additionally, the Pentagon must streamline programs that offer grants to private innovators for the development of demonstration prototypes. The barriers to entry for small and enterprising energy-related scientists need to be reduced. Not only is it in the financial and tactical interest of the U.S. to shift the military away from a majority reliance on oil, it is now in the greater strategic interest of the country that the military’s extensive technological research enterprises focus on the development of alternatives. Our instruments of national power that safeguard the flow of energy resources should not themselves be powered by
those same resources. The strategic risk of doing so is now rising with the fiscal expense. And as with other enterprises and initiatives, the military’s investment in energy innovation will result in more than military hardware advances — such innovation will accelerate invaluable development and commercialization by the private sector. Given the current political environmental consensus growing with regard to climate change, viable replacements for transportation power will require the dual C’s: low cost and low carbon. The country’s reliance on oil is troubling simply from the economics of

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diminishing growth in supply and increasing demand. Introducing the aggravating reliance on belligerent states and the threat of a disruption in global supply raises the issue to a critical status. Contemplation of the tactical and strategic national security implications of an oil-based military further escalates the imperative to a crisis level. Funding for military R&D has always been an investment in national security just as

investment and dedication in innovation has always been a mainstay of global power. With energy security and national security now so inextricably entwined, investment in military energy R&D must be redoubled, with the reasonable expectation that the immediate and tactical public benefits of such a flanking maneuver against our oil dependence will be followed by a strategic shift to tangible and lasting energy security.

THE AFF RESULTS IN COORDINATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT, WHICH SOLVES THE CASE
Thomas D. Crowley, et. al., President, L. E. Peabody & Associates, Inc., “Transforming the Way DOD Looks at Energy,” LMI Research Institute Report Commissioned by the Pentagon, April 2007 (http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_404_FT602T1_Transforming%20the%20Way%20 DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy_Final%20Report.pdf)
To effectively plan for the future in a world with increasingly scarce low-cost fossil fuel energy resources, DoD must leverage technology to facilitate improvements in fuel energy efficiency. Demand reduction measures, combined with alternative sources of energy, including

alternative fuels, offer many possibilities for reducing DoD’s dependence on traditional energy sources and the associated logistics support requirements. We used a variety of research techniques to survey the energy technology landscape. From this research, we can
make some high-level observations concerning research efforts, technology development, and applicability. We can also begin to identify those that might offer the most promise to help reduce DoD’s energy dependence when evaluated through the Organize/Engineer/Invent framework in the context of a specific energy challenge.1 Finally, we provide some sample applications of the framework to some specific energy challenges. RESEARCH OBSERVATIONS Our key observations are as follows: Research is diverse and not well focused. DoD research investment is demand-side focused. Multiple solutions will likely be required to significantly reduce traditional energy dependence. Technologies with a multiplier effect may significantly reduce logistics and other support costs. Unmanned vehicles offer significant opportunities. Better information management could be as significant as energydirected technologies. The following subsections expand on our observations. Diverse, Unfocused Research Numerous

federal (primarily DoD and DOE) and commercial energy R&D efforts are underway. These efforts, which are at various stages of maturity, represent a large, varied portfolio, but their direction and funding—at least in DoD—are uncoordinated and not integrated with an energy-efficient future operational concept. A primary reason for this lack of strategic planning regarding energy-related R&D may be the absence of a central group in DoD that can assist the Secretary of Defense with developing a holistic energy strategy, making energy-related decisions on the basis of solid business practices, initiating DoD-wide directives, and coordinating the flow
of resources to the most critical technologies required to realize energy-efficient operations. Although the fixed installation side of DoD, through the DUSD(I&E), has an energy

DoD’s operational side—where two-thirds of its energy is consumed—does not have a strategic plan with short- and long-term goals, metrics, and milestones. Although USD(AT&L) owns the functions most often associated with energy
plan and monitors its success, planning—infrastructure and environment, logistics management review, and defense research and engineering—the doctrinal, organizational, policy, and resource issues cut across the organization. DoD has created an ad hoc body, the Energy Security Integrated Project Team (IPT), to study the energy issue. The IPT has recommended creation of an Alternative Fuels Task Force with some of the integrating responsibilities listed above, but questions remain regarding the lifespan of the body and its staffing and funding sources. Demand-Side Focus of DoD Research The

technology portfolio is diverse, but most of the known dollar investment in R&D is focused on demand-side opportunities. This is a natural bias, because DoD is a platform-centric organization; that is, its acquisition and planning is based on weapon system development and support. In fact, a number of supplyside technologies are being sponsored by industry and other government agencies. Many energy policy practitioners assert that the private sector and DOE are best positioned to sponsor supply-side energy development and question DoD’s role on supply-side development. Although this division between government and commercial sources may represent the best model for advancing the consideration of alternative energy solutions, DoD could take a more global perspective in integrating energy and operations, trying to fill the gaps by leveraging supply-side technologies. One area in which additional DoD involvement is clearly appropriate is the development of what we call “cross-cutting” technologies, technologies that can supply power at the local level and reduce the demand for bulk energy supplies and the associated logistics burden. Given
that DoD’s projected fuel needs can be met with conventional domestic petroleum production,2 DoD leadership in the development of alternate liquid fuel production involves a national-level policy decision regarding the appropriateness of DoD’s role as a change leader. At a minimum, DoD should participate in supply-side technology development to the extent necessary to ensure that developed products can be applied to DoD uses with little, if any, additional modification. And, in view of the range of alternatives to provide liquid fuels being pursued by DOE and the commercial sector, DoD should be mindful of the risk of foreclosing future options by supporting capital-intensive programs that might then preclude the later development of solutions with higher source to use energy efficiency and reduced environmental impact. Requirement for Multiple Solutions to Energy Dependence The change associated with moving away from conventional oil-derived fuels is evolutionary, rather than revolutionary. The energy density of current fuels makes them difficult to replace within the life span of current platforms. Most technologies associated with the Energy Security IPT effort offer demand-side savings, which are valuable but will only provide savings incrementally as they are introduced to the force over time. The life expectancies—often decades—of DoD systems increase the importance of addressing the energy demands of legacy platforms and ensuring that energy considerations are properly factored into the design of new capabilities and replacement capabilities for those platforms reaching the end of their service life. The Multiplier Effect As new technologies are considered, they need to be evaluated, not only for their operational effectiveness and energy efficiency, but for their multiplier effect, which occurs when the direct or indirect consequences of an action magnify its effect. In this context, a

technology has a multiplier effect if it reduces fuel consumption and, in doing so, causes additional reduction in the total burden of providing fuel. For instance, delivering fuel in the deployed setting requires a long and energy-intensive logistics tail. When a technology reduces fuel consumption at the front end, the demands placed on the entire logistics tail decrease, resulting in savings beyond just the fuel acquisition costs.3 Technologies that may have high payoff due to the multiplier effect should be given strong consideration for implementation. New operational concepts can also serve to focus technology development on capabilities that may have high payoff via a multiplier effect, particularly if they can
reduce the deployed forces required to accomplish an operation.

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Michigan ‘08 SOLVENCY – EFFECTIVE TECHNOLOGY PORTFOLIO SOLVES -- CREATES EFFECTIVE RENEWABLE TECHNOLOGY FOR THE PENTAGON
Thomas D. Crowley, et. al., President, L. E. Peabody & Associates, Inc., “Transforming the Way DOD Looks at Energy,” LMI Research Institute Report Commissioned by the Pentagon, April 2007 (http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_404_FT602T1_Transforming%20the%20Way%20 DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy_Final%20Report.pdf) Selecting among the numerous technological, organizational, and process options for addressing DoD’s energy challenges is a daunting task. Some options are readily available and easy to implement, but they may produce only limited savings in fuel usage and cost, particularly when viewed over the entire DoD system. Other options, including some still in the development stages or with longer implementation cycles, may offer greater promise for long-term savings. Because of this, it is unlikely that a single-point solution will deliver all of the desired energy reduction benefits. Satisfying the need both for immediate savings and for longer term sustainable reductions in energy consumption requires a portfolio of solutions. The Organize/Engineer/Invent framework can produce a menu of technology and process improvement options to address energy challenges. Table 3-1 illustrates this concept. The process is relatively straightforward, but identifying viable options and selecting among alternatives requires a detailed analysis of each option. The analysis must include the relative costs and benefits in relation to the strategic, operational, fiscal, and environmental disconnects. This process requires a combination of quantitative analyses to determine the technical merits and operational and fiscal implications of each option, qualitative analyses to determine the relative importance of addressing each disconnect, and an understanding of DoD or national-level policy or organizational constraints associated with implementing the solutions. Achieving a balance between strategic, operational, fiscal, and environmental criteria will also depend on DoD policy, especially for the strategic criteria. Moreover, a good solution set might exert negative pressure on one of the evaluation criteria, but still exert enough benefit in the other categories to overwhelm any individual category. Portfolios or combinations of investment options should be created by assessing their ability to directly address the strategic, operational, fiscal, and environmental disconnects. Creating portfolios enables the packaging of complementary combinations of organizing, engineering, and inventing options that may deliver a greater level of benefits than selecting a single option. For instance, a solution set that effectively addresses three of the four disconnects might be preferred over a solution set that improves only operational effectiveness. The portfolio approach also provides the opportunity to identify and limit investment in engineering solutions that are inconsistent with eventual implementation of a preferred longterm invented solution. Evaluation and reevaluation of combinations of investment strategies should be a continual process. SUMMARY Creation of a sustainable energy strategy requires a structured approach to DoD’s energy challenges and targeting of the appropriate technologies and resources to address these problems. The Organize/Engineer/Invent framework provides the building blocks of such an approach and enables the development of both technical and nontechnical options for meeting DoD’s most important energy challenges. Figure 3-2 illustrates the overall assessment process. At the highest level, this framework also informs DoD that the first, and perhaps most meaningful, steps may be to address DoD’s corporate organization and processes to reduce energy dependence.

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Michigan ‘08 SOLVENCY – EFFECTIVE TECHNOLOGY THE PHASED NATURE OF THE PLAN CAUSES INVESTMENTS IN A PORTFOLIO OF RENEWABLES WHICH INCREASES THEIR VIABILITY
Thomas D. Crowley, et. al., President, L. E. Peabody & Associates, Inc., “Transforming the Way DOD Looks at Energy,” LMI Research Institute Report Commissioned by the Pentagon, April 2007 (http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_404_FT602T1_Transforming%20the%20Way%20 DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy_Final%20Report.pdf) DoD energy transformation must begin in the near term, addressing current practices and legacy forces, while investing for long-term changes that may radically alter future consumption patterns. We recommend a time-phased approach to reduce our reliance on fossil and carbon-based fuels. This approach includes the following: Organizational and process changes that can be implemented immediately Engineered solutions, to improve the efficiency of current forces and those nearing acquisition Invention of new capabilities, employed in new operational concepts, for those forces yet to be developed. Applying this approach to the three focus areas will give DoD an opportunity to develop portfolios of solutions that can reduce energy use and dependence. The coordinating body can evaluate these portfolios to against the energy disconnects to identify optimal solutions across the services, broader department objectives, and U.S. government strategic objectives and energy efforts. The coordinating body can then focus technology development as required to achieve the desired solutions.

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Michigan ‘08
---MODELING---

MODELING – USFG MILITARY INVESTMENT IN ALTERNATIVE ENERGY CAUSES MODELING BY THE REST OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT Boston Globe, 2007 [“Environmental defense”,
http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/05/27/environmental_defense/, May 27]

Still, if the military can give a boost to clean alternative energy technologies, its motivation doesn't much matter. The military's new sensitivity to fuel scarcity may also help reframe the politics of global warming. In March, the Army War College held a conference on the national security implications of a warming planet. Separately, in April a group of 11 retired senior generals released a report arguing that climate change, by playing havoc with water supplies, weather patterns, and agriculture, would be a force for global instability in coming years. And under a bipartisan proposal expected to easily win congressional approval, both the Pentagon and the CIA will be required to consider the effects of climate change in evaluating threats to the country. "Anytime the Pentagon says that a nonmilitary issue has national security implications," says Israel, "it gets instant credibility."

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Michigan ‘08
=====INHERENCY / UNIQUENESS===== ---ABOUT THE PLAN---

DOD NOT DOING ENOUGH
The DOD lacks a comprehensive strategy for energy for mobility forces Aerospace Daily & Defense Report March 17, 2008 (“Pentagon must better address energy concerns, GAO says” l/n) Despite the efforts of the different Pentagon services to address energy concerns ? and an acknowledgment in the Defense Department of the importance of energy issues ? the DOD still needs a cohesive energy plan, a recent U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report says. ?DOD lacks elements of an overarching organizational framework to guide and oversee mobility energy reduction efforts,? the GAO said in its report, ?Defense Management: Overarching Organizational Framework Needed to Guide and Oversee Energy Reduction Efforts for Military Operations,? released last week. ?In the absence of an overarching organizational framework for mobility energy, DOD cannot be assured that its current efforts will be fully implemented and will significantly reduce its reliance on petroleum-based fuel,? the GAO reported (See related charts, pages 6,7). A DAILY analysis of Pentagon contracts and modifications shows that the Defense Department paid $11.1 billion for fuel-related expenses in 2007, making it the second highest DOD financial outlay behind fixed-wing operations. The Department of Defense (DOD) relies heavily on petroleum-based fuel for mobility energy the energy required for moving and sustaining its forces and weapons platforms for military operations,? the GAO said. ?Dependence on foreign oil, projected increases in worldwide demand, and rising oil costs, as well as the significant logistics burden associated with moving fuel on the battlefield, will likely require DOD to address its mobility energy demand.?

THE D.O.D. IS NOT DOING ENOUGH -- NO REQUIREMENT AND INSUFFICIENT FUNDING FOR RENEWABLES Carns and Schlesinger ‘08
(General Michael Carns, United States Air Force (Retired), Dr. James Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense, “More Fight – Less Fuel,” Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, February 2008 http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-02-ESTF.pdf)

Finding #1: The recommendations from the 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force Report “More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden” have not been implemented. The main Task Force recommendation in 2001 was that DoD re-engineer its business processes to make energy a factor in the key Departmental decisions that establish requirements, shape acquisition programs and set funding priorities. This was based on their findings that these decisions were not informed about their energy consequences, yet ultimately drove operational fuel demand, and that high fuel demand compromised operational effectiveness. This Task Force finds these situations have not changed.

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Michigan ‘08 SQ RENEWABLES INSUFFICIENT The military is scaling up alternative energy programs now, but funding falls far short of an effective transition Sohlman, Swedish journalist and writer formerly the editor of Världen i Fokus, 2008 [Eva, also reporter
for Reuters, The Economist,, The New York Times and The Washington Post “Green Hawks in the Pentagon: the American Army Is on a Green Mission,” March 17 http://www.thewip.net/contributors/2008/03/green_hawks_in_the_pentagon_th.html] The Department of Defense is therefore investing an estimated $500-$600 million dollars on research and development of solar, wave, biomass and wind energy, as well as conventional green energy sources. A new law demanding better energy efficiency has been passed, so by 2025 the Army will have to take a quarter of its energy from renewable sources. But that is far too little, far too late, say hawks like Todd Hathaway, a major in the Army who is writing his PhD thesis on nuclear science, focusing on new environmentally friendly technology. “We can’t afford to not fix this now, and that can only be done with cutting-edge technology,” says the fast-paced 36-year-old outside the Pentagon, whose front boasts a vast field of solar cells. “Unfortunately there is a strong resistance against new technology from the multi-billion industry for established green energy. We – inventors, scientists, retired Army people and professors – have to invest our own money to get the projects going. This is serious, as these are the kind of technologies that will make this planet survive.”

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Michigan ‘08 SQ FUEL EFFICIENCY INSUFFICIENT FUEL EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS ARE UNDERFUNDED AND CAN’T SOLVE THE CASE Carns and Schlesinger ‘08
(General Michael Carns, United States Air Force (Retired), Dr. James Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense, “More Fight – Less Fuel,” Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, February 2008 http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-02-ESTF.pdf)

Finding #4: There are technologies available now to make DoD systems more energy efficient, but they are undervalued, slowing their implementation and resulting in inadequate future S&T investments. The Task Force heard over a hundred presentations on technologies that addressed all categories of end use, covering the full range of maturity from basic research to readyto- implement. Many appear quite promising, but DoD lacks accepted tools to value their operational and economic benefits. As a result, cost effective technologies are not adopted, science and technology programs significantly under-invest in efficiency relative to its potential value, and competitive prototyping to accelerate deployment of efficiency technologies is not done.

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Michigan ‘08 MILITARY FOSSIL FUEL USE HIGH NOW MILITARY USE OF FOSSIL FUELS IS HIGH AND RAPIDLY GROWING
Thomas D. Crowley, et. al., President, L. E. Peabody & Associates, Inc., “Transforming the Way DOD Looks at Energy,” LMI Research Institute Report Commissioned by the Pentagon, April 2007 (http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_404_FT602T1_Transforming%20the%20Way%20 DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy_Final%20Report.pdf) A recent Los Angeles Times article noted that the U.S. military is consuming about 2.4 million gallons of fuel every day in Iraq and Afghanistan.19 The data, provided by the U.S. Central Command, show that DoD is using approximately 57,000 barrels a day, at a cost of about $3 million per day. This equates to about 16 gallons per soldier per day. This is significantly more than the 2005 consumption rate of 9 gallons per soldier. These numbers make it clear that energy consumption for military operations has increased dramatically in the last 15 years. In Desert Storm, consumption was 4 gallons per soldier per soldier, and in World War II, consumption was only 1 gallon per day per soldier. Appendix A contains additional detail about DoD’s mobility fuel use.

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Michigan ‘08
=====HEGEMONY ADVANTAGE===== ---GENERAL- --

PLAN SOLVES HEGEMONY THE AFF SOLVES HEGEMONY -- NEW ENERGY STRATEGY FOR THE MILITARY IS KEY
Gregory J. Lengyel, Colonel, United States Air Force, “Department of Defense Energy Strategy: Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks,” Brookings Institute, August 2007 (http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/08defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf) This paper has attempted to objectively address the US National Security problem of deteriorating energy security from a Department of Defense perspective. Energy is the life blood of the US economy and the key enabler of US military combat power. The United States’ unique ability to project military power anywhere on the globe requires incredible quantities of liquid hydrocarbon fuel. Today, the primary source of fuel is imported oil from an economically and politically unstable world oil market. The true cost of fuel is much more than it appears on the purchasing receipt. The DOD’s never ending need for fuel comes with a high price tag which includes not only the bulk purchase price of the fuel itself, but also the cost of a fuel logistics system that includes tens of thousands of personnel, storage facilities, tanker trucks, and major weapons systems such as the KC-135 whose primary mission is to deliver fuel. Additionally, fuel has a significant cost in combat capability that is almost impossible to quantify. There are numerous outstanding energy programs within the Department of Defense. Rising energy costs have given new emphasis to saving fuel in each of the Services, and the DOD facilities energy management program is a model for the federal government. Recent energy studies by military and energy experts provide volumes of recommendations to improve efficiency and save energy. However, there is no existing comprehensive DOD Energy Strategy, and no single energy senior official or energy advocate in the Department. The military’s dependence on vast amounts of fuel and electricity creates vulnerabilities. Disruption in the flow of fuel and electricity due to natural disaster, sabotage or physical attack on the petroleum or electricity infrastructure cannot be dismissed as an unlikely event. Also, the fact that so much of US and other countries energy needs rely on imported oil creates foreign policy and economic vulnerability. To improve energy security the DOD needs a comprehensive Energy Strategy that: • Improves National Security by decreasing US dependence on foreign oil • Ensures access to critical energy requirements • Maintains or improves combat capability • Promotes Research for future energy security • Is fiscally responsible to the American tax payer • Protects the environment Also required is an organizational structure to implement that strategy through the establishment of an ASD for Energy Security with policy and resource authority to serve as the Senior Official for energy issues in the Department. The ASD for Energy Security must implement the Department’s Energy Strategy through: • Leadership and culture change to make energy a consideration in all military actions and operations • Innovation and process efficiencies as well as efficiency improvements in platforms and facilities to reduce energy demand • Increased energy supply via alternative fuels and renewable energy programs The Department of Defense can lead the way in transforming the way in which the United States consumes and produces energy. In the 1985 movie, Back to the Future, scientist Dr. Emmett Brown returns from the year 2015 with a 1980’s vintage vehicle modified with a “Mr. Fusion” device creating huge amounts of energy from organic material found in common household garbage. The year 2015 is only 8 years away and there is no evidence Mr. Fusion, or any other major scientific breakthrough making oil obsolete, is going to happen inside the next 30 years. Mr. Fusion represents the unlikely event of a game winning home run with bases loaded and a full count. In reality there are few home runs to reduce the United States’ addiction to foreign oil. Improving energy security must be done using a steady, incremental approach not tied to individual personalities, specific military leaders or partisan political administrations. Securing the energy future of the Department of Defense is a prerequisite to ensuring the United States remains the world’s preeminent global power.

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Michigan ‘08 RENEWABLES BOOST HEGEMONY
Alternative energy solves hard power Worldwatch Institute, 2006 [“American Energy: The Renewable Path to Energy Security”, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2006/09/american_energy.html/AmericanEnergy.pdf, September] A 2005 study by the U.S. Department of Defense found that renewable energy can enhance the military’s mission, providing flexible, reliable, and secure electricity supplies for many installations and generating power for perimeter security devices at remote installations. Renewable energy provided more than 8 percent of all electricity for U.S. military installations by the end of 2005. Both the military and the Central Intelligence Agency are turning to new lightweight batteries in the field and for use in intelligence applications.

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Michigan ‘08 FOSSIL FUEL USE UNDERMINES HEGEMONY FOSSIL FUEL DEPENDENCE UNDERMINES HEGEMONY
Thomas D. Crowley, et. al., President, L. E. Peabody & Associates, Inc., “Transforming the Way DOD Looks at Energy,” LMI Research Institute Report Commissioned by the Pentagon, April 2007 (http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_404_FT602T1_Transforming%20the%20Way%20 DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy_Final%20Report.pdf) Over the past several decades, the United States has become increasingly reliant on imported energy, primarily from petroleum. The Energy Information Agency (EIA) forecasts that U.S. dependence on petroleum imports will increase to 68 percent by 2025. DoD, the largest U.S. consumer of energy, also relies on foreign supplies of crude oil and the finished transportation fuels (such as military jet fuel) that are derived from it. Fuel represents more than half of the DoD logistics tonnage and more than 70 percent of the tonnage required to put the U.S. Army into position for battle.1 The Navy uses millions of gallons of fuel every day to operate around the globe, and the Air Force—the largest DoD consumer of fuel— uses even more. DoD’s heavy operational dependence on traditional fuel sources creates a number of decidedly negative effects: DoD shares the nation’s reliance on foreign energy sources, which effectively forces the country to rely on potential adversaries to maintain its economy and national security.2 DoD’s energy dependence exposes the department to price volatility, forcing it to consume unplanned resources that could be used to recapitalize an aging force structure and infrastructure. The availability of traditional energy supplies beyond 25 years is difficult to project. Because of the 8- to 20-year time frame of future operational concepts and a similarly long, or longer, capital asset replacement cycle for DoD platforms, DoD must begin now to address its uncertain energy future. The United States bears many costs associated with the stability of the global oil market and infrastructure. The cost of securing Persian Gulf sources alone comes to $44.4 billion annually.3 DoD receives little support from other consuming nations to perform this mission although they share in the benefits due to the global nature of the oil market. In this environment of uncertainty about the availability of traditional fuel sources at a reasonable cost, DoD is facing increasing energy demand and support requirements that it must meet if it is to achieve its broader strategic goals— notably, establishment of a more mobile and agile force. However, recent technological advances in energy efficiency and alternative energy technologies offer a unique opportunity for DoD to make progress toward reconciling its strategic goals with its energy requirements through reduced consumption of fuel— especially foreign fuel. To capitalize on this opportunity, DoD needs to implement an energy strategy that encompasses the development of innovative new concepts and capabilities to reduce energy dependence while maintaining or increasing overall warfighting effectiveness.

FOSSIL FUEL DEPENDENCE UNDERMINES FORWARD DEPLOYMENT AND CAUSES COMPETITION WITH CHINA AND INDIA
Thomas D. Crowley, et. al., President, L. E. Peabody & Associates, Inc., “Transforming the Way DOD Looks at Energy,” LMI Research Institute Report Commissioned by the Pentagon, April 2007 (http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_404_FT602T1_Transforming%20the%20Way%20 DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy_Final%20Report.pdf) Today, the United States is the superpower. Yet, the scramble to secure access to oil continues while the availability of easily recoverable oil diminishes, putting the United States into increasing competition with other oil importers, most notably, the rapidly emerging economies of India and China.1 As the U.S. government’s energy security strategy evolves, the U.S. military, which is highly dependent on oil to fuel the engines of its overwhelming operational superiority, must develop a long-term strategy to deal with the changing energy environment.

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Michigan ‘08 FOSSIL FUEL USE UNDERMINES HEGEMONY
Oil undermines hegemony -- numerous reasons Scire, 2008 (John, Adjunct Professor of Political Science at University of Nevada, Reno, "Oil dependency, national security" http://www.nevadaappeal.com/article/20080210/OPINION/227691244 feb 10) DoD's dependency on oil as a primary motor fuel makes military operations much more costly than if it had alternative fuels. Oil dependency also requires that we dedicate military forces to the Persian Gulf area, reducing our ability to use those forces in other places. Furthermore, the U.S. military presence in the Middle East raises the potential for military conflicts with other importing nations as world demand increases and supplies decrease. Our oil dependency also strains military alliances, such as NATO, as members compete for oil. Witness the French and Germans working with the Iranians to increase oil production and Pakistan building a port to import Iranian natural gas while we are trying to stop the Iranian nuclear program. Their need for oil and gas trumps our need to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. The last and perhaps most serious impact on national security of our oil dependency is that the chronic weakening of the U.S. economic base will inevitably weaken our military; we cannot sustain a strong military with a weak economy.

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Michigan ‘08 FOSSIL FUEL USE UNDERMINES WARFIGHTING
Fuel dependence undermines warfighting -- the plan solves Lovins et al 2004 (Amory Lovins, cofounder and CEO of Rocky Mountain Institute, former advisor to the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense, Winning the Oil End Game, pg. 221) As the rest of the federal government leads, follows, or gets out of the way, there's one part of the government that is trained, prepared, and obliged to lead: the Department of Defense. We showed on pp. 84-93 why DoD absolutely requires superefficient land, sea, and air platforms to fulfill its national-security mission. To be sure, as a byproduct of platform efficiency, DoD will also greatly enhance its warfighting capability and trim probably tens of billions of dollars per year off its overstressed budgets; but the most important result will be the Pentagon's ability to deploy and sustain agile, effective forces. The more the military can be relieved of the duty to protect oil, the safer will be our troops, our nation, and the world. And the military's spearheading of lightweighting and other efficiency technologies will greatly hasten the day it will be relieved of this unnecessary mission. Right now, the Pentagon's requirements-writing, design, and procurement of military platforms place a modest rhetorical priority but a low actual priority on fuel efficiency. The Defense Science Board (DSB) task force's report of 31 January 2001 set out the needed reforms. It was briefed to the full DSB in May 2001, released mid-August 2001, and concurred with by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 24 August 2001.883 Eighteen days after that came 9/11, which diverted attention from any further action. Decisive adoption is now overdue. Fortunately, there are growing signs, chiefly within the Services, of interest in shifting in-house and contractor design professionals toward integrative, wholesystem thinking that can "tunnel through the cost barrier" to radical energy efficiency at lower capital COSt.884 The main missing ingredient is turning efficiency aspirations into actual requirements and acquisitions. Leadership to do so must come from the Secretary of Defense.

Fossil fuel use undermines combat effectiveness -- slows down troops on the battlefield and exposes the military to vulnerabilities CNA, 2007 [CNA Corporation, a non profit organization that has been conducting independent research on issues
of public concern for over 60 years, “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change”, http://securityandclimate.cna.org/report/National%20Security%20and%20the%20Threat%20of%20Climate%20Chang e.pdf]

“Seventy percent of the tonnage on the battlefield is fuel,” he said. “That’s an amazing number. Between fuel and water, it’s almost everything we take to the battlefield. Food and ammo are really quite small in comparison. “Delivering that fuel requires secure lines of communication,” Gen. Farrell said. “If you have bases nearby, you may be able to deliver it with much less risk, but that’s a supply line issue. And we see in Iraq how dangerous it can be to transport fuel. “The military should be interested in fuel economy on the battlefield,” he said. “It’s a readiness issue. If you can move your men and materiel more quickly, if you have less tonnage but the same level of protection and firepower, you’re more efficient on the battlefield. That’s a life and death issue.” Gen. Farrell talked about the challenge of focusing on long-term issues. “Climate change is not something people can recognize,” he said. “In geologic times, it’s quick. But in human terms, it’s still very slow. It’s hard to get all of us to do something about it. And that leads me to believe we should deal with other things that are a problem today but that also get us to the heart of climate change. That’s where I get to the issue of smart energy choices. “Focus on conservation and on energy sources that aren’t based in carbon. Move toward a hydrogen economy, in part because you know it will ultimately give you efficiency and, yes, profit. When you pursue these things, you build alliances along the way. That’s safety. It’s a benefit we see right now.”

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Michigan ‘08 FOSSIL FUEL USE UNDERMINES WARFIGHTING
Fossil fuel use exposes the military to attacks, undermining warfighting Mark Clayton Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor, Christian Science Monitor [News Paper] September 7, 2006, In the Iraqi war zone, US Army calls for 'green' power [Lexis] Memo to Pentagon brass from the top United States commander in western Iraq: Renewable energy - solar and wind-power generators - urgently needed to help win the fight. Send soon. Calling for more energy in the middle of oil-rich Iraq might sound odd to some. But not to Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Richard Zilmer, whose deputies on July 25 sent the Pentagon a "Priority 1" request for "a self-sustainable energy solution" including "solar panels and wind turbines." The memo may be the first time a frontline commander has called for renewable-energy backup in battle. Indeed, it underscores the urgency: Without renewable power, US forces "will remain unnecessarily exposed" and will "continue to accrue preventable ... serious and grave casualties," the memo says. Apparently, the brass is heeding that call. The US Army's Rapid Equipping Force (REF), which speeds frontline requests, is "expected soon" to begin welcoming proposals from companies to build and ship to Iraq 183 frontline renewable-energy power stations, an REF spokesman confirms. The stations would use a mix of solar and wind power to augment diesel generators at US outposts, the spokesman says. Despite desert temperatures, the hot "thermal signature" of a diesel generator can call enemy attention to US outposts, experts say. With convoys still vulnerable to ambush, the fewer missions needed to resupply outposts with JP-8 fuel to run power generators - among the Army's biggest fuel guzzlers - the better, the memo says. "By reducing the need for [petroleum] at our outlying bases, we can decrease the frequency of logistics convoys on the road, thereby reducing the danger to our marines, soldiers, and sailors," reads the unclassified memo posted on the website InsideDefense.com, a defense industry publication that first reported its existence last month.

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Michigan ‘08 AT: NO TECH AVAILABLE RECENT TECH UPGRADES HAVE MADE RENEWABLES VIABLE FOR THE MILITARY
Thomas D. Crowley, et. al., President, L. E. Peabody & Associates, Inc., “Transforming the Way DOD Looks at Energy,” LMI Research Institute Report Commissioned by the Pentagon, April 2007 (http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_404_FT602T1_Transforming%20the%20Way%20 DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy_Final%20Report.pdf) In an environment of uncertainty about the price and availability of traditional energy sources, DoD is facing increasing energy demand and support requirements that it must meet if it is to achieve its broader strategic goals—notably, establishment of a more mobile and agile force. However, recent technological advances in energy efficiency and alternative energy technologies offer a unique opportunity for DoD to make progress toward reconciling its strategic goals with its energy requirements through reduced consumption of fuel—especially foreign fuel. To capitalize on this opportunity, DoD needs to implement an energy strategy that encompasses the development of innovative new concepts and capabilities to reduce energy dependence while maintaining or increasing overall warfighting effectiveness. Recognizing that DoD must change how it views, values, and uses energy—a transformation that will challenge some of the department’s most deeply held assumptions, interests, and processes—the Office of Force Transformation and Resources, within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, asked LMI to develop an approach to establishing a DoD energy strategy.

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Michigan ‘08 AT: CAN DEVELOP TECH LATER PROCUREMENT AND DESIGN DECISIONS MUST BE MADE AT LEAST A DECADE IN ADVANCE -- YOU CAN’T JUST GET NEW TECH LATER
Thomas D. Crowley, et. al., President, L. E. Peabody & Associates, Inc., “Transforming the Way DOD Looks at Energy,” LMI Research Institute Report Commissioned by the Pentagon, April 2007 (http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_404_FT602T1_Transforming%20the%20Way%20 DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy_Final%20Report.pdf) The availability of traditional energy supplies beyond 25 years is difficult to project. Because of the 8- to 20-year time frame of future operational concepts and a similarly long, or longer, capital asset replacement cycle for DoD platforms, DoD must begin now to address its uncertain energy future. The United States bears many costs associated with the stability of the global oil market and infrastructure. The cost of securing Persian Gulf sources alone comes to $44.4 billion annually.3 DoD receives little support from other consuming nations to perform this mission although they share in the benefits due to the global nature of the oil market. In this environment of uncertainty about the availability of traditional fuel sources at a reasonable cost, DoD is facing increasing energy demand and support requirements that it must meet if it is to achieve its broader strategic goals— notably, establishment of a more mobile and agile force. However, recent technological advances in energy efficiency and alternative energy technologies offer a unique opportunity for DoD to make progress toward reconciling its strategic goals with its energy requirements through reduced consumption of fuel— especially foreign fuel. To capitalize on this opportunity, DoD needs to implement an energy strategy that encompasses the development of innovative new concepts and capabilities to reduce energy dependence while maintaining or increasing overall warfighting effectiveness.

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Michigan ‘08
---COSTS---

RENEWABLES SOLVE OIL COSTS RENEWABLES SOLVE THE IMPACT OF HIGH FUEL COSTS FOR THE MILITARY
Thomas D. Crowley, et. al., President, L. E. Peabody & Associates, Inc., “Transforming the Way DOD Looks at Energy,” LMI Research Institute Report Commissioned by the Pentagon, April 2007 (http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_404_FT602T1_Transforming%20the%20Way%20 DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy_Final%20Report.pdf) Fiscal. DoD seeks to reduce operating costs of the current force to procure new capabilities for the future. But, with increased energy consumption and increased price pressure due to growing global demand for energy, energy-associated operating costs are growing. In parallel with the increase in the global demand for energy is an increase in concern about global climate change and other environmental considerations. Therefore, when identifying technical solutions to its energy challenges, DoD should also considered a fourth disconnect—environmental. From our research, we concluded that DoD has the opportunity to address the four disconnects by fundamentally changing how it views, values, and uses energy. Many actions are required to implement this transformation, but the highest-level requirements are straightforward: Incorporate energy considerations (energy use and energy logistics support requirements) in the department’s key corporate processes: strategic planning, analytic agenda, joint concept and joint capability development, acquisition, and planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) Establish a corporate governance structure with policy and resource oversight to focus the department’s energy efforts Apply a structured framework to address energy efficiency, including alternate energy sources, to the department’s greatest energy challenges— those areas consuming the most fuel, requiring the most logistics support, or having the most negative impact on the warrior.

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Michigan ‘08 AT: RETROFITTING EXPENSIVE THE EQUIPMENT IS GOING TO BE RETROFITTED ANYWAY -- YOU MIGHT AS WELL CHANGE THE ENGINES Carns and Schlesinger ‘08
(General Michael Carns, United States Air Force (Retired), Dr. James Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense, “More Fight – Less Fuel,” Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, February 2008 http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-02-ESTF.pdf)

The challenge is to translate reductions in battlespace fuel demand into the savings that would result from retiring or diverting the equipment and systems no longer needed to deliver that fuel. The methodology developed by OSD(PA&E) provides the most comprehensive estimate of the costs of fuel in peacetime at installations and in specific operational situations but has not yet been converted into a full analysis ready to apply. The task of relating reductions in these costs to specific reductions in battlespace fuel demand also remains to be done. 3.3.1.6 Reset Opportunities While not acquisitions, reset (or recapitalization) programs direct substantial sums of money to rebuilding existing equipment to original specifications. The net effect is to refurbish yesterday’s equipment buys to yesterday’s vehicle technology baseline. A refurbished 1970s technology High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) is still a 1970s vintage HMMWV. The Army estimates its current reset requirement at about $85 billion.15 The Task Force views this investment as an opportunity to move technology forward. While there are limitations imposed by the basic configuration of the equipment, the Task Force strongly recommends explicitly exploring opportunities to improve the energy efficiency of systems scheduled for reset.

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Michigan ‘08 COSTS WILL RISE FUEL COSTS WILL RISE DRAMATICALLY FOR THE MILITARY
Michael Hornitschek, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force, “War Without Oil: A Catalyst for True Transformation,” Air War College Report, 2-17-2006 (http://www.nps.edu/cebrowski/Docs/sustainability/other%20articles/War%20Without%20Oil.pdf)
This type of mushrooming emerging-economy demand elevates prices and precisely collides with a growing U.S. demand for imported oil. U.S. demand is expected to grow by 37 percent (1.5 percent per year) in the next 20 years to a total of 27.9M bbls/day in 2025, at which point it will be importing 68 percent of its oil.38 The EIA chart in Figure 7 most clearly illustrates America’s expected oil future: What are the U.S. military consequences of this situation? First, as the world’s largest single oil consumer, the DoD will pay significantly more to sustain its daily operations. Whereas the temporary 1973 and 1980 energy crises were politically motivated, OPEC-engineered, supply shortages that selfcorrected after world demand constricted and non-OPEC suppliers expanded production, the 2005 energy situation appears semi-permanent, with global demand essentially equaling available global production capacity. EIA reported that in 2005 surplus global oil production capacity was only 1.5M bbls/day, less than 2 percent above the daily 84M bbl/day demand.40 Consequently, Goldman Sachs expects oil to remain at $60+ a bbl for at least the next 5 years— indicating that a new oil equilibrium in world oil prices has been reached.41 Acute regional crises such as another Gulf Coast Katrina-style weather event, a terrorist destruction of the 5M-barrel/day Saudi Ras Tanura petroleum processing facility42, or a UNsponsored embargo of Iran, could also temporarily drive the price of oil to as high as $131 per barrel.43 The second and greater significance of a permanently tightening global energy market is that precisely when the energy cost of national security is rising, by 2025 DoD’s activities and America’s foreign policy could be ever more dictated by the requirement to secure the 68+ percent share of oil it needs to acquire internationally.

FUEL NEEDS WILL RISE DRAMATICALLY IN THE NEAR FUTURE
Thomas D. Crowley, et. al., President, L. E. Peabody & Associates, Inc., “Transforming the Way DOD Looks at Energy,” LMI Research Institute Report Commissioned by the Pentagon, April 2007 (http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_404_FT602T1_Transforming%20the%20Way%20 DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy_Final%20Report.pdf)
Recent experience indicates that the nature of the threat facing the United States is changing. Today, we cannot be sure in advance of the location of future conflicts, given the threat of dispersed, small-scale attacks inherent in warfare with rogue nations and insurgent forces. In addition, the U.S. military must be prepared to defend against single strikes capable of mass casualties. This complex security environment—an environment in which a wide range of conventional and unconventional attacks can come from unpredictable regions of the world and the risk of a single attack is high—requires the United States not only to maintain a force that is forward and engaged on a daily steadystate basis, but also to ensure that it is ready for quick, surge deployments worldwide to counter, and deter, a broad spectrum of potential threats. Department-wide and service-specific strategy documents have identified solutions to navigating in this new environment. The solutions have three general themes (described in Appendix B): Theme 1. Our forces must expand geographically and be more mobile and expeditionary so that they can be engaged in more theaters and prepared for expedient deployment anywhere in the world. Theme 2. We must transition from a reactive to a proactive force posture to deter enemy forces from organizing for and conducting potentially catastrophic attacks. Theme 3. We must be persistent in our presence, surveillance, assistance, and attack to defeat determined insurgents and halt the organization of new enemy forces. To carry out these activities, the U.S. military will have to be even more energy intense, locate in more regions of the world, employ new technologies, and manage a more complex logistics system. Considering the trend in operational fuel consumption and future capability needs, this “new” force employment construct will likely demand more energy/fuel in the deployed setting. Simply put, more miles will be traveled, both by combat units and the supply units that sustain them, which will result in increased energy consumption. Therefore, DoD must apply new energy technologies that address alternative supply sources and efficient consumption across all aspects of military operations.

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Michigan ‘08 COSTS HIGH
High fuel prices force military to buy gas not supplies

Army Times ‘08
(William H. McMichael and Rick Maze - Staff writers Posted : Sunday May 18, 2008 9:11:59 EDT http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/05/army_fuel_051908w/) The skyrocketing cost of fuel isn’t just hitting U.S. drivers in the pocketbook — it’s blowing a bit of a hole in the Pentagon budget as well. In a revised request for supplemental war funding for fiscal 2009, submitted May 2, defense officials have asked Congress to appropriate $3.69 billion for all fuels, a $2.2 billion increase over their initial request. That, of course, looks far ahead and could still prove to be inadequate. According to Pentagon budget documents, the request would support a crude oil price of $97.19 per barrel — and also assumes that the military’s overall fuel costs will drop by 4.8 percent. The current world price, however, has climbed to and is hovering around $120 per barrel, and many analysts think rising global demand and other factors will keep prices high. And 2009 isn’t the only concern; the Pentagon needs more money for fuel to cover the remaining five months of this fiscal year. This would come by way of the $108 billion war supplemental appropriation request, which has yet to be approved. The Pentagon has asked for a total of $1.9 billion for fuel, an increase of $281.4 million over its original supplemental request. All told, that’s an additional $2.48 billion on top of the amounts included in the Pentagon’s 2008 and 2009 base budgets — and defense officials already acknowledge that the 2009 supplemental request won’t cover that entire fiscal year. That would buy another 19 F-22 fighters for the Air Force, or 36 MV-22 Ospreys for the Marine Corps.

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Michigan ‘08
---IRAQ---

FOSSIL FUEL USE UNDERMINES IRAQ EFFORT FOSSIL FUEL USE BY THE MILITARY UNDERMINES ONGOING EFFORTS TO STABILIZE IRAQ
Thomas D. Crowley, et. al., President, L. E. Peabody & Associates, Inc., “Transforming the Way DOD Looks at Energy,” LMI Research Institute Report Commissioned by the Pentagon, April 2007 (http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_404_FT602T1_Transforming%20the%20Way%20 DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy_Final%20Report.pdf) The Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) estimates that 20,000 soldiers are employed to deliver fuel to operations (and spending $1 million per day to transport petroleum, which does not include fuel costs for contractor-provided combat support). The delivery of fuel poses such an operational and tactical risk that in July 2006, Maj. Gen. Richard Zilmer, the highest-ranking Marine Corps officer in Iraq’s Anbar Province, characterized the development of solar and wind power capabilities as a “joint urgent operational need.” General Zilmer cited reductions in often dangerous fuel transportation activities as the main motivation for this request: “By reducing the need for [petroleum-based fuels] at our outlying bases, we can decrease the frequency of logistics convoys on the road, thereby reducing the danger to our Marines, soldiers, and sailors.”

Renewables are critical to military readiness and mission success in Iraq.
CNA, 2007 [CNA Corporation, a non profit organization that has been conducting independent research on issues of
public concern for over 60 years, “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change”, http://securityandclimate.cna.org/report/National%20Security%20and%20the%20Threat%20of%20Climate%20Chang e.pdf]

For deployed systems, the DoD pays a high price for high fuel demand. In Iraq, significant combat forces are dedicated to moving fuel and protecting fuel supply lines. The fuel delivery situation on the ground in Iraq is so limited that the Army has established a “Power Surety Task Force” to help commanders of forward operating bases cut the number of fuel convoys by using energy more efficiently. Maj. Gen. Richard Zilmer, USMC, commander of the multinational force in the Anbar province of Iraq, asked for help in August 2006. His request was for renewable energy systems. According to Gen. Zilmer, “reducing the military’s dependence on fuel for power generation could reduce the number of road-bound convoys…” Without this solution [renewable energy systems], personnel loss rates are likely to continue at their current rate. Continued casualty accumulation exhibits potential to jeopardize mission success…” Along a similar vein, Lt. Gen. James Marris, while commanding general of the First Marine Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom, urged: “Unleash us from the tether of fuel.” Energy efficient technologies, energy conservation practices and renewable energy sources are the tools forward bases are using to stem their fuel demand and reduce the “target signature” of their fuel convoys. Numerous DoD studies dating back from the 2001 Defense Science Board report “More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden” have concluded that high fuel demand by combat forces detracts from our combat capability, makes our forces more vulnerable, diverts combat assets from offense to supply line protection, and increase operating costs. Nowhere are these problems more evident than in Iraq, where every day 2.4 million gallons of fuel is moved through dangerous territory, requiring protection by armored combat vehicles and attack helicopters.

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Michigan ‘08
---IMPACTS---

IMPACT – GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR U.S. HEGEMONY SOLVES GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR
Zalmay Khalilzad, Defense Researcher at RAND, Washington Quarterly, Spring, 1995 lexis Global Leadership Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and lowlevel conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

COLLAPSE OF HEGEMONY RESULTS IN APOLARITY WHICH RISKS NUMEROUS SCENARIOS FOR NUCLEAR WAR
Niall Fergusen, Professor of History at New York University, Foreign Policy, July / August 2004
For more than two decades, globalization--the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital--has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization--which a new Dark Age would produce--would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony--its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier--its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity--a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.

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Michigan ‘08 IMPACT – GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR
American primacy is vital to accessing every major impact—the only threat to world peace is if we allow it to collapse Thayer, professor of security studies at Missouri State, November 06 (Bradley, The National Interest, “In Defense of Primacy”, November/December, p. 32-37)
A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power-the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, either because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher

Layne warned of these dangers of primacy and called for retrenchment.1 Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a
diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower

But retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy. There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this. So
and seapower to defend its interests. the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action but they fall to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not. A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based

retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going
on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat.

predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from .American
To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself.

This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore

balancing.

Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global common"--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space-allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased.' This is not an

A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes, their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements-and they include almost
advantage that should be relinquished lightly. all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states

U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect-has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate
aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies. with allies outside of the where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A.

You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezeula. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to
Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states

even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies
because it is a rising great power. But such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba-it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very

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Michigan ‘08 IMPACT – GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR
well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States

. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order-free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Rai Donner sang: "You don't
today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War,

American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United
U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American

once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States.
worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at

.

the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the
the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those

the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"-it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The
missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many

About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous
months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those ill need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was

When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg.
well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror.

47

Michigan ‘08 HEGEMONY SUSTAINABLE UNIPOLARITY IS DURABLE – OVERWHELMING DOMINANCE AND GEOGRAPHICAL ADVANTAGES ENSURE
William Wohlforth, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, “The Stability of a Unipolar World” International Security, Summer 1999 Unipolarity Is Durable Unipolarity rests on two pillars. I have already established the first: the sheer size and comprehensiveness of the power gap separating the United States from other states. This massive power gap implies that any countervailing change must be strong and sustained to produce structural effects. The second pillar— geography—is just as important. In addition to all the other advantages the United States possesses, we must also consider its four truest allies: Canada, Mexico, the Atlantic, and the Pacific. Location matters. The fact that Soviet power happened to be situated in the heart of Eurasia was a key condition of bipolarity. Similarly, the U.S. position as an offshore power determines the nature and likely longevity of unipolarity. Just as the raw numbers could not capture the real dynamics of bipolarity, power indexes alone cannot capture the importance of the fact that the United States is in North America while all the other potential poles are in or around Eurasia. The balance of power between the sole pole and the second-tier states is not the only one that matters, and it may not even be the most important one for many states. Local balances of power may loom larger in the calculations of other states than the background unipolar structure. Efforts to produce a counterbalance globally will generate powerful countervailing action locally. As a result, the threshold concentration of power necessary to sustain unipolarity is lower than most scholars assume. Because they fail to appreciate the sheer size and comprehensiveness of the power gap and the advantages conveyed by geography, many scholars expect bi- or multipolarity to reappear quickly. They propose three ways in which unipolarity will end: counterbalancing by other states, regional integration, or the differential growth in power. None of these is likely to generate structural change in the policy-relevant future.44

MULTIPOLARITY IS NOT EMERGING – GREAT POWER STATES PREFER UNIPOLARITY
William Wohlforth, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, “The Stability of a Unipolar World” International Security, Summer 1999
Thus the quick routes to multipolarity are blocked. If states value their independence and security, most will prefer the current structure to a multipolarity based on regional unipolarities. Eventually, some great powers will have the capability to counter the United States alone or in traditional great power alliances that exact a smaller price in security or autonomy than unipolarity does. Even allowing for the differential growth in power to the United States’ disadvantage, however, for several decades it is likely to remain more costly for second-tier states to form counterbalancing alliances than it is for the unipolar power to sustain a system of alliances that reinforces its own dominance.

48

Michigan ‘08 INTERVENTION INEVITABLE INTERVENTION IS INEVITABLE
Zalmay Khalilzad, Former Professor of Political Science at Columbia and Director of Project Air Force at RAND, Current US Ambassador to Iraq, Conflict in the 21st Century, 1998 P. 11 We are convinced that the United States will remain engaged as a major player on the global scene through the first years of the 21st century. Indeed, despite the occasional eruption of isolationist sentiments, we believe that the nation simply has little choice in the matter. The sheer magnitude of the U.S. economy; the country’s dense and increasing web of commercial, cultural, political, and security ties to other nations and actors; and its sheer pervasiveness and prominence make the United States the globe’s “500-pound gorilla” whether we like it or not. With the end of the global East-West competition, the United States can be more selective in its military involvement around the world than was the case during the Cold War. However, as a powerful actor with global interests, the United States will remain likely to become involved in a variety of foreign contingencies, ranging from forward defense of a threatened ally to disaster relief and other varieties of humanitarian assistance. The U.S. military will be called upon to play a major role in some such undertakings. As such, it seems desirable that the armed forces, including the Air Force, remain “fullservice” providers. It is difficult to identify what existing deployable capabilities the military can afford to divest itself of in the face of the possible menu of challenges confronting the United States over the next quarter century.

49

Michigan ‘08 AT: BALANCING NO IMPACT TO BALANCING AND IF HEGEMONY COLLAPSES BALANCING IS INEVITABLE
Stephen Walt, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls” Naval War College Review, Spring 2002 Today, U.S. primacy helps deter potential challenges to American interests in virtually every part of the world. Few countries or nonstate groups want to invite the "focused enmity" of the United States (to use William Wohlforth's apt phrase), and countries and groups that have done so (such as Libya, Iraq, Serbia, or the Taliban) have paid a considerable price. As discussed below, U.S. dominance does provoke opposition in a number of places, but anti-American elements are forced to rely on covert or indirect strategies (such as terrorist bombings) that do not seriously threaten America's dominant position. Were American power to decline significantly, however, groups opposed to U.S. interests would probably be emboldened and overt challenges would be more likely.

HEGEMONY DETERS BALANCING
William Wohlforth, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, “The Stability of a Unipolar World” International Security, Summer 1999
The U.S. combination of quantitative and qualitative material advantages is unprecedented, and it translates into a unique geopolitical position. Thanks to a decades-old policy of harnessing technology to the generation of military power, the U.S. comparative advantage in this area mirrors Britain’s naval preeminence in the nineteenth century. At the same time, Washington’s current brute share of great power capabilities—its aggregate potential compared with that of the next largest power or all other great powers combined—dwarfs Britain’s share in its day. The United States is the only state with global power projection capabilities; it is probably capable, if challenged, of producing defensive land-power dominance in the key theaters; it retains the world’s only truly blue-water navy; it dominates the air; it has retained a nuclear posture that may give it first-strike advantages against other nuclear powers; and it has continued to nurture decades-old investments in military logistics and command, control, communications, and intelligence. By devoting only 3 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defense, it outspends all other great powers combined—and most of those great powers are its close allies. Its defense R&D expenditures are probably greater than those of the rest of the world combined (Table 3). None of the major powers is balancing; most have scaled back military expenditures faster than the United

States has. One reason may be that democracy and globalization have changed the nature of world politics. Another possibility, however, is that any effort to compete directly with the United States is futile, so no one tries.

CONCERNS OVER U.S. HEGEMONY ARE MERELY RHETORIC, THE LARGEST POWERS WILL ALL BANDWAGON
William Wohlforth, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, “The Stability of a Unipolar World” International Security, Summer 1999
Most of the counterbalancing that has occurred since 1991 has been rhetorical. Notably absent is any willingness on the part of the other great powers to accept any significant political or economic costs in countering U.S. power. Most of the world’s powers are busy trying to climb aboard the American bandwagon even as they curtail their military outlays. Military spending by all the other great powers is either declining or holding steady in real terms. While Washington prepares for increased defense outlays, current planning in Europe, Japan, and China does not suggest real increases in the offing, and Russia’s spending will inevitably decline further.61 This response on the part of the other major powers is understandable, because the raw distribution of power leaves them with no realistic hope of counterbalancing the United States, while U.S.-managed security systems in Europe and Asia moderate the demand for more military capabilities.

50

Michigan ‘08 AT: OVERSTRETCH HEGEMONY KEY TO COALITION BUILDING
Robert Art, Professor of International Relations at Brandeis, Research Associate at the Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard and Senior Fellow at MIT’s Security Studies Program, International Security, Winter 1999

Second, isolationism forgoes the opportunity to exploit the full peacetime political utility of America’s alliances and forward-deployed forces to shape events to its advantage. Isolationism’s general approach is to cope with events after they have turned adverse rather than to prevent matters from turning adverse in the first place. Thus, even though it does not eschew the use of force, isolationism remains at heart a watching and reactive strategy, not, like selective engagement, a precautionary and proactive one. Third, isolationism makes more difficult the warlike use of America’s military power, when that is required, because it forgoes peacetime forward deployment. This provides the United States with valuable bases, staging areas, intelligence-gathering facilities, in-theater training facilities, and most important, close allies with whom it continuously trains and exercises. These are militarily significant advantages and constitute valuable assets if war needs to be waged. Should the United States have to go to war with an isolationist strategy in force, however, these assets would need to be put together under conditions ranging from less than auspicious to emergency-like. Isolationism thus makes war waging more difficult than need be.

COALITION BUILDING SOLVES OVERSTRETCH BY DISPERSING COSTS AMONG ALLIES
Alberto Coll, Former Professor at the Naval War College, Washington Quarterly, Winter 1993 There will be other conflicts of this kind where it will be desirable for the United States to be engaged, while limiting the extent and risks of its engagement. By joining others in a peacekeeping or peaceenforcement effort, the United States can leverage its political and military power considerably and reduce the risks and costs of its involvement. As we move into an era of ever deadlier military technologies and virulent ethnic and religious struggles, multilateral peacekeeping and peacemaking operations that can defuse conflicts and promote settlements will become increasingly relevant to both U.S. security and international order.

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Michigan ‘08
=====PRIVATE SECTOR SPILLOVER ADVANTAGE=====

PLAN SOLVES ECONOMY THE AFF SOLVES THE ECONOMY AND TECHNOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP BY BOLSTERING THE DEFENSE BASE Carns and Schlesinger ‘08
(General Michael Carns, United States Air Force (Retired), Dr. James Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense, “More Fight – Less Fuel,” Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, February 2008 http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-02-ESTF.pdf)

The Task Force recognizes that proving new concepts at scale through competitive prototyping requires significant investment. But DoD has used this approach before and by doing so has achieved rapid advancements in shorter periods than required today. Unfortunately, DoD abandoned this practice a few decades ago as unaffordable. The Task Force concluded that DoD cannot afford not to do competitive prototyping. Such prototyping reduces the risk of deploying advanced technologies more quickly in multibillion acquisition programs. The Task Force also noted the competitive prototyping program should include several important features to ensure effective execution: • It must remain uncoupled from Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP) approved programs in order to avoid risk-aversion and “dumbing-down” by program advocates, whether contractor or government. Cost effective energy efficiency is an unqualified good that DoD should recognize. • The prototypes should be administered by an independent organization with experience in these types of programs in order to: a) streamline the contracting process, b) minimize program management interference with the contractor, c) avoid Service bias, and d) demonstrate contractor’s claims. • The competitive prototype program should fund at least two competitors per vehicle category in order to: a) broaden the number of technological approaches, b) maintain competitive pressure, and c) ensure industrial design base continuity. • The funding should be from Budget Activity 4 accounts (“Advanced Component Development and Prototypes”), and not Science and Technology (S&T) (Budget Activity 1-3), to ensure strong ties to acquisition. The Task Force’s Platform Panel suggests a dedicated level on the order of $500M per year. An effective program would provide operators and program manager’s confidence in innovative technologies through real world testing. It would also provide the industrial base with experience in using new technologies, help to secure technological leadership and improve the competitive position of the defense industry. 3.4 Strategic Technology Vectors Technology does not develop in a particular direction for arbitrary reasons. It does so in response to a perceived need. The Task Force noted recent DSB summer studies on the subject of strategic technology vectors to guide research investments and concluded DoD’s energy problems sufficiently critical to add two new strategic vectors: endurance and resilience.16 This Task Force concluded they would compliment the current vectors of speed, stealth, persistence and networking. Endurance exploits improved energy efficiency and autonomous energy supply to extend range and dwell—recognizing the need for affordable dominance, requiring little or no fuel logistics, in persistent, dispersed, and remote operations, while enhancing overmatch in more traditional operations. Resilience combines efficient energy use with more diverse, dispersed, renewable supply—turning the loss of critical missions from energy supply failures (by accident or malice) from inevitable to near-impossible.

52

Michigan ‘08 PLAN CAUSES SPILLOVER THE PLAN SPILLS OVER TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR Boston Globe, “Environmental Defense,” 5-27-2007
(http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/05/27/environmental_defense/)
It also, some analysts say, could have a dramatic impact on the broader effort to move society away from fossil fuels. The American military has a storied record as a technological innovator: the computer, the commercial jetliner, and the Internet originated from military research and transformed modern life. And with billions to spend it can provide a major proving ground for new energy technologies developed in the private sector. "In terms of alternative energy, the Department of Defense is big enough, in certain sectors, to be the tipping point," says Stuart Funk, an energy specialist at LMI who was once the Pentagon official responsible for fuel operations. The effort has its skeptics. Even supporters are quick to point out that the
Department of Defense is unlikely to accomplish much unless it better organizes its far-flung initiatives. And environmentalists are dubious of an institution that has more often been an adversary. They point out, for example, that some of the ideas -- such as increasing the use of coal to make synthetic fuel -- could actually be more environmentally damaging than the status quo. "It's a little bit early to tell whether the Pentagon is going to be a force for progress or not on the issue of protecting the climate," said David Hawkins, director of the climate center at the Natural Resources Defense Council. Indeed, the Pentagon's central goal is not to align the military with the environmental movement. It is to reduce costs -- the Pentagon spent $13.5 billion on energy last year -- and cut the dependence of its fighting forces on foreign energy. A recent Pentagon-commissioned study by LMI described the American military's reliance on oil as "unsustainable in the long term," the Globe reported earlier this month. Still, the new energy consciousness coincides with a growing conviction among military and intelligence analysts that the planet's changing environment, and the country's reliance on oil, are potent national security issues. And some voices within the military are starting to espouse a worldview -- emphasizing the limits on natural resources and the volatility of ecosystems -- that is decidedly environmentalist in tone. "Clean technologies have become strategic, in part because the military, like the rest of us, is realizing how fragile the environment is," said Kenan Sahin, CEO and founder of Tiax, a Cambridge-based technology development firm working on several projects with the Department of Defense. Whether that means the military is becoming environmentalist, or simply a smarter fighting machine, may be a distinction that makes less and less of a difference. Early last year, in a paper titled "War Without Oil: A Catalyst for True Transformation," an Air Force lieutenant colonel named Michael Hornitschek laid out his vision of the super-efficient American military of 2050. Army and Marine vehicles would run on electric hybrid engines or fuel cells. Warship hulls would be nano-engineered to make them lightweight and more fuel efficient. Surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft would be solar-powered, and individual soldiers would carry pocket hydrogen fuel cells. Expeditionary bases would be capable of generating their own energy from wind, sunlight, biofuel, or garbage. Such a fighting force has an element of "Star Wars fantasy," Hornitschek wrote. But the ideas in the paper are not that far from projects already being funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in conjunction with university laboratories and companies like DuPont, GE, and Hewlett Packard. For one project, DARPA is trying to develop a substitute jet fuel derived from plants such as palm trees and jatropha shrubs. Currently, the Air Force is the largest consumer of energy in the Department of Defense, and every dollar increase in the price of a barrel of oil raises its annual costs by $60 million, according to Kevin Billings, the Air Force's deputy assistant secretary for Environment, Safety and Occupational Health. Another major challenge is the sometimes nightmarish logistics of supplying energy to soldiers in the field. Fuel convoys in Iraq, for example, are favorite targets of insurgent attacks. And with troops increasingly equipped with high-tech devices like satellite phones, GPS locators, and night-vision goggles, energy isn't merely a matter of gasoline -- batteries are also a vital military commodity. A typical soldier carries 10 to 27 pounds of batteries, according to DARPA. To help reduce the load on the military's energy supply lines, DARPA is exploring longer-lasting fuel cells to replace current batteries, as well as technologies, like high-efficiency solar cells and even mobile generators that run on discarded plastic packaging, to allow more power to be generated in the field. Technologies like these would have uses far beyond the battlefield. Higher efficiency solar panels could make solar power more cost-competitive with other forms of energy, and better fuel cells could be used for everything from storing energy generated from solar arrays and wind farms to freeing cellphones from the need to be charged as often.

Cheaper, more reliable jet fuel would no doubt be a boon in the private sector, especially the airline industry, for whom fuel costs are a leading headache. And the same technologies may have applications for other fuels as well.

TECHNOLOGY CREATED WOULD BE USED BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR Carns and Schlesinger ‘08
(General Michael Carns, United States Air Force (Retired), Dr. James Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense, “More Fight – Less Fuel,” Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, February 2008 http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-02-ESTF.pdf) 3.6 National Spinoff Benefits Finally, there are spin-off benefits addressed in the TOR - the national benefits. OSD (PA&E) estimated it is worth $42 to avoid delivering a gallon of fuel through aerial refueling and at least $15 to avoid delivering a gallon of fuel to the forward edge of a battlefield. If the cost of force protection for fuel convoys in Afghanistan and Iraq were used, the $15 figure likely would be far higher since it is based on minimal force protection. It is unlikely that energy efficiency has a higher value to any other organization in the country, possibly the world. If DoD were to invest in technologies that improved efficiency at a level commensurate with the value of those technologies to its forces and warfighting capability, it would probably become a technology incubator and provide mature technologies to the market place for industry to adopt for commercial purposes. The overall national outcome of changing DoD business processes to accurately value efficiency is difficult to predict but doing so would be consistent with best business practices used by the world’s most successful companies and likely would develop multiple technologies for use in the civilian sector as well as by DoD itself.

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Michigan ‘08 PLAN CAUSES SPILLOVER
The military is critical for catalyzing innovation into the private sector Lovins et al 2004 (Amory Lovins, cofounder and CEO of Rocky Mountain Institute, former advisor to the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense, Winning the Oil End Game, pg. 159-161) RMI’s analysis strong suggests that the military and aerospace sectors are the most likely candidates to build the initial and primary market demand that would enable the advanced materials sector to gain the requisite scale economies. The diffusion of military innovation into wide civilian use has encouraging precedents. The best known example is the microchip. In 1976, U'.S. military purchases accounted for 17% of IC [integrated-circuit] sales worldwide ($700 million out of total sales of $4.2 billion)-a significant market share that gave DoD leverage in defining product specifications and directions. In the next 20 years, the Ll.S, military market increased only marginally, to $1.1 billion, while the commercial market exploded to $160 billion. The military market now [in 1999] accounts for less than 1 % of sales, and the commercial market has become the dominant force in setting IC product directions. Although lower prices have resulted, the DoD is now compelled to use commercial IC products and adapt them to meet military requirements, as necessary. Such investments often have surprising and serendipitous spin-offs. Military R&D in advanced aero-engine turbines is obviously the basis of today's modern commercial aircraft, which could hardly get off the ground without those lightweight, fuel-efficient, high-bypass engines. Less obviously, those commercial engine technologies in turn are the basis for the combined-cycle gas-fired power plants that have rapidly transformed the global electric power industry. The advanced materials we envisage for efficient cars and trucks, especially the carbon-fiber composites, are historically based on aerospace technology. The business challenge arises because aerospace applications typically have about a thousand times smaller volume and a thousand times higher cost than automotive ones. Direct technology transfer is therefore insufficient; R&D is needed for mass production of advanced-composite structures that meet the automotive industry's requirements of high volume and low cost. As noted in our earlier discussion of the lightweighting revolution (p. 57), such efforts in the private sector already show promise, and military attention could greatly accelerate their application.:" Non-aerospace military needs, especially for lightweight land and sea plat- forms, are an important pathway to this commercialization because they often need higher production volumes and lower costs than military aircraft. As previously discussed (pp. 84-93), military mission requirements focus strongly on lighter, stronger, cheaper, and more energy-efficient vehicles to fit today's rapid-response and agility-based doctrine and to lower logistics cost and vulnerability. The military has the R&D budget to support the development of advanced materials (composites and lightweight steel), and already does so to a degree. The military clearly has the scale. If DoD were to adopt the changes proposed to its Humvee (HMMWV) production alone, a 10,000-unit yearly production run of the multipurpose vehicle would require 5 million pounds of carbon fiber. This represents over 6% of the current worldwide production capacity of carbon fiber for all applications (80 million pounds). By 2025, the Ll.S. automobile industry alone could demand ~ 1.7 billion pounds of carbon fiber, 21 times current worldwide production, corresponding to compound growth of 15%/y.675 And this rapid expansion is feasible: composite industry sources estimate that within five years the industry could be ready for cost-effective mass production of carbon-fiber-based civilian and military vehicles.?" The synchronized timing of the co-evolution is important. For example, Ford's first round of Escape hybrid SUVs is limited not by the market or its manufacturing
capacity, but by Sanyo's nickel-metal-hydride buffer-battery manufacturing capacity, because soaring demand for Japanese hybrids keeps the supply chain rather fully occupied.?"

, military technology support should be launched now in order to have the capacity ready in time for the automakers' shift. To minimize exposure to the cumbersome DoD budget process, early commitments should focus on DARPA and the more agile R&D and early-application Service organizations.
Therefore

54

Michigan ‘08 PLAN CAUSES SPILLOVER The plan will spill over – cause the rest of the U.S. to go green. Friedman, Two-Time Pulitzer Prize Winning Columnist for the NYT, 2007
[Thomas, “The Power of Green”, International Herald Tribune, originally in the The New York Times Magazine, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/15/opinion/web-0415edgreen-full.php, April 15]

The notion that conserving energy is a geostrategic imperative has also moved into the Pentagon, for slightly different reasons. Generals are realizing that the more energy they save in the heat of battle, the more power they can project. The Pentagon has been looking to improve its energy efficiency for several years now to save money. But the Iraq war has given birth to a new movement in the U.S. military: the ''Green Hawks.'' As Amory Lovins of the Rocky Mountain Institute, who has been working with the Pentagon, put it to me: The Iraq war forced the U.S. military to think much more seriously about how to ''eat its tail'' -- to shorten its energy supply lines by becoming more energy efficient. According to Dan Nolan, who oversees energy projects for the U.S. Army's Rapid Equipping Force, it started last year when a Marine major general in Anbar Province told the Pentagon he wanted better-insulated, more energyefficient tents in the Iraqi desert. Why? His air-conditioners were being run off mobile generators, and the generators ran on diesel, and the diesel had to be trucked in, and the insurgents were blowing up the trucks. ''When we began the analysis of his request, it was really about the fact that his soldiers were being attacked on the roads bringing fuel and water,'' Nolan said. So eating their tail meant ''taking those things that are brought into the unit and trying to generate them on-site.'' To that end Nolan's team is now experimenting with everything from new kinds of tents that need 40 percent less air-conditioning to new kinds of fuel cells that produce water as a byproduct. Pay attention: When the U.S. Army desegregated, the country really desegregated; when the Army goes green, the country could really go green. ''Energy independence is a national security issue,'' Nolan said. ''It's the right business for us to be in. ... We are not trying to change the whole Army. Our job is to focus on that battalion out there and give those commanders the technological innovations they need to deal with today's mission. But when they start coming home, they are going to bring those things with them.' III.

The military is a technological leader – key to influence how the rest of the U.S. and encourage alternative energy use. Boston Globe, 2007
[“Pentagon Study Says Oil Reliance Strains The Military”, May 1, Lexis]

The military is considered a technology leader and how it decides to meet future energy needs could influence broader national efforts to reduce dependence on foreign oil. The report adds a powerful voice to the growing chorus warning that, as oil supplies dwindle during the next half-century, US reliance on fossil fuels poses a serious risk to national security. “The Pentagon’s efforts in this area would have a huge impact on the rest of the country,” Copulos said.

The plan is key to creating a spillover effect. Boland, news editor at SIGNAL Magazine, 2007
[Rita, “Services Transition to New Energy Sources”, http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/Signal_Article_Template.asp?articleid=1262&zoneid=202, February]

Echoing Aimone, Holcomb says the Defense Department needs to start examining energy alternatives now and that efforts are underway to make changes. He adds that the military is a juggernaut that will not adapt quickly. However, modifications in the way the services approach and use energy, and new technologies they develop to conserve and produce energy, will have a ripple effect that will impact the U.S. public.

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Michigan ‘08
plan causes spillover

PLAN CAUSES ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SPILLOVER THROUGHOUT THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Michael Hornitschek, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force, “War Without Oil: A Catalyst for True Transformation,” Air War College Report, 2-17-2006 (http://www.nps.edu/cebrowski/Docs/sustainability/other%20articles/War%20Without%20Oil.pdf) If the above methodology demonstrates a feasible approach for guiding DoD energy transformation to serve the Department’s own requirements, it can then be argued that the lessons learned and knowledge gained from such an endeavor could be applied toward a larger national energy transformation. The DoD-tocivilian transition model has been successfully applied in other major societal changes to include racial integration, sexual equality, and the benefits of networked-based information sharing (i.e., Arpanet/internet) to highlight a few. The creation of a broadly supported post-petroleum DoD vision and transformation strategy could not only preserve a relevant military force, but also lead a positive, bi-partisan, interagency, and economic demonstration for preserving American security overall.

56

Michigan ‘08
---AIRLINES---

2AC – AIRLINES ADD-ON THE PLAN SPILLS OVER TO THE AIRLINES Boston Globe, “Environmental Defense,” 5-27-2007
(http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/05/27/environmental_defense/)
It also, some analysts say, could have a dramatic impact on the broader effort to move society away from fossil fuels. The American military has a storied record as a technological innovator: the computer, the commercial jetliner, and the Internet originated from military research and transformed modern life. And with billions to spend it can provide a major proving ground for new energy technologies developed in the private sector. "In terms of alternative energy, the Department of Defense is big enough, in certain sectors, to be the tipping point," says Stuart Funk, an energy specialist at LMI who was once the Pentagon official responsible for fuel operations. The effort has its skeptics. Even supporters are quick to point out that the Department of Defense is unlikely to accomplish much unless it better organizes its farflung initiatives. And environmentalists are dubious of an institution that has more often been an adversary. They point out, for example, that some of the ideas -- such as increasing the use of coal to make synthetic fuel -- could actually be more environmentally damaging than the status quo. "It's a little bit early to tell whether the Pentagon is going to be a force for progress or not on the issue of protecting the climate," said David Hawkins, director of the climate center at the Natural Resources Defense Council. Indeed, the Pentagon's central goal is not to align the military with the environmental movement. It is to reduce costs -- the Pentagon spent $13.5 billion on energy last year -- and cut the dependence of its fighting forces on foreign energy. A recent Pentagon-commissioned study by LMI described the American military's reliance on oil as "unsustainable in the long term," the Globe reported earlier this month. Still, the new energy consciousness coincides with a growing conviction among military and intelligence analysts that the planet's changing environment, and the country's reliance on oil, are potent national security issues. And some voices within the military are starting to espouse a worldview -- emphasizing the limits on natural resources and the volatility of ecosystems -- that is decidedly environmentalist in tone. "Clean technologies have become strategic, in part because the military, like the rest of us, is realizing how fragile the environment is," said Kenan Sahin, CEO and founder of Tiax, a Cambridge-based technology development firm working on several projects with the Department of Defense. Whether that means the military is becoming environmentalist, or simply a smarter fighting machine, may be a distinction that makes less and less of a difference. Early last year, in a paper titled "War Without Oil: A Catalyst for True Transformation," an Air Force lieutenant colonel named Michael Hornitschek laid out his vision of the superefficient American military of 2050. Army and Marine vehicles would run on electric hybrid engines or fuel cells. Warship hulls would be nano-engineered to make them lightweight and more fuel efficient. Surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft would be solar-powered, and individual soldiers would carry pocket hydrogen fuel cells. Expeditionary bases would be capable of generating their own energy from wind, sunlight, biofuel, or garbage. Such a fighting force has an element of "Star Wars fantasy," Hornitschek wrote. But the ideas in the paper are not that far from projects already being funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in conjunction with university laboratories and companies like DuPont, GE, and Hewlett Packard. For one project, DARPA is trying to develop a substitute jet fuel derived from plants such as palm trees and jatropha shrubs. Currently, the Air Force is the largest consumer of energy in the Department of Defense, and every dollar increase in the price of a barrel of oil raises its annual costs by $60 million, according to Kevin Billings, the Air Force's deputy assistant secretary for Environment, Safety and Occupational Health. Another major challenge is the sometimes nightmarish logistics of supplying energy to soldiers in the field. Fuel convoys in Iraq, for example, are favorite targets of insurgent attacks. And with troops increasingly equipped with high-tech devices like satellite phones, GPS locators, and night-vision goggles, energy isn't merely a matter of gasoline -- batteries are also a vital military commodity. A typical soldier carries 10 to 27 pounds of batteries, according to DARPA. To help reduce the load on the military's energy supply lines, DARPA is exploring longer-lasting fuel cells to replace current batteries, as well as technologies, like high-efficiency solar cells and even mobile generators that run on discarded plastic packaging, to allow more power to be generated in the field. Technologies like these would have uses far beyond the battlefield. Higher efficiency solar panels could make solar power more cost-competitive with other forms of energy, and better fuel cells could be used for everything from storing energy generated from solar arrays and wind farms to freeing cellphones from the need to be charged as often. Cheaper, more reliable jet fuel would no doubt be a boon in the private sector, especially the airline industry, for whom fuel costs are a leading headache. And the same technologies may have applications for other fuels as well.

57

Michigan ‘08 2AC – AIRLINES ADD-ON
That’s key to the industry Lovins et al 2004 (Amory Lovins, cofounder and CEO of Rocky Mountain Institute, former advisor to the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense, Winning the Oil End Game, pg. 128)
Fuel costs are the airline industry's biggest variable cost except labor. Because of their high volatility, fuel costs are the industry's financial Achilles' heel. Per passenger-mile, you pay airlines about the same as y pay to own and run your car, but like low-income households, airlines gush red ink whenever fuel prices spike up. Meanwhile, overcapacity is depressing the near-term growth prospects of airplane manufacturers How do we address both problems, so as to revitalize the airline industry and reduce oil dependence at the same time? The key to this puzzle is that fuel savings from new airplanes are very cheap per gallon, but new planes are expensive. The legacy airlines are too broke to buy many new planes, so when the profitable discount careers buy very efficient new planes, they displace their high-cost competi~Itors'" even faster,
accelerating the market exit of the legacy carriers and the cost savings to customers. If policymakers decide that they wish to save the legacy airlines, a good way to give them a better chance of survival-better for society than, Sa simply throwing federal dollars at their operating deficits or assuming y, their $31 billion in pension obligations's-would be an innovative loan guarantee program for the airline industry to purchase or lease new fuelefficient aircraft (Box 16). Current-dollar jet fuel prices rose 54°!c> to $1.18/ gallon between May 2003 and May 2004, increasing fuel costs to 2.13rt/seatmile.651 As we noted on p. 17, each time the jet fuel price increases 1 cent, it costs U'.S. airlines $180 million a vear.?" Higher fuel prices cost the three largest Ll.S. carriers-United, American, and Continental-an additional $700 million in 2004.653 But if new efficient a' craft used Conventional Wi~dom t~chnologi~s,. u.s. airlines' fuel cost wou;~ drop 29% to 151rt/seat-mIle, savmg $6.2 billion per year. Those savings would rise to $8.4b/y with State of the Art planes, which would cut fuel costs to 1.14rt/seat-mile, even at mid-2004 fuel prices. The economics of fuel efficiency are

compelling. Over its 30-year life, On 7E7 will save over $7 million in present-valued fuel costs compared Wit~ the 767 it replaces (or $5.3 million vs. the A330 with which it competes) yet its capital cost is comparable or lower.?" If United had reconfigured' just 9% of its 2003 fleet with similarly efficient planes, its net income would have increased by $34 million." (State of the Art planes could roughly double those savings.) Even incremental retrofits can be attractive. For
example, Southwest is executing a plan to attach blended winglets to all of its 737-700s at a cost around $710,000 per plane.?" The answer lies in the structural changes in the Ll.S. airline industry and the financial state of the Ll.S. airlines. The major U.s. carriers are facing devastating competition from discount carriers whose lower-cost business model is based on a more efficient point-to-point service, lower embedded labor costs, and lower non-labor operating costs. Low-cost carriers' market share has risen from 5% in 1987 to 25% in 2004. The market capitalization of the six biggest discounters is now $18 billion, far higher than the $4 billion market capitalization of the six largest traditional airlines.?" Southwest Airlines alone has a tenth the market share and a twelfth the revenue of the Big Six combined-but nearly three times their combined market capitalization. The major airlines,

having borrowed ~$100 billion to stay alive.?" are now carrying so much debt that either they're in bankruptcy or their credit ratings have slipped to junk-bond status. This makes it hard for them to finance the new fuel-efficient (and often more lightly crewed)
jets they need. And if they were to do so, the present-valued lifetime fuel savings are only ~6% of the capital cost of a new plane--eritical to operating margins, but hardly enough by itself to justify turning over the fleet when cash is scarce. 660 The project will improve each plane's fuel efficiency by 34%, saving ~$113,OOO more than the winglets cost (present-valued at 5%/y real over 30 years). If Southwest applied this technology to its entire 2003 fleet of 388 aircraft, it would invest nearly $300 million to cut operating costs by 0.6%, paying back in 8 years and earning a real IRR of ~12%/y!S7 So if fuel savings are profitable, why aren't all airlines updating their fleets like Southwest, especially with new planes?

Airlines key to the economy Kelly 08 (Gary, CEO of Southwest Airlines and Vice Chairman of its board of directors. CEOpinon “Airline Industry Very Fuel Efficent, http://www.thecro.com/node/620, GN) According to a recent study, “Commercial Aviation and the American Economy,” the airline industry, which includes both passenger and cargo carriers, is a major driver of economic activity, especially in the United States, where the airline industry is directly responsible for 5.8 percent of gross economic output and 8.8 percent of national employment. Despite our role in being a major generator of economic activity, airlines account for only about 2 percent of GHG emissions in the United States and 3 percent worldwide.

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Michigan ‘08 PLAN SPILLS OVER
The Airlines are willing to put the money out for new planes – the only question is availability of technology. Additionally, the military is the perfect stepping stone for the techonology Lovins et al 2004 (Amory Lovins, cofounder and CEO of Rocky Mountain Institute, former advisor to the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense, Winning the Oil End Game, pg. 128) Airlines are willing to pay more for reductions in operating costs: the investment per seat for long-range aircraft increased 130% during 1959-95.666 But some airlines need financing, and all need superefficient planes to choose from. Worldwide commercial airline production is largely a duopoly comprising Boeing and Airbus. These companies are in a continuous high-stakes engineering design competition to beat the rival's performance. Currently they each have a new plane in development for release in the next four years (Box 14). Airbus is set to release the 555-seat A380, a plane designed to compete with Boeing's 747, around 2006. Boeing in turn is designing the 7£7 Dreamliner to replace its own 767 and 757 models and compete against Airbus's A330. Airbus is worried enough to begin to design a more-fuelefficient engine upgrade for its A330, though that platform's higher weight and drag will limit its ability to compete with 7£7.667 Both manufacturers chose to target the competition's signature aircraft, and each claims to have surpassed the other's current operating efficiency by at least 15%. Development costs are around $10-12 billion for a new model aircraft.?" Airbus projects that the A380 project will not reach breakeven until the 251st plane is sold (even longer if list prices are discounted). Based on the adoption pattern of the 747-400 released in 1989, this volume may take longer than four years to achieve. Technology innovation is not just
about improved efficiency, however. Technological innovation enables, and sometimes creates, new business models. Airbus is betting on the continuation of the existing hub-andspokes business model by even larger fleets, justifying gigantic airplanes. Boeing is betting that the discounters' point-to-point regional business model will spread to transcontinental and intra-regional flying. Boeing may also be contemplating design variants larger or smaller than the 7£7 base model to hedge its market-structure bet, whereas the A380 will offer less size flexibility. At any size, Boeing's more efficient technology should be attractive to airlines facing volatile and possibly high fuel prices. RMI expects that this battle will play itself out over the next five to ten years. If Boeing begins to gain the advantage, then its business strategy will have been proven by the market. We expect this to spur investment by all airline manufacturers in a more efficient generation of aircraft. A complete cycle of new airplane development takes up to about a decade, followed by another couple of decades to replace older models.?" Therefore, State of the Art planes would not come on line until 2015 or beyond, regardless of technological and manufacturing improvements, and much of their benefit comes after 2025. Our scenario analysis below assumes that after 2015, new State of the Art planes would be phased into the fleet. Of course, feebate-like incentives could accelerate this adoption, but may not be necessary. The overarching national aviation goal should be to ensure that new planes bought in the short term are as efficient they can be (like 7£7); that State of the Art successor models are developed and brought to market wi~h due deliber~te ~peed; and that both airframe manufacturers and their customers find It advantageous and >feasible to adopt the most efficient airplanes available at any given time. An obvious way to accelerate State of the Art civilian airplane development is

smart military procurement, since Blended-Wing-Body or "flying wing" designs-under development by Boeing, NASA, and others since the early 1990s-and their associated technologies, such as next-generation engines, also have broad military applications, initially for tankers, weapons systems/ and command/ control, and later for heavy lift and cargo applications. The Blended-Wing-Body concept is under continuing study by Boeing's Phantom Works and Integrated Defense Systems branches for military use. A 17-ft-wingspan scale model was flight-tested in 1997 in collaboration with Stanford University, and an improved 21-ft-wingspan model is under development with Cranfield Aerospace (UK). DARPA and other agencies are helping with concept development for military applications/ and Boeing and its competitors would happily build on that expertise to bring medium-to-large Blended-Wing-Body airplanes to the commercial market as market conditions warrant. Thus with airplanes as with heavy trucks, the key enabling technologies are of such strong military as well as civilian interest for both cutting costs and transforming capabilities (pp. 84-93) that military science and technology development should be one of the leading elements of any coherent national effort to displace oil. Across the range of land, sea, and air platforms, this is most true for advanced lightweight materials, as we see next.

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Michigan ‘08 AIRLINES KEY TO ECONOMY
The Airline industry is crucial to the US economy Campbell Hill 06 (The Campbell Hill Aviation Group, Aviation and Research Consultants, “Commercial Aviation and the American Economy,” March 2006 http://www.smartskies.org/NR/rdonlyres/E20C3048-9FD4-46D891F1-6303C4148C5A/0/CommercialAviationEconomyMar06.pdf) 

The U.S. civil aviation sector (including air transportation, related manufacturing and air­based travel  and tourism) was  collectively responsible for $1.37 trillion of national output in 2004, supporting 12.3  million U.S. employees and $418  billion in personal earnings. Commercial aviation accounts for the  majority of this impact with $1.2 trillion in output,  $380 billion in earnings and 11.4 million jobs.  U.S. Civil Aviation Economic Impact (2004) Commercial Aviation General Aviation  Total Output (Billion $)  1,247 118  1,365 Earnings (Billion $)  380 38  418 Employment (000)  11,393 956  12,349 The national economy is highly dependent on commercial aviation, which, in 2004, was directly or  indirectly responsible for 5.8 percent of gross output (i.e., economic activity), 5.0 percent of personal  earnings and 8.8    percent of national employment.    Commercial Aviation Impact as Share of U.S. Economy (2004) 8.8% 5.0% 5.8% Employment Personal Earnings Gross Output  1
The direct impact of commercial air transportation and related industries in 2004 was estimated at $247  billion in gross output, $72 billion in earnings and over a million jobs.  Commercial air transportation  was the primary source of direct impacts, with $130 billion of output, followed by aircraft and related  manufacturing ($75 billion), air express  couriers ($24 billion) and air transportation support goods and  services ($18 billion).The indirect impact of expenditures by commercial air travelers creates an  additional $191  billion of gross output, $67 billion of earnings and 3.3 million jobs. The lodging and food  industries account for more than half of the total output impact, with retail shopping,  recreation and  entertainment and ground transportation spending also top­impact sectors.  The direct and indirect impacts of commercial aviation generate additional “induced”  impacts as  industry revenues and employee earnings are used to purchase goods and services from other industries.  The service sector accounts for nearly half of the $1.25 trillion  in total national impact, both through  travel and tourism services and support to both direct and indirect impact industries.  1 The total impact of commercial aviation is compared to national aggregates of Gross Output and Personal Earnings (from the Bureau of Economic Accounts) and Total Covered Employment (from the Bureau of Labor Statistics) for the 50 states and the District of Columbia combined. Commercial Aviation Total Impacts = $1.25 Trillion of U.S. Economic Activity Transportation & Warehousing 18% Manufacturing 20% Services 47% Trade 11% All Other 4% The distribution of national impacts by state was determined by the location of airports, tourist destinations, business travel centers and aviation-related manufacturing plants, as well as the location of industries supporting the direct and indirect impact industries. California was the top-impact state, with $203 billion of gross output impacts, followed by Texas, Florida, Georgia and New York. Top Five States in Total Impact (Billion $) $202.6 $126.9 $93.6 $72.7 $59.5 California Texas Florida Georgia New York The distribution of impacts by congressional district was similarly based on local industrial patterns, with the top districts being either tourist destinations (Hawaii and Las Vegas area) or top aviation manufacturing centers (Western Washington). Top Five Congressional Districts in Total Impact (Billion $) $9.6 $8.9 $8.7 $8.2 $7.8 District 1, Hawaii District 2, Hawaii District 3, Nevada District 8, Washington District 1, Nevada ii Introduction This report summarizes the estimated impact of commercial aviation on individual U.S congressional districts in 2004. The impact estimates are based on a model that allocates national and state-level impacts derived using secondary economic and transportation data sources of the federal government. 2 The district-level estimates use Census of Population employment data for 2000 as allocated to the 109 th congressional districts. The following describes the general concepts and methodologies used to measure the economic impact of the U.S. civil aviation sector, and provides summary results at the national, state and district level. Appendix A provides a detailed description of the impact methodologies. Appendices B and C summarize the results at the state and congressional district levels, respectively. National Economic Impact of U.S. Civil Aviation The economic impact of any particular industry sector can be measured by the output, earnings and employment associated with that sector, plus any “induced” (or supporting) economic activity that results from any purchases made by that sector’s firms and its employees. Total economic impacts of an industry combine both the first-level impacts (as related to the industry’s sales, revenue or output) and induced impacts (as related to purchases required to “produce” the sales or output and household spending by the industry’s employees). Civil aviation is a vital component of the U.S. passenger and cargo transportation sector and combines commercial and general aviation activities. The air transportation sector supports the travel and tourism industries, and is supported by the aircraft manufacturing sector. Each of these sectors also requires supporting goods, services and labor. The relative impact of civil aviation depends both on the absolute demand for the output from these sectors, as well as the interdependence between those sectors and other U.S. industries. The primary impacts of commercial aviation on the U.S. economy are related to: (1) airlines and supporting services (commercial and non-commercial) (2) aircraft, engines and parts manufacturing  (3) air­visitor travel and  other trip­related expenditures  The first two sectors (air transportation and aircraft manufacturing) create direct impacts through the  production of air transportation services; the  visitor­related expenditures constitute an indirect impact  that results from the primary transport activity. All of these sectors are directly affected and 

supported by  the U.S. civil aviation system, consisting of airports, airspace and supporting infrastructure.  Direct  impacts of civil aviation are created through transportation and other activities at airports as  measured by the  employment, payroll and sales/output associated with the following industries/entities:  Scheduled and non­scheduled  commercial airlines (passenger and cargo) and air couriers  Airport and aircraft service providers (including FAA and  other government services)  Air cargo service providers  General aviation (non­commercial) aircraft operators  (including flight schools)  2 These results were based on methodologies similar to those developed in previous national  impact studies by the Federal  Aviation Administration and other industry groups.   [continues]The induced impacts of  commercial aviation in 2004 are estimated at $808 billion in output, $241  billion in earnings and 7.0 million jobs. Most  of these induced impacts are attributed to the service  sector, with the manufacturing and trade sectors also significantly  impacted [continues] The commercial aviation sector has a significant impact on the U.S. economy, based on air  transportation and airport services, manufacturing of air transportation equipment and travel and  tourism expenditures  by air passengers. Including induced impacts, the U.S. commercial aviation sector  drove $1.2 trillion in economic  activity (5.8 percent of U.S. total), $380 billion in earnings (5.0 percent)  and 11.4 million jobs (8.8 percent). 14 The  direct impact of commercial air transportation and related industries was estimated at $247 billion  in gross output, $72  billion in earnings and over one million jobs, with commercial air transportation  accounting for approximately half of  the output impact. Commercial air­traveler expenditures created  indirect impacts including $191 billion of gross output,  $67 billion of earnings and 3.3 million jobs,  mostly for the accommodations and food service sectors.  The national  impact of commercial aviation extends to every congressional district and the District of  Columbia. California was the  top­impact state, with $203 billion of gross output impacts followed by  Texas, Florida, Georgia and New York. The top 

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Michigan ‘08
congressional districts are either major tourist  destinations (Hawaii and Las Vegas area) or top aviation­manufacturing  centers (Western Washington),  although every district has a significant level of impact.  

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Michigan ‘08
---AUTO---

2AC – AUTO ADD-ON
The plan spills over to the auto sector -- it’s key to the industry Lovins et al 2004 (Amory Lovins, cofounder and CEO of Rocky Mountain Institute, former advisor to the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense, Winning the Oil End Game, pg. 128)
If the U.S. fails to act decisively and coherently during this period, we will not only continue to lose market share: we will ultimately lose the manufacturing base, and those high-wage manufacturing jobs will be lost forever. Clinging to heavy and inefficient product lines will make us the unrivaled leaders in producing products that the world's consumers do not want, in commanding the loyalty of a steadily aging and shrinking customer base, and in depending on perpetually cheap fuel that seems ever less likely to remain reliable. Worse, we will fall behind in the advanced materials technology race, ceding the next generation of high-technology manufacturing jobs to agile and uninhibited competitors overseas. Add the subtler forms of competition in software dominated vehicles and solutions-economy business models, and the prospects dim further for automakers that perpetuate existing product lines, changing only incrementally, cocooned within a comfortable regulatory and price environment. Detroit's dilemma is unpalatable: if countries like China and India do leapfrog to ultra light fuel-cell cars, they'll pose a grave competitive threat regardless of oil price, but if they don't, their growth in oil demand, and the cashflow needs of demographically and socially challenged oil exporters, will conspire to keep upward pressure on fuel prices more consistently than in the 1990s, making customers even more dissatisfied with Detroit's slow progress toward oil-frugal cars. For the u.s. economy, either path-importing cheaper superefficient cars or importing costlier oil-creates a drag on growth, drives inflation and interest rates, and destroys good jobs.?" When thoughtful auto executives say they're uncomfortable having their industry's future depend on unpredictable oil prices, they're right-but in a far deeper sense than they may intend. The imperatives of the end of the Oil Age converge with those of radically shifting automotive technology to compel the linked transformation of these two largest global industries. If their twin transformations dance smoothly together, it'll be sheer delight. But if either industry lags, it'll get stepped on, and more agile partners will cut in. More than 50 years ago, economist Joseph Schumpeter described the process of "creative destruction," where innovations destroy obsolete technologies, only to be overthrown in turn by ever newer, more efficient rivals.?" Creative responses to economic shifts occur when businesses respond to innovation in ways that are "outside the range of existing practice .... Creative responses cannot be predicted by applying the ordinary rules of inference from existing facts, they shape the whole course of subsequent events and their long run outcome."586 Depending on how radical the change is and how flexible the sector is, the impetus for change can often come from within the industry. In Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Schumpeter argued in 1943 that businesses are "incessantly being revolutionized from within by new enterprise, i.e. by the intrusion of new commodities or new methods of production or new commercial opportunities into the industrial structure as it exists at any moment."5S7 This process has played out across many industries, most recently those transformed by the Internet. Now, focused partly by the concerns about oil and climate, it has come squarely to the transportation sector.:" How can this sector's existing players address the creative destruction challenge? In The Innovator's Dilemma, Harvard Business School professor Clayton Christensen explained how industry leaders get blindsided by "disruptive innovations" because they focus too closely on their most profitable customers and businesses.:" The U.S. car and truck companies' asset base, supplier networks, and labor contracts are tied to manufacturing highly profitable but inefficient light trucks and SUVs. Their business focus is on how to provide larger, more powerful, and higher-margin vehicles to their most profitable customers in this segment, virtually ignoring the underserved, low-margin small-car segment that has been scooped up by the new Korean entrants Hyundai and Kia. (The Big Three have even come dangerously close to ignoring the entire car sector.) The increasing difficulty of competing in small and medium cars heightens dependence on SUV profits. However, those same SUVs are too large and too fuel consumptive to gain a market foothold in countries outside the U.s.; the French government has proposed stiff taxes on them, with growing support from other European countries, and the government of Paris is even considering outlawing them as a public nuisance.?" So while the upsurge in Ll.S, demand for SUVs was an unusually persistent bonanza for Detroit because competitors at first thought SUVs were a passing fad, the global market share of the Big Three continues to shrink.:" They're slowly being forced up the value chain by the foreign competition, and may soon find themselves stranded without much of a market. Their dilemma is akin to the Swiss watchmaking industry's plight before Nicholas Hayek's radical simplifiers at Swatch saved their market from Asian competitorsstarting with the cheapest commodity watches. efficient scale of manufacturing from nearly 150,000 vehicles per year to around 50,000. The less lumpy cashflow (plus quicker ramp-up due to simpler manufacturing) requires and risks less investment, and the more agile plant allows a closer and more dynamic match to customer needs. If advancedcomposite autobodies cut manufacturing capital costs to this extent, as considerable proprietary analysis suggests they can, then the total manufactured costs of the new generation of high-efficiency vehicles could be competitive with today's comparable cars.:" The composite manufacturing technologies discussed on p. 57 are already becoming available to make carbon-composite autobody parts for less than 20% of the cost of aerospace composites, with at least

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Michigan ‘08 2AC – AUTO ADD-ON
80% of their perforrnance.?" Fig. 20 (p. 65), for example, shows that a gasoline-engine, nonhybrid, but ultralight advanced-composite midsize SUV could sell for just 1.6% more than the most nearly comparable steel SUV on the 2004 market, yet use 58% less fuel. Its Cost of Saved Energy, 15ft/gal, is one-fifth that of a conservative estimate for the popular 2004 Prius hybrid, and yields a one-year simple payback time at $1.50/ gal.629 Fig. 20 also shows that an ultralight advanced-composite hybrid SUV would save fuel at a cost of 56ft/ galstill one-third below Prius's-for a threeyear simple payback. Yet these figures are not for a midsize sedan like Prius, but for an uncompromised midsize SUV crossover vehicle with a slightly roomier interior than a 2000 Explorer and with superior simulated crashworthiness (Box 7, p. 62). These comparisons suggest that such an ultralight vehicle, even with hybrid drive, could command a far broader market than Prius enjoys today. With just hybrid drive and no ultra lighting, that market is big enough for Toyota to have slated 4% of its total 2005 production, or 300,000 vehicles, for hybrid powertrains.?" Ultralighting saves far more fuel but costs about the same (Fig. 21, p. 66). Since a State of the Art ultralight-hybrid light vehicle made from either advanced composites or lightweight steels could thus be profitably sold at a competitive cost, we conclude that investment in such manufacturing plants would be financially justified, as long as there is a market for the vehicles. Today's hybrids, as we just discussed, provide an encouraging hint at that market, but hybrids are still a tiny part of total vehicle sales. There are more fundamental reasons to expect robust demand for State of the Art vehicles.

AUTO SECTOR KEY TO THE ECONOMY
Don Hall, President ? Virginia Automotive Dealers Association, Richmond Times Dispatch, 3-10-2004, lexis AS IMPORTANT as the impact of such a drastic tax increase would be on Virginia car buyers, it would have an even greater impact on our overall economy. Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the automotive industry has been one of the only sources of strength in our economy. The direct impact will be to the dealerships themselves. New car and truck dealerships in Virginia account for nearly $20 billion in retail sales annually - more than 20 percent of Virginia's total retail sales. They employ more than 37,000 Virginians. However, the indirect impact could be even more severe. New car and truck dealerships purchase more than $915 million in goods and services from other Virginia businesses. This includes everything from advertising to utilities to insurance. Lost sales will result in lost buying power, which will ripple throughout our economy. Most people don't realize how critical the automotive industry is to our economy. According to a 2001 report on the "Contribution of the Automotive Industry to the U.S. Economy" prepared by the University of Michigan and the Center for Automotive Research (CAR), for every worker directly employed by the auto industry, nearly seven spin-off jobs are created.

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Michigan ‘08 EFFICIENCY KEY TO AUTO SECTOR
Efficiency key to competitiveness versus major auto competitors Lovins et al 2004 (Amory Lovins, cofounder and CEO of Rocky Mountain Institute, former advisor to the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense, Winning the Oil End Game, pg. 128) Perhaps the greatest peril, though it's only starting to emerge on the fringes of automobility, is transformation of the business model. Traditionally, automakers sell vehicles and oil companies sell gallons. Both want to sell more, while customers prefer on the whole to buy fewer (but more physically and stylistically durable) vehicles that use fewer gallons. These opposite interests don't create a happy relationship. But suppose an automaker or an oil company leased a mobility service (Box 20, p. 196) that provides vehicles or other means of physical or virtual mobility, tailored to customers' ever-shifting needs. Customers would pay for getting where they want to be, not for the means of doing so. Then vehicles and gallons, instead of being the providers' source of profit, turn into a cost: the fewer vehicles and gallons it takes to provide the mobility service that the customer is paying for, the more profit the provider makes and the more money the customer saves. Most major car and oil companies are thinking quietly but seriously about this business model. Most industry strategists fear that the first firm to adopt it on a large scale could outcompete all the rest, both because of a better value proposition and because aligning producers' with customers' interests tends to yield better outcomes for both. There is no guarantee that such transformative business models will start in America. So far, they've tended to emerge in small countries, such as Switzerland and Holland, and in developing countries-that is, in places where congestion and high fuel and land prices force innovation at the most fundamental level, transcending mere technology. Preoccupied with obvious competitors in Japan, Korea, and Europe, American automakers risk being blindsided by China's automakers. The Chinese are positioning themselves to enter the world market with a leapfrog play of highly efficient vehicles, backed by the strength of the scale and experience gained in their burgeoning 4.3-million-vehicle/y (2003) domestic market. The Chinese government's National Development and Reform Commission's 2 June 2004 white paper steers the $25.5 billion automaking investment that's expected during 2004-07 to raise output to nearly 15 million vehicles a year, nearly as big as the whole u.s. market. This policy is also raising barriers to market entry (each project must invest at least $241 million including $60 million of R&D), consolidating. the fragmented 120-plant automaking sector, and tightening domestic efficiency standards that most heavy U'.S. vehicles can't meet (p. 45). Hybrids and lightweighting are specifically to be encouraged. Moreover, this automotive strategy is intimately linked with a transformative energy strategy. Four weeks after its release, Premier Wen [iabao s Cabinet approved in principle a draft energy plan to 2020. It makes energy efficiency the top priority, pushes innovation and advanced technology, and emphasizes environmental protection and energy security to "foster an energy conservation-minded economy and society" in which "the mode of economic growth should be transformed and a new-type industrialization road taken."?" As other industries have learned the hard way, WTGgoverned global competition works both ways, and it's dangerous to underestimate the dynamism of Chinese manufacturing. Chinese industry is supported by a strong central policy apparatus rooted in five millennia of history, and is enabling the world's most massive construction boom in at least two thousand vears. Already, too, homegrown Chinese fuel-cell cars are rapidly advancing in several centers, raising the likelihood that Chinese leaders' aversion to the oil trap will be expressed as leapfrog technologies not just in efficient vehicles but also in oil-free hydrogen fueling. In a few decades, a mighty Chinese economy's automakers might have taken over or driven out the Big Three and even bought major Japanese automakers. In case 1.4 billion Chinese moving rapidly to make something that beats your uncle's Buick isn't enough of a threat, there's also India's younger, smaller, but rapidly maturing auto industry. It's only $5b/y, but is growing by 15% a year. Quality has improved so rapidly, on a Korea-like trajectory, that in 2004, Tata Motors is exporting 20,000 cars to the UK under the MG Rover brand. India "may be better placed than China is to become a global low-cost auto-manufacturing base."582 A billion Indians, with an educated elite about as populous as France, have already transformed industries from software to prosthetics, using breakthrough design to undercut U.S. manufacturing costs by as much as several hundredfold.:" India's domestic car market, like China's, is evolving under conditions that favor an emphasis on fuel efficiency.

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Michigan ‘08 EFFICIENCY KEY TO AUTO SECTOR
Innovation and fuel efficiency key to the auto sector Lovins et al 2004 (Amory Lovins, cofounder and CEO of Rocky Mountain Institute, former advisor to the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense, Winning the Oil End Game, pg. 128)
To complement market forces, and to reduce the risk to the weakened Ll.S transportation equipment sector, we need a coherent set of government policies to support the transition. We need economically efficient policies that shift companies' and customers' choices toward higher-fuel-economy vehicles of all kinds while expanding their freedom of choice; help manufacturers to retool their factories and retrain their workers; support the rapid emergence of costeffective bio-fuels, other renew ables, and domestic fuels; upgrade our transportation systems to reduce congestion; align utilities' profit motives with their customers' interests; and eliminate perverse incentives across the domesticenergy value chain. While we can probably never satisfy those pure libertarians who hold that no government intervention can ever be justified, and indeed we think many of today's energy problems spring from ill-advised past interventions, we will make a reasoned case that some limited, targeted, and carefully defined changes in federal, state, and local policy (pp. 169-226) are not just desirable but very important for managing national risks and achieving national goals. When considering our suggestions to foster this transition and benefit all stakeholders, remember that any long-term vision beyond the comfortably familiar always looks odd at first. In 1900, the U.s. had ~8,OOO cars. Fewer than 8% of the two million miles of rural roads were paved. Anyone who'd proposed then that half a century hence, the ubiquitous horse and buggy would be gone, replaced by a wholly unfamiliar infrastructure in which the newfangled oil industry would refine, pipe, and sell a new product called gasoline, would have been dismissed as a dreamer. Anyone who'd predicted that a century hence, 170,000 U.s. retail outlets would be pumping this new fuel into nearly 240 million light vehicles whizzing along 600,000 miles of highway would have been banished as a lunatic. Yet we live in that world today because the genius of private enterprise, building on Henry Ford's 1908 Model T (which got 2.5 million cars on the road during 1908-16), was supported by a series of public policies, from the early decision to have taxpayers finance public roads to President Eisenhower's 1956 Interstate Highway System. The changes proposed here are far less momentous than those. They need virtually no new infrastructure; they use well-established technologies made by existing industries; they meet current user requirements even better than today's technologies do; and they're profitable for both producers and consumers. The issue is how to help them happen smoothly, quickly, and well, so American industry can vault the obstacles to doing what it does best innovation.

Innovations are critical to the auto economy Lovins et al 2004 (Amory Lovins, cofounder and CEO of Rocky Mountain Institute, former advisor to the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense, Winning the Oil End Game, pg. 128) Technological advances are generally and rightly considered the main engine of economic growth.?" State of the Art ultralight-hybrid vehicles and their associated advanced technologies are in the same tradition as the technological changes that were so vital to the U'S. economy in the twentieth century. Throughout their lifecycle, these vehicles will consistently favor high-productivity production processes and supply highskill, high-wage, high-value-added jobs with large and widely distributed economic multipliers. Automaking has undergone several major transformations before, often triggered by new materials.'?' Our proposal for the transformation of the transportation sector is underpinned by technological improvements in advanced materials and their manufacturing techniques, powertrains (especially using electric traction), power electronics, microelectronics, software, aerodynamics, tires (another materials-dominated field), and systems integration. Collectively, these form a new high-technology industrial cluster that will expand U.S. competitiveness beyond the transportation sector alone-much as the development of the microchip, crossfertilized with other technologies, has created the largest and most dynamic sector of the modern economy, and the information revolution in turn has transformed the entire economy.'" How can another such co-evolution (in the automotive sector and beyond) be encouraged in order to synchronize the industrial development strategy? And rather than stifling this evolution with planning, how can creative policy maximize opportunities for the broadest and most durable kind of wealth creation?

65

Michigan ‘08 EFFICIENCY KEY TO AUTO SECTOR
Efficient cars are inevitable -- It’s only a question of doing so before the US is crowded out of foreign markets Lovins et al 2004 (Amory Lovins, cofounder and CEO of Rocky Mountain Institute, former advisor to the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense, Winning the Oil End Game, pg. 128)
The market will ultimately deliver more efficient cars, trucks, and airplanes. Indeed, it already has begun to do so with the introduction of doubled-efficiency hybrid vehicles in the past few years and Boeing's 7E7 in 2007-08. But will it be U.s. or foreign manufacturers who reap the benefit of this market transition? If U.s. business and political leaders are not decisive now, we could end up replacing imported oil with imported cars and airplanes. And while competitive global markets will ultimately bring efficient fleets to U.s. buyers, this could take so long that the U.S. automotive sector exits just as its successors enter. Let's therefore recap the business and policy challenge before we move on to the policies that can help business leaders to address it timely. The fundamental business problem in U.S. automaking is the disparate financial strength of the Big Three and their competitors. The Big Three simply do not have the ability to invest quickly in an entirely new and properly broad product line, even at the lower
product development and production costs we've described, without giving up one of the strategic R&D programs they're already conducting. Of course the Big Three can, should, and do incorporate lighter and stronger parts into their existing product lines and new platforms, but that's incremental change, while the coming global shift in automotive technology and markets requires radical and rapid change. Neither competitive forces nor the oil-market concerns discussed on pp. 8-25 will wait for business-as-usual. By contrast, Toyota, and to a lesser degree Honda, Nissan, and others,

have the financial strength and the business strategy to adopt holistic bundles of new technology rapidly in new product lines. They continue to have the benefits of their domestic markets, access to lower-cost capital, and the keiretsu supply-chain system, plus the lower-cost, high-quality lean manufacturing system made famous by Toyota and the support of their domestic and regional markets. Korean automakers should not be overlooked. They've gained more points of global market share in the 1990s than any other country and are considered a disruptive force in the automobile market.v" They have succeeded in the way Toyota pioneered, by entry into the lowest-profit-margin segment of the business, the small car market. Like Toyota, their strategy is to leverage that position into the highermargin segments. What better way than with breakthrough technology? The same opportunity is doubtless occurring to India's burgeoning automakers. The Chinese have the potential to build a new automobile industry from scratch, and they show every sign of preparing to leapfrog the West. To appreciate the power of a massive domestic market with patriotic buying behavior,
overseen by a farsighted central policy, consider China's growth in the technology sector. Over the past five years, China has sustained a 400,{) annual growth rate in high-tech exports, and now manufactures 35% of the world's cellphones. China has passed the U.S. to become ~the world's largest mobile phone market (as noted on p. 6, note 46, it has more cellphone users than the Ll.S, has people), and China Mobile and 'China Unicorn are the numbers one and three largest mobile carriers globally.6% The explosive growth of Chinese automotive manufacturing capability is already positioning it as a tremendous threat to U.s. automakers (p, 135).696 In 2003 alone, sales of Chinese-made vehicles in China grew by more than one-third (p. 2). Not only are Chinese companies investing in automaking, but General Motors plans to invest $3 billion in its Chinese operations over the next three years.?" and GM's competitors are similarly ambitious. Yet China's intention to serve more than its home and regional market could hardly be plainer: the State Development and Reform Commission's 2 June 2004 white paper (p. 135) says, "Before 2010, our country will become an important vehicle making nation, locally made products will basically satisfy domestic demand, and we will enter the international market in a big way."?" Shanghai Automotive Industry Group already hopes to partner with MG Rover

China, Europe, and Japan all have the advantage of technology-forcing regulations that stimulate demand for new, more efficient cars. These rules appear to reflect some
Group Ltd., buy Ssangyong (Korea's fourth-biggest automaker), and become one of the world's top ten automakers/?" rivalry, and the gap between these regulations and u.s. rules is widening. China's 2004 white paper requires that the "average fuel consumption for newly assembled passenger vehicles by the year 2010 will be reduced by at least 15 percent compared to the level of 2003"; this applies better-than-Ll.S. minimum standards to every new vehicle (not just their average) and bars used-car imports.?" European automakers, as an alternative to legislated standards, have voluntarily committed to the equivalent of 39 mpg by 2008 (25(1'0 lower fuel intensity) and are considering 46 mpg (another 15% intensity drop) by 2012.700 New legislation in Japan requires 23% fuel-economy gains during 1995-2010, to levels up to 44 mpg depending on vehicle class, via the "Top Runner" program (p. 45, note 225) committing all new vehicles to approach the most fuel-frugal vehicle in their class."" Canada's Climate Action Plan, with 2004 bipartisan endorsement, promises 25% mpg gains by 2010 despite the close integration of its auto industry with that of the Ll.S. In striking contrast, no increase is contemplated in the U.s. 27.5-mpg average car standard-passed in 1975 and first effective in MY1984and the 2003 1.5-mpg increase in Ll.S. lighttruck standards to just 22.2 mpg for MY2007 will yield little or no actual gain.702 This growing gap hardly bodes well for U'.S. exports to an increasingly integrated global market. As we'll show next,

efficiency standards aren't the only or even the best way to improve fleet efficiency, but if, for whatever cause, new American cars' efficiency continues to stagnate, then most foreign buyers, and an increasing share of Ll.S, buyers, simply won't want them. However, a key competitive opportunity remains as unexploited by foreign as by U'.S. policymakers. While the U.s., Japan, and Europe are all providing generous R&D funding for the fuel cell as the next-generation engine, all of their official programs give far more limited attention to the near-term practical potential for a lighter, stronger platform and body to get to fuel cells sooner and solve the hydrogen storage problem (p. 233), while saving far more gasoline and diesel fuel meanwhile. The United States has at least as great technological breadth and depth in advanced materials as Japan and Europe, and a more entrepreneurial flexible market system for rapidly exploiting that capability. Capital quickly migrates to those companies that demonstrate the ability to earn superior returns. The invisible
hand of the market, as described by Adam Smith, was an early attempt to describe the movement of capital in society. The speed of capital migration has accelerated of late, so the invisible hand will feel more like the invisible fist when it hits those automakers that fall behind in the competitive race for the nextgeneration vehicle. Do Ll.S. business leaders and policymakers really want to wait for the market to deliver the next

generation of efficient mobility via leisurely meandering, or should we enact the few critical strategy and policy shifts that would transform the market more quickly and potentially save and revitalize the Ll.S. transportation manufacturing sector? As we debate this, consider that the entire extra business investment needed to reach ~77% market capture in 2025 by superefficient cars and light trucks and ~ 70% by efficient heavy trucks-some $70 billion spread over a decade or two is what the United States now spends directly every seven months to buy foreign oil that's largely wasted.

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Michigan ‘08 AUTO SECTOR COLLAPSING
US Companies are losing out to foreigners -- the industry is in risk of collapse Lovins et al 2004 (Amory Lovins, cofounder and CEO of Rocky Mountain Institute, former advisor to the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense, Winning the Oil End Game, pg. 128) In 1970, U.S. automobile manufacturers were the envy of the world. The Big Three-Chrysler, Ford, and GM-produced nine out of every ten cars sold in America. Then the 1970s oil price shocks caught them unawares, and Japanese manufacturers swooped in, initially offering smaller and more efficient cars that better met many customers' needs, then leveraging into other segments. Thirty years later, the Ll.S, automobile sector is on the ropes. The Big Three have been reduced to 59% domestic market share. Their competitive situation is worsening: since 1999, U'.S. car manufacturers lost 2% domestic market share each year to Japanese and European competition, and now barely sell the majority of the cars within their home market. The last bastion of competitive strength and profits has been the light-truck sector, where the Ll.S. still maintains 75% market share, but this too is now under frontal assault. The U.S. market position in light trucks is protected by a 25% tariff on imported vehicles, leading the Japanese and German competition to build their factories on U'S. soil. These transplants increasingly make all kinds of light vehicles, from 1990s-style truck-based SUVs to the car-based "crossover" vehicles that outsold them in the first half of 2004 and may portend their decline.?" Reliance on lawyers and lobbyists to try to avert competition and regulation has long restrained American automakers from fully exploiting their extraordinary engineering prowess.?" And so the nation's and the world's largest industry, providing a tenth of all U.S. private-sector jobs (p. 17) and creating the machines that provide core mobility for most Americans, is sufficiently at risk that an Economist cover story recently questioned whether any of the Big Three would survive the global hypercompetition of the next 10-20 vears.?" On 16 March 2004, its editorialist opined: "Put bluntly, the short-term outlook for the Big Three is dreadful.. .. If anything, the long-term outlook is worse.'?"

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Michigan ‘08
---TRUCKING---

2AC – TRUCKING ADD-ON
Efficiency is key to the trucking industry Lovins et al 2004 (Amory Lovins, cofounder and CEO of Rocky Mountain Institute, former advisor to the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense, Winning the Oil End Game, pg. 150) Investments in fuel efficiency can help bring back financial health to the trucking sector. Its structure and business conditions are quite favorable for a comparatively rapid transition to more efficient fleets, because buyers and sellers of new trucks are relatively concentrated, and both have strong economic incentives to improve fuel efficiency in order to restore or increase profits (Technical Annex, Ch. 20). There are two major categories of trucks: heavy trucks (Class 8, pp. 73-77) and medium trucks (Classes 3-7, p. 77). U'.S. Class 8 trucks consume ~ 1.5 million barrels of diesel fuel per day-lO.4% of the nation's total oil use, and over three times the total usage of energy of Classes 3-7 (78% of whose fuel use is in the heaviest categories, Classes 6 and 7).637 Among medium and heavy trucks, the big ones matter most. The U'.S. trucking industry at first appears highly fragmented, with more than 56,000 for-hire and private fleets.638 Barriers to entry are low; for example, the minimum efficient scale for LTL (less-than-truckload) operations is 2 million ton-miles hauled annually, equivalent to just five trucks.?"

TRUCKING KEY TO THE ECONOMY
Anuradha Nagarajan, et. al., University of Michigan Business School, “The Economic Impact Of Internet Usage In The Trucking Industry,” September 12, 2000 (http://economy.berkeley.edu/conferences/9-2000/EC-conference2000_papers/mitchellbrooking.pdf) In summary, the trucking industry plays a vital role throughout the U.S. economy, with substantial contributions from both for-hire trucking and in-house trucking services. In 1996, the trucking industry directly accounted for 3.1% of GDP. In addition, the industry plays a critical support role for other transportation modes and for other sectors of the economy such as the resource, manufacturing, construction, and wholesale and retail trade industries. Across other industries, a $1 increase in demand for a commodity leads to about 4.6 cents in new demand of for-hire and in-house trucking services. Trucking also plays a vital role in international trade, especially in the movement of freight to and from Mexico and Canada.

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Michigan ‘08 MILITARY SPILLOVER SOLVES TRUCKING
Technological innovations for lighter trucks are possible – the military is uniquely positioned for doing so Lovins et al 2007 (Amory B., Amory Lovins is cofounder and CEO of Rocky Mountain Institute. A consultant experimental
physicist educated at Harvard and Oxford (where he received an MA by virtue of being a don), he has advised the energy and other industries for over 30 years, as well as the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense. Published in 28 previous books. Kyle Datta, ormer Managing Director of RMI's consulting practice, is also CEO of New Energy Partners, an energy consulting and renewable development firm in Hawai'i. He is a former Vice President of Booz. Odd-Even Bustnes, a former member of RMI's Energy & Resources and Commercial & Industrial consulting practices (and Special Aide to the CEO 2002–04), holds a Dartmouth BA (High Honors) in Engineering and Government, an Oxford MSc in Chemical Engineering, and a Princeton MPA in Economics. Jonathan Koomey, Senior Fellow at RMI, is on a leave of absence from Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), where as a Staff Scientist he led the End-Use Forecasting Group. He holds a Harvard AB cum laude pg `128)

The technology improvements necessary to make the vehicles more aerodynamic and lightweight are substantially easier technically than for cars (Technical Annex, Ch. 6), and most are well proven. These innovations account for two-thirds of trucks' potential fuel savings. The other third comes from engine improvements, which will require more R&D, but that's the core product-development business of such capable firms as Cummins, Caterpillar, and Detroit Diesel. Our judgment is that the main missing ingredient for radically increased efficiency in the trucking sector is better customer information on what's possible. RMI's recent conversations with the heads of two very large Class 8 fleet operators substantiate this hypothesis. These savvy business leaders were astonished that
more than a few percent of truck energy could be profitably saved. On learning of the State of the Art potential, their basic reaction was, "Let's build one, and if it works, we'll simply tell the truckmakers that we want them to make such trucks for us." When our consulting practice previously advised one of these same firms on an experimental building, its design required a certain technology that could readily be made but hadn't been brought to market. When we asked the leading vendor's sales department for one, they said, "Sorry, sir, it's not in the catalogue." When we replied, "Our client is X Corporation, and if they like this product, they'll buy a truckload a day indefinitely," the answer instantly changed to "Yes, sir! When do you want it?" That energy-saving, profit-enhancing product was duly delivered, successfully tested, and widely propagated. The opportunity to do the same with Class 8 trucks is starting to be validated. In 2004, one of the most innovative, engineering-intensive, and successful bulk carriers in the U.s.648a redesigned a Class 8 tractor-trailer combination from scratch in collaboration with a major truckmaker. The goals-25% higher payload, doubled fuel economy, enhanced safety and driver ergonomics, and reduced emissions-did turn out to appear feasible, and a prototype is planned to be built in late 2004. Interestingly, the technology suite didn't include the Cd reductions and superefficient engines emphasized on pp. 73-77 above, but is expected to achieve comparable results by emphasizing careful integration of off-the-shelf improvements. This implies that our State of the Art portfolio conservatively omitted some collectively significant technological opportunities. The business opportunity for the truck manufacturers is not selling more trucks in the u.s. per se, but selling trucks that provide higher value to their customers, yielding decisive advantage in margin or market share. The same product improvements will also make the trucks more competitive in other countries where the diesel prices are higher, notably in Europe, where the reduced CO2 and other emissions would also provide a strong marketing advantage. For medium trucks, major development efforts are already underway in Europe and Japan to reduce radically the noise and

course the same spectrum of demands occurs in the Pentagon’s truck fleet, perhaps the world’s largest, with the added incentive of the huge logistics costs for delivering fuel. When one also considers the DOD’s need for superefficeient diesel engines for medium and heavy tactical vehicles, using military procurement to insert advanced technologies rapidly into the heavy-truck market faster becomes a key enabler for military transformation.
emissions of urban delivery trucks; this is accelerating global demand for the most advanced technologies, such as fuel cells. And of

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Michigan ‘08
---PEAK OIL ADVANTAGE---

1AC – PEAK OIL ADVANTAGE PRIVATE SECTOR SPILLOVER SOLVES THE PEAK
Scott C. Buchanan, Strategist in the Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation, “Energy and Force Transformation,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 2006 (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i42/17-JFQ42%20Buchanan%20Pg%2051-54.pdf) The DOD energy burden is so significant that it may prevent the execution of new and still evolving operational concepts, which require the rapid and constant transport of resources without regard for the energy costs.5 These energy burdens will increase as new operational concepts demand a lighter, more agile and dispersed force, with the attendant increase in logistical sustainment. As increasing portions of the budget are set aside for fuel purchases to account for the volatility in fuel prices, increased capability will need to be built into new platforms to mitigate likely impacts on force shape and composition. It is crucial, therefore, that DOD develops an energy strategy that reduces the energy burdens of our operational concepts. Decoupling traditional energy sources from systems and platforms may radically alter both operational requirements and capabilities, as well as alter strategic realities. The use of technologies that no longer rely on the current energy infrastructure is the wave of the future. For instance, one estimate suggests that a third of DOD resources are focused on one small area of the world—the Middle East. The annual investment in securing this region currently exceeds $150 billion per year.6 Reducing our dependency on oil should make these resources available for investment in future force and infrastructure needs. Depending upon which view one chooses to accept, the global oil supply will either last no more than a few decades or will perhaps last a century. On one side of the debate, experts argue that because of the limited supply of oil, it will increase in expense as it depletes in availability or production (referred to as Hubbert’s peak). Market analysts, on the other hand, argue that the market will force a correction of the oil demand, thereby stemming the flow of oil and prolonging the inevitable. Both arguments underscore that oil is an increasingly scarce commodity. Clayton Christensen has argued that “markets that don’t exist can’t be analyzed.”7 Until a market correction takes hold, or there is a global shift toward alternative sources of fuel, oil demand will continue and, perhaps increasingly, will influence the global security environment. DOD has the opportunity to take action to shape this future to our advantage.

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Michigan ‘08
=====RECAPITALIZATION ADVANTAGE=====

1AC – RECAPITALIZATION ADVANTAGE CONTENTION __ : RECAPITALIZATION FIRST -- THE DEFENSE BUDGET IS STRAINED AND A HOST OF MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS ARE FACING FUNDING SHORTFALLS
Lawrence Farrell, Lieutenant General, United States Air Force (Retired), “Difficult Choices Lie Ahead for The Nation’s Military Services,” National Defense Industrial Association, July 2008 (http://www.ndia.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Resources1/Presidents_Corner2/Presidents_Corner.htm) July 2008 - Much discussion — even hand wringing — is taking place among the military, Congress, and defense industry about where finite resources need to be placed. At issue is the current, expensive conflict in Iraq on the one hand and on the other, equally demanding arenas, such as preparing for future conflicts, that are getting shortchanged in the process. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has touched on this subject in various speeches recently, which is an indication of how much tension still exists within the Pentagon about how to plan for the future without neglecting current needs. “Much of what we are talking about is a matter of balancing risk: today’s demands versus tomorrow’s contingencies … As the world’s remaining superpower, we have to be able to dissuade, deter, and, if necessary, respond to challenges across the spectrum,” Gates said. In a world of limited resources, the services surely will have to make difficult decisions in the months and years ahead. The military services perform three basic functions — organize, train, and equip forces for combat operations. Our military forces bring technologically superior equipment to the battlefield and extremely well-trained warriors. In peacetime, the services concentrate on modernization and advancing the state of technology while constantly improving training. In wartime, the pendulum must swing over to winning the current conflict. That means resources often have to be diverted from future modernization to pay for operations, maintenance, and to replace destroyed and damaged equipment. The Defense Department is thus forced to do what military leaders say they never want to do: plan to fight the last — in this case the current — war. The nation’s political leadership and citizens want the current conflict to be resolved as quickly as possible. If the services accumulate a backlog of modernization and recapitalization needs, the dilemma — win the current war or modernize for future conflicts — is painfully sharpened. That seems to be where the services find themselves now. The Army came into the current conflict as it was defining the requirements for its Future Combat Systems family of vehicles and high-tech weapons. It now finds that much of those resources are being pulled into the recapitalization of older war-torn equipment. The Navy’s ship recapitalization has fallen behind. Current ship production rates won’t get the Navy to its 313-ship goal unless it is willing to continue to age its fleet — driving up maintenance dollars and sacrificing operational availability. The Air Force entered the current conflict with a huge backlog of modernization needs — antiquated tankers, inadequate airlift assets, a small and outdated bomber fleet, as well as aging fighters, transport aircraft and special operations aviation platforms, to name just a few. One statistic stands out. Thirty years ago, the average age of Air Force airplanes was eight years. Today it is 25 years. And maintenance requirements are on the increase. Complicating this picture is the dysfunctional nature of the current budget process and the services’ dependence on huge supplemental appropriations which, as we have seen in recent weeks, get stalled on Capitol Hill by partisan gridlock. The Defense Department is still waiting for Congress to approve a $165 billion war supplemental for fiscal year 2008. The legislation has been slowed by lawmakers who want to add billions of dollars in domestic programs and funds for a GI Bill. The Defense Department therefore finds itself, as of mid-June, again with an overdue supplemental and the prospect of civilian layoffs and payroll shortfalls. There is no way to place this situation in a good light.

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Michigan ‘08 1AC – RECAPITALIZATION ADVANTAGE FUEL COSTS MAKE RECAPITALIZATION IMPOSSIBLE -- THE PLAN SOLVES BY MAKING RESOURCES AVAILABLE
Thomas D. Crowley, et. al., President, L. E. Peabody & Associates, Inc., “Transforming the Way DOD Looks at Energy,” LMI Research Institute Report Commissioned by the Pentagon, April 2007 (http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_404_FT602T1_Transforming%20the%20Way%20 DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy_Final%20Report.pdf) The need to recapitalize obsolete and damaged equipment and to develop high-technology systems to implement future operational concepts is growing. At the same time, the procurement accounts for DoD are constantly under pressure from the rising costs of nondiscretionary accounts in the DoD budget (fuel, manpower) and requirements for non-defense spending (social security, health care). In this pressurized fiscal environment, controlling operating costs is essential to enable the procurement of new capability needs. However, fuel costs and consumption trends are increasing the total operating costs of the force, and projected trends will create the need to make investments in additional logistics capability. Thus, investment for future combat capability must increasingly compete with growing operating costs and logistic support requirements. In addition to the financial planning challenge associated with energy market volatility, the inability to fully account for energy considerations in operational and force development analysis impacts the investment decisions necessary to build the future force. The real cost of fuel to DoD is
more than just the DESC standard price used for programming, budgeting, and investment decisions.22 To assess this difference, the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) has been studying the delivered cost of fuel for the military. PA&E estimated the “wholesale” cost to each service and then added the costs incurred for “retail” delivery as well as other costs incurred by the services and agencies. For a fuel-type dependent standard cost of $2.29 to $2.32 per gallon, PA&E found that the composite costs per gallon are as follows: Air Force JP-8 (weighted cost)—$6.36 air delivery cost (9 percent of total)—$ 42.49 Army JP-8—$5.62 (wartime delivered cost not estimated due to variance in mission and escort requirements)23 Navy JP-5 (weighted cost at sea)—$3.08 (airborne delivered cost not estimated due to data availability and variance in scenarios) Navy F-76 (weighted cost at sea)—$2.74. The PA&E brief emphasizes that efforts to refine the method and apply fully burdened fuel costs are ongoing and that more focus should be applied to the method than to the specific numbers.24 The inability to estimate potential wartime costs applies a downward bias to these burdened fuel costs.

THOSE RESOURCES WILL BE REINVESTED TO RECAPITALIZE
Scott C. Buchanan, Strategist in the Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation, “Energy and Force Transformation,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 2006 (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i42/17-JFQ42%20Buchanan%20Pg%2051-54.pdf) The DOD energy burden is so significant that it may prevent the execution of new and still evolving operational concepts, which require the rapid and constant transport of resources without regard for the energy costs.5 These energy burdens will increase as new operational concepts demand a lighter, more agile and dispersed force, with the attendant increase in logistical sustainment. As increasing portions of the budget are set aside for fuel purchases to account for the volatility in fuel prices, increased capability will need to be built into new platforms to mitigate likely impacts on force shape and composition. It is crucial, therefore, that DOD develops an energy strategy that reduces the energy burdens of our operational concepts. Decoupling traditional energy sources from systems and platforms may radically alter both operational requirements and capabilities, as well as alter strategic realities. The use of technologies that no longer rely on the current energy infrastructure is the wave of the future. For instance, one estimate suggests that a third of DOD resources are focused on one small area of the world—the Middle East. The annual investment in securing this region currently exceeds $150 billion per year.6 Reducing our dependency on oil should make these resources available for investment in future force and infrastructure needs.

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Michigan ‘08 1AC – RECAPITALIZATION ADVANTAGE PROCUREMENT COSTS FOR THE JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER HAVE PUSHED THE F-22 OUT OF THE BUDGET -- NEW FUNDING IS KEY
Richard Aboulafia, Vice President of Analysis for the Teal Group, An Intelligence Company Specializing in Aerospace and Defense Research, “The U.S. Tactical Aircraft Crisis,” Aerospace America Journal, April 2008 (http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace/images/articleimages/pdf/Industry%20Insights_APR2008.pdf)

Skeptics have accused the Air Force of using the F-15 fleet troubles as a rationale for additional F-22 buys, but notably, senior DOD officials have remarked on the extent of the F-15 problems. DOD, unlike the Air Force, is generally against extended F-22 procurement, largely because of concerns that additional F-22 buys could create budget pressure against the F-35. Yet it is unclear whether DOD can do anything about the aging fighter problem. There is broad agreement that the FY09 defense budget—likely to exceed $700 billion with supplemental spending bills—is at or near the peak of the defense spending cycle. It is the last Bush administration budget, and the next one could well reflect a Democratic presidency, with the start of an Iraq war wind-down. Supplemental defense spending packages related to Iraq and Afghanistan are likely to wind down, as well. The FY09 budget deftly manages to avoid the F-22 debate altogether. It conspicuously lacks both long-lead funding for an FY10 purchase and the funds needed to shut the line down. There has been discussion of adding four more planes to the FY09 batch via supplementals, but this would add only a few months to the production program. With or without the additional four aircraft, the last funded plane will be delivered in 2011. The only sign of hope is that the FY09 Air Force unfunded priority list includes $497 million in advanced procurement money for an FY10 production lot of 20 F-22s. If this funding is provided; if it is followed by the actual FY10 funding for these planes; and if the notional four FY09 supplemental planes are funded, total F-22 procurement would be raised to only 207 aircraft from the current 183. In terms of recapitalization, the Navy is in better shape than the Air Force. Its highest procurement priority has been the F/A-18E/F and its related EA-18G electronic warfare plane. The F/A-18 line is very much open, costs are quite reasonable (about $45 million-$50 million per aircraft), and there has finally been an export order (Australia signed for 24 F/A- 18Fs last year). Yet when viewed from a toplevel perspective, the FY09 budget provides for a paltry level of fighter recapitalization. The good news is that it provides about $10.4 billion in tactical aircraft procurement funding, a record level for over 20 years. The bad news is that this pays for only 81 aircraft—20 F-22s, eight Air Force F-35s, 45 F/A-18E/F/Gs, and eight Navy/ Marine F-35s. Options, good and bad There are three good options to remedy this aircraft recapitalization problem. The first is the most obvious: Increase spending on new tactical aircraft. The Air Force, for example, continues to insist that it wants 381 F-22s, with procurement ongoing despite the F-35 spending ramp-up. There also has been congressional talk of another 100 F-15Es, although the Air Force steadfastly resists the suggestion. The Navy has indicated that it is looking at another batch of F/A18E/F/Gs beyond the current 579 aircraft. All three air arms, especially the Marines, continue to plan on large-scale production of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, with an ultimate combined goal of over 2,400 planes. The problem is that the F-35 was supposed to cost about $40 million in today’s money. While there are hopes of getting the unit recurring flyaway down to $55 million-$60 million, the unit price of the first production batches is actually around $100 million. This means that when F-35 procurement spending ramps up, it is unlikely to produce much more than the 81 fighters funded in FY09.

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Michigan ‘08 1AC – RECAPITALIZATION ADVANTAGE F-22 PRODUCTION IS KEY TO THE ECONOMY AND AIR POWER AJC, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, “Raptor's fate tied to state's workers; Made in Marietta: F-22's future determines jobs of 2,000 at Lockheed,” 3-10-2008 lexis
The Marietta-built F-22 Raptor is capable of amazing feats. It can cruise at 1,100 miles an hour, soar to 60,000 feet, and destroy air and ground targets with ease, all while staying virtually undetectable to radar. It is a technogeek's dream, a unique blend of speed, stealth and maneuverability designed to make pilots swoon and enemies duck and cover. The question is: Can the Raptor fight off an even fiercer foe --- a budget-conscious Defense Department that wants to cap Raptor production at 187 planes? In Cobb County, especially, there is keen interest in the answer. Lockheed Martin's giant plant in Marietta assembles the plane, and roughly 2,000 of the facility's 7,000 jobs are tied to its production. Without new funding, the project will start ramping down at the end of 2008, and wrap up by 2011. Should that happen, the company says, jobs "would be lost." Lockheed, said Cobb County Chamber of Commerce Chief Operating Officer and Senior Vice President Don Beaver, "is a strategic asset for our country, a treasure for Georgia because of the multi-million-dollar contracts that are shared by vendors throughout the state, and a stalwart in the county since the plant was built. Lockheed's been more than just jobs, they've been part of the fabric of this community forever." No one's saying the plant is going away, but threats to one of its key products spark concern. Worries over the future of the Raptor are as long-standing as the debate over its need. While no one seems to question the aircraft's military capabilities, there are those who doubt its role in a changed military theater. Questionable need The debate has pitted the Pentagon on one side against the Air Force and members of Congress on the other. Originally, plans called for several hundred Raptors to be built, but over the years the number was whittled amid cost concerns and changing priorities. In December, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called for Raptor production funding to stop at 187 planes. Recently, the Air Force suggested 380 would be more like it. Those who would end Raptor production say America no longer needs the F-22, or at least more of the planes, to defend itself, particularly at a per-plane price that's estimated at $130 million to more than $300 million, depending on whether research and development costs are included. Lockheed says the cost today for an F-22 is $137.6 million. Gates pointed out that the Raptor --- conceived in the late 1980s as a successor to the F-15 --- hasn't been a factor in either Iraq or Afghanistan and that its main use is against a "near peer." The limited risk of a conflict against China or Russia in the near future, he suggested, doesn't justify building more. U.S. Sens. Johnny Isakson and Saxby Chambliss of Georgia both are "big supporters" of continued Raptor production, Isakson said. "It's very important to the security of the United States," he said "The planes speak for themselves," he added. "They've proven themselves over and over in the theater. Anybody who looks at the performance sees that the F-22 has met or exceeded every benchmark set for it." Isakson also noted that there is broad support around the nation for the project. Lockheed said the plane has 1,000 suppliers in 44 states, giving it political clout. "The economic impact is nationwide," Isakson said. "And it's a big economic generator and important to the state of Georgia." U.S. Rep. Phil Gingrey, whose congressional district includes the Marietta plant, said more Raptors are "required to maintain air dominance and defend our homeland in the coming decades." Gingrey added, "The U.S. simply cannot maintain its status as a superpower in the skies and protect our airspace if we continue to rely upon an aging fighter force while our adversaries build newer, more capable aircraft. I sincerely hope our national security interests will triumph over budgetary constraints." Both Isakson and Gingrey said they listen to the Air Force when its leaders say they need more of a certain type of aircraft.

THE IMPACT IS GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR.
Walter Russell Mead, Senior Fellow in American Foreign policy @ the Council on Foreign Relations, World Policy Institute, 1992 What if the global economy stagnates – or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: North against South, rich against poor. Russia, China, India – these countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to the world than Germany and Japan did in the ‘30s.

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Michigan ‘08 1AC – RECAPITALIZATION ADVANTAGE INDEPENDENTLY -- RESOURCES FOR RECAPITALIZATION WOULD ALSO BE SPENT ON REFUELING TANKERS -- THIS IS KEY TO AIR POWER
Michael Kennedy, Senior Economist for Project Air Force, RAND, “Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for KC-135 Recapitalization,” 2006 (http://www-tc.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/tanker_rand.pdf) Recapitalization of the KC-135 aerial refueling tanker is very important for U.S. national security and has a significant impact on the U.S. national budget. Aerial refueling tankers are a critical part of U.S. military and national security strategy. Without them, air power cannot be deployed to overseas theaters in a timely way; it cannot be operated at militarily required distances from overseas bases; U.S.-based strategic air forces cannot execute overseas missions; and homeland defense air patrols would lose substantial effectiveness. The KC-135 constitutes the bulk of the current tanker force, embodying about 80 percent of U.S. aerial refueling capability. The KC-135 fleet is nearing 50 years of age, and it has exhibited some technical difficulties and increased costs of operation. KC-135 recapitalization also has major budgetary implications. The total cost of both operating the KC-135s until they are retired and acquiring and operating their replacements is in the $200 billion range over the next half century.

AIR POWER IS KEY TO DETER NUMEROUS CONFLICTS -- PARTICULARLY A CHINESE INVASION OF TAIWAN
Zalmay Khalilzad and Ian Lesser, RAND, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, 2001 p.164-5
(http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR897/MR897.chap3.pdf) This subsection attempts to synthesize some of the key operational implications distilled from the analyses relating to the rise of Asia and the potential for conflict in each of its constituent regions. The first key implication derived from the analysis of trends in Asia suggests that American air and space power will continue to remain critical for conventional and unconventional deterrence in Asia. This argument is justified by the fact that several subregions of the continent still harbor the potential for full-scale conventional war. This potential is most conspicuous on the Korean peninsula and, to a lesser degree, in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the South China Sea. In some of these areas, such as Korea and the Persian Gulf, the United States has clear treaty obligations and, therefore, has preplanned the use of air power should contingencies arise. U.S. Air Force assets could also be called upon for operations in some of these other areas. In almost all these cases, U.S. air power would be at the forefront of an American politico-military response because (a) of the vast distances on the Asian continent; (b) the diverse range of operational platforms available to the U.S. Air Force, a capability unmatched by any other country or service; (c) the possible unavailability of naval assets in close proximity, particularly in the context of surprise contingencies; and (d) the heavy payload that can be carried by U.S. Air Force platforms. These platforms can exploit speed, reach, and high operating tempos to sustain continual operations until the political objectives are secured. The entire range of warfighting capability— fighters, bombers, electronic warfare (EW), suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), combat support platforms such as AWACS and J-STARS, and tankers—are relevant in the Asia-Pacific region, because many of the regional contingencies will involve armed operations against large, fairly modern, conventional forces, most of which are built around large land armies, as is the case in Korea, China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf.

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Michigan ‘08 1AC – RECAPITALIZATION ADVANTAGE THE IMPACT IS EXTINCTION Straits Times 6-25-2000
THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

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Michigan ‘08 SOLVENCY – RECAPITALIZATION THE AFF FREES UP RESOURCES FOR RECAPITALIZATION
Thomas D. Crowley, et. al., President, L. E. Peabody & Associates, Inc., “Transforming the Way DOD Looks at Energy,” LMI Research Institute Report Commissioned by the Pentagon, April 2007 (http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_404_FT602T1_Transforming%20the%20Way%20 DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy_Final%20Report.pdf)
LMI identified three areas of disconnect between DoD’s current energy consumption practices and the capability requirements of its strategic goals: Strategic. DoD seeks to shape the future security environment in favor of the United States. But, our dependence on foreign supplies of fuel limits our flexibility in dealing with producer nations who oppose or hinder our goals for greater prosperity and liberty. Operational. DoD’s operational concepts seek greater mobility, persistence, and agility for our forces. But, the energy logistics requirements of these forces limit our ability to realize these concepts. Fiscal. DoD seeks to reduce operating costs of

the current force to procure new capabilities for the future. But, with increased energy consumption and increased price pressure due to growing global demand for energy, energy-associated operating costs are growing. In parallel with the increase in the global demand for energy is an increase in concern about global climate change and other environmental considerations. Therefore, when identifying technical solutions to its energy challenges, DoD should also considered a fourth disconnect—environmental. From our research, we concluded that DoD has the opportunity to address the four disconnects by fundamentally changing how it views, values, and uses energy. Many actions are required to implement this transformation, but the highest-level requirements are straightforward: Incorporate energy considerations (energy use and energy logistics support requirements) in the department’s key corporate processes: strategic planning, analytic agenda, joint concept and joint capability development, acquisition, and planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) Establish a corporate governance structure with policy and resource oversight to focus the department’s energy efforts Apply a structured framework to address energy efficiency, including alternate energy sources, to the department’s greatest energy challenges— those areas consuming the most fuel, requiring the most logistics
support, or having the most negative impact on the warrior. The following are some options for energy actions related to DoD’s corporate processes: Apply the energy-efficiency requirements of Executive Order 13423 (3 percent reduction per year, or 30 percent reduction by 2015 from 2003 baseline) to mobility forces Analyze current and projected energy and energy logistics required to support operational plans and capability-based planning and incorporate findings in other corporate processes Assess the role of information in reducing energy requirements through improved operational and logistics effectiveness and reduced intheater personnel requirements Incorporate energy considerations (energy use and energy logistics support requirements) in all future concept development, capability development, and acquisition actions Make energy a top research and development priority Improve the incentives for investment in energy efficiency Increase global efforts to enhance the stability and security of oil infrastructure, transit lanes, and markets through military-to-military and state-to-state cooperation Make reducing energy vulnerability a focus area of the next strategic planning cycle and Quadrennial Defense Review. To coordinate the efforts of DoD components, provide strategic direction, focus research and development efforts, and monitor compliance with energy-efficiency guidelines, DoD needs an effective energy governance structure. We recommend that DoD establish a coordinating body with policy and resource oversight authority. Considering the need for collaboration among the services and DoD, we believe an empowered committee would be more effective that a single leader. From our survey of emerging energy technologies, the department has a wide range of options for addressing energy efficiency and alternate sources of energy. Under the guidance of the coordinating body, DoD can begin a structured analysis of how to apply organizational, process, and technology changes to execute a strategy to reduce energy dependence. Although assessing the strategic, operational, fiscal, and environmental impacts of a change provides a mechanism to value potential choices, these impacts may not provide sufficient insight to be determinative. To promote the changes that will have the greatest utility in addressing the disconnects, we recommend that the department begin by focusing on three areas: Greatest fuel use (aviation forces) Greatest logistic difficulty (forward land forces and mobile electric power) Greatest warrior impact (individual warfighter burden). DoD energy transformation must begin in the near term, addressing current practices and legacy forces, while investing for long-term changes that may radically alter future consumption patterns. We recommend a time-phased approach to reduce our reliance on fossil and carbon-based fuels. This approach includes the following: Organizational and process changes that can be implemented immediately Engineered solutions, to improve the efficiency of current forces and those nearing acquisition Invention of new capabilities, employed in new operational concepts, for those forces yet to be developed. Applying this approach to the three focus areas will give DoD an opportunity to develop portfolios of solutions that can reduce energy use and dependence. The coordinating body can evaluate these portfolios to against the energy disconnects to identify optimal solutions across the services, broader department objectives, and U.S. government strategic objectives and energy efforts. The coordinating body can then focus technology development as required to achieve the desired solutions. For the energy transformation to be successful, DoD’s senior leaders must articulate a clear vision for the change and must ensure—through their sustained commitment and active participation—that it becomes engrained in the organization’s ethos. We propose the following vision: DoD will be the nation’s leader in the effective use of energy, significantly reducing DoD’s dependence on traditional fuels and enhancing operational primacy through reduced logistics support requirements. Establishing a goal for mobility energy efficiency will

provide near-term objectives in support of the vision, enhance operational effectiveness by reducing logistics support requirements, and free resources for recapitalization of the force. Our estimates show that implementing a 3 percent reduction per year until 2015 could result in savings of $43 billion by 2030 based on Energy Information Agency reference case price projections, without including any multiplier effects.

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Michigan ‘08 COSTS PREVENT RECAPITALIZATION

Rising oil prices wreak havoc on military procurement
Reuters ‘08
(Rebekah Kebede http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN20389654 { U.S. military fuel costs double from 2003 to 2007] Thu Mar 20, 2008) The military spent some $12.6 billion on jet fuel, diesel and other fuels for its worldwide operations in 2007, the last period for which data is available, up from $5.2 billion in 2003, according to data released this week by the Defense Energy Support Center. The energy bill for war in Iraq and Afghanistan last year was $1.7 billion, but no comparison was available for 2003. Despite the surge in spending, the amount of fuel the U.S. military bought declined 9.5 percent to about 132.5 million barrels worldwide in 2007 from 145.1 million barrels in the year of the invasion, according to the data. "(The rising oil price) makes our operations worldwide more expensive for the military services," said Jack Hooper, a spokesman for the DESC. The increases in fuel prices have "wreaked havoc" on some Defense Department programs as officials pulled money from them to cover fuel costs for critical operations, according to a Defense Science Board report released earlier this year.

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Michigan ‘08

---AIR FORCE--FUEL COSTS HURT AIR FORCE HIGH OIL COSTS HURT THE AIR FORCE Boston Globe, “Environmental Defense,” 5-27-2007
(http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/05/27/environmental_defense/) Such a fighting force has an element of "Star Wars fantasy," Hornitschek wrote. But the ideas in the paper are not that far from projects already being funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in conjunction with university laboratories and companies like DuPont, GE, and Hewlett Packard. For one project, DARPA is trying to develop a substitute jet fuel derived from plants such as palm trees and jatropha shrubs. Currently, the Air Force is the largest consumer of energy in the Department of Defense, and every dollar increase in the price of a barrel of oil raises its annual costs by $60 million, according to Kevin Billings, the Air Force's deputy assistant secretary for Environment, Safety and Occupational Health.

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Michigan ‘08 RECAPITALIZATION KEY RECAPITALIZATION KEY -- AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT IS AGING AND WILL PREVENT THE SUCCESS OF AIR MISSIONS
Mitch Gettle, Master Sgt., US Air Force, “Wynne: AF needs to recapitalize,” 1-10-2006 (http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123013999) With the combination of aging and heavily used equipment, the Air Force needs recapitalization across the board, Secretary of the Air Force Michael W. Wynne said. In past discussions about Air Force recapitalization, aircraft usually took center stage. Although aircraft still need to be recapitalized, there has been a shift. "The Air Force recapitalization program is not focused simply on aircraft," Secretary Wynne said. "Where we know we have advanced technologies, we want to introduce them; where we know we have emerging missions, we want to satisfy them."

AIR FORCE AIR CRAFT ARE AGING -- UNDERMINES AIR POWER Natty J, National Journal, “Aging Aircraft,” 3-15-2008 lexis
The gleaming icon of American military supremacy is the jet fighter, streamlined and lethal as it shrieks through the sky. On November 2, 2007, one of those fighters broke into pieces in the air. The pilot ejected safely, but the Air Force grounded an entire class of aircraft -- 441 A/B and C/D models of the F-15 Eagle air superiority fighter -- for most of two months. Training flights were canceled, homeland-security patrols were transferred to other aircraft, and pilots were stuck on the ground in simulators while maintenance crews conducted a series of frenzied inspections. "There were daily conference calls with the accident investigation board," said Maj. Joe Harris, commander of the Air National Guard's 142nd Aircraft Maintenance Squadron in Portland, Ore. "We were released to fly, and then they grounded us again." Getting their base's 20 F-15s back in the air took Harris's mechanics "over 5,000 hours" of work, he said -- 250 hours per plane. The problem: A key structural element in many early F-15s -- including six of the 20 at Harris's base -- had been manufactured too thin and thus did not conform to specifications. The defect was so slight that no one noticed for two decades. But the F-15 that cracked up in flight had been in continuous service for 27 years. That translated into 5,600 flight hours, thousands of jarring takeoffs and landings, and countless high g-force turns. The wear and tear had simply added up. The average age of the 441 grounded F-15s? Twenty-five and a half. Those F-15s are not alone. The average age of the Air Force's core fighter, the F-16, is 16.7 years. The average age of the Navy's F-18 is a relatively youthful 13.6 because the Navy bought more fighters in the 1990s than the Air Force did. Both services, nevertheless, are relying primarily on fighters built during President Reagan's defense buildup. Even the military's own notoriously optimistic budget projections call for buying new planes at such high prices -- and therefore at such low annual rates of production -- that some 1980s-vintage aircraft will have to stay in service through the 2020s, when they will be more than 40 years old.

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Michigan ‘08 AT: AGING TAKEOUTS NEG TAKEOUTS ASSUME ONLY AGE OF AIR CRAFT, NOT USE -- IRAQ HAS PLACED ABOVE-AVERAGE STRAINS ON THE AIR FORCE
Richard Aboulafia, Vice President of Analysis for the Teal Group, An Intelligence Company Specializing in Aerospace and Defense Research, “The U.S. Tactical Aircraft Crisis,” Aerospace America Journal, April 2008 (http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace/images/articleimages/pdf/Industry%20Insights_APR2008.pdf)

The age of the fighter fleet has been greatly worsened by higher than expected utilization rates. The Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts continue to require air power for strike missions. The Air Force typically executes 250 sorties daily. The situation is equally bad with Navy/Marine aviation. In fact, because of fatigue, some USMC F/A-18Cs are being replaced by older reactivated A models. Because of a concerted effort to avoid casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan, strike missions have increased markedly. There were over 1,200 tactical bombing missions in 2007. That was about five times the total in 2006, and more than the number in the previous three years combined.

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Michigan ‘08
---F-22---

EXT – F-22 KEY TO ECONOMY PRODUCTION OF THE F-22 KEY TO DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
Jodi Rell, Governor of Connecticut, “Rell fights for continued fighter production,” 12-27-2007
(http://www.zwire.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=19146887&BRD=1379&PAG=461&dept_id=162912&rfi=6) "Like the decision to move forward with early procurement for building two submarines a year for the Navy, keeping the Raptor production lines humming will ensure that we do not lose these vital jobs - and the highly skilled men and women who fill them - in our aerospace industry," Gov. Rell said. "The Raptor program involves more than 1,000 suppliers in 44 states, including thousands of workers at Pratt & Whitney in Connecticut who build the F119 turbofan engines that power the F-22. Apart from being unwise to leave the Air Force short of the number of aircraft it needs to properly complete its mission, it would be an unacceptable risk to our national defense to see this industrial infrastructure crumble due to a lack of work."

AEROSPACE KEY TO HEGEMONY AND THE ECONOMY Walker, ’02 (Robert, Wexler and Walker Public Policy Associates, Chair, Commission on the Future of the US
Aerospace Industry, http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf) Aerospace will be at the core of America’s leadership and strength in the 21st century. The role of aerospace in establishing America’s global leadership was incontrovertibly proved in the last century. This industry opened up new frontiers to the world, such as freedom of flight and access to space. It provided products that defended our nation, sustained our economic prosperity and

safeguarded the very freedoms we commonly enjoy as Americans. It has helped forge new inroads in medicine and science, and fathered the development of commercial products that have improved our quality of life. Given a continued commitment to pushing the edge of man’s engineering, scientific and manufacturing expertise, there is the promise of still more innovations and new frontiers yet to be discovered. It is imperative that the U.S. aerospace industry remains healthy to preserve the balance of our leadership today and to

ensure our continued leadership tomorrow.

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Michigan ‘08 F-22 KEY TO AIR POWER THE AIR FORCE NEEDS ADDITIONAL F-22s -- AIR POWER WILL COLLAPSE OTHERWISE Moseley and Gingrey ‘08
(Michael Moseley, General and Chief of Staff, USAF, Phil Gingrey, Rep (R-GA),Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Congressional Documents and Publications, 2-27-2008 lexis)
(Gingrey) In a nutshell, the situation is that the base budget for FY '09 contains no funds for line shutdown or for advanced procurement of the F-22, and there seems to be a discrepancy between where that will leave us in terms of the size of the F-22 fleet and where the Air Force and most independent experts believe that number should be. That will leave us at 183 and possibly 187 if, as Secretary Gates has indicated, there are four additional F-22s in the supplemental request. General Moseley, in your professional opinion as the senior uniformed leader of the Air Force, what is the Air Force's validated requirement of F-22 A Raptors? GEN. MOSELEY: Sir, you know I do support the budget, I do support the president's budget. I am grateful that in that budget the termination language has been removed and the line will continue so the numbers discussion will be given, will be allowed to continue into the next administration. And so the balance of F-35 and F-22s and legacy airplanes is where we're working now. But if you're asking my personal opinion, with what we know right now, the number is still 381. REP. GINGREY: Three (hundred) eighty-one. Thank you.
Thank you, Chief. Secretary Wynne, as civilian leader of the Air Force, where do you put the requirement? Has anything happened to make that requirement change? SEC. WYNNE: Well, sir, I am not a uniformed officer and so I have to be very supportive of the president's budget, but I also am grateful that the secretary has allowed the program to not be closed and that it has allowed the debate to continue into next year, giving, I think, the military authorities the right to argue for continued extension. Where I come down is, frankly, I worry very much about how we are going to manage across this globe to make sure we have air superiority, which has been the predicate for victory ever since World War II. I also worry about the integrated air defense systems, because the last time we had a balanced survivability between us and them we lost 2,000 airplanes, one of which was my brother. REP. GINGREY: Mr. Secretary, if you could give me that number I would appreciate it. The number of F-22 A's that you think we need. SEC. WYNNE: Sir, I have to tell you that, not being a professional airman but being secretary of the Air Force, I'm sort of stuck on that. I can only tell you that where ACC currently is is at 381. REP. GINGREY: Thank you. And I assume that requirement is based on, among other things,

the fact that China and Russia are developing fifth-generation Raptor-like technology, safety concerns pertaining to our F-15 fleet, and our nation's desire, of course, as you just said, Mr. Secretary, to maintain air superiority. I assume that requirement is driven in part, that over the last 10 years multiple independent studies and over 20 Air Force studies have all recommended that the Air Force requires far, far more than 187 F-22 Raptors to do the job previously done, by the way, by 800 F-15 A's through D's. With a fleet of 187 Raptors, and after accounting for training, tests and maintenance requirements, fewer than 110 of those F-22s will be operational. Without a change in procurement plans, I believe this small number of F-22s will make it extremely difficult for the Air Force to provide air dominance to our combatant commanders for the next several decades.

F-22 KEY -- PROJECTS POWER OUT OF ALASKA, WHICH IS KEY TO GLOBAL FORCE PROJECTION Stevens and Kuhn 2007
(Ted Stevens, Sen. Alaska, Anthony Kuhn, Senior Airman, USAF, Air Force Link, 2-14-2007 http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123041055)
Alaska Sen. Ted Stevens said the F-22 will play a key role is guaranteeing American superiority of the sky over the Pacific. "General Billy Mitchell once observed this: Alaska is the most strategic place in the world ... whoever holds Alaska will hold the world," Senator Stevens said. The F-22 is the Air Force's newest fighter aircraft. Its combination of stealth, supercruise, maneuverability, and integrated avionics, coupled with improved supportability, represents an exponential leap in warfighting capabilities. The F-22 performs both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions allowing full realization of operational concepts vital to the 21st century Air Force. Gen. Paul V. Hester, the PACAF commander, said the F-22 will show America's continued commitment to maintain peace and stability in the Pacific. "An important part of this business is to know and show the foes of America ... who stand against our allies and friends ... that you have the capacity, the capability, as well as the will to use that power," General Hester said.

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Michigan ‘08 F-22 KEY TO AIR POWER F-22 KEY TO AIR POWER -- F-15 IS AGING AND MUST BE RETIRED AND F-35 CAN’T COME ONLINE FOR AT LEAST 5 YEARS
Scott P. Van Cleef, retired Air Force brigadier general and the president of the Virginia State Air Force Association, “Don't let the Air Force fall out of the skies,” Roanoke Times, 2-5-2008 (http://www.roanoke.com/editorials/letters/wb/149251)
"The Air Force is going out of business," the secretary of the Air Force recently said. "At some time in the future [aircraft] will simply rust out, age out or fall out of the sky. If you want an Air Force, at some point you need to buy airplanes." That time is now. On Nov. 2, during a routine training mission over Missouri, an F-15 fighter jet broke apart in midair. The canopy ripped off as the nose and cockpit broke away from the aircraft, breaking the Air National Guard pilot's left shoulder, but he ejected and parachuted to safety. The cause was fatigue failure of one of four longerons that provide stiffness to the fuselage, much as a keel does for a boat. As a result, the entire fleet of 441 air superiority F-15s was grounded for more than two months for inspection. On Jan. 9, about 60 percent of the A, B, C and D model F-15s were returned to flight, but today more than 160 remain grounded indefinitely. That is the equivalent of putting three aircraft carriers out of business. Why should you care? The grounded aircraft are no longer available to provide air superiority for U.S. troops or air defense over the United States. It will take months for many pilots to regain flying proficiency. It is increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain our aging fleet. In 1973, the average age of Air Force aircraft was eight years. Today it is more than 24 years. Our KC-135 aerial tankers and our B52 bombers are more than 46 years old. More than 800 aircraft of all types are grounded or flight restricted. Old aircraft break in new and unpredictable ways. Older fighters are losing their technological advantage and face international fighters that equal or exceed them. We're in this position largely because of the acquisition vacation of the 1990s. We never got back on track, and 17 continuous combat operations by the Air Force have taken their toll. Replacing our aging tanker fleet is the Air Force's No. 1 acquisition priority. A replacement combat search and rescue helicopter is another. Many of our C-130E transports are nonflyable and our giant C-5A transports are unreliable and operate under serious restrictions. In fact, we lease outsized cargo aircraft from Russia. Yet the new C-130J and the C-17 strategic airlift production lines are scheduled to close. That means replacement aircraft are not even budgeted. Finally, punctuated by the F-15s on the ground, the need for more F-22 Raptor fighters is critical. The F-22 is the most capable fighter in the world. It is designed to replace the F-15, but the production total has been cut deeply. Three independent studies support a fleet of about 381 F-22s, but arbitrary budget restrictions have capped the number at 183. That is not enough, and fails to provide even one downsized F-22 squadron for each of the 10 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces the Air Force deploys. The F-22 line is scheduled to terminate in 2011. The first F-35 fighter, meant to replace aging F-16s and A-10s, rolls out in 2013, leaving a two-year gap between active fighter production lines. Incredibly, the Air Force might soon have not one open production line for transport, bomber or fighter aircraft. This has serious implications for our aerospace industrial base and our ability to keep the lead in aerospace technology. The Air Force is smaller today than what we had at the start of World War II. There is no telling what threats we will face in the future, but in the past we have not successfully predicted what the next war will look like. Even if large near-peer countries do not become threats (e.g. Russia and China), the weapons they build will fall into the hands of nations that are.

IT’S UNQUESTIONABLY BADASS
C Todd Lopez, Staff Sergeant, USAF, F-16.net, “F-22 Raptor News” 4-24-2007 (http://www.f16.net/news_article2293.html)
During Exercise Northern Edge 2006 in Alaska in early June, the F-22 proved its mettle against as many as 40 "enemy aircraft" during simulated battles. The Raptor achieved a 108-to-zero kill ratio at that exercise. But the capabilities of the F-22 go beyond what it can do. It is also able to help other aircraft do better. "When you are outnumbered on the battlefield -- the F-22 helps the F-18 and the F-15s increase their performance," General Lewis said. "It gives them more situational awareness, and allows them to get their expenditures because you can't kill all these airplanes with just the weapons aboard the F-22. It takes the F-15's and F-18's weapons. It was very successful, (in its) ability to get everybody to integrate." One role the F-22 is particularly good at, General Lewis said, is establishing air dominance. This means making airspace above an area safe for other aircraft to come in do their mission. The F-22 is superb at performing air-to-air combat and eliminating surface-to-air missiles. In fact, the F-22 is capable of dealing with both of those threats at the same time.

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Michigan ‘08 F-22 DETERS CHINA AND -- KEEPING THE PRODUCTION LINE OPEN ALLOWS SALES TO JAPAN, BOOSTS THE U.S. ECONOMY AND DETERS CHINA
Amy Butler, “Senate may push for foreign F-22 sales,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, 3-6-2008 lexis Key Senate staffers on the defense oversight committees are considering adding a proposal in the fiscal 2008 war spending supplemental to lift restrictions on selling the stealthy Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor abroad. This would clear the way for Japan to become the first foreign military sales customer for the fighter. Tokyo is willing to offer about $1 billion for an initial purchase, according to a Senate aide. Flyaway price for the F-22 is now $153 million. China is the primary threat addressed by the F-22. And, this aide says, some staffers on the defense oversight committees see Japan as providing a foreign presence beyond Air Force plans to base Raptors in Alaska and other areas of the Pacific. ?Why shouldn?t some of our allies share some of the cost of addressing this threat and supporting the production line,? the aide says. This is similar to the strategy of selling missile defense radars, ships and missiles to Japan to augment U.S. capability to counter ballistic missile threats from Pyongyang. The Obey amendment prevents sale of the twin-engine Lockheed Martin fighter outside the United States. The U.S. Air Force is buying 183 of the aircraft, though it continues to fight an uphill battle to get another roughly 200 planes. A first step is talk of including either $400 million for long-lead items or $600 million for four Raptors in the fiscal 2008 supplemental now being crafted at the Pentagon. The Marietta, Ga., production line faces closure without more work.

F-22 KEY TO AIR DOMINANCE VERSUS CHINA
C Todd Lopez, Staff Sergeant, USAF, F-16.net, “F-22 Raptor News” 16.net/news_article2293.html)

4-24-2007 (http://www.f-

"Because of its stealth and its speed, it is unique in that category, in that it allows us to establish air dominance," General Lewis said. "It goes after the aircraft, the SAMs, and the cruise missiles. And it can do it all at the same time. The legacy (aircraft) can do any one of those, kind of okay, but they can't survive in contested airspace. They can first try to take care of the aircraft, then they can work on the SAMs. But the F-22 has demonstrated, last year in (final operational testing and evaluation), that we can do that simultaneously." Of particular interest to the Air Force is the F22's ability to deal with "double digit SAMs." A double digit SAM, Air Force parlance for Russian-designed mobile surface-to-air missiles, is so named for the two digit designator in their NATO reporting name. The Russian-designed S-300P Angara, for instance, is designated "SA-10" by NATO countries. The "S-300PMU Favorit" is designated the "SA-20." Both Russia and China manufacture these weapons systems, and they are readily available on the market. These weapons are highly mobile and pose a threat to Air Force legacy aircraft such as the F-15 and F-16. "It's a huge problem in the future if you think about a double digit SAM. A double digit SAM is equivalent to our (phased array tracking intercept of target missiles)," General Lewis said. "As you know, PATRIOTs shot down some of our own friendlies. And the friendlies knew they were being targeted by the PATRIOT. They tried the best they could and they still got shot down. That is the future if there are double digit SAMs in that environment. You have got to go in there and kill them. If you can't kill them, you will be denied air space. That is what we envision."

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Michigan ‘08 F-22 WORKS / AT: TECH PROBLEMS THE F-22 WORKS -- IT’S UNQUESTIONABLY BADASS
John A. Tirpak, Senior Editor, Air Force Magazine, Journal of the Air Force Association, Vol 84, No 7, July 2001 (http://www.afa.org/magazine/july2001/0701fighter_print.html) The F-22 and the Joint Strike fighter are both stealthy and both will use the most advanced avionics and weapons, but there the similarity ends. The F-22 has the highest unit cost of the three because it meets the most stringent requirements of all-stealth, extreme agility, flight at high altitude, and persistent high speed. It will have to take on and win against large numbers of the very toughest enemy fighters and air defenses. It must be able to range the battlefield at will, clearing the air for less-capable, less-stealthy airplanes needed later to fully prosecute a war. The F-22 will have a ground attack capability as well, to deliver bombs against critical point targets deep inside enemy territory. No one doubts the F-22 will perform as advertised. Even the makers of its toughest overseas competitor, the Eurofighter Typhoon, advertise their airplane as being 80 percent as capable as the F-22.

TESTS ON THE TECH PRODUCED A 108 TO ZERO KILL RATIO
C Todd Lopez, Staff Sergeant, USAF, F-16.net, “F-22 Raptor News” 16.net/news_article2293.html)

4-24-2007 (http://www.f-

During Exercise Northern Edge 2006 in Alaska in early June, the F-22 proved its mettle against as many as 40 "enemy aircraft" during simulated battles. The Raptor achieved a 108-to-zero kill ratio at that exercise. But the capabilities of the F-22 go beyond what it can do. It is also able to help other aircraft do better.

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Michigan ‘08 AT: AIR POWER RESILIENT AIR POWER IS NOT RESILIENT -- RECAPITALIZATION IS KEY
Roscoe Bartlett, House Representative (R-MD), Testimony before the Joint Hearing on Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request for Tactical Aviation Programs, Congressional Documents and Publications, 3-11-2008 lexis With that said, we should not maintain false confidence in our technological superiority. Other nations such as China and India are fielding modern fighter aircraft, multilevel air defense systems, and aerial surveillance systems. At the same time the United States estimate difficult and expensive choices regarding the recapitalization of our ageing aircraft.

AIR POWER COLLAPSE IS POSSIBLE -- AGING F-15 TECH MAKES NEW UPGRADES VITAL
John A. Tirpak, Senior Editor, Air Force Magazine, Journal of the Air Force Association, Vol 84, No 7, July 2001 (http://www.afa.org/magazine/july2001/0701fighter_print.html) F-22 Raptor The Air Force's top priority program is the F-22. It needs the F-22 because the service does not believe its 30-year-old air superiority champ, the F-15, can soldier on much longer. Designed in the late 1960s to go against the Soviet-built MiG-21 and MiG-23, the F-15 is now matched or surpassed by later generations of foreign aircraft such as Russia's Su-35 and S-37, the Eurofighter Typhoon, and France's Rafale. Gen. John P. Jumper, head of Air Combat Command, said, "We've had a chance to look at this latest generation of airplanes," and when US pilots flying real or simulated threat airplanes go against US pilots in current US fighters, "our guys flying their airplanes beat our guys flying our airplanes. ... And that airplane we're flying is the F-15." USAF requires an airplane that is greatly superior to the opposition because of US military strategy of fighting at the enemy's doorstep. Upon arrival in a crisis, a few squadrons of American airplanes could be facing an enemy's entire air force, and some "traditional adversary" nations have fleets of hundreds of airplanes, many of them late-model types. Simply to survive, US fighters must be able to shoot down many enemy aircraft for each of their own lost in combat. The F-15 was also designed before the advent of digital avionics, digital engine controls, stealth, and new engine technology, while competitor aircraft designed in the 1980s and 1990s have, to some degree, incorporated all these advances. Curse of Old Age Moreover, USAF's F-15 fleet is afflicted by all of the problems of old age as they pertain to aircraft: crumbling seals, stress cracks, airframe fatigue, frayed wiring, parts shortages, and obsolescent components. The problems are fixed to the degree possible, but it takes more and more manpower to do so. The airplanes stay out of service longer, cannibalization rates are going up, readiness rates are going down, and more age-related problems crop up all the time.

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Michigan ‘08 AT: 183 IS ENOUGH 381 IS REQUIRED FOR ADEQUATE AIR POWER -- 183 IS TOTALLY INSUFFICIENT
Phil Gingrey, Rep (R-GA),Testimony before the Joint Hearing on Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request for Tactical Aviation Programs, Congressional Documents and Publications, 3-11-2008 lexis
REP. GINGREY: Well, let me tell you, I'll speak for the Air Force, and it's 381 -- and Secretary Wynne and General Mosley indicated to us in previous hearings that it is 381. Hearing materials also indicate the Air Force needs these 381 F- 22s to meet the national military strategy, which requires ability to perform two near-simultaneous combat -- major combat operations and also to perform homeland defense missions and the Quadrennial Defense Review Requirements. An integral part of meeting the National Military Strategy is outfit each of the Air Force's 10 Air Expeditionary Forces with one squadron of 24 F-22s. The Air Force and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, JROC believe, the force structure needed to accomplish this is 240 assigned aircrafts and 141 for testing, training, and backup. Clearly, we cannot accomplish this with a 187 F-22 Raptors, which translates about 110 that are operationally available.

MORE F-22s ARE REQUIRED TO REPLACE OUTDATED AIR CRAFT THAT WILL SOON BE RETIRED
Phil Gingrey, Rep (R-GA),Testimony before the Joint Hearing on Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request for Tactical Aviation Programs, Congressional Documents and Publications, 3-11-2008 lexis
And the Air Force urgently needs to replace approximately -- what, 500 1970 and 1980 vintage F-15, A-D Eagles, not to mention over the last 10 years multiple independent studies and over 20 Air Force studies, all recommended the Air Force requires far, far, more than 187 F-22 Raptors to do the job previously done by 800 F-15 A-Ds.

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Michigan ‘08 AT: JSF SOLVES OUR ECONOMY IMPACT IS SPECIFIC TO THE F-22 -- THE JSF DOES NOT SOLVE JSF IS ONLY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE -- WOULDN’T BE USED TO DETER CHINA
Michael Moseley, General and Chief of Staff, USAF, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Congressional Documents and Publications, 2-27-2008 lexis
Sir, I would tell you the F-22 is designed to operate at high altitude, at higher G, at higher speeds to be able to deliver the ordnance. The two airplanes are compatible, just like the F-16 and the F-15 are today. The F-35 is going to be a great airplane. In fact, our first A model comes off the line in June or July of this year and we've got about 12 of them, Navy, Air Force and Marine, coming down the line now to be able to fly those. But they're designed for roughly two different environments. One is a striking airplane with inherent self-defense capability and one is an inherent air superiority airplane with inherent striking capability. That's why they marry with each other so well. And the capabilities -- the characteristics of the two airplanes are ideal matches. So, sir, our desire is to be able to field both sets of these aircraft in the numbers that we need. And that's why we're grateful for the '09 budget and for the SecDef to keep the line open on the F- 22. And the numbers will work out.

JSF WON’T BE READY FOR AT LEAST 5 YEARS -- F-22 IS READY NOW
Hank Johnson, Rep (D-GA), Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Congressional Documents and Publications, 2-27-2008 lexis
REP. JOHNSON: Well, certainly I can appreciate that. And let me close by saying that we've heard today that we are dramatically short of the number of F-22s needed for meeting the Air Force's requirement. Roughly, we have about half of what we need. And as widespread procurement of the Joint Strike Fighter is not expected until at least 2013, I think we need to bridge the gap by procuring additional F-22s.

JSF DOES NOT SOLVE -- ONLY ONE THIRD AS EFFECTIVE AS THE F-22
C Todd Lopez, Staff Sergeant, USAF, F-16.net, “F-22 Raptor News” 16.net/news_article2293.html)

4-24-2007 (http://www.f-

"Even without stealth, this is the world's best fighter," General Lewis said. "The F-22, its ability with speed and maneuverability, is unprecedented. The problem with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in establishing air dominance is that you have to buy two or three to replace the F-22, because it only has half the weapons load, and it doesn't have the speed. You can't replace (the F-22) one-for-one with an F-35 or any other legacy fighter such as the F-15E."

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Michigan ‘08 AT: F-15S SOLVE F-15s ARE OUTDATED -- AND, ADVERSARIES HAVE SUPERIOR PLANES The Hill, “Fighters in dogfight for Congress support,” 1-30-2008 (http://thehill.com/business-lobby/fighters-in-dogfight-for-congress-support-2008-01-30.html)
The Air Force wants the F-22 because “it does not want to have parity” with its opponents in any future conflict, according to Maj. David Small, an Air Force spokesman. “Some of our potential future adversaries are already acquiring aircraft with capabilities well beyond the F-15 such as the SU-35,” he said in an e-mail statement.

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Michigan ‘08 AT: WE CAN JUST BUY F-22S LATER FALSE
Duncan Hunter, House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member (R-CA), Congressional Documents and Publications, 2-27-2008 lexis
"Here's our problem. We can not develop and field the complex weapons systems demanded by today's global security environment in one budget cycle or even under one administration. We can not pull an F-22 out of a hat if our planning factors and intelligence assessments prove wrong.

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Michigan ‘08 IMPACT – NORTH KOREA F-22 IS KEY TO DETERRENCE -- PARTICULARLY AGAINST NORTH KOREA
Amy Butler, Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 19, 2005
F-22 program officials are taking steps to distance the platform from the ongoing war on terrorism that dominates news headlines daily and to set realistic expectations about when and where it will deploy. Moseley declined to specify a particular base. It will likely be used to monitor activity in North Korea and to deter aggression into the southern part of the peninsula.

THE IMPACT IS ASIAN WARS
Ray Midkiff, Colonel, US Army, “U.S. Regional Strategy for North Korea,” 3-10-2005 (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil198.pdf)
The intent of this project is to propose a different approach to the United State's regional strategy for North Korea. The Korean War ended fifty-one years ago however, the U.S. is no closer to resolving this conflict than it was in 1953. The Korean Peninsula remains a dangerous place and a potential flashpoint threatening the stability of Northeast Asia. North Korea maintains large conventional and non-conventional forces as well as ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. These capabilities threaten South Korea and Japan. North Korea's nuclear weapons program has the potential to threaten even more of the region and spark an arms race in a very volatile part of the world. The current United States strategy for North Korea is too limited to realize any sort of normalization in relations. A new approach is needed that will produce long-term stability in the region, set the conditions for eventual reunification of North and South Korea and end North Korea's nuclear weapons ambitions.

EXTINCTION
Ogura and Oh ‘97
North Korea, South Korea, and Japan have achieved quasi- or virtual nuclear armament. Although these countries do not produce or possess actual bombs, they possess sufficient technological know-how to possess one or several nuclear arsenals. Thus, virtual armament creates a new nightmare in this region - nuclear annihilation. Given the concentration of economic affluence and military power in this region and its growing importance to the world system, any hot conflict among these countries would threaten to escalate into a global conflagration.

(Toshimaru and Ingyu, Teachers – Economics, Monthly Review, April)

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Michigan ‘08 IMPACT – PROLIF / TERRORISM DEFENSE TECH UPGRADES KEY TO SOLVE PROLIF AND TERRRORISM Deutch and Perry 2005
(John M. Deutch and William J. Perry, Research Worth Fighting For, The New York Times, April 13, 2005) Of course, the administration and Congress need to make tough budget choices. But to shift money away from the technology base to pay for Iraq, other current military operations or research on large, expensive initiatives, is to give priority to the near term at the expense of the future. This is doubtful judgment, especially at a time when the nature of the threat confronting America is changing. New threats, like catastrophic terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, urgently call for new technology.

TERRORISM CAUSES EXTINCTION Yonah Alexander prof and dir of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, Washington Times, 8-28-2003
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance
or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we

have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.

PROLIF CAUSES EXTINCTION

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=====SOFT POWER ADVANTAGE=====

1AC – SOFT POWER ADVANTAGE CONTENTION ___: SOFT POWER SOFT POWER IS LOW, BUT RECOVERABLE -- ADDRESSING ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT IS KEY Korea Times, “Both Soft, Hard Powers Needed for NK Denuclearization: Nye,” February 12, 2008
lexis **The person quoted in the article is Joseph Nye, former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government

"The United States managed such a combination during the Cold War, but more recently U.S. foreign policy has tended to over-rely on hard power because it is the most direct and visible source of American strength," he said. A major threshold was the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which have thrown the United States off course, he said. "Since the shock of 9/11, the United States has been exporting fear and anger rather than our more traditional values of hope and optimism," he said. "The United States should become a smart power by once again investing in the global goods." His advice for Washington to be a smart power is the restoration of alliances and focusing on global development, public diplomacy, economic integration and global goods such as energy security and climate change.

A PERCEPTION THAT THE U.S. VALUES NATIONAL SECURITY OVER THE ENVIRONMENT IS DEVASTATING SOFT POWER -- THE PLAN BREAKS THE PATTERN, RESTORES U.S. LEGITIMACY, AND BUILDS RELATIONS WITH EUROPE
Jutta Brunnee, Prof of Law and Chair in Environmental Law at the University of Toronto, “The United States and International Environment Law: Living with an Elephant,” European Journal of International Law, 2004 p. 643-7
D National Security The misgivings about international law and multilateral institutions, and the inclination towards alternative approaches, have likely been heightened by the post-September 11 preoccupation with national security.203 Arguably, this preoccupation has also entailed a shift of public concern and a shift of resources away from environmental issues. At any rate, all indications are that environmental and natural resource issues have become security issues. Some issues have been explicitly cast as matters of national security, as the Bush administration has done with American ‘energy security’ 204 But the systematic weaving of environmental concerns into the security agenda preceded the current Bush administration. Already the Clinton administration pushed strongly for a new, broader vision of foreign policy and national security.205 This push was flanked by a rise of ‘environmental security’ analysis in the scholarly literature.206 The initial goals of environmental security rhetoric most certainly included

the elevation of environmental degradation on policy and funding agendas. However, after September 11, it appears that many environmental issues have become subordinated to security considerations. The American Under-Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Paula Dobriansky expressed the underlying assumptions as follows: Many problems that used to be considered individually, such as environmental disputes, health-related issues, migration flows, narcotics trafficking, and trafficking in persons, among others, must now be viewed as integral to national security and stability. We have gone from a world where we assess our safety based on how we handle one large danger to one in which we must handle numerous, individual concerns 207 This thinking is also implicit in the Bush administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy.208 The document makes reference to environmental concerns only in the context of the need to promote free markets and free trade. Because a strong world economy advances ‘prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world’, it is said to be inextricably linked to US national security.209 As part of a ‘comprehensive’ free trade strategy, the Security Strategy highlights the need to ‘[p]rotect the environment and workers’ 210 E American Power, Multilateralism and Unilateralism The current American preoccupation with national security intersects with the desire to maintain and enhance US power in the post-Cold War world. At least in part, current policy-makers are driven by the sense that ‘in today’s world, we still need a sheriff, and that only the United States can play such a role’. 211 In turn, there is a keen sense that a ‘realistic sheriff’ cannot rely exclusively, or even primarily, on military power to accomplish its goals.212 Therefore, the United States must harness and develop what Joseph Nye has called ‘soft power’, which means ‘getting others to want what you want’, and ‘rests on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes
the preferences of others’ 213 A critical source of soft power, argues Nye, is the ‘ability to establish a set of favorable rules and institutions that govern areas of international activity’ 214 And this seems to be precisely the policy that the Bush administration has been pursuing, whether successfully or not. In a 2002 speech, the State Department’s then Director of Policy Planning, Richard Haass,

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offered the following observations: In the 21st century, the principal aim of American foreign policy is to integrate other countries and organizations into arrangements that will sustain a world consistent with U.S. interests and values, and thereby promote peace, prosperity, and justice as widely as possible… We are doing this by persuading more and more governments and, at a deeper level, people to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate for our mutual benefit.215 The United States, as a ‘resourceful sheriff”, must be a coalition builder.216 Depending on the issue at hand, the ‘coalitions of the willing’ may be broadly multilateral.217 But, increasingly, they may not be. Both the regional environmental hub approach and the emphasis on public-private partnerships for sustainable development also fit neatly into what Richard Haass has called the ‘doctrine of integration’ 21% From the standpoint of international environmental law, the key question is what this self—declared ‘distinctly American internationalism’219 will mean for MEAs and other efforts to structure global environmental governance. As suggested earlier, it is relatively harder for the United States to shape policy outcomes within multilateral regimes. Thus, regional or country-specific approaches may be seen as more direct and effective ways to project soft power.22° At another level, they are simply sensible responses to the diffusion of actors and arenas that characterizes globalization, in the environmental as in other fields. In any case, it is to be expected that the United States will continue to promote ‘U.S. interests and values’ at multiple levels. But all the focus on regional or public-private approaches notwithstanding, multilateral environmental regimes will also remain part of the policy picture. Quite apart from the fact that some environmental problems cannot be solved but through multilateral engagement, it is arguable that the very importance of soft power will keep the United States tied into MEAs and other regimes. Eventually, these facts may even bring the United States back into the climate change regime. Although the withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol remains an

isolated step in American MBA practice, it is routinely cited, along with the rejection of the International Criminal Court and of certain arms control treaties, as evidence of a broader pattern of not just US selective multilateralism, but of a growing inclination to exempt itself from standards applicable to others.221 Few observers outside the United States have been swayed by the US claim that it is simply looking to move beyond a flawed treaty. A number of factors explain this phenomenon. Non-participation in Kyoto is not simply a matter of lacking or slow domestic progress towards ratification. The Bush administration took the unusual step of formally declaring its opposition to the protocol. 222 Its blunt dismissal of the protocol came after more than a decade of active involvement in the climate change negotiations, and after considerable success in shaping many parts of the regime according to American preferences.223 But, more than that, given the treaty’s entry into force formula, US non-ratification placed significant hurdles in the path of the treaty ever taking effect.224 In addition, even if the protocol enters into force, it will do so without participation of the largest emitter of global greenhouse gases.22’ The US decision on Kyoto, therefore, concerns not merely its own position vis-a-vis the treaty, but has significant effects on the effectiveness or even the existence of the treaty as such.226 The perils of American ‘a la carte multilateralism’, have manifested themselves on many fronts over the last few years.227 But there are few better illustrations than the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and the responses that this perfectly legal step provoked. Ultimately, soft power rests on credibility.228 In this context, it matters that the Kyoto withdrawal is widely seen as part of a broader pattern. A country’s ability to get others to want what it wants will be diminished if it is perceived as a purely self—interested actor, which is precisely what current US climate change policy invites. In addition, over-reliance on coalitions of the willing, be it in the environmental context or beyond, undermines rather than enhances perception of the United States as a trustworthy, good faith actor. 229 This assessment applies in particular to US relations with European and other states that perceive a duty to cooperate to be at the very heart of the international legal order. 230 Therefore, even the Bush administration will likely have to adjust its approach to international law in view of its inherent limits. However, it is unlikely that such adjustments would have beneficial effects for the climate change regime. American re-engagement, be it in the Kyoto Protocol or in a new treaty. 231 arguably will have to wait for a new American administration. 232 The many state and local climate change initiatives that have been launched in the face of federal inaction may come to play an important role in assisting this move. 233 A recently publicized report commissioned by the Department of Defense, which argues that rapid climate change ‘should be elevated beyond a scientific debate to a US national security concern’, may also enter into the equation. 234

US-EU rift causes global war Kissinger 2004 (Henry, Federal News Service, "Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership: An Independent Task Force Report on Transatlantic Relations, 3-19-2004, lexis) What if the United States believes that Europe has become irrelevant and is just another player with which we have relations of convenience? Then we will be living in a world very similar to the pre-World War I world in which regions and countries pursue their own national interests in combinations of shifting relationships, adjusted from time to time; a relationship that at the beginning may seem very tempting, but is very difficult to maintain over an extended period, and in the case of Europe wound up in an armaments race and in a huge conflict.

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The aff overcomes alternate causalities to soft power

Friedman, Two-Time Pulitzer Prize Winning Columnist for the NYT, 2007
[Thomas, “The Power of Green”, International Herald Tribune, originally in the The New York Times Magazine, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/15/opinion/web-0415edgreen-full.php, April 15]

Equally important, presidential candidates need to help Americans understand that green is not about cutting back. It's about creating a new cornucopia of abundance for the next generation by inventing a whole new industry. It's about getting our best brains out of hedge funds and into innovations that will not only give us the clean-power industrial assets to preserve our American dream but also give us the technologies that billions of others need to realize their own dreams without destroying the planet. It's about making America safer by breaking our addiction to a fuel that is powering regimes deeply hostile to our values. And, finally, it's about making America the global environmental leader, instead of laggard, which as Schwarzenegger argues would "create a very powerful side product." Those who dislike America because of Iraq, he explained, would at least be able to say, "Well, I don't like them for the war, but I do like them because they show such unbelievable leadership not just with their blue jeans and hamburgers but with the environment. People will love us for that. That's not existing right now." In sum, as John Hennessy, the president of Stanford, taught me: Confronting this climate-energy issue is the epitome of what John Gardner, the founder of Common Cause, once described as "a series of great opportunities disguised as insoluble problems." Am I optimistic? I want to be. But I am also old-fashioned. I don't believe the world will effectively address the climate-energy challenge without America, its president, its government, its industry, its markets and its people all leading the parade. Green has to become part of America's DNA. We're getting there. Green has hit Main Street it's now more than a hobby but it's still less than a new way of life.

SOFT POWER IS THE ONLY WAY TO SOLVE TERRORISM
Joseph Nye, Former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “Why 'Soft Power' Matters in Fighting Terrorism,” Washington Post, 3-30-2004 (http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=1259&paper=1483)
As we wend our way deeper into the struggle with terrorism, we are discovering that there are many things beyond U.S. control. The United States alone cannot hunt down every suspected al Qaeda leader hiding in remote regions of the globe. Nor can we launch a war whenever we wish without alienating other countries and losing the cooperation we need to win the peace. The war on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations -- Islam vs. the West -- but rather a civil war within Islamic civilization between extremists who use violence to enforce their vision and a moderate majority who want such things as jobs, education, health care and dignity as they practice their faith. We will not win unless the moderates win. Our soft power will never attract Osama bin Laden and the extremists. We need hard power to deal with them. But soft power will play a crucial role in our ability to attract the moderates and deny the extremists new recruits. With the end of the Cold War, Americans became more interested in budget savings than in investing in our soft power. Even after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, a bipartisan advisory group reported that the United States spent a paltry $150 million on public diplomacy in Muslim countries in 2002. The combined cost of the State Department's public diplomacy programs and all our international broadcasting that year was just over a billion dollars -- about the same amount spent by Britain or France, countries one-fifth our size. It is also equal to one-quarter of 1 percent of the military budget. No one would suggest that we spend as much to launch ideas as to launch bombs, but it does seem odd that we spend 400 times as much on hard power as on soft power. If we spent just 1 percent of the military budget, it would mean quadrupling our spending on soft power. If the United States is going to win the struggle against terrorism, our leaders are going to have to learn to better combine soft and hard power into "smart power," as we did in the Cold War. We have done it before; we can do it again.

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Michigan ‘08 1AC – SOFT POWER ADVANTAGE TERRORISM CAUSES EXTINCTION Yonah Alexander prof and dir of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, Washington Times, 8-28-2003
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.

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Michigan ‘08 PLAN SOLVES – SOFT POWER THE PLAN SOLVES SOFT POWER AND E.U. RELATIONS Carns and Schlesinger ‘08
(General Michael Carns, United States Air Force (Retired), Dr. James Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense, “More Fight – Less Fuel,” Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, February 2008 http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-02-ESTF.pdf)

2.4 Global Warming and Our Energy Choices An important and growing issue affecting energy is global warming. In the U.S., oil, coal and natural gas supply about 85% of total energy, and all produce greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs). Since the U.S. is responsible for more than 20% of annual worldwide emissions, global warming has become a major geopolitical issue, with international pressure growing for the U.S. to take a more active leadership role to address it. Many of our closest allies consider global warming among their most important issues. On February 14, 2002, President Bush announced the Administration’s Global Warming Initiative, with a key goal of reducing U.S. greenhouse gas intensity by 18% between 2002 and 2012.11 Since then the U.S. has reduced this intensity by about 11%, though absolute emissions have not declined. In April 2007, the Supreme Court decided that EPA has the legal authority to regulate carbon emissions as a pollutant. In addition, a number of legislative proposals have been introduced to limit U.S. GHG emissions, and several regions of the United States have adopted or are adopting their own carbon cap-and-trade systems. Many senior energy industry executives have suggested the inevitability of future carbon regulation, and a number have publicly advocated federal regulation as preferable to a patchwork of state and local laws.12 The global movement toward constraints on future carbon emissions is gaining support. DoD cannot be oblivious to this trend. Thus, the Task Force recommends that if DoD decides to provide financial backing to synthetic fuel production plants, it should avoid investing in processes that exceed the carbon footprint of petroleum. The Task Force recommends DoD continue to invest in low carbon synthetic fuel technologies that address unique, pressing DoD needs. For example, equipment capable of producing fuel at forward deployed locations using locally available renewable or waste feedstock reduces gallon for gallon the amount needed to be moved and protected in theater. DoD should continue to invest in research into alternative, non-petroleum, renewable and low-carbon footprint fuels for the long term.

The plan increases allied support.
Cardarelli, Former colonel in the U.S. Army, Chief of Plans and Operations at the Near East South Asia Center For Strategic Studies, 2002 [Rosaline, “Maintaining A Trained and Ready
Army From An Environmental Perspective”, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA404598&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, April 9]

Without a doubt, environmental factors strike at the very heart of security and military support initiatives. Even the National Security Policy attempts to examine the effects of environmental degradation from a global perspective. It is evident that the national security of the United States and its relationship with allies are directly affected by decisions involving the environment.

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Michigan ‘08 PLAN SOLVES – SOFT POWER Inaction on the environment is a crucial determinant of anti-Americanism.
Ghaleigh, Lecturer in Public Law, Edinburgh Law School, 2007
[Navraj Singh, “The Environment and Anti-Americanism” http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/file_download/publications/2_27_theenvironmentandantiamericanism.pdf]

If the intellectual landscape allows for “respectable prejudices”,1 then anti-Americanism regarding the global environment has as sound a claim as any. Of course every prejudice, every “feeling towards a person or thing, prior to or not based on actual experience”,2 is presumptively objectionable. But when we think of contemporary environmental challenges, the predilection of anti-Americanism can be stripped of its dubious character – made “respectable” – on the basis that there is a solid foundation for our objection. Indeed, there are few areas of international governance where our “actual experience” leads so strongly to an unfavorable feeling as in respect of America and the environment. Whether pertaining to patterns of American consumption, the failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol or the actuality of extreme climate phenomena, ill dispositions to the US are not entirely absent “actual experience”. If we were looking for evidence of (in)activity in the realm of the environment, any informed global citizen would be able to point to evidence of American conduct that reflects ill on that polity.

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Michigan ‘08 PLAN SOLVES – TERROR COOPERATION Alternative energy innovation helps the US generate cooperation for the war on terrorism
Malone, author of “Bin Laden’s Plan”, frequently writes about international relations, 12-28-2007
[David, “RECOMMENDATIONS: Defeating Al Qaeda through an Ideological Campaign”, http://www.binladensplan.com/Conclusion.htm#A, accessed 6/25/08]

With the stage set for a critical realignment of the global perspective on the 9/11 War, America can proceed to salvage its reputation by displaying its unparalleled value to civilization with its greatest feat of technological wizardry to date. Recognizing both the calamitous role of Middle Eastern oil supplies in this war and the central importance of energy to increasing the global standard of living, America must embark on an international initiative to resolve the current global energy crisis with technological innovation. In an effort analogous to the Manhattan Project or the moon landing, America and its allies must make an unprecedented investment of resources to answer the alternative energy question: "What is the safest, most cost-effective, technologically feasible method to provide practically inexhaustible energy to all of the world's people? Will a multi-year research and development project discover the atom bomb of peace, one such cheap, renewable energy source? Will this project enhance the opportunity for a shortterm hybrid solution in which a U.N. study group would assess all of the world's populated regions and recommend a unique solution for each region that maximizes the energy production potential of the area's natural resources and combustion-engine-based infrastructure?"

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Michigan ‘08 ENERGY KEY ENERGY CONSERVATION IS KEY TO SOFT POWER Sewall, Professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government – Harvard University, 2008
[Sarah, “A Strategy of Conservation: American Power and the International System”, http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP08-028/$File/rwp_08_028_sewall.pdf, May]

The fundamental goal of any U.S. national security strategy is to allow the United States and its citizens to continue to thrive and prosper. In order to preserve American power in the 21st century, the United States should aim to conserve and reform states and the international system. There are three component objectives within this strategy, based on a synthesis of the preceding threats and their bearing on U.S. security. First, the United States must stigmatize, deter, and prevent the expansion of potentially catastrophic and system-challenging behaviors and actors while creating new rules and tools that address new threats. Second, it must enhance each individual state’s (or, where necessary, other entities’) accountability and capability for ensuring security within its area of responsibility, shrinking the amount of territory that lacks cognizable authorities. Third, it should revise bilateral and international expectations and institutions to channel emerging powers toward stable, system-reinforcing behaviors. In the short term, these component objectives should align with the interests of a majority of states and peoples in a stable international environment and effective governance, a compatibility that is critical for the application of a conservation strategy. There will be tensions and tradeoffs, however, which deserve acknowledgment. Stability and state strength are not normative conditions per se, and may at least in the short term conflict with the goals of promoting human rights and democratic governance. Psychologist Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs indicates that physical security is paramount at the individual level; at the international level, stability can facilitate the advancement of other normative goals. Peace then becomes the paramount, albeit not exclusive, concern of this strategy. The strategy rejects normative crusading with destabilizing consequences in favor of stability that allows the incremental advancement of other normative goods. In the longer term, this approach is designed to protect U.S. interests even as global power continues to shift among and perhaps gradually beyond states. The art of applying a conservation strategy will lie in the effective calibration of continuity and change. The component approaches and the specific policies and capabilities needed to fulfill a strategy of conservation derive from its ambition. The objective of stabilizing the interstate system and simultaneously transforming it for the 21st century by definition cannot be achieved by a single state or by force of arms. Several implications follow for the United States. It should demonstrate its benign intent as global leader; stress its broad interest in stability; and illustrate the alignment of its interests with other states, particularly great and rising powers. These measures are key to sustaining the legitimacy and effectiveness of the strategy because the United States must rely heavily on other states, international institutions and rules, and non-state actors to achieve shared goals. A sustainable and effective strategy of this ambition must be executed indirectly in many aspects. The United States will require greater political and strategic flexibility, because the strategy demands the pursuit of different paths and partners. Diplomacy and paradigm-changing ideas are vital, as overreliance upon U.S. military power or economic means may be counterproductive and will inevitably be insufficient. These approaches are not entirely new. A conservation strategy would still employ alliances, nuclear deterrence, and security assistance and seek to maintain conventional military superiority, a technological edge, and other staples of U.S. national security policy. The key differences are attaining greater flexibility to explore new policies and partnerships and working by, with, and through other partners to achieve shared goals. In terms of carrying out the strategy, the first order of business is restoring U.S. legitimacy as a global leader to enhance its ability to achieve all other ends. Although this will be an ongoing proposition, many steps with significant impact can be taken immediately. Some of the most important measures entail simply halting recent controversial and counterproductive practices. As it restores its authority and repositions itself internationally, the United States will be more effective in dealing with individual challenges and better positioned to lead a more ambitious and longer-term agenda of strengthening and/or re-conceiving institutions and solutions to global problems. The following description divides implementation of a conservation strategy into two main strategies: strategic flexibility and the indirect approach. Strategic Flexibility Strategic flexibility includes two main missions: ending destabilizing practices and [Continues Next Page -- No Text Removed]

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undertaking new policy initiatives to strengthen global leadership. America should cease practices and policies that fail to stabilize the international arena, either because they upend interstate relations or they galvanize international opposition to the United States. It must place the struggle against violent extremism in the proper context, downplaying its centrality to U.S. interests; America cannot let terrorism become the nation’s sole preoccupation. Phrases such as the “global war on terror,” “long war,” “persistent conflict” and other negative, militarized paradigms to describe the United States’ global purpose are counterproductive. The country instead must communicate a positive agenda and outcome. Until the United States has significantly disengaged from Iraq, it will lack essential strategic flexibility to protect other long-term interests. In order to revitalize the process of Iraqi reconciliation, the United States should begin a phased withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq. It must also clarify that it will not maintain permanent bases in Iraq. Intensified and broadened regional diplomacy can support and monitor Iraqi governance, and increased humanitarian assistance can help manage the consequences of withdrawal. Redeploying troops to other areas of the world is essential for restoring the U.S. armed forces’ strength, shoring up military efforts in Afghanistan and against al Qaeda, repairing the U.S economy, and restoring the country’s international standing. In a related vein, Washington must reverse the U.S. policy of unilateral preemption, instead stressing prevention and collective action while reiterating the United States’ enduring right to self-defense. U.S. policy and practice must be reversed by committing to uphold international law governing the use of force during armed conflict, including a flat and unequivocal rejection of torture, closure of the detention facility at Guantanamo, and a revision of military tribunals to include meaningful protections for the accused. The United States should also abandon the policy of imposing democracy by force, which has proven ineffective and destabilizing. It should instead focus on modeling positive democratic practices and promoting human security, both of which result from effective governance, regardless of regime typology. Diplomacy and bilateral levers can carefully and consistently support incremental political reform in nations with which the United States maintains close relations. The United States should halt its development of new nuclear weapons and apply realistic criteria to research on strategic ballistic missile defense. In order to strengthen global nonproliferation efforts, America should unilaterally reduce its nuclear arsenals, recommit to working toward the goal of a nuclear-free world, and reinforce arms control regimes and incentive structures. It should also work with other countries to increase efforts to secure nuclear material globally. As a final step in ending destabilizing practices, Washington should initiate a review of all bilateral and international agreements signed or rejected since the 9/11 attacks, including security cooperation agreements related to terrorism as well as global initiatives such as the Kyoto Protocol and the ICC. It should also indicate a willingness to participate fully in shaping future international conventions to address global challenges. The second component of strategic flexibility aims to create greater room for political maneuver and credibility for global leadership through new policy initiatives that reshape relations with key states, rebuild alliances, and create new partnerships with rising powers – with the aim of marginalizing new or aspiring nuclear states and hostile non-state actors that challenge the stability of the international system. These steps should ameliorate hostility toward the United States and increase U.S. leverage to launch new and far-reaching initiatives. In some cases these policies are an exponential expansion of current efforts. In other cases, they represent significant departures from current U.S. policy. In line with this mission, the government should require greater U.S. energy conservation through fuel efficiency standards and energy taxes and significantly increase funding for alternative energy development. This must be a presidential challenge, akin to putting a man on the moon, and will entail a populist educational effort, such as the national anti-smoking campaign. Such progress will signal a change in American attitudes; enable the United States to lead collective approaches to controlling climate change; and move the nation closer toward greater energy independence, which would fundamentally reshape strategic perceptions and options. This is essentially a call for national sacrifice and service, requiring large dislocations in the short term for a potentially game-changing strategic payoff.

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Michigan ‘08 ENVIRONMENT KEY US soft power is in serious decline – a renewed comitment to the environment is key.
Talbott, president of the Brookings Institution, 2006 [Strobe, “How Bush Can Fix His Policy Failures”,
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2006/1218globalgovernance_talbott.aspx, December 18]

After the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, the administration squandered an instantaneous, international outpouring of goodwill. It rejected an unprecedented offer from Nato to deploy troops alongside US forces in Afghanistan and used the 9/11 attacks on the US as a pretext for attacking Iraq, in part by "connecting the dots" between Afghan-based terrorism and Iraqi totalitarianism, even though the two phenomena were separate and hostile to each other. The Iraq invasion was the high-water mark of Bush unilateralism and the low-water mark of America's standing in the world's eyes. In the months and years ahead, the US will need maximum participation and trust from the international community, especially for the "diplomatic offensive" recommended by the Baker-Hamilton Study Group on Iraq. That will require not just a new approach to Iraq but an overhaul of US foreign policy. Yet the reluctance with which Mr Bush gave up on his effort to keep John Bolton as US ambassador to the United Nations suggests either that he does not understand the extent to which Mr Bolton personified the administration's contempt for the world body—or, worse, does not care. Whatever course the president chooses in Iraq, he will need the UN. He should appoint a new UN ambassador who is both inclined and empowered to strengthen an institution that the US has systematically undercut in recent years. With this in mind, Mr Bush should early in the New Year meet Ban Ki-moon, incoming secretarygeneral, and help him establish, on behalf of the world body, the best possible relationship with the Congress. Another welcome step would be for the US to stop boycotting the new Human Rights Council at the UN, a successor to—and improvement on—the old Human Rights Commission that Eleanor Roosevelt helped establish. The administration needs to find other ways of making clear that it respects international law. Mr Bush insulted many friends around the world by "unsigning" a treaty establishing the International Criminal Court. At a minimum, the administration should abandon efforts to flout the Geneva and torture conventions and deny habeas corpus to detainees. Having used Saddam Hussein's prisons to torture some prisoners captured by the coalition, and having sent others to countries where they were likely to be tortured, the US should close its detention facility in Guantánamo Bay, or make it Genevacompliant. Along with the UN and other international institutions that the US played a key role in building after the second world war, the global arms control and nonproliferation regime is in jeopardy—again, in large measure because of Bush administration policies. Since 2001, the US has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, watered down the strategic arms reduction process, allowed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to languish unratified and done considerable damage to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Remedial steps could include: returning to negotiations with Russia on significantly lower levels of nuclear weapons; actively seeking a moratorium on the production of fissile material; and backing away from its flirtation with the idea of developing new bunker-busting warheads that would require testing—and therefore breaking with the CTBT. The fate of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change—which Mr Bush pronounced "dead" in 2001—might seem extraneous to challenges such as dealing with terrorism, Iraq and the meltdown of US policy in the greater Middle East. In fact, however, the administration's obstructionism and obscurantism on global warming has, for more than five years, come to symbolise what much of rest of world resists in the style and substance of US leadership. Vigorous administration support for US legislation to limit heat-trapping gases would be a step towards a negotiated international agreement.

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Michigan ‘08 MILITARY SOLVES
THE DOD IS VISIBLY THE WORLD’S BIGGEST POLLUTER Hamel 4, Medical Science @ UToronto, Environment and War, Paul A. http://scienceforpeace.sa.utoronto.ca/Essays_Briefs/Hamel/Hamel-EnvironWar.html We probably all agree here that waging war is generally pretty bad for the environment. We don’t need to think very deeply about the environmental catastrophe that arises when one drops a nuclear weapon on defenceless citizens. The devastation to the environment that millions of litres of agent orange or of napalm on the countries of Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos are also pretty easy to think about. What I will focus on here are two aspects that are less obvious than "total war" but which allow us to think about, 1) the consequences of the military doctrine on a global scale and, 2) how the dominant economic forces on the planet benefit from destruction of the environment. I will illustrate that the same global forces which maintain a system of
inequality are the ones which drive the agenda leading to unregulated assault on the earth’s environment and which disproportionately affects underprivileged people on this planet. Here is part of a speech given by Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and reported in the Chicago Tribune on May 16th of this year 2003:

"The federal government is America’s biggest polluter and the Department of Defence is the government’s worst offender. According to the Environmental Protection Agency, unexploded ordnance waste can be found on 16,000 military ranges across the U.S. and more than half may contain biological or chemical weapons. In total, the Pentagon is responsible for more than 21,000 potentially contaminated sites and, according to the EPA, the military may have poisoned as much as 40 million acres, a little larger than Florida. That result
might be considered an act of war if committed by a foreign power. " These comments were made earlier this year at a time when the U.S. Defence establishment was attempting to have more of its activities exempted from environmental laws in the

. Bob Feldon of the economic think tank, Dollars and Sense, wrote earlier this year that: "The U.S. Department of Defense is, in fact, the world’s largest polluter, producing more hazardous waste per year than the five largest U.S. chemical companies combined." Indeed, even members of the US military and the Pentagon itself have admitted that the military bases in the US are an environmental catastrophe. Admiral (ret.) Eugene Carroll, before the First International Conference on US Military Toxics and Bases
US Clean-up in 1997 stated in reference to Cold War rationale: "In a mindless, criminally negligent process, we poured resources into military expansion both at home and abroad without any regard for the environmental consequences. Pollution was ignored on the grounds that "national security" took absolute priority over all other considerations." The effects of these activities in the US are known, of course, by the people who live around or on the military installations all through the US. Citizen groups have formed and have documented the extent of the damage to the local environment. For example, the Environmental Health Coalition released a 30 page report documenting Military Toxic waste throughout the US. In another report by the Environmental Working Group, documentation of massive perchlorate contamination, (used in all rocket propellants) in the water table is available. This study also discusses on page 32 a study conducted by the main manufacturer of rockets in the US, Lockheed Martin, where perchlorate was feed to human subjects at a dose 83 times higher than the permissible levels in California"the subjects received $1,000 compensation for this risk. This experiment was part of an overall campaign to have the regulated levels of perchlorate in the environment relaxed, thus allowing greater contamination and helping to avoid law suits.

US industrial-military activities outside of the US on foreign soil would also occur at an incredible level. For example, in a horrific incident that took place in 1968, a B52 bomber crashed
This pollution nightmare occurring by the US government on US soil correctly predicts that before landing on a runway in Greenland. This bomber was loaded with 4 nuclear weapons. The land upon which it crashed had already been confiscated by the US during the 1950’s in order to build a massive military base as part of the DEW line. A Danish group recently determined that extremely high levels of radioactivity still exist on the ground as well as in the fish in the ocean around the crash site. The Pentagon has also conceded that not all of the plutonium was recovered following the crash.

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Michigan ‘08 IMPACT – TERRORISM SOFT POWER KEY TO SOLVE TERRORISM
Joseph Nye, Former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “Anti-Americanism : America must regain its soft power,” International Herald Tribune, 5-19-2004 (http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/05/19/ednye_ed3_.php) While Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and others in the administration have denigrated soft power, it will be essential to winning the "war on terrorism." Soft power is the ability to get what we want by attracting others rather than by threatening or paying them. It is based on our culture, our political ideals and our policies. Yet we have squandered it badly. Being pro-American has become so politically toxic in the domestic politics of many countries that their leaders have had to limit their cooperation with us. Skeptics about soft power argue that anti-Americanism is inevitable because of our role as the world's only military superpower. They regard popularity as ephemeral and advise us to simply ignore the polls. As the big kid on the block, we are bound to engender envy and resentment as well as admiration. But the ratio of hate to love depends on whether we are seen as a bully or a friend. We were large in the 1940s, but we won favor with the Marshall Plan. It may be true that wars were traditionally determined by whose armies won, but in the "war" against terrorism in this information age, success also depends on whose story wins. And we are losing the battle of the story.

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Michigan ‘08 IMPACT – HEGEMONY SOFT POWER IS KEY TO OVERALL HEGEMONY Sloan and Borchert ‘03
(Stanley Sloan is founding director of the Atlantic Community Initiative and a Visiting Scholar at Middlebury College, Heiko Borchert heads SCPA, a political and business consulting firm in Switzerland, “Europe, U.S. Must Rebalance Soft, Hard Power,” Defense News, 9-15-2003 http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Soft,%20hard%20power.html)

Mastering 21st century security challenges obviously will require the effective use of military power to deal with tyrants like Saddam Hussein and terrorists like Osama bin Laden. It is good news that U.S.-European military cooperation has quietly expanded to global levels, with NATO taking on missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. But most of the struggle against terrorism and instability will require deployment of soft power as effectively as the United States used its hard power in Iraq. Soft power is a nation’s ability to influence events based on cultural attraction, ideology and international institutions, about which Joe Nye, a Harvard professor who was a high-ranking defense official during President Bill Clinton’s administration, has written so eloquently. Soft power can help legitimize hard power. Hard power is essential to win wars, and often to give credibility to strategic choices, but soft power is vital to win and preserve the peace.

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Michigan ‘08

---EUROPE--RENEWABLES KEY
US RENEWABLE ENERGY PROMOTION BOOSTS US/EU RELATIONS Ahearn, Archik and Belkin 7 Ahearn is a specialist in foreign trade at Congressional Research Service, Archik is a specialist in Defense at the Congressional Research Service, Belkin is a specialist in Trade at the Congressional Research Service, “CRS Report for Congress” http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22645.pdf
Energy Security and Climate Change. European leaders have made curbing global climate change an integral objective of EU energy security policy. In March 2007, EU members established binding targets for the use of renewable energy and biofuels and committed to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20% compared to 1990 levels by 2020. Building on this agreement, European officials are reportedly seeking U.S. support for an international treaty regulating greenhouse gas emissions after 2012, when the U.N. Kyoto Protocol is set to expire, and for an international marketbased carbon emissions credit trading system. The United States is not party to the Kyoto Protocol, and U.S. officials appear reluctant to commit to global regulation; instead, they advocate transatlantic cooperation to promote alternative and clean energy technology. In light of the differences on global climate change regulation, the United States and EU used the April 2007 summit to launch initiatives jointly promoting technological advances in clean coal and carbon capture and storage, energy efficiency, biofuels, and methane recovery, among other areas. Although European officials agree with the United States that these technologies should help improve transatlantic energy security and mitigate the negative effects of climate change, they are reportedly disappointed by perceived U.S. reluctance to pursue binding international emissions targets and a global carbon trading system. U.S. officials, pointing out that from 2000-2004 carbon dioxide emissions increased at a faster rate in the EU than in the United States, argue that the U.S. approach, based on fostering technological innovation as opposed to binding regulation, is proving more effective in curbing global warming.4 At the April 2007 summit, U.S. and European leaders sought to downplay differences over carbon emissions targets and carbon trading, expressing confidence that their decisions to promote clean and renewable energy sources represent a step forward in transatlantic cooperation both to increase energy security and curb climate change. However, analysts note that past efforts — such as a 2006 pledge creating an annual strategic review of U.S.-EU energy cooperation, a U.S.-EU High Level Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development, and a U.S.-EU Energy CEO Forum — yielded little if any tangible progress.

US FAILURE TO ADOPT RENEWABLE ENERGY CRUSHES US/EU RELATIONS Lugar 7 4/30, US Senator, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies http://www.aicgs.org/documents/advisor/lugarapril30.pdf
Earlier this year I wrote to German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, and urged her government to focus on energy security during Germany’s presidency of the European Union. I argued that Germany is uniquely situated to provide leadership in this area. Berlin can play a key role in bridging the gap between those capitals that are facing aggressive tactics against their energy infrastructure and those governments that are rushing to secure long-term contracts.

The upcoming U.S.-EU Summit in Washington offers Germany and the United States an important opportunity to underscore issues related to emergency energy preparedness, diversification of supply routes, and harmonization of policies on biofuels and other renewable energy sources. Beyond constructing strong policies related to energy, a united transatlantic
community must engage Russia and other energy rich nations. We must speak clearly with Russia and other energy producers about our concerns and our determination to protect our economies and our peoples. We should ensure that competition, transparency, and antitrust rules form the basis of international energy transactions – an objective endorsed at the St. Petersburg G-8 Summit. In the best case, Russia would comply with the Energy Charter Treaty of 1994 and the Transit Protocol. More broadly, we should outline the clear benefits of a future in which Russia solidifies consumerproducer trust with the West and respects energy investments that help expand and maintain production capacity. The fickleness of energy markets affects not only consumers, but producers. Energy is a two-way relationship and will remain so even as Europe and the United States diversify their energy resource base. By their nature, alliances require constant study and revision if they are to be resilient and relevant. They must examine the needs of their members and determine how the freedom, prosperity, and security of each member can be safeguarded. For more than a half

century the transatlantic community has prospered while meeting common threats and expanding the zone of peace and security across Europe. But if we fail to reorient the transatlantic relationship to address energy security, we will be ignoring the dynamic that is most likely to spur conflict and threaten the wellbeing of alliance members.

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US MUST ADOPT AN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TO REINVIGORATE EU/US RELATIONS McCain 8, John, US Senator, Council on Foreign Relations http://www.cfr.org/publication/15755/mccains_oped_on_the_us_and_europe.html
Americans and Europeans share a common goal – to build an enduring peace based on freedom. Our democracies today are strong and vibrant. Together we can tackle the diverse challenges we face, whether radical religious fanatics who use terror as their weapon of choice, the disturbing turn towards autocracy in Russia or the looming threats of climate change and the degradation of our planet. But the key word is “together”. We need to renew and revitalise our democratic solidarity. We need to strengthen our transatlantic alliance as the core of a new global compact – a League of Democracies – that can harness the great power of the more than 100 democratic nations around the world to advance our values and defend our shared interests. At the heart of this new compact must be mutual respect and trust. We Americans recall the words of our founders in the Declaration of Independence, that we must pay “decent respect to the opinions of mankind”. Our great power does not mean we can do whatever we want whenever we want, nor should we assume we have all the wisdom and knowledge necessary to succeed. We need to listen to the views and respect the collective will of our democratic allies. When we believe that international action is necessary, whether military, economic or diplomatic, we will try to persuade our friends that we are right. But we, in return, must also be willing to be persuaded by them. The nations of the Nato alliance and the European Union, meanwhile, must have the ability and the will to act in defence of freedom and economic prosperity. They must spend the money necessary to build effective military and civilian capabilities that can be deployed around the world, from the Balkans to Afghanistan, from Chad to East Timor. We welcome European leadership to make the world a better and safer place. We look forward to France’s full reintegration into Nato. And we strongly support the EU’s efforts to build an effective European Security and Defence Policy. A strong EU, a strong Nato and a true strategic partnership between them is profoundly in our interest. We all have to live up to our own high standards of morality and international responsibility. We will fight the terrorists and at the same time defend the rights that are the foundations of our societies. We cannot torture or treat inhumanely the suspected terrorists that we have captured. We must close the detention facility at Guantánamo and come to a common international understanding on the disposition of dangerous detainees under our control. International responsibility also means preserving our common home. The risks of global

warming have no borders. Americans and Europeans need to get serious about substantially reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the coming years or we will hand over a much-diminished world to our grandchildren. We need to reinvigorate the US-European partnership on climate change where we have so many common interests at stake. The US and Europe must lead together to encourage the participation of the rest of the world, including most importantly, the developing economic powerhouses of China and India. I have introduced legislation that would require a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, but that is just a start. We need a successor to Kyoto, a cap-and-trade system that delivers the necessary environmental impact in an economically responsible manner. New technologies hold great promise. We need to unleash the power and innovation of the marketplace in order to meet our environmental challenges. Right now safe, climate-friendly nuclear energy is a critical way both to improve the quality of our air and to reduce our dependence on foreign energy sources.

EU ANGER ON US INACTION IN CLIMATE CHANGE SPILLS OVER TO OTHER ISSUES Market Watch 7, 12/14 http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/us-faces-europe-snub-failing/story.aspx?guid=%7B448364C699D5-4B30-8506-0FF6FDC9814E%7D SANTA MONICA, Calif. (MarketWatch) -- European countries are threatening to boycott the Major Economies Meeting the United States has scheduled next month in Hawaii. Members of the European Union are upset that the U.S. refuses to deal at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change meeting being held right now in Bali, Indonesia. Humberto Rosa, the chief delegate from Portugal, which holds the rotating presidency of the European Union, has
been widely quoted as saying the Hawaii meeting would be meaningless if there is no deal made on limiting carbon emissions by the world's major countries, including the United States, at the Bali conference. The boycott of the forthcoming U.S. meeting would do little to help solve the issue of carbon emission reductions, which what all these meeting are ostensibly about -- ostensibly because

more and more the issues of global warming are getting superceded by the issues of

political positioning.

Climate change is one thing but economic change is another. Mess with the latter and bullets and ballots are cast. The former garners mostly just a lot of talk. The U.S. purchases about $280 billion worth of goods from China a year and by doing so is responsible for about a quarter of the carbon emissions produced by its coal plants. Coal plants provide energy to manufacturers. Meanwhile, China, and India along with it, is enjoying robust economic growth because of globalization: jobs in Bangalore, for example, mean more office space, more travel, more production -- and more energy use. China, India and the U.S. are among the world's biggest polluters. None want to step up and reduce their pollution levels, often referred to as their carbon footprints, because it would mean hampering their economies. Or so they believe. Power play There are research and studies that point to initiatives that would lower pollution through alternative energy sources as net positive for economies through job growth, new construction, new products and services, etc. It makes sense. When a new sector is born so too are revenues. But the climate-change debate isn't about any of that. It's about jockeying for positions of power. The EU shouldn't boycott the U.S. meeting in Hawaii if the U.S. refuses to sign whatever treaty is agreed. Or, I should note, if it decides not to go along with any treaty that is agreed. The U.S. signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which called for limiting carbon emissions to below 1990 levels, it just never went along with it. Rather than snub, at every opportunity European countries should lobby the U.S. to change its ways. Which effects change more: a steady stream of calls, campaigns and efforts, or dead silence? When you don't like something or someone you want to be ignored. When it or they are around all the time you have to figure out a way to deal with it. The U.S., China and India must learn to "deal with it." Show them the money A far more effective way to engage these issues is to hit polluting countries where it hurts most: in their economies. And this is why it's curious to me that these talks aren't part of trade and international commerce talks. The U.S. Secretary of Commerce is Carlos Gutierrez. Right now he is in China talking about motorcycles. The next meeting should be combined with World Trade Organization talks. Then you'll get people's attention and attendance.

The U.S. delegation probably smiled when the EU threatened to not attend the Hawaii meeting. "Good," they may have thought, "one less thing to deal with." The world, however, must learn to deal with it. For that to
Money, after all, talks. occur, it's Jerry McGuire time: "Show me [us, them, and everyone else] the money!" Talk about commerce and carbon in the same sentence. That will prompt actions, not stalemates.

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Michigan ‘08 IMPACT – ECONOMY / HEGEMONY US-EU RELATIONS KEY TO US HEGEMONY, THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, AND GLOBAL STABILITY
Zbigniew Brzezinski, CSIS and Former National Security Adviser, The Geostrategic Triad, 2001 p. 29
THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE IS AMERICA’S MOST IMPORTANT GLOBAL relationship. It is the springboard for U.S. global involvement, enabling America to play the decisive role of arbiter in Eurasia—the world’s central arena of power—and it creates a coalition that is globally dominant in all the key dimensions of power and influence. America and Europe together serve as the axis of global stability, the locomotive of the world’s economy, and the nexus of global intellectual capital as well as technological innovation. Just as important, they are both home to the world’s most successful democracies. How the U.S.-European relationship is managed, therefore, must be Washington’s highest priority.

HEGEMONY SOLVES GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR
Zalmay Khalilzad, Defense Researcher at RAND, Washington Quarterly, Spring, 1995 lexis Global Leadership Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and lowlevel conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

ECONOMY SOLVES GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR.
Walter Russell Mead, Senior Fellow in American Foreign policy @ the Council on Foreign Relations, World Policy Institute, 1992 What if the global economy stagnates – or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: North against South, rich against poor. Russia, China, India – these countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to the world than Germany and Japan did in the ‘30s.

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US-EU cooperation is critical to prevent cyber and biological terrorism Hamilton ‘03
(Daniel, Dir – Center for Transatlantic Relations – Johns Hopkins U., FDCH, 611, Lexis)
Third Priority: Transatlantic Homeland Security Third, we must develop "transatlantic" approaches to homeland security and societal protection. When the United States was attacked, our allies immediately invoked the North Atlantic Treaty's mutual defense clause, in essence stating that the September 11 attack was an attack on a common security space - a common "homeland." It is unlikely that a successful effort to strengthen homeland security can be conducted in isolation from one's allies. The U.S. may be a primary target for Al-Qaeda, but we know it has also planned major operations in Europe. A terrorist WMD attack on Europe would immediately affect American civilians, American forces, and American interests. If such an attack involved contagious disease, it could threaten the American homeland itself in a matter of hours. The SARS epidemic, while deadly, is simply a "mild" portent of what may be to come. Bioterrorism in particular is a first-order strategic threat to the Euro-Atlantic community. A bioterrorist attack in Europe or North America is more likely and could be as consequential as a nuclear attack, but requires a different set of national and international responses. Europeans and Americans alike are woefully ill-prepared for such challenges. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, it has become very clear that controlling borders, operating ports, or managing airports and train stations in the age of globalization involves a delicate balance of identifying and intercepting weapons and terrorists without excessively hindering trade, legal migration, travel and tourism upon which European and American prosperity increasingly depends. Efforts to protect the U.S. homeland against cyberattack, for example, can hardly be conducted in isolation from key allies whose economies and information networks are so intertwined with ours. Unless there is systematic trans-European and transAtlantic coordination in the area of preparedness, each side of the Atlantic is at greater risk of attack. Uneven "homeland security" coordination and preparedness within Europe renders North America more vulnerable, particularly since North America's security is organically linked to Europe's vulnerability to terrorist infiltration. Similarly, if U.S. and Canadian efforts render the North American homeland less vulnerable to terrorist attack, terrorists may target Europe. Just because the Cold War has faded does not mean that Europeans and North Americans are less dependent on one another. Current efforts are a good start, but still tend to be ad hoc and uneven. Complementary, sustained, and well-institutionalized efforts are needed in areas ranging from intelligence, counterterrorism, financial coordination and law enforcement to customs, air and seaport security, and other activities.

Bioterror causes extinction Steinbrenner ‘97
Although human pathogens are often lumped with nuclear explosives and lethal chemicals as potential weapons of mass destruction, there is an obvious, fundamentally important difference: Pathogens are alive, weapons are not. Nuclear and chemical weapons do not reproduce themselves and do not independently engage in adaptive behavior; pathogens do both of these things. That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. The use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled. For most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But for a few pathogens - ones most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use - the risk runs in the other direction. A lethal pathogen that could efficiently spread

(John, Snr Fellow – Brookings, Foreign Policy, 12-22, Lexis)

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from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population. The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit.

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=====ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP ADVANTAGE=====

2AC – ENVIRO LEADERSHIP ADD-ON THE PLAN SOLVES ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP Carns and Schlesinger ‘08
(General Michael Carns, United States Air Force (Retired), Dr. James Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense, “More Fight – Less Fuel,” Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, February 2008 http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-02-ESTF.pdf)

2.4 Global Warming and Our Energy Choices An important and growing issue affecting energy is global warming. In the U.S., oil, coal and natural gas supply about 85% of total energy, and all produce greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs). Since the U.S. is responsible for more than 20% of annual worldwide emissions, global warming has become a major geopolitical issue, with international pressure growing for the U.S. to take a more active leadership role to address it. Many of our closest allies consider global warming among their most important issues. On February 14, 2002, President Bush announced the Administration’s Global Warming Initiative, with a key goal of reducing U.S. greenhouse gas intensity by 18% between 2002 and 2012.11 Since then the U.S. has reduced this intensity by about 11%, though absolute emissions have not declined. In April 2007, the Supreme Court decided that EPA has the legal authority to regulate carbon emissions as a pollutant. In addition, a number of legislative proposals have been introduced to limit U.S. GHG emissions, and several regions of the United States have adopted or are adopting their own carbon cap-and-trade systems. Many senior energy industry executives have suggested the inevitability of future carbon regulation, and a number have publicly advocated federal regulation as preferable to a patchwork of state and local laws.12 The global movement toward constraints on future carbon emissions is gaining support. DoD cannot be oblivious to this trend. Thus, the Task Force recommends that if DoD decides to provide financial backing to synthetic fuel production plants, it should avoid investing in processes that exceed the carbon footprint of petroleum. The Task Force recommends DoD continue to invest in low carbon synthetic fuel technologies that address unique, pressing DoD needs. For example, equipment capable of producing fuel at forward deployed locations using locally available renewable or waste feedstock reduces gallon for gallon the amount needed to be moved and protected in theater. DoD should continue to invest in research into alternative, non-petroleum, renewable and low-carbon footprint fuels for the long term.

The impact is extinction extinction.
Batten, Managing Director for Energy and Environmental Policy at the Center for American Progress, Ph.D. ecologist, 2007 [Kit, “The Lessons of Bali: The U.S. Needs to Lead on Global Warming”,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/12/bali_lessons.html, December 17]

It is imperative that the United States play a more constructive role to help the community of nations promptly begin to reduce their emissions of global warming pollution. This is essential if we hope to avoid the worst effects of global warming. In its last year in office, the Bush administration must do more than get out of the way. And the U.S. Congress must pass comprehensive global warming legislation that not only caps greenhouse gas emissions but also promotes low-carbon technologies, renewable electricity, greater efficiency, and more green job creation. This way the United States can take the lead once again in this planetary effort. Our globe depends on it.

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The plan increases soft power which overwhelms current Anti-Americanism. International Herald Tribune, 2007
[Byline: Thomas L. Friedman, “The Power of Green”, April 15, 2007, originally in the The New York Times Magazine, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/15/opinion/web-0415edgreen-full.php]

Equally important, presidential candidates need to help Americans understand that green is not about cutting back. It's about creating a new cornucopia of abundance for the next generation by inventing a whole new industry. It's about getting our best brains out of hedge funds and into innovations that will not only give us the clean-power industrial assets to preserve our American dream but also give us the technologies that billions of others need to realize their own dreams without destroying the planet. It's about making America safer by breaking our addiction to a fuel that is powering regimes deeply hostile to our values. And, finally, it's about making America the global environmental leader, instead of laggard, which as Schwarzenegger argues would "create a very powerful side product." Those who dislike America because of Iraq, he explained, would at least be able to say, "Well, I don't like them for the war, but I do like them because they show such unbelievable leadership not just with their blue jeans and hamburgers but with the environment. People will love us for that. That's not existing right now." In sum, as John Hennessy, the president of Stanford, taught me: Confronting this climate-energy issue is the epitome of what John Gardner, the founder of Common Cause, once described as "a series of great opportunities disguised as insoluble problems." Am I optimistic? I want to be. But I am also old-fashioned. I don't believe the world will effectively address the climate-energy challenge without America, its president, its government, its industry, its markets and its people all leading the parade. Green has to become part of America's DNA. We're getting there. Green has hit Main Street it's now more than a hobby but it's still less than a new way of life. A green military is key to power projection, demonstrating environmental leadership, and gets modeled by other militaries. Cardarelli, Former colonel in the U.S. Army, Chief of Plans and Operations at the Near East South Asia Center For Strategic Studies, 2002 [Rosaline, “Maintaining A Trained and Ready
Army From An Environmental Perspective”, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA404598&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, April 9]

Environmental protection must be viewed as an integral part of environmental security as it relates to national security. The United States must be aware and sensitive to the possibility that environmental issues or degradation may threaten our interests in regions of strategic importance. The ability to sustain readiness depends on our capabilities abroad and power projection platforms in friendly countries. As such, environmental protection can be translated into military forces being directly involved because they actively demonstrate leadership at the national and internal level when conducting of their mission. Facets of the environment such as air, land and water usage are critical for military training, missions and personnel well being. Additionally, this sets the stage for other militaries of the world to support and promote an environmentally sustainable behavior and to practice good stewardship in a democratic environment when political, social, economic instability and conflict can be directly influenced by environmental protection.

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The plan provides the U.S. with the credibility to solve greenhouse gas emissions.

Antholis, managing director of the Brookings Institution, and Talbott, president of the Brookings Institution, 2007 [William and Strobe, “Tackling Trade and Climate Change Leadership on the Home Front of Foreign Policy”,
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/~/media/Files/Projects/Opportunity08/PB_TradeandClimate_Antholis_Talbott.p df]

Once the United States has acted domestically, the next President will be empowered to aggressively rejoin global negotiations, undertaking three critical steps: Forge a united front among industrial nations. The EU already has made real progress in establishing an emissions trading system. It will be suspicious of extended U.S. timeframes unless our emissions cuts have become law. Thus, the United States should have a definitive domestic program in place prior to negotiations and it should include members of Congress from both parties in the negotiations, to send a strong message that any deal will be ratified. Convince developing countries to set aside any resentment toward America’s past inaction on climate and to begin slowing and reversing their own steeply climbing emissions. This will not be easy. The United States will have gone eight years without taking any meaningful actions, while the emerging countries are driven by an urgent domestic need to develop their economies. Immediate steps that could help are 1) using a portion of the revenues generated by the sale of emission permits to create an emergency fund for climate-change related disasters in poor nations and 2) applying the long-term target concept to developing countries for their own emissions. Their targets could be set for some future time and linked to early compliance steps by industrial nations.

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=====COUNTERPLANS===== ---CAP AND TRADE CP FROM PACKET---

2AC – CAP AND TRADE CP Perm -- Do Both. The cp does not solve our hegemony advantage -- 1ac Lengyel ev is conclusive that without a requirement, the DOD will continue to increase oil use. Hegemony is the biggest impact -- it solves and can deter their impact. And, they don’t solve our other advantage because hegemony is key to the economy.
Stephen Walt, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls” Naval War College Review, Spring 2002
By facilitating the development of a more open and liberal world economy, American primacy also fosters global prosperity. Economic interdependence is often said to be a cause of world peace, but it is more accurate to say that peace encourages interdependence-by making it easier for states to accept the potential vulnerabilities of extensive international intercourse.10 Investors are more willing to send money abroad when the danger of war is remote, and states worry less about being dependent on others when they are not concerned that these connections might be severed. When states are relatively secure, they will also be less fixated on how the gains from cooperation are distributed. In particular, they are less likely to worry that extensive cooperation will benefit others more and thereby place them at a relative disadvantage over time.11 By providing a tranquil international environment, in short, U.S. primacy has created political conditions that are conducive to expanding global trade and investment. Indeed, American primacy was a prerequisite for the creation and gradual expansion of the European Union, which is often touted as a triumph of economic self-interest over historical rivalries. Because the United States was there to protect the Europeans from the Soviet Union and from each other, they could safely ignore the balance of power within Western Europe and concentrate on expanding their overall level of economic integration. The expansion of world trade has been a major source of increased global prosperity, and U.S. primacy is one of the central pillars upon which that system rests.12 The United States also played a leading role in establishing the various institutions that regulate and manage the world economy. As a number of commentators have noted, the current era of "globalization" is itself partly an artifact of American power. As Thomas Friedman puts it, "Without America on duty, there will be no America Online."13

THE CAP DESTROYS THE ECONOMY
Ben Lieberman, Senior Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation, National Review Online, 9-28
(http://energy.nationalreview.com/post/?q=NjA4NTJkN2JkY2JlMjIxZmNmYzRmOTdmNTM1YzE4NmE=) The reason Kyoto Protocol signatories are not reducing their emissions is that doing so is proving to be prohibitively costly. These nations are learning the hard way what the Bush administration has understood all along — that attempts to rapidly force down the fossil-fuel use that provides the backbone of modern economies will be very expensive. As costs enter into the debate, they could well prove to be a game changer. While inundating the public with scary stories about global warming’s effects, the proponents of cap-and-trade have thus far said little about the costs of combating the threat—and for good reasons. Their agenda would inflict serious and noticeable economic pain long before it would have even a modest impact on the earth’s future temperature. Kyoto’s provisions, if fully implemented, would have cost Americans hundreds of billions of dollars annually from higher energy prices, but would, according to proponents, avert only 0.07 degrees Celsius of global warming by 2050.

Dispo / Conditionality bad

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Michigan ‘08 2AC – CAP AND TRADE CP THE AFF FREES UP RESOURCES FOR FORCE RECAPITALIZATION
Scott C. Buchanan, Strategist in the Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation, “Energy and Force Transformation,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 2006 (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i42/17-JFQ42%20Buchanan%20Pg%2051-54.pdf)
The DOD energy burden is so significant that it may prevent the execution of new and still evolving operational concepts, which require the rapid and constant transport of resources without regard for the energy costs.5 These energy burdens will increase as new operational concepts demand a lighter, more agile and dispersed force, with the attendant increase in logistical sustainment. As increasing portions of the budget are set aside for fuel purchases to account for the volatility in fuel prices, increased capability will need to be built into new platforms to mitigate likely impacts on force shape and composition. It is crucial, therefore, that DOD develops an energy strategy that reduces the energy burdens of our operational concepts. Decoupling traditional energy sources from systems and platforms may radically alter both operational requirements and capabilities, as well as alter strategic realities. The use of technologies that no longer rely on the current energy infrastructure is the wave of the future. For instance, one estimate suggests that a third of DOD resources are focused on one small area of the world—the Middle East. The annual investment in securing this region currently exceeds $150 billion per year.6 Reducing our dependency on oil should make these resources available for investment in future force and infrastructure needs.

RECAPITALIZATION IS KEY TO AIR POWER
General John Corley, Commander, Air Combat Command, “Combat Air Forces Strategic Plan and Recapitalization,” Transcript of the AFA Air Warfare Symposium, 2-21-2008 (http://www.afa.org/events/AWS/2008/post_Orlando/scripts/corley.asp)
At the same time, F-15s, F-16s, and other aircraft are reaching the end of their service life. Air dominance yesterday, air dominance today, air dominance tomorrow, how will the strategy work? From 20 to 30 aircraft per month of the fighter side to 20 aircraft of the F-22 variety in an entire year. It’s not a viable strategy. Meanwhile, potential adversaries continued to ramp up their production of aircraft and in the next decade we’ll see the increasing proliferation of those aircraft and those systems throughout and around the globe. My sense is our combat forces will face that ever-increasing both capable and capacity
force and our dominance will be challenged. The proliferation of those aircraft and those threats dictate that we, again, have both capability and capacity to meet that threat to assure the air dominance for that joint force. Otherwise, history kind of gives us some pretty graphic examples what happens when you don’t. When you fight a symmetrical force, there is an increased risk. And that increased risk is measured in things like lethality and costs, it’s measured terms of the lives of men and women, like who are in the back of this audience and represent our fine Air Force today. Stalemates in the Western Front in terms of World War I, point at examples of why you must maintain an asymmetric advantage, and air dominance provides that. Additionally, the transparency of the world that we live in, with our media that’s out there. They help to frame, and in an interesting way, they help to shape the debate and the public opinion. Air dominance, in my mind, it helps the joint force achieve its objectives and do so by shortening the fight. That’s critically important. Our Congress and the public expect that our U.S. forces, led by air dominance from your U.S. Air Force, will in fact win 99 to nothing, and not a 54 to 55 relationship. Meeting this expectation for U.S. air dominance, both in capability and capacity, places demands. Should we give up on overmatch? Not while we have an AFA. Should we cede the lead in fighter aviation and aircraft to another air force? Not while we have a U.S. Air Force. Unfortunately, our ability to assure this air dominance has been increasingly brought into focus for us. Focus from some of the events that have occurred in the last few months of 2007. Let me give you just a bit of a today in where we are in terms of the fleet. As most of you know, on the second of November in 2007, an F-15C tail number 80034 literally snapped in two on a training mission. Let me discuss a bit about that mishap and some of the subsequent series of events that have resulted from, and what it has taught us about these fleets of aircraft. So here are the facts. Missouri Air National Guard. Structural failure, broke apart. But why did it break apart? Frankly, as we began to dig through that we began to understand that we were extremely grateful and thankful that we got the aviator back and he wasn’t killed. We stood down 666 F-15s across the combat air forces, convened an Accident Board to learn and determinate of what was the cause. And from the beginning we wanted to be transparent about our actions, and in fact have done that. What did happen with this F-15? It was an immense effort. Partnership from across the investigation teams of Bruce Carlson from the Air Logistics Center, Air Force Research Laboratory, the Boeing Corporation, the best in terms of academia, and the staff at Langley Air Force Base. If there was good news in this, we discovered a [inaudible] design attribute of F-15Es and as rapidly as we could we returned them to the fight. But F-15As through Ds were a remarkably different story. Maintenance crews toiled during those periods of November and December of 2007, some 26,000 hours, twelve and a half man years, to go through and inspect a series of aircraft to see what we would find in those inspections. Fifty-four hundred hours of combing through the wreckage and finally found a smoking gun, perhaps not all but at least a smoking gun -- a four inch crack, a four inch fatigue crack, in a langeron. Langerons, I-beams, structure, skeletal structure of the aircraft, but a single point failure with the consequences if it fails catastrophic like what happened in St. Louis. Over time that fatigue crack over, over time that fatigue crack had propagated, ultimately leading to structural failure and the break-up of that aircraft and almost the loss of that airman. The langerons were not predicted to crack so no inspection procedures were in place prior to the mishap. Those procedures now exist, as does an extensive program to look at the longevity and the structural integrity of that aircraft and more. But I have concerns; we still don’t know what we don’t know about the fleet. Look, we’ve added patches, we’ve added stiffeners, we’ve added crossbeams, we’ve put band-aids all over that aircraft and more. These repairs have shifted the stress in the airplane from one place to the other and now we need to go back and look at a fatigue test, which was done some thirty years ago, to see what are the effects. Soon we’ll conduct that new fatigue test under Bruce Carlson’s leadership and the operational impact, however, of what we find and what we found on that day of 2 November, does have significant and catastrophic effects across the fleet. It wasn’t just a single point failure in my mind. It was a wake-up call and an opportunity to look under the hood of an aging fleet. Today we’ve done much of the inspection work. We’ve got most of our F-15s back in the air, some will never fly again. Some must be repaired before they ever fly again. And today units and aviators are getting re-qualified in as rapid a fashion as they can to support homeland defense. But it’s still going to take critical months before they’re fully back up to speed in terms of combat mission ready status, and until then, we’ve had F-15Es, F-22s, even Canadian CF-18s perform some of the homeland defense missions. It is a cascade effect across this fleet, and while they’ve been doing that, other missions in support of other combatant commanders in regions around this globe for a global power force have been put on the sideline. This F-15C incident is of great concern and it’s representative, as I said, of a systemic problem in terms of our aging fleet. So limiting the scope, in my mind, of this problem to just simply a faulty fatigue crack and a faulty langeron in one airplane really misses the point. It would be remarkably short-sided. This is not an isolated incident, but it’s another sign that old things break in new and different ways. Within our fighter force alone, we routinely find cracked bulkheads in the F-16. We undergo service life extensions and modifications trying to continue to keep these aircraft into the air. A-10s are requiring 242 new ship sets worth of wings so that they can remain viable and operational, not just now at the multiple decades old, but well into the multiple decades in the future. On the 2nd of November, in my mind, we were served notice for our fleet, we were given an ability to understand what would be the cost of not performing these missions and the risk that we would obtain. If you look at aircraft, they can at least be measured in three primary ways. One is of course going to be the usage, it’s more of a flight hours kind of a concept; another one is the physical age, the years; and then you have one that is a military utility, or usefulness. I would argue that our

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legacy fleet faces significant challenges in all three of those areas, both in terms of age, in terms of military utility, and in terms of physical age. We can continue to band-aid and extend the life of our fighters, F-15s, F-16s, which were originally designed to last 4,000 hours. We’ve extended them to 8,000 hours. Is that the right strategy? In the 1980s, when the majority of the current fighter force was built, that fleet averaged six years of age, not unlike our adversaries today. But today, even with the current production of F-22, that fighter force is going to continue to average 20 years and continue to exceed in terms of its age. So if we open up the scope just a little bit broader and think about the ACC fleet writ large and move to the combat air force’s fleet, it’s not a 20 year old fleet, it’s a 25 year old fleet, and it continues to age. And as I discussed a little bit earlier, this does not take into account how the aircraft are currently being used or the additional stresses put on them just to survive so they can also be lethal in the current environment. As the fleets age and are growing older, they are becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. Some of the people in the back of this room today represent the best that we have inside of our Air Force in an attempt to sustain and maintain these fleets, but it’s coming at a huge cost. The average cost per aircraft to maintain this rate has increased dramatically, up almost by a factor of two just inside this last decade. Every year our new problem set grows. Every day in the F-15 fleet we receive three engineering requests on how to maintain the aging fleet. Every day, three additionals. When we think about the F-15s that we put them through depot, 800 hours have been added to the work to keep F-15s viable. Is this an appropriate strategy for us to continue to pursue? So due to the reduced military utility, the increased down time for additional maintenance man hours, our ability to achieve and maintain air dominance is increasingly put at risk. The only answer in my mind is to recapitalize and to modernize the CAF fleet. Because you see, for far too long we have bought way too much risk because we bought too little iron. If we don’t have the iron, we will not have any options. One way to potentially begin to think through this problem is with the thought of a new Combat Air Forces strategic master plan. I’ve asked that we move our ACC strategic master plan in a new and different direction, a different direction that will be perhaps more coherent, more synchronized, and more integrated, and will include the partnerships and relationships with the others that participate inside of this Combat Air Force. Thus we’ve created a CAF strategic master plan. We’ve begun the integration of those planning efforts and to try to move it under a single document, if we can. We’re working with our key decisionmakers, with the Chief, with Secretary Wynne. We’re working with the MAJCOM commanders that are arrayed in front of you. How will we provide combat capability to support the tasking, to support the missions, the functions primary and collateral? We need to make sure that it’s in line with our national defense and our military strategies and it has to be consistent with the Chief’s strategy white paper and the soon to be released Secretary’s strategy paper. This Combat Air Force strategic plan will describe the specific ends, it’ll describe the ways, it’ll describe the means required to succeed against the threat, which we believe we’ll encounter in this global environment both today and, as our title of this conference says, into the future. The strategy will guide everything we do inside of the Combat Air Force, from articulating the strategy itself to developing operational concepts based on our core competencies and to identify required capabilities and to prioritize resources for those required capabilities. So to give you just a peak and an insight in the current development of this, let’s talk about this definition of a CAF. Where we’ve been, what it was, where we think it should be going. Combat Air Force. What is it? Who is it? What will it look like over the next 20 years? Currently working with the leadership arrayed in front of you today, these colleagues on trying to work the definition, but at least as we’ve begun this work we’ve come up with a few truths. Traditionally, when America thinks of the Combat Air Force, it visualizes only fighters and bombers flying through the air to destroy an adversary. Clearly, it is and will remain the tip of the Air Force spear, but the CAF is more than that. The Combat Air Force delivers coercive effects and it does it globally and it does it through the air domain. It’s got to do it rapidly and it has to do it in any environment, 24/7/365 in a global sense. Today the CAF is the aggregate of its people, its organizations, its capabilities, and its capability to deliver global vigilance and global power for the nation and for all. It’s not just about fighters and bombers in my mind, it’s about those that maintain, it’s about those that’s serve, it’s about those that support, protect, and supply the entire CAF portfolio, many of which are represented in this audience. A 21st Century Air Force, how does the CAF contribute? How will it operate in the air and space and cyber domains? Today the CAF has historically focused really on generating coercive effects primarily for the air domain. But as we move further into the 21st Century, this requirement for a cross-domain dominance, the seamless integration of all of our capabilities, that’s going to drive the redefinition of the CAF to all of those Air Force capabilities that deliver those coercive effects in defense of our United States and protect our interests abroad. It’s going to be what allows the joint force commander to achieve the desired outcomes across the full range of military operations, humanitarian relief all the way through preventing war via dissuasion and deterrence to inflicting strategic paralysis on an adversary. The essence of a Combat Air Force; it has always been about combat, so let me provide some additional definition of coercion and coercive effects and capture them and how we’ll try to work that and maybe a short explanation. Coercion, in my mind, threat of force or use of force and the air power theory as we’ve looked at this continuum, if you will, of coercion goes from deterrence on one end, and that’s really perhaps represented as Howie has talked with you about by forward presence and the threat of force. Perhaps a middle piece of coercion as we look along the continuum, called compellence, all the way to a point represented by the limited use of force or the ability to deny and eventually disable an adversary’s capabilities all the way through destruction of those capabilities. That’s the application of the brute force piece of it. So if that’s coercion, and that’s a bit of a thought on CAF definition. Let’s think about vision and let’s think about mission in those definitions. As we’ve begun to examine these, a vision and a mission statement, here’s where we are, and it remarkably parallels what we’ve talked about today from this conference’s perspective. Vision: a dominant Combat Air Force always. And a mission statement: to fly, to fight, to dominate from the air integrating capabilities and delivering precise coercive effects in defense of our nation and its global interests. These statements show that we are currently the dominant one inside of our core competencies and areas leave interestingly enough two, at least, areas for further improvement. Expanding our current capabilities to meet increasing threats and those emerging threats, both those that we understand and those that we are yet to understand, while widening our aperture to better address ways to meet challenges across the spectrum of conflict. During the Cold War, the Combat Air Force really focused on the high end of the spectrum -- major combat operations. But emerging threats and challenges through the spectrum of conflict, from stable peace to major combat operations have changed our culture and the necessity for us to change the CAF in response. This is not to say that we’ll give up on our primary function, it must always be those areas that could cause a joint force failure in a traditional conflict. Rapid strike, theater access, join air dominance, surface dominance, full spectrum battle space awareness, cyber space dominance and agile combat support. The CAF plays both a lead and a supporting role in all of these areas and these roles will change as the Air Force expands across that cross-domain set of capabilities. The CAF cannot focus exclusively on the high end of conflict, we must continue to expand our forces on a regular and catastrophic, but also undisrupted, challenges that we face. This will ensure we continue to support our Chief’s number one priority -- winning the global war on terror -- but still being prepared to meet the challenges of the future. It’s not just fight tonight, it is future fight. And as I touched on earlier, the CAF’s strategic plan will describe the specific CAF ends, ways, means that are required to meet this new strategy. Not surprisingly, many of them are those that you have heard from the past like freedom of action, decision superiority, persistent engagement, persistent dominance, cross-domain dominance, and the remainder of the CAF strategic plan will define ways and means used to realize that vision and that mission. It’ll be built along three principles, three primary principles. First, integration and interdependency will become more and more important for the future of the Combat Air Forces, both within ACC, the CAF, and I believe increasingly, inside of the Air Force. The principle recognizes that modern war and warfare is comprehensive, that it is joined, that it is interdependent, it’s often intergovernmental and multinational if the peace is to succeed. This will also serve us well, in my mind, as we try to tackle the challenges along with our partners in Space Command and Cyber Command. The establishment of maintaining and obtaining a cross-domain dominance today and in the future. A second principle: the need for full spectrum operations. The CAF must expand its capability portfolio to address the full spectrum of conflict from peacetime military engagement activities, building partnership, for example, to irregular warfare activities, counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense, to regaining our edge against traditional challenges of those near peer adversaries and competitors with those double digit and triple digit SAMs and increasingly a fourth to fifth generation air threat of their own. A third principle: capture current processes and procedures and make them transparent for all and available in one place. A desire for us, as we develop this CAF strategy plan, is to have a one stop location for anyone who wants to understand what the CAF is, where it’s going, how it’s going to get there. Every airman, those in the back of the room to those that are out across this globe need to understand how and to be able to identify with where he or she fits in and how they contribute to the CAF ends, ways, and means. It’ll be a master document, a document that’ll provide the guidance for not just ACC, but to contribute to the CAF. Finally, we need to look for opportunities to improve our current operations and we need to do that now. While planning for the future we must remain absolutely focused on the current fight. Strategic thinking provides conceptualizations that may be immediate use in our current operations to improve both the efficiency, but more importantly the effectiveness of our operations. We’re going to work in parallel, we’re going to work in the continuum, we’re going to work in coordinated efforts to build future capabilities while we modernize the current force, concepts that our CAF warriors of the future will benefit from. So, air dominance. A bit of a history lesson from the past, a bit of where we are today in the challenges we face, and a bit of the development of a CAF strategic master plan. Yesterday, today, and tomorrow. It has been and it remains what? Air dominance. Why? A strategic imperative, one we must never cede to an adversary. We’re proud of the fact that no American has been attacked since 1953 and we’ve got to and

Recapitalization, it’s vital, it’s an essential priority for our air force. Not just the Combat Air Force. And we have to do it now. We need to replace these aging fleets of airplanes that we discussed in the inventory and that will become more important with each passing day, but we have to be smart about the way we do it and how we’re going to go about doing it. We have to identify what the mission areas are that are most dear to us and those missions that we can get help with. Air dominance. It’s about an Air Force. It’s about a Combat Air Force. It’s about what’s core and what must be secured and can continue to be secured. We’re going to develop that CAF strategic plan. It’ll put ultimately a guide for the development of systems and provide operational capabilities required to secure those national interests.
we fully intend to remain that way.

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Michigan ‘08 2AC – CAP AND TRADE CP AIR POWER IS KEY TO DETER NUMEROUS CONFLICTS -- PARTICULARLY A CHINESE INVASION OF TAIWAN
Zalmay Khalilzad and Ian Lesser, RAND, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, 2001 p.164-5
(http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR897/MR897.chap3.pdf) This subsection attempts to synthesize some of the key operational implications distilled from the analyses relating to the rise of Asia and the potential for conflict in each of its constituent regions. The first key implication derived from the analysis of trends in Asia suggests that American air and space power will continue to remain critical for conventional and unconventional deterrence in Asia. This argument is justified by the fact that several subregions of the continent still harbor the potential for full-scale conventional war. This potential is most conspicuous on the Korean peninsula and, to a lesser degree, in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the South China Sea. In some of these areas, such as Korea and the Persian Gulf, the United States has clear treaty obligations and, therefore, has preplanned the use of air power should contingencies arise. U.S. Air Force assets could also be called upon for operations in some of these other areas. In almost all these cases, U.S. air power would be at the forefront of an American politico-military response because (a) of the vast distances on the Asian continent; (b) the diverse range of operational platforms available to the U.S. Air Force, a capability unmatched by any other country or service; (c) the possible unavailability of naval assets in close proximity, particularly in the context of surprise contingencies; and (d) the heavy payload that can be carried by U.S. Air Force platforms. These platforms can exploit speed, reach, and high operating tempos to sustain continual operations until the political objectives are secured. The entire range of warfighting capability— fighters, bombers, electronic warfare (EW), suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), combat support platforms such as AWACS and J-STARS, and tankers—are relevant in the Asia-Pacific region, because many of the regional contingencies will involve armed operations against large, fairly modern, conventional forces, most of which are built around large land armies, as is the case in Korea, China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf.

THE IMPACT IS EXTINCTION Straits Times 6-25-2000
THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

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Michigan ‘08 EXT – CAP HURTS ECONOMY CAP MOVES TOO QUICKLY AND TOO DEEPLY -- HURTS THE ECONOMY
Jeff Poor, Business and Media Institute, 9-20-2007 (http://www.businessandmedia.org/articles/2007/20070920130301.aspx)
“Yet as an economist, I have grave doubts that international agreements imposing a globalized so-called cap-and-trade system on CO2 emissions will prove feasible,” Greenspan wrote. Greenspan wrote the size of the cap in the system is its “Achilles’ heel.” He pointed to the European Union’s failure to make a meaningful difference with its cap-and-trade system. “The European Commission reported in May 2006 that the EU’s original fifteen members would cut emissions by 2010 by only 0.6 percent compared with 1990 levels,” wrote Greenspan. “The Kyoto Protocol target is 8 percent by 2012. When that face emerged, the price of permits fell by two-thirds. The system inconvenienced very few.” Greenspan is also not a believer that carbon taxing is a positive means to fight global warming, a method favored by some in Congress. “A carbon tax might not be job-destroying if it were uniform across the globe, but I am skeptical that such uniformity is even remotely feasible,” he said. Still, Greenspan said he believes global warming is a threat and joked that we might have to change the name of Glacier National Park if the glaciers disappear. He warned of rising sea levels and adverse weather conditions and their impact on economies. But he was blunt about how proposed policies could harm the economy. “There is no effective way to meaningfully reduce emissions without negatively impacting a large part of an economy,” Greenspan wrote. “Net, it is a tax. If the cap is low enough to make a meaningful inroad into CO2 emissions, permits will become expensive and large numbers of companies will experience cost increases that make them less competitive. Jobs will be lost and real incomes of workers constrained.”

COSTS SNOWBALL -- CUTS WILL BECOME MORE INTENSE, INFLICTING INCREASING DAMAGE ON THE ECONOMY
Iain Murray is senior fellow in energy, science, and technology at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, “The Break Up: Time for a Green Divorce,” 9-28-2007 (http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=OTYyNGI4ZTNiNjg5NDRlODZjNmRiMTYyNjNjZmMzOTY=)
And it would be all pain for no gain. The federal Energy Information Administration estimates the total cost of the NCEP’s cap-and-trade proposal at $331 billion between 2010 and 2025. According to a 1998 estimate published in the journal Geophysical Research Letters, this would avert an increase in the global mean temperature of 0.008° Celsius. That’s a lot of money for such a microscopic result. Yet the environmentalists won’t be satisfied with this — they will require deeper and quicker cuts in emissions, and the new framework will make this much easier. The principle has been established; everything else is just haggling over price. Those deeper and quicker emissions cuts won’t be cheap. America will pay through the nose to get the sort of cuts that will significantly affect global temperature. Every dollar that goes out of the economy to pay for emissions cuts weakens the nation.

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Michigan ‘08 AT: ECONOMY DA LINKS TO AFF THE AFF DOES NOT PUT A HARD CAP ON THE ECONOMY. OUR ARGUMENT IS ONLY THAT BUSINESSES WILL ADOPT FUEL EFFICIENT TECH WHEN IT BECOMES BENEFICIAL. THE CP REQUIRES A MUCH HARDER, MUCH FASTER CUT. HERE’S EV TO SUPPORT -- VOLUNTARY EFFORTS DON’T LINK TO OUR ECON DA Lieberman and Schaefer ‘07
(Ben Lieberman, Senior Policy Analyst in the Institute for Economic Policy Studies at Heritage, Brett Schaefer, Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs at Heritage, WebMemo #1636, 9-24-2007 http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/wm1636.cfm) Critics contend that the non-Kyoto approaches to address climate change are too weak to address the problem, but the track record indicates otherwise. The Kyoto approach of curtailing emissions—through onerous international regulation and multilateral treaties with arbitrary, binding emissions targets—has proven to be imperceptive, inflexible, and ineffectual. The reality is that Kyoto nations are simply not reducing their emissions. By contrast, emissions in the United States actually declined by 1.3 percent in 2006, a decline unmatched by most countries bound by Kyoto.[3] One year of declining emissions does not a trend make, but evidence is emerging that that the flexible approach of the Bush Administration is more effective that the ineffective, if not counterproductive, Kyoto approach.

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---MECHANISM COUNTERPLANS---

AT: EXCLUDE THE REQUIREMENT THE REQUIREMENT IS KEY -- CULTURE CHANGE IS THE MOST DIFFICULT PART OF SOLVING THE AFF Carns and Schlesinger ‘08
(General Michael Carns, United States Air Force (Retired), Dr. James Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense, “More Fight – Less Fuel,” Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, February 2008 http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-02-ESTF.pdf)

Recommendation #5: Identify and exploit near-term opportunities to reduce energy use through policies and incentives that change operational procedures. Since WWII, energy has been abundant and cheap, with the exceptions of two short periods during the 1970s and 1980s, and very recently. During WWII, tankers moving fuel to U.S. forces were attacked, and the response was to devise ways to avoid using tanker ships, such as building pipelines to mitigate the risk. During Korea and Vietnam, energy security was not a concern. Changing a culture that considers energy cheap and abundant is one of the most difficult challenges facing the Department and the nation. The business changes recommended by the Task Force will take time to show results, but changing operational practices to conserve energy can show immediate results.

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Michigan ‘08 REQUIREMENT KEY – SOFT POWER Mandatory regulations are the only way to regain international credibility.
Antholis, managing director at the Brookings Institution, and Stern, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, 2008 [William J., and Todd, “A Changing Climate: The Road Ahead for the United States”,
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/winter_climate_change_antholis.aspx]

With a nation ready to be led on this issue and an international community waiting for the United States to finally stand up, the next president has a pivotal opportunity to shift course and take bold, broad action. His or her first mission must be to implement a serious, mandatory climate program at home, not only because the United States is a dominant producer of heat-trapping greenhouse gases, but also because it will have no international credibility unless and until it acts decisively at home. At the same time, the president should pursue a layered diplomacy centered on a core group of major emitters; active engagement with key bilateral partners, especially China; and the multilateral UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

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Michigan ‘08 AT: EXEMPT SOMETHING CP The counterplan devastates soft power -- the plan solves***
Osowski, Senior Analyst at The Avascent Group, specializing in National defense and security with an emphasis on the naval services (USCG, USMC, Navy); international security affairs, 2005
[Christine, “The U.S. Military’s Environmental Responsibility: Identifying, Meeting and Moving Beyond Obligations”, May]

The first recommendation is that DoD adopt a new paradigm of sustainability rather than continuing in its current compliance mindset. Since the implementation of its first department-wide environmental policies DoD has been operating under the command and control mindset that has traditionally characterized environmental policy across the U.S. This is a selfdefeating paradigm however, as the focus has turned to obtaining exemptions from environmental regulations in order to have greater flexibility to accomplish missions, instead of seeking and encouraging innovative ways to lessen the military’s environmental footprint. DoD must get out of the mind-set that exemptions equal flexibility. Beyond inhibiting innovation, the command and control mindset has also been a public relations nightmare for DoD. This approach sends the wrong message to the American public and to host nations. The message it sends is that the U.S. does not care about the environment or the impact of our actions on people. The public hears about the requests for exemptions rather than the positive environmental steps the military is taking. This paradigm also suggests that environmental regulations and obligations are something to get around, rather than emphasizing the fact that such regulations are in place to protect the military. The military benefits greatly from environmental planning and protection. First and foremost, safe handling of hazardous materials and sound environmental practices protect the health of troops. Additionally, preplanning can reduce the post-conflict cost of clean-up. Even if the U.S. or the military is not legally obligated it often ends up contributing aid anyways in order to facilitate stability. Third, the public image of the military comes under fire anytime there is environmental mismanagement. In today’s modern conflicts winning the public relations battle is an increasingly important part of succeeding in the broader conflict. An effective environmental strategy is a critical component of the winning hearts and minds campaign.

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---FUEL COUNTERPLANS---

FUEL EFFICIENCY – EXPENSIVE FUEL EFFICIENCY IS JUST AS EXPENSIVE
Gregory J. Lengyel, Colonel, United States Air Force, “Department of Defense Energy Strategy: Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks,” Brookings Institute, August 2007 (http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/08defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf) The “low hanging fruit” for improving efficiency on older aircraft is re-engining or modifying existing engines. This is particularly true for large nonfighter aircraft, as the commercial aviation market, where fuel costs now exceed labor costs, has demanded higher efficiency engines in recent decades. Unfortunately, there is no corresponding commercial market for high performance afterburning engines used on fighter aircraft. It should be noted however, that re-engining an aircraft is expensive and can impact all major aircraft systems and the training support structure. The cost of implementation may include reanalysis, redesign, or recertification of major aircraft systems to include cockpit controls and instrumentation, bleed air systems, hydraulic systems, electrical systems, aircraft structure, as well as developing and training new maintenance operations, publishing new technical manuals, training aircrews on new systems, and modifying training courseware and simulators as required. In short, re-engining is no simple task.

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Michigan ‘08 2AC – ETHANOL COUNTERPLAN ETHANOL IS NOT WIDELY APPLICABLE FOR THE MILITARY -- CAN’T SOLVE THE AFF
Gregory J. Lengyel, Colonel, United States Air Force, “Department of Defense Energy Strategy: Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks,” Brookings Institute, August 2007 (http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/08defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf) Ethanol is an important alternative to petroleum based gasoline in the larger national strategy to reduce oil consumption, and the DOD should follow government guidelines in purchasing new non-tactical vehicles capable of operating on ethanol or other alternatives to gasoline. However, gasoline represents only 1.1% of DOD energy costs and aggressive pursuit of ethanol for the DOD will not make a significant difference.

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Michigan ‘08 2AC – SYNFUEL COUNTERPLAN THE COUNTERPLAN DEVASTATES THE ENVIRONMENT
Gregory J. Lengyel, Colonel, United States Air Force, “Department of Defense Energy Strategy: Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks,” Brookings Institute, August 2007 (http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/08defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf) A coal-based synthetic fuel industry also has significant environmental burdens to overcome. Synfuel plants consume huge quantities of water, both as part of the coal conversion process and for cooling. A typical plant consumes about 3.5 barrels of water for each barrel of synthetic fuel produced. Water is a potentially limiting factor for building synfuel plants in many coal-rich western states like Wyoming and Montana.42 An even bigger environmental issue is the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) produced by refining coal can be 50-100% higher than refining petroleum.43 Advocates for synfuel point out the CO2 can be captured and used for “enhanced oil recovery” by pumping the captured CO2 into oil wells to retrieve otherwise unobtainable oil, or sequestered in underground saline aquifers or other “storage” locations to prevent addition of CO2 to ever-increasing GHG problem. Skeptics are quick to point out that carbon capture and sequestration has never been proven on any large scale, and if attempted, would surely add to the cost of synfuel production.

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Michigan ‘08 EXT – SYNFUEL HURTS ENVIRONMENT
Synthetic fuel produces more carbon emissions  Blackwell 6/15/07 (Kristine, National Defense Fellow, Foreign Affairs division, “The Department of  Defense: Reducing its Reliance on Fossil­Based Aviation Fuel – Issues for Congress”  http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:FSof3DFiGIJ:www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34062.pdf+energy+dem and+and+department+of+defense+reduce&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=3&gl=us&client=firefox­a) Cons. Challenges involved with the large-scale production of F-T fuel may make its long-term use by DOD problematic. Notwithstanding the low carbon emissions produced by burningF-T fuel inengines, total carbon emissions generated through the fuel's production and use are estimated to be twice that of petroleum- based fuel. Although advocates of F-T argue that the carbon emissions generated during fuel manufacture can be sequestered, 33 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) officials and other experts have stated that large-scale carbon sequestration is several years away.

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=====DISADS=====

CMR – NO LINK The Pentagon wants renewable energy – it cuts costs and increases military flexibility Friedman, New York Times columnist, 2007 [Thomas L, “The Power of Green,” New York Times
Magazine, April 15 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/15/magazine/15green.t.html?scp=4&sq=the+power+of+green&st=nyt] People change when they have to — not when we tell them to — and falling oil prices make them have to. That is why if we are looking for a Plan B for Iraq — a way of pressing for political reform in the Middle East without going to war again — there is no better tool than bringing down the price of oil. When it comes to fostering democracy among petroauthoritarians, it doesn’t matter whether you’re a neocon or a radical lib. If you’re not also a Geo-Green, you won’t succeed. The notion that conserving energy is a geostrategic imperative has also moved into the Pentagon, for slightly different reasons. Generals are realizing that the more energy they save in the heat of battle, the more power they can project. The Pentagon has been looking to improve its energy efficiency for several years now to save money. But the Iraq war has given birth to a new movement in the U.S. military: the “Green Hawks.” As Amory Lovins of the Rocky Mountain Institute, who has been working with the Pentagon, put it to me: The Iraq war forced the U.S. military to think much more seriously about how to “eat its tail” — to shorten its energy supply lines by becoming more energy efficient. According to Dan Nolan, who oversees energy projects for the U.S. Army’s Rapid Equipping Force, it started last year when a Marine major general in Anbar Province told the Pentagon he wanted alternative energy sources that would reduce fuel consumption in the Iraqi desert.

TIMES ARE CHANGING -- THE PENTAGON IS LOOKING INTO ALTERNATIVE ENERGY OPTIONS
Thomas D. Crowley, et. al., President, L. E. Peabody & Associates, Inc., “Transforming the Way DOD Looks at Energy,” LMI Research Institute Report Commissioned by the Pentagon, April 2007 (http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_404_FT602T1_Transforming%20the%20Way%20 DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy_Final%20Report.pdf) Recognizing that DoD must change how it views, values, and uses energy—a transformation that will challenge some of the department’s most deeply held assumptions, interests, and processes—the Office of Force Transformation and Resources, within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Policy, asked LMI to develop an approach to establishing a DoD energy strategy. Specifically, it asked LMI to develop a process for identifying, evaluating, and implementing new energy-saving and -replacement technologies and techniques and to identify possible energy governance structures that would enable DoD to gain a system view of energy consumption, support requirements, efficiency, and costs.

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JSF is delayed -- unclear if it will ever come online Canberra Times 8 (March 13, “Super Hornet buy likely after JSF audit,” lexis) Latest cost estimates were "not comprehensive, accurate, well documented or credible", with US defence agencies believing costs were understated by up to $38billion and the development schedule was likely to slip from 12 to 27 months. Management reserves had been spent more quickly than anticipated to an "untenable level" last year but instead of asking Congress for more money, the US Department of Defence had "opted instead to reduce test resources". It will not build two of the planned 15 development test aircraft, reduce flight testing and reduce staff more quickly than planned. "The plan significantly increases the risks of not completing development testing on time and not finding and fixing design and performance problems until late into operational testing and production, when it is more expensive and disruptive to do so," it said. "It also does not directly address and correct the continuing problems that caused the depletion in management reserves. "This increases the risk that development costs will increase substantially and schedules will be further delayed. The flight-test program has barely begun, but faces substantial risks with reduced assets as design and manufacturing problems continue to cause delays that further compress the time available to complete development." The office expected the project would need more resources and more time for development, "likely delaying operational testing, the full- rate production decision, and achievement of initial operational capabilities".

INVESTMENT IN ALTERNATIVE ENERGY IS A NET COST-REDUCER
Scott C. Buchanan, Strategist in the Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation, “Energy and Force Transformation,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 2006 (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i42/17-JFQ42%20Buchanan%20Pg%2051-54.pdf)
This much is clear: so long as DOD systems and associated logistics are wed to an oil infrastructure, meaningful advances in adaptability and agility and overall force transformation will likely be superficial at best. Moreover, the artificially low prices

reported for the cost of fuel do not allow for market adjustments in response to the rising costs of oil. The consequence of this pricing approach is that investments in fuel efficiency appear too expensive in costbenefit analyses and program tradeoff studies used to prioritize system acquisition decisions. However, investments in fuel efficiency actually create savings opportunities that enable investment in technologies. In turn, these new technologies will help maintain the U.S. military’s capability advantage over potential adversaries.

PREFER OUR TURN TO THE LINK -- THEIR EV FALSELY ASSUMES LOW FUEL COSTS Carns and Schlesinger ‘08
(General Michael Carns, United States Air Force (Retired), Dr. James Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense, “More Fight – Less Fuel,” Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, February 2008 http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-02-ESTF.pdf)

Technologies that could reduce the fuel demand of a deployed system but which do not appear cost effective if the fuel cost is assumed to be $2.50 per gallon might be extremely compelling if the actual cost of moving and protecting the fuel were used instead. According to preliminary estimates by OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) and the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) the cost of delivering fuel to battle begins at around $15 per gallon and increases the deeper into the battlespace the fuel moves, assuming no force protection requirements for the supply convoys. Fuel delivered in-flight has been estimated to be on the order of $42 per gallon. The Task Force estimates these values to be low, and not accounting
for much of the force structure needed to deliver the fuel demanded by deployed assets. In order to implement FBCF, the Department will need to undertake a rigorous effort to develop a methodology for estimating the values, and establish a policy formalizing them. As of this writing, the Department has yet to establish appropriate values to use for FBCF. Using FBCF drastically changes the calculus of system energy efficiency.

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Michigan ‘08 2AC – DOD TRADE OFF DISAD OIL COSTS TRIGGER THE LINK -- CASE TURNS THE DISAD Aivaz and Rhyne, 2007 [Mike and Jason, “US military guzzling 340,000 barrels of oil daily,”
November 15, The Raw Story, http://rawstory.com/news/2007/Military_largest_user_of_energy_in_1115.html] The skyrocketing price of oil isn't just a burden for American drivers at the gas pump -- it's also a potentially crippling problem for the US military, the nation's number one energy consumer. The combined branches of the American military burn through a whopping 340,000 barrels of oil a day, reports CNN Pentagon correspondent Barbara Starr. "If you think it's expensive to fill your gas tank," Starr told Situation Room host Wolf Blitzer, "just consider what the military is going through right now." With the already high price of oil still on the rise, military expenditures on energy are increasing dramatically. "And with oil near $100 a barrel," Starr reports, "the Pentagon estimates each $10 a barrel increases in oil costs the military -and the tax payer -- an additional $1.3 billion a year. To pay the tab, money is sometimes borrowed from other vital military programs. "

D.O.D. CAN STEAL MONEY FROM OTHER PROGRAMS TO PAY FOR THE JSF Star Telegram, Fort Worth Star Telegram, “Report urges Navy to push unmanned flight envelope,” 6-24-2008
(http://www.star-telegram.com/389/story/718603.html)

Senior Navy officials have many high-priority programs they would like to pay for, such as new ships and the F-35 joint strike fighter. The temptation will be to take money intended for the X-47B program — an estimated $1 billion through 2013 — to help pay other bills.

COMPARATIVE EV -- OUR HEGEMONY ADVANTAGE OUTWEIGHS YOUR TRADE OFF DISAD Carns and Schlesinger ‘08
(General Michael Carns, United States Air Force (Retired), Dr. James Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense, “More Fight – Less Fuel,” Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, February 2008 http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-02-ESTF.pdf)

A second reason cited is the “split incentives” argument. This is a well known management issue and one DoD recognizes. It says the owner of one corporate account is not incentivized to make investments that only benefit the owners of other accounts, even if the investment is in the best interest of the corporation overall. For DoD, the issue is investing acquisition funds to reduce operating and support costs. If a more efficient combat system requires more acquisition investment, DoD could decide to increase the acquisition budget at the expense of the operating and support budget. The argument goes that the logistics community will not permit their budgets to be reduced, so the acquisition programs will not get the increased funding. But again, this is no reason for choosing not to understand that the option exists. Additionally, there are other reasons for making combat systems more efficient beyond the logistics budget – operational vulnerability and force protection demands may be more important issues. Understanding the full range of costs, benefits and risks of making deployed systems more efficient reveals options to decision makers that would not otherwise be visible. Having more options available is better than having fewer.

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No trade off -- cost sharing solves McGeary and Hanna 4 (Michael and Kathi E., Editors, Committee on Alternative Funding Strategies for DOD's Peer Reviewed Medical Research Programs, Strategies to Leverage Research Funding:Guiding DOD's Peer Reviewed Medical Research Programs, http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11089) POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF COST SHARING AND MATCHING REQUIREMENTS
Mandatory cost-sharing or matching requirements have a number of potential advantages and disadvantages for funders and grantees. The primary potential advantage for both parties is that cost-sharing provisions may stretch or conserve limited program funds, allowing more projects to be supported and more support to be dedicated to particular efforts. Scarcity of funds is, in fact, often thought to be a motivation for imposing this requirement even though some federal agencies have issued policies that prohibit the use of cost sharing or matching only to stretch program budgets. According to a Department of Health and Human Services Grants Policy Directive, “Matching or cost sharing may not be required through administrative action solely as a means of offsetting budget reductions” (DHHS, 1999). Cost-sharing and matching requirements also can serve to leverage new sources of funding. Indeed, some organizations may specifically orient their giving to take advantage of such arrangements. According to a report on trends in U.S. funding for biomedical research, for example, the Pew Charitable Trusts “have attempted to identify a place within the biomedical research funding community where their support can be effectively leveraged to achieve the greatest impact” (University of California, 1996). Other programs, such as the California Breast Cancer Research Program (see Appendix A), have adopted the same strategy. Cost sharing or matching also can help assure real commitment to projects by participants, which may be particularly true for technology development programs, where cost sharing can provide some assurance that a company views a project as a promising one. The Advanced Technology Program of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, for example, imposes strict cost-sharing requirements for its grantees (see Appendix A). A National Research Council assessment (2001) notes that this feature keeps the program anchored in the market economy and focused on efficiency and the bottom line. It also provides a mechanism for weeding out unpromising research approaches.

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Michigan ‘08 TRADE OFF – CASE TURNS DISAD FUEL COSTS PROMPT NEW BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES Hurst, Lead Writer, Red, Green, & Blue, 6/16/08 [Timothy B. “Price of Oil Has Department of Defense
Looking to Save Fuel,” http://redgreenandblue.org/2008/06/16/price-of-oil-has-department-of-defenselooking-to-save-fuel/] You see, Rob’s day-long visit to play golf in Massachusetts was made possible by an officer (or officers) who rightly feared that ending up with a surplus of fuel at the end of that fiscal year would slash the budget for fuel in the next. Rob’s little visit was back in the early 1990s, but with today’s skyrocketing fuel prices, and the added fuel demands of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the “largest single user of petroleum products in the world” is looking for ways to use less fuel - and more types of it. The Shreveport Times reports that the military spent $12.6 billion on jet fuel, diesel and other fuels in 2007 and rising fuel costs have the DoD asking Congress for additional funding to cover a projected shortfall. In the meantime, the Air Force has been looking for ways to offset rising fuel costs, including conservation. Col. West Anderson is the 2nd Bomb Wing’s vice commander at Barksdale AFB.

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Michigan ‘08 TRADE OFF – AT: IRAQ / AFGHANISTAN GET CUT [__] No tradeoff – Congress lacks the political will to cut vital projects from Iraq or Afghanistan Moran, Executive Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, 2007
[Michael, “110th Congress—Defense Spending Issue Looms,” January 4 http://www.cfr.org/publication/12344/#6] Most experts doubt Congress has the political will to cut significantly during wartime, no matter how unpopular the war gets. Many experts believe the Pentagon missed its chance to manage this spending crisis more logically in the recently completed Quadrennial Defense Review, which declined to set priorities that budget planners could use as a guideline. This has created a mismatch between service ambitions and funding (National Interest), writes Gordon Adams of the Wilson Center. “When ‘Anything Goes’ is the budgetary tune, it is not clear the public is getting the modern, transformed, smoothly operated military it seeks and deserves.” Many programs now appear too far along to cut. In the late 1990s, Air Force leadership defeated efforts to force the service to curtail plans for two separate high-performance aircraft—the F-22 and F-35. Both now are regarded as protected projects since R&D and other commitments are so far advanced. Yet the service has scaled back the pace of purchases, and that debate might continue and be applied to other weapons systems in other services—particularly Navy shipbuilding. More generally, DOD spending on missile defense—a frequent target of Democratic criticism—might also be subject to limitations on its growth pending more clear demonstrations of its abilities. The Government Accountability Office and others have criticized tests of the nascent technology—funded at just under $10 billion annually right now—as unrealistic. As with other expensive multiyear procurement programs, “the issue will be the rate of future annual growth rather than an immediate reduction in funds,” says McAleese

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Michigan ‘08 TRADE OFF – AT: TURNS RECAPITALIZATION We’ve read uniqueness evidence on our advantage -- there’s zero chance of broad recapitalization now. Only the plan generates sufficient funds. AND -- THE LINK IS TOO SMALL TO TURN THE ADVANTAGE -- HERE’S SPECIFIC EV Carns and Schlesinger ‘08
(General Michael Carns, United States Air Force (Retired), Dr. James Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense, “More Fight – Less Fuel,” Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, February 2008 http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-02-ESTF.pdf)

Another reason cited is the large investment in modeling and simulation (M&S) needed to develop accurate logistics modules. While such M&S is not without effort, a few million dollars per year to provide better tools to the warfighters and acquisition community and new insights to senior leaders is negligible relative to the improvements to multi-billion dollar acquisition decisions it can generate. 3.6 National Spinoff Benefits Finally, there are spin-off benefits addressed in the TOR - the national benefits. OSD (PA&E) estimated it is worth $42 to avoid delivering a gallon of fuel through aerial refueling and at least $15 to avoid delivering a gallon of fuel to the forward edge of a battlefield. If the cost of force protection for fuel convoys in Afghanistan and Iraq were used, the $15 figure likely would be far higher since it is based on minimal force protection. It is unlikely that energy efficiency has a higher value to any other organization in the country, possibly the world. If DoD were to invest in technologies that improved efficiency at a level commensurate with the value of those technologies to its forces and warfighting capability, it would probably become a technology incubator and provide mature technologies to the market place for industry to adopt for commercial purposes. The overall national outcome of changing DoD business processes to accurately value efficiency is difficult to predict but doing so would be consistent with best business practices used by the world’s most successful companies and likely would develop multiple technologies for use in the civilian sector as well as by DoD itself.

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Michigan ‘08 2AC – OIL DISAD Non-unique – A. Inevitable cap & trade legislation Murray, BusinessGreen, 6/9/08 [James, “Despite Senate defeat, US cap-and-trade hailed as ‘inevitable,’”
http://www.businessgreen.com/business-green/news/2218557/despite-senate-defeat-cap-trade]

Despite the defeat in the Senate last week of the Lieberman-Warner Bill, US legislation imposing binding emission caps look likely to be adopted next year after both Barack Obama and John McCain signalled they would have supported the proposed climate bill. Neither presidential candidate cast votes on the Climate Security Act, but both said they would have voted in favour raising the prospect of the proposals being revived when the next president takes office in January 2009. McCain had indicated previously that he would oppose the bill, citing inadequate incentives for nuclear power. However, he said in a statement that despite reservations he would have supported the bill. "I believe this legislation needs to be debated, amended, improved and ultimately enacted," he said. "That does not mean I believe the pending bill is perfect, and in fact, it is far from it." The bill was defeated after 48 senators voted in favour and 36 against, leaving the bill 12 votes short of the 60 required to ensure it progressed. A further six Senators wrote letters indicating they would have voted in favour, had they been available. Despite the defeat, supporters of the legislation hailed the move as a huge step forward in attempts to curb US emissions. Democrat Senator Barbara Boxer, who helped shepherd the bill, said that the vote underlined changing US attitudes to global warming, noting that when climate change legislation was last voted on in 2005 it got only 38 votes. She added that supporters of the bill would now begin work on a "roadmap" for the next president that could see an amended version of the legislation adopted as early as next year. Under the legislation, carbon emissions from 87 per cent of US power stations, oil refineries and other carbon intensive operations would have been included in a cap-and-trade scheme designed to cut US emissions by around 67 per cent by 2050. Critics of the bill, including President Bush who said he would veto the legislation, argued that it would damage the US economy. But supporters of the bill, including the Ceres coalition institutional investors and a group of leading US energy firms, claimed the package of measures would help create jobs and provide the legislative framework for building a low carbon economy. Environmentalists hailed the vote as a "turning point" in the US debate on global warming. Lexi Shultz, deputy director of the Climate Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, said that the bill had gained such momentum that legislation capping emissions was now " inevitable". "More senators than ever before supported moving forward on climate solutions, including senators who voiced opposition to global warming bills in the past," she said. "Americans are demanding global warming solutions. It's a shame they will have to wait another year. But our country will have another global warming debate in 2009 with a new Congress and president. Putting a cap on global warming pollution is inevitable."

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Michigan ‘08 2AC – OIL DISAD B. Civilian alternative energy incentives Burger, TechNewsWorld Writer, 2007 [Andrew K, “U.S. House Bill Signals Major Policy Shift, Big
Boost for Renewable Energy,” Aug 12 http://www.resourceinvestor.com/pebble.asp?relid=34743] Highlighting a swift and sharp turnabout in national energy policy since President Bush first took office and proposed his national energy security policy, the U.S. House of Representatives working on a Saturday just prior to breaking for summer recess debated and by a vote of 241-172 ultimately passed HR3221, the New Direction for Energy Independence, National Security and Consumer Protection Act. Ten committees spent months hammering out the House’s 888-page energy bill, which will provide long-term incentives, capital investment and other types of support for a wide range of alternative energy resources and technologies, including solar, wind, ocean and geothermal power, biofuels and carbon capture and sequestration. A Renewable Energy Standard (RES) amendment to the House bill introduced by Rep. Tom Udall (D-NM) requiring electric utilities to incrementally increase the percentage of electricity they produce from renewable sources from 2.75% by 2010 to 15% by 2020 passed by a 220-190 vote. The House by a vote of 221-189 also passed HR 2776, the Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Tax Act of 2007, which by eliminating an estimated $16 billion in oil and gas subsidies will provide some $16 billion in tax credits and bonds to promote investment in renewable energy production from wind, solar, celluosic ethanol, other biofuels and energy conservation efforts. Democratic Leadership All On Board The passage of the House energy bills highlights the dramatic shift in national energy policy that has taken place since President Bush was re-elected to a second term in 2004. “Energy independence is a national security issue, an economic issue, an environmental and health issue, and a moral issue,” said Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) who led efforts to draft and pass the legislation. “A new coalition is forming in the Congress.

NO LINK
Thomas D. Crowley, et. al., President, L. E. Peabody & Associates, Inc., “Transforming the Way DOD Looks at Energy,” LMI Research Institute Report Commissioned by the Pentagon, April 2007 (http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_404_FT602T1_Transforming%20the%20Way%20 DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy_Final%20Report.pdf) In FY05, the United States consumed about 20 million barrels per day. Although the entire federal government consumed a mere 1.9 percent of the total U.S. demand, DoD, the largest government user of oil in the world, consumed more than 90 percent of all the government’s petroleum (liquid fuel) use.12 Although DoD is highly dependent on petroleum and is the largest single petroleum user, it cannot by itself, drive the market. However, because DoD’s operations (the capabilities, costs, and the strategy that define them) rely so heavily on the petroleum market, they are vulnerable to the price and supply fluctuations affecting the petroleum market. Examining the impact of the future energy environment on DoD, and the options available to react to this environment, requires an understanding of the DoD energy consumption profile (how and where is energy being consumed).13 Energy consumption falls into two categories: facility energy use and mobility energy use.

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Michigan ‘08 OIL – NO LINK [__] No link – military oil consumption is relatively insignificant Singer, professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois, 2008
[Clifford, “Oil and Security,” January, published by the Stanley Foundation, http://www.policypointers.org/page_7028.html] Back in 1913, Churchill promoted a principal solution to the problem of short-term inelasticity: the use of petroleum reserves. The United States has such reserves. However, with the idea that oil is a strategic commodity, it treats them as strategic petroleum reserves. This means that the reserves are increased in times of strategic uncertainty, when prices are high. Setting them aside for military emergencies means they are essentially never used, since with DoD using less than 2 percent of US oil consumption, the need does not arise. In contrast to the common business adage, “buy low, sell high,” the policy for US petroleum reserves has recently been “buy high, never sell.” This leads to the following conclusion:

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Michigan ‘08 OIL – NO LINK TO MIDDLE EAST NO LINK -- PRACTICALLY NONE OF THE MILITARY’S FUEL COMES FROM THE MIDDLE EAST EAW, Environmentalists Against War, 2003 [“How Fuel-efficient Is the Pentagon? Military’s Oil
Addiction,” September 10 http://envirosagainstwar.org/know/read.php?itemid=593] The Defense Fuel Supply Center is the world’s biggest customer for refined crude oil. The DFSC purchases three-fourths of the military’s oil products from within North America. While only five percent of the Pentagon’s purchases actually come directly from the Middle East, one of the military’s most trusted suppliers had been the Kuwait National Petroleum Company (the ninth largest foreign supplier of US military oil).

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=====POLITICS===== ---PLAN POPULAR---

PLAN BIPARTISAN THE AFF IS BIPARTISAN Boston Globe, “Environmental Defense,” 5-27-2007
(http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/05/27/environmental_defense/) Increasingly, the military sees energy efficiency -- and moving away from oil -- as part of its national security mission. Does that mean the Pentagon is turning green? By Drake Bennett | May 27, 2007 Over the next three years, the US Air Force plans to add an important new class of vehicles to its fleet. They can't fly. They have no weaponry. They look like golf carts, and none of them can break 25 miles per hour. What they can do is save fuel. Although the Air Force hasn't decided exactly which models to buy, some of the candidates are electric-powered, others run on ethanol, and even those that use traditional gasoline boast fuel economies between 40 and 50 miles per gallon. By 2010, the Air Force promises, it will have replaced nearly a third of the cars and trucks currently used on bases to transport airmen and supplies. These "lowspeed vehicles" are just one part of a broad effort by the American military to drastically reduce its use of traditional fossil fuels at a time when global oil markets are unstable, gas prices are approaching historic highs, and climate change is increasingly a matter of bipartisan political concern. In scale and coordination the effort is not the Manhattan Project some critics say is needed. But as a loose collection of initiatives, it is impressive in its breadth, encompassing the everyday and the exotic: from energy efficient windows and light bulbs and geothermal plants to research into jet fuel that can be made from weeds, portable generators that run on plastic waste, and even a fleet of satellites to harvest solar power from space.

Unanimous support for the aff Geman, E&E Daily senior reporter, 2006
[Ben, “Senate-passed defense bill nudges DOD on renewables,” Environment and Energy Daily, June 26, Vol. 10 No. 9, lexis] Expanded use of power derived from renewable sources of energy and alternative transportation fuels received a good deal of attention in a fiscal 2007 defense authorization bill approved unanimously last week in the Senate. Amendments to S. 2766 accepted before final passage include: Language by Bingaman and Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) that says DOD shall seek to buy or produce no less than 25 percent of its electricity from renewable sources by 2025 and thereafter. It says DOD must seek to buy or produce electricity from renewables when it is "life-cycle cost effective to do so." A measure offered by Sens. Mark Pryor (D-Ark.) and Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.) requiring the Defense Department, to the extent possible, to use energy efficient products when constructing military installations. It calls for use of products that meet or
exceed specifications of the federal Energy Star program or products listed on the Energy Department's "Federal Energy Management Program Product Energy Efficiency Recommendations" product list. A measure offered by Sens. Saxby Chambliss (R-Ga.), Ben Nelson (D-Neb.) and Jim Talent (R-Mo.) requiring a new Defense Department study on military use of alternative fuels, including "any measures that can be taken to increase the use of such fuels by the Department of Defense and the Defense agencies." The amendment says the study must address ethanol, biodiesel, cellulosic ethanol, and other bio-based fuels. A Bingaman amendment that requires DOD to consider use of fuel cells as replacements for current backup power systems in operations such as "telecommunications networks, perimeter security and remote facilities." The goal, according to the amendment, is to increase the longevity of backup and standby power systems. Bingaman and Menendez also offered a successful amendment that requires a new DOD report on actions to cut use of oil-based fuels by DOD. The report is to include updates on provisions addressing the issue in last year's broad energy bill, 1992 energy policy legislation and two Clinton-era executive orders -"Greening the Government Through Efficient Energy Management" and "Greening the Government Through Federal Fleet and Transportation Efficiency." Sens. Bingaman and Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.) offered a successful

amendment that says DOD must seek to improve the fuel efficiency of weapons platforms. The goals of the amendment, the text states, are to enhance platform performance; cut the size of fuel logistics systems; reduce the burdens high fuel consumption places on agility; cut costs; and reduce the financial impact of volatile oil prices.

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Michigan ‘08 PLAN POPULAR – GREEN HAWKS Green Hawks strongly support the aff and have significant clout in Congress Sohlman, Swedish journalist and writer formerly the editor of Världen i Fokus, 2008 [Eva, also reporter
for Reuters, The Economist,, The New York Times and The Washington Post “Green Hawks in the Pentagon: the American Army Is on a Green Mission,” March 17 http://www.thewip.net/contributors/2008/03/green_hawks_in_the_pentagon_th.html] ”The United States’ dependence on oil makes us very vulnerable from a security and environmental perspective. Why buy oil from Islamic theocracies, which sponsor terrorism against us? We are fighting a war against terror, but are paying for both sides. How smart is that?” asks the sprightly 66-year-old Woolsey. • Green Hawk Jim Woolsey. Photograph courtesy of Warner Independent Pictures. • Woolsey is one of the Green Hawks in the Pentagon – a new movement of tree-huggers, activists, researchers, inventors, army people and neoconservative hawks – who are leading the way toward alternative energy and energy conservation in America. Their motivation is the security of the nation, since they see terrorism and climate change as the greatest threats against the US as a superpower. “The goal is to become energy independent, but to get there we have to shift to green energy,” says Woolsey who has been engaged in this question since the oil crises in the 1970s. But according to estimates, the US, the world’s biggest consumer of oil, will continue to increase its oil consumption. Unless something is done to counter this trend it will probably mean that the country, which already imports around 60% of its oil, will become even more dependent on the oil-rich Middle East. In order to stop this scenario and find new solutions, the Green Hawks hold open meetings in the Pentagon. These meetings, which have already acquired legendary status, attract people from the Pentagon, the Army, Navy, Air Force, Department for Homeland Security, the State Department, Congress, embassies, think tanks, environmental organizations, security firms and the weapons industry, all seeking to make new connections and exchange information, knowledge and experiences. A senior European security analyst who attended one of these meetings described it as “bustling with people from all kinds of groups and interests. Very dynamic.” Ironically, it was the Iraq war – which many believe was a US attempt to secure its access to oil – which made the Pentagon realize the advantages alternative energy would offer. Hundreds, if not thousands, of American soldiers have been killed in attacks during transports of fuel and water. Dan Nolan, who oversees energy projects for the US Army's Rapid Equipping Force, explains it was not until the cost of fuel was measured in blood (American blood) that the commanders started to understand. “Our transports have never been as vulnerable and exposed as they are in Iraq. More oil is not the solution, it is the problem.” As a consequence the Army now tries to generate what is needed on site; it uses fuel cells which produce water as a byproduct. It uses tents that need 40 percent less air-conditioning, which in turn is now increasingly run on green energy instead of diesel. The diesel generators emit heat, which is easily spotted with infrared detection.

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---PLAN UNPOPULAR--PLAN PARTISAN The aff is partisan -- evokes a political fight Eisman, Washington Correspondent for the Virginian-Pilot, 6/26/08 [Dale, “Congress approaches holiday
with no gas plan,” June 26, http://hamptonroads.com/2008/06/congress-approaches-holiday-no-gas-plan]

A group of House Republicans, including Rep. Thelma Drake of Norfolk, above, kept up the pressure for drilling on Wednesday. The Defense Department’s energy costs, a particular concern in her military-heavy district, have more than doubled since 2003, Drake noted, even as military consumption of fuel has declined. With gasoline prices pushing toward $4.25 a gallon throughout much of the country, an uneasy Congress prepared for a summer holiday on Wednesday with no sign that Democrats and Republicans are anywhere near a consensus on what they can do about the problem. In hastily convened hearings and a string of news conferences on Capitol Hill, the two parties traded barbs over what or who is responsible for energy price spikes and whether finding more oil, or using less, is the key to controlling costs. Neither side has it exactly right, a few members acknowledged. "There's been bipartisan neglect on energy," said Rep. John Peterson, a Pennsylvania Republican who is Congress' most vocal advocate of more aggressive exploitation of U.S. energy resources, including offshore drilling along the Eastern Seaboard. Peterson and a group of House Republicans, including Rep. Thelma Drake of Norfolk, on Wednesday kept up the pressure for drilling. The Defense Department's energy costs, a particular concern in her military-heavy district, have more than doubled since 2003, Drake said, even as military consumption of fuel has declined. "Our national security is endangered," she said. But Democrats warned that offshore drilling wouldn't produce oil for a decade or more and argued that profiteering oil companies and speculation on petroleum futures markets are the immediate culprits as gas prices rise. Sen. Charles Schumer, a New York Democrat who heads Congress' Joint Economic Committee, said he's for more drilling, too, at least in the western Gulf of Mexico. "You still can't drill your way out of the problem," he said. "If you don't do conservation, if you don't do alternative energy, and you don't tell the big oil companies they can no longer run energy policy in America, we won't succeed, plain and simple." Peterson insisted that some offshore oil could be available in as little as five years once Congress and the White House let energy companies go after it. Prodded by environmentalists, Congress and a series of presidents have imposed a moratorium on most offshore drilling along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts since the 1980s. Virginia officials signaled last year that they're willing to support exploration to determine the extent of reserves more than 50 miles off the state's shores. No decision about actual production should be made before exploration, Gov. Timothy M. Kaine argues. The proceeds from leases for offshore oil fields could pump up to $200 million annually into Virginia's treasury, according to one estimate. Rep. Randy Forbes, a Chesapeake Republican, said Democrats are prone to look at how gas prices have climbed during the presidency of George W. Bush and blame him. His fellow Republicans prefer to focus on dramatic increases since the Democrats took control of Congress in early 2007 and place blame there, he said.

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Michigan ‘08 AT: ENVIRONMENTAL LOBBY SUPPORT ENVIRONMENTAL LOBBY IS SKEPTICAL OF THE MILITARY -- THE PLAN DOES NOT ELICIT A WAVE OF SUPPORT FROM THEM Boston Globe, “Environmental Defense,” 5-27-2007
(http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/05/27/environmental_defense/)
"In terms of alternative energy, the Department of Defense is big enough, in certain sectors, to be the tipping point," says Stuart Funk, an energy specialist at LMI who was once the Pentagon official responsible for fuel operations. The effort has its skeptics. Even supporters are quick to point out that the Department of Defense is unlikely to accomplish much unless it better organizes its far-flung initiatives. And environmentalists are dubious of an institution that has more often been an adversary. They point out, for example, that some of the ideas -- such as increasing the use of coal to make synthetic fuel -- could actually be more environmentally damaging than the status quo.

THE AFF SPLITS THE ENVIRONMENTAL LOBBY -- ESTABLISHED RENEWABLE PRODUCERS FEAR THEIR TECH WOULD BE UNDERCUT Sohlman, Swedish journalist and writer formerly the editor of Världen i Fokus, 2008 [Eva, also reporter
for Reuters, The Economist,, The New York Times and The Washington Post “Green Hawks in the Pentagon: the American Army Is on a Green Mission,” March 17 http://www.thewip.net/contributors/2008/03/green_hawks_in_the_pentagon_th.html] The Department of Defense is therefore investing an estimated $500-$600 million dollars on research and development of solar, wave, biomass and wind energy, as well as conventional green energy sources. A new law demanding better energy efficiency has been passed, so by 2025 the Army will have to take a quarter of its energy from renewable sources. But that is far too little, far too late, say hawks like Todd Hathaway, a major in the Army who is writing his PhD thesis on nuclear science, focusing on new environmentally friendly technology. “We can’t afford to not fix this now, and that can only be done with cutting-edge technology,” says the fast-paced 36-year-old outside the Pentagon, whose front boasts a vast field of solar cells. “Unfortunately there is a strong resistance against new technology from the multi-billion industry for established green energy. We – inventors, scientists, retired Army people and professors – have to invest our own money to get the projects going. This is serious, as these are the kind of technologies that will make this planet survive.”

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---ELECTIONS--PLAN POPULAR – OHIO Plan is an economic boon for Ohio Gilbert, Toledo Blade Staff Writer, 2007
[Meghan, “Wind, solar to help fuel 2 National Guard bases,” July 24, http://www.greenenergyohio.org/page.cfm?pageID=1405] The U.S. Department of Defense is investing the money for research and implementation of the renewable energy sources to fuel the Ohio Air National Guard's 180th Fighter Wing, based at Toledo Express Airport, and the 200th Red Horse squadron, based at Camp Perry near Port Clinton, U.S. Rep. Marcy Kaptur (D., Toledo) announced yesterday. "Toledo can help America become energy-independent again," Miss Kaptur said. "Our country is strategically vulnerable because we import two-thirds of the energy that we use, the petroleum we use. And we're getting it from the most dangerous and undemocratic places in the world." The University of Toledo's Wright Center
for Photovoltaics Innovation and Commercialization will help with the research and implementation. At the 180th, the plan is to focus on solar energy to power the base, which already has replaced about 20 percent of its streetlights with solar-powered models, Lt. Col. Bill Giezie said. The idea is to build a ground-mounted photovoltaic array on the base that would convert solar energy directly into electricity, said Robert Collins, interim co-director of the Wright Center and a professor of physics at UT. The array would be similar to the one at the corner of Dorr Street and Westwood Avenue at UT's alternative energy incubator. However, that array produces 12 kilowatts of energy, and the one planned for the 180th would generate 1 megawatt, Mr. Collins said. That means the array at the 180th would be about 80 times the size, but the base has acres of land to accommodate it, he said. "Projects like this, if they can be done at low cost, they're demonstrations that show what can be done on all scales from the small homeowner to the large businesses in the area," he said. Further east, the 200th at Camp Perry will look at how winds off Lake Erie could help power that base. The studies will include wind monitoring, wetland evaluation, and avian and bat risks, among other factors. Based on those findings, the base could install a 600 kilowatt wind turbine. But a back-up plan for solar technologies also will be included in the project, Maj. Michael Hrynciw said. "This

is really a cutting edge project," Major Hrynciw said. "We've done a lot of energy reduction, but now we will be producing energy." Making these bases
energy self-sufficient is a two-part process. Phase one will evaluate the operational, safety, environmental, and energy requirements of the alternative energy sources. The bases hope to have that complete by the end of the year, paving the way for the second phase in spring or summer of next year in which they would implement the plans, Colonel Giezie said. Of the $7.1 million in federal funding, $5.1 million is directed to the 180th project and $2 million to the 200th. Toledo's history in the glass business makes it a natural leader in solar energy production, Miss Kaptur said, adding that not only will these projects help reduce utility costs and our

dependence on petroleum, but that this could create new opportunities and new jobs in related fields in northwest Ohio. "We literally are inventing the future," she said.

Ohio will define the election -- economy key Wilkes 6/18/08 [“Ohio Looking to Be Big Swing-State Pickup for Obama,”
http://www.eyesonobama.com/blog/content/id_20986/title_Ohio-Looking-to-Be-Big-Swing-State-Pickupfor-Obama/]
Moreover, this is a state that is seemingly in McCain's central demographic. The balanced political climate features a cross section of voters, including a wealth of independent swing voters, which the Arizona Senator has targeted as his must-win group. In fact, a poll from just about six months ago by Survey USA put McCain ahead of any Democratic challenger by 15 points. What has likely contributed to Ohio's change of heart is the continued economic woes on the national front. The Economist called the state "a slice of Midwest that contains a bit of everything American- part north-eastern and part southern, part rural and part urban, part hardscrabble poverty and part booming suburb." With the widespread financial burdens, that means that people across Ohio's socioeconomic spectrum are struggling as a result of the sagging economy. A good chunk of the state's GDP comes from industrial production, one of the hardest hit sectors of the national downturn. It's home to numerous automobile and manufacturing plants that supply everything from rubber tires to the machines that produce them. In many ways, the national economic situation can be measured on the faces of the men and women work there, and with layoffs in all types of manual labor, Ohioans are looking for some respite. As it stands, Republicans- and George W. Bush in particular- are finding their feet to the fire when it comes to accountability, and that appears to be putting McCain in a rough spot. Trouble in Ohio could spell danger for McCain on a much wider scale. It's varied and diverse demographics make the state a perfect testing group for the rest of the nation. In other words, the ground situation in Ohio is a fairly good indicator of feelings across the United States. Since 1892, the candidate who wins Ohio in the general election has won the White House all but twice. What could be more bad news for McCain is that no Republican presidential candidate has ever won the White House without winning Ohio.

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Michigan ‘08 PLAN POPULAR – NEVADA DoD alternative energy will build support in Nevada Edwards, Nevada State Democratic Party, 2007 [John G., “No military objection will blow in wind,”
Review-Journal http://www.nvdems.com/go/in-the-media/no-military-objection-will-blow-in-wind/] Defense Secretary Robert Gates has informed Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid that the military will not object to wind farms in an area of eastern Nevada, moving a $1 billion project closer to reality. Tim Carlson, a renewable energy developer, plans to build a 450-megawatt wind farm in the Wilson Creek Range area 40 miles north of Pioche. The Defense Department's agreement is "another step forward" to developing what would be Nevada's first utility-size wind farm, Carlson said. Carlson's company, Nevada Wind, is in talks with a partner for the project. He declined to identify the partner. Hill Air Force Base in Utah has been concerned about wind-power projects in the area because wind turbines can interfere with radar. But Reid received assurances from Gates that the department will not object to wind farms in the Wilson Creek area, spokesman Jon Summers said Tuesday. Reid has been arguing that Nevada should cancel plans for coal-fired power projects that emit massive quantities of carbon dioxide, which causes global warming. This announcement shows that Reid also is working to support renewable energy projects, Carlson said. Carlson, a former head of the Nevada Development Authority and long-time friend of Reid, previously tried to develop a $130 million wind farm on the Nevada Test Site, but Nellis Air Force Base objected and the project died in 2002. The developer said he enjoyed working with Air Force representatives on concerns about the Wilson Creek project and noted that the Air Force uses more renewable energy than any other part of the federal government. Carlson said the project could provide the Air Force with information about flying in areas where wind turbines interfere with radar signals. While the Defense Department said it would not oppose wind turbines at Wilson Creek, Gates is believed to oppose wind projects near Goldfield. "The Department of Defense plays a very important role in this state," Carlson said. "You've got to work with them. You can't fight them." Reid, D-Nev., has been talking with military officials in an effort to find ways that the state can tap wind power, a form of renewable energy. In February, for example, Reid met with area base commanders and members of the Nevada Renewable Energy Task Force about finding ways to build wind farms that do not cause problem for Navy and Air Force pilots. Nevada Wind has been monitoring the wind in the Wilson Creek area for four years. The site is close to a transmission line that Sierra Pacific Resources proposes to build connecting utilities to a planned coal-fired project near Ely and also to a transmission line that LS Power Group wants to build to its proposed coal-fired power project near Ely. Carlson said he also has been talking with the Southern Nevada Water Authority about connecting the Wilson Creek project to a power line that the water authority will use to supply electricity to pumps for a water pipeline linking Northern and Southern Nevada. "I think it's a great location," Carlson said. The wind power facility's first priority, Carlson said, would be to sell power to Nevada users, including Nevada Power Co., electric cooperatives or the water authority.

Nevada is a crucial swing state CNN 2007 [“Poll suggests Nevada could become a swing state in 2008,:” Nov 15,
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/11/15/debate.preview/index.html] A influx of new arrivals have made Western states like Nevada competitive battlegrounds. Nevada became a bastion for Republicans in the '70s and '80s when a population boom brought a large number of white, "Reagan Republicans" to the state. President Bush won Nevada in 2000 and 2004. Now, another population boom is changing the state's politics. Las Vegas is the country's fast-growing congressional district. Many young families are moving to Las Vegas to take up jobs in the burgeoning service sector. Retirees, veterans, Hispanics and Asian-Americans are also moving to Las Vegas area, which accounts for 70 percent of the state's population as well.

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---MISC---

MILITARY SPENDING UNPOPULAR Military spending unpopular -- the only priority is ground force in Iraq -everything else is just perceived as trading off with that Frost & Sullivan, research firm, 2008 [Published as a news service by IHS, “U.S. DoD to Procure
Additional Equipment to Maintain, Improve Defense Capability,” Feb 5 http://aerodefense.ihs.com/news/2008/frost-dod-equipment.htm] Air transport, tanker, fighter aircraft and some classes of ships nearing the end of their life cycle will also likely require investments. Analysts said the expansion of the Army and U.S. Marine Corps will necessitate a greater budget allocation for equipment procurement. "The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) called for the creation of 117 regular Army, 106 National Guard and 58 Reserve modular brigades," said Curran. "This would require an Army end-strength of 482,400 active and 533,000 reserve troops in 2011, while the addition of Marine Corps Special Operations Command will ensure that the Marine Corps increases to 175,000 active and 39,000 reserve." With the 2008 U.S. presidential election looming, it appears a point of debate among candidates will be the siphoning of funds from naval and air assets to the ground forces, analysts said. "Though air and naval weapons systems usually enjoy bipartisan support due to the large number of jobs generated, the need to keep the Army and Marines well-equipped has deferred new air and naval weapons programs," said Curran. "However, the government will continue to focus on anti-terrorism operations with an emphasis on command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and special operations capabilities."

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Michigan ‘08
=====TOPICALITY=====

2AC – MUST AFFECT SUBSTANTIAL CONSUMPTION (1) We meet -- the plan affects a substantial amount of consumption
Karbuz 07 (Dr.Sohbet Karbuz, works for International Energy Agency, “US Military Oil Pains” http://www.energybulletin.net/node/26194) Unsurprisingly, its oil consumption for aircraft, ships, ground vehicles and facilities makes the Pentagon the single largest oil consumer in the world.

(2) Counter interp – Substantially means to a large extent American Heritage ‘03 (Reprinted in thefreedictionary, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/substantially)
Considerable in importance, value, degree, amount, or extent: won by a substantial margin.

(3) This is a solvency question, not topicality. The plan says we must be a considerable increase. (4) The plan does not have to affect consumption -- substantial modifies the size of the increase in the incentive. (5) Prefer our interp -(a)

Consumption is an artificial limit. That word was in the topic during the college energy topic, but no longer is. Artificial limits are unpredictable and meaningless.

(b) Aff ground -- making the topic about consumption forces the aff to affect a huge amount of the economy, limiting aff flex and new aff options. The neg has enough tools, prefer aff ground.
<optional>

(6) We meet – the plan is an incentive for the rest of the country Boston Globe, “Environmental Defense,” 5-27-2007
(http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/05/27/environmental_defense/)
It also, some analysts say, could have a dramatic impact on the broader effort to move society away from fossil fuels. The American military has a storied record as a technological innovator: the computer, the commercial jetliner, and the Internet originated from military research and transformed modern life. And with billions to spend it can provide a major proving ground for new energy technologies developed in the private sector. "In terms of alternative energy, the Department of Defense is big enough, in certain sectors, to be the tipping point," says Stuart Funk, an energy specialist at LMI who was once the Pentagon official responsible for fuel operations. The effort has its skeptics. Even

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Michigan ‘08 PLAN AFFECTS A LOT OF CONSUMPTION THE PLAN AFFECTS A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION
Gregory J. Lengyel, Colonel, United States Air Force, “Department of Defense Energy Strategy: Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks,” Brookings Institute, August 2007 (http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/08defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf) The United States imports 26% of its total energy supply and 56% of the oil it consumes.2 The Department of Defense is the single largest consumer of energy in the United States3. The United 8 States has built the mightiest military in world history, but has done so with little regard to the huge burden that comes with an insatiable appetite for energy.

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