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Columbia University Spring 2012
Copyright 2012 All Rights Reserved
The Editors Sarah Scheinman, Editor-in-Chief Grace Bickers, Layout Editor The Executive Board Sam Klug, Administrative Director Philip Verma, Research Director Sharin Khander, Treasurer College Jaycox, Outreach Director Kendall Hope Tucker, Secretary Tyler Dratch and Grace Rybak, Equal Justice Director Grace Rybak and Natalie Zerwekh, Health Director Sophia Rogers, Energy and Environment Director Asher Hecht-Bernstein, Economic Development Director Grace Bickers, Education Director Jonathan Lee, Defense and Diplomacy Director
Letter from the Editor This year marks the fourth annual Columbia Roosevelt Review from the Columbia University chapter of the Roosevelt Institute. We are proud to put forward twenty policy proposals written by students hailing from Columbia College, Barnard College the School of General Studies/Jewish Theological Seminary joint program, and the School of International and Public Affairs. The Roosevelt Institute occupies a unique space on the Columbia University campus. As a student-run, non-partisan, progressive think-tank, our chapter offers students an opportunity to discuss current events, issues of public policy and evaluate the effectiveness of proposals in an open environment on a weekly basis. Our membership is innovative and pragmatic, offering creative solutions to perpetual problems and considering all obstacles in the way of progress. This year, the breadth of proposals is astounding. Submissions range from discussions of expanding access to transportation for the disabled to American relations with Southeast Asia. Our members have proposed ways to rectify abuses in immigration policy and offered a blueprint for reforming the NCAA. The scope of the ideas and the creativity of the proposals in this journal reﬂect the best elements of the Roosevelt Institute’s commitment to openminded but rigorous discussion. The proposals fall within our six pre-existing centers that meet in addition to our weekly body meetings: Economic Development, Education, Energy and Environment, Equal Justice, Healthcare and Defense and Diplomacy. Serving as the Editor-in-Chief of the Columbia Roosevelt Review has been a true privilege. As a senior, I have watched our journal grow from an idea into an institutionalized and highly anticipated feature of the Columbia University Roosevelt Institute. Each year this organization continues to grow, and with great excitement, I look forward to reading future policy proposals from Roosevelt Institute. To all our writers, center leaders, executive board members, and our layout editor, thank you for all your hard work and for making the Columbia Roosevelt Review such a success. Sincerely, Sarah Scheinman
Table of Contents
Economic Development 5 Financial Literacy as Part of the Education System Victor Chen 6 The Politics of Economic Policy: Different Outcomes Brazil and Argentina Rachel Ferman 14 A Bipartisan Compromise for a Gasoline Tax Hike Sharin Khander 15 Expanding Disability Access to Public Transportation Asher Hecht-Bernstein and Ze’ev Gebler Education 19 Integrating Hospital Schools Into Local School Districts Collete Jaycox 20 Restoring Fairness to College Athletics Sam Klug 22 The Politics of Immigration Akshay Kini Energy and Environment 26 Public-Private Collaboration to Improve Green Investment Sophia Rogers 26 The Environmental Case for City Living Leah Reiss Equal Justice 30 Unpaid Interns: America’s Forgotten Workforce Sarah Scheinman 32 The Case of Weekend Voting Kendall Hope Tucker 32 Fixing the Federalized Immigration Enforcement System Philip Verma 34 The Reformation of the Rockefeller Drug Laws Juliana Colangelo Healthcare 42 Refocusing Funding on Biomedical Research Esther Brot 43 Equality and Parental Leave Nathalie Zerwekh 44 Expanding the Use of Abuse Assessment Screens to Identify Victims of Domestic Violence Tehreem Rehman Defense and Diplomacy 47 Educating Afghans Through Coordinated Teacher Training Grace Bickers 49 The Strategic Logic of Female Suicide Terrorism Delaney Simon 56 Building an Enduring Regional Economic and Security Architecture in the Asia Paciﬁc Delaney Simon
FINANCIAL LITERACY AS PART OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM
Weiduo Chen A lack of adequate education in the area of ﬁnancial literacy contributed to the economic recession of 2008 as people lacked the formal learning to consistently make sound personal ﬁnancial decisions. As ﬁnancial literacy experts Olivia Mitchell of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and Annamaria Lusardi of Dartmouth College explain, “we realized that we’re putting young people out into the wide world without enough understanding of what compound interest means and not paying your bill every month. The subprime mortgage problem wasn’t much different—people didn’t understand the consequences of taking out a mortgage where you never really paid down principal.”1 And indeed the problem starts with students graduating high school with minimal ﬁnancial knowledge. Charles Schwab & Co. reports that, quite alarmingly, less than 30% of teens know how credit card interest or income taxes work, and only 13% of teens know what a 401(k) plan is.2 These students go into the real world not knowing how to manage their ﬁnances, and this causes problems later down the road. This necessary ﬁnancial knowledge is lacking because it is not being taught at schools or by parents. The Council for Economic Education reports that as of 2007, only nine states required a personal ﬁnance course to be offered in high school and only seven required one to be taken for graduation.3 How can we expect our kids to be ﬁnancially literate if the very system that is supposed to be preparing them for the real world is doing little to teach them the basics of personal ﬁnance? According to Visa, a mere 5% of adults report learning about the vital skill of money management in elementary or high school. Almost half report having learned about money the hard way, or in other words, through trial and error.4 As these kids go enter society, they eventually become parents, but having received very little formal ﬁnancial education, are unable to teach their kids about money. This creates a nasty self-perpetuating cycle. More numbers also suggest that many Americans also struggle with loan repayment and compound interest. A U.S. Department of Treasury Survey revealed that almost half of all Americans report having trouble keeping up monthly expenses, and almost 60% report having no savings for their children’s education.5 MSN Money reported in 2008 that a whopping 10% of Americans with mortgages were late or had trouble with mortgage repayment in year leading up to the survey.6 Such reckless ﬁnancial behavior contributed quite directly to the subprime mortgage crisis, and undoubtedly many of these ﬁnancial obstacles could have been avoided had more adults received ﬁnancial education early on. Financial illiteracy creates problems beyond personal saving and debt management challenges. A study by Braunstein and Welch done in 2002 reveals that market efﬁciency de-
pends on ﬁnancially literate consumers, and educated consumers demand better products.5 The social incentive for ﬁnancial literacy education is signiﬁcant and is not limited to having an efﬁcient economy. The cost of poor ﬁnancial knowledge results in other social costs as well. The effect is two-fold, according to a study done by Harnish.7 Firstly, low levels of ﬁnancial literacy lead to poor economic decisions, which result in poorer health (people cannot focus as much money and effort in maintaining health), lower college attainment levels (mismanagement of money leads to not being able to afford college), and overall decreased quality of life (higher stress, inability to purchase what one wants to purchase). Secondly, the cost of poor ﬁnancial planning gets shifted to other members of the community. The state and nation must divert economic resources to use public safety net programs to remedy problems caused by ﬁnancial illiteracy, leaving less money for more productive purposes. The implementation of ﬁnancial literacy programs could remedy not only the individual challenges caused by ﬁnancial illiteracy but could also impact national markets and economy for the better. Teachers are aware of the problem, but public schools lack the necessary infrastructure to implement such curriculums. The Networks Financial Institute at Indiana State University revealed that eight in ten teachers think it is important to teach ﬁnancial literacy in U.S. classrooms, but often lack the capability and time to teach it. 7 Their time is already invested in relatively full curriculums, and change is difﬁcult. Teachers have state requirements they already have to follow and student test score indicators that they have to achieve. As a result, there is little, if any, time left in a typical public school curriculum to accommodate courses in ﬁnancial literacy without making it a required course. To be fully effective, ﬁnancial literacy education must be implemented nation-wide and in all public school systems. However, since nearly all education policy is handled at the state level, ﬁnancial literacy education curriculums would have to be implemented state by state, with support from the federal government. Such support from the federal government could come in the form of funding and grants, along with recommendations to alter existing education curriculums. Although traditionally the majority of K-12 education funding has come from the state and local levels, the federal share of K-12 spending has risen very quickly in recent years, so it is not unreasonable to call for federal spending on such a nationally important issue as ﬁnancial literacy education.7 Legislation for federal funding should provide for the money necessary to train teachers and develop and implement curriculums across states and local school systems. Considering relative cost, it will be more economical to train current teachers to teach an additional subject of ﬁnancial literacy than to hire a new batch of teachers who only teach money and ﬁnance. Teachers and schools might be hesitant at ﬁrst to take on a new academic subject to teach, but as schools gradually begin adopting a ﬁnancial literacy curriculum, other schools across the state and nation will see the positive results and follow suit. With backing
from the federal government, minimal money would come out of states’ own pockets, and states’ other academic programs will remain unaffected, so there is little reason for states not to embrace federal funding and integrate ﬁnancial literacy into their education systems. Ultimately, the funding required to implement such a program is minimal compared to the amount of money individuals will save personally and the nation will save as a whole due to higher ﬁnancial literacy leading to more sound ﬁnancial and economic decisions. Financial literacy classes should start early on in elementary school and last throughout high school until graduation. Building ﬁnancial concepts over the course of a student’s schooling years is more effective than condensed, comprehensive classes a few times during middle or high school. As with learning a new language, consistent but perhaps shorter practice sessions are always more effective than sporadic marathon sessions. Moreover, such required classes should have standardized periodic assessments to make sure students are on the right track (this also serves to validate what will be a large investment the federal government is making). For example, students passing a ﬁnancial literacy assessment can be an indicator teachers must achieve year after year, similar to how they achieve certain reading and math indicators in their classrooms. If schools do not have the resources to create entirely new classes devoted to ﬁnancial literacy education, they can choose to include ﬁnancial literacy curriculum in the curriculums of their math and economics classes. For example, elementary school math classes can teach money and savings when they teach counting, addition, and subtraction. Whichever method schools choose, whether new ﬁnancial literacy classes or integrating ﬁnancial literacy curriculum into the curriculum of existing classes, the key is that schools and teachers are serious about making sure kids come out of the public education system ﬁnancially literate. As money and ﬁnance are such integral parts of our lives, every citizen should have the right to ﬁnancial literacy, just as every citizen should have the basic right to literacy. Nationwide, the problem is quite clear - statistics on ﬁnancial literacy in the United States are quite alarming - but the solution is also quite clear: federally supported implementation of ﬁnancial literacy education curriculum in public school systems at the state and local levels. countries, Brazil and Argentina fell into economic chaos as their newly cash-strapped governments tried and failed to service their foreign debts, and eventually fell into delinquency. The economic crises that ensued contributed to a regime change in both countries, four-digit hyperinﬂation, and numerous heterodox and orthodox attempts to recalibrate the macroeconomic system. By the mid to late 1990’s, both countries had successfully stabilized their economies. Argentina’s Convertibility Plan that pegged the Argentine peso to the US dollar was successful at curbing inﬂation, securing investor conﬁdence, and stabilizing the economy. Argentina was seen as a “poster child” for the region.1 Similarly, Brazil’s Real Plan attained a high degree of success. The old inﬂationary currency was pegged to an imaginary currency, the URV; its value was recalculated daily on a currency board. After months of ﬁscal adjustments, the new currency, the Real, was introduced seamlessly to replace the old currency. Economic stabilization was achieved with low inﬂation levels. Following the enactment of the Convertibility and the Real Plans, GDP in Argentina and Brazil increased steadily and at faster rates than have ever been recorded previously.2 At the turn of the millennium, Brazil and Argentina ‘s economies suffered from these artiﬁcially overvalued currencies. Devaluation crises induced by external shocks ensued. In Argentina, devaluation occurred in 2001, causing investor conﬁdence to plunge and dramatic capital ﬂight. Devaluation abruptly decreased the artiﬁcially high purchasing power of the Argentine Peso, making it difﬁcult for businesses to stay aﬂoat and for people to purchase necessary foodstuffs. Additionally, “Unemployment soared to levels unheard of since the founding of the republic, and violent crime spiraled out of control”.3 The banking system collapsed as customers ran to withdraw saving before accounts were frozen. Ultimately, a twenty percent recession took hold and the country defaulted again on foreign debt payments.4 Political crisis accompanied economic crisis, culminating with a presidential resignation. No fewer than ﬁve interim presidents were appointed before Congress settled on a candidate to ﬁll the presidential seat. Similarly, external shocks induced Brazil’s devaluation of the Real in 1999. Following a failed attempt at a controlled devaluation, the Real fell 40% fall against the dollar, and eventually stabilized at -25% to the dollar.5 The Brazilian government remained cohesive throughout the crisis and was able to take assertive steps to mitigate its macroeconomic and social effects. The government followed the IMF prescription to cut public spending, increase taxes and increase interest rates in order to receive $41.5 billion dollars in credits from IMF. In contrast to what occurred in Argentina, Brazil was able to avoid a foreign debt default. In comparison to the effect of devaluation on the Argentine economy, devaluation had a minor effect on the Brazilian economy as positive growth was achieved that same year. The difference in outcomes of both devaluation crises begs the question of why the devaluation crisis was so much more profound in Argentina than in Brazil? In other words, what factors were present in Brazil that allowed its economy
THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC POLICY
DIFFERENT OUTCOMES BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA Rachel Ferman Introduction Mexico’s 1982 unilateral moratorium on foreign debt servicing unleashed a debt crisis in Latin America. Subsequent lending to Latin American countries halted, and interest rates on previous loans increased. Among other Latin American
to adapt and recover that were not present in Argentina? The answer is rooted in the political structures that inﬂuenced policymaking in the inter-crisis period. While both countries followed neoliberal policies, the extent that each country embraced reform differed. Carlos Menem, Argentina’s president who spearheaded the economic reform process, privatized inefﬁcient state owned industries and presided over the Convertibility plan. However, Menem’s reform process did not alter the structure of the macroeconomic system so that it would survive beyond times of overvaluation. In contrast, the reform process in Brazil penetrated and corrected the institutional structure of the macroeconomic system in such a way that devaluation did not result in crisis. Like in Argentina, privatization of inefﬁcient industries occurred, while only in Brazil did reforms to ﬁscal policy and to the federal ﬁscal redistribution system take place. The lack of ﬁscal policy reform led to Argentina’s inferior macroeconomic performance during the crisis. The degree of success of Brazil and Argentina’s economic policies hinged on each government’s ability to impose major economic restructuring measures. Brazil’s political structure was such that deep economic reforms, including ﬁscal policy reforms, occurred, while Argentina’s political structure allowed for little more than superﬁcial reforms that left the macroeconomic system vulnerable to shocks. This paper argues that the nature of the political structures that emerged and evolved since re-democratization from authoritarian military regimes played a signiﬁcant role in the success of economic policy instated by the Brazilian and Argentine governments in the post 1980’s debt crisis era. Brazil and Argentina have followed distinct institutional paths since re-democratization. Factors including the ﬁscal relationship between the central government and the state, the structure of the electoral and the party systems, and the degree of executive power created distinct political environments within each country. Determining the nature of the political structures in place during the post-crisis period can reveal how macroeconomic policies were implemented, which can ultimately explain why Argentina suffered an economic collapse after currency devaluation in 2001, while Brazil’s economy recovered within the same year of devaluation. There is evidence that supports that the Brazilian decentralized federalist system that employed a proportional representation electoral structure was more successful at producing effective economic policies than Argentina’s centralized federalist system that employed a pluralist electoral structure. Background Brazil and Argentina are among the countries that experienced a democratic transition, following the framework Huntington describes as the “Third Wave of Democracy”.6 Both of these countries were run by what Guillermo O’Donnell has termed “bureaucratic-authoritarian” military regimes. Brazil’s democratic transition was a slow and gradually-liberalizing process that ofﬁcially turned power over to a civilian government on January 16th, 1985.7 Argentina’s democratic transition occurred abruptly following the Falkland Islands military defeat in 1982. Stripped of legitimacy, the military announced democratic elections and a return to democracy beginning the following year. Both countries were in the midst of severe economic crises during this political transition . In addition to focusing on democratic consolidation, these newly formed “fragile” democracies were responsible for remediating the ailing economy. During this democratic consolidation phase, major political institutions solidiﬁed that impacted economic policymaking. A few of these institutions differed in signiﬁcant ways in Brazil and Argentina. The institutional structures differed in that Argentina’s constitution established a perverse federal-state ﬁscal relationship, established an electoral system that favored pre-existing large parties, and created the conditions for a strong executive to centralize power. Brazil’s constitution established a conciliatory ﬁscal relationship between state and central government, established an electoral system that allowed for multiple parties to gain seats, and secured greater legislative powers over the executive. Institutional Design of the Federal Fiscal Distribution System Both Argentina and Brazil are federations of states (in Argentina, provinces) united under a central government. Fiscal responsibilities are divided between the state and the federal government. The central government is responsible to provide funds to the states to perform their various duties. The institutional design of the federal ﬁscal system can either promote or inhibit central and state government cooperation. In the case of Argentina, the ﬁscal redistribution structure created state interests that were different from federal interests, making compromise between the central government and states elusive. In Brazil, the institutional design of federal ﬁscal redistribution created congruent interests. Argentina’s 1992 Coparticipation Agreement between the central state and the provinces changed the transfer system from a percentage-based distribution to a ﬁxed transfer distribution from the central government to the provinces.8 When this agreement was struck, the central government anticipated that it would lower state transfers from their previous levels, however, when the economy turned, the minimum transfer payments proved to be a burden to the federal government. On the other hand, state representatives enjoyed this situation and had no incentive to compromise with the federal government and accept the losses a change in ﬁscal policy, austerity measures or devaluation would entail. This agreement outlines a system where federal and state incentives did not coincide, or more clearly, “the provinces did not internalize the macroeconomic situation of the federal government.”9 In order to have enough money to make these constitutionally guaranteed transfers, the federal government had to borrow money, further increasing the already staggering foreign debt. This relationship helps explain why Argentine stabilization policies were supported while reforms were met with more resistance. States had an interest in stabilizing the economy as
a hyperinﬂationary situation creates losers athwart state and attain budget surpluses. Cardoso also promulgated measures federal lines. However, structural reforms had the potential to to stop public sector delinquency, which made states accountalter the ﬁscal relationship enjoyed by the states, while beneﬁtable for their own debts. Unlike in Argentina where structural ting the macroeconomic health of the country. For example, in reforms were not viewed as necessary for economic expansion, order to balance the budget, the federal government proposed the states were willing to endure temporary cuts in order to cuts to federally funded programs. States that enjoy or depend make the federal system ameliorate inefﬁciencies. Similarly, on these programs opposed these cuts, despite their integral since Brazilian states’ economic fate was contingent on the contribution to hitting austerity targets. macroeconomic health of the country due to the percentage This inimical relationship affected the quality of economic based and not ﬁxed transfer system, the central government policies. Saiegh describes the process that leads to sub-prime did not face tremendous difﬁculties in convincing the states policies, explaining, “The political and institutional process of that economic reforms were required in order to stabilize and implementing reforms left distinctive imprint on outcomes, recover from crisis. in that it limited the reform agenda. Compromises had to be stuck between powerful actors on aspects such as design and The Electoral System and Political Party Structure sequencing that was facilitated by horse-trading and other inefﬁEach country’s electoral system and political party struccient compensations”.10 Since the best or most efﬁcient policies ture affected the dynamics within each legislature, and between would not be supported by the states without signiﬁcant chang- the legislative and executive branches. Both countries have es, reforms that included painful yet necessary macroeconomic bicameral legislatures that are composed of an upper house, restructuring measures, like altering the federal and state ﬁscal or the Federal Senate, and a lower house, or the Chamber of relationship, were watered down and ineffective. The ConvertDeputies. In Argentina, members are elected to both houses ibility Plan did not threaten to alter this ﬁscal relationship, and via direct elections, whereas in Brazil members are elected via was thus supported by state actors. proportional representation (PR) in the lower house, and direct Although the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 heavily fa- elections in the upper house. The type of electoral system vored the state and called for redistribution of over 20 percent directly relates to the number of political parties represented in of federal collected funds to the states, at the same time the government. document assigned greater ﬁscal responsibilities to the federal Argentina’s new democracy re-adopted the Constitution government.11 In order to operate according to the excessively of 1853. Pre-authoritarian political parties that had survived the redistributive institutional guidelines esmilitary regime by going underground had At the turn of the millentablished in the Constitution, the Federal great inﬂuence on the institutions estabnium, Brazil and Argentina‘s government was predetermined to borlished in the new democracy because they row or operate at a deﬁcit. Additionally, were the organized pro-democracy opposieconomies suffered from the excessively decentralized constitution tion to the military dictatorship. These parthese artiﬁcially overvalued allowed states to borrow irresponsibly, currencies. Devaluation crises ties, “still ha[d] essentially the same interests despite federal level commitments to they had before, they represent[ed] the induced by external shocks austerity.12 States had “soft” budget limisame societal ground”, and in order to enensued. tations since the constitution called for sure the disproportionate amount of power federal assumption of any unserviceable to the historically predominant political debts the state accrued. This ﬁscal institutional structure created parties, the system that was re-established after the transition little incentive for states to curb borrowing despite federal level followed the institutional legacy of pre-authoritarian times.13 commitments to austerity, and inherently committed the central The pluralist electoral system concentrates the number government to debt. of political parties in government. The effective number of Despite these institutional ﬂaws, the Brazilian federalpolitical parties in Argentina hovers between one and three, the state ﬁscal relationship included a key incentive for state strongest by far is the the Justicialist Party (Partido Justicialista cooperation that the Argentine system lacked; instead of PJ), an ideologically divided and factionalized Peronist party that receiving a ﬁxed amount of federal transfers, Brazilian states occupies both sides of the ideological spectrum. Opposition received a percentage of total federal collections. Thus, it was parties are thus forced to form electoral alliances and coalitions in the interest of the state for the macroeconomic situation in against the Justicialists. The radical party, the UCR, was the only the country to be positive. Perhaps bolstered by the interest in credible opposition, however has increasingly ceased to be a securing a sound ﬁnancial structure to ensure greater long-term national force. Alternate parties to the PJ are fragmented and transfers, Congressionally approved changes to the ﬂaws in the disorganized, leaving “no stable partisan alternative to repreﬁscal structure occurred in Brazil. President Fernando Henrique sent disaffected or previously excluded voters in Argentina” as Cardoso introduced a constitutional amendment that would these parties have repeatedly failed to build national organizadecrease the percentage of federal funds transferred to states, tions and enduring linkages.14 The result is PJ dominance in thereby increasing the funds available for federal use on constinational politics. tutionally mandated programs, and creating the conditions to Argentina’s Justicialist Party holds a majority of the seats
in Congress. Sub-national, provincial level politics are important to electoral and legislative outcomes. Speciﬁcally, provincial governors, who are often party bosses, are the elite heads of local patronage machines that deliver votes and support to the national party. These bosses have signiﬁcant power over individual legislators because they control the party lists, which are critical for legislators’ political careers. Legislators are in turn loyal to provincial governors and legislate according to provincial interests that are not cohesive with federal interests; “In effect, the Congress is run by a cartel of provincial bosses… executives must negotiate the support of the governors to get bills through the legislature”.15 Provincial governors and bosses were very resistant to orthodox, neoliberal and ﬁscal policy reforms, which can be explained in part by the macroeconomic ambivalence and insulation created by the guaranteed ﬁxed transfer of Federal funds to the states. Low legislative autonomy due to dependence on provincial bosses with statist interests led to a legislative environment where party politics weighed in heavier than ﬁnding a solution to the crisis.16 The mismatch of state and federal interests created by the institutional design of the federal ﬁscal system was echoed in the legislature, a dichotomy that “undermined internal cohesion of state apparatus”. 17 Corporate interests were also ingrained in the political parties. Private sector inﬂuence was a considerable factor in legislative policy decisions. The Peronist PJ Party transformed from a mass party to a catch-all party. Replacing the mobilization power of labor, the traditional source of Peronist support, with the ﬁnancial power of business the Peronist party was able to remain in power while implementing neoliberal policies.18 By favoring some sectors that beneﬁtted from reforms, the party prevented uniﬁed labor opposition to economic reform. Big business formed a natural alliance with neoliberal Peronists as it beneﬁtted from market reforms, as privatization reinforced its dominant distributional coalition. The electoral system in Brazil was established after the civilian government replaced the military regime in the Democratic Constitution of 1988. The opposition to the military regime was fragmented and represented many powerful interests. In addition to authoritarian manipulation, a factor that contributed to the wholesale abandonment of pre-authoritarian parties is the enormous demographic transformation caused by industrialization and urbanization under the military regime.19 New parties that emerged during authoritarianism, either as regime-created supporters or as grassroots opposition had no stake in the rules and institutions of the pre-authoritarian regime. The institutional structure of the party system in Brazil, in contrast with that in Argentina, shows relatively little continuity with pre-authoritarian institutions.20 Instead, the constitution assured political space for these opposition groups turned parties by establishing an extremely permissive electoral system. The establishment of a PR system can also be interpreted as a safeguard against the possibility for one-party dominance that the country experienced under the recently deposed military authoritarian regime. The electoral system established by the 1988 Constitution includes features like low barriers to party formation and low party ﬁdelity once elected. The open-list proportional representation system allows voters to vote for parties as well as individuals. Reinforced by individualistic campaigning practices of political candidates, citizens tend to vote for individuals rather than along party lines. On the one hand, the system is very representative; the number of parties with seats is above twenty. On the other hand, these same features contribute to extreme party fragmentation and low accountability, which leads to institutional weakness and inefﬁciency. The large amount of parties in Congress requires the formation of legislative coalitions to achieve majorities, which are fashioned behind closed doors and are fragile as party ﬁdelity is low. A lack of party ﬁdelity and the option to vote for individuals hinders party unity and institutionalization. The results of a comparative study of twelve Latin American party systems ranked Brazil’s degree of party institutionalization near the bottom, which inhibits clarity.21 Numerous political parties led to a lack of party coherence necessary to end inﬂation and recapture economic growth. Fishlow argues that after a brief period of democratic political consolidation following the transition, regaining economic growth came to dominate over other objectives, including partisan tendencies. States’ stake in the country’s macroeconomic virility left legislators disposed to constructive dialogue and to be persuaded into supporting nonpartisan executive initiated policies believed to capture expansion. Both of these electoral and political party structures make economic reform difﬁcult because they foster a lack of incentive to compromise, both within the legislature and between the legislature and the executive. Argentina’s majoritarian party structure favored Peronist legislators with provincial ties who relied on machine politicking and were captured by powerful party bosses. Economic policies did or did not pass based on the interests of a few major provincial bosses, which kept the best policies from passing, while allowing the policies that hurt these isolated interests the least to pass. Brazil’s fragmented multiparty legislature was inefﬁcient, yet it was also allowed for malleability and coalition building. Although low party loyalty made legislators unpredictable, the nature of a PR system innately erects higher barriers to being taken over by powerful interests. Although both electoral systems and political party structures create problematic legislatures, key characteristics distinguish one from the other. Due to the electoral system, the Brazilian legislature is more representative and depends on coalition building. The majoritarian Argentina system is more disproportionate and depends on a single party majority. Additionally, Brazil’s multiparty legislature is less easily captured by interests because multiple parties are needed to form majority coalitions, and single interest groups would have to successfully target multiple parties to get inﬂuence, a higher opportunity cost than targeting a single majority party as in Argentina. Thus, there is greater legislative autonomy in Brazil. Brazilian state economic interests coincide with federal economic interests, so
partisan divisions do not fall along economic lines. State and federal interests are contradictory and economic policies are very contentious in Argentina. This combination of features allowed for more profound economic policymaking in Brazil. Degree of Executive Power and Leadership President Carlos Menem served two terms; he was elected in 1989 and served until 1999. During his presidency, the executive branch centralized power and gained the use of decree measures to pass economic reforms. Try as he did by bribing and paying-off legislators, Menem could not translate his power into forming legislative support for his policies because the legislature was dominated by opposing interests. Despite having wide discretionary powers, Menem could not impose policies that directly repudiated key legislative interests, so signiﬁcant structural or ﬁscal policy reforms that contained provisions to improve the macroeconomic condition of the economy were not passed. Although in practice Menem was able to institutionally consolidate power, the president yielded to extremely powerful interest networks that originated from outside the governmental institutional structure that were not disposed to negotiation. Decrees were passed on reforms that were not highly opposed by Congress, which was captured by these interest networks. Argentine Presidents that attempted to unilaterally pass neoliberal reforms faced political instability supported in part by members of Congress. Major political instability occurred under President Fernando de la Rua; major protests erupted in Buenos Aires that were allegedly supported by the Peronist legislature. Congress prevented de la Rua’s reforms from passing and forced him to resign. Duhalde, a provincial governor, was appointed to the Presidential seat and readopted Menem’s strategy of yielding to strong provincial interests. Because of the conﬂicting interests between the antireform provincial bosses and pro-reform big business, Argentine presidents have been unable to control congress, “even when the president’s party had a majority or plurality in the Chamber”.22 Presidents that wanted to get their agenda enacted by the legislature sometimes engaged in negotiations with provincial governors. This executive and sub-national negotiation has high transaction costs and is inefﬁcient. President Raul Alfonsin, the ﬁrst Argentine president since redemocratization, was not adept at responding to the economic crisis as issues of human rights abuses and criminal convictions of former military ofﬁcers took precedent. His Austral Plan failed to curb hyperinﬂation as it did not include the kind of drastic reforms necessary to combat the depth of the recession. Capitalizing on the public’s traumatic experience with hyperinﬂation, shortly following his 1989 election, Menem secured public support for emergency measures that would concentrate executive decision-making power. Despite ﬁerce opposition from Argentine public servants, the military, Congress, and trade unions, policy isolation was achieved because in the midst of a runaway hyperinﬂationary situation, the concentration of the economic decision making power was perceived as necessary, and tactical steps were taken to ensure executive isolation to implement economic policies.23 Romero has explained Menem’s leadership path as centrist, detailing, “In the name of governability, the executive made incursions into the legislature and the judiciary…aided by…Peronist traditions, Menem advanced considerably along that path, and his leadership, almost like that of a prince, broke away markedly from the republican traditions”. Among the policies that conferred strong powers to the president were the “Necessity and Urgency Decrees”.24 Other measures that concentrated power included the merging of government departments and packing of the judiciary in order to reduce the likelihood of judicial review of his actions. The Argentine political system can be classiﬁed as a delegative, or direct, democracy, a system with weak and inefﬁcient institutional structures where the president assumes a false sense of popular mandate and rules by decree. Menem’s patrimonial leadership style that depended on personal loyalties has even been referred to as authoritarian. The “wide discretionary powers” gained by this regime have been viewed as an inimical feature to democratic consolidation.26 The tendency to rule by decree seems to be linked with the centralized presidential system. The problem with the presidential system is that, “The nature of elections and of the executive branch generates the false sense of mandate, and the misperception in turn inhibits cooperation and consensus-building between president and opposition, both within the government and without”.26 This sense of popular mandate seems to have been the case in Argentina, where the executive branch was institutionally more powerful due to the centralizing measures initiated by Menem. Brazil’s presidential system did not exhibit these symptoms, which could be due to the far greater decentralization of power conferred to the states, and by extension the legislature, that is purveyed in the 1988 Constitution. Additionally, a President that wins an election in two-party system is more likely to win by a greater majority than a President that wins in a multi-party system. This could also contribute to an inﬂated perception of popular mandate. Another possible explanation for the concentration of power is, “presidents who do not have majority party support in congress have far less incentive to seek and maintain lasting coalitions in congress…presidents tend to be less receptive to dissatisfaction with the executive…”27 Even when the Justicialist party was the majority, the PJ party was not a reliable majority because it was ideologically divided and fragmented. When patronage and concessions could not get legislators on board, decrees gave Menem an alternative to bypass congress and enact policies. A combination of increased autonomy in executive policymaking and public inquietude about hyperinﬂation allowed for early stabilization policies to be carried out in relative isolation, as evidenced by the lack of transparency in early state-owned enterprise privatizations, a subject of corruption scandals that erupted after Menem’s presidency. Policymaking by decree became increasingly less legitimate as the macroeconomic situ-
ation improved. In an effort to garner legitimacy for reform the provinces. Instead of increasing due to the success of the measures, Menem began securing congressional approval for stabilization reforms, popular support waned as the inﬂation economic reforms that contained contentious policy initiafell because people perceived themselves to be in the domain of tives.28 Congress increasingly made alterations on economic gains. Austerity measures and ﬁscal policy alterations reprepolicy proposals by extensive revising or delaying of implemensented risks in comparison with the new equilibrium status quo. tation. The short-term losses that accompanied these second-stage Convertibility, the maintenance of a 1:1 parity of the peso reform measures eclipsed the long-term gains. The provinces to the dollar, was maintained despite being overvalued and con- enjoyed steady transfer payments in the overvalued currency tributing to trade deﬁcits. Finance Minister Dominique Cavallo, that kept purchasing power high. Menem was not in the posithe creator of the Convertibility Plan, “hoped for a 1991 deﬂa- tion to pass neoliberal or ﬁscal policy reforms due to a lack of tion, but inﬂation occurred, which increased consumer prices by support. 50% between 1991 and 1994”.29 If Menem had pursued reforms The failure to enact structural reforms contributed to the to the ﬁscal policy, provincial governors would have opposed depth of Argentina’s devaluation crisis. When subject to internal them because with the overvalued currency, neoliberal budget and external shocks, Argentina’s economy collapsed because it deﬁcit reductions appeared to be hitting was built on an unstable and unalterable their targets. Devaluating the peso would structure. Maintaining investor conﬁStates’ stake in the counhave revealed negative government acdence in order to prevent capital ﬂight try’s macroeconomic virility counts and therefore a greater justiﬁcation made it almost impossible to devalue the left legislators disposed to for strengthening austerity measures, the efcurrency or reduce high interest rates. constructive dialogue and to fects of which states did not wish to endure. Since it did not undertake ﬁscal policy rebe persuaded into supportThe public also was against devaluation, espeforms to corrected imbalances, Argentina ing nonpartisan executive cially the middle classes who would have felt was dependent on foreign investment initiated policies believed to their purchasing power decrease, no longer and capital ﬂows to ease these ﬁscal deﬁable to buy imports relatively cheaply. Other cits. The inﬂow of volatile capital derailed capture expansion. solutions to manage government ﬁscal policy government focus on austere budget were proposed such as improving tax compliance, reforming fed- cuts.30 In a regression comparing capital ﬂows to each Latin eral and provincial revenue sharing, and reducing government American country and economic performance, Argentina’s payrolls. These and other free-market reforms met resistance be- correlation was 0.95, in comparison so Brazil’s 0.76, meaning cause, among other reasons, free trade has a detrimental effect that Argentina’s economic evolution was more correlated with on employment. Because ruling by decree transfers the presiden- capital ﬂows than Brazil’s.31 One of the reasons why Argentina tial sense of mandate from the horizontal to the vertical plane, was more vulnerable to capital inﬂows and outﬂows than Brazil or from the legislature to the public, Menem faced opposition is because Brazil imposed fees for short-term investments while by both groups by pursuing unpopular reforms that would have Argentina did not. altered ﬁscal policy. Although Menem seemed to have a lot of power because Weyland’s prospect theory sheds light on why Menem he issued many decrees, in reality, Argentine presidents hands was able to use decree powers to pursue early stabilization were tied as they were barred from substantially altering the reforms like privatization and pass the Convertibility Plan, internal macroeconomic structure of the economy. The degree while further reforms like changes in ﬁscal policy or changes of macroeconomic policy change inﬂexibility and popular to the federal and provincial revenue sharing structure were resistance is exempliﬁed in Fernando de la Rua’s presidency. met with greater resistance. The prospect theory states that Peronist opposition coalition Alianza managed to win both legispeople are risk-seeking in the domain of losses, and risk-averse lative and presidential elections due to widespread concerns of in the domain of gains (4-8). In post-crisis Argentina, economic corruption and unemployment in the incumbent government. stabilization was established with the Convertibility Plan and When he sought to fulﬁll 1999 electoral campaign promises the privatization of inefﬁcient state owned industries because of enforcing austerity measures, raising taxes and adopting the public and the political elite were experiencing a hyper-inﬂa- labor reforms, the measures produced “record unemployment, tionary situation, which would be considered within the domain reduced and delayed wages to federal and provincial workers, of losses. Weyland’s theory indicates that within this domain, and the closing of public schools” which annihilated whatever people are willing to endure risk, or accept a greater amount of support for neoliberal measures that existed in Argentina. change than if they were not experiencing hyperinﬂation. In this Voter approval for Alianza plummeted. The outcome of these case, Argentine people were willing to accept the consolidation measures unleashed “social mobilization and protests unseen of Presidential powers, and the issuing of swift, non-negotiated for nearly a generation”.32 Furthermore, when his coalition economic polices that would create an end to rising double-digit party lost control of both houses of Congress to the Peronists inﬂation. in the 2001 legislative elections, austerity measures were The second half of Weyland’s theory accounts for why suspended and Congress became ungovernable. Described as further reforms were supported neither by the public, nor by an internal coup, “Peronist governors unleashed a political crisis
which led to de la Rua’s resignation”.34 A civilian protest march on the Casa Rosada ended with an ignominious ﬂee by de la Rua via helicopter. In response to de la Rua’s resignation, the legislative assembly appointed Justicialist governor of Buenos Aires Eduardo Duhalde to the Presidency, who “unlike his predecessors in the ofﬁce of chief executive, he rapidly learned that in order to rule he needed the governors on his side”.35 In the midst of the economic meltdown of 2001, Duhalde devalued the peso and defaulted on foreign debt. Executive power dynamics were different in Brazil. The high degree of fragmentation in Brazilian party politics created a legislative environment where negotiation and consensus were difﬁcult within the branch, and policy debates often resulted in prolonged gridlock. Beyond the legislative branch itself, congressional ineffectiveness threatened legislative relations with the executive, as a president facing economic realities requires a certain degree of efﬁciency that a discordant Congress does not afford. In contrast to the bipartisan system in Argentina, Brazil’s multiparty system increases congressional inefﬁciency and “… makes interparty coalition building more difﬁcult, and contributes to immobilism in executive-legislative relations”.36 Similar to the Argentine case, Brazilian presidents could choose to wholly bypass the legislature by using executive decrees, or “Medias Provisorias”. The ﬁrst Presidents to handle the crisis responded in this way. However, the interactions between the Brazilian legislature and the executive evolved in a distinct path from the relationship between the branches in the Argentine government. Despite slight executive centralization in times of economic crisis, presidential powers have devolved as the new democracy consolidates. In contrast to policy isolation that produced Argentine stabilization, Brazilian economic stabilization was established via negotiated policies; the Real Plan was congressionally reviewed and approved. This process was facilitated because the legislature and the executive shared macroeconomic goals that allowed cooperation not only on stabilization measures, but also on ﬁscal and structural reform policies. Another factor that contributed to a greater focus on legislative coalition building is that Brazilian presidents could fashion coalitions out of a diversity of parties; Argentine presidents in a bipartisan, predominant party system did not have the same political openings; either a party held the majority or it did not. Macroeconomic instability between 1985-1994 was prolonged by the powerful yet disorganized legislative institution. Brazil was undergoing a crisis of governability, where a weak party system led to an inefﬁcient Congress, and without this political support, stabilization efforts initiated by the executive all proved to be unsuccessful. Beginning in the mid 1980’s to the early 1990’s, Presidents Jose Sarney and his successor Fernando Collor de Mello repeatedly bypassed the non-coalescing legislature by using decrees to instate seven distinct heterodox economic plans; each plan failed to curb inﬂation and stabilize the economy. In contrast to the early acceptance of decrees in Argentina, rule by decree was unpopular in Brazil. This can be attributed to the purposefully statist and decentralized constitution that was written speciﬁcally to prevent centralization after redemocratization. In 1991, the Chamber of Deputies restricted the use of decrees.37 Whereas Menem was able to stack the judiciary to avoid being convicted of wrongdoing while in ofﬁce, “autocratic” and “arrogant” President Collor, had constitutional reforms rejected and was impeached by the Congress in 1992 on charges of corruption and bribery.38 Presidents Sarney and Collor embarked on liberalization plans that consisted of deregulation and privatization that did not address the ﬁscal crisis that was causing high levels of inﬂation. For example, Collor initiated a “draconian and highly interventionist stabilization plan” that did not resolve the perverse ﬁscal problems enshrined in the constitution because of Congressional resistance to constitutional reforms.39 The failure to alter ﬁscal policy is seen as the cause of failure of the initially successful Cruzado Plan. These plans that included compulsory sudden shock economic therapy are similar to Argentina’s stabilization plan, however they failed to work in Brazil.40 Congress did not support these plans because it had close ties to organized groups who favored the ﬁscal structures the constitution established. Facing an oppositional Congress, these presidents’ responses were not to negotiate, but rather to bypass Congress by using decrees. The economic therapy that did work in Brazil was one that was based on voluntary market adjustment. However, it was also an orthodox neoliberal response to the crisis, the type of economic policy that had strong historical ties to the military dictatorship. A shrewd politician that seemed to have learned from the autocratic mistakes of previous presidents, Fernando Henrique Cardoso did not take the approach of congressional bullying, but instead attempted to win congressional majorities via transparent negotiation and persuasion. One justiﬁcation for the change in inter-political relations is partial attribution of the failure of multiple economic plans to a lack of Congressional support. Cardoso believed in order to combat hyperinﬂation, political forces had to set aside partisan divisions and put public accounts in order.41 Despite its inefﬁciencies, Congressional support was now understood as essential for the success of economic growth programs. In contrast to the previous presidents’ rather undemocratic style of leadership, Cardoso’s record of democratically seeking approval for policies has been highlighted by prominent Brazilian studies scholars.42 Cardoso purposely contrasted himself with his predecessors by reafﬁrming his resolve for transparent, predictable and gradual governance.43 Even as Finance Minister during interim president Itamar Franco’s term, “Cardoso spent 1995 cajoling opponents and bargaining for congressional votes needed to carry out his economic liberalization program”.44 In addition to the support of the political elite, the importance of public support for economic policies contrasted Brazil from Argentina. Cardoso used the media to gain support for his policies. The president himself participated in interviews on the radio and television, and even used technocrats to promulgate policies knowing that their seemingly impartial advice would be more trusted than politicians’.45 One explanation why
the Brazilian public and especially the political elite may have trusted Cardoso to ameliorate the economy using orthodox policies is found in the “Nixon in China” metaphor. Cardoso, a respected academic, is one of better-known Dependency theorists. Brazilians must have believed that for a person with his nationalist reputation to be negotiating with the international technocrats of the IMF, Cardoso must have truly believed that these policies were the only way to stabilize the economy. Cardoso’s rhetoric also contained social democratic tones that appealed to the poor and to states with high concentrations of lower income populations. An example of this is the idea that the end of hyperinﬂation would lead to a decrease in the gap in social inequality. During the Cardoso period, the central state reasserted its role in macroeconomic policy.46 The stabilization plan that began while Cardoso was Finance Minister for Itamar Franco’s regime required the passing of ﬁscal reforms that would enlarge the primary surplus. Cardoso sought Congressional approval of measures to this end, which included a provision that would entitle the Federal government to retain 20% of directly collected revenues, instead of redistributing them to the states. This policy was introduced to Congress under the title, “Fundo Social de Emergencia”, or the Emergency Social Fund, and was a measure that would reduce the ﬁscal autonomy of the states.47Similarly to Menem’s centralization path, the policy was introduced with strong necessity connotations, which capitalized on society’s fears of growing hyperinﬂation. On the other hand, in contrast to Argentina’s increasing executive isolation, this policy did not serve to isolate the economic decision-making powers, but to mitigate institutional inefﬁciencies created by the constitution, which is telling as the name was subsequently changed to the “Fiscal Stabilization Fund”. Examples of the problems that would be corrected by the reform policies were correcting a tax burden that amounts to 40% of GDP, and correcting a public pension system that runs a $20 billion dollar annual deﬁcit.48 Cardoso’s moderate strategy proved to be effective. Cardoso ﬁrst introduced temporary reforms such as the Fiscal Stabilization Fund, and only in second term did he take advantage of the a secure majority coalition in Congress to pass lasting ﬁscal reforms via constitutional amendments. Cardoso waited until permanent reforms would be met by a favorable Congress; the importance of Congressional approval for macroeconomic reforms is paramount is the Brazilian long-term economic strategy. In contrast to the ﬁrst and second waves of economic reform in Argentina, Brazil’s “waves” of macroeconomic reforms were merged. Elements of “second wave” structural reform were integral parts in the “ﬁrst wave” stabilization program; in other words, in order to ensure the success of the Real Plan, constitutional amendments that would alter ﬁscal policy and internal economic structures were required. Argentina’s convertibility reforms could be fully enacted without structural reforms, however future structural reforms were anticipated for full macroeconomic stability. This difference may be due to the fact that Brazilian’s convertibility was based on a domestic currency board, while Argentina’s convertibility plan relied on the foreign US dollar. The strength of Brazil’s ﬁscal policy depended on the health of domestic markets, whereas the strength of Argentina’s ﬁscal policy depended on the strength of a foreign market. This created incentives for the Brazilian government to continue macroeconomic reforms, while withdrawing incentives for change in the Argentine economic structure. Additionally, when the devaluation crisis occurred, Brazil’s government had preserved independent margins of ﬂexibility to devalue the Real currency in a non-erratic way, whereas Argentina’s government did not ensure such precautions. Conclusion These ﬁndings show that a more decentralized federalist system that used a proportional representation electoral structure can produce more effective economic policies than a more centralized federalist system that employs a pluralist electoral structure. This goes against the argument that the greater the centralization of authority, the more insulated from outside pressures a regime is and, thus the greater efﬁciency at producing economic growth. In Brazil, a powerful yet institutionally weak legislature shared a similar amount of power with the executive. Both levels of the federalist system, along with both branches of government, shared macroeconomic interests. A politically savvy executive could manufacture majority coalitions in order to pass far-reaching congressionally approved economic reform policies. Argentina’s government had strong executive and legislative branches. Both of these branches, and both levels of the federal system, had conﬂicting interests. It was very difﬁcult for the executive to command a majority in Congress as provincial interests mostly captured the majority party. Beyond stabilization, the economic reforms that were passed were superﬁcial reforms that did not threaten the status quo of the ﬁscal policy and structure of the economic system. A factor that allowed for greater political cohesion in Brazilian politics was and is, as New York Times writer Anan Guirdandas said, the Brazilian economy was rebuilt on the ideology of “whatever works”. Facts became more important than principles as partisan conﬂicts were set aside to ensure the macroeconomic economic stability and progress. This was not the case in Argentina, where “Personality-based factions and social movements, rather than political parties per se, continue to deﬁne much of the political arena”. There will always exist groups that pursue their self-interest that are against the selfinterest of others. The lack of governmental autonomy from entrenched private interests and factions has kept it from functioning as a broker of the “greater good”. The result of this circumstance in inter-crisis Argentina was the economic, and to a certain extent, political “meltdown” that occurred in 2001. Another factor that set Brazil apart from Argentina in the inter-crisis period is executive leadership. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, not a politician by training, possessed the long-sightedness of an academic to understand that a bandage,
or short-term solution to the crisis, was not the most ideal response to the economic situation. As a member of the nonpolitical elite, Cardoso was less motivated by securing a stake in further political endeavors, and more motivated by the perhaps idealistic conviction that Brazil had the means to stop being the perpetual “nation of the future”. Cardoso was also a proponent of democracy and transparent negotiation, the conditions for which certainly were present in the Brazilian policymaking arena. Carlos Menem was a member of the political elite; he is what Weber would call a Professional Politician, a position that is simultaneously essential yet harmful to democracy. Professional Politicians have their own interests, yet disguise those interests as public interests. The decisions Menem made while president had long-term repercussions on the rest of his career. He had been a provincial governor before becoming president, and undoubtedly aspired to continue in politics after his term. In this perspective, the decisions and policies Menem promulgated while in ofﬁce cannot be viewed as the decisions of a political outsider, but rather as calculated decisions that would not alter the status quo in a way that would prevent his re-entry into politics after his presidency. Brazil avoided slipping into economic insolvency due to a political structure that created the conditions for healthy economic policies to reach fruition. In contrast, the political structures present in Argentina during the post-crisis period did not create a political environment in which the type of signiﬁcant macroeconomic reforms could take root. Ultimately, the politics of the inter-crisis period and the economic structures that were established during those years can account for why Brazil’s economy is one of the world’s fastest growing economies in the twenty ﬁrst century, while Argentina’s economy continues to yield modest growth rates. and transit systems have increased, revenue into the fund has remained constant. A fuel tax hike is needed to maintain our troubled highway infrastructure system which requires constant upkeep. The list of projects in need of repair is extensive. According to TRIP, a national transportation research group: 33% of the nation’s major roads are in “poor or mediocre condition, 36 % of major urban highways are congested and 26% of bridges are “structurally deﬁcient or functionally obsolete”.3 Neglecting what is needed to maintain the condition and performance of any asset creates a backlog of maintenance and capital improvement that needs to be met. The backlog of bridges alone that are in need of repair is estimated at $72 billion. Maintaining a safe and effective transportation system is vital to the functioning of commerce. A $1 per gallon hike in gas tax would bring in $100 billion a year in government revenue and make a dent in the looming ﬁscal gap. Regulatory Relief The rate at which fossil fuels burn is about 10 times less than the rate of natural CO2 exchange within the terrestrial biosphere, making it one of the main contributors to anthropogenic climate change. All three fossil fuels are being consumed at appreciable rates but oil leads the way at 3.3 Gton/year. Higher gasoline taxes would be the most direct and least invasive policy to address environmental concerns and provide regulatory relief for the automobile industry. To reduce carbon dioxide emissions in the transportation sector 14 percent from 2005 levels by 2020, the cost of driving would simply have to increase. Congress has tried to reduce energy dependence with corporate average fuel economy standards. These CAFE rules are heavy-handed government regulations replete with unintended consequences: they are partly responsible for the growth of SUVs. CAFE was born in 1975, a product energy crisis resulting from the OPEC oil embargo. It changed shape through the decades, ﬁnding varying degrees of success in boosting average fuel economy. During an aggressive overhaul of the regulations in 2007, Congress attempted to make the regulations fair for all automakers. The issue at hand was some companies offer full model lines, from cars to large SUVs and pickups, but some don’t. The fuel-economy standard would penalize companies like Ford and GM, while carmakers that sold only smaller cars effortlessly abide by the rules. So the concept of vehicle footprint was added. Models that ran large, crossing speciﬁc length-by-width thresholds‚ would have less ambitious fuel-economy targets. While the Obama administration has pushed for more aggressive CAFE numbers, the amended regulations retain the footprint-based leniency towards bigger cars and light trucks. The result is a loophole which allows the entire auto industry to sidestep some of the more painful efﬁciency requirements by inﬂating vehicle footprints. With a regulatory loop-hole built in and the well-known customer preference for large cars, the industry lurches towards the inevitable option of larger models and more light trucks. In addition, by making the car ﬂeet more fuel-efﬁcient, the regulations encourage people to drive more, offsetting some of the conservation beneﬁts and exacerbating road congestion. A higher gas tax would accom-
A BIPARTISAN COMPROMISE FOR A GASOLINE TAX HIKE
Sharin Khander Unless Congress extends the 18.4 cents per gallon federal tax on gasoline, the mandate will expire on September 30. The tax has not increased since 1993, and its purchasing power, accounting for inﬂation, is now only 11 cents.1 With November 2012 elections approaching, one campaign promise you will not hear is to increase the tax on gasoline substantially to a ﬁgure like $1 per gallon. Although political consultants would advise against this measure, the policy beneﬁts outweigh the costs in several respects. Growing Demand for New Infrastructure Excise taxes on engine fuel make up 90% of the $37 billion Highway Trust Fund, a transportation fund which ﬁnances the construction of major interstate highways and various forms of mass transit.2 As the cost of building roads, bridges,
plish everything CAFE standards do, but without the adverse side effects. Economic Consequences In the broad context of public economics, a negative externality of a market activity, such as environmental degradation can be removed with a Pigovian tax, such as one on gasoline.4 The burden of a tax is shared by consumer and producer. In this case, as a higher gas tax would discourage oil consumption, promoting energy independence and decreasing the price of oil in world markets. As a result, the price of gas to consumers would rise by less than the increase in the tax. Some of the tax would in effect be paid by oil producers like Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Public ﬁnance experts have long preached that consumption taxes are better than income taxes for long-run economic growth, because income taxes discourage saving and investment. Gas is a component of consumption. An increased reliance on gas taxes over income taxes would make the tax code more favorable to growth. Political Feasibility Many Democratic and moderate Republican politicians have rallied support behind raising the gas tax for ﬁscal and environmental concerns. Allowing the Highway Trust Fund to go bankrupt would have devastating effects on the country’s highways, bridges, mass transit systems and the economy as a whole. The Simpson-Bowles commission on budget reform urged an immediate 15 cent-per-gallon increase; former Senators Bill Bradley of New Jersey and John Danforth of Missouri have suggested a $1 increase to be phased in between now and 2020. Right-leaning economists like Gregory Mankiw and Kenneth Rogoff agree that Pigovian taxes are far more transparent and potentially less prone to the pitfalls seen in Coasian measures like international carbon-quota trading. A tax like one on gasoline can help preserve the atmosphere while also discouraging some of the most exotic and risky energy-exploration activities by making them unproﬁtable. Although the gas tax has received bipartisan support, the political stigma of tax hikes remains a major deterrent in putting forth effective policies. accessibility, what tradeoffs are acceptable in contemplating the ﬁnancial possibility of effective legislation? The passage of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1970 marked the ﬁrst time national policy dictated that access to public transportation was a right held equally by disabled and non-disabled citizens.1 It required that all agencies responsible for providing transportation had to make “special efforts” in order to provide equally accessible means of transportation for all citizens.2 The vagueness of the language allowed for a number of different solutions based on varying interpretations of “special efforts”. Most of the proposed solutions fell into two camps, either providing specialized services in response to speciﬁc demand or making regular services more accessible.3 Then the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was passed, which stated: No otherwise qualiﬁed individual with handicaps in the United States…shall solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the beneﬁts of, or be subjected to any discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal ﬁnancial assistance.4 At ﬁrst, the Department of Transportation allowed individual localities to use their discretion in implementing the law, and the DOT judged these proposals on a case-by-case basis. This initial level of ﬂexibility was soon replaced by a standardized requirement that every single transportation agency that receives federal funding must undertake certain measures to ensure equal access to their facilities.5 For example, in order to receive federal funding for a bus, the bus had to be equipped with a wheelchair lift. It was no longer acceptable to have a ﬂeet of demand-responsive cars in addition to non-accessible buses. Because of the DOT’s enforcement of Section 504, any ﬂexibility in designing transportation systems was replaced by the rigidity of a federal mandate.6 The result of this was a persistent disagreement between disability advocates and local transport agencies as to whether the DOT was right in taking such a dogmatic approach to these regulations. Many transportation ofﬁcials claimed that any static approach to a complex problem like transport provision would result in suboptimal policies, less services in response to speciﬁc demands, and ultimately fewer opportunities for disabled passengers to have access to transportation. The practical result of the DOT’s one-size-ﬁts-all solution was threefold: it dissuaded localities from retroﬁtting buses to be wheelchair accessible (such improvements were not funded), pushed back plans to launch new bus ﬂeets due to the new costs that were only partially defrayed by federal subsidy, and it forced the handicapped to continue to be dependent on unreliable and expensive paratransit services. The contention over proper implementation of Section 504 falls under the overarching question of what should be the ideal goal of a transportation providing policy. The two main approaches are either mobility—providing the greatest means of transport for the largest number of people, or accessibility — allowing disabled people full access to all mainstream forms of
EXPANDING DISABILITY ACCESS TO PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
Asher Hecht-Bernstein, Ze’ev Gebler Disabled people face innumerable difﬁculties in using public transportation, and the government has long struggled to ﬁnd a successful solution to this problem. The most famous legislation towards this end, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, has raised a contentious debate over what the ultimate goal of a successful transportation policy should be. Is it providing greater mobility for disabled passengers, or mainstream access to public transit? And if the ultimate goal is full
transportation.7 The Department of Transportation, along with portation for some disabled persons, but still relegates those in numerous Disability rights organizations such as ADAPT (Ameri- wheelchairs to inconsistent and frustrating paratransit services. can Disabled for Accessible Public Transportation), are adamant Thus, for the past 30 years America’s stance has made a clear in their support of full accessibility to means of transport. They distinction between the ambulatory handicapped and those in claim that public transportation is a civil right, and to exclude wheelchairs. The signiﬁcant investments that were meant to people based on their disabilities is segregation as severe as racial be made in making buses accessible never fully materialized, bias.8 Policy makers and transportation agencies such as APTA and today 44% of the United States’ local transit systems only (American Public Transit Association) often voice the contrary offer paratransit services and only several have fully accessible opinion, saying that a successful transportation policy is able to public transit systems.13 Additionally, the poor implementation provide the greatest number of rides in the most cost effective of accessible bus systems has actually had signiﬁcant deleterious way. Both of these goals are the standards by which transport effects. plans are judged, as a successful plan must both allow for handiThe main problems associated with accessible bus cap access while still maximizing the amount of trips taken. services are the lifts, drivers, and costs. The lifts are extremely Our position is that accessibility should be the ultimate faulty, causing delays or even malfunctioning but still used in goal of any policy regarding transportation for the handicapped. the regular routes, causing extreme burdens on the passengers However, accessibility to systems of public transportation takes waiting for the buses.14 Disabled passengers complained that time and large-scale investment. This aldrivers were not helpful in helping them use the lows critics to claim that plans based sole- Today 44% of the United buses, although additional positive feedback and ly on accessibility (like the current DOT States’ local transit systems too small a sample size limit the conclusiveness of only offer paratransit services the data.. The overall effect was that disabled passtance) seem to shun the very real need for effective transportation right now and only several have fully sengers were discouraged from using the buses for an ideological higher ground. Propo- accessible public transit and ridership began to drop, causing a negative nents of the mobility argument claim that systems cycle in which fewer passengers led to less fremainstreaming transportation is largely a quent handicap accessible bus routes offered, less symbolic goal, and meaningful accessibility is gained from trans- accessibility; further reducing the number of passengers able to porting the largest amount of people to the most meaningful and use the bus.15 Additionally, besides requiring the bus itself to be beneﬁcial activities.9 But one of the main functions of the Section accessible there are a number of other infrastructure related 504 regulations was to ensure a higher level of employment for improvements that are usually lacking in accessible bus routes, disabled people thus allowing them a greater part in mainstream such as curb cuts for easier access to the bus and shelters for society.10 The ideal solution is one in which full access to public inclement weather.16 transportation need not come at the cost of limited mobility for Demand responsive paratransit services, although these passengers. promoted by many as the more cost-effective option, have sufProponents of the mobility argument maintain that fered from a number of problems in execution. Most dial-a-ride separate of transportation provided for disabled passengers offerings have similar rules of operation, as they must follow a nonetheless provide an equal result. But transportation is such number of guidelines established by the DOT—same operating a fundamental part of the way that we organize ourselves, hours as general transit services, similar fare structures17—but that exclusion from mainstream forms of transportation causes also a number of similarities determined not by any regulaalienation and exclusion from society.11 Equality in transportations but by cost saving measures. Passengers typically must tion is necessary for its ability to bring together people of differ- order the car 24-48 hours before their intended travel time, ent levels of ability, not just in the workplace or whatever the simply due the dearth of paratransit vehicles. But there are a given location, but in all aspects of life. Separation leads to bias, number of other shared characteristics that go beyond efﬁcient ignorance, and misconceptions about other types of people, costs into unpleasant experiences for the passengers. Because and it is only through interaction that people with disabilities supply is such an issue, often times companies will simply stop 12 can gain a greater foothold in mainstream culture. And so distaking reservations when demand gets too high, as passengers ability advocates struggle with the question of how to fulﬁll this complained about the MBTA in Boston that 26% of the time fundamental right in a cost effective manner. no cars were available.18 Because the greatest cost for this The two most commonly offered proposals for provid- type of service is an increase in passengers—resulting in more ing transportation to the disabled are accessible bus systems cars needed, more drivers, etc.—companies have little to no and demand-responsive paratransit services. Unfortunately, incentive to increase their service offerings. There is generally after analyzing the costs and beneﬁts of different plans, the a shortage of effective paratransit travel, and these companies CBO ultimately favored a plan that incorporated mobility by are typically too inefﬁcient to properly meet the needs of their offering dial-a-ride vans for the handicapped but failed to ﬁnd customers, so they artiﬁcially reduce demand by restricting orroom for wheel-chair accessible public transportation (dubbed ders.19 Overall, both buses and paratransit services have a 10% the “Taxi Plan”). This legislation does increase equality of transfailure rate, when the service does not arrive as requested,
however this problem is exacerbated for paratransit services, as there is no follow up van as opposed to the next scheduled bus.20 Transit is such an essential part of the way that we live our daily lives, interact with others, and integrate with society that only being able to do so successfully 90% of the time is an inexcusable failure. Within Section 504 there is a clause necessitating “reasonable expenditure” on behalf of the transportation agencies for making accessible transit.21 Organizations do not have to change the fundamental nature of their program, but within certain reasonable limitations, they must do everything to allow disabled people to make use of their services. Section 504 also mandates a 3% expenditure cap for agencies to spend on making their services accessible, which has a large part in deﬁning what are “reasonable” accommodations. While Section 504 made some signiﬁcant steps towards identifying the problems and complications of providing public transportation to the handicapped, it did not set up a politically or economically feasible landscape for localities to best address the issue of ensuring accessibility for all without sacriﬁcing mobility in the interim. New legislation is necessary to encourage signiﬁcant infrastructure investment (both for new vehicles and to refurbish existing ones) that actually encourages the use of public transport rather than pushing the disabled into solely using paratransit services. Paratransit services can be seen as a necessary evil, a crutch, that should only be used to bridge the time until accessibility is a reality. Until that time, however, it is necessary that these services are able to receive funding in order to accommodate the immediate demand. Because of the expenditure cap, localities have been forced to implement half-solutions that can barely serve current demand and will certainly be lacking in the future. By eliminating the expenditure cap, subsidizing upfront infrastructure investment, and providing paratransit service as a supplemental option we can move towards a system that provides fair and comprehensive transport services. The majority of cities use transportation services that fail to provide disabled persons with either the mobility or accessibility that they deserve. The disagreement over the ultimate goal of these services have served to prevent either side from effectively implementing a feasible and efﬁcient solution. Our plan is to have a clear focus on providing accessible transport, while still maintaining a degree of ﬂexibility that is often lacking from accessibility-centered solutions. This solution requires both a signiﬁcant investment in an infrastructure that can provide for common transportation for people of all levels of ability, as well as supplementing this with demand responsive para-transit services for those not served by the main form of transport. Creating a ﬂeet of fully accessible buses is indeed expensive, but it incurs most of its costs upfront. And more importantly, the associated costs of this plan do not change drastically based on the number of disabled passengers using this service. A demand responsive car service, while requiring signiﬁcant less initial investment, incurs signiﬁcant labor costs that increase dramatically based on increases in ridership. Using only this as a solution becomes extremely expensive when there are either large number of passengers, or signiﬁcant variations in the number of people using this service. For this reason, paratransit services are useful only in providing transport for those who cannot use the bus. This would allay concerns that section 504 imposes too rigid a solution, and allow for the most amount of people to gain access to transport while still minimizing the per-passenger cost of transportation.
INTEGRATING HOSPITAL SCHOOLS INTO LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS
Colette Jaycox As a nation, we have come to agree that the education of America’s youth should be a priority. A variety of programs have been established to that end, including state and federal testing regimens to insure school quality and free and subsided school lunch programs to help low-income students concentrate on their studies. But there is one student sub-population that has been consistently ignored at the local, state, and federal levels—severely ill students. Students aged K-12 who ﬁnd themselves diagnosed with life-threatening diseases are often forced to drop out of school due to their lack of mobility, compromised immune systems, and need for constant treatment, even when they are mentally capable of continuing with their education. Moreover, schools often serve as the primary source of routine and social interaction for children. This means that, along with falling behind in their studies, students suffer the social and emotional ramiﬁcations of being away from school for an extended period of time.1 Thankfully, there is already a solution: hospital schools. Hospital schools are accredited by their area’s school district, and can provide tailored educational services to young patients that still meet state educational guidelines. Unfortunately, hospital school programs currently serve only a limited number of students. There are only a handful of hospitals school in the entire United States: Carleson Hospital School, CA; Lucile Packard Hospital School, CA; Duke Children’s Hospital School, NC; Hospital School of the Children’s Hospital and Research Center Oakland, CA; North Carolina Children’s Hospital School, NC; Children’s Hospital of The King’s Daughters School, VA; and the University of Wisconsin Hospital School; WI.2 This low number ought to be changed. I propose that school districts containing hospitals with a population of at least 15 in-patient children (patients living in the hospital for continuous treatment) be mandated to assist in the establishment, accreditation, and funding of a hospital school within their school district, in order to provide for the education of all children in their district area. This can be done at a comparatively low cost. A hospital school can consist of a staff of as small as two teachers, depending on the health of patients and the size of the class. The Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital School, for example, in the children’s wing of the internationally recognized Stanford Hospital, is able to provide comprehensive services to children who have come for treatment from across the United States with a staff of only ﬁve teachers.3 Hospitals with less national draw will require even fewer resources to function effectively, meaning that the important beneﬁts of an accredited hospital education can be achieved at a very reasonable cost to the hosting school district. Furthermore, precedent already exists for the provision
of these types of services. The current IEP (Individualized Education Program) process states that schools that cannot accommodate the needs of students with qualifying disabilities within their district are required to develop and pay for the implementation of an individualized plan to ﬁt that student’s needs. This can include fronting the cost of a student’s placement in a private institution should the public school district be unable to provide the necessary services themselves.4 The establishment of hospital schools with sufﬁciently high in-patient populations would as such follow the logic of the IEP process, and could indeed function as an extension of it. There are many reasons that hospital schools are uniquely placed to meet the needs of hospitalized students in a way the public school system is ill-equipped to do. Children facing life-threating illnesses, for instance, often need accommodation for their speciﬁc diseases and can require time-intensive services like bedside instruction. As such, having the permanent teaching staff of a hospital school, however small, accustomed to speciﬁcally instructing ill children is necessary, rather than simply sending district teachers to students remotely, as district teachers have neither the time nor expertise to give a hospitalized student the instruction time they need. Nor is district-assisted homeschooling an acceptable alternative. First, this discriminates against lower-income and single-parent families, for whom the caregiver cannot stay home and must go to work to continue to fund their child’s treatment. Second, hospital schools, because they are accredited by their local district, are entitled to proctor standardized exams for their students— a service homeschooling cannot provide. This is a more vital provision than many realize. Students with neutropenia, for example, a common side effect of chemotherapy treatments that results in a dangerously low white blood cell count, cannot be in public spaces with large amounts of people due to their compromised immune systems. This means they would be rendered unable to take their standardized exams, such as the SAT, ACT, SAT Subject, and AP exams, since they could not be around other students in a testing hall. Hospital schools, however, as accredited institutions, can administer standardized tests to students in a quarantined area of a hospital ward. This means that students with compromised health can still complete their schooling and even look to higher education opportunities during their treatment and recovery. Children with medical conditions are often neglected by the educational system when situation forces them from their local schools—but this doesn’t mean that their right to a quality education should be surrendered. By instituting hospital schools with signiﬁcant pediatric in-patient populations, the United States can make sure that no child—even a sick child— will be left behind.
RESTORING FAIRNESS TO COLLEGE ATHLETICS
Sam Klug The promise of Division I college sports is rooted in the American faith in meritocracy and mobility, purportedly rewarding student-athletes for their talent with a free education and, for a select few, an opportunity to ply their trade professionally. For years, however, trends in college athletics—especially in the revenue-producing sports of football and men’s basketball—have made this promise a lie. While graduation rates for college athletes as a group continue to exceed the national average of graduation rates for all students who attend college—in 2011, the rates were 82% and 63%, respectively—this pleasing notion that athletic competition is in fact beneﬁcial for students’ academic performance becomes less and less true as we narrow our focus and look closer at participants in speciﬁcally these revenue-producing sports at the largest programs.1 The notion that student-athletes are getting a quality college education in exchange for their performance on the ﬁeld or on the court has become increasingly inaccurate. College athletics in the United States represents a multibillion dollar industry in which the people who create most of the value (the athletes) receive none of the monetary rewards. As college athletics have garnered a larger and larger fan base, the proportion of resources universities devote to these programs has risen, as have the salaries of coaches and the size of athletic departments. In 2010, the Southeastern Conference (SEC) took in over a billion dollars from athletic-related: ticket sales, concession sales, merchandise, licensing fees, and, most of all, television contracts.2 Nick Saban, the head football coach at the University of Alabama, made over $5 million last year, yet none of the players on his championship-winning team could take in a single dime.3 The NCAA’s conception of amateurism serves as the organization’s justiﬁcation for this inequitable distribution of resources. Under NCAA eligibility rules, college athletes cannot participate if they are found to have “contracts with a professional team,” “salary for participating in athletics,” “prize money,” “play with professionals,” “tryouts, practice or competition with a professional team,” “beneﬁts from an agent or prospective agent,” “agreement to be represented by an agent,” or “delayed full-time college enrollment to participate in organized sports competition.”4 These prohibitions serve the notion that somehow college athletics are “purer” than professional sports, despite the massive quantities of money that ﬂow to coaches and administrators. The NCAA’s deﬁnition of amateurism and the power of the organization itself are intimately tied together. Having enshrined rules against paying athletes for their participation from the early twentieth century, the NCAA only gained the power to enforce those rules when it gained exclusive rights to license the broadcast of college football games through a series of decisions in the 1950s and early 1960s. The increase in popularity of the March Madness basketball
tournament in the 1980s, for which the NCAA also controlled the television contract, made up for the revenue lost when the major football conferences seized control of the television revenue from bowl games when the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the NCAA’s monopoly in the 1984 NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma decision.5 The continued success of this tournament has provided the NCAA with increasing revenues from television contracts, thus empowering them to continue to enforce their amateurism rules. Rules that forbid players from taking any compensation beyond their athletic scholarships have led to scandal after scandal involving coaches or recruiters offering athletes cash or other in-kind beneﬁts under the table in return for a commitment to play for their schools. These scandals usually induce retribution against the athlete and the coach, and occasionally against the program: common consequences include suspensions for players, small ﬁnes for coaches, and, in the most severe occurrences, bans on postseason participation for the program. The reactions to this rule-breaking, however, serve mostly as public relations efforts by the NCAA to maintain a veneer of responsibility and fairness. These punishments have done nothing to change a fundamentally unfair system whereby collegiate athletes are not compensated for the wealth they produce. There are two major strands of thinking on how to reform the crisis in collegiate athletics. One side of the debate, exempliﬁed by the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, focuses on restoring the balance between academics and athletics, attempting to make amateurism work more effectively for the student-athletes in question. Another side seeks to do away with the concept of amateurism altogether, and instead emphasizes the need to compensate athletes monetarily through salaries. What is needed is a combination of the two approaches, one that reﬂects both the diversity of the collegiate athletic structure and the radical need to end the exploitation of athletes at the top levels of competition in the revenue sports of football and men’s basketball. The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, founded in 1989 with the goal of “ensur[ing] that intercollegiate athletics programs operate within the educational mission of their colleges and universities,” has emphasized the imbalance between education and athletics in major college sports programs.6 Their recent report, “Restoring the Balance: Dollars, Values, and the Future of College Sports,” suggested genuine positive changes to restore priority to academic values in collegiate athletics, such as “reduc[ing] the funding provided for winning and link[ing] new funding to academic success” and “reallocat[ing] some postseason football revenues on the basis of academic values.”7 On the other side of the debate, Taylor Branch, a historian of the American civil rights movement, has been one of the strongest proponents of a Pay-for-Play solution to the NCAA’s unjust compensation problem.8 While Branch has primarily emphasized the problems and hypocrisies of the NCAA, he proposes a solution based on free-market prin-
ciples: colleges should not be required to pay their athletes, game companies, and others into the world of college sports. but neither should they be required not to pay their athletes. A class-action antitrust suit brought against the NCAA Branch and others have proposed, essentially, a free market in at the U.S. District Court in San Francisco in 2009, led by Ed young athletes, whereby the schools attempting to compete at O’Bannon, a former UCLA basketball player and winner of the the highest levels in revenue-generating sports—and thus the John Wooden award for player of the year in 1995, exemplischools who gain the lucrative television and endorsement conﬁes the problems with the NCAA’s and the Knight Commistracts from these sports—would have to pay competitive prices sion’s approach to ancillary revenues. O’Bannon and the other for the services of the athletes who represent their principal plaintiffs in the suit are arguing that once college athletes leave products. their universities, their likenesses belong to them, and thus, the The multi-tiered structure of the NCAA already offers NCAA, as well as their individual schools and conferences, owe different levels of “compensation” based on the talent of, and them royalties for sales of videos of them playing. The NCAA, demand for, athletes: Division III schools (and the Division I Ivy however, argues that any use of these athletes’ likenesses is League) do not offer athletic scholarships; Division II schools covered under Part IV of the “Student-Athlete Statement,” may offer a few; and Division I schools can offer differing numwhich authorizes the NCAA “to use your name or picture… ber of scholarships depending on the size of the program (larger to promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events, programs in the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) conferences activities or programs.”13 The NCAA’s argument holds that may offer more scholarships than those in the smaller, Footex-student-athletes, people who may have played professionally ball Championship Subdivision (FCS) conferences). By deﬁnor not, have no property rights in their likenesses from their ing “compensation” solely as scholarships, however, this tiered collegiate days; once a student-athlete, always a student-athlete. structure falls well short of the standards of a real market. A This case stands as an especially egregious example of the report authored by the National College Players Association NCAA’s exploitation of its amateurism rules in order to proﬁt, (NCPA), for example, found that “if allowed access to the fair largely through contracts with outside companies, from the market like the pros, the average FBS football and basketball bodies and images of college athletes. player would be worth approximately $121,048 and $265,027 In October 2011, the NCAA approved two rule respectively”—numbers far exceeding the value of a yearly scholchanges that demonstrated its recognition of the problem of arship.9 Further, the NCPA study found that a college athlete unfair compensation for its athletes. The ﬁrst and more widely on a full athletic scholarship at an FBS conference school had publicized of these changes allows schools to add $2,000 average out of pocket expenses of $3,222 in the 2009-10 acastipends on top of the full athletic scholarships they could offer demic year, a ﬁgure that refers to living expenses and other student-athletes. The second of these changes allows colleges essentials such as books and transportation.10 In part because of to offer multi-year scholarships in addition one-year, renewable the failure of “full” scholarships to cover the actual costs college scholarships. Such multi-year scholarships used to be the norm athletes’ living and educational arrangements, the report found, in college athletics, until the NCAA changed its rules in 1973 the average full scholarship FBS athlete earns less than the fedand instituted a limit on the duration of athletic scholarships to eral poverty line, by $1,874 living on campus one year—a move that failed to align with its and $1,794 living off campus.11 purported desire to support the “student” If schools can give their The Knight Commission’s approach, and athletes $2,000 for purposes component of its “student-athletes.”14 These the approach taken by the NCAA based on other than sponsoring their two changes indicate that the NCAA is their antiquated conception of amateurism, already taking a mixed approach (although education, why can they further falls woefully short when considering moving very slowly) toward solving the not give them $3,000? Or what is known as “ancillary revenue.” Ancilproblem of compensation for college ath$10,000? lary revenue—all revenue the universities gain letes, but they also suggest that the crucial from their athletic programs indirectly, i.e., not through ticket concept undergirding the NCAA’s current system—amateurand concession sales—encompasses television contracts, apparel ism—is untenable. As the NCPA’s report demonstrates, the gap sponsorships, the sale of jerseys and other gear, and the use of between full scholarships and the actual cost of attending these players’ “likenesses” in video games, among other things. These universities is often far greater than $2,000. Furthermore, sources produce far more revenue for universities than do the there is a conceptual problem with providing “stipends”—which actual gate receipts themselves, yet the Knight Commission acts are deﬁned as outside scholarships, not as components of as though these sources of revenue should not factor into the them—to “amateurs.” If schools can give their athletes $2,000 equation of providing equitable treatment to college athletes. for purposes other than sponsoring their education, why can Indeed, the commission argues that, in order to “treat college they not give them $3,000? Or $10,000? athletes as students ﬁrst and foremost,” NCAA rules “should The best immediate solution to the problem of not allow commercial sponsors or other third parties to use compensation in college athletics would combine the Knight symbols of the athletes’ identities for ﬁnancial gain or to proCommission’s commitment to restoring the balance between mote commercial entities.”12 This proposal appears laughably naacademics and athletics for many athletes and programs and ïve given the extent of the penetration of shoe companies, video the pay-for-play approach favored by Branch, the NCPA, and
others for the elite athletes producing the most revenue for the schools. The NCAA’s recent move to allow multi-year scholarships—a rule change that is currently under review by the association’s governing body—should be expanded. As the best way to ensure that student-athletes graduate college is through guaranteed four-year scholarships, the NCAA should allow and encourage colleges to offer four-year guaranteed scholarships in whatever sports they choose. Incentives based on academic performance should be increased beyond what the Knight Commission recommends, such that at least a third of all funds available based on performance incentives should be allocated based on academic as opposed to athletic bases. In conjunction with these changes focused on redressing the balance between academics and athletics, the NCAA should deregulate its strict no-pay-for-play rules beyond simply allowing schools to pay its athletes $2,000 stipends. Indeed, given the NCPA report’s ﬁnding that the average full scholarship falls $3,222 short of covering the real cost of attending college, universities should discover the average shortfall for athletes at their schools and should increase the size of their full scholarships by that amount. Using the $3,222 average ﬁgure, this change would cost FBS schools and Division I basketball schools a total of $47 million annually, a number that would increase to $94 million annually if Title IX provisions were found to apply.16 Funding for this new policy could come from the television revenues that the NCAA takes in from the March Madness basketball tournament, which amount to $771.4 million per year (through 2024), and the television revenues that the FBS conferences accrue from the Bowl Championship Series, which equal $125 million per year (through 2014). Given the popularity of these sports, the next television contracts are likely to be even larger, meaning that the expansion of scholarships will not endanger these universities’ ﬁnancial security for the foreseeable future. Additionally, the NCAA should lift restrictions on college athletes’ commercial opportunities outside of school. Rather than keeping all of the ancillary revenue from college sports in the hands of administrators, the NCAA should adopt the much less stringent model of amateurism favored by the Olympics, which would allow its athletes to secure their own endorsement deals and work with their own agents.17 The NCAA may not be inclined to make these policy changes on its own. Congress, however, has the power to enact these changes through legislation, as the NCAA represents a nationwide regulatory body. If the NCAA fails to act on its own to protect its athletes—which is, after all, its stated goal— Congress should intervene. These policy changes would not completely solve the problem of the unequal distribution of revenue in college athletics. For that, a full-scale destruction of the notion of amateurism is required, which in turn would require large cultural shifts in the way Americans understand universities and view college sports, shifts not easily addressed in a policy proposal. These intermediate steps, however, would make schools take seriously their obligation to educating their athletes by allowing four-year scholarships, would force schools to use more of their revenue from television deals to provide stronger “full” scholarships, and would allow college athletes to pursue proﬁtable opportunities outside of their direct participation in their sports. All of these policy changes would result in a fairer deal for college athletes.
THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION
Akshay Kini The New York City Board of Education’s methods of assessing America’s greatness lies in its openness and democratic institutions that are meant to serve as a melting pot for peoples of all colors and cultures. Our Constitution was founded upon the principled virtues of egalitarianism and liberty, and yet we deny these very freedoms to highly talented foreign-born workers who can only strengthen, not weaken, our country. Instead of accepting them into our culture and forming a dynamic economy, we close our doors to the vast majority of immigrants. In the global economy, investments and innovation follow talent, and restricting this talent can only weaken America’s vast economic empire. We currently have a visa crisis. 9/11 is the most direct cause of the stringent caps on the number of visas issued annually. Prior to the terrorist attack, between 1990 and 2000, the number of visas increased by 31%. Afterwards, new restrictions were put in place that required foreign nationals to undergo interviews and FBI background checks, resulting in a sharp reduction in visas issued, which dropped from 284,000 in 2001 to 216,000 in 2003. Although the number of H-1B visas, which are used for temporary employment, and F visas, which are a type of non-immigrant student visa that allows foreigners to pursue education in the United States, has since increased, foreign students are now more inclined to study in their home countries or in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, or the UK, all of which are competing with the United States for university education.1 As a result, the number of foreign students enrolled in United States plummeted. After increasing by 78% between 1990 and 2003, enrollment of foreign graduate students declined from 280,000 in 2003 to 266,000 in 2007. This decline is even more pronounced between 1970 and 2006: US share of foreign students enrolled in higher education fell from 29% to 12%i. Let’s look at this from another perspective: the number of doctorates that are obtained from US universities. The number of foreign doctorates acquired from US universities has jumped from 16% in 1980 to nearly 50% now. And, in the ﬁeld of engineering, foreigners accounted for nearly 60% of doctorates obtained at US universities in 2005.2 The numbers are very clear: we are pushing foreign nationals away from the United States and feeding them into our competitors’ economies. Although there has been an increase in the number of doctorates obtained at US universities, this is only further proof that by restricting the number of visas
issued the US is simply depriving itself of a vast pool of foreign to R&D, leading to higher rates of innovation, patenting, and talent. And, according to a study released just a few months the production of new technologies. This is empirical: “a 10% ago by Dr. Finn, who follows the career paths of foreigners increase in the population of H-1B visa holders is associated who obtain PhDs in the U.S., a majority of the group (nearly with 4% to 5% increase in company patenting activity,” in high65-70% of them) of highly trained foreign nationals securing tech sectors.6 High-skilled workers also reduce trade costs. 3 PhDs stays in the United States. In an economy where imThey bring knowledge about markets and investment opportumigrants account for only 15% of the US labor force yet obtain nities abroad, increasing the US’ access to foreign markets and nearly 50% of the doctorates offered at US universities, there facilitating increased trade with these countries. This lowers is a marked imbalance that should send a clear signal to policythe cost of conducting business abroad as well as domestically— makers regarding its status quo immigration policies. companies can learn new foreign inputs to use in production. Obtaining PhDs and pursuing higher education in the This diffusion of ideas beneﬁts both countries. United States without applying those skills on the job would So why does it matter? The economic growth rebe of no use, so it is important to evaluate the contribution of sulting from increased immigration also increases US living immigrants to overall US competitiveness, technological innovastandards on the aggregate level. Production of new techtion, and economic growth. Almost any yardstick of economic nologies result in US capital and labor as a whole being more growth and technological entrepreneurship will point to improductive, resulting in outputs of all industries to increase. migrants providing positive economic beneﬁts. From a global perspective, the share of global demand met For instance, nearly 40 percent of the 2010 Fortune by US producers would rise, due to decreased input costs 500 companies were founded by immigrants or their children. and increased productions via technological innovation and Despite only making up 10 percent of the American population increased efﬁciency, but the composition of US output would since 1850, immigrants founded 90 of the Fortune 500 comparemain unchanged—no industry would grow at the expense of nies and children of immigrants founded another 114. And this is another. Plus, opening our doors to highly skilled immigrants a growing a trend: the newest Fortune 500 companies are more would result in hundreds of thousands of jobs for native likely to have an immigrant founder. Consider the 25-year pericitizens.7 Immigrant-founded Fortunate 500 companies alone od between 1985 and 2010. The companies formed during this employ close to 3.6 million people. So for those who argue period, which account for nearly 20 percent of that immigrants “steal” our jobs, think the Fortune 500, have an immigrant founder.4 The numbers are very clear: again. Others argue that immigration These companies include Apple, Google, AT&T, would decrease wages, and a simple lawe are pushing foreign Budweiser, Colgate, eBay, General Electric, IBM, bor supply/demand model would imply nationals away from the and McDonald’s, many of which are now global that an increase in supply of workers United States and feeding powerhouses. Better yet, these companies span should lead to a decline in wages, but them into our competitors’ nearly every sector, ensuring continued innothere are a few problems with this logic. economies. vation in a vast array of ﬁelds, including: aeroFirstly, there is currently no consensus space, defense, ﬁnance, Internet, consumer products, insurance, about wage impacts. And secondly, this assumes an increase electronics, hospitality, natural resources, and many others. in very low-skilled workers as well, whereas in this paper I am Here is the incredible part: these immigrant founded advocating for an increase in highly skilled immigrants, which, Fortune 500 companies earn a combined revenue of nearly as described above, would lead to an increase in economic $4.2 trillion, or approximately 30 percent of the United States’ growth and hence an increase in per capita GDP such that the GDP. In other words, 10 percent of America’s labor force is average person’s disposable income would rise. driving 30 percent of its economy (and this is a massive over You may ask what it is about immigrants that make approximation because that 10 percent also includes unskilled them so much more successful than our native citizens. There workers who do not contribute to entrepreneurship/innovais an intuitive answer to this question: it is not necessarily that tion). And the only reason immigrants account for 40 percent they are more skilled in the high-tech sectors. It is important to of Fortune 500 companies is because we are excluding an note that the United States only accounts for 5% of the world 5 enormous crowd of entrepreneurs with incredible skillsets. population, so there is a vast amount of untapped, latent talent This number could be much higher, and given that the Fortune in this world. Probabilistically, there is a much higher likelihood 500 companies account for nearly 73% of US GDP, there is of a foreigner (compared to a native American citizen) beunbelievable potential for these foreign nationals to accelerate ing able to spearhead a successful idea, so we should channel technological innovation and economic growth. those ideas into America, especially since we have the best This economic growth stems from a continual increase socio-politico-legal business environment for entrepreneurs. in total factor productivity, the biggest two components of And, some would argue, these immigrants are risk takers and which are technology growth and efﬁciency. Since foreignhard workers because they made a bold decision to leave their born nationals account for such a large percentage of the total home country to come to the US, and as such, they have an number of PhDs obtained at US universities, opening up our enormous incentive to succeed and support their families. It is doors to immigrants can result in a greater labor force devoted the mentality—the drive—that pushes them to reach their limits
and take the extra steps that many native American citizens would not. Should we not reward this perseverance, especially if it is driving our economy? The closest the United States has come to supporting caps on skilled immigration is when the House of Representatives voted with an overwhelming margin of 389 to 15 on the Fairness for High-Skilled Immigrants Act of 2011. Under current law, immigrants from a given country cannot acquire greater than 7 percent of the 140,000 green cards issued annually . This is unreasonable, especially when comparing the size of some European countries (whose population may be a few million people) to that of India or China (whose populations are close to 1.2 billion and rising). The legislation that passed the House a few months ago attempts to address these issues by removing the caps on high-skilled foreign immigration, allowing for a greater ﬂow of global talent. There are two major problems, though. First, is that while the legislation may remove the cap on how many people from a given country can apply for a green card, the total number of green cards dispensed will not change. This means that the U.S. would not be able to attract a greater number of foreign nationals, bringing us back to square one. And secondly, politics plays a huge role in immigration policy in Congress. After the House passed its legislation on Nov. 29, Senator Charles Grassley placed a hold on the bill, and the other Republicans seem to be in accordance with Grassley’s clear intention to block the bill. So without doubt, based on the progress of immigration policy in the last decade, attempting to push for progressive immigration policies in Congress is extremely politically volatile. Nevertheless, there is no reason that a bill that passed the House by an overwhelming margin cannot also pass in the Senate. The potential for change is there; our Senators just need to realize the beneﬁts of approving bipartisan immigration legislation—the health of the U.S. economy depends on it. Washington needs to address our immigration problems, and it can do so very simply by grants seeking to come to the United States. This would simply require that Congress remove the so-called “cap” on H1-B visas (which they do not even follow) and allow anyone entry into the United States if they will be employed in specialty occupations. This would mean that the U.S. would increase the total number of green cards dispensed. American science and technology PhD programs, in order to incentivize them to stay in the United States. Granted, these are two very politically volatile steps, but they are very feasible nonetheless. America can and needs to take these steps if it hopes to expand its economy, reduce unemployment, and raise living standards for its native citizens while simultaneously rewarding hard-working foreign nationals for their efforts and successes. Offering freedom to skilled immigrants is the ﬁrst step towards building a progressive policy for all types of immigrants—legal or illegal. We need to slowly work our way towards granting freedom to all immigrants, irrespective of their background, education, or status. The door for immigrants is right there in front of us—America just needs to open it.
ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT
PUBLIC-PRIVATE COLLABORATION TO IMPROVE GREEN INVESTMENT
Sophia Rogers The September 2011 bankruptcy of solar industry ﬁrm Solyndra aroused concern about government funding of green research and development. In 2009, Solyndra had received roughly $535 million in loans and grants from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. At that time Solyndra was growing rapidly and considered on the cutting edge of solar technology.1 Though Solyndra’s CEO Brian Harrison reported optimistically on the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial state in a June 2011 memo to the House Committee on Commerce and Energy, in September, Solyndra applied for bankruptcy, laying off over a thousand employees. Politicians quickly responded to the political scandal, in one of two ways. Republicans questioned whether federal tax revenue should be invested in developing alternative energy forms (such as), decrying Solyndra as having manipulated federal funding. Democrats were more concerned with why Solyndra failed after such a promising start. These competing viewpoints lead to a crucial question in energy policy: How can we encourage the success of innovative research and development without squandering taxpayer money? The federal government funds green research and development in a number of ways, some more risky than others. The American Recovery and Reconstruction Act, for instance, used $45 billion in spending provisions to fund renewable energy projects.2 Spending provisions included funding for Smart Grid Technology ($4.5 billion), Renewable R&D and Demonstration Projects ($16.8 billion), and the Renewable Energy Loan Guarantee Program ($6 billion). Tax incentives included the Production and Investment Tax Credits for wind, geothermal, biomass, hydro, landﬁll gas, waste-to-energy, and marine projects, and the Grant Program to which renewable energy project developers may apply. The Department of Energy’s loan guarantees program funds risky, innovative ﬁrms, some of which fail. Solyndra was one of these ﬁrms. Solyndra failed because it could no longer compete with less technologically advanced ﬁrms, such as those from China.3 The company developed a multi-faceted solar module consisting of one glass tube nested inside another with 150 solar cells inside. The module absorbed light from many angles and used a combination of metals instead of the standard silicon material which was in global shortage in the early years of the company. However, the capital intensive production process did not survive on the market. In order to continue funding private green research and development, the government must equal its monetary investment with a closer working partnership. Solyndra’s failure did not come out of nowhere; a closer partnership between expert energy economists and the company from its inception would have improved the company’s chances of success. The Department of Energy can collaborate with the White House’s
Ofﬁce of Energy (newly founded with the Obama administration) to work closely with renewable energy ﬁrms to ensure their success. Legislators can create energy subsidies and carbon taxes to make it easier for renewable energy ﬁrms to compete.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL CASE FOR CITY LIVING
Leah Reiss Problem Urban areas in America are more environmentally sustainable than the suburban sprawl that has dominated the housing development market since the end of World War II. Cities have lower rates of per capita consumption of energy and building materials due to their higher population densities and multiple-family dwellings. These populations also have easier accessibility to amenities through walking or public transportation, both of which reduce dependence on automobiles, thus reducing use of fossil fuels and pollution output.1 Suburban sprawl, on the other hand, can result in increased dependency on automobiles, higher levels of pollution output, and lower density communities with larger dwellings that require more building materials and energy to run appliances.2 Despite the fact that city living has a less harmful effect on the environment than suburban living, American cities have actually stopped growing. In fact, the major cities of the 50 largest urban areas gained 3.7 percent in population in the 1990s but declined 1.3 percent from 2000 to 2010 and 14 of the 15 most populous US cities either grew more slowly or declined in population in the past decade than in the 1990s.3 More signiﬁcantly, the majority of urban population loss, especially in inner-city neighborhoods, comes from the middle class. From 1970 to 2000 the proportion of metropolitan neighborhoods classiﬁed as middle classed declined from 58 percent to 41 percent, and the proportion of inner-city neighborhoods classiﬁed as middle-class declined from 44 percent to 23 percent.4 This is a serious problem because the middle class comprises the major base of the US economy. Therefore, without a signiﬁcant middle class population, cities can become places of an unstable, stratiﬁed environment consisting only of the wealthy and the poor, lose their primary economic base, and be less able to function economically. In order to try to get the United States moving in a direction towards environmental sustainability, the government and the cities must ﬁnd incentives to attract the middle class back to urban areas. The problem with this is that middle class families generally prefer living in suburbs to living in cities. Suburbs often provide better access to education, affordable housing, and amenities like green spaces, along with a greater perception of safe, comfortable, and healthy living than that which is provided in inner-city neighborhoods.5 In order for cities to overcome
population loss, they must create incentives that counterbalance the attractiveness of suburban living. Admittedly, several of these problems are very difﬁcult to attempt to mitigate with policy. For example, policy makers have been proposing solutions to the plight of inner-city public schools for years to little avail. However, changes can be implemented in cities if, instead of solely dwelling on reasons why people leave urban environments, policy focuses also on emphasizing and improving the aspects that draw families to urban environments. Solution Cities attract people because they provide access to cultural resources such as museums, theatres, and arenas; they offer a wide variety of retail options for modern consumers; they have networks of public transit which reduce a family’s transportation budget; and they have more job opportunities. Cities are unattractive because they are perceived as less child-friendly than suburbs, they are more densely populated, and housing is less available and more expensive. To try to solve these problems, the federal, state, and local branches of government must work together to create an urban policy strategy that will incentivize city living. This strategy should include: 1. Emphasizing reliance on public transportation by building on pre-existing public transit systems to make travel more convenient and less expensive. Public transportation would beneﬁt taxpayers, cities, and the green initiative alike. It is an industry that currently employs more than 400,000 people, so any increased development would only bring more jobs to cities and thus more people looking for work. Families that use public transit instead of automobiles can save more than $9,900 per year. For every $10 million invested, over $30 million is yielded in increased business sales. In addition, a household that switches to public transportation reduces gasoline consumption by 223 gallons per year and carbon dioxide emissions by more than 4,800 pounds per year.6 2. Changing the way loans and mortgages are distributed. Before the Great Depression about half of homeowners held mortgages for an average of three to ﬁve years. Currently, it is much easier for people to get loans if they choose to purchase a house in a suburb as a result of the creation of the Home Owners Loan Association (HOLA) and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) during the New Deal, which introduced the 15 and 20-year mortgages.7 This easier accessibility to loans was not granted to renters in urban areas, so families became less ﬁnancially capable of renting city apartments. These laws should be shifted so that they are less lenient for suburban homeowners and more helpful for metropolitan renters. In addition to allowing more families to afford city prices, this policy change might stop another housing bubble like the one that lead to the “Great Recession” from reoccurring due to out of control speculation.8 3. Changing building limitations in cities with regards to building heights and historic preservation districts. “In a fortystory building, a 1,200-square-foot unit is only using 30 square feet” of land.9 However, many cities today have complicated height limits, like Washington D.C.’s regulation that the height of a building must not exceed 20 feet more than the length of the street it faces.10 These confusing limitations severely limit the enormous potential in housing space created by building up. In addition, building restrictions on historically protected areas. For example, 15 percent of the non-parkland below Manhattan’s 96th Street is classiﬁed as an historic district.11 This means that anyone looking to make any external changes to this land must get approval by the Landmarks Commission. Though it is important to keep a city’s history alive, preservation cannot be extended to every historical building due to a city’s necessity to continue to grow in order to provide adequate housing. Lightening of these restrictions would free up building space that developers could use to build more housing units, thus lowering the average cost of living in cities. 4. Creating new green spaces in currently unused urban spaces like brown ﬁelds or abandoned lots. Parks are attractive to families with children so they can draw in new residents. In addition, if they are created in rundown areas that are mostly abandoned, this opens up the opportunity for developers to create affordable housing in conjunction with the parks in order to bring in an entirely new neighborhood population. Resistance Of course, these efforts will not go without resistance. Public transportation can be tricky to develop due to several factors. The particular geography and organization of each city requires a different transportation system for practically every city. Also, these efforts cost a lot of money, and though they pay off in the long run, it can be difﬁcult to muster the political will and the monetary capital to actually get these projects off the ground. With regards to suburban living, Americans will not give up the white picket fence and two car lifestyles to which they are accustomed without incentives. Any measure to try to limit automobile use is fated to gain vehement opposition, so it is best for policy to focus on making public transportation easier to use, rather than making cars less convenient to use. Attempting to lighten building restrictions is often accompanied by angry tenants who oppose any policy that would result in further development in areas of cities viewed as more neighborhood-like.12 People often attach sentiment to any area deemed historical, and such it will be difﬁcult to remove some of the protections surrounding these areas. Cities probably will not see the same level of opposition to the creation of green spaces because parks are generally appreciated both by current and future residents, and the urban administrations. The largest barrier to making any sort of progressive changes in cities is the fact that the state governments have ultimate authority over city governments; to paraphrase Dillon’s Rule, cities are creatures of the states.13 Conclusion Concerns about the United States’ contribution to environmental degradation are growing stronger each year.
Research shows that cities are more environmentally sustainable than suburbs, so the government (federal, local, and state) should be incentivizing movement of the middle class back in to urban areas, instead of the ever-expanding suburban sprawl. This can be accomplished by creating more convenient systems of public transportation in metropolitan areas, increasing availability of housing to lower the overall costs, increasing the ﬁnancing opportunities available to urbanites, and creating green spaces. Though proponents of this cause will encounter opposition in the forms of lack of political will, low availability of funding, and neighborhood crusaders, this cause is too important to be inhibited by apathy and misunderstanding of the reasoning behind the environmental importance of living in cities.
UNPAID INTERNS: AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN WORKFORCE
Sarah Scheinman Walk into an ofﬁce, phones are ringing, coffee is brewing, letters are being written and a friendly receptionist greets visitors at the door. Now imagine a world without interns, what will remain in this scenario? As internships become more and more commonplace - particularly among students aspiring for certain professions in ﬁelds where experience is crucial - the workplace grows more dependent upon free and/or cheap labor from its youngest members. Questions arise, perhaps most fundamental of all, is this practice legal?1 Society has imposed a system of highly suggested complimentary service on younger generations with the belief that this is a condition upon future employment. And legally, internships exploit loopholes in the minimum wage requirements that have been at the cornerstone of labor laws since the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the passage of New Deal legislation meant to protect workers. I will examine the problem with the advent of unpaid internships; I will discuss the use of misclassiﬁcation as a means of excluding interns and stipended workers from salary as well as workplace protections. Additionally, I will consider the consequences of misclassiﬁcation – the lack of regulation and greater economic implications for undervaluing work. I will consider the obstacles to passing legislative reforms, I will draw conclusions regarding the legality of this behavior and ﬁnally, I will propose a remedy meant to place restrictions on companies that use unpaid interns to perform work that would have otherwise been paid while rewarding student workers with pay. My goal is to recommend a solution that’s purpose is twofold; to curtail the growth of unpaid internships and to regulate their practice under the law. Widespread unpaid internships are a relatively new phenomenon in American society, and they’ve expanded rapidly given the recent economic downturn. Ross Perlin, in his book, Intern Nation, claims unpaid internships are ﬂourishing and saving companies more than $600 million annually in the current economic climate.2 His claims are supported by statistics, a survey conducted by researchers at Northwestern University found that between 1992 and 2008 the number of students that had worked an unpaid internship nearly tripled from 17% to 50%.3 Gone are the days of apprenticeships where shadowprojects yielded work. For white-collar worker aspirants, unpaid internships offer little to no wages with zero guarantees of post-internship employment. For unpaid interns, the issue is one of misclassiﬁcation. By labeling unpaid interns as volunteers or trainees, they do not fall within the general deﬁnition of employee located in the text of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. As a result, unpaid interns are not entitled to the workplace protections given to employees. The FLSA deﬁnes the
term “employ” very broadly, employees are those “who are ‘suffered or permitted’ to work [and therefore they] must be compensated under the law for the services they perform for an employer.”4 Yet, the current legal standard for unpaid work is based on Walling v. United States, a 1947 Supreme Court decision regarding blue-collar apprenticeships. In Walling, the Supreme Court held that the FLSA deﬁnition of “employ” does not make all persons employees who, without any express or implied compensation agreement, may work for their own advantage on the premises of another.5 Consequently, unpaid interns or strictly stipended workers of contemporary society are excluded from protections under the FLSA.6 Misclassiﬁcation as a means of exclusion has precedent. When the National Labor Relations Act was passed in 1935, Southern legislators agreed to the bill with the condition that agricultural and domestic workers (a predominantly AfricanAmerican workforce) were not entitled to the protections guaranteed by law to all other workers.7 And in 1947, TaftHartley sought to curb labor advances by excluding supervisors and independent contractors from NLRA provisions, through misclassiﬁcation, thus making them unable to form a union and bargain collectively. By merely changing a title, victims of misclassiﬁcation lose their claims to what Nelson Lichtenstein has called Industrial Democracy, the right to have your voice heard in the workplace. Without a salary, unpaid interns are not safeguarded with employment discrimination and sexual harassment laws. For interns, laws like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disability Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and many others that protect workers against racial, gender, disability, and age discrimination, simply do not apply. Unpaid interns are not entitled to protections nor are they rewarded with salary; without a contract to rely on or look to for legal protections, unpaid interns have no guarantees of receiving anything at the close of the internship. There are economic and social consequences for an increased reliance on interns as well. Unpaid summer internships are biased towards students with ﬁnancial security because they require three months of forgone wages as well as travel, housing, and other living expenses. Low-income students are either denied the opportunity to participate in these experiences, or must take on signiﬁcant debt in order to receive the same professional advantages as their higher income peers. Unpaid internships effectively institutionalize socioeconomic disparities by widening the opportunity gap from the early years of employment. Furthermore, the use of unpaid interns at companies permits (and even incentivizes) the replacement of regular workers with unpaid college students and recent graduates. As a result, unpaid internships actually decrease employment opportunities for paid workers because their jobs are being done for free. To combat the growing problem of unpaid internships the Department of Labor put forward updated regulations for unpaid workers. In 2010, the DOL issued a new set of guidelines titled Fact Sheet #71: Internship Programs Under the
FLSA.8 The DOL explained, in order for an unpaid internship to be legal, it must serve an educational purpose for the intern and cannot replace a paid position; this will be determined with the application of six new criteria: more, unpaid interns are forced to contend with cultural cohesion that exists in opposition to labor and creates a political system that is averse to worker gains. This cohesion coupled with a heterogeneous working class with deep rifts between workers and the general public, a political climate is fomented 1. The internship, even though it includes actual operation that simply cannot suit the interests of workers.13 American poof the facilities of the employer, is similar to training which would litical institutions are not well suited to grant beneﬁts to labor. be given in an educational environment; In addition to the multitude of obstacles, the lack of 2. The internship experience is for the beneﬁt of the inpolitical will pervades all discussions of reform. Despite exemptern; tions for the government and non-proﬁts, United States Congress has no incentives for 3. The intern does not displace regBy labeling unpaid interns changing the current system.14 And internalular employees, but works under close as volunteers or trainees, ly, a lack of solidarity among unpaid interns supervision of existing staff; they do not fall within the makes the prospect of organizing student general deﬁnition of employ- workers highly improbable. Unpaid interns 4. The employer that provides the ee located in the text of the lack a shared experience in the workplace training derives no immediate advantage Fair Labor Standards Act of and many see each other as competition as from the activities of the intern; and on 1938. occasion its operations may actually be opposed to fellow vulnerable laborers. As impeded; a result, strategic political alliances like those that led to the passage of labor reforms during the New Deal 5. The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the simply cannot exist in modern political discourse, and thus conclusion of the internship; and provide a large impediment towards organizing in opposition 6. The employer and the intern understand that the into unpaid internships.15 Finally, much like the predicament for tern is not entitled to wages for the time spent in the internship. workers in the face of globalization, employers may wield the Despite these positive steps towards reining in harmful threat of ridding their ranks of unpaid interns if forced to comunpaid internship practices, these criteria prove problematic ply with regulations, thus ending the practice of giving students to enforce; they are subjective, require regulation or at least work experience to enhance future job prospects. some basic oversight, and are without penalties. Put simply, Beyond the aforementioned challenges, I believe the EPI’s the current solution does not go far enough. The Economic proposal is hampered by the lack of authority possessed by all Policy Institute recommends replacing these criterion disgovernment bureaucracies burdened with oversight. Furtherseminated by the DOL with a cost-beneﬁt standard. This new more, it is difﬁcult to fairly gauge the costs incurred versus the test would compare the per-hour cost to the employer of an beneﬁts reaped for businesses that use unpaid interns, and intern (through supervision and training) relative to the perthese metrics vary on a case-by-case basis. I believe we need hour beneﬁt to the employer of an intern (through an intern’s a broader solution. Legally, all workplace protections should production).9 If the cost exceeds the beneﬁt, than the student be amended to include volunteers and student interns, this would qualify as an intern and FLSA wage protections would was proposed as part of the EPI plan as well. Congress should not apply. If the beneﬁt exceeds the cost, then the student is include student workers, volunteers, and trainees in the FLSA, simply replacing work that the employer would have already the NLRA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and other relevant paid a regular worker to perform, and the student should be legislation. Because of the current discourse and discord in compensated as an “employee” under the FLSA.10 The EPI also American politics, Congressional legislation to include student proposes a series of institutional changes that seek to include interns may prove impossible, politically. In order to remedy student workers in the provisions and protections for employthese problems, I propose the usage of Executive Powers and ees. the President issuing an Executive Order to enact the regulaWhile the recommendations of the EPI put forth a bluetory component, much like the Executive Orders 8802 and print for reform, there are great obstacles to organizing and 10988 signed by FDR and JFK respectively.17 enacting political change targeted at unpaid internships. HistoriThe second and far more complicated issue—is that of cally, workers have struggled to achieve gains within American salaries and payment. While stipends are sometimes used political institutions given America’s individualist ideology that to allay the costs of working (transportation, food, housing), at times is incompatible with the goals of organizing campaigns these payments are not enough.18 Concerns over fomenting a and collective bargaining.11 The focus on the role of employers workforce permanently relegated to wages below the povand claim that management holds exceptional power to create erty line pose a considerable worry, however, new laws must a hostile terrain for labor, through methods like employer require all workers to receive salaries that equal to or above mobilization and strict legal parameters for union behavior.12 minimum wage, in compliance with federal and state employThere is undoubtedly an uphill political battle that must be ment laws. With this two-pronged approach to combating the waged in order to reform the use of unpaid interns. Furtherproblem of unpaid internships—through legal and economic
means—we have the opportunity to ensure that society’s newest workers are rewarded for their work while allowing their ambition to ﬂourish. These proposed rules and regulations for unpaid internships might play a pivotal role in employment opportunity in America. Since employers will be obligated to compensate interns with salaries, the actual work completed by interns will be more valuable to companies since they will make a ﬁnancial commitment to each intern. Additionally, paying interns would discourage the replacing of employees with unpaid workers. Indeed, companies may even hold onto their employees for longer, because they cannot be replicated with a free workforce. Finally, by protecting workers, America will be ensuring the workplace is a more equal and fair environment for all its citizens. a chance that a candidate will have a scandal or change his/her viewpoints.5 Also, absentee ballots are sometimes not counted unless a race is very close.6 A simple solution that could help expand America’s voter turnout, especially because it is about 23% lower than in other developed democracies, would be to hold elections on Saturdays and Sundays.7 Opponents of this plan say that it would cost too much money, because election ofﬁcials would have to be paid double (for working two days instead of one), but if polls were open for half the time each day, approximately 6.5 hours depending on the state, the government would not be required to pay more and a much wider variety of people would have the opportunity to vote. This would not only make it easier for people who work on the weekdays to vote, but it would also allay the concerns of religious people who may not be able to vote on one of the two days of the weekend. Considering that the United States gets on average a 56.8% voter turnout in each presidential election, it’s clear that voting on Tuesdays is not promoting democracy within this country.8 Voting on Tuesdays discriminates against the working class, it hurts our American democratic system and it ridicules the premise that everyone gets a vote in the United States. Politicians need to take accountability for this broken system. The Weekend Voting Act was recently reintroduced in Congress and it deserves bipartisan support.9 Politicians of all parties should be able to rally behind a change that would make American politics more democratic and less discriminatory for all.
THE CASE FOR WEEKEND VOTING
Kendall Hope Tucker Voting on Tuesdays in the United States is an antiquated and inherently discriminatory practice. Employees who work long hours, travel for work, or hold multiple jobs, are often unable to take time out of their day to go vote. Those who are paid hourly wages often feel as though they can’t afford to take time off to spend an hour at the polling station. This skews the electorate so that working class people become disenfranchised and don’t get equal representation for their views and ideas.1 As the 2012 primary season showed, even though voting usually happens in the United States on Tuesdays, it doesn’t have to. South Carolina’s Republican presidential primary was held on Saturday, January 21st and Louisiana’s was on Saturday, March 24. Similarly, many caucus states opted out of Tuesday as their state’s Election Day.2 Most elections are held on Tuesdays because this originally ﬁt better with the agrarian calendar that dominated 19th century American life. According to the non-proﬁt organization “Why Tuesday?”, it could take people in the 1850s over a day to travel to their polling stations, and as a result of this, voting had to take place on Tuesdays or Wednesdays so that people would be home in time for church on Sunday. Wednesdays were market days, so Tuesday was the day chosen by default.3 The California Voter Foundation did a study on why people don’t vote and found that about one quarter of voters identiﬁed as infrequent or unregistered replied that they don’t vote because they are too busy on a weekday.4 The spokesman for the foundation said that the answer to this problem was to try and inform more people about the advantages of early voting or voting by absentee ballot. This won’t be an effective solution to the problem, though, because absentee and early voting faces a variety of its own problems. For example, early voters do not have the same amount of information about candidates as voters who vote on Election Day. In the time between an early voter casts his/her vote and the election, there is always
FIXING THE FEDERALIZED IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM
Philip Verma Since the passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), a militarized immigration enforcement system has developed in the United States. From 1986 to 2002, the Border Patrol’s budget increased tenfold, tripling the number of guards on the U.S.-Mexico border and implementing new surveillance technologies.1 Immigration enforcement now costs the federal government $17 billion annually and has shown no effect in reducing the number of undocumented immigrants in the country, the ostensible purpose of such policy.2 These policies, combined with a piecemeal border wall, have created a heavily-militarized frontier between Mexico and the U.S. Policy approaches to limiting illegal immigration rooted in border patrol have failed in part because most undocumented immigrants in this country did not cross the border illegally but rather overstayed their visas. The strict Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) therefore included a controversial provision known as Section 287(g) which authorized the Immigration and Naturalization Service—now Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—to train municipal police members to identify and detain undocu-
mented immigrants stopped during normal police activities. the event of robbery, sexual assault, domestic abuse, and other IIRIRA also added the category of “aggravated felony” to the crimes. It also reduces the likelihood of community cooperation Immigration and National Act which carried severe consequenc- in the event of a police investigation. These programs isolate, es for immigrants and asylees in the country, including deporta- divide and terrorize immigrant communities and are antithetition. This broad range of crimes included murder, rape, drug cal to the stated goal of combating crime. Local police forces trafﬁcking, illegal entry into the country; even so-called “crimes have also described S-Comm as an intrusion on local authority; of moral turpitude” like jumping a turnstile and shoplifting fell although the Obama administration initially claimed that states into the category of aggravated felony.3 could opt out of the program, it quickly backtracked, requiring According to most outside reviews, training for police them to participate without providing any additional federal forces that contracted with ICE was minimal to non-existent.4 funding.9 The law thus empowered these police to stop and detain Secure Communities is a fundamentally problematic proindividuals without educating them at all about discretion or the gram that channels anti-immigrant politics and encourages the limitations of their authority. Given the well-documented hisproﬁling and intrusive policing of immigrant and Latino commutory of racial proﬁling by police—NYPD’s practice of “stop and nities. Both it and 287(g) should be suspended immediately and frisk” and its targeting of Muslim communities serve as prime local police should be educated of these changes so that proﬁlexamples—the devolution of immigration enforcement was a ing does not continue anyway. Cooperation between ICE, im5 dangerous and irresponsible precedent. It bears striking simimigrants’ rights groups and local police to produce a pamphlet larities in practice, if not in law, to recent xenophobic state bills on the limitations of police authority would ease this education in Arizona and Alabama, which allow the police to use “reason- process. The stated goal of current immigration enforcement able suspicion” to stop and check individuals for papers. policy is to deport only criminal immigrants without escalating President Obama, who promised immigration reform dur- costs. S-Comm mandates information-sharing as soon as the ing his 2008 campaign, has pushed a new form of federalized individual in question is arrested, long before they are even immigration enforcement in the “Secure Communities” program, charged or tried for their crime. Direct federal-local enforceoften nicknamed S-Comm. An ironic name for a program of mass ment partnerships under 287(g) should be eliminated entirely deportation, it uses biometric data sharing between federal, and S-Comm should be amended to only investigate individuals state and local agencies to detain and deport who are convicted of a crime, excluding undocumented immigrants who are arrested. the “aggravated felonies” invented by The law thus empowered The stated goal is to only deport criminal imIIRIRA. Undocumented immigrants conthese police to stop and migrants, leaving most of the twelve million victed of a crime that would earn more detain individuals without individuals here without papers. And unlike than two years jail time would be deporteducating them at all about able but all others would be exempt from 287(g), S-Comm does not ofﬁcially deputize discretion or the limitations the purview of such a program. This ICE’s enforcement authority, only its data. of their authority. However, there have been numerous probwould reduce police incentive to racially lems with the program. As of 2011, 26% of proﬁle for immigration checks and would the 142,000 removed through S-Comm had no criminal charges, prohibit indeﬁnite detention of immigrants awaiting the status indicating a ﬂawed database or an overzealous police future.6 of their criminal case. A second criticism of the program is that it incentivizes racial The U.S. immigration system is in need of overhaul; fedproﬁling. Even though the program does not encourage ofﬁcers eral, state and local governments should seriously consider the to stop people suspected of being undocumented (as Arizona’s efﬁcacy and humanity of “tough on immigration” policies. FederSB1070 did), giving police an active role in immigration enforce- alized enforcement, privatized detention centers and militarized ment opens the door to proﬁling, particularly of Latinos. Police border controls have created what many have called a “deforces already have spotty history of targeting Blacks and La- portation dragnet,” detaining and deporting masses of people, tinos, particularly for drug possession; immigration authority including college students, hard-working parents, individuals should not be added to their purview. Signiﬁcantly, S-Comm with mental illnesses, and even a few U.S. citizens. The private investigations begin after someone is arrested; they need not prison industry has something to do with this; the powerful be formally charged or convicted. Unclear guidelines from ICE Corrections Corporation of America which runs more than 60 to local authorities and uneven federal oversight have only aug- detention centers and prisons around the country lobbied for mented these problems.7 the passage of Arizona’s now-infamous immigration law.10 The Immigrants’ rights groups have not been the only group more people locked up, the greater the proﬁts are for executo criticize S-Comm, 287(g) and other federal-local partnertives and shareholders. Given that funding for detention centers ships. Local law enforcement have also come out against these comes from taxpayers, the government should work to end programs, claiming that they reduce immigrant communities’ these private-public partnerships that incentivize immigrant 8 conﬁdence in the police. Whether this is the sole cause of apprehension. Obviously though, this is part of a larger probmistrust cannot be said, but when immigration status can be lem of a prison-industrial system that incentivizes incarceration checked easily, individuals might be reluctant to call the police in and prolonged detention and cannot be solved with a single
change in immigration policy. Fixing Secure Communities, the current cornerstone of federal-local enforcement policy, would constitute a small but signiﬁcant step in the greater struggle for immigrant rights. these laws, but a system of incarceration that is ineffective and detrimental to society as a whole. Not only the system of incarceration, but the injustice and prejudice surrounding those who have been released creates an environment where formerly productive and contributive members of society are prevented from leading successful lives as a result of continued addictions and an inability to employ themselves in legitimate jobs. Methodology Throughout this paper, I will look at the forces behind the reconsideration of the Rockefeller Drug Laws, both theoretical and political. For the past several decades, reform advocates have used a combination of statistically supported data on incarceration ineffectiveness for substance abuse and drug related crime, economically grounded facts on the exorbitant costs of the NYS prison system and evidence that the laws are racially biased, to support their opinions. I reviewed literature from major reformers, as well as newspaper articles reﬂecting public opinion and sentiment during the periods of reform to reﬂect on the sources that spurred the reformation of the Rockefeller Drug Laws. I also conducted two interviews with members from the “Drop the Rock” coalition: Robert Gangi, director of the Correctional Association of New York and Beatriz Torres, a social worker with the Appellate Defender’s ofﬁce in New York City. Gangi’s interview offered personal insight as well as major political forces in reform efforts while Torres’ conversation revealed information on the effects of the reforms on New York prisoners once they have been released. The Rockefeller Drug Laws The infamous New York State Rockefeller Drug Laws of May 8, 1973 reﬂect the national sentiment of the time; a return to law and order in a society that was falling pray to the post-Vietnam War drug culture of the 1960’s. The law’s author, Nelson A. Rockefeller, stood ﬁrm on drug law enforcement as a tactic to reinforce his conservative platform for a possible presidential nomination: “law-and-order credentials for a likely nomination campaign against Reagan, who pioneered the conservative turn in sentencing reform.”7 These laws were also an attempt by Governor Rockefeller to cater to public opinion, regardless of whether or not their fears were entirely rational. Attorney General Eric Schneiderman, politically one of the most outspoken representative for reform of the Rockefeller laws, in his speech in support of the bill in 2009 that would reform the laws remarks: “It all started with an effort to pander to the public’s fears.”8 In fact, as a liberal-leaning Republican, Governor Rockefeller had previously supported rehabilitative treatment programs for drug users as opposed to incarceration. In 1967, Rockefeller created the Narcotic Addiction and Control Commission in aimed at helping addicts get clean; a program that was quickly deemed costly and in-effective.9 Weiman and Weiss show that Rockefeller’s budget priorities “demonstrated a ﬁrm commitment to drug-rehabilitation programs and the underlying view that treatment, not incarceration, was the appropriate cure for petty drug dealers.”10 Unfortunately,
THE REFORMATION OF THE ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAWS
Juliana Colangelo Introduction “A long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superﬁcial appearance of being right,” wrote Thomas Paine when he called for civil disobedience against monarchy.1 A similar argument can be made against the tactics used to address substance abuse over the past several decades. Since the 1970’s, politicians have taken a hard line, through punitive criminal-justice policies, against drug use and crime.2 However, as shown by increasing incarceration rates of non-violent drug offenders under the Rockefeller Drug Laws, the system is working in an ineffective manner, targeting low-level drug users rather than violent, high-level dealers. For instance, there are currently 12,000 members of the New York State incarceration system convicted under the Rockefeller Drug Laws, most of them non-violent offenders and in 2008, 40% of the 5,191 persons convicted of non-violent drug crime were sentenced solely for possession, not selling. In addition, in 2009 about 50% of drug offenders were convicted of the three lowest level crimes, which involve minute drug amounts such as a ½ gram of cocaine for a class D felony.3 During the past decade, politicians in New York State have ﬁnally decided to work towards reforming one of the most problematic examples of incarcerationbased drug policy: the Rockefeller Drug Laws, born in a world of fear surrounding addiction and drug use and reformed under the pretenses of injustice, unnecessary massive expenditures and ineffectiveness. Even today, the scientiﬁc and societal depth of knowledge on drug abuse, addiction, human neurology and the effectiveness of a criminal solution to drug use has seen little progress over the past three decades. Therefore, laws such as the Rockefeller Drug Laws are largely based on “presumed rationality.”3 Evidence has proven that the Rockefeller Laws cannot be correlated with the decrease in crime that occurred in New York during the 1990’s. In fact, the number of people in prison for drug related offenses began to decrease during the 1990’s when the general crime rate began to drop.5 In addition, there has been no signiﬁcant reduction in substance addiction and use in New York since the passage of the Rockefeller laws. A government report from 2002 found that drug use by state prison inmates in the month before their offense increased between 1991 and 1997 from 50 percent in 1991 to 57 percent in 1997.6 Based on presumed knowledge, can we allow the continued unfair persecution of citizens as well as the waste of millions of tax-payer’s dollars that is a result of the New York incarceration system? We must continue to reform not only
given the realities of the early 1970’s heroine and violent-crime dicted offenders who need help.”18 Dunne’s statement, reportepidemic as proven by increasing homicide rates and the failure ed in 2000, represented a widespread sentiment among many of the Narcotic Addiction and Control Commission, Rockefeller New Yorkers concerned by the laws. Two series of reforms occreated laws that would in theory both punish high-level drug curred in the New York State Legislature: ﬁrst in December of dealers and provide rehabilitative services for low level drug 2004 and August of 2005 (legislation referred to as the 2006 dealers who sold primarily to support their own habits.11 Howreforms) and again in March 2009. ever in reality, these laws would prove to be far from rehabilitaWell before the 2004/5 reforms, newspapers were tive and targeted at low-level rather than high-level dealers. In publishing articles and opinion pieces on the shortcomings of part, the passage of these laws was a way for Rockefeller as the Rockefeller Drug Laws, raising social awareness and public a liberal-leaning Republican to reassert his clout amongst the opinion on the issue. One editorial from the 1977 New York hard-line Republican party and prove that he was not soft on Times quotes, “The ineffectiveness of Governor Rockefeller’s crime, especially considering his presidential aspirations. hard-line, hard drug law illuminates two vexatious problems: the At the time, the Rockefeller Drug Laws were the nation’s drug trafﬁc and the criminal justice system..neither susceptible harshest drug policies, giving Rockefeller more clout for the pos- to the quick dramatic ﬁx.”19 Early articles also comment on the sibility of a Republican presidential nomination, however other inability of the laws to target big-time, high-level drug dealstates quickly followed suit and imposed similarly severe laws. ers. “The laws have increasingly meant long sentences for the For example, in 1978 Michigan enacted the “650-Lifer law” which addicts and small-scale pushers.”20 Articles such as these prove had similar provisions to the Rockefeller that the sentiment for the irrationality and laws, including life imprisonment without ineffectiveness of the Rockefeller Laws was On March 25, 2009 Govthe possibility of parole as punishment for apparent, even as early as four years after 12 ernor Paterson signed into drug crimes. Politically, these laws were a the laws were passed. Public political opinion law a new series of reforms, and action against the laws did not come as way for conservative politicians to bolster written by Assemblyman their political status with panicked middleearly, as politicians were afraid to appear soft Jeff Aubrey titled Assembly on crime. class constituents who were worried about Bill (A.6085). crime rates, as a result of media sensationOne politician who did come out alism concerning the drug problem, which early for reform was then Governor Mario exaggerated the United States drug probCuomo who argued that New York State lem.13 At the expense of ethnic-racial minorities in urban areas, could no longer afford to maintain the mass imprisonment of politicians such as Rockefeller installed legislation that would in- low-level drug abusers and dealers. Cuomo’s argument was not crease incarceration rates in order to appease middle class con- as inﬂuential because it was seen as sacriﬁcing public safety for cerns.14 ﬁscal panic.21 Political arguments would have to go beyond a ﬁsImmediately following the passage of the Rockefeller laws, cal crisis to prove to citizens that not only were the Rockefeller incarceration rates for inmates on drug violations increased Laws costing outrageous amount of money to tax-payers, but only marginally, from 11 percent to 12 percent of the totally they were also ineffective and there were cheaper and more prison population between 1972 and 1977.15 According to effective alternatives to dealing with substance abuse, issues Vanessa Barker’s study of pragmatic politics, this initial minimal that would arise to support the two major series of reforms. increase can be attributed to the local criminal-justice authorAs Mr. Gangi said: “people (in my political assessment) won’t ity’s reluctance to enforce the law, as they saw it as “wasteful care about cost of prisons if they think it is making them safer and unproductive.”16 But a shift occurred in the 1980’s with the because they will pay a high price for safety, but if you are able escalation of the war on drugs, shown by Governor Carey’s to make the case that it’s (prison) not working and that you increased budget for prison construction, state prosecutors and could be safer through other means that are cheaper and more local law enforcement. The results were a felony drug arrest humane: that’s a very strong argument.”22 This argument would rate that more than doubled between 1979 and 1984, a trend prove to be extremely inﬂuential, particularly for the 2009 that continued throughout the 80’s and into the 90’s.17 reforms when ﬁscal tensions were at an all time high. Drug Law Reform Despite high rates of arrest since the implementation of the Rockefeller Drug Laws, the rehabilitative intentions of Mr. Rockefeller have not proven to be effective. John Dunne, former Republican senator one of the original sponsors of the laws, has admitted “beyond any shadow of a doubt that these laws are not working. “The Rockefeller Drug Laws have failed to achieve their goals. Instead they have handcuffed our judges, ﬁlled our prisons to dangerously overcrowded conditions, and denied sufﬁcient drug treatment alternatives to nonviolent ad2004 Reforms The ﬁrst series of reforms in 2004 and 2005 were only a pre-cursor to more signiﬁcant reforms that would occur in 2009. On December 14, 2004 Governor Pataki signed into law the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA), N.Y. Laws Ch. 738. These laws made several changes to the laws: reduced the minimum penalty for conviction on A-I felonies (the most serious crimes) from 15 years-life to a minimum of 8 years-20 years, doubled the weight threshold for the two most serious possession offenses (A I and AII), allowed those serving life sentences to
apply for re-sentencing and eliminated life sentencing, increased funding for in-prison drug treatment programs, reformed parole practices stating that after three years parole must be terminated for a person convicted under the Rockefeller laws and the original indeterminate sentencing scheme was replaced with a determinate sentencing scheme that reduced mandatory minimum prison sentences for non-violent felony drug offenders.23 The political sentiment surrounding the 2004 and 2005 reforms was crucial to their success in the New York State legislature. First, prior to taking ofﬁce in January of 1995, Governor Pataki was quoted as saying “it was time to reform Rockefeller drug laws”, the importance of his rhetoric, despite his lack of action on the issue, was that in adopting a drug law reform mantle he helped to take political sting out of the issue.24 Second, for the ﬁrst time in New York State politics a politician faced defeat for his lack of support for the repeal of the Rockefeller Drug Laws shown in the election of David Soares to the position of District Attorney in Albany County. The Soares election sent a political message to the legislature and Joe Bruno, head of the NY senate, that Rockefeller reform legislation was crucial.25 His election also showed that prosecutors as well as defendants were advocating for reform. Community support from coalitions such as Drop the Rock and the Drug Policy Alliance were particularly important as the impetus behind the ﬁrst series of reforms. These reforms were the result of persistent, organized and informed resistance from multiple key players in the political, religious and correctional justice realm. Individuals played a key role in reform as well. Robert Gangi, director of the Correctional Association of New York, is one of the pioneers for reform efforts and director of the “Drop the Rock” a coalition dedicated to the downsizing of the New York State prison statement and the repeal of the Rockefeller Drug Laws since 2000.26 In addition, church groups such as the council of churches of NYC and the Catholic church were extremely supportive as well as other organizations such as the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU), the Drug Policy Alliance and the Legal Action Center. Further, support from publications such as the New York Times, the Albany Times Union, TIME magazine and Newsday have been crucial for the success of reforms as a means for exposing the story to the public.27 In addition, leading up to the 2004 reforms, the inﬂuence of minority voters was felt more strongly. “But in recent years, there has been a growing consensus that the laws are too harsh, a position that, not coincidentally, was highlighted during election years as all side have sought to appeal to black and Latino constituents, whose leaders have been most vocal in demanding changes in the laws.”28 These sentiments were particularly relevant for Democratic politicians who were most often representatives for minority communities. Therefore it comes as no surprise that some of the most vehement opposition to the dissolution of the Rockefeller laws consistently came from Republican politicians. Efforts by Republicans such as Governor Pataki in 2004 to reform the laws were more of a way to appease the opposition, rather than create signiﬁcant change.29 However, the 2004 and 2005 reforms were a fairly conservative measure passed mostly to just appease reform advocates.30 Indeed, the reforms left a lot to be desired by reformers. A primary concern for advocates like Gangi was that people would think monumental change had occurred when this was really not the case. “Our political concern was that headlines would read “laws are changed” and people would think “we changed the laws and we no longer have to focus on the issue” when this really was not the case.”31 Some reformers, such as the Drug Policy Alliance saw the passage of these reforms as substantial, coming from the view-point that the laws must be broken down bit by bit and that “any deal was better than no deal.”32 Yet, many key reforms were still missing. Daily News reporter Juan Gonzales reports in 2004 shortly after the ﬁrst set of reforms were passed: “They rejected calls for new money for drug treatment programs. They refused to give back to judges some discretion in arrests, proof that further reform legislation was necessary.”33 In addition, one of the most detrimental components of the laws still remained: mandatory sentencing, which took away judicial discretion when it came to sentencing. 2009 Reforms The primary grounds for reform and repeal of the laws prior to 2009 stood the same: they were expensive and wasteful, ineffective, responsible for egregious mis-carriages of justice particularly against minority populations and still included a mandate for minimum sentencing. As then Senator Schneiderman remarked in a congressional debate on the bill that would ultimately lead to the 2009 reforms, “This is not a matter of soft on crime. This is a matter of SMART on crime.”34 On March 25, 2009 Governor Paterson signed into law a new series of reforms, written by Assemblyman Jeff Aubrey titled Assembly Bill (A.6085). The new reforms created an entire series of change with a few very poignant points. First, it restored partial judicial discretion for non-violent offenders, giving judges the power to divert some people into substance abuse treatment or other community-based programs. At an attempt to target high-level dealers the reforms enhanced penalties for major drug trafﬁckers and those who sell to children.35 The bill provided for retroactive relief for those sentenced under the old version of the Rockefeller sentencing scheme. Most importantly, the bill focused on the rehabilitative aspects of substance abuse by creating re-entry planning services for those in prison such as services to improve medical and housing assistance upon release, expanding eligibility criteria for state inmates to qualify for medical parole and streamlines the medical parole application process,36 establishing a “crime reduction fund” for the purposes of funding prevention and treatment services37 and calling for a greater role for the State’s Ofﬁce of Alcohol and Substance Abuse Services (OASAS) in monitoring and guiding drug treatment programs in the prisons.38 Using a quote made by Mr. Gangi, the 2009 reforms were a results of a political atmosphere in which “the stars were aligned”: Governor Patterson was a Democrat with a
history of supporting reform and repeal of the laws, the state Senate was in democratic hands and Sheldon Silver and the state assembly were in support of reforms. In addition, coalitions such as Drop the Rock had worked to get a petition with over 30,000 signatures for reform in addition to organizing a rally, which was heavily reported by the news and press, in March of 2009 right before the passage of the reforms.39 As a result, politicians sought to be seen as pro-Rockefeller drug reform to reﬂect the popular sentiment of the time; it was seen as a “badge of political honor” to support reform, especially in a democratic political atmosphere whereas before it had been a third-world political issue that nearly all politicians were reluctant to touch, even those who felt extremely passionate about the issue.40 As opposed to the 2006 reforms, Democratic politicians played a much greater role in the 2009 reforms due to the political clout the issue now had. Then Senator and Chariman of the Senate Codes Committee, which oversees criminal justice matters, on an interview with NY1 on the 2009 reforms stated: “Not because of policy but because of politics.”41 Politicians such as Jeff Aubrey, long-time Assemblyman and Chairman of the Assembly Standing Committee on Correction as well as author of the 2009 Rockefeller law reforms and Speaker of the New York State Assembly Sheldon Silver42 have also played key roles in reform efforts. On January 22, 2009 during opening remarks for the New Directions for New York conference held at the New York Academy of Medicine, January 22-23, 2009, Silver remarked: “I am proud to tell you, on behalf of my Assembly Majority colleagues that this year – 2009 – is the year we will ﬁnally enact real reform of the Rockefeller Drug Laws.”43 Malcolm Smith, Senate Majority Leader, was also extremely inﬂuential. Remarking on his commitment to the issue, then Senator Schneiderman remarked: “This happened because we had every democratic vote and Malcolm Smith made sure of that.”44 This type of commitment from politicians, ampliﬁed by positive news coverage by both newspapers and television channels, was crucial to the success of the reforms.In addition, democratic politicians such as Schniederman used the example of the election of President Obama as an argument for a state that was ready for change.45 Obama’s presidency was so inﬂuential because he too was pushing for drug law reform but on a national level. In the summer of 2010, Obama signed a bi-partisan bill closing the gap between prison sentences for those who use powder cocaine and those using crack cocaine, spurred by a Justice department review of sentencing guidelines.46 This proves that not only was political atmosphere crucial on a federal level, but on a national one as well. Governor Paterson’s role in the 2009 reforms was particularly crucial. In his January State of the State address, Paterson said: “I can’t think of a criminal justice strategy that has been more unsuccessful than the Rockefeller Drug Laws.”47 The racial component of the Rockefeller Laws was especially a pressing issue for African-American politicians like Paterson because the laws were an egregious example of the racism that is present in the United States criminal justice system. In fact, every year New York State locks up more black and Latino people on drug charges than black and Latino people graduate from institutions of higher education.48 For Paterson, when he was still considering running for re-election, supporting reform was crucial for securing a more stable voting base, particularly amongst African-American voters.49 Even more inﬂuential than his words, was Paterson’s history as an opponent to the laws. In 2002, then Senate Minority leader Paterson was arrested in an act of civil disobedience when protesting the Rockefeller Laws in front of Governor Pataki’s Midtown ofﬁces.50 Further, in 2004 when the ﬁrst set of reforms was passed Paterson said he felt the legislation “Didn’t make any kind of difference.”51 Despite these factors, the primary proponents for change within the legislature were holdovers from former Governor Spitzer’s term. There was a lack of communication between Paterson and his people in the legislature, mostly prosecutors, who were taking a hard line against reform. As a result, Gangi and other organizers agreed to target Paterson and embarrass him into signing new legislation by protesting in front of his ofﬁce in March of 2009 as a reminder to the cause he was once arrested over.52 An explicit example of the political clout the issue now held can be shown in the Democratic primary race in June 2010 for NY Attorney General between Kathleen M. Rice and Eric Schneiderman. The issue of Rockefeller Drug law reform was important in this past year’s election because there was a large contingent of Democratic voters who supported reform. It was debated whether Rice, who was not a registered Democrat until 2005, had always supported reform or was now changing her views after deciding to run for ofﬁce. On the opposite side, Schneiderman, who had been a long time supporter of reform and had sponsored reform legislation, challenged the legitimacy of Rice’s claims and even challenged Rice to debate the issue: “Given that we have an honest difference of opinion,” Mr. Schneiderman said in an interview, “on our state’s most deﬁning criminal justice issue, I believe the public would be well served by an honest and respectful debate on our divergent positions and records.”53 Schneiderman ended up securing the position in November of 2010, further proof of the now supportive political sentiment surrounding reform. In addition to the political atmosphere, the ﬁnancial crisis just prior to 2009 caused concern over the monumental costs of the New York incarceration system. Katherine Tinto argues that “the most-cited reason for reform is that the Laws have contributed to the enormous increase in the cost of prison operation, yet have failed to reduce signiﬁcantly the amount of drug use in New York.”54 Governor Paterson also believed that the reforms would allow for hundreds of millions of dollars in savings.55 Although people are willing to pay a high price for safety, reformers have been able to make a very strong argument with the case that alternatives to incarceration such as substance abuse treatment were more cost effective and more successful in reducing the crime associated with the drug trade than prison.56 Repealing the Rockefeller Drug Laws is one of the ﬁrst steps towards reducing the NY state prison population
which could result in the closing of many prisons. zation called “Prisoners of the Census.”62 Gangi states: “Our question to state policymakers is simple: At a time when government plans to lay off long-term Effects of the Rockefeller Drug Laws on Individuals workers and cut valuable services, how can you overlook the Not only were political and editorial forces extremely hundreds of millions of dollars in savings achievable by closing relevant for the most recent series of reforms, but personal stoempty prisons?”57 When prisons are lesser and lesser populated, ries of those directly effected by the laws were highlighted by it will be an irrefutable argument that they must be shut down. the media in various ways. An explicit example of this inﬂuence TIME magazine journalist Maia Szalavitz remarks that it costs can be seen from the story of Anthony Papa, who had been NYS taxpayers nearly as much to send an offender to prison for incarcerated under the laws, and remained continually outspoone year, approximately $45,000 per year in a New York State ken on the issue after his release. During his 12 years in prison prison as reported by Speaker Silver58, an amount comparable he earned degrees in behavioral science, theology and paralegal to the amount it costs for one year at Columbia University, the studies in addition to learning how to paint. Papa was able to site of a recent drug bust in December of 2010.59 As insensible use art as a social weapon to speak out against the injustices as it may seem to continue the unfair execuand violations of human rights and civil tion of the Rockefeller Drug Laws, relentless liberties that the Rockefeller Drug Laws A 1997 study by RAND’s opposition has prevented the full repeal of have been responsible for. “One night Drug Policy Research Centhe laws. while sitting in my 6 x 9 cell I picked up a ter concluded that treatThroughout both series of reforms, the mirror and saw the face of individual that ment is the most effective primary opposition came from the District was to spend the most productive years tool in the ﬁght against drug of his life in a cage. I picked up a paintAttorney’s ofﬁce and Republican politicians. abuse, reducing serious A common sentiment amongst the opposibrush, put color to canvas and painted crime 15 times more than tion was the fear of appearing to “look soft” the image I saw. About seven years later mandatory minimum senagainst crime by being in support of reforms. that piece, titled “15 to Life,” was exhibtences Prior to the implementation of any reform ited at the Whitney Museum of Amerilegislation a 2004 article quotes, “Perhaps can Art (in 2008).”63 Papa’s experience more than any other, the issue of Rockefellshows the awareness that can be raised er drug law reform reﬂects the thorny politics of New York. through personal experience combined with art. Neither the governor nor the state’s two top legislative leaders The impact of the reforms to the Rockefeller Drug Laws 60 want to appear as soft on crime.” As mentioned earlier, Repub- for persons who have not been incarcerated has also been lican politicians have consistently been the greatest opponents profound. An interview conducted by the Drop the Rock to the laws for similar reasons to their initial implementation by campaign with Sarah, a woman who was not incarcerated for Governor Rockefeller in 1973; to appease middle class fears. drug possession as a result of reforms, remarks on the positive As the prison population increased exponentially from changes she has been able to make in her life through treat1970 throughout the 2000’s, small upstate New York towns ment programs.64 With regards to the recent occurrences at where prisons were located saw a massive increase in populaColumbia University in 2010, former student Maia Szalavitz tion. These prison towns were another possible source of describes the help she was able to receive as a result of not beresistance to Rockefeller Law reform because this increase in ing incarcerated under the Rockefeller laws nearly two decades population, bolstered by unrepresented prisoners, was often ago, before any reforms had taken place. “Head I been conbeneﬁcial for these small towns as they received more governvicted and sent to prison, I probably would never have become ment money. Meanwhile the mostly urban communities where the health journalist and author I am today….I have thrived these prisoners came from did not receive any additional aid. because I had access to treatment.”65 Svalavitz recognizes that Newsweek reporter Ben Adler published a provocative article as a white, highly educated woman, her educational status and on this the beneﬁts of prisons to small towns in the summer race worked in her favor to prevent her incarceration. Still, she of 2010. “Ironically, the prisoners—mostly low-income men of understand that incarceration and discriminatory enforcement color—bring two things they themselves lack: economic and are not the solutions for substance abuse.66 The experience of political power. Woodbourne Correctional provides 403 jobs, women like Svalavitz and Sarah show that treatment is a more the large majority (roughly 280) of which are for prison guards. viable option for handling the problems associated with subEvery two weeks, according to the New York State Departstance abuse. A 1997 study by RAND’s Drug Policy Research ment of Corrections, they pump a payroll of $920,000 into the Center concluded that treatment is the most effective tool in local economy.”61 Fortunately, a law passed close to the publica- the ﬁght against drug abuse, reducing serious crime 15 times tion of this article ensured that incarcerated persons would be more than mandatory minimum sentences.67 counted in the census as residents of their home communities, no longer falsely increasing the populations of prison towns. Interview with Beatriz Torres Thirteen rural New York counties were accused of supposed, At the Ofﬁce of the Appellate Defender in New York “prison gerry-mandering” as shown by a report from an organi- City, a social work program was started nearly ten years ago
to assist persons who are applying for resentencing or parole, often as a result of the 2006 and 2009 reforms. The lawyers at the ofﬁce help prisoners repeal their sentences while social workers in the program help their clients with basic services and needs once they are released. Beatriz Torres, a social worker at the Ofﬁce of the Appellate Defender and a student at the school of Social Work at Columbia University, assists persons who have been approved for parole acquire basic services such as housing and job acquisition once they are released. The primary purpose of the support and services Torres provides is to give newly released prisoners the resources to be independent. However, strict parole requirements where persons are required to report to ofﬁcers even after they are released further deprive ex prisoners of their independence.68 Torres also helps her clients complete their parole requirements. Many persons convicted of drug crimes are re-incarcerated for violating their parole requirements, which often mandate drug tests. Due to the lack of substance abuse treatment programs, many people begin using drugs again and fail to meet their parole requirements. Torres remarked that many of her clients reported continued drug use while in the incarceration system. This is further proof that the incarceration system is far from rehabilitative. Due to the limited amount of treatment programs available for substance users, it is often those who have mental illness in addition to substance-abuse behavior that receive admission into treatment programs.69 Conclusion, Predictions and Recommendations Given the history of reform surrounding the Rockefeller Drug Law reforms, I predict that there is serious potential, and need, for future reformation. In addition, given the new NYS legislation, prisoners will no longer be counted as part of the population where the prison is located and as a result rural upstate prison towns will have less of a reason to resist reform. Still today as reported by one of the biggest advocated for change speaker Sheldon Silver, “individuals convicted of a Class B felony drug offense, one of the most commonly charged drug offenses, (most typically “possession with intent to sell”) must go to state prison as well as Those charged with A-1 felonies, involving the sale of 2 oz or possession of 8 oz of a hard drug; A-2 felonies involve the sale of ½ oz or possession of 4 oz of a hard drug.”70 This means that full judicial discretion has not been restored and that the main criterion for guilt is still the weight of the drug in possession, and not the person’s role in the transaction. This means that over 10,000 drug offenders will be left behind bars without an opportunity to appeal for a reduction in their prison term.71 Ultimately, the lack of knowledge surrounding drug use and drug treatment makes it difﬁcult to prescribe the right answers to a problem that has persisted throughout United States history. To quote John Gilbride, head of the New York Drug Enforcement Agency since 2005 states: “A war indicates there is going to be a beginning and an end. There’s always going to be individuals who abuse drugs. I don’t think one day it’s all going to end, and no one’s going to be addicted to anything anymore. And as long as people abuse drugs, there will be individuals looking to proﬁt by selling drugs. Our job is to try to stop drug trafﬁcking, but if s also drug awareness, it’s drug education. Those things don’t have an end.”72 Therefore, drug treatment policies must reﬂect the ever-lasting nature of the substance abuse issue by focusing on treatment rather than punishment. The drastic reformation of some of the most draconian drug laws in history, gives hope that there is room for change and innovation in the realm of substance abuse politics. As more prisons are shutdown in New York, alternatives to incarceration must be imagined for those arrested for substance abuse and possession. My proposal has several components that deal with each step in the drug arrest and treatment process. Ultimately, the attitude on treatment of drug offenders must evolve from a criminal matter to an issue of public health and well being. Recognizing the illegal aspect of drug use, possession and sales, substance abuse is still a major health and mental issue. Although I am not proposing the legalization of illegal substances (that would be an entirely separate proposal), I am advocating for a change in the way the state, law enforcers and medical professionals view the issue. I. Full Repeal of the Rockefeller Drug Laws Although the Rockefeller Drug Laws have been radically reformed, thousands of people are still sent to jail every year for minor drug offenses. The laws must be reformatted to match the seriousness of the crime. Recognizing that drug offenses are serious, putting the punishment near the level of much more serious crimes such as rape is not appropriate or effective. The federalist system we live in allows for drastic differences between states on governance of issues. Drug policy is one of the issues where states policies exist on an extremely broad continuum, from liberal and permissive, such as Colorado, to extremely strict and punitive, like New York. Unsurprisingly, pot-heavy states in the West and Northeast (New York as the exception) have more lenient laws.73 New York should adopt a drug law system more similar to that of the state of Utah, which was the ﬁrst state to reduce the penalty of ﬁrstoffense possession of marijuana to a misdemeanor.74 To go even one step further, New York could look to Oregon, the ﬁrst state to decrease possession of small amounts (less than one ounce) of marijuana in 1973. II. Increase in Access to Treatment Programs With prison closures already taking place, the savings gained from these closings should be reinvested into providing greater access to substance abuse treatment programs. Eligibility for such programs must be determined on a case-by-case basis, acknowledging, among other factors, an individual’s level of motivation and productivity. As treatment programs for ﬁrst time offenders have the potential to eliminate offenses from one’s record, this alternative would give offenders a greater opportunity to re-enter the workforce. III. Decrease Re-incarceration for Technical Violations Each year, far too many people are sent to prison for
technical parole violations such as missing a meeting with an ofﬁcer. For instance, in 2009 over 8,200 people were sent to prison for violating parole, not for committing new crimes.75 By decreasing these rates, recently released persons will have greater opportunities to build new lives and start new careers. IV. Differentiation between Adults and Minors Especially with regards to drug use, usage by minors has different effects and circumstances than for adults. Due to high rates of usage amongst minors and the more detrimental effects drug use can have on a minor’s education and future opportunities, treatment programs must be put over incarceration. V. Differentiation between Use and Possession of Illegal Substances If treatment as an alternative to incarceration were to be introduced, it would be vital within the court to differentiate between a person’s relation to the drug which they are being charged with. One who has signiﬁcant more use as opposed to intent to sell, must be considered more seriously for treatment programs. These ﬁve statutes are only the ﬁrst towards a lengthy and detailed reconﬁguration of the New York State drug laws. However, they are the ﬁrst of a series of measures that would help to restructure the attitude towards drug abuse from punitive and harsh to more supportive and restorative. Using treatment programs as opposed to incarceration will help to transform the lives of many people, creating more productive members of society.
REFOCUSING FUNDING ON BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
Esther Brot The National Institutes of Health, or, as it is more commonly known, NIH, is the largest ﬁnancial supporter of basic science research—research of the basic mechanisms of disease, cellular and molecular—in the world, though its funding has been cut to 2001 levels.1 NIH support is key for basic science research, which occurs in universities, not in an industrial setting, since pharmaceutical companies do not invest in research unless they are fairly sure the investment will result in proﬁt. The government should take on a higher level of funding for basic science research for two reasons: ﬁrst, the government has historically supported research and such support has paid off well, and second, basic science research is the only type of research that will eventually lead to the creation of cures and preventatives for disease. Basic research tends to take longer than industrial, discovering what industrial-based research cannot, because universities inculcate the right creative environment while in the industrial setting immediate production is the only focus.2 Therefore, government funding for universities is key to basic science and the continuance and evolution of clinical therapies. Currently government funding for research has been decreasing because of the desire to both cut the budget due to economic constraints and keep defense spending at prebudget cut levels. Therefore funding is not occurring because the current government has not realized what the impact of cutting the NIH budget will be, namely the brain drain and loss of potential monetary advantages from discovery of therapeutic interventions. The US has long been one of the top research countries in the world because the US government previously understood the need for backing scientiﬁc research.3 Now the government is hampering scientiﬁc research, especially diseaserelated basic science, when it is needed more than ever, due to America’s rapidly aging population as well as the expanding world population. Diseases like cancer, Alzheimer’s Disease, stroke, glaucoma, Parkinson’s Disease, and ALS (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis or Lou Gehrig’s disease), are more prevalent than ever before, yet there are no effective therapies for any of these diseases.4 Basic science research is key to coming up with therapies, preventatives, and cures for such diseases because basic science looks directly at the mechanisms that cause such illnesses at the cellular and genetic levels. To effectively treat any disease, virus or illness it is important to understand the cellular and molecular mechanisms underlying the disease. Short-Term Solution: To solve in the short-term the problem of inadequate funding for NIH, I propose a reallocation of funds from green research. Green research refers to environmental sustainability, new cleaner and more environmentally friendly ways to power the country that does not use oil or gas. Green research is a
noble cause and needs to be pursued, but not at the collapse of biomedical funding. Disease impacts human life far more directly and immediately than climate change does. There is overwhelming support of AIDS, breast cancer, and Parkinson’s research charities by the general population of the US. There is no such equivalent support for green research, suggesting that disease should be addressed before climate change. $92 million has been set aside for green research but said research has not been completely forthcoming.5 For example, Solyndra, Obama’s top choice solar company, and a recipient of millions of dollars of government funding, has gone bankrupt without returning any governmental money. Solyndra was a solar panel company with the most advanced technology, but with cost ineffective methods of manufacturing. These ineffective methods led to the company declaring bankruptcy shortly after receiving government money.6 While this failure does not speak to all the green research projects supported by the US, it does demonstrate the great cost which failure in green research poses. It takes much more money in general to fund green research than to fund biomedical research, because although both use cutting-edge technology, green research usually necessitates projects on a larger scale than biomedical research does. Additionally, private funding for green research is generally more available than for biomedical research because the dividends are more immediate. Green research, even if not government-funded, can achieve great advances because private companies are far more likely to invest in, for example, solar technology than they are to invest in a single neurologist’s work on caspase-2 and its death pathway. To solve the underfunding of basic science research, the money previously set aside for green companies should be used to supplement the greatly cut NIH budget. While it represents a difﬁcult choice, the government should prioritize funding for biomedical research over green technology research until the budget and the economy have recovered enough to support both. Long-Term Solution: Because of the current state of the economy and the government’s continual push to keep defense spending high, the federal government is unlikely to increase NIH funding. New avenues of funding for the research that NIH usually covers will have to be used. One such avenue would be pharmaceutical companies. While the companies themselves do not want to take the time to do the long-term research, they do reap the beneﬁts that such research produces, and with the decreasing availability of government grants such research is beginning to disappear in the United States. The United States is losing money because the US has lost out on obtaining money by making patents and medicines, because no funding for such research is available. In place of or with conjunction with the federal government, pharmaceutical companies could fund basic science research. My proposal is that private funding supplement government funding during this interim of low economic productivity.
Pharmaceutical companies could invest in basic science research at universities and research centers, like the Salk Institute. NIH already has established funding procedures, so it is the best-suited medium through which to fund university research. Pharmaceutical companies would not be funding NIH, rather they would use NIH funding procedure to decide which grants to fund. The NIH grant funding structure will prevent the pharmaceutical companies from steering research and trying to maximize proﬁt. For money to come back to the companies a speciﬁc accounting procedure must be established to ensure that the company that funded some speciﬁc research will have ﬁrst negotiating rights to patents and therefore be able to use the patents to create drugs from which proﬁts can be gained. As research takes a long time, and can incorporate a large number of collaborators on one project, pharmaceutical companies would not be funding one speciﬁc researcher, but a grant, which can include more than one researcher. Grants are how scientists ask for funding, and as said above, such grants would still go through the NIH funding structure in order to insure that the pharmaceutical companies do not limit research. Biomedical research is vital to the longevity and health of the American populace. As the NIH is currently underfunded, biomedical research is being neglected. As a short-term ﬁx, money from green research should be reallocated to supplement the NIH budget. Green research, while it is vital in the long term, has both a greater chance of receiving private funding and may not seem as necessary as cures for diseases to the American people. In the long term, if governmental funding remains low, pharmaceutical companies could act as funders for university biomedical research. It is clear that, until the economy completely rebounds, pre-2008 levels of funding will not be available. However, if something close to such levels is not achieved, the US will lose some of its most intelligent, talented researchers to other countries that have placed a higher priority on essential biomedical research. ing maternity leave policies because they allowed women to keep their jobs while temporarily out of commission due to childbirth, and thus pursue more prominent positions in the workplace and sustain more successful careers in the long-run. Today, adequate maternity provisions remain an important factor in women’s career choices. Women are still on average lower earners than their husbands, and so have “strong incentives to reduce their employment and take on a large majority of child care responsibilities” after having a child.3 Paid leave is especially important for women who are the primary breadwinners for their families. Adequate maternity leave policy thus protects the needs of individual mothers at the same time as promoting equality in employment. Ironically, however, it does so as a beneﬁt that categorically excludes men. The question of how to set legal standards for maternity leave that do not violate pre-existing equal rights legislation has constituted one of the main barriers to cohesive leave policy at the national level. In 1976, the Supreme Court ruled that an employer was not discriminating against women if it provided an insurance plan that excluded pregnancy coverage —it was merely removing “one physical condition—pregnancy—from the list of compensable disabilities.”4 Two years later, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), which clariﬁed that discrimination “on the basis of sex” did indeed include discrimination ”on the basis of pregnancy.”5 In turn, Congress afﬁrmed that “women affected by pregnancy be treated the same for all employment purposes…as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.”6 With the possibility of government-regulated maternity beneﬁts off the table, the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 provided for maternity leave only in the same sense as medical leave, in general, and thus set up the paltry system under which employers currently operate. A clear solution to the equal rights conundrum is coherent parental leave legislation, legislation guaranteeing adequate maternity leave as well as expanded paternity leave beneﬁts. Other countries have already broadened maternity policies with the intention of promoting greater equality between the sexes. In Norway, for example, working parents are granted forty-two weeks of paid parental leave (or a whole year at 80% compensation).7 Mothers are required to take off six weeks from work after having a child, but have the right to share their long-term parental leave with their husbands. Transferable parental leave gives men the option of staying home while their wives return to work, moving the country toward greater gender equality in both employment and care giving. Non-gender-speciﬁc parental leave policies would also be more responsive to the needs of LGBT parents. Gay fathers might not be eligible to receive traditional maternity beneﬁts, but expanded paternity leave would allow them greater ﬂexibility in arranging the child care arrangement best suited to their family. In a rapidly changing cultural landscape, adequate provisions for non-traditional family situations are surely becoming a necessity. The United States’ twelve weeks of unpaid maternity
EQUALITY AND PARENTAL LEAVE
Natalie Zerwekh The United States lags far behind other advanced industrialized democracies when it comes to providing maternity leave for working mothers. While most developed nations provide between three months and one year of paid parental leave to new parents, the US is one of only two that guarantee no paid leave.1 The Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 guarantees 12 weeks of job-protected leave to public employees and those who work for companies that employ more than ﬁfty people, but that leaves 40% of the American work-force at the mercy of their employers should they ask for any more than regular time off of work after having a child.2 Maternity leave became an especially important issue in the 1960s and 1970s, as more women entered the workplace than ever before. Women’s Rights activists supported expand-
leave falls far short of the maternity beneﬁts guaranteed in almost every other advanced industrialized democracy. And when 40% of workers are ineligible for federal leave, American parental leave policies are in dire need of reform. Non-gender speciﬁc parental leave policies would surmount the legal contradiction between equal rights legislation and maternity beneﬁts that favor female employees, at the same time as responding to the needs of non-traditional families. The physician should make sure that resource referrals to counseling, legal, and other relevant services are provided during the visit, while making it appear as a routine component of clinical visits. If the patient communicates a desire to utilize a resource during the visit, the physician would then refer her to a social worker to facilitate the patient’s use of the resources. Major Obstacles/Implementation Challenges: In the midst of other medical priorities, physicians might feel as if there is not enough time to screen for domestic violence during their patient visits.8 Some doctors might feel inadequately trained to address the emotions that arise when a patient confesses that she is a victim of abuse, or become frustrated when the patient remains with the abusive partner.9 It may be difﬁcult for physicians to provide referrals in rural areas where resources are limited. Although the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force found insufﬁcient evidence to recommend universal clinical screening for domestic violence, this policy proposal targets a higher risk population—pregnant women.10 As a means of addressing these major obstacles to successful implementation of domestic violence screening, it appears that providing all OB/GYN doctors with training on the signs of domestic violence, its tendency to escalate, its effects on all aspects of one’s health, and the imperative nature of preserving patient autonomy to even a greater scale in light of the feelings of helplessness and inferiority that being a victim of domestic violence often generates, is essential. Doctors may always be pressed for time, especially in the face of the increased corporatization of the ﬁeld of medicine. Yet, continuous exposure to the signiﬁcant links between occurrence of domestic violence and major health ailments, especially for women, would ideally impel OB/GYN doctors to take the initiative to screen all of their patients for domestic violence before screening has to become compulsory. Rural populations, unfortunately, continue to be considered as a part of underserved communities in the ﬁeld of medicine. However, counseling and other services are now increasingly being provided over the phone as well, and physicians working in rural areas may feel better about dealing with potential domestic violence survivors after learning about potential resource referrals that they could now feasibly make.
EXPANDING THE USE OF ABUSE ASSESSMENT SCREENS TO IDENTIFY VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Tehreem Rehman Problem Statement: Domestic violence is a pervasive problem that affects 25% of women in the United States.1 Pregnancy further increases a woman’s risk for being abused, making her vulnerable to severe physical injuries such as blunt trauma to the abdomen, hemorrhaging, preterm labor, miscarriage, and even maternal death.2 Routine screening for conditions unrelated to domestic violence such as preeclampsia and gestational diabetes occurs during pregnancy. Although existing data suggests that domestic violence is more prevalent than these conditions among pregnant women, the vast majority of hospitals still do not screen for domestic violence.3 Furthermore, domestic violence is one of the most underreported crimes, presumably due to a lack of conﬁdence in the justice system.4 Consequently, a hospital setting in which a patient is guaranteed conﬁdentiality and privacy with her physician may prove to be a more conducive forum for identifying victims of domestic violence. Proposed Solution: Since women utilize medical services signiﬁcantly more frequently during pregnancy than they do at any other time, OB/GYN doctors are in a great position to follow up on self-administered domestic violence questionnaires on a regular basis in order to optimize the chances of identifying victims of domestic violence.5 Based on previous studies, the most reliable screening tool would be the Abuse Assessment Screen, which consists of four brief questions proven effective in identifying abuse.6 Medical assistants should administer these questionnaires before the patient sees her doctor and update the patient’s medical record if the responses indicate a history of abuse. If an immediate threat is present, the hospital staff needs to be prepared for following security procedures to ensure the safety of the patient.7 Nevertheless, if the patient is identiﬁed as a domestic violence victim, the doctor should take time to inform the patient about the prevalence of domestic violence, in order to assure her that she is not alone, and discuss the health ramiﬁcations of such abuse. If there are any visible injuries, the doctor ought to photograph and document them for future legal action, and then formulate a safety plan with the patient.
ONE IS TOO MANY: REFORMING CAMPUS POLICY ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE
Grace Rybak In 2011, the Obama administration placed a muchneeded focus on the problem of sexual violence on college campuses. In an initiative led by Vice President Biden, the administration called attention to the prevalence of sexually based offenses at colleges and universities.1 Although statistics are difﬁcult to calculate due to serious underreporting of
crimes of sexual violence, an estimated 20% of females and 6% of males are victims of actual or attempted sexual assault while in college. Sexual assault can trigger many serious health concerns, including depression, alcohol and drug dependency, post-traumatic stress disorder and suicidal thoughts.2 The rates at which these crimes occur are unacceptable. In April 2011, the Department of Justice released new guidelines to colleges and universities stating that inadequate responsiveness to sexual assault is a violation of Title IX, an amendment banning federal funds for schools that discriminate based on sex. According to Title IX, a school must take swift and immediate action when a sexual assault is reported. The school must investigate the complaint, take action to protect the student submitting the complaint, and prevent the crime from occurring again. In deciding the case, the school must adhere to the preponderance of the evidence standard.3 This standard lowers the burden of proof for the accuser. Rather than requiring the accuser to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the preponderance of the evidence standard means that if the probability of guilt is 51% or greater, the case is decided in favor of the accuser. The reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act, which is currently pending in the Senate, would reinforce this guideline by requiring colleges and universities to adopt this standard in cases involving sexual violence.4 In December, Columbia University released a new sexual assault policy aimed at compliance with the Department of Education Standards. This new policy marked a signiﬁcant shift. The [Columbia] policy was expanded to include “gender-based harassment, sexual harassment, intimate partner violence, and stalking” in addition to sexual assault. Columbia also created a new position, called the Title IX investigator, to investigate claims of sexual violence. When a claim is presented, this investigator interviews witnesses and gathers evidence, a burden that was previously placed on the complainant. The new policy also allows third parties to report complaints, which is somewhat controversial because it means that resident advisors and academic advisors are required to report allegations of sexually based offenses. This diminishes conﬁdentiality, but the justiﬁcation is that a possible perpetrator may harm other students if the allegation is not investigated.5 The implementation of the new guidelines on campus sexual violence policy has been controversial. After making changes similar to those at Columbia, Yale University was attacked in an editorial in the Wall Street Journal by Peter Berkowitz, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. In the editorial, Berkowitz alleged that the new procedures put in place to comply with Department of Education policies violate the due process rights of the accused. In keeping with the Obama administration guidelines, Yale implemented a preponderance of the evidence standard for sexual violence crimes. According to Berkowitz, the preponderance of the evidence standard makes a guilty verdict too likely. He also asserts that the recommendation that the victim should not be cross-examined is unfair to the accused perpetrator. The right to due process is essential to our judicial system, and Berkowitz is correct that we should not violate this right even in an effort to protect victims of sexual violence. However, the preponderance of the evidence standard, which is the most common standard of proof, is widely used in our courts.6 Thirty states use this standard in domestic violence cases.7 Similar to sexual assault, domestic violence is often underreported because victims fear they will be unable to prove their allegations.8 By attacking the use of the preponderance of the evidence standard in campus investigations of sexual violence, despite the fact that this standard is widely used in civil cases and in domestic violence cases, Berkowitz is encouraging the insidious misperception that sexual violence is falsely reported at a higher rate than other crimes. In fact, only 2% of sexual assaults are falsely reported.9 This misperception is one of the many reasons why reporting sexual violence can be very intimidating for victims. Using the preponderance of the evidence standard for university cases involving sexual assault is important because sexual assault is inherently difﬁcult to prove. As the National Women’s Law Center stated in a letter of support for the Department of Education’s new guidelines, “a more stringent standard would be particularly inappropriate because of unique barriers that sexual harassment and violence complainants face.”10 An investigation by the Center for Public Integrity found that women reporting sexual assault sometimes are met with suspicion when they bring their allegations to administrators or are discouraged from initiating proceedings against the perpetrator, suggesting that the administration is biased against their claims.11 Claims of sexual assault are very difﬁcult to prove since there are usually no eyewitnesses to corroborate claims. When alcohol is involved, proving the allegation becomes even harder.12 The guidelines issued by the Obama administration and adopted by Columbia and many other universities are an important ﬁrst step in dealing with the issue of sexual violence on college campuses. The new rules make the process of reporting an allegation less onerous for victims, which will hopefully help solve the problem of underreporting. The Ofﬁce of Civil Rights should initiate punishment against schools that do not comply with the new standards, beginning with a threat to rescind Title IX funds if the school does not reform its policy on sexual violence. Sexual assault is an incredibly painful experience, and no student should be discouraged from reporting a crime because of fear that the allegation will be too difﬁcult to improve. Schools that are not supportive of students who come forward to report these incidents are further victimizing the accusers. Once the new standards for addressing sexual assault claims are in place, colleges and universities must place more emphasis on prevention. The staggering rates at which sexual violence occurs on campuses are unacceptable, and no student should ever be subjected to this trauma.
EDUCATING AFGHANS THROUGH COORDINATED TEACHER TRAINING
NGO-run community schools in Afghanistan effectively address local security concerns by promoting community involvement in education as well as ensuring that the right to education is met in rural or insecure regions where the fragile Ministry of Education (MoE) cannot operate. Despite the success of this approach, the long-term stability of the Afghan education system is jeopardized by the government’s failure to transition community schoolteachers along with students into the state system. This lack of incorporation threatens the security and sustainability of new government schools by dismissing the very cultural characteristics that make community schools safe and successful. This paper examines the community school model and integration process then proposes the solution of sharing standards for teacher education and training between NGOs and the MoE, to be coordinated through the Education Cluster of Ofﬁce for the Coordination of Humanitarian AffairsAfghanistan.
The Community School Approach:
After over thirty years of conﬂict and the complete restructuring of the government after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the Afghan Ministry of Education is still struggling to meet the educational needs of its ethnically and geographically diverse population. Approximately 60 percent of Afghan girls remain out of school and 33 percent of boys.1 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have adopted a successful strategy in providing primary education through community schools while the Afghan government stabilizes. Such community-based school models have been used in Afghanistan for over sixty years as a way to reach rural communities, and NGOs have been employing this method since the 1980s.2 Community-based schools serve as an important alternative in many areas in which students cannot attend or do not have the opportunity to study at government schools. Operating within existing structures such as houses or mosques, community schools engage local populations and provide safer access to education within the context of the local culture. With the help of an NGO, communities establish a board of local residents who function as a type of school board to make sure that local cultural norms and speciﬁc needs are being met and respected. While small in number compared to public schools, the ﬂexible and specialized approach to each school allows the model to function well despite regional insecurity. The ultimate goal of these schools is their absorption by the MoE at a later time when the government will be able to support them.3 As of 2010, over 3,000 community schools had been absorbed by the government across 1,400 communities in more than twelve Afghan province.4 Although community schools are established and monitored by
independent NGOs, they follow the same standards as government schools to ease integration and support the still-fragile MoE. Community schools follow the same curriculum as government schools, including subject matter and hours of instruction per subject, as well as the same government-mandated testing policies. While community schools often only operate for several hours a day so that both students and teachers can continue working other jobs, ﬂexible school calendars keep the total number of classroom hours equal to that of government schools.5 The community board nominates and hires local residents to serve as teachers at each school to ensure respected individuals are teaching, therefore promoting acceptance and participation in the school by students and parents. According to a report by the International Rescue Committee, “In some communities, families allow their daughters to be taught by men from the community if they are known and trusted. Experience has shown that parents of older girls even allow their daughters to attend coed home-based classes if the boys in the class are from the same community.”5 If the schools were taught by an outsider, many of these girls would not have access to education in situations where strict gender segregation rules could not be enforced. The engagement of community members who make decisions and ensure a form of cultural quality control over school administration is of the one of the most important factors in each school’s overall success and sets community schools apart from public schools. Approaching education in a way that involves the community builds a foundation of support for education necessary for the later viability of government schools. Community schools are designed as temporary solutions until a time when the government is able to take over and support them. By aligning curricular and institutional standards with that of the MoE, community schools aim to make the transition process as seamless as possible. Integration can take several forms, the ﬁrst of which is simply a change in the status of a school during which the NGO would relinquish responsibility and government ofﬁcials would take charge. The second scenario entails the building of a government school near an existing community school, after which the community school ceases operation and students transfer to the new public school. Other options include “clustering,” or combining nearby community schools to form one new government school, or “satellite” integration, which allows students and teachers to continue within the community school while linking the administration to a government school.6 The main incentive for integration is sustainability. Realistically NGOs will not always be able to support community schools. Integration also relieves economic pressure from community members. Parents of students within a community often work together to provide compensation for local teachers, either of monetary or in-kind support, but at government schools the MoE is responsible for teacher salaries. Government payroll is also an incentive for teachers, allowing increased job security and decreasing the worry that teachers
will not be able to continue their positions because of economic concerns.7 Furthermore, in state-schools, students can receive ofﬁcial recognition for their learning and are able to continue their educations at higher levels. Free state-sponsored education also allows more children to attend school despite their family circumstances.
Teacher Training in Community Schools:
Many teachers in community-based schools, though recommended by their community school board, lack a complete and formalized education and have little teaching experience. While the structure of community schools allows for greater engagement with community members in school administration, NGOs provide essential support training teachers in subject material and pedagogy. Teachers receive training in language and math as well as seminars in curriculum and materials development. In addition to subject-speciﬁc training, teachers are also taught speciﬁc techniques for creating a respectful environment that promotes student development and wellbeing, an especially important matter in areas of insecurity and violence. Many NGOs also promote and work to identify potential women teachers, and women-only training is often provided in conformity to cultural norms and encourages women to participate in the schools.8 While community-based school teachers perform at standards comparable to government school teachers, discrepancies often exist in teaching norms. IRC workers report that students in their community schools are able to pass the entrance exams to public schools, and studies have shown that these students perform well once integrated into government schools. Unlike community schoolteachers, those from state schools often must travel long distances in order to teach and are often responsible for more students per class, resulting in less community involvement and parental interaction. Government schools do not formally recognize community-based teachers, and previous time spent teaching within the community is not as accepted as valid professional experience. This is because many community school teachers do not possess the required twelfth grade diploma necessary to teach in the public system, although this requirement is often not upheld in rural regions like those in which community schools usually operate.9
Lack of Teacher Transition Raises Educational and Security Risks:
often forces them to close.11 The loss of teachers through the transition from community schools to those run by the government puts students at risk of receiving an inadequate education or none at all. Another potential risk raised by the failure to transition teachers is that of security. Community schools operate effectively not only within areas the government does not have the resources to support them, but also in highly insecure areas in which the operation of government schools is unsafe. Schools identiﬁed with the government or with intervening military forces are attacked more frequently than the community schools, and education programs driven by local communities are considerably safer from attack than those without community engagement.11 Community support has long been a priority for NGOs in order for acceptance of their work, and to ensure the safety of international workers. Insurgents are far less likely to see a community school as a potential threat when it is supported by community members, especially when an attack could damage their relations with that community. Schools serve as community hubs, especially when located within an existing community meeting place, allowing them to serve as centers of humanitarian aid and distribution including food programs and health services. However, Insurgents view schools built by outside entities, especially those taking part in other humanitarian efforts, as legitimate targets for attack.12 The security risks associated with government schools in highly insecure regions leads many NGOs to publicly disassociate their community schools with those run by the state, while still maintaining a “shadow alignment” of standards. This separation alienates them from the government and makes integration more difﬁcult once the necessary level of security has been reached for the transition to occur. In volatile security situations it is imperative to transfer the community acceptance and support of NGO-sponsored schools to government schools in order to decrease the likelihood that new schools are viewed as targets for attack.
Coordinating Teacher Training Through OCHA:
Most teachers are not rehired during the integration into the government system despite a shortage of public school teachers and the acceptance and support of parents for community schools teachers. The MoE estimates that 32,000 new teachers will be needed annually to reach Millennium Development Goals and equitably distribute teachers and schools across the country. Yet, they only report a foreseeable increase of 13,100 teachers per year.10 Community schools generally depend upon the continued commitment of teachers in order to function, but economic insecurity—and in the case of female teachers, a lack of support from their husbands or families—
The United Nations Ofﬁce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Afghanistan’s (OCHA) Education Cluster needs to use its unique position as a liaison between the government and NGOs to build a MoE-approved framework for teacher training in community schools that promotes the inclusion of community school teachers during integration. Cochaired by UNICEF and Save the Children, the cluster brings together members of NGOs currently involved in education efforts as well as representatives of the MoE, thus functioning as the perfect platform for reaching consensus between groups on teacher accreditation standards. Once deﬁned and approved by both parties, the Cluster can coordinate training to meet these standards so that teachers are qualiﬁed for positions in both types of schools, and therefore able follow students in the transition to state-sponsored schools. Coordinating teacher training supports the vision and mission of the Education Cluster, “To enable all children and
young people to have immediate access or ensured continuity to a quality education in a safe environment, in order to protect, develop and facilitate a return to normalcy and stability,” and “To develop and maintain a cohesive and coordinated approach to ensure the quality of rapid response for education in conﬂict/disaster-affected regions of Afghanistan.”13 Allowing trusted and respected community teachers to transition to government schools both promotes the continuity of education for students and contributes to the overall stability of their educational experience. Teachers familiar with the local culture can also strengthen the relationships between parents, community members and governmental ofﬁcials, thereby enabling a more efﬁcient and coordinated response to conﬂict or natural disaster. Integrating community and governmental teacher training also advances the Cluster’s immediate objective to “Support the Ministry of Education to participate fully in the education cluster” by helping the MoE work with and not against NGO efforts to support education.14 Coordinated teacher training also helps alleviate the lack of qualiﬁed teachers. Community teachers would be able to ﬁll newly created positions at government schools opening in areas formerly supported by community schools alone. By aligning the educational standards of NGOs and the government fewer formal discrepancies will exist between the two groups, allowing for a cost- and time-efﬁcient transitional process. Such coordination also helps to achieve the MoE’s long-term goal of decentralizing teacher recruitment from Kabul and instead focusing on meeting individual schools’ speciﬁc needs.15 Because community teachers already suit the needs of their communities, as expressed by members of the communities, both goals are met without an extra expenditure of resources by the government. Integrated teacher training also addresses the potential security risks associated with the transition from community to government-run schools. Bringing community teachers into the government system legitimizes the new schools in the eyes of parents and continues the community involvement that deters insurgent attacks. The regular salary promised by government payroll especially provides increased opportunities for women by giving husbands and family members an economic incentive to allow their wives and daughters to work as teachers.16 The increased security and stability offered by the presence of community teachers during the integration period would help provide education in neglected areas and while deterring insurgent attacks. Such stability can only be provided if the training received by community teachers is recognized by the MoE, thus enabling the transfer to state-sponsored schools.
and political divide between both groups threatens the continued progress of education. While highly insecure contexts may make certain disassociations necessary to protect workers, students, and teachers, if these actions are accepted and understood by both parties they need not dissolve formal ties or erode the ultimate and shared goal of providing the best education to as many students as possible. Though setting common standards for teaching training between government and NGO schools is not the only measure that needs to be taken in order to address the many problems plaguing education in Afghanistan, it would be a step forward, strengthening ties between the government and communities in order to promote and ensure a better life for the next generation of Afghani citizens.
THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF FEMALE SUICIDE TERRORISM
Delaney Simon On April 9th, 1985 sixteen-year-old Sana’a Mehaidli drove a truck full of explosives into an Israeli Defense Force convoy, killing two Israeli soldiers and injuring two more.1 Dubbed “the bride of the south,” Sana’a was the ﬁrst woman to commit an act of suicide terrorism. She certainly was not the last. Between 1985 and 2006, there were more than 220 female suicide bombers, representing nearly 15 percent of the overall number of suicide bombers around the world and those intercepted in the ﬁnal stages before the attack.2 In the past 10 years, virtually every major terrorist group that uses suicide bombing as a tactic has employed female attackers, including extremely patriarchal religious groups such as Al Qaeda. In the Palestinian territory, women comprised around 5.6% of all suicide bombers. In Sri Lanka, women account for 20-25% of the total and in Chechnya, 43%.3 These women serve simply as weapon carrying vessels- they are at their most valuable dead. Why then do so many organizations actively recruit women to be suicide terrorists, even those that explicitly advocate the subjugation of women? As Sana’a’s epithet suggests, female suicide terrorists hold a different symbolic value than male suicide terrorists. “These warriors are home-makers” a women wrote to an Islamic Jihad newsletter, “and they are just as good at ﬁghting and carrying explosives as they are at moving furniture around the house.”4 Blurring the masculine notion of violence and destruction with the feminine conceptions of beauty, purity, weakness, and maternity, female suicide terrorism allows groups to exploit gender stereotypes to bolster sympathy and support for the act and their organizations. Gender norms are not speciﬁc to certain religions or regions, women are perceived in the same ways around the globe and thus the symbolic value of women is applicable across groups and to local, regional and international audiences. Suicide terrorism is deﬁned as “an operational method in which the very act of the attack is dependent upon the death of the perpetrator. The terrorist is fully aware that if she/
The state of education in Afghanistan has and continues to improve through the efforts of both the MoE and of NGOs. Both actors have adopted successful strategies to address problems in the current system, and both are necessary as reforms continue to move forward. However, the natural
he does not kill her/himself, the planned attack will not be men, security provisions often fail to account for women. After implemented.”5 The explanatory frameworks for female suicide September 11th, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security terrorism are vast and contradictory, but most scholars discuss failed to include any women in its ofﬁcial proﬁle of potential the distinctiveness of female involvement in particular. terrorists used to screen visa applicants.15 In Chechnya, the RusSeveral scholars argue that female suicide terrorism is special sian news magazine Kommersant-Vlast had a female journalist because women have different motivations than men. Mia fully covered in a niqab trace the exact steps of failed suicide Bloom, for example, writes, “When men conduct suicide bomber Zarema Muzhakhoyeva. Despite clutching a black missions, they are motivated by religious or nationalist fanatisatchel to her chest and behaving in a nervous manner, she was cism, whereas women appear more often motivated by very able to secure a table at the same café where Muzhakhoyeva’s personal reasons.”6 “Personal reasons” have been said to failed attack took place without being questioned once.16 include avenging a personal loss, redeeming the family name Furthermore, female attackers receive eight times the media or personal reputation, escaping a monotonous life, achieving coverage as attacks by men.17 Heightened publicity is a valuable fame, or mitigating personal trauma due to sexual or other asset to terrorists groups, not only because it gives notice and abuse.7 Lindsay O’Rourke rejects this explanation, arguing that attention to the terrorists cause but also because it stimulates both male and female attackers have experienced a variety of recruitment.18 traumatic personal events, but that “scholars are more prone These explanations are valuable and elucidate the rea8 to assume personal motives for female attackers.” Accordingly, sons why groups employ women to complete suicide missions scholars are inclined to perceive female acts through a gender or at least show that female suicide bombers have a different speciﬁc lens by associating women with emotion and men with value than male suicide bombers. Yet current scholarship has intellect. only hit the tip of the iceberg. We know that women have Other scholars see female suicide terrorism as signiﬁ- more tactical value than men because they arouse less suspicion cant by connecting it with feminism. Rather than personal trau- and generate a greater response, but what is it exactly about ma, women are motivated by a desire for female equality. “…If women that makes these explanations true? Why do groups the question we are trying to clarify is whether the shahidad [fe- and publics see female suicide terrorists differently than they male suicide bombers] are dying for equaldo male suicide terrorists, and how is this female suicide terrorism ity, the answer is yes, very much so,” Mira an asset? Feminist IR has long discussed the allows groups to exploit Tzoreff argues.9 Barbara Victor makes differences in masculine/feminine images gender stereotypes to bolster in wartime. As Jessica West argues, “our a similar argument: “the idea of equality touches upon the very core of what [fesympathy and support for the interpretations of international events do male suicide terrorists] long for.”10 Howevindeed produce a hegemonic femininity that act and their organizations. er, the association between female acts of places women in the familial world of emotion terror and feminism is misguided. As Schweitzer argues, female and victimhood.”19 The difference in symbolic value between suicide terrorists serve simply as “pawns or sacriﬁcial lambs.”11 women and men, or the inability to separate acts committed by Their value lies simply in their ability to carry weapons; they are females from sex, explains the advantageousness of employing essentially vessels facilitating the deaths of the enemy. Further- women to commit suicide terror. Gender stereotypes serve to more, as O’Rourke points out, “if female suicide bombers truly legitimize acts of violence such as suicide attacks or to at least resent the established gender roles of their societies, why would promote sympathy, which in turn generates support for the they perpetrate attacks against target states that uphold more actor, the groups, and the cause. Thus, female suicide terrorism liberal values?”12 If these women are dying for equality, then they is employed because it is strategically useful. will die without seeing the fruits of their labors. One can think To analyze the logic for using female suicide terrorof far more efﬁcient ways of advancing female equality that do ism in terms of gender stereotypes, I will look at the use of not include suicide. While this explanation takes a fairly modern gender stereotypes by three cases, and analyze the subsequent angle, it again is motivated by the tendency to place female acts propaganda of the terrorist group and the subsequent impresin a gynocentric category, which distracts from the real reasons sions of the press and publics. By doing so I will show how that women commit and terrorist groups employ female suicide seeing attacks through a feminine lens legitimates or provides terrorism. sympathy for the attack. Then, I will break down these stereoMost convincingly, scholars note the disproportionate types to show how we naturally push women into gynocentric effectiveness of female suicide bombers opposed to male suicategories. This will ultimately prove that the use of female cide bombers. O’Rourke, for example, makes a compelling case attackers is strategically logical. In doing so, I will look at three that female attackers are more likely to complete a mission and cases: Chechnya, Palestine, and Sri Lanka. The terrorist groups inﬂict greater casualties than men.13 This is because women are in these countries represent vastly different traditions and sociless likely to arouse suspicion and thus are better able to clear eties, yet each of them utilizes similar gender stereotypes when 14 checkpoints and other security obstacles, especially in Muslim approaching female suicide terrorism, with all organizations countries where searching a woman could offend her honor. As utilizing the same main gendered tropes. a result of the stereotype that women are less bellicose than
Chechnya With the fall of the Soviet Union, Chechens, a mostly Muslim ethnic minority living primarily in Russia’s North Caucasus region, launched a coordinated separatist effort with terrorism at the heart of the resistance strategy. While no single group is an umbrella for all separatist Chechens, the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB), the Chechen-based Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR) and the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs are the major terrorist entities in the struggle.20 Women have carried out acts of suicide terrorism since the beginning of the struggle. In fact, women were involved in the ﬁrst instance of Chechen suicide terrorism when Khava Barayeva and Luisa Magomadova drove a truck ﬁlled with explosives into the temporary headquarters of an elite OMON (Russian Special Forces) detachment in the village of Alkhan Yurt in Chechnya on June 7th, 2000.21 Since then, females have been overwhelmingly active in suicide terrorist operations, participating in almost equal numbers to men. Women also participated in the two largest mass hostage-taking events associated with suicide terrorism to date- the takeovers of the Moscow Dubrovka Theater and the Beslan school in North Ossetia.22 Chechen women are distinct from their Palestinian and Sri Lankan counterparts. While they are Muslim and maintain a traditional family structure, “Chechen women are more emancipated than their Arab sisters… it is common for Chechen women to attend university and to hold full-time jobs outside their homes.”23 Furthermore, they are citizens of a country that recognizes western conceptions of female equality, having grown up with the inﬂuence Soviet-style feminism. Yet, as will be discussed below, popular conceptions of Chechen female suicide bombers are similar to those of their Palestinian and Sri Lankan equivalents. Palestine While Chechen women were involved in acts of suicide terror from beginning of the resistance movement, Palestinian resistance groups were hesitant to use women as suicide bombers and to include them in the movement. The ﬁrst female suicide attack in the Palestinian resistance movement occurred in 2002, almost a decade after the ﬁrst male suicide attack in 1994. The inclusion of women in the movement was initially incompatible with the ideology of all Palestinian resistance groups, especially religious ones. As the Sheik Ahmad Yassin, the former spiritual head of Hamas remarked, “a woman martyr is problematic for Muslim society… a man who recruits a woman is breaking Islamic law. He is taking the girl or woman without the permission of her father, brother, or husband, and therefore the family of the girl confronts an even greater problem since the man has the biggest power over her, choosing the day that she will give her life back to Allah.”24 The ﬁrst female suicide attack happened by accident on January 27, 2002 when Wafa Idris blew herself up in a downtown Jerusalem shopping mall, killing one Israeli man and injuring 131 others.25 She was not supposed to detonate the explosives but rather to help her brother pass through a checkpoint unsearched, yet “when [Fatah] saw the reaction in the street… they realized [popular sentiment] was unanimously positive” 26 and incorporated women into their suicide terror strategy. Weeks after Wafa’s death, the al-Aqsa Martyr’s brigade ofﬁcially opened a woman’s suicide unit. Realizing the effectiveness of female suicide terrorism, Sheik Yassin changed his position: “We are men of principle and according to our religion, a Muslim woman is permitted to wage Jihad and struggle against an enemy who invades the holy land. The Prophet would draw lots among the women who wanted to go out with him to make Jihad. The Prophet always emphasized a woman’s right to wage Jihad.”27 To validate female involvement, Islamic movements began to cite the hadith28 that decrees: “if even one center of Muslim soil is conquered, then all are commanded to take a part in a jihad: a child without his father’s permission, a woman without her husbands permission, and a slave without his owner’s permission.”29 Palestinian resistance movements were able to overcome their patriarchalist traditions in order to justify acts that would be strategically useful. Sri Lanka The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was founded in 1976 with the aim of creating a Tamil state independent of Sri Lanka. While there are other Tamil separatist movements, the LTTE is by far the most signiﬁcant. Unlike Chechen or Palestinian resistance movements, the LTTE is Marxist and secular. Women are not only a central component of suicide terror missions but also of the movement at large. Originally only men, by the mid 1980s the LTTE vigorously recruited women into the organization as ﬁghters. In 1983 it founded a special section for women called the Vituthalai Pulikal Munani (Women’s Front of the Liberation Tigers), which went on to wage battles against the Sri Lankan military. By 1989 it had its own leadership structure. According to Miranda Allison, the women’s military wing is a well-organized and highly disciplined force and its suicide squad, known as the Black Tigers, has a large number of women in it.30 Women comprised about 24% of the 316 killed and identiﬁed as Black Tigers, not including Black Tiger cadres arrested or captured and those known to be Black Tigers who committed suicide by taking cyanide.31 Yet while the LTTE itself is far more advanced in terms of gender equality than the other movements, it still utilizes the same gender stereotypes to bolster support for its cause. These three cases are drastically different. They have different ideologies, causes, religious afﬁliations and attitudes towards women. Yet they all use women as suicide bombers, even if such use contradicts key ideological principles. Not only do they all use women as suicide terrorists, they all utilize the same gynocentric tropes to promote sympathy for and to legitimate acts of terror. As such, the reasons that each group uses women as suicide terrorists are similar if not the same. Chechen resistance groups, Palestinian resistance groups, and
the LTTE exploit the association of men with violence and strength and women with peace and weakness to legitimate the suicide attacks and to prove the high level of commitment to their cause. The suggestion is that women will defy their nature for the cause because it is that important. The press, a good mirror for public opinion, makes this connection on its own. In an editorial entitled, “It’s a Woman!” Al-Sha’ab declared: It is a woman who teaches you the meaning of Jihad, and the way to die a martyr’s death. It is a woman who has shocked the enemy, with her thin, meager, and weak body… and the acceptance of death with a powerful, courageous embrace.32 Contrasting ‘female qualities’ of feebleness and delicacy with the ‘male qualities’ of bravery and valor, the article suggests the incongruity of an act where the two meet. The proud tone suggests that for a woman to go against her nature to commit violence carries more meaning than a violent act by a man. J.B. Elshtain argues, “women… seem out of control when they engage in violence, unless the act mirrors imagined male valor.”33 Indeed, there is no room in our narrative for an exclusively female act of violence. By coating a “masculine” act with ideas of femininity, associations with cruelty and evilness are sidelined. Instead, the woman’s courage and commitment are highlighted. This trope is repeated across organizations to legitimate the act of female suicide terrorism and also to recruit more members. In Sri Lanka, Tamil women use the gender binary to goad men into action with the catchphrase, “don’t be a bunch of eunuchs.”34 A propaganda slogan in Chechnya reads, “women’s courage is a disgrace to that of modern men.”35 The implication is if women are brave enough fulﬁll their duty to the cause, then men should be brave enough to ‘man up.’ Again, all acts of violence, perpetrated by men or women, are deﬁned in andocentric terms. Bringing up ideas of masculinity serves to stimulate men into action. While there is a tendency to associate violence with masculinity, there is a tendency to associate women with beauty. The tendency to glamorize females serves to enforce a positive image of the female suicide terrorists. Muriel Degauque, a Belgian woman who committed a suicide attack on a U.S. military convoy in Iraq in 2005, is frequently described in terms of her good looks. A Sunday Times article describes Degauque as “lovely,” “adorable,” and mentions that she is “pretty” twice. Gender speciﬁc terms are used throughout the article: she is remembered as a “good little girl,” who was “just like all the other girls, dreaming I suppose about becoming a teacher or a nurse.”36 Her attractiveness makes it hard to demonize her and gendered recollections of her “normal” female childhood imply innocence and purity. The local councilor who offered his recollection ‘supposes’ that “all…girls” desire to become teachers or nurses, two unthreatening and markedly feminine occupations. The case of Degauque shows that women are likely to be shown in a positive light. The tendency to impose physical attractiveness is seen across the board in both Western and non-western contexts. Wafa Idris, the Palestinian suicide bomber, is described in terms of her physical attractiveness. An article about Idris in the Egyptian government opposition daily newspaper Al-Wafd describes her as “ the beautiful and pure Palestinian woman Wafa Idris.”37 Like the descriptions of Degauque, the author was also inclined to associate a female with beauty, which by extension implies purity and innocence. By doing so, she prevents the deﬁlation of Idris’ name, avoiding a dirty image. Chechens are also prone to such associations. In an article marking the one year anniversary of the Moscow theater siege, schoolteacher Lilia Mikhailovna is interviewed about her thoughts on the Black Widows: “they were all so independent, so daring, so beautiful -because they were all young.”38 The youth and beauty aspect removes any idea of violence or cruelty. It is inconceivable that a man would get the same media treatment; he would not be romanticized for his youth and beauty. Furthermore, as Claudia Brunner argues, female suicide bombers are mostly cited by their ﬁrst names, treated like little girls despite their age (Wafa Idris was 28-years-old). “While this trivialization underlines their young age and thereby supports the interpretation of innocence mentioned before, their male martyr companions are mostly named by their full name and treated as grown-ups, even if they are only 16 years old.”39 Even after they murder dozens of civilians, female suicide bombers are routinely cast as victims. Terrorists groups and the media emphasize female bombers’ lack of agency, personal loss, or history of abuse in order to garner support for female attackers. In the LTTE case, women are portrayed as victims of rape. Whether or not they have been raped is a matter of contention. Several scholars argue that they are rape victims and cite this as a major reason why women become involved in the LTTE.40 Gunawardena, however, argues that reports of women joining the LTTE because they were raped are greatly exaggerated and mainly used by the LTTE as propaganda. For example, the LTTE portrayed the suicide bomber that killed Rajiv Gandhi as a victim of rape by the Indian Peace Keeping Force. Her attack, it was suggested, was a personal vendetta, not a politically motivated assassination. However, on this occasion there were two female suicide bombers tasked for this target, the second on standby for reserve, suggesting that it was not a personal vendetta, but a carefully thought out plan by the organization.41 The question of whether or not these women have been raped is almost beside the point. More signiﬁcant is the organization’s eagerness to advertise that female suicide bombers are rape victims, and victims of the enemy no less. Rape serves as a justiﬁcation for the act, legitimating the violence because of the perception that it was motivated by genuine personal suffering. By stimulating the sympathy of the public, the act of terrorism seems more benign. In Chechnya, female suicide terrorists are described as “Black Widows,” a label which, as Jessica West argues, “paints the women as bereaved, victimized, and without agency.” The female suicide terrorist’s motivation is not political, but personal. She has been driven to desperation and hopelessness, and now seeks revenge on behalf of her loved ones.42 This descrip-
tion recurs, in differing forms, in the majority of coverage of the sources.47 Black Widows. In the BBCs reporting of Black Widows from Signiﬁcantly, such manipulations of agency would never July 2003- September 2004, they are referred to as the wives be possible with male terrorists. While commentators often or sisters of Chechen ﬁghters killed in the war with Russia or of discussed men as brainwashed or manipulated, only women non-combatant men illegally killed or disappeared. Repeatedly can be raped, considered sexually impure, or lack value due to they are described as desperate and seeking revenge.43 The infertility. Furthermore, it is more convincing that women, as Guardian’s coverage offers similar descriptions. One 2004 arthe weaker sex, are coerced into terrorism through devastating ticle is titled “Women Moved by Family, Not Ideology: Chechen personal circumstances. Violence Breeds Black Widows.” “Her fate,” the author writes, While the victim backﬁring issue shows that gender “ﬁts into the pattern of violence that has led dozens of young stereotypes prompt sympathy for female suicide terrorists, it Chechen women, the so-called “black widows”, to become is a challenge to the argument that gender stereotypes prompt 44 smertnitsi - suicide bombers.” By suggesting that her act is more sympathy, by extension, for terrorist group. However, in a matter of “fate” and by using the word “led,” the author the grand scheme of strategy, this is but a minor problem. The removes agency from the acts of terrorism. Rather than feeling victim image does not negate other valuable gynocentric tropes disgusted with the violent actions, the reader feels sorry for the and when it does not backﬁre, it is helpful to terrorist groups situation of the bomber. This makes it easier to ﬁnd fault with by placing blame on the occupying power. Overall, the victim the Russian forces that have (assumedly) killed the brothers backﬁring problem is a minor caveat and not substantial enough and husbands of the Black Widows, exactly the reaction the of a problem to negate the use of female suicide terrorists Chechen separatists desire. altogether. The Israeli media similarly paints Palestinian female Speciﬁcally female labels are employed to refer to suicide terrorists as victims. A description like the following in female suicide terrorists to provide gravitas to the cause. The the weekend magazine Yediot Ahronot is typical. The story of mother label is particularly signiﬁcant. Palestinian resistance Rasha, a Palestinian woman, who planned to commit a terrorist movements have long employed conceptions of motherhood attack and was arrested, is tear jerking: to strengthen ideas of a Palestinian nation-state. Initially, all When she was born, her father, Khaled, was no longer near Palestinian women symbolized “mothers of the nation.” This her. He left her mother, Mariam, when she was initially used as propaganda to make women was pregnant… all during her childhood and The tendency to glamorize give up their children to become shahids (suicide teenage years, Rasha tried to get close to females serves to enforce a bombers) with Palestinian [her father], but he avoided her… when he positive image of the female women being described as manabit – plant nursdrew away from her, he marked her as dam- suicide terrorists. eries – or as men-producing factories. A “womaged, and she became depressed…She was an’s womb,” as Mira Tzoreff suggests, became attracted to wanted terrorists…perhaps because she had no fa- “nationalized,” and termed a “military womb.”48 Motherhood ther. 45 is similarly signiﬁcant to the separatist movement in Sri Lanka, Again, by framing her actions in terms of personal loss, where “Tamil mothers make great sacriﬁces for their sons on a the public judges her less. Like the Chechen widows and the daily basis; feeding them before themselves or their girl chilTamil rape victims, this Palestinian would-be bomber is justiﬁed dren, serving them, and so on.” As Mangalika Silva argues, “the because of her suffering. self-sacriﬁce of the female bombers is almost an extension of This approach can sometimes backﬁre, however. the idea of motherhood in the Tamil culture, [as] in this strongly Groups opposing terrorist organizations use the tendency to patriarchal society, acting as a human bomb is an understood see women as victims to their advantage by arguing that female and accepted offering for a woman who will never be a mothsuicide terrorists are victims of the terrorist organizations. Rus- er.”49 This symbolism is extended dramatically when women sian news sources, for example, often claim that Black Widows strap weapons over their stomachs, feigning pregnancy with were forced into terrorism after they were raped, drugged, a maternal lump composed of explosives. The use of women 46 kidnapped, or corrupted by Chechen ﬁghters. The Sri Lankan as suicide terrorists allows for the intersection of the ideas of government accuses the LTTE of raping Tamil women in order mother and resistance ﬁghter, a sort of mythical image, which to coerce them into becoming suicide terrorists. The idea is bolsters the signiﬁcance of the terrorists’ cause and imbibes it that rape leaves them with little other value than that of explo- with a weighty symbolism. sive vessels, so they turn to terrorism. Israeli media also accuses Similarly, virginity is used to also reinforce the symbolPalestinian groups of raping women and then convincing them ism of the cause. Hanadi Garedat, who committed a suicide to become suicide bombers. For example, another article in attack in Haifa, was dubbed the “Bride of Haifa.” This title Yediot Ahronot claims, Agents of Fatah and Tanzim in the Beit suggests that she is “married to the soil of Haifa,” linking her Lehem area rape young Palestinian women, or seduce them terrorist act with the earth, suggesting that she belongs to it. into having sexual relations. They blackmail them by As Tzoreff argues, “this title represents the feminization of telling them, ‘either you commit suicide attacks, or we’ll tell the national metaphoric conjugal bond: the soil of Haifa is the your family, these are reports obtained by IDF intelligence substitute for a ﬂesh and blood husband in Hanadi Garedat’s
unrealized marriage.”50 Through the use of bodily imagery, the cause is mythologized. Brunner argues that there is a tendency to describe women in terms of the body. “Females who entirely destroy their own bodies are very likely to be referred to in terms of corporeality that re-establishes binary gender hierarchy. Moreover, bodily metaphors directly refer to the gendered representation of suicide bombing in general.”51 The inclination to associate women with the body shows that women are useful in fortifying the symbolic value of the terrorist act, more so than men. Paradoxically, while traditional female roles are employed to discuss female suicide attackers, so too are conceptions of feminism. The logic is that because women are stepping outside of their gender roles to commit violence, they are advancing equality. Both Arab and Western commentators have imbibed the debate with this idea. An Australian journalist noted, “when a teenage girl straps explosives to her body and blows herself up in a Jerusalem supermarket, you know feminism has arrived, even in places where Germaine Greer is not exactly a household name.”52 “[Female suicide terrorism] is a very liberating thing to watch, as a Palestinian woman. It shows how women can be equal to men in every way, even in military resistance,” says an expert for gender issues in a UN project in Gaza.53 In Sri Lanka, female suicide terrorists are called “freedom birds.” In an Arab newspaper, Al-Sha’ab, an article describes a female suicide attack, reading: “it is a woman who blew herself up, and with her exploded all the myths about women’s weakness, submissiveness, and enslavement…it is a woman who has proven that the meaning of [women’s] liberation is the liberation of the body from the trials and tribulations of this world.”54 Taking one’s own life and murdering others in the process is certainly not what Gloria Steinem had in mind when she argued for women’s liberation, but the rhetoric implies that female involvement in terrorism represents an advance for women. By becoming martyrs, “Palestinian women have torn the gender classiﬁcation out of their birth certiﬁcates, declaring that sacriﬁce for the Palestinian homeland would not be for men alone; on the contrary, all Palestinian women will write the history of the liberation with their blood and will be time bombs in the face of the Israeli enemy. They will not settle for being mothers of martyrs.”55 The utilization of the feminist discourse in suicide terrorism seems to contradict the use of gender norms as discussed earlier; a feminist would not approve of tropes that remove agency from the female terrorist or comment persistently about her beauty. However, terrorist employment of gendered tropes is not based on a logical or coherent ideology about women, but on a ‘whatever works’ principle. Just as terrorist groups will cite a long forgotten Hadith in order to justify the use of female bombers, so too will they use contradictory tropes. The feminist rhetoric is used because it allows western onlookers to view the terrorist organizations as modern, negating the barbaric image of suicide terrorism. The Arab media employs the feminist dimension to portray “the Palestinian female suicide terrorist as a full partner in the national and religious jihad, while downplaying personal attacks”56 Terrorist groups also use this rhetoric to recruit potential terrorists. As O’Rourke points out, terrorists groups are aware that potential terrorists have a variety of motives for committing an attack just as their audiences have a variety of world views. Terrorists will use any argument they can to gain support for their cause as long as it “does not contradict the main strategic object of combating a foreign military presence.”57 Some groups are more likely to employ this rhetoric than others. Of the groups surveyed, the LTTE is the most likely to use feminist rhetoric. Bose argues that women’s emancipation is one of the reasons the women joined the movement in the ﬁrst place. “Many women have joined the movement at least partly because they see their participation as a means of breaking taboos, and, in particular, destroying the stultifying straitjacket of conformity and subservience traditionally imposed upon them by a rigidly and self-righteously patriarchal society.”58 Secular Palestinian resistance groups like Fatah and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine are more likely to develop this aspect than their religious counterparts. Fatah Revolutionary Council was quoted in al-Quds, published in London, saying that by committing terrorism, “the Palestinian woman reiterates that she stands at the side of the men in the struggle for freedom.” Qauis Abdul Karim from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine added, “the martyr’s death of that ﬂower, Wafa, proves that all sectors of our people, men and women, each at each other’s side, are united in the struggle for freedom, and in the confrontation of aggression.”59 Hamas, reluctant to use female suicide bombers in the ﬁrst place, only uses a very vague feminist discourse to connect female suicide bombing with a nationalist rhetoric. Women’s rights are stated, but only in terms of “a women’s right to wage jihad.” As Brunner clariﬁes, “this construction does not take the equality of men and women as a starting point, but rather it explains the women’s room for maneuver from a deﬁnitely subordinated position, which may only be temporarily lifted in the case of a common interest for what is imagined as the Islamic community.”60 A Hamas leader explains it this way: “the state of jihad suspends the usual relations of subordination and allows women, like slaves, to be active subjects in a highly circumscribed temporal zone but only in the ﬁght against the enemies of Islam.”61 Thus, in the religious Islamic model, equal opportunity is only a means to the end of national liberation. Once liberation is achieved, women will go back to their former status, subordinated “like slaves.” Even when Islam is under threat, there is no equality in death. Whereas men are told they will obtain62 virgins in paradise after they commit a suicide bombing, female suicide bombers do not get63 virgins but become “even more beautiful than the seventy-two virgins. If they are not married, they are guaranteed a pure husband in paradise, and of course they are entitled to bring seventy of their relatives to join them there without suffering the anguish of the grave.”64 Just because terrorists use feminist arguments does
not mean that they are examples of equal opportunity or treat- has basically collapsed we will never know whether Prabament. The symbolic value of dying in equal numbers to men karan would have actually attempted to build a gender-equal has little real-life value. In Chechnyan suicide operations, it is Tamil state. Even if the LTTE had been successful, the example clear that men play leader and women follow. In the Nord Ost of other resistance movements would suggest that once the Theater takeover, the “Black Widows” did not detonate their movement is successful, women would be pushed back into the bombs before gas overtook them. Zedalist suggests that this background. may have been because the women were waiting for the order When we think of female suicide bombers, we imto detonate and were hesitant to do so without being told to. mediately ask the question, why women? The world, regardless Furthermore, a Chechen female has never played a signiﬁcant of whether it is familiar with the concept of feminism, sees acts leadership role within a terrorist organization.65 of female violence as an aberration. This is especially the case Even in secular Palestinian resistance groups, which no- with suicide terrorism, an act that is so violent, with results tably employ feminist rhetoric, women play no role whatsoever so deadly. As we seek to ﬁnd explanations for this shocking in the leadership organizations or in the planning of their own act, we are unable to give gender-neutral explanations. She is attack.66 As with Hamas, the payoff for female suicide terrorists beautiful, she is pure, she is a victim, she was manipulated, she is lower than the payoff for males. Depending on who takes is a widow, she is a mother, or she is a virgin. Terrorist groups responsibility for the attack, a Palestinian terror organization exploit these tendencies, even using contradictory explanations distributes a lifetime stipend of four hundred dollars a month to like feminist. Even when the gendered tropes are contradictory, the families of male suicide bombers. Families of female suicide the overarching point is the same: the female suicide terrorist 67 bombers receive two hundred per month. is never simply a suicide bomber - she is always a female suicide Some scholars have argued bomber. Because of our inability to separate the act terrorist employment of gen- from the gender, our ideas about the female suicide that Arab uses of female suicide terrorists are examples of feminism, but dered tropes is not based on terrorist are intertwined with our ideas about her it is a speciﬁcally Arab type of femi- a logical or coherent gender. Because the feminine paradigm is in connism. Rivka Yadlin points out that the ideology about women, but tradiction to rationality, intelligence, and violence, Western conception of feminism may on a ‘whatever works’ the female suicide bomber is perceived in a more not applicable to the Muslim world. In principle. positive, forgiving, and sympathetic light. Terrorist the East, she argues, feminism is less groups understand this, if only intuitively, and use about equality with men and more about a “principled rejection it to their advantage. They understand that using female suicide of Western values and the internalization of their role as guard- terrorists will bolster support for their cause. Therefore, they ians of Muslim authenticity.” As a Jordinian newspaper al-Dustur use female suicide terrorists because they are strategically logicommented in response to Wafa Idris’ bombing, “Wasn’t it the cal to use. West that kept demanding that the Eastern woman become To prevent further terrorist attacks, American secuequal to the man? Well, this is how we understand equality.”68 I rity agencies must refrain gendering suicide bombers. Gender reject this argument. Where there is a lack of equal opportunity stereotypes cause policy makers and security agencies to ignore there is no feminism. Indeed, as Mia Bloom points out, “the mes- female suspects. When 15% of suicide bombers are female; the sage female suicide bombers send is that they are more valuable US Security should screen women just as they screen men. In to their societies dead than they ever could have been alive.”69 order to do this, the United States government should allocate The LTTE is signiﬁcantly different than the Chechen greater resources in the federal budget to the Department of and Palestinian examples. It has female divisions run by women Homeland Security – because of internal politics, greater fundand espouses feminism as central to the LTTE agenda. While ing for the DHS has historically been relatively easy to achieve. there are disagreements regarding the degree of women’s The funding should be allocated under the provision that it involvement in the upper echelons of the organization, several would increase the number of women hired by the DHS as have argued that there are numerous women in the LTTE screeners, to accommodate for the growing numbers of Female decision-making body.70 The women’s front has published its Suicide Terrorists, while simultaneously respecting their privacy, feminist position, stating as central the aim “to eliminate all disand ensuring the search is conducted by someone of the same crimination against Tamil women…to ensure that Tamil women sex. Furthermore, failing to recognize and attempt to counter control their own lives…to secure legal protection for women the symbolic impact of female terrorism allows female terrorists against sexual harassment, rape and domestic violence.”71 Even to become martyrs. By failing to see female suicide terrorists the LTTE leader, Velupilla Prabhakaran has argued that “the in a gender neutral way, policy makers thus fail to destruct the ideology of women liberation [sic] is a child born out of the message of terrorist groups. Thus, this requires both changes in womb of our liberation struggle… Tamil women are subjected resources and in mindset in the American security community. to intolerable suffering as a consequence of male chauvinistic Ultimately, this will decrease the instance of suicide terrorist oppression, violence and from the social evils of casteism and attacks overall both by reducing risk of terrorist attacks and by dowry…”72 However, women’s liberation was always second to limiting the persuasive power of terrorist groups. Tamil separatism and now that the Tamil resistance movement
BUILDING AN ENDURING REGIONAL ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
Jonathan Lee The signiﬁcance of US-ASEAN relations In November 2011, Secretary of State Clinton announced the dawn of a “Paciﬁc Century” and with it, a pivot in US foreign policy away from the Middle East towards the Asia-Paciﬁc— reafﬁrming America’s unique placement as both an Atlantic and Paciﬁc power.1 In a bold move, the Obama administration has argued that the US needs to build a trans-Paciﬁc network that will consolidate its presence in East Asia— forming a mutually beneﬁcial strategic and economic partnership in a region which generates 60% of global GDP and almost half of global trade.2 This is in part a response to a growing desire in the region for US leadership and commitments as tensions between China and its neighbors have risen over potent ﬂashpoints such as the territorial dispute over the South China Sea, which speaks to the region’s need for greater cooperation and dialogue on security. A strong US presence in the Asia-Paciﬁc is necessary and beneﬁcial in addressing the aforementioned needs. However, this is not to say that the US’s job will be easy in a region that is so diverse, rife with territorial disputes, and lacking in supranational norms of governance (as with the European Union). Any American commitments in the region must be constructive and contribute to a lasting regional economic and security framework that brings all regional powers, including China, into the fold. In order to accomplish this, the US must engage with multilateral institutions and promote regional cooperation and stability. A crucial player in the Asia-Paciﬁc is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is composed of 10 Southeast Asian nations including Singapore, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Myanmar. Together, ASEAN member countries are home to over 620 million people and have a combined GDP of $1.3 trillion.3 However, ASEAN’s inﬂuence extends far beyond Southeast Asia through a network of regional forums that drive the conversation on critical issues such as security and trade, which have attracted the interest of major powers such as the US, Russia, and China. On the economic front, ASEAN— whose countries are the most trade dependent in the world— hosts the East Asia Summit (EAS) and plays a key role in promoting free-trade and economic liberalization.4 ASEAN has set a goal of creating a free-trade market between all of its member states by 2015 and has already signed Free Trade Agreements with China, South Korea, and Japan.5 ASEAN also provides invaluable forums for dialogue on security, in a region known for its paucity of inter-state military cooperation, through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM).6 In sum, ASEAN plays a unique role in bringing all major East Asian nations together and has the potential to promote multilateral approaches to conﬂicts. As the largest military and economic power in the world,
the US has the opportunity to engage ASEAN in a way that not only creates a more stable and integrated economic environment, but also encourages multilateralism and the development of norms for conﬂict resolution in East Asia. ASEAN should be, in the words of President Obama, the “fulcrum” of the AsiaPaciﬁc’s economic and security architecture.7 Economic Integration The United States has made laudable headway in deepening its economic ties with ASEAN, which is its fourth largest trading partner. In 2010, US exports to ASEAN increased by 27% to almost $86 billion, accounting for 440,000 jobs in the US, while ASEAN-US trade totaled $180 billion.8 In the last two years, FDI ﬂow from the US private sector into ASEAN grew to a stunning $165 billion— greater than the US’s total investment in China, Japan, and Korea combined.9 Furthermore, President Obama announced in 2009 that the US would participate in the Transpaciﬁc Partnership (TPP), which has the ambitious goal of creating a single, streamlined trans-Paciﬁc free trade area with coherent regulatory standards on labor, intellectual property, and environmental protection.10 According to Ambassador for ASEAN Affairs Scot Marciel, the end goal of these measures is the creation of a region-wide “conveyor belt for trade growth, foreign exchange earnings, technology transfer and broad economic development.”11 Thus far, nine Paciﬁc countries, including four from ASEAN, have signed on. However, the US’s engagement with ASEAN falls short in important regards vis-à-vis the TPP. Ernest Bower of the Center for Strategic and International Studies criticizes the US strategy for “supporting a strong ASEAN on the security and political front, but that it is happy to divide ASEAN when it comes to trade.”12 As of now, only four ASEAN members are TPP countries and only seven of 10 members, as members of the Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC), are eligible for TPP accession. Limiting the eligibility for TPP accession to APEC countries sends a contradictory message to ASEAN. On the one hand, the US supports an economically integrated region, yet its ambitious trade platform for the region only includes four of its members. The United States can take multiple measures to align TPP with a more comprehensive strategy for East Asia. First, the Obama administration should continue aggressively pushing for the ratiﬁcation of FTA’s in the Asia-Paciﬁc, as it has done successfully with South Korea, Panama, and Colombia. As of now, Singapore is the only ASEAN country that has an FTA with the US. Prominent US leaders, such as Senate Foreign Relations Committee member Richard Lugar and members of the CSIS US-ASEAN Strategy Commission, have argued the US should take concrete steps to pave the way for negotiating a US-ASEAN FTA and signal its commitment in helping ASEAN members build capacity to enter the FTA.13 For instance, with the success of elections in Burma, the US could begin lowering sanctions and increasing investment in the country’s infrastructure. According to Singapore’s Foreign Minister, K Shanmugam, signing bilateral FTA’s with more ASEAN countries would also
be a platform to achieve the US-ASEAN FTA. Passing this FTA is important because it is consistent with the goal of lowering barriers to TPP accession. Having these agreements in place would also ease any misgivings that ASEAN may have about the TPP, by reafﬁrming the US’s commitment to ASEAN. Another crucial step in rationalizing US economic engagement in the region is inviting China to join the TPP. As many analysts have noted, trying to build an integrated freemarket in the region without its largest and most important economy is foolhardy, to say the least. Jagdish Baghwati of the Council on Foreign Affairs, afﬁrms this sentiment, arguing that the exclusion of China makes the TPP a “discriminatory plurilateral FTA a ‘partnership’, invoking a false aura of cooperation and cosmopolitanism”, as opposed to genuine multilateralism.14 He notes that by announcing the TPP at a time when China has taken heavy-handed and aggressive measures in asserting its territorial sovereignty in disputed waters (such as the South China Sea and East China Sea), the US has effectively forced the hand of threatened Asian nations and made the TPP a divisive measure for containing China. This is a mistake, ﬁrst, because it undermines the viability of the TPP. Furthermore, attempting to confront and isolate China will undermine regional security by failing to acknowledge that ASEAN has deep cultural and commercial linkages to China. The last thing any ASEAN (or East Asian, for that matter) nation wants is open conﬂict between the US and China. Multilateral Cooperation on Security Foreign Minister Shanmugam correctly notes that “it is quite untenable to speak in terms of the containment of China” given its size, its prowess, and its right to a more prominent position in the region.15 He argues that East Asia is big enough to accommodate both China and the US and warns that it is not useful to think of the US-China relationship as a zero-sum game. Moreover, Richard Bush of Brookings concurs that such an approach to China is divisive; remarking that “the fundamental reality is that all Asian countries want to have good relations with the United States and with China. Regarding China, they want the beneﬁt of economic engagement and a reduction of tensions. From the United States, they want a security hedge should ties with China go sour.”16 The US should not mistake its welcome in Asia as an invitation to provoke a great power rivalry in the region, which would harm its relations and its own interests. In this light, moves such as excluding China from the TPP and deciding to rotate 2,500 Marines in Australia are not only unnecessarily provocative, but corrosive to regional stability. As Bush argues, the US can best inﬂuence China and the Asia-Paciﬁc “through a regional presence that sets boundaries and by exploiting the opportunities provided by shared and overlapping interests.”17 ASEAN’s regional forums on defense, which have attracted the participation of all major powers in the region, provide the US with the best opportunity to promote diplomatic cooperation as a means of conﬂict resolution. For instance, in the South China Sea, where China and four ASEAN nations have conﬂicting claims, the US should sustain a strong message calling for free and open navigations of waters. It also should support ASEAN in its efforts to negotiate a binding code of conduct with China for naval activities in the region, as ASEAN has offered to do.18 At the same time, however, the US should press ASEAN to take more concrete steps towards diplomacy with China by putting the sea dispute on the agenda for annual ARF and ADMM meetings with the goal of reaching a multilateral resolution of the conﬂict. Short of encouraging negotiation, the US should not take advantage of the situation to ramp up its bilateral military alliances, as it has done with the Philippines. Instead, a more measured way of signaling its commitment to ASEAN would be to offer non-military, humanitarian aid or cooperate with countries in developing domestic security and counter-terrorist forces. The United States has a clear strategic interest in the Asia-Paciﬁc, which is currently the most dynamic region in the world. Given the depth of its military and economic ties to the region, however, the US has the opportunity to shape its future in a way that improves prospects for security and economic prosperity for itself and the world—and it should do so by making its trade policy truly multilateral and refraining from divisive military activity. Engaging with, rather than bypassing ASEAN— as the most respected and established multilateral organization in the region— to further the US’s twin interests of trade and security would not only establish its leadership through example, but also be a concrete ﬁrst step toward stabilizing the Asia-Paciﬁc through trade integration and multilateralism.
Weiduo Chen, Financial Literacy Education as Part of the Public Education System
1. Mark Miller, “Lack of Financial Literacy Can Hurt Retirement,” Reuters, February 16, 2012, http://www.reuters. com/article/2012/02/17/column-miller-literacy-idUSL2E8DH3EA20120217. 2. “Optimistic Teens May Need Financial Reality Check, Schwab Survey Shows,” Charles Schwab Corporation, March 27, 2007, http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/schwab/index. jsp?ndmViewId=news_view&ndmConﬁgId=1002458&newsId=2 0070920006167&newsLang=en. 3. “Economic, Personal Finance & Entrepreneurship Education in Our Nation’s Schools in 2007,” Council for Economic Education, 2007, http://www.councilforeconed.org/about/survey2007/ NCEESurvey2007.pdf. 4. “Visa Back-To-School Survey Finds That Only 5% of Kids Learn Vital Life Skill of Money Management in Class,” Visa, August 2007, http://www.practicalmoneyskills.com/english/ presscenter/releases/081307.php. 5. Lisa A. Donnini, KayAnn Miller, and Kitch Walker, “Improving Americans’ Financial Literacy: Educational Tools Work,” The Patrick Collins Group, LLC, http://www.practicalmoneyskills. com/summit2011/wp_imp_ﬂ.pdf. 6. Liz Pulliam Weston, “Raise Your Credit Score to 740,” MSN Money, http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Banking/YourCreditRating/weston-raise-your-credit-score-to-740.aspx. 7. Lisa A. Donnini, KayAnn Miller, Kitch Walker, “Improving Americans’ Financial Literacy: Educational Tools Work,” The Patrick Collins Group, LLC. 8. “National K-12 Financial Literacy Qualitative & Quantitative Research,” Networks Financial Institute at Indiana State University, April 2007, http://www.networksﬁnancialinstitute.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/NationalK12FinancialLiteracyStudy.pdf . 9. “10 Facts About K-12 Education Funding,” U.S. Department of Education, June 2005, http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/10facts/index.html.
Rachel Ferman, The Politics of Economic Decision-making: Similar Circumstances, Different Outcomes Brazil and Argentina
1. Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo, Argentine Democracy: the Politics of Institutional Weakness (University Park (Pa.): Pennsylvania State University, 2006), ix. 2. “GDP (current US$) – Brazil and Argentina,” December 12, 2011, World Bank World Development Indicators. 3. “Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2003 - Argentina,” FreedomHouse.org., December 12, 2011, http://www. freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=335&ye ar=2003. 4. Levitsky and Murillo, 50.
5. Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith. “Brazil: Development For Whom?” Modern Latin America, 6th edition (New York: Oxford UP, 2005), 178, 6. Samuel P. Huntington, “Chapter 1: What?” The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1991), 3. 7. “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Brazil.” Rep. Polity IV-a, June 1, 2011, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Brazil2010.pdf, 1 8. Levitsky and Murillo, 6. 9. Sebastian M. Saiegh, “The ‘sub-national’ connection: legislative coalitions, cross-voting, and policymaking in Argentina,” Chapter 6 in Flavia Fiorucci and Marcus Klein (Eds.), The Argentine Crisis at the Turn of the Millennium: Causes, Consequences, and Explanations (Amsterdam: Aksant Academic Publishers, 2004), 109. 10. Saiegh, 107. 11. Peter R. Kingstone, “Chapter 9: Muddling Through the Gridlock - Economic Policy Performance, Business Responses and Democratic Sustainability,” Democratic Brazil: Actors, Institutions, and Processes (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2000),189. 12. Fishlow, 25 13. Barbara Geddes, The Initiation of New Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Working paper no. 80 (College Park: University O Maryland, 1993), 21. 14. Timothy J. Power, “Political Institutions in Democratic Brazil: Politics as a Permanent Constitutional Convention,” Democratic Brazil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2000), 20. 15. Levitsky and Murillo, 8. 15. Levitsky and Murillo, 9-10. 16. Flavia Fiorucci and Marcus Klein (Eds.), The Argentine Crisis at the Turn of the Millennium: Causes, Consequences, and Explanations (Amsterdam: Aksant Academic Publishers, 2004), xi 17. Kurt Weyland, “Chapter 2: The Brazilian State in the New Democracy,” Democratic Brazil: Actors, Institutions, and Processes (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2000), 38. 18. Edward L. Gibson, “The Populist Road to Market Reform: Policy and Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina,” World Politics Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997), 360. 19. Rex A. Hudson, ed., Brazil: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1997), Web, http://countrystudies.us/brazil. 20. Barbara Geddes, The Initiation of New Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Working paper no. 80. (College Park: University O Maryland, 1993), 21. 21. Timothy J. Power, “Political Institutions in Democratic Brazil: Politics as a Permanent Constitutional Convention,” Democratic Brazil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2000), 28. 22. Saiegh, 118. 23. Judith A. Teichman, The Politics of Freeing Markets in Latin America Chile, Argentina, and Mexico (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 119. 24. Saiegh, 118.
25. Teichman, 120 26. Shugart, Matthew Soberg, and John M. Carey, “Chapter 2: Deﬁning Regimes with Elected Presidents, and Chapter 3: Criticisms of Presidentialism and Responses,” Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992), 32. 27. Luis Alberto Romero, “The Argentine Crisis: A Look at the Twentieth Century,” Chapter 2 in Flavia Fiorucci and Marcus Klein (Eds.), The Argentine Crisis at the Turn of the Millennium: Causes, Consequences, and Explanations (Amsterdam: Aksant Academic Publishers, 2004), 35. 28. Teichman, 167. 29. Fiorucci and Klein, 50. 30. Romero, 30. 31. Fiorucci and Klein, 49. 32. Freedom House-c, 2. 33. Romero, 35. 34. Saiegh, 123. 35. Mainwaring-a, 23. 36. Polity IV-a. 37. Albert Fishlow, Starting over: Brazil since 1985 (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2011), 177. 38. Kingstone, 191. 39. Fishlow, 36. 40. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, A Arte Da Política: a Historia Que Vivi, Ed. Ricardo A. Setti, 3rd ed. (Rio De Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2006), 147. 41. Fishlow; Skidmore. 42. Kingstone ,195. 43. “Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2002 - Brazil.” FreedomHouse.org, December 12, 2011, http://www. freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2002&count ry=867. 44. Cardoso, 151. 45. Montero, 62. 46. Alfred P. Montero, “Chapter 3: Devolving Democracy? Political Decentralization and the New Brazilian Federalism,” Democratic Brazil: Actors, Institutions, and Processes (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2000), 43. 47. Fishlow, 178. 48. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Political Regimes and Economic Growth,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer 1993), 51. 49. Anand Giridharadas, “Brazil Tries Pragmatism, Not Politics,” New York Times, November 18, 2011, Currents section. 50. “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Argentina,” Rep. Polity IV-b, June 1, 2011, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Argentina2010.pdf. IV-b 51. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” Max Weber’s Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocations, Trans. John Dreijmanis (New York, NY: Algora Publ., 2008), 161. 1. “The Clear Case for the Gas Tax,” The New York Times, Editorial, August 15, 2011, Web, http://www.nytimes. com/2011/08/16/opinion/the-clear-case-for-the-gas-tax.html. 2. Murray Rothbard, “Making Economic Sense: That Gasoline Tax,” Ludwig Von Mises Institute, 59. 3. “Study: CAFE Standards Could Mean Bigger Cars, Not Smaller Ones,” Popular Mechanics, December 8, 2011. 4. Gregory Mankiw, “The Pigou Club Manifesto,” Greg Mankiw’s Blog, October 8, 2006, http://gregmankiw.blogspot. com/2006/10/pigou-club-manifesto.html.
Asher Hecht-Bernstein and Ze’ev Gebler, Expanding Disability Access to Public Transportation
1. Lynette Petty, “Section 504 transportation regulations: molding civil rights legislation to meet the realities of economic constraints,” Washburn law journal 26.3 Washburn University School of Law, 1987), 558-600. 2. Petty. 3. Theodore Poister, “Federal Transportation Policy for the Elderly and Handicapped – Responsive to Real Needs?” Public Administration Review. Vol 42, No. 1 (Jan –Feb 1982), 6-14. 4. Petty. 5. Poister. 6. Poister. 7. Poister. 8. David Pfeiffer, “Public Transit Access for Disabled Persons in the United States,” Disability, Handicap and Society, Vol 5, No. 2, (1990), 152-166. 9. Poister. 10. Petty. 11. Glenn Yago, “The Sociology of Transportation,” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 9 (1983), 171-190. 12. Petty. 13. Pfeiffer. 14. Pfeiffer. 15. Pfeiffer. 16. Pfeiffer. 17. Sharon Rennert, “All Aboard: Accessible Public Transportation for Disabled Persons,” N.Y.U.L. Rev. 63 (May 1988), 360. 18. Rennert. 19. Mary Johnson, “As Unpleasant as Possible to Ride,” Ragged Edge (January 5, 2005). 20. Pfeiffer. 21. Rennert. 22. James Podgers, “Mass Transit for the Disabled: How Far Should It Go?,” American Bar Association Journal, 66 (1980), 425. 23. Ariel Kaminer, “A Godsend, Except When It’s Not,” New York Times online, February 5, 2010, http://www.nytimes. com/2010/02/07/nyregion/07critic.html. 24. Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, Congress of the United States, “Urban Transportation for Handicapped Persons: Alternative Federal Approaches,” 1979.
Sharin Khander, A Bipartisan Compromise for a Gasoline Tax Hike
Colette Jaycox, Integrating Hospital Centers into Local Schools
1. “Hospital School provides routine, relief for sick children,” WRAL Online, November 27, 2008, http://www.wral.com/ news/local/story/4035320/. 2. “Hospital School: Duke Hospital in Durham, North Carolina,” Accessed March 12, 2012, http://hospital.dpsnc.net/; “Lucille Packard Children’s Hospital at Stanford,” Accessed March 12, 2012, http://www.lpch.org/forPatientsVisitors/PatientServices/ School/school.html; “UNC Health Care,” Accessed March 12, 2012, http://www.unchealthcare.org/site/healthpatientcare/ patient/other/hospital_school.html. 3. “Lucille Packard Children’s Hospital at Stanford.” 4. “Understanding Special Education,” Accessed March 12, 2012, http://www.understandingspecialeducation.com/IEPprocess.html.
Sam Klug, Restoring Fairness to College Athletics
1. “NCAA grad rates top 80 percent,” National Collegiate Athletic Association, October 25, 2011, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2011/October/ NCAA+grad+rates+top+80+percent. 2. Libby Sander, “With an Assist From Alabama, Southeastern Conference Breaks the $1-Billion Mark,” Chronicle of Higher Education, December 7, 2010, http://chronicle.com/article/ The-Billion-Dollar-Conference/125643/?key=HDp3dwRoMCI QbHs3YDsXYWsDYXBqN057aiYdbXgkbllXEA%3D%3D#re venue1. 3. James K. Gentry and Raquel Meyer Alexander, “From the Sideline to the Bottom Line,” New York Times, December 31, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/sports/ncaafootball/contracts-for-top-college-football-coaches-grow-complicated.html?scp=4&sq=Nick%20Saban&st=cse. 4. “Amateurism,” National Collegiate Athletic Association, Accessed March 31, 2012, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Eligibility/Becoming+Eligible/Amateurism. 5. Taylor Branch, “The Shame of College Sports,” The Atlantic Magazine, October 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/8643/. 6. “About,” Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, Accessed January 15, 2012, http://www.knightcommission.org/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=74. 7. Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, “Restoring the Balance: Dollars, Values, and the Future of College Sports,” 2010. 8. Branch, “The Shame of College Sports.” 9. Ramogi Huma and Ellen J. Staurowsky, “The Price of Poverty in Big Time College Sport,” National College Players Association, Accessed January 15, 2012, 4. 10. Huma and Staurowsky, “The Price of Poverty in Big Time College Sport,” 4.
11. Huma and Staurowsky, “The Price of Poverty in Big Time College Sport,” 4. 12. Knight Commission, “Restoring the Balance,” 17. 13. “Student-Athlete Statement—NCAA Division 1,” Academic Year 2011-12, Accessed January 15, 2012. 14. Huma and Staurowsky, “The Price of Poverty in Big Time College Sport,” 7. 15. Huma and Staurowsky, “The Price of Poverty in Big Time College Sport,” 5. 16. Richard Sandomir and Pete Thamel, “TV Deal Pushes N.C.A.A. Closer to 68-Team Tournament,” New York Times, April 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/ sports/ncaabasketball/23ncaa.html; Associated Press, “BCS, ESPN reach deal to air games from 2011-14,” ESPN.com, November 18, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/ wire?section=ncf&id=3710611. 17. Huma and Staurowsky, “The Price of Poverty in Big Time College Sport,” 5; Joe Nocera, “The Case for Agents,” New York Times online, March 12, 2012, http://nocera.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/the-case-for-agents/?ref=joenocera.
Akshay Kini, The Politics of Immigration
1. Gordon H. Hanson, “Immigration, Productivity, and Competitiveness in American Industry,” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, January 2011, PDF. 2. Robert V. Hamilton, “Immigration Policy: Highly Skilled Workers and U.S. Competitiveness and Innovation,” The Brookings Institution, February 7, 2011, PDF. 3. David North, “Big Majority of Foreign PhDs Stay in the U.S. Many Years After Degree,” Center for Immigration Studies, January 19, 2012. 4. “The ‘New American’ Fortune 500,” Partnership for a New American Economy, June 2011, PDF. 5. Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda, “Raising the Floor for American Workers: The Economic Beneﬁts of Comprehensive Immigration Reform,” Center for American Progress, January 2011, PDF. 6.“Visa Law Would Give U.S. World’s Tired, Poor Technologists: View,” Editorial, Bloomberg online, November 30, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-01/expanded-visa-law-would-give-u-s-world-s-tired-poor-technologists-view.html.
Energy and Environment
Sophia Rogers, Public-Private Collaboration to Improve Green Investment
1. David Baker and Carolyn Said, “Solyndra: Energy Superstar’s Rapid Rise and Fall,” San Francisco Chronicle online, September 20, 2011, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/ c/a/2011/09/17/BULV1L4P3S.DTL. 2. David Rotman, “Solyndra: We Told You So - MIT Technology Review,” Technology Review, March 28, 2012, http://www. technologyreview.com/blog/energy/27169/. 3. Rotman. 4. Baker and Said.
ment of Labor. 7. Farhang, Sean, and Ira Katznelson. “The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New Deal and Fair Deal.” Studies in American Political Development 19.01 (2005). 8. “Wage and Hour Division FLSA2010-RE: Fact Sheet #71: Internship Programs Under The Fair Labor Standards Act.” Washington, D.C.: Department of Labor. 9. Edwards, Kathryn Anne, and Alexander Hertel-Fernandez. “Paving the Way through Paid Internships: A Proposal to Expand Educational and Economic Opportunities for Low-Income College Students.” Washington, D.C.: Demos and The Economic Policy Institute. 10. Ibid. 11. Hattam, Victoria “Institutions and Political Change: Workingclass formation in England and the United States, 1820-1896”. 12. Fantasia, Rick, and Kim Voss. Hard Work: Remaking the American Labor Movement: University of California, 2004. 13. Richard Oestreicher, 1998, “The Rules of the Game: Class Politics in Twentieth-Century America”. 14. Bacon, Natalie, “UNPAID INTERNSHIPS: THE HISTORY, POLICY, AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF “FACT SHEET #71.” Ohio State Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal. Volume 6:1. Page 91. 15. Farhang, Sean, and Ira Katznelson. “The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New Deal and Fair Deal.” Studies in American Political Development 19.01 (2005). 16. Executive Order 8802 established the Fair Employment Practices Commission, and Executive Order 10988 gave federal workers the right to bargain collectively. 17. Work – unless it is limited to training for a speciﬁc period of time that will be followed by paid employment at the same company – cannot be done for free because it undervalues the entire labor force
Leah Reiss, The Environmental Case for City Living
1. “Liveable Cities: The Beneﬁts of Urban Environmental Planning,” The Cities Alliance Publications, October 2007, http:// www.citiesalliance.org/ca/sites/citiesalliance.org/ﬁles/CA_ Docs/resources/cds/liveable/1.pdf. 2. Howard Frumkin, “Urban Sprawl and Public Health,” Public Health Reports, Vol. 117 (May-June 2002), http://www.cdc. gov/healthyplaces/articles/Urban%20Sprawl%20and%20Public%20Health%20-%20PHR.pdf. 3. Haya El Nasser, “Most major U.S. cities show population declines,” USA Today online, June 27, 2011, http://www.usatoday. com/news/nation/census/2011-04-07-1Acities07_ST_N.htm. 4. George Galster, Jackie Cutsinger, and Jason C. Booza, “Where Did They Go? The Decline of Middle-Income Neighborhoods in Metropolitan America,” Brookings Institution, June 2006, http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2006/06poverty_ booza.aspx. 5. Nicole Stelle Garnett, “Save the Cities, Stop the Suburbs?,” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 116, No. 3 (December 2006). 6. “Facts at a Glance,” Public Transportation, http://www. publictransportation.org/news/facts/Pages/default.aspx. 7. Bernadette Hanlon, John R. Short, and Thomas J. Vicino, Cities and Suburbs: New metropolitan realities in the US (Oxford: Routledge, 2010). 8. Hanlon, Short, and Vicino, Cities and Suburbs. 9. Edward Glaeser, Triumph of the City (New York: Penguin Press, 2011). 10. Michael Grunwald, “D.C.’s Fear of Heights,” Washington Post online, July 2, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/30/AR2006063001316. html?nav=rss_print/outlook. 11. Glaeser, Triumph of the City. 12. Glaeser, Triumph of the City. 13. Clay L. Writ, “Dillon’s Rule,” Virginia Town and City, Vol. 24, No. 8 (August, 1989).
Kendall Hope Tucker, The Case for Weekend Voting
1. Why Tuesday?, Accessed March 26, 2012, http://www. whytuesday.org/, 2. “2012 Primary Schedule,” 2012 Election Central, Accessed March 19, 2012, http://www.2012presidentialelectionnews. com/2012-republican-primary-schedule/. 3. “Why Do We Vote On Tuesday?,” Why Tuesday?, Accessed April 1, 2012, http://www.whytuesday.org/answer/. 4. Robert Longley, “Survey Answers, Why Don’t More Americans Vote?,” About.com US Government Info, Accessed April 1, 2012, http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/thepoliticalsystem/a/ whynotvote.htm. 5. David Brooks and Gail Collins, “Do You Really Want to Vote for That Candidate?” Opinionator, New York Times online, September 29, 2010, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes. com/2010/09/29/do-you-really-want-to-vote-for-that-candidate/. 6. Rick Maze, “Republicans to Review Absentee Ballot Problems,” Marine Corps Times online, November 3, 2010, http:// www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/11/military-absen-
Sarah Scheinman, Unpaid Interns: America’s Forgotten Workforce
1 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/11/ education/11scores.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1&sq=new%20 york%20standardized%20testing&st=cse&scp=20 2 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/21/science/21memory. html?_r=2&src=me&ref=general 3 http://usny.nysed.gov/rttt/application/summary.html (New York State Race to the Top application summary of Regents Education Reform Plan) 4 http://www.k12center.org/rsc/pdf/ResnickBergerSystemModel.pdf 5 http://www.dataqualitycampaign.org/survey/elements 6. WHD. 2004. “Wage and Hour Division FLSA2004-5NA: RE: FLSA Status of Student Interns.” Washington, D.C.: Depart-
tee-voting-investigation-110310w/. 7. “Voter Turnout,” FairVote.org, Accessed April 1 2012, http://www.fairvote.org/voter-turnout. 8 “Voter Turnout,” FairVote.org. Accessed April 1, 2012, http://www.fairvote.org/voter-turnout. 9. Steve Israel, “U.S. Reps. Israel and Larson Announce Legislation to Move Election Day to Weekend,” The Online Ofﬁce of Congressman Steve Israel, Accessed April 1, 2012, http://israel.house.gov/index. php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1038:us-repsisrael-and-larson-announce-legislation-to-move-election-day-toweekend&catid=53:2012-press-releases.
Juliana Colangelo, The Reformation of the Rockefeller Drug Laws
1. Burns, Ed, Dennis Lehane, George Pelecanos, Richard Price, and David Simon. “The Wire’s War on the Drug War.” TIME Magazine. TIME Magazine, 5 Mar. 2008. Web. 18 Nov. 2010. <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1719872,00.html#ixzz12v6I5K4c>. 2. Weiman, David F., and Christopher Weiss. “The Origins of Mass Incarceration in New York State: The Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Local War on Drugs.” In Do Prisons Make Us Safer?: The Beneﬁts and Costs of the Prison Boom, edited by Steven Raphael and Michael A. Stoll, 74. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009 3. Drop the Rock. Correctional Association of New York. <http://www.droptherock.org/?page_id=122>. 18 Nov. 2010 4. Herman, Susan N. “Measuring Culpability By Measuring Drugs? Three Reasons to Reevaluate the Rockefeller Drug Laws.” Albany Law Review 63.3 (2000): 798. Print. 5. USA. New York State Assembly. Breaking New York’s Addiction to Prison. By Sheldon Silver. New York State Assembly’s Committee on Ways and Means, 8 May 2008. Web. 24 Sept. 2010. <http://assembly.state.ny.us/ssspolicy/Rockefeller.pdf>. 6. White House Ofﬁce of National Drug Control Policy, Drug Policy Information Clearinghouse, Fact Sheet, Drug Use Trends, 2002. 7. Herman, Susan N. “Measuring Culpability By Measuring Drugs? Three Reasons to Reevaluate the Rockefeller Drug Laws.” Albany Law Review 63.3 (2000): 798. Print. Pg. 86. 8. Senator Schneiderman Argues for Drug Law Reform. Perf. Eric Schneiderman. YouTube- Broadcast Yourself. 6 Apr. 2009. Web. 14 Dec. 2010. <http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=vCKpQr27UOU>. 9. Gray, Madison. “New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws.” TIME 2 Apr. 2009. CNN. Web. 20 Oct. 2010 10. Weiman, David F., and Christopher Weiss. “The Origins of Mass Incarceration in New York State: The Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Local War on Drugs.” In Do Prisons Make Us Safer?: The Beneﬁts and Costs of the Prison Boom, edited by Steven Raphael and Michael A. Stoll, 86. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009. 11. Barker, Vanessa. “The Politics of Punishing: Building a State Governance Theory of American Imprisonment Variation.” Punishment and Society 8(3 2006: 5-32. 12. “Rethinking The ‘Lifer Law’ - 60 Minutes - CBS News.” Breaking News Headlines: Business, Entertainment & World News - CBS News. CBS News, 4 June 1999. Web. 18 Nov. 2010. <http://www.cbsnews.com>. 13. Goode, Erich. “The American Drug Panic of the 1980’s: Social Construction of Objective Threat?” International Journal of the Addictions 25, no. 9 (1990): 1094. 14. Weiman, David F., and Christopher Weiss. “The Origins of Mass Incarceration in New York State: The Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Local War on Drugs.” In Do Prisons Make Us Safer?: The Beneﬁts and Costs of the Prison Boom, edited by
Philip Verma, Fixing the Federalized Immigration Enforcement System
1. National Council of La Raza, “Common Myths about Undocumented Immigrants” 2006 2. Marshall Fitz, “Safer Than Ever: A View from the US-Mexico Border,” Center for American Progress, August 2011. 3. “1934 Appendix D- Grounds for Judicial Deportation,” U.S. Department of Justice Criminal Resource Manual, Accessed March 1, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm01934.htm. 4. “Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Through the 287(g) program,” Immigration Policy Center, April 2010, http://www. immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/local-enforcement-immigrationlaws-through-287g-program. 5. “Racial Disparity in NYPD Stop and Frisks,” Center for Constitutional Rights, January 15, 2009, http://ccrjustice. org/learn-more/reports/report%3A-racial-disparity-nypdstop-and-frisks; David Crary, “NYPD Surveillance of Muslim Communities Prompts Post-9/11 Civil Liberties Debate,” Hufﬁngton Post, November 19, 2011, http://www.hufﬁngtonpost.com/2011/11/19/nypd-surveillance-of-muslims-9-11-civilliberties_n_1102912.html. 6. “Secure Communities: A Fact Sheet,” Immigration Policy Center, Accessed March 1, 2012, http://www.immigrationpolicy. org/just-facts/secure-communities-fact-sheet. 7. “Secure Communities: A Fact Sheet.” 8. “Backlash Against Secure Communities Grows as Local Police Ask ‘Just Let Us Do Our Jobs!’” Americas Voice Online, Accessed March 1, 2012, http://americasvoiceonline.org/blog/ entry/backlash_against_secure_communities 9. Elise Foley, “DHS Overrides States; Says Illinios Must Share Fingerprint Data for Deportations” Hufﬁngton Post, May 6, 2011, http://www.hufﬁngtonpost.com/2011/05/06/dhssecure-communities-illinois_n_858528.html. 10. Neil Conan, “How Corporate Interests Got SB1070 Passed,” Talk of the Nation, NPR online, http://www.npr.org/ templates/story/story.php?storyId=131191523.
Steven Raphael and Michael A. Stoll, 86. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009. 15. Ibid. 16. Barker, Vanessa. “The Politics of Punishing: Building a State Governance Theory of American Imprisonment Variation.” Punishment and Society 8(3 2006: 5-32. 17. Weiman, David F., and Christopher Weiss. “The Origins of Mass Incarceration in New York State: The Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Local War on Drugs.” In Do Prisons Make Us Safer?: The Beneﬁts and Costs of the Prison Boom, edited by Steven Raphael and Michael A. Stoll, 97. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009 18. NYCLU. “Legislative Memo: NYCLU Strongly Supports Reform of Rockefeller Drug Laws.” New York Civil Liberties Union. NYCLU, 1 May 2000. Web. 18 Nov. 2010. <http:// www.nyclu.org/node/743>. 19. “Hard Drugs and Simple Solutions. “ New York Times (1923-Current ﬁle) 26 Jun 1977,ProQuest Historical Newspapers New York Times (1851-2007) w/ Index (1851-1993), ProQuest. Web. 14 Dec. 2010. 20. Farber, M.A. “DRUG FLOW NOTED DESPITE NEW LAWS :Authorities in State Say Big Dealers Go Unchecked but Addicts Get Stiff Terms Drug Flow Noted in Spite of StringentLaws Old Law Toughened Most Offenses Not Major Deterrent Discounted. “ New York Times (1923-Current ﬁle) 25 Jun 1974,ProQuest Historical Newspapers New York Times (18512007) w/ Index (1851-1993), ProQuest. Web. 14 Dec. 2010. 21. “The Prices of Punishment.” New York Times (1923-Current ﬁle) 25 Feb 1991,ProQuest Historical Newspapers New York Times (1851-2007) w/ Index (1851-1993), ProQuest. Web. 14 Dec. 2010. 22. Colangelo, Juliana. “Rockefeller Drug Laws- A Discussion with Robert Gangi, Director of the Correctional Association of New York.” Personal interview. 25 Oct. 2010. 23. “Real Reform.” Reform the Rockefeller Drug Laws NY.http://www.realreformny.org/ 24. Colangelo, Juliana. “Rockefeller Drug Laws- A Discussion with Robert Gangi, Director of the Correctional Association of New York.” Personal interview. 25 Oct. 2010. 25. Gonzalez, Juan. “Drug-Law Reform Stings Some.” The Daily News [New York City] 9 Dec. 2004. New York News, Trafﬁc, Sports, Weather, Photos, Entertainment, and Gossip NY Daily News. 9 Dec. 2004. Web. 08 Oct. 2010. 26. “The Campaign.” Drop the Rock. Correctional Association of New York. Web. 18 Nov. 2010. <http://www.droptherock. org/?page_id=122>. 27. Colangelo, Juliana. “Rockefeller Drug Laws- A Discussion with Robert Gangi, Director of the Correctional Association of New York.” Personal interview. 25 Oct. 2010. 28. Baker, Al. “Time Eases Tough Drug Laws, but Fight Goes On.” The New York Times 16 Apr. 2004. Www.thenewyorktimes.com. The New York Times. Web. 24 Sept. 2010. 29. Colangelo, Juliana. “Rockefeller Drug Laws- A Discussion with Robert Gangi, Director of the Correctional Association of New York.” Personal interview. 25 Oct. 2010. 30. Colangelo, Juliana. “Rockefeller Drug Laws- A Discussion with Robert Gangi, Director of the Correctional Association of New York.” Personal interview. 25 Oct. 2010. 31. Colangelo, Juliana. “Rockefeller Drug Laws- A Discussion with Robert Gangi, Director of the Correctional Association of New York.” Personal interview. 25 Oct. 2010 32. Ibid. 33. Gardiner, Sean. “Buy and Busy: New York City’s War on Drugs at 40.” City Limits Investigates, Summer 2009. 34. Senator Schneiderman Argues for Drug Law Reform. Perf. Eric Schneiderman. YouTube- Broadcast Yourself. 6 Apr. 2009. Web. 14 Dec. 2010. <http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=vCKpQr27UOU>. 35. Senator Schneiderman Argues for Drug Law Reform. Perf. Eric Schneiderman. YouTube- Broadcast Yourself. 6 Apr. 2009. Web. 14 Dec. 2010. <http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=vCKpQr27UOU>. 36. United States. New York State Assembly. New York State Assembly. 7 Apr. 2009. Web. 14 Dec. 2010. <http://assembly. state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A00156&sh=t>. 37. NYCLU. “NYCLU Applauds Signiﬁcant Step in Dismantling Draconian Rockefeller Drug Laws.” New York Civil Liberties Union. NYCLU, 4 Mar. 2009. Web. 18 Nov. 2010. <http:// www.nyclu.org/node/2271>. 38. “Analysis of Rockefeller Drug Law Reform Bill.” The Correctional Association of New York. Web. 14 Dec. 2010. <http:// droptherock.ipower.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/ analysis-of-rockefeller-reform-bill.pdf>. 39. Colangelo, Juliana. “Rockefeller Drug Laws- A Discussion with Robert Gangi, Director of the Correctional Association of New York.” Personal interview. 25 Oct. 2010. 40. Ibid. 41. Eric Schneiderman Discussing Rockefeller Drug Law Reform on NY1. YouTube. 24 Apr. 2009. Web. 14 Dec. 2010. <http:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=l6d4Etp3CtA&feature=related>. 42. “Silver: End NY’s War on Drugs.” Interview by Errol Louis. WWRL Morning Show with Errol Louis. WWRL, 29 Jan. 2009. Web. 24 Sept. 2010 43. Honorary Sheldon Silver Plenary Remarks Part 2. DrugPolicyAlliance. YouTube, 22 Jan. 2009. Web. 14 Dec. 2010. <http://www.youtube.com/user/ DrugPolicyAlliance#p/u/38/e-SyNRl0zqc>. 44. Eric Schneiderman Discussing Rockefeller Drug Law Reform on NY1. YouTube. 24 Apr. 2009. Web. 14 Dec. 2010. <http:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=l6d4Etp3CtA&feature=related>. 45. Senator Schneiderman Argues for Drug Law Reform. Perf. Eric Schneiderman. YouTube- Broadcast Yourself. 6 Apr. 2009. Web. 14 Dec. 2010. <http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=vCKpQr27UOU>. 46. Obama Signs Law to Reduce Crack Powder Sentencing Disparity (FOX News). YouTube. DrugPolicyAllianceChannel, 4 Aug. 2010. Web. 14 Dec. 2010. <http://www.youtube.com/ user/DrugPolicyAlliance#p/u/4/q45IZp_c7ns>.
47. Gray, Madison. “New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws.” TIME 2 Apr. 2009. CNN. Web. 48. Gangi, Robert. “The Rockefeller Drug Laws.” Racializing Justice, Disenfranchising Lives: The Racism, Criminal Justive, and Law Reader. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 49-51. Print 49. Colangelo, Juliana. “Rockefeller Drug Laws- A Discussion with Robert Gangi, Director of the Correctional Association of New York.” Personal interview. 25 Oct. 2010. 50. Liu, Irene Jay. “Paterson Once Arrested over Rockefeller Drug Law Reform.” Web log post. Capitol Conﬁdential. 8 Jan. 2009. Web. 20 Oct. 2010. 51. Liu, Irene Jay. “Paterson Once Arrested over Rockefeller Drug Law Reform.” Web log post. Capitol Conﬁdential. 8 Jan. 2009. Web. 20 Oct. 2010. 52. Colangelo, Juliana. “Rockefeller Drug Laws- A Discussion with Robert Gangi, Director of the Correctional Association of New York.” Personal interview. 25 Oct. 2010. 53. Confessore, Nicholas. “Litmus Test in Primary: Overhauled Drug Laws.” The New York Times 20 June 2010. N.Y./Region. The New York Times. 54. Tinto, Katherine Eda. “The Role of Gender and Relationship in Reforming the Rockefeller Drug Laws.” New York University Law Review 76.3 (2001): 906-44. HeinOnline. Web. 18 Nov. 2010. 55. Gray, Madison. “New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws.” TIME 2 Apr. 2009. CNN. Web. 20 Oct. 2010 56. Gangi, Robert. “The Rockefeller Drug Laws.” Racializing Justice, Disenfranchising Lives: The Racism, Criminal Justive, and Law Reader. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 49-51. Print 57. “The Campaign.” Drop the Rock. Correctional Association of New York. Web. 18 Nov. 2010. <http://www.droptherock. org/?page_id=122>. 58. USA. New York State Assembly. Breaking New York’s Addiction to Prison. By Sheldon Silver. New York State Assembly’s Committee on Ways and Means, 8 May 2008. Web. 24 Sept. 2010. <http://assembly.state.ny.us/ssspolicy/Rockefeller.pdf>. 59. Szalavitz, Maia. “Perspective: Kicking Drugs After Columbia Bust.” TIME, 10 December 2010. Web. 13 December 2010. 60. Baker, Al. “Time Eases Tough Drug Laws, but Fight Goes On.” The New York Times 16 Apr. 2004. Www.thenewyorktimes.com. The New York Times. 61. Adler, Ben. “Do Rural Prisons Beneﬁt Locals?” Newsweek - National News, World News, Business, Health, Technology, Entertainment, and More - Newsweek. 1 July 2010. Web. 62. “New York to Correct Miscount of Incarcerated People.” Prisoners of the Census. Web. 14 Dec. 2010. <http://www. prisonersofthecensus.org/news/2010/08/03/ny_law/>. 63. Papa, Anthony. “Painting.” 15 Years To Life. 3 Sept. 2008. Web. 20 Nov. 2010. <http://www.15yearstolife.com/art1. htm>. 64. Roberts, Samuel K., and “Sarah”. Interview with ‘Sarah’, 10 July 2009. New York City. 65. Szalavitz, Maia. “Perspective: Kicking Drugs After Columbia Bust.” TIME, 10 December 2010. Web. 13 December 2010. 66. Ibid. 67. “Are Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences Cost-Effective? | RAND.” RAND Corporation Provides Objective Research Services and Public Policy Analysis. RAND Corporation, 1997. Web. 14 Dec. 2010. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_ briefs/RB6003/index1.html>. 68. Colangelo, Juliana. “Rockefeller Drug Laws- A Discussion with Beatriz Torres, Social Worker at the Appellate Defender’s Ofﬁce.” Personal interview. 27 Oct. 2010. 69. Ibid. 70. USA. New York State Assembly. Breaking New York’s Addiction to Prison. By Sheldon Silver. New York State Assembly’s Committee on Ways and Means, 8 May 2008. Web. 24 Sept. 2010. <http://assembly.state.ny.us/ssspolicy/Rockefeller.pdf>. 71. “Analysis of Rockefeller Drug Law Reform Bill.” The Correctional Association of New York. Web. 14 Dec. 2010. <http:// droptherock.ipower.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/ analysis-of-rockefeller-reform-bill.pdf>. 72. Gardiner, Sean. “Buy and Busy: New York City’s War on Drugs at 40.” City Limits Investigates, Summer 2009.Vol.33, Iss. 2: pg.1. 73. Rao, Jessica. “States Where Pot Is a Slap on the Wrist.” Marijuana & Money: Special Report. CNBC, 20 Apr. 2010. Web. 16 Feb. 2012. <http://www.cnbc.com/id/36179381/ States_Where_Pot_is_a_Slap_on_the_Wrist>. 74. Galliher, John F., and Linda Basilick. “Utah’s Liberal Drug Laws: Structural Foundations and Triggering Events.” Social Problems 26.3 (1979): 284-97. JSTOR. Web. 16 Feb. 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/800454>. 75. “The Campaign.” Drop the Rock. Correctional Association of New York. Web. 16 Feb. 2012. <http://www.droptherock. org/?page_id=122>.
Esther Brot, Refocusing on Biomedial Research
1. Rachel Riederer, “In the Next Round of Budget Talks, Big Cuts for Health Research Are Coming,” The Nation online, April 11, 2011, http://www.thenation.com/article/159847/ next-round-budget-talks-big-cuts-health-research-are-coming. 2. Riederer, “In the Next Round of Budget Talks, Big Cuts for Health Research Are Coming.” 3. Michael Day, “Royal Society’s Knowledge, Networks, and Nations report: would Einstein get funded today?” The Telegraph, March 29, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/ science-news/8412074/Royal-Societys-Knowledge-Networksand-Nations-report-would-Einstein-get-funded-today.html. 4. Michael Day, “Royal Society’s Knowledge.” 5. Tina Casey, “ARPA-E Funds $92 million in Energy Research Leading to New Green Jobs,” July 27, 2010, CleanTechnica.com, http://cleantechnica.com/2010/07/17/arpa-e-funds-92-million-in-energy-research-leading-to-new-green-jobs/. 6. Bjorn Lomborg, “Government shouldn’t be picking Solyn-
dras,” USA Today online, October 24, 2011, http://www. usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/story/2011-10-24/solyndra-green-energy-research/50894932/1. Nursing Science, 1, 77-86. 9. Covington, D., Dalton, V., Diehl, S., Wright, B., & Piner, M. (1997). Improving detection of violence among pregnant adolescents. Journal of Adolescent Health, 21, 18-24. 10. Curry, M. A., Perrin, N., & Wall, E. (1998). Effects of abuse on maternal complications and birth weight in adult and adolescent women. Obstetrics & Gynecology, 92(4), 530-534. 11. O’Reilly, R., Beale, B., & Gillies, D. (2010). Screening and intervention for domestic violence during pregnancy care: A systematic review. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 11(4), 190-201. 12. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2009, June 18). Intimate partner violence during pregnancy: A guide for clinicians. Retrieved from http:// www.cdc.gov/ reproductivehealth/violence/intimatepartnerviolence/sld021. htm 13. Brigham & Women’s Hospital. (2004). Domestic violence: A guide to screening and intervention. Retrieved from http://www.brighamandwomens. org/about_bwh/ communityprograms/PassagewayScreening.pdf 14. National Association of County & City Health Ofﬁcials. (2008, June). Intimate partner violence among pregnant and parenting women: Local health department strategies for assessment, intervention, and prevention. Retrieved from http:// www.naccho.org/topics/ HPDP/mch/upload/IPV-IssueBrief-6-11-08.pdf 15. Bacchus, L., Mezey, G., & Bewley, S. (2002). Women’s perceptions and experiences of routine enquiry for domestic violence in a maternity service. British Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, 109, 9-16. 16. American College of Physicians. (2004). Screening for family violence: Recommendations from the U.S. preventive services task force. Annals of Internal Medicine, 140(1), 70.
Natalie Zerwekh, Equality and Parental Leave
1. “Parental Leave Policies in 21 Countries: Assessing Generosity and Gender Equality,” Center for Economic and Policy Research, Accessed 24 Sept. 2011, http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/parental_2008_09.pdf. 2. “U.S. Department of Labor - Find It By Topic - Leave Beneﬁts – FMLA,” U.S. Department of Labor, Accessed 24 Sept. 2011, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/beneﬁts-leave/fmla.htm. 3. “Parental Leave Policies in 21 Countries: Assessing Generosity and Gender Equality,” Center for Economic and Policy Research, Accessed 24 Sept. 2011, http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/parental_2008_09.pdf. 4. Marjorie Weinzweig, “Pregnancy Leave, Comparable Worth, and Concepts of Equality,” Hypatia 2.2 (1987), 73, Accessed 25 Sept. 2011, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3809861?seq=3. 5. Weinzweig, “Pregnancy Leave, Comparable Worth, and Concepts of Equality,” 74. 6. Weinzweig, “Pregnancy Leave, Comparable Worth, and Concepts of Equality,” 74. 7. Arnlaug Leira, “Caring as a Social Right: Cash for Child Care and Daddy Leave,” Social Politics 5 (1998), 362-378, Accessed 24 Sept. 2011, <http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/3/362.full.pdf>.
Tehreem Rehman, Screening for domestic violence in OB/GYN clinics
1. Tjaden, P. & Thoennes, N. National Institute of Justice and the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention. (2000). Extent, Nature and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence: Findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Ofﬁce 2. Gelles, R. J. (1998). Violence and pregnancy: Are pregnant women at greater risk of abuse?. Journal of Marriage and the Family, (50), 841-847. 3. Huth-Bocks, A. C., Levendosky, A. A., & Bogat, G. A. (2002). The effects of domestic violence during pregnancy on maternal and infant health. Violence and Victims, 17(2), 169-185.) 4. Gazmararian, J. A., Peterson, R., Spitz, A. M., Goodwin, M. M., Saltzman, L. E., & Marks, J. S. (2000). Violence and reproductive health: Current knowledge and future research directions. Maternal and Child Health Journal, 4(2), 79-84. 5. Maston, C., & Klaus, P. U.S. Department of Justice, Ofﬁce of Justice Programs. (2005). Criminal Victimization in the United States, 2003 Statistical Tables. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Ofﬁce. 7. Gazmararian, 79-84. 8. Kataoka, Y., Yaju, Y., Eto, H., Matsumoto, N., & Horiuchi, S. (2004). Screening of domestic violence against women in the perinatal set- ting: A systematic review. Japan Journal of
Grace Rybak, One is Too Many: Reforming campus policy on sexual assault
1. Ofﬁce of the Vice President, In Video Message, Vice President Biden Calls on New Generation to Take Action in Preventing Dating Violence and Sexual Assault at School and On Campus, The White House, September 13, 2011. 2. U.S. Department of Education, Ofﬁce for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence Background, Summary, and Fast Facts, April 4, 2011. 3. U.S. Department of Education, Ofﬁce for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence Background, Summary, and Fast Facts. 4. Wendy Kaminer, “What’s Wrong with the Violence Against Women Act?,” The Atlantic, March 19, 2012. 5. Abby Abrams, “After New Push by Federal Government, Co-
lumbia Makes Changes to Sexual Assault Response,” Columbia Spectator, December 8, 2011. 6. Letter of Support to the Ofﬁce of Civil Rights, National Women’s Law Center, February 8, 2012, http://www.nwlc. org/sites/default/ﬁles/pdfs/nwlc_ltr_to_ocr_re_prep_of_evidence_std_2.8.12.pdf. 7. “Standards of Proof for Domestic Violence Civil Protection Orders (CPOs) By State,” American Bar Association, June 2009. 8. Becky Mabry, “Domestic Violence Common, but Underreported” University of Illinois News Bureau, November 16, 2000. 9. “Rape Myths and Facts,” Roger Williams University, February 12, 2012. 10. Letter of Support to the Ofﬁce of Civil Rights, National Women’s Law Center, February 8, 2012. 11. Kristin Jones, “Lax Enforcement of Title IX In Campus Sexual Assault Cases,” The Center for Public Integrity, February 25, 2010. 12. Jones, “Lax Enforcement of Title IX In Campus Sexual Assault Cases.” 11. Kirk, Jackie, and Rebecca Winthrop. “Moving from innovation to policy: IRC’s work with community-based education in Afghanistan.” Opportunities for change Education innovation and reform during and after conﬂict. Edited by Susan Nicolai. Paris: International Institute for Educational Planning and UNESCO, 2009. 12. Glad, M. Knowledge on ﬁre: Attacks on education in Afghanistan: Risks and measures for successful mitigation. Ottawa: Care Canada/World Bank/Afghanistan Ministry of Education, 2009. 13. Harmer, Adele, Abby Stoddard, and Victoria DiDomenico. Aiding education in conﬂict: The role of international education providers operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan. UNESCO, May 6, 2011. 14. OCHA-Afghanistan. Education Cluster. 2004-2005. http:// ochaonline.un.org/afghanistan/Clusters/Education/tabid/5583/language/en-US/Default.aspx (accessed November 7, 2011). 15. OCHA-Afghanistan. Education Cluster. 2004-2005. http:// ochaonline.un.org/afghanistan/Clusters/Education/tabid/5583/language/en-US/Default.aspx (accessed November 7, 2011). 16. Wardak, Farooq. Education Interim Plan 2011-13. Kabul: Ministry of Education, January 2011. 17. Kirk, Jackie, and Rebecca Winthrop. “Moving from innovation to policy: IRC’s work with community-based education in Afghanistan.” Opportunities for change Education innovation and reform during and after conﬂict. Edited by Susan Nicolai. Paris: International Institute for Educational Planning and UNESCO, 2009.
Defense and Diplomacy
Grace Bickers, Securing Education in Afghanistan Through Coordinated Teacher Training
1. Sigsgaard, Morten. Education and fragility in Afghanistan: a situational analysis. INEE, UNESCO, IIEP, Paris: IIEP, 2009. 2. Harmer, Adele, Abby Stoddard, and Victoria DiDomenico. Aiding education in conﬂict: The role of international education providers operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan. UNESCO, May 6, 2011. 3. Burde, D. “It takes a village to raise a school.” New York Times. September 16, 2010. http://www. nytimes. com/2010/09/17/opinion/17burde.html (accessed November 6, 2011). 4. Winthrop, Jackie, and Rebecca Kirk. Meeting EFA: Afghanistan Home-Based Schools. Washington D.C.: USAID EQUIP2, 2006. 5. Winthrop, Jackie, and Rebecca Kirk. Meeting EFA: Afghanistan Home-Based Schools. Washington D.C.: USAID EQUIP2, 2006. 6. Sigsgaard, Morten. Education and fragility in Afghanistan: a situational analysis. INEE, UNESCO, IIEP, Paris: IIEP, 2009. 7. Sigsgaard, Morten. Education and fragility in Afghanistan: a situational analysis. INEE, UNESCO, IIEP, Paris: IIEP, 2009. 8. Winthrop, Jackie, and Rebecca Kirk. Meeting EFA: Afghanistan Home-Based Schools. Washington D.C.: USAID EQUIP2, 2006. 9. Winthrop, Jackie, and Rebecca Kirk. Meeting EFA: Afghanistan Home-Based Schools. Washington D.C.: USAID EQUIP2, 2006. 10. Wardak, Farooq. Education Interim Plan 2011-13. Kabul: Ministry of Education, January 2011.
Delaney Simon, The Logic of Female Suicide Terrorism
1. Steve Emerson, “The Growing Threat of Female Suicide Bombers” Family Security Matters, March 30, 2010, http:// www.think-israel.org/emerson.femalesuiciders.html. 2. Yoram Schweitzer ed., “Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?,” Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies: Tel Aviv University: 2006, 8. 3. For Palestine ﬁgures, Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism (CPOST), University of Chicago: http://cpost.uchicago.edu (accessed November 29, 2010); for Sri Lanka and Chechnya ﬁgures, Schweitzer (2006), 9. 4. Women referred to as Um Hassan (mother of Hassan), published in the newsletter of Islamic Jihad. Cited in Arnon Regular, “Suicide Bomber Training is Almost Feminist” Haaretz, May 26, 2003 accessed November 14, 2010, www.haaretz.com. 5. Deﬁnition from the Institution for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), cited by Deborah Zedalis, “Female Suicide Bombers,” Strategic Studies Institute: 2004, 2. 6. Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).145. 7. Mia Bloom, “Female Suicide Bombers: A Global Trend?” Dædalus, Winter 2007; Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers (Emmaus,
PA: Rodale, 2003); Mia Tzoreff, “The Palestinian Shahida: National Patriotism, Islamic Feminism, or Social Crisis” in Yoram Schweitzer ed., “Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?” (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies: Tel Aviv University: 2006), 13-25; Schweitzer, 2006. 8. Lindsey A. O’Rourke, “What’s Special about Female suicide terrorism?” Security Studies 18, no. 4 (2009): 681. 9. Tzoreff, 22. 10. Victor, 235. 11. Schewiter (2006), 9. 12. O’Rourke (2009), 703. 13. For a complete data set see O’Rourke (2009). 14. Schewitzer (2006) 9. 15. Jessica Stern, “When Bombers are Women,” The Washington Post, 18 December 2003. 16. John Reuter, “Chechnya’s Suicide Bombers: Desperate, Devout or Deceived,” The American Committee for Peace in Chechnya (2004): 8. 17. Bloom, (2007), 100. 18. Zedalis (2004), 7. 19. Jessica West, “Feminist IR and the Case of the ‘Black Widows’: Reproducing Gendered Divisions” Innovations Vol. 5: 2005, 1. 20. Preeti Bhattacharji, “Chechen Terrorism (Russia, Chechnya, Separatist)” Council on Foreign Relations, April 8, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9181/chechen_terrorism_russia_chechnya_separatist.html accessed November 21, 2010. 21. Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova, “Black Widows and Beyond: Understanding the Motivations and Life Trajectories of Chechen Female Terrorists,” in Female Terrorism and Militancy, Cindy D. Ness ed. (Routledge: New York, 2008), 100. 22. Speckhard and Akhmedova (2008), 100. 23. Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova, “Black Widows: The Chechen Female Suicide Terrorists” in Yoram Schweitzer ed., “Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?” Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies: Tel Aviv University: 2006: 63-80, 72. 24. Sheik Ahman Yassin interviewed in January, 2002 quoted in Victor, 30. 25. Victor, 20. 26. Ehud Ya’ari, an Israeli television journalist and terrorism expert, quoted in Victor, 25. 27. Sheik Yassin interviewed by Victor in July 2002, Victor 32. 28. A saying not in the Qur’an but attributed to Mohammed. 29. Tzoreff, 22. 30. Miranda Alison, “Cogs in the Wheel? Women in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” Civil Wars, v. 6, no. 4, Winter 2003, 38-9. 31. Arjuna Gunawardena, “Female Black Tigers: A Different Breed of Cat?” in Female Terrorism and Militancy, Cindy D. Ness ed. (Routledge: New York, 2008), 84. 32. Al-Sha’ab (Egypt), February 1, 2002 in Bloom (2007) 98. 33. Cited by Claudia Brunner, “Sex and Suicide Bombers” Haaretz, November 11, 2005. http://www.haaretz.com/printedition/opinion/sex-and-suicide-bombers-1.173827 accessed November 21, 2010. 34. Amrita Basu quoted in Bloom (2007) 99. 35. Dimitri Sudakov quoted in Bloom (2007) 99. 36. “The Making of Muriel the Suicide Bomber” Sunday Times (London), December 4, 2005. 37. Victor, 54. 38. Luba Vinogradova, “Deadly Secret of the Black Widows,” The Times (London), October 22, 2003. 39. Claudia Brunner, “Female Suicide Bombers – Male Suicide Bombing? Looking for Gender in Reporting the Suicide Bombings of the Israeli–Palestinian Conﬂict,” Global Society 19, no. 1 (2005): 29 – 48, 43. 40. See Alison, 42 and Adele Ann, quoted in Gunawardena, 43 41. Jain Commission Report on the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, cited by Gunawardena, 86. 42. West, 6 43. West, 6-7. She cites “Chechen ‘black widow’ bomber jailed,” BBC News Online [news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3610327.stm], April 8, 2004. “Inside the mind of a ‘black widow’,” BBC News Online [news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ europe/ 3081126.stm], September 4, 2003. “Chechen terror haunts Russia,” BBC News Online [news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ world/ europe/3605252.stm], September 1, 2004. Jonathan Eyal, “Analysis: Russian Caucasus quagmire,” BBC News Online [news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3632332.stm], September 6, 2004. Alan Quartly, “Chechnya’s forgotten refugees,” BBC News Online [news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ europe/3058829.stm], July 14, 2003. 44. Nick Paton Walsh, “Women moved by family not ideology,” Guardian Unlimited [www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,2763,1294685,00.html], September 1, 2004. 45. Yediot Ahrnot, quoted in Issachorff, 45. 46. West 6. She cites Vadim Manenkov, “Chechen militants try to use pregnant woman as suicide bomber,” ITAR-TASS, June 23, 2003. Vadim Rechkalov, “Dolphin-Girls,” Izvestiya, August 5, 2003; Mikhail Tollegin, “The Suicide Industry: The Terrorist War Against Russia Has Been Given a Feminine Face,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 2, 2004. “Russian Deputy Internal Affairs Minister on Security, Terrorism in Chechnya,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, October 11, 2003. 47. Yediot Ahrnot, quoted in Issachorff, 44. 48. Tzoreff, 13-14. 49. Mangalika Silva “Co-ordinator, Women for Peace,” quoted in Gunawardena, 84. 50. Tzoreff, 20. 51. Brunner, 35. 52. Brunner, 43. 53. Aitemad Mohann, cited in Brunner, 43. 54. Al-Sha’ab (Egypt), February 1, 2002 in Bloom (2007), 98. 55. Dr. Samiya Sa’ad Al-Din, Al-Akhbar (Egypt), February 1, 2002 in Bloom (2007), 98. 56. Avi Issacharoff, “The Palistinian and Israeli Media on Female Suicide Terrorists, in Yoram Schweitzer ed., “Female Suicide
Bombers: Dying for Equality?” (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies: Tel Aviv University: 2006), 25-43; Schweitzer, 2006, 43. 57. Lindsday O’Rourke, “Behind the Woman, Behind the Bomb,” New York Times, August 2nd, 2008. 58. Alison, 43. 59. Fatah and Qauis Abdul Karim quoted in Issacharoff, 47. Italics mine. 60. Brunner, 40. 61. Asma Afsarnddin, ed. Hermenetics and Honor: Negotionating Female “Public” Space in Islamic/ate Societies. (Massachusetts: Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 2000), 82. 62. Sheik Yassin, quoted in Victor, 112. 63. Deborah Zedalis, “”Female Terrorism and Militancy, Cindy D. Ness ed. (Routledge: New York, 2008),106. 64. Speckhard and Akhmedova (2008), 106. 65. Beyler points out that “it is mostly men who govern this [terrorist organization’s] infrastructure…women are rarely involved in the higher echelons of the decision-making process of these groups. Women may volunteer, or…be coerced to conduct a murderous strike, but the woman’s role is ultimately dictated by the patriarchal hierarchy that rules Palestinian society and its terrorist groups.” Beyler is cited in Bloom (2007), 102. Brunner describes the steps taken before a suicide attack is carried out, which highlight the lack of involvement of women in the process: “until a new martyr is born by performing such an attack, there are a lot of steps to be taken in advance. When an organization decides to apply suicide bombing as an instrument of political resistance, a target is chosen, information is gathered and perpetrators are recruited or contacted and prepared for the mission. Explosives are produced, transportation to the chosen spot has to be organized and the operation is carried out. Finally, somebody has to take over the task of ‘public relations’, producing videos, copying posters, disseminating them and the like. In addition to that, there must be the maintenance of strategic cooperation between different political forces among the Palestinians, and also with external players. All of these components are essential parts of a so-called successful operation. None of them, however, can be called a place of female or feminist business, and there is no evidence that women are involved at other levels of the whole operation. Even if the decision for participation in martyrdom is reached by a woman, the circumstances within which she can carry out her plan are very masculine ones.” Brunner, 45. 66. Victor, 35. 67. Rivka Yadlin, “Female Martyrdom: The Ultimate Embodiment of Islmaic Existance?” in Yoram Schweitzer ed., “Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?” Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies: Tel Aviv University: 2006: 51-62, 55. 68. Yadlin, 54. 69. Bloom (2007), 102. 70. De Silva argues that there is no evidence of female participation in policy-making, decision-making or planning at the highest levels. Coomaraswamy argues that LTTE women “are not initiators of ideas, they are only implementers of policy made by someone else, by men.” However, Bose claims that there were three women in the top decision making body and Thamilini maintains that of 12 members on on the LTTE central committee ﬁve were women. All quoted in Alison, 47. 71. Alison, 45. 72. Prabhakaran quoted in Alison, 45.
Jonathan Lee, The Signiﬁcance of US-ASEAN Relations
1. Hillary Clinton, “America’s Paciﬁc Century,” Foreign Policy, November 2011. 2. Clinton, “America’s Paciﬁc Century. 3. Scot Marciel, “United States-ASEAN Relations,” Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, December 9, 2009. 4. William Cohen, “Developing an Enduring Strategy for Southeast Asia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2011. 5. Catharin Dalpino, “Group Think: The Challenge of US-ASEAN Relations,” The Asia Society, March 2008. 6. Dalpnio, “Group Think.” 7. Ernest Bowers, “US Strategic Alignment: Squaring Trade and Grand Strategy in the Asia-Paciﬁc,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 30, 2012. 8. K. Shanmugan, “New Directions: Singapore Politics and Foreign Policy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 8, 2012. 9. Cohen, “Developing an Enduring Strategy for Southeast Asia.” 10. Clinton, “America’s Paciﬁc Century.” 11. Marciel, “United States-ASEAN Relations.” 12. Bowers, “US Strategic Alignment.” 13. Bowers, “US Strategic Alignment.” 14. Jagdish Bhagwati, “America’s Threat to Trans-Paciﬁc Trade,” East Asian Bureau of Economic Research, January 10, 2012. 15. Shanmugam, “New Directions.” 16. Richard Bush, “The Response of China’s Neighbors to the US Pivot to Asia,” The Brookings Institution, January 31, 2012. 17. Bush, “The Response of China’s Neighbors to the US Pivot to Asia.” 18. Cohen, “Developing an Enduring Strategy for Southeast Asia.” All photos courtesy Wikimedia Commons.
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