LMDIT 2008 CAFE

Chase 1/45
CAFE

CAFE.......................................................................................................1 FYI (Not Super Important).......................................................................2 Read Me (Much More Important)............................................................3 1AC 1/14.................................................................................................4 1AC 2/14.................................................................................................5 1AC 3/14.................................................................................................6 1AC 4/14.................................................................................................8 1AC 5/14.................................................................................................9 1AC 6/14...............................................................................................10 1AC 7/14...............................................................................................11 1AC 8/14...............................................................................................12 1AC 9/14...............................................................................................14 1AC 10/14.............................................................................................15 1AC 11/14.............................................................................................17 1AC 12/14.............................................................................................18 1AC 13/14.............................................................................................19 1AC 14/14.............................................................................................20 2AC Case Explanation..........................................................................21 2AC – If You Have to Describe Implementation.....................................22 AT Specific Vehicle Low Mileage Good Turns.........................................24 Agent (NHTSA).....................................................................................25 2AC OSPEC...........................................................................................26 2AC T – ‘Incentives’..............................................................................28 2AC Ban CAFE CP 1/2...........................................................................29 2AC Ban CAFE CP 2/2...........................................................................30 2AC States CP.......................................................................................32 2AC Gas Tax CP 1/2..............................................................................33 2AC Gas Tax CP 2/2..............................................................................34 Politics – Plan Popular...........................................................................36 Case 1NC 1/..........................................................................................37 Case 1NC 2/..........................................................................................39 Gas Tax CP 1NC 1/2..............................................................................40 Gas Tax 1NC CP 2/2..............................................................................41 Gas Tax CP 2NC Overview....................................................................42 Gas Tax 2NC CP Solves / Case Solvo Turn.............................................43 ............................................................................................................43 CP Solves Oil Shocks............................................................................44 AT Artificially Competitive / Perm Out of Ban.......................................45

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

Chase 2/45
FYI (Not Super Important)

Collantes suggests reading his “decision-making flowchart” to understand the debate. Here it is:

Who likes and who doesn’t like the plan? Collantes with his charts again:

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

Chase 3/45
Read Me (Much More Important)

This aff is not really ready to run. It needs more work. The reason is because the mechanism I’ve been exploring for changing CAFE is a little convoluted, and it takes time. Why is the aff so convoluted? Well, it would be a lot more straightforward to just raise CAFE standards, but that aff seems next to impossible to win with. The counterplan in this file, for example, is basically game over against an aff that raises standards. Plus, the DOT is raising the standards now anyways, that aff wouldn’t really even be inherent (which is not as flashy and winnable as slicy-dicy counterplans, but the point remains – large structural problems with the aff). So, I wanted to find a way to alter the CAFE act that didn’t involve raising standards, so the current standards raises could be used as DA non-uniques. This means that the aff is much more strategic, but also more convoluted and requires more work to maintain. Is that tradeoff worth it? Your decision. But I’m almost positive some teams will read CAFE this year, so at least the neg business in here should be real good for you. If you do decide you want to read this aff, you should track down Michigan State University’s cites for their version, which should be on the free and open college cite wiki somewhere. Since I figured you would be able to do that yourselves, I haven’t made any effort to locate their cites, I’ve only done original stuff. By the way, I haven’t included any net benefits for the CP in here except the case stuff – I figure you should have plenty of econ and politics files to work from, the arguments are straightforward. P.S. The ethanol advantage is that changing the way we make ethanol is good, which is why the Bader card works with the aff despite the fact that it’s just ethanol bad (he clearly assumes the squo – the card above Bader explains a distinction between tech and non-tech methods of production.

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

Chase 4/45
1AC 1/14

The National Highway Transportation Safety Administration Administrator should increase alternative energy incentives in the United States by amending the Corporate Average Fuel EconomyAlternative Motor Fuel Act program to create fuel-economy credits granted to owners of flex-fuel vehicles. The credits should be related to the proportion of fuel dispensing stations in states where the vehicles are deployed offering high ethanol blends.

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

Chase 5/45
1AC 2/14

Contention I is Comrade Napoleon – Increases in Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards are inevitable – the 07 bill hiked it, and the DOT is going to raise it further to 31.5 MPG Jerome, Wired, ‘8
(Marty April 22, “Fed Poised to Accelerate CAFE Standard” http://blog.wired.com/cars/2008/04/feds-poised-to.html The ink is barely dry on the new CAFE standard, yet the Department of Transportation is expected to announce today that it is accelerating the timetable for the new mileage standard. No doubt, the auto industry will kick up a fair amount of fuss. The proposed regulation would require the industry to meet a target of 31.5 mpg by 2015. In effect, it would force automakers to speed up their development of lighter, more fuel efficient cars and trucks. The current law requires automakers to meet an average 35 mpg between 2011 and 2020. The new regulation means that car makers would have to meet more than half of that savings in the first half of the phase-in period. Environmental groups have long maintained that improvements made in the early stages will add up significantly over time. The Union of Concerned Scientists has been particularly vocal about the benefits of moving quickly on the new standard. The question unanswered is whether the auto industry will challenge the new regulation in court.

Also note that the Alternative Motor Fuels Act is tied to CAFE Collantes, Science and International Affairs at Harvard Belfer Center, ‘8
(Gustavo, “Biofuels and the Corporate Average Fuel Economy Program: The Statute, Policy Issues, and Alternatives,” May) Specifically, Congress, through AMFA, endeavored to induce manufacturers to deploy vehicles capable of operating on alternative fuels by providing for special treatment of such vehicles under the CAFE program. Automobile fuel economy regulation is codified in Chapter 329, Title 49 of the United States Code. AMFA resulted in amendments to this chapter related to alternative fuels. As codified in 49 U.S.C. §32905, the fuel economy of a vehicle powered by alternative fuel is based on the notion of “fuel content of the alternative fuel”: a legislatively-established petroleumfuel equivalence of alternative fuels. Reflecting Congress’s awareness of the lower per-gallon mileage that alternative fuels generally yield relative to gasoline, Section 32905 establishes that, for the purpose of measuring fuel economy, one gallon of alternative fuel is equivalent of 0.15 gallons of petroleum fuel. Thus, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is to estimate the fuel economy of a vehicle running on alternative fuel by dividing the actual miles per gallon by 0.15.3 This way, not only would CAFE not hinder the commercialization of alternative-fuel vehicles, but also deploying such vehicles would help manufacturers meet their CAFE requirements. Further, AMFA prohibits the Department of Transportation (DoT) to use the fuel economy obtained through the alternative-fuel capability of vehicles to estimate the maximum feasible fuel-economy standard. To determine the maximum feasible average fuel economy level, the DoT Secretary “(1) may not consider the fuel economy of dedicated automobiles [automobiles that operate only on alternative fuel]; and (2) shall consider dual fuel automobiles to be operated only on gasoline or diesel fuel” (49 U.S.C. §32902).

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

Chase 6/45
1AC 3/14

Contention II: All ethanols are born equal, but some ethanols are more equal than others First, CAFE-AMFA successfully jumpstarts flex-fuel vehicle development, but the lack of incentives tied to fuel is a structural problem that prevents effective alternative fuel use and development Collantes, Science and International Affairs at Harvard Belfer Center, ‘8
(Gustavo, “Biofuels and the Corporate Average Fuel Economy Program: The Statute, Policy Issues, and Alternatives,” May) Ultimately, the raison d’être of government intervention is to provide a societal benefit.  When Congress took it upon itself to amend the CAFE program to provide for special  treatment of alternative-fuel-capable vehicles, its primary intent was to lure manufacturers into deploying such vehicles. In this respect, the legislative initiative has  been relatively successful. The domestic car companies have taken advantage of the  incentives introduced by AMFA and traded flex-fuel vehicles for some average fuel  economy—a strategy not only allowed by the statute but also contemplated by Congress  when it passed the Act in 1988. In light of this, the alternative-fuel provisions do not  strictly constitute a loophole in the CAFE program. Congressional intent on passing  AMFA, however, rested on the premise that once a reasonable supply of alternative-fuel  vehicles developed, a demand for alternative fuels would ensue. The latter effect was  observed to a very limited extent. Therefore, all in all, the AMFA amendments cannot be  considered a success. More importantly, as it will be discussed in this section, they  cannot be expected to be any more successful than they have so far been, if they maintain  their current structure.  Though wellintentioned and pioneering, AMFA took a unidimensional approach to solve  a multidimensional problem. AMFA could have been more successful had the chickenand-egg problem actually been the main obstacle to the market diffusion of alternative  fuels. The main obstacles have been, however:  a- The relatively low value proposition that flex-fuel vehicles running on ethanol  blends could offer to consumers, vis-à-vis the mainstream vehicle-fuel system;  b- The lack of a policy mechanism to internalize the external costs of gasoline  relative to alternative fuels. In fact, the chicken-and-egg problem arises only when the relative value proposition of a  new product to any sizeable segment of the consumer population is low— otherwise,  market forces would spontaneously become active in deploying both the product and the  supporting technology. Of course, there may be a role for government even when market  forces act spontaneously, if the new product brings about higher societal benefits than the  mainstream competitor. Areas of government participation may include permitting,  development of codes and standards, consumer education, and oversight of various  possible forms of market failures, including the internalization of externalities.  29  Starting from an incomplete understanding of the relevant mechanisms of technology  innovation, AMFA provided incentives for the vehicle manufacturer, but ignored the  consumer and the fuel provider. The importance of systemic approaches to technology  policy was not well understood in the time when AMFA was first adopted. It was with  the California Low Emission Vehicle and Clean Fuels program, adopted in 1990, that  technology innovation and energy paradigm shift started to be approached by addressing  both vehicle and fuel. It took a few more years to learn, predominantly through the policy process of the California Zero Emission Vehicle program, that the value proposition to the consumer is also critical (Collantes, 2006b). The revision of the CAFE program in 2007, by leaving the structure AMFA provisions unaltered, failed to incorporate any of come on, come on, sign up, come on, this one’s nothing like vietnam except for the bullets, except for the bombs, except for the youth that’s gone

LMDIT 2008 CAFE

Chase 7/45

these lessons.  One more structural deficiency characterizes the AMFA program. On establishing the  CAFE program, Congress provided guidelines but gave DoT the ultimate authority to  determine whether to revise the fuel economy standards. For the AMFA provision,  however, Congress adopted an entirely different philosophy—it prescribed the  methodology and only left to the regulatory agency the decision of whether or not to  extend the program for an additional four-year period. This unfortunate choice can be  singled out as the main cause for the conflictive nature of the related policy debate—  many stakeholders found themselves with the difficult choice between an ill-designed  policy to pursue a noble policy goal and no policy at all.  

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

Chase 8/45
1AC 4/14

Subpoint A is production methods Ethanol production will boom now, but plants will continue to use outdated methods alternatefuelsworld.com, ‘7
(4/29 “Ethanol Fuel Markets” Dan Sweeney Online) Earlier we announced the imminent arrival of a book length report on the explosive market for ethanol fuel and fuel additives. On Tuesday, May 1, the report will be issued by Visant Strategies, www.visantstrategies.com, (631) 893-3028. The report examines the roots of the current ethanol boom and chronicles the frenzy of plant construction activity currently underway. In it I project a very optimistic growth scenario for the industry with a near doubling of capacity occurring within five years from now and ultimately as much as a ten fold increase overall. I also examine in detail the relative merits of the various feedstocks for ethanol production as well as all of the major production methods, both established and experimental. This study is not a hype based forecast nor is it a species of Green advocacy. Instead I have attempted to determine the likeliest outcomes for the ethanol fuel business and the best business opportunities within it. And ethanol is a business, a big business, and one in which there will be winners and losers. The winners will be those who can produce ethanol cheaply and the losers will be those who are not cost competitive. It’s strictly a commodity market. Right now almost all of the major manufacturers and most of the major investors are betting against new production technologies and new feedstocks. Practically all plants under construction around the world are of more or less traditional design. Only a handful utilize innovative techniques. And little wonder. Almost all plants are constructed by a few large plant engineering firms specializing in this area, and since none has actual experience in building or operating plants based on the newer techniques, their ability to quote projects utilizing such techniques with any degree of precision is rather limited. And since only one cellulosic ethanol plant is in commercial operation, the operational economics of the newer techniques are still mostly conjectural. Would you invest tens of millions of dollars in an unproven technology when failure would mean total loss and no possibility of selling the production equipment for anything other than scrap metal? Of course not, and neither would most equity investors. So why not trial the new technologies on a smaller scale? That’s precisely what the process innovation companies are trying to do, but you can’t operate the plants profitably since economies of scale are everything in ethanol production irrespective of the processing technology. That best you can do is to establish proof of concept, and most investors want to get in after proof of concept is completed not before.

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

Chase 9/45
1AC 5/14

Better production methods solve the problems with corn ethanol in the squo – more carbon efficiency relative to gasoline Collantes, Science and International Affairs at Harvard Belfer Center, ‘8
(Gustavo, “Biofuels and the Corporate Average Fuel Economy Program: The Statute, Policy Issues, and Alternatives,” May) Different ethanol production pathways have nontrivially-variant impacts in terms of natural resources consumption (e.g. land and water), ecosystems conservation, and carbon emissions. The magnitude of such impacts will certainly be correlated, though not  necessary linearly, to production levels. Any biofuel policy that overlooks these concepts  and generalizes every gallon of ethanol under one single nominal umbrella —for example,  “corn ethanol”—is inherently flawed. It is well known that the well-totank (WTT)  carbon intensity of a gallon of ethanol can vary significantly depending on the feedstock  (e.g. Tilman et al., 2006). There has been less discussion, however, about the potential  variance in WTT carbon intensity of ethanol produced from the same feedstock. Land-  use change, farming practices, energy supply to the biorefinery, and ethanol distribution  infrastructure and logistics are all variables affecting the carbon footprint of a given  gallon of ethanol (or any biofuel, for that matter) available at the pump.  Important to the climate impacts of farming practices are the strategies adopted for land  fertilization. Variables within such strategies include the amount of nitrogen fertilizer  used (typically, 2 percent of the nitrogen in the fertilizer ends up as nitrogen in nitrous  oxide, a greenhouse gas) and whether corn stover is left to decompose in the field after  harvesting. Choices in terms of energy sources and technologies used in ethanol  production may have even more significant implications for climate policy. Currently,  most biorefineries in the United States use natural gas boilers, with a small minority of  plants operating coal boilers. A concern repeatedly raised by producers during my visits  to biorefineries in the Midwest, was the rise and fluctuation of natural gas prices and their  impacts on production costs. To address this question, producers are considering—for  existing and projected plants—strategies ranging from gasification of corn biomass, to capturing and use of cattle manure biogas, to installing wind turbines, to shifting to coal-  fired boilers.  Wang et al. (2007) find that corn ethanol produced in a modern plant fueled by natural  gas may reduce lifecycle carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) emissions by 28 percent  relative to gasoline. If the same plant was coal-fired, however, the ethanol produced may  result in a 3 percent increase in lifecycle CO2e emissions relative to gasoline. Using  GREET, the same model used by Wang et al. (2007), my analysis of the effect of reliance  on coal, instead of natural gas, to power ethanol production yields the results shown in  Figure 2. I estimate that if all ethanol production is supported by coal instead of natural  gas, E85 flex-fuel vehicles emissions are 435 gCO2e/mile, versus 455 gCO2e/mile for conventional gasoline vehicles. The scenario of complete reliance on coal for ethanol  production results in 18 percent more CO2e emissions relative to a scenario of complete  reliance on natural gas. As ethanol is blended in gasoline as an oxidant and octane  enhancer, the way it is produced will have an effect on the lifecycle carbon content of  retail gasoline too. Though barely noticeable, the extremes of the gasoline vehicle curve  in Figure 2 differ by 2 gCO2e/mile. Lifecycle emission estimates are dependent on assumptions about myriad factors, such as per-acre corn yield, biorefinery efficiency,  allocation of carbon credits to byproducts (e.g. distiller’s dried grain with solubles), ratio  of dry-mill plants to wet-mill plants, and many others. The slight difference between the results in Figure 2 and those in Wang et al. (2007) can be explained by variations in the  initial assumptions, and is a reminder that assessment of lifecycle estimates necessitates  of an understanding of the underlying assumptions.  

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

Chase 10/45
1AC 6/14

Increasing support for ethanol production key to production innovation Governor’s Ethanol Coalition, ‘5
(April, “Ethanol from Biomass” http://www.ethanol-gec.org/GEC_biomass_rept_4-1205.pdf) While the ethanol industry is growing rapidly and on target to  produce roughly 5 billion gallons a year by 2007 and can meet the 8  billion gallon goal by 2012 with encouragement, production signifi-  cantly above that amount may impact corn prices and livestock  feed costs. Therefore, to ensure an increasing share of the nation’s  transportation fuel needs are met with ethanol the Coalition be-  lieves that the industry should be aided in establishing additional  sources of production that include the use of lower-value, higher-  availability biomass feedstocks so that the nation can meet and  even exceed this 10 percent long-term goal.  The use of ethanol, particularly biomass-derived ethanol, can  produce significant savings in carbon dioxide emissions. This  approach offers a no regrets policy that reduces the potential future  risks associated with climate change and has the added benefit of economic development. In fact, ethanol’s power to bring economic  growth to small farms, agricultural cooperatives, and larger  agribusiness concerns is already being realized in some rural areas  of the nation. Continuing the growth trend through the production  of biomass-derived ethanol can make current production more  efficient and diversify feedstocks to include such sources as corn  stover, wood waste, municipal solid waste, and grasses–offering  the potential for ethanol production in every region of the nation.

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

Chase 11/45
1AC 7/14

This solves every ethanol bad argument, put your turns away Glasgow and Hansen, Rocky Mountain Institute, ‘5
(Nathan and Lena, Researchers/Consultants, “Setting the Record Straight on Ethanol” http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/reinsider/story?id=38601) Biofuels, and specifically ethanol, have been the subject of a great deal of criticism in recent months by detractors claiming that more energy is required to produce ethanol than is available in the final product, that it is too expensive, and that it produces negligible carbon reductions. These critiques are simply not accurate. State-of-the-art technologies have been competently forecasted-even proven in the market-to produce ethanol that is far more cost-effective and less energy-intensive than gasoline. We'll explore why, and why the critics have gotten it wrong. When we say biofuels, we mean liquid fuels made from
biomass-chiefly biodiesel and ethanol, which can be substituted for diesel fuel or for gasoline, respectively. The technology used to produce biodiesel is well understood, although its biomass feedstocks are limited and production today is fairly expensive. We will instead focus on ethanol, which we believe has significantly greater potential.

Ethanol, which can be substituted for or blended with gasoline, has traditionally been produced from either corn or sugarcane feedstocks. In fact, Brazil currently meets more than 25 percent of its gasoline demand with ethanol made from sugarcane. (The sugar

is so cheap that the resulting ethanol sells in New York for $1.10 a gallon-with about 81 percent the energy content of a gallon of gasoline-after paying a 100 percent duty, illegal under WTO rules, to protect U.S. corn farmers. Undeterred, the Brazilians are merrily expanding their ethanol exports to Asia.) Even gasoline in the United States contains, on average, 2 percent ethanol (used as a substitute for MTBE to oxygenate fuel). American ethanol is almost exclusively made from the kernels of corn, accounting for about 7 percent of the corn crop. But

conventional processes and feedstocks used to make ethanol are not feasible in the United States on a large scale for three reasons: they're not cost-competitive with long-run gasoline prices without subsidies, they compete with food crops for land, and they have only marginally positive energy balances. Happily, in addition to starch-based feedstocks, ethanol can be produced from "cellulosic" feedstocks, including biomass wastes, fast-growing hays like switchgrass, and short-rotation woody crops like poplar. While not cost-competitive today, already observed advances in technology lead us to believe that in the next few years, ethanol made from these crops will become cost-competitive, won't compete with food for cropland, and will have a sizeable positive energy balance. Indeed, because these crops are expected to have big biomass yields (~10-15 dry tons/acre, up from the current ~5 dry tons/acre), much less land will be required than conventionally thought. Further, cellulosic ethanol will typically have twice the ethanol yield of corn-based ethanol, at lower capital cost, with far better net energy yield. A common complaint about ethanol is that the quantity of feedstocks is limited and land used to grow feedstocks could be put to better use. For cellulosic feedstocks, the situation is quite the contrary. Cellulosic feedstocks are plentiful: for example, municipal and agricultural wastes can be used to create ethanol, with the positive side-effect of reducing the quantity of waste we must dispose of. Using waste to produce fuel has the clear benefit of a virtually free feedstock,
and because energy is generally expended to create the product, not the waste, this type of ethanol obviously has a positive energy balance. Not quite as obvious is to what extent dedicated energy crops can be used to produce ethanol. We believe the answer is straightforward. Research by Oak Ridge National Laboratory shows that dedicated energy crops can be grown without competing with food crops because they can be grown in marginal areas unsuited for food crop production, or on about 17 million acres of Conservation Reserve Program land that is currently being withheld from agricultural use. Cellulosic crops have additional environmental benefits for several reasons. First, because crops like switchgrass are deep-rooted perennials, growing them actually prevents soil erosion and restores degraded land. For this same reason, cellulosic crops also have significantly lower carbon emissions. While corn-based ethanol reduces carbon emissions by about 20 percent below gasoline, cellulosic ethanol is predicted to be carbon-neutral, or possibly even net-carbon-negative. We can't remember how many times

we've been asked the question: "But doesn't ethanol require more energy to produce than it contains?" The simple answer is no-most scientific studies, especially those in recent years reflecting modern techniques, do not support this concern. These studies have shown that ethanol has a higher energy content than the fossil energy used in its production. Some studies that contend that ethanol is a net energy loser include (incorrectly) the energy of the sun used to grow a feedstock in ethanol's energy balance, which misses the fundamental point that the sun's energy is free.

Furthermore, because crops like switchgrass are perennials, they are not replanted and cultivated every year, avoiding farm-equipment energy. Indeed, if polycultured to imitate the prairies where they grow naturally, they should require no fertilizer, irrigation, or pesticides either. So, according to the U.S. Department of Energy, for every one unit of energy available at the fuel pump, 1.23 units of fossil energy are used to produce gasoline, 0.74 of fossil energy are used to produce corn-based ethanol, and only 0.2 units of fossil energy are used to produce

Critics further discount cellulosic ethanol by ignoring the recent advancements of next-generation ethanol conversion technologies. A recent example that has received significant attention is David Pimentel's March 2005 paper in
cellulosic ethanol.

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

Chase 12/45

Natural Resources Research, which argues that ethanol production from cellulosic feedstocks requires more fossil energy to produce than the energy contained in the final product. However, Pimentel bases his analysis on only one technology used to produce ethanol, ignoring two other developing technologies. His chosen conversion technology, acid
hydrolosis, is the least efficient of the three. A superior option, thermal gasification, converts biomass into a synthesis gas composed of carbon oxides and hydrogen. The gas is then converted into ethanol via either a biological process using microorganisms or a catalytic

(GLASGOW AND HANSEN CONTINUE BELOW) (GLASGOW AND HANSEN CONTINUE, NO TEXT OMMITTED)
reactor. Both of these processes show good potential for increased energy yields and reduced costs by using cellulosic feedstocks. This conversion technology is currently being tested in pilot plants in Arkansas and Colorado. Still better, enzymatic reduction hydrolosis already shows promise in the marketplace. Such firms as Iogen and Novozymes have been developing enzymes, and "smart bugs," that can turn biomass such as corn residues (leaves, stalks, and cobs) into sugars that can then be converted into ethanol. Historically, the biggest cost component of this technology was the creation of enzymes. Earlier this year, though, in combination with the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Novozymes announced a 30-fold reduction in the cost of enzyme production in laboratory trials. Expected benefits from this process include low energy requirements, high efficiency, and mild process conditions. A pilot plant exists in Ontario and another is planned in Hawai'i. The first commercial-scale enzymatic reduction hydrolosis plant is scheduled to be built and operational by Iogen within two years,

1AC 8/14

No matter which of these conversion technologies ultimately wins, it is clear that cost-effective and efficient ethanol production from cellulose is on the horizon-which is good news for the United States, where mobility consumes seven of every ten barrels of oil we use. Our voracious appetite for that oil comes at a cost-we have to buy it, we have to deal with the pollution that comes from using it, and, because 12 percent of our oil comes from the Middle East, we have to defend it. Because mobility consumes 70 percent of the oil we use, mostly by burning gasoline, it's the first place to look
producing ethanol at a targeted cost of $1.30 per gallon.

for a solution. Our recent publication Winning the Oil Endgame (www.oilendgame.com) shows that the critical first step to reducing our oil consumption is tripled automobile efficiency-which can improve safety, maintain or improve performance and comfort, and repay its extra cost (if any) within two years at today's U.S. gasoline prices. But there's no reason to stop there. Using biofuels instead of gasoline to power our cars has the potential to displace 3.7 million barrels per day of crude oil-that's a fifth of our forecasted consumption in 2025, after more efficient use. In fact, an 85/15 percent blend of ethanol/gasoline in the tank of RMI's designed 66-mpg SUV would result in the vehicle getting

, focusing on the nexus of the agriculture and energy value chains will create huge opportunities for business and huge wins for our country. The critics simply have it wrong.
~320 mpg per gallon of fossil fuel burned (because the majority of fuel burned is ethanol). Clearly

Status quo ethanol production will cause environmental devastation, soil erosion, and food shortages across the globe – changing to more technological methods is key Bader, Competitive Enterprise Institute, 8
(Hans, 4/15, “As Food Riots Continue, Finance Ministers Criticize Ethanol Subsidies”, http://www.openmarket.org/2008/04/15/as-food-riots-continue-finance-ministerscriticize-ethanol-subsidies/) Ethanol and biofuels have been wrongly depicted by politicians like Al Gore as a solution to global warming. But in reality, subsidized ethanol production gravely harms the environment, and also causes starvation, high food prices, and rioting. “The diversion of food crops to biofuel production was a significant factor contributing to global food prices rocketing by 83% in the last year, and causing violent conflicts in Haiti and other parts of the world,” reports African Energy News. ”Food riots have also taken place in Egypt, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Mauritania, Madagascar and the Philippines in the past month“ (and in Pakistan and Mexico, too). Unable to afford food, hungry Haitians are now eating “cookies made of dirt, vegetable oil, and salt.” “International Monetary Fund (IMF) President Dominique Strauss-Kahn has warned that hundreds of thousands of people will face starvation if food prices keep rising.” Millions of poor people in the Third World now risk being evicted from their homes and becoming homeless as vast tracts of land are converted to produce ethanol and other biofuels. come on, come on, sign up, come on, this one’s nothing like vietnam except for the bullets, except for the bombs, except for the youth that’s gone

LMDIT 2008 CAFE

Chase 13/45

Finance ministers and central bankers are now calling for an end to ethanol subsidies and other “biofuel policies adopted recently in the West.” South African finance minister Trevor Manuel called such subsidies “criminal.” Earlier, the Indian Finance Minister Chidambaram noted that “in a world where there is hunger and poverty, there is no policy justification for diverting food crops towards bio-fuels. Converting food into fuel is neither good policy for the poor nor for the environment.” Ethanol subsidies do not result in reduced greenhouse gas emissions, but they do result in soil erosion, deforestation, and other environmental damage.

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

Chase 14/45
1AC 9/14

Environmental degradation risks extinction Warner, International Politics at Foreign Policy at American U,
94, August, Politics and Life Sciences, , p 177 Massive extinction of species is dangerous, then, because one cannot predict which species are expendable to the system as a whole. As Philip Hoose remarks, "Plants and animals cannot tell us what they mean to each other." One can never be sure which species holds up fundamental biological relationships in the planetary ecosystem. And, because removing species is an irreversible act, it may be too late to save the system after the extinction of key plants or animals. According to the U.S. National Research Council, "The ramifications of an ecological change of this magnitude [vast extinction of species] are so far reaching that no one on earth will escape them." Trifling with the "lives" of species is like playing Russian roulette, with our collective future as the stakes.

Hunger causes 36 million deaths a year systemically, and massive poverty Narula, Faculty Director Center for Human Rights and Global Justice ‘6
(Smita, Asst. Prof.Clinical Law & Faculty Director Center for Human Rights and Global Justice@ NYU, “The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable UnderInternational Law,” 44 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 691, LN//) Almost sixty percent of annual deaths worldwide - roughly 36 million - are a direct or indirect result of hunger and nutritional deficiencies. n17 More than 840 million people worldwide are malnourished. n18 Over ninety-five percent live in the developing world. n19153 million of them are children under the age of five. n20 Hunger is both a cause and consequence of poverty. Hungry workers [*699] produce less and therefore earn less. In turn, theirpoverty exacerbates their hunger. n21 Malnourishment is also the largestsingle contributor to disease. Undernourished mothers give birth tounderweight children who are more susceptible to diseases that lead to theirpremature deaths. n22 Children who are sick and hungry also do poorly inschool. n23 As a result they are more likely to end up as unskilledlaborers, who do not earn enough to feed themselves or their families. The cycleof poverty, disease, and hunger continues.

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Poverty is superbad Gilligan, Director of the Center for the Study of Violence, 96
(James professor of Psychiatry at the Harvard Medical School, and a member of the Academic Advisory Council of the National Campaign Against Youth Violence. Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and its Causes.. P. 191-196)

The deadliest form of violence is poverty.

You cannot work for one day with the violent people who fill our prisons and mental hospitals for the criminally insane without being forcible and constantly reminded of the extreme poverty and discrimination that characterizes their lives. Hearing about their lives, and about their families and friends, you are forced to recognize the truth in Gandhi’s observation that the deadliest form of violence is poverty. Not a day goes by without realizing that trying to understand them and their violent behavior in purely individual terms is impossible and wrong-headed. Any theory of violence, especially a psychological theory, that evolves from the experience of men in maximum security prisons and hospitals for the criminally insane must begin with the recognition that these institutions are only microcosms. They are not where the major violence in our society takes place, and the perpetrators who fill them are far

Any approach to a theory of violence needs to begin with a look at the structural violence in this country. Focusing merely on those relatively few men who commit what
from being the main causes of most violent deaths.

we define as murder could distract us from examining and learning from those structural causes of violent death that are far more significant from a numerical or public health, or human, standpoint. By “structural violence” I mean the increased rates of death, and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted with the relatively lower death rates experienced by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large proportion of them) are a function of class structure; and that structure is itself a

I am contrasting “structural” with “behavioral violence,” by which I mean the nonnatural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on. Structural violence differs from behavioral violence in at least three major respects. *The lethal effects of structural violence operate continuously, rather than sporadically, whereas murders, suicides, executions, wars, and other forms of behavioral violence occur one at a time. *Structural violence operates more or less independently of individual acts; independent of individuals and groups (politicians, political parties, voters) whose decisions may nevertheless have lethal consequences for others. *Structural violence is normally invisible, because it may appear to have had other (natural or violent) causes.
product of society’s collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These are not acts of God.

[Continued… (9 Paragraphs Later…)]
The finding that structural violence causes far more deaths than behavioral violence does is not limited to this country. Kohler and Alcock attempted to arrive at the number of excess deaths caused by socioeconomic inequities on a worldwide basis. Sweden was their model of the nation that had come closes to eliminating structural violence. It had the least inequity in income and living standards, and the lowest discrepancies in death rates and life expectancy; and the highest overall life expectancy in the world. When they compared the life expectancies of those living in the other socioeconomic systems against Sweden, they found that 18 million deaths a year could be attributed

During the past decade, the discrepancies between the rich and poor nations have increased dramatically and alarmingly. The 14 to 18 million deaths a year caused by structural violence compare with about 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. Comparing this frequency of deaths from structural violence to the frequency of those caused by major military and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million military and civilian deaths, including those by genocide—or about eight million per year, 19391945), the Indonesian massacre of 1965-66 (perhaps 575,000) deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two million, 1954-1973), and even a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (232 million), it was clear that even war cannot begin to compare with structural violence, which continues year after year. In other words, every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide, perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world. Structural violence is also the main cause of behavioral violence on a socially and epidemiologically significant scale (from homicide and suicide to war and genocide). The question as to which of the two forms of violence—structural or behavioral—is more important, dangerous, or lethal is
to the “structural violence” to which the citizens of all the other nations were being subjected.

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moot, for they are inextricably related to each other, as cause to effect.

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Subpoint B is oil dependence – Ethanol solves it Ethanol Promotion and Information Council, Updated ‘8
(“Energy Independence, Original date of authorship unknown, http://www.drivingethanol.org/ethanol_facts/why_dependence_foreign.aspx) Ethanol fuels America Sure, ethanol is great for your car and better for the environment. But when you choose ethanol, you're also doing your part to lessen our dependence on oil. The less oil we use, the less we have to worry about the stability and intentions of other countries when it comes to our nation's fuel supply. Right now, ethanol production replaces gasoline that would require the use of 600,000 barrels of oil a day. So Ethanol Is Essential In The Struggle To Reduce Our Dependence On Oil. The United States currently imports about 37 million gallons of gasoline each day. Since 1970, Americans increased gasoline consumption from 12 billion gallons of fuel per year to more than 160 billion gallons of fuel per year. Ethanol is helping address the need for renewable fuel options - so someday we won't have to worry about other countries holding the keys to our nation's critical fuel supply.

Oil dependence jacks Middle East stability and makes peace impossible Teal, Associated Content, ‘8
(Allan, Mar 24, “Why Oil Affects Middle East Conflict” http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/672777/why_oil_affects_middle_east_policy. html?cat=75) Oil gives Middle East nations huge influence in world affairs. Countries can restrict the amount of oil that they will buy if a nation makes them angry. We see this when the United States and her allies placed an embargo on Iranian oil. However, this has not made a reduction in demand for Iranian oil. It just changed the customers standing in line. When world stock markets sniff the possibility that oil may not flow as freely as the world wants and needs, it sends them into a nosedive. This keeps prices high and Middle East coffers full. With this glut of cash, these nations are positioned to finance political actions at home and abroad. They can help channel cash to candidates who they believe will help further their causes. Even with restrictions for foreign contributions, United States presidential candidates manage to get money funneled through to their cash reserves. This buys influence on foreign policy decisions. You can often see this in action when political leaders seem to waffle on whether to support our allies in the region or push an agenda of appeasement for Middle East oil suppliers. Many times the effort is to get nations to push Israel into concessions of land and power. These concessions help the enemies of Israel while straining relations between Israel and her allies. The cash from these huge oil sales is used to arm Middle East nations with state-ofthe-art arsenals of ships, jets, and artillery. Spending a few billion here or there seems like small change to these oil rich lands. They are also able to help arm various terrorists organizations that serve their political purposes. These can either undermine Israel or work to weaken her allies. In some cases, they simply wear down the resolve of these nations to stay on task of trying to build stability in the region.

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Causes nuclear escalation and global conflict Steinbach Hiroshima/Nagasaki Peace Committee ‘2
(John, Hiroshima/Nagasaki Peace Committee + Centre for Research on Globalization, "Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: a Threat to Peace," Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish
satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if

the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

Secureenergy.org ‘6/’5
(“Oil Dependence: A Threat to U.S. Economic & National Security” http://www.secureenergy.org/reports/Briefing-OilDependence.pdf) A National Imperative Oil dependence endangers U.S. economic and national security. In addition to hundreds of billions of dollars each year in direct costs, oil dependence feeds the growth of Islamist terrorism; provides vast amounts of money to unstable, undemocratic governments; increases the likelihood of international conflict; puts American troops in harm’s way; and exposes Americans to the risk of severe economic disloca- tion. For example: Terrorism Al Qaeda has targeted and continues to target oil infrastructure as a way of “bleeding” the U.S. econo- my. Along the oil supply and distribution chain, numerous chokepoints are vulnerable to attack. Shipping lanes are of particular concern: > Roughly 90 percent of Middle East oil exports pass through the Strait of Hormuz (17 mbd), Bab el Mandeb (3.0 mbd), or the Suez Canal/Sumed pipeline (3.8 mbd)—passageways with limited alternatives.10 > Another 11.7 mbd pass through the Strait of Malacca and 3.1 mbd through the Turkish Straits. > Each of these passageways is vulnerable to accidents, piracy, or terrorism, and the effects of a major attack at one of these points could devastate the global economy. Some oil-rich families fund terrorist groups, and the Saudi government has spent tens of billions of dol- lars over the last three decades spreading Wahhabism—an intolerant ideology that lays the groundwork for a broad doctrine of hatred, especially against the West.

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Impact is human survival Alexander, Director of Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, 3
(Yonah, “Terrorism myths and realities,” Washington Times, 8-28-03, p. lexis) Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere

tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of

Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns. Two myths in particular must be debunked immediately if an effective counterterrorism "best
terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare.

practices" strategy can be developed[e.g., strengthening international cooperation]. The first illusion is that terrorism can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts - political, social and economic - are addressed. The conventional illusion is that terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced by "freedom fighters" anywhere, "give me liberty and I will give you death," should be tolerated if not glorified. This traditional rationalization of "sacred" violence often conceals that the real purpose of terrorist groups is to gain political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies. For instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to resolve national grievances [such as Jewish settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but primarily to destroy the Jewish state. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's international network not only opposes the presence of American military in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government that follows the rule of the Caliphs." The second myth is that strong action against terrorist infrastructure [leaders, recruitment, funding, propaganda, training, weapons, operational command and control] will only increase terrorism. The argument here is that lawenforcement efforts and military retaliation inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of violent revenge. Clearly, if this perception continues to prevail, particularly in democratic societies, there is the danger it will paralyze governments and thereby encourage further terrorist attacks. In sum, past experience provides useful lessons for a realistic future strategy. The prudent application of force has been demonstrated to be an effective tool for short- and long-term deterrence of terrorism. For example, Israel's targeted killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron commander of the Islamic Jihad, defused a "ticking bomb." The assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab - a top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who was directly responsible for several suicide bombings including the latest bus attack in Jerusalem - disrupted potential terrorist operations.

it behooves those countries victimized by terrorism to understand a cardinal message communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940: "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however long and hard the road may be: For without victory, there is no survival."
Similarly, the U.S. military operation in Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime as a state sponsor of terror. Thus,

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Contention III is I’m Out of Animal Farm References The plan’s incentive is an effective way to increase FFV and alternative fuel deployment – overcome structural issues with CAFEAMFA Collantes, Science and International Affairs at Harvard Belfer Center, ‘8
(Gustavo, “Biofuels and the Corporate Average Fuel Economy Program: The Statute, Policy Issues, and Alternatives,” May) Insofar as the AMFA provisions constitute the only incentives that automobile manufacturers have to deploy alternative fuel-capable vehicles, and with the supply of  biofuels on the rise, there seems to be, in principle, a strong argument to keep (a form of)  them in place. Two overarching questions remain on the way of warranting the AMFA  provisions:  a- What is the expected impact of flex-fuel vehicles on energy security?  b- Is the current incentive scheme adequate, and if not, how to revise it? This section is concerned with addressing these questions.  Figure 13 shows a proposed logic sequence to assess whether to keep, eliminate, or revise  the AMFA provisions. The sequence starts with questions related to energy security and  they were broadly addressed above.  Assuming positive answers to all the energy security questions, the question of whether  incentives are necessary for the market introduction of FFV seems to follow naturally. It  is widely accepted that incentives of some type are desirable. The population of FFV has  grown dramatically since the adoption of AMFA. In addition to AMFA, factors that  determined such growth include the Energy Policy Act (EPAct) of 1992 and Executive  Order 13149. EPAct 1992 requires that in FY 2000 and beyond, 75% of light-duty  vehicles (defined as vehicles under 8,500 lbs GVWR) acquired by Federal agencies must  be flex-fuel. EPAct also sets requirements on acquisitions of alternative-fuel vehicles by  state agencies and fuel providers that operate at least 50 light-duty vehicles. E.O. 13149,  “Greening the Government through Federal Fleet and Transportation Efficiency”, signed  by President Clinton on April 21, 2000, requires Federal agencies to develop strategies to reduce their annual consumption of petroleum by 20% by the end of FY 2005, relative to  their consumption in FY 1999. Federal agencies’ 2000 purchases of AFVs totaled 7,949,  bringing their AFVs inventory to 55,260—14% of the total in-use AFV population in  2000 (U.S. DoE, 2000). Therefore, much of the increased demand for alternative-fuel  vehicles has been driven not by direct consumer interest but by government incentives of  various forms.  

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2AC Case Explanation

The plan sounds complicated because it’s technical, but all it really does is create incentives in the CAFE act for high ethanol gas stations to change the way the US produces ethanol - ethanol is inevitable, but supporting the process allows better technological innovations that make it more efficient and environmentally friendly

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2AC – If You Have to Describe Implementation
Here’s a bunch of implementation information about the program National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, No Date
(“CAFE Overview – Frequently Asked Questions http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/CARS/rules/CAFE/overview.htm) How is the actual Average Fuel Economy reported by manufacturers to the Government? Manufacturers are required to submit three reports: 1) Pre-model year; 2) Mid-model year; and 3) Final Report. The pre- and mid-model year reports are submitted to NHTSA, while the final report is submitted to and validated by the EPA. Who classifies vehicles for the purposes of CAFE and how is it done? Authority to establish vehicle classifications for the purposes of calculating CAFE was delegated to NHTSA. Specifically, the definitions are as follows:1) Passenger Car – any 4-wheel vehicle not designed for off-road use that is manufactured primarily for use in transporting 10 people or less.2) Truck – a 4-wheel vehicle which is designed for offroad operation (has 4-wheel drive or is more than 6,000 lbs. GVWR and has physical features consistent with those of a truck); or which is designed to perform at least one of the following functions: (1) transport more than 10 people; (2) provide temporary living quarters; (3) transport property in an open bed; (4) permit greater cargo-carrying capacity than passenger-carrying volume; or (5) can be converted to an open bed vehicle by removal of rear seats to form a flat continuous floor with the use of simple tools. Are import vehicles treated the same as domestics when it comes to CAFE? The rules are different for passenger cars and trucks. There is a statutory “two-fleet rule” for passenger cars. Manufacturers’ domestic and import fleets must separately meet the 27.5 mpg CAFE standard. For passenger cars, a vehicle, irrespective of who makes it, is considered as part of the “domestic fleet” if 75% or more of the cost of the content is either U.S. or Canadian in origin. If not, it is considered an import. Beginning in 1980, light trucks were administratively subjected to a similar two-fleet rule. However, given changes in market conditions (the “captive import” sector of the fleet had become insignificant), NHTSA eliminated the two-fleet rule for light trucks beginning with MY 1996. Therefore, there are no fleet distinctions, and trucks are simply counted and CAFE calculated as one distinct fleet of a given manufacturer. How are alternative fuel vehicles treated under CAFE? The CAFE law provides for special treatment of vehicle fuel economy calculations for dedicated alternative fuel vehicles and dual-fuel vehicles. The fuel economy of a dedicated alternative fuel vehicle is determined by dividing its fuel economy in equivalent miles per gallon of gasoline or diesel fuel by 0.15. Thus a 15 mpg dedicated alternative fuel vehicle would be rated as 100 mpg. For dual-fuel vehicles (vehicles that can use the alternative fuel and gasoline or diesel interchangeably), the rating is the average of the fuel economy on gasoline or diesel and the fuel economy on the alternative fuel vehicle divided by .15. For example, this calculation procedure turns a dual fuel vehicle that averages 25 mpg on gasoline or diesel with the above 100 mpg alternative fuel to attain the 40 mpg value for CAFE purposes. Several limitations are established for CAFE credits for dual fuel vehicles. For MYs 1993-2004, the maximum CAFE increase attributable to dual fueled vehicles in a manufacturer’s passenger car or light truck fleet is 1.2 mpg. The Alternative Motor Fuels Act (AMFA) directed the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the EPA Administrator and the Secretary of Energy, to conduct a study and submit a report to Congress evaluating the success of the policy decision to offer CAFE credit calculation incentives for dualfuel and gaseous dual-fuel vehicles. The report was transmitted to Congress in March 2002.The statutory language also requires that the Department of Transportation either extend the incentive program for dual-fuel vehicles beyond MY 2004 for up to four more years with a maximum allowable increase in average fuel economy for a come on, come on, sign up, come on, this one’s nothing like vietnam except for the bullets, except for the bombs, except for the youth that’s gone

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manufacturer of 0.9 miles per gallon; or issue a Federal Register notice that justifies termination of the incentive program. In March 2002, NHTSA issued an NPRM proposing to extend the availability of the CAFE credit incentive for dual-fueled vehicles for four years, through the end of the 2008 model year. A final rule will be issued in 2003. Are any vehicles exempted from CAFE standards?Light trucks that exceed 8,500 lbs gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) do not have to comply with CAFE standards. These vehicles include pickup trucks, sport utility vehicles and large vans. A study prepared for the Department of Energy, in February 2002, by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory found that 521,000 trucks with GVWR from 8,500 to 10,000 lbs were sold in calendar year 1999. The vast majority (82%) of these trucks are pickups and a significant number (24%) were diesel. At the end of 1999, there were 5.8 million of these trucks on the road accounting for 8% of the annual miles driven by light trucks, and 9% of light truck fuel use. How is a manufacturer’s CAFE determined for a given model year?A manufacturer’s CAFE is the fleet wide average fuel economy. Separate CAFE calculations are made for up to three potential fleets: domestic passenger cars, imported passenger cars and light trucks. The averaging method used is referred to as a “harmonic mean”. The regulatory language describes the calculation as: “the number of passenger automobiles manufactured by the manufacturer in a model year; divided by the sum of the fractions obtained by dividing the number of passenger automobiles of each model manufactured by the manufacturer in that model year by the fuel economy measured for that model.” The numerical example below illustrates the process. Assume that a hypothetical manufacturer produces four light truck models in 2004, where MPG means miles per gallon and GVWR means gross vehicle weight rating measured in lbs: Model MPG GVWR Production Volume Vehicle A Vehicle B Vehicle C 22 20 16 3000 3500 4000 130,000 120,000 100,000

Vehicle D 10 8900 40,000 Because the Vehicle D exceeds 8,500 GVWR, it is excluded from the calculation. Therefore, the manufacturer’s light truck CAFE is calculated as:=Average Light Truck Fleet Fuel Economy The 2004 model year light truck CAFE standard is 20.7 mpg therefore the manufacturer is not in compliance.

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AT Specific Vehicle Low Mileage Good Turns
No link – don’t alter CAFE mileage standards No link – credits mean those manufacturers can keep making them if they have to National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, No Date
(“CAFE Overview – Frequently Asked Questions http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/CARS/rules/CAFE/overview.htm) Manufacturers can earn CAFE “credits” to offset deficiencies in their CAFE performances. Specifically, when the average fuel economy of either the passenger car or light truck fleet for a particular model year exceeds the established standard, the manufacturer earns credits. The amount of credit a manufacturer earns is determined by multiplying the tenths of a mile per gallon that the manufacturer exceeded the CAFE standard in that model year by the amount of vehicles they manufactured in that model year. These credits can be applied to any three consecutive model years immediately prior to or subsequent to the model year in which the credits are earned. The credits earned and applied to the model years prior to the model year for which the credits are earned are termed “carry back” credits, while those applied to model years subsequent to the model year in which the credits are earned are known as “carry forward” credits. Failure to exercise carry forward credits within the three years immediately following the year in which they are earned will result in the forfeiture of those credits. Credits cannot be passed between manufacturers or between fleets, e.g., from domestic passenger cars to light trucks.

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Agent (NHTSA)

NHTSA Administrator is legally designated to do everything with regards to CAFE National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, No Date
(“CAFE Overview – Frequently Asked Questions http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/CARS/rules/CAFE/overview.htm) The Secretary of Transportation has delegated authority to establish CAFE standards to the Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). NHTSA is responsible for establishing and amending the CAFE standards; promulgating regulations concerning CAFE procedures, definitions and reports; considering petitions for exemption from standards for low volume manufacturers and establishing unique standards for them; enforcing fuel economy standards and regulations; responding to petitions concerning domestic production by foreign manufacturers and all other aspects of CAFE, including the classification of vehicle lines as either cars or trucks; collecting, recording and cataloging Pre- and Mid-model year reports; adjudicating carry back credit plans; and providing program incentives such as credits for alternative fueled vehicle lines.

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2AC OSPEC

1. We meet – DoD is an agent of the federal government 2. Counterinterpretation – ‘the’ means we can specify an actor Chambers Dictionary 98 (p 1718) the: demonstrative adjective – used to refer to a unique person or thing . 3. Specification is better a. key to solvency debates – agents take actions, not monolithic government – specific solvency claims key to inform productive activism and education on Africa policy b. their interpretation incentivizes agent PICs – uniquely bad for debate – create artificial ground outside the resolution – inculcates political docility by refusing to engage the merits of a policy question 4. Substantive links off of plan action solve the impact – we have to defend an increase in public health assistance – agent just generates better solvency debates 5. We meet - Individual agency actions are still considered “federal government” actions Words and Phrases 04 v. 16A, p. 42) (Cummulative Supplementary Pamphlet,

N.D.Ga. 1986. Action against the Postal Service, although an independent establishment of the executive branch of the federal government, is an action against the “Federal Government” for purposes of rule that plaintiff in action against government has right to jury trial only where right is one of terms of government’s consent to be sued; declining to follow Algernon Blair Industrial Contractors, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 552 F.Supp. 972 (M.D.Ala.). 39 U.S.C.A. 201; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 7.—Griffin v. U.S. Postal Service, 635 F.Supp. 190.—Jury 12(1.2).

6. We have evidence justifying our agent – NHTSA Administrator is legally designated to do everything with regards to CAFE – this means even if we said USFG, normal means for implementation is the actor we specified National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, No Date
(“CAFE Overview – Frequently Asked Questions http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/CARS/rules/CAFE/overview.htm) The Secretary of Transportation has delegated authority to establish CAFE standards to the Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). NHTSA is responsible for establishing and amending the CAFE standards; promulgating regulations concerning CAFE procedures, definitions and reports; considering petitions for exemption from standards for low volume manufacturers come on, come on, sign up, come on, this one’s nothing like vietnam except for the bullets, except for the bombs, except for the youth that’s gone

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and establishing unique standards for them; enforcing fuel economy standards and regulations; responding to petitions concerning domestic production by foreign manufacturers and all other aspects of CAFE, including the classification of vehicle lines as either cars or trucks; collecting, recording and cataloging Pre- and Mid-model year reports; adjudicating carry back credit plans; and providing program incentives such as credits for alternative fueled vehicle lines.

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2AC T – ‘Incentives’

We meet – a. CAFE standards carry a negative incentive for compliance National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, No Date
(“CAFE Overview – Frequently Asked Questions http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/CARS/rules/CAFE/overview.htm) The penalty for failing to meet CAFE standards recently increased from $5.00 to $5.50 per tenth of a mile per gallon for each tenth under the target value times the total volume of those vehicles manufactured for a given model year. Since 1983, manufacturers have paid more than $500 million in civil penalties. Most European manufacturers regularly pay CAFE civil penalties ranging from less than $1 million to more than $20 million annually. Asian and domestic manufacturers have never paid a civil penalty. For MY 2002, five passenger car fleets including BMW, DaimlerChrysler import, Fiat, Lotus, and Porsche are projected to fail to meet 27.5 mpg passenger car CAFE standard. In addition, two light truck fleets including BMW and Volkswagen will likely fail to meet the light truck CAFE standard of 20.7 mpg. Final Reports for MY 2002 provided by the EPA to NHTSA in mid-calendar year of 2003 may adjust these projections favorably.

b. the plan creates new incentives in the CAFE program that are positive – tax breaks tied to ethanol c. ethanol is alternative energy EQC Study Report 4
(September, “Hydrogen, Wind, Biodiesal, and Ethanol: Alternative Energy Sources to Fuel Montana’s Future?” http://www.aeromt.org/PDFs/2004energyreport.pdf) Members of the EQC at the beginning of the 2003-04 legislative interim expressed an interest in studying the selected alternative energy sources. The stated rationale was that given Montana's current energy situation, it is important to evaluate alternative energy resources like biodiesel, hydrogen, wind, and ethanol to help diversify Montana's energy options. The full EQC unanimously incorporated this expressed interest into the Council's interim work plan. At the June 2003 EQC meeting, the Council appointed a six- person subcommittee to investigate alternative energy resources. The Council allocated .10 FTE (270 hours) of staff resources to this subcommittee.

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

Chase 29/45
2AC Ban CAFE CP 1/2

Our interpretation is that ‘Ban’ counterplans out of inevitability claims without specific solvency advocates are illegitimate – a. their functionally utopian – no one serious proposes them, political possibilities involve reforming programs in certain ways – this means reform literature is relevant, informative, and politically useful to debate about – there’s zero educational value to debates regarding made up proposals that will never be considered b. unpredictable – solvency advocates are key to determine the ban counterplans we cut offense against – predictability of counterplans is key to aff debatability, if the neg doesn’t need a solvency advocate they can just object-fiat out of our advantages and win every debate

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

Chase 30/45
2AC Ban CAFE CP 2/2

2. all your CAFE bad turns use faulty analysis – no connection between the act and your claims, means you can’t solve your offense Gerard and Lave, Center for Study and Improvement and Regulation at CMU, ‘3
(David and Lester, “The Economics of CAFE Reconsidered: A Response to CAFE Critics and A Case for Fuel Economy Standards http://aeibrookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/phpAo.pdf) The points made by these critics are important, but they imply policies quite different from those drawn. Specifically, the costs of market distortions and the external costs stem from the failure of current gas prices to reflect the full social costs of gasoline consumption. Lutter and Kravitz (2003), for example, argue that, at the margin, there are external costs of 10.4 cents per mile associated with additional crashes (7.8 cents), congestion (2.4 cents), and pollution (0.2 cents).5 If so, gasoline is under-priced dramatically, insurance markets are inefficient, and congestion policy needs fundamental reform. The authors do not explore the role of the CAFE program in generating these costs, nor do they offer any policy prescription for mitigating them. Given that the current realized fleet average fuel economy is 17 miles per gallon MPG),6 a corrective Pigouvian tax increase of about $1.75 per gallon would be needed to internalize these externalities. Implementing a corrective tax would lower the critics’ cost estimates markedly. The market distortions exist because, at current gasoline prices, consumers place a low priority on fuel economy. Higher gasoline prices would reduce these distortions by reducing driving and the associated externalities and by leading consumers to demand vehicles with greater fuel economy. Thus, we conclude that the recent criticisms are not as much an indictment of the CAFE program as a vivid illustration of the failure of current transportation policy to internalize enormous external costs.

3. CAFE key to solve the case – consumer regulation alone sends mixed signals and can’t solve oil dependency Gerard and Lave, Center for Study and Improvement and Regulation at CMU, ‘3
(David and Lester, “The Economics of CAFE Reconsidered: A Response to CAFE Critics and A Case for Fuel Economy Standards http://aeibrookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/phpAo.pdf) The CAFE program has the potential to provide a useful signal to automakers concerning  what they will have to achieve in future years, giving them time to perform the needed research  and development and build the needed plant and come on, come on, sign up, come on, this one’s nothing like vietnam except for the bullets, except for the bombs, except for the youth that’s gone

LMDIT 2008 CAFE

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equipment. CAFE keeps automakers' attention  on fuel economy, getting them to figure out how to squeeze each tiny increment of fuel economy  out of their vehicles. Consumer desires for greater fuel economy would have the same effect, but  signals from buyers are scrambled by the range of consumers with differing desires.  

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

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2AC States CP

1. 50 state fiat is a voting issue – a. no distinction between 50 states or 50 countries – if the negative can pick a group of political bodies and fiat all of them, it justifies any multi-actor fiat – its impossible to generate offense against functionally utopian counterplans that have every actor in the world except the USFG concur – kills debate and affirmative ground, makes the activity meaningless b. our interpretation is that the negative can fiat one alternate agent from the aff – solves the warrants to 50 state fiat good, they can read a similar counterplan if they find an agent that can compel multi-state action – our interpretation preserves aff ground and forces good neg research c. pre-empt – federalism is not a warrant for the counterplan’s theoretical legitimacy – even if evidence is written in context of energy policy and federalism there’s plenty of debateable topic ground aside from federalism – literature is secondary to functionality of debate for determining theoretical concerns 2. Perm – do both – the fed and the states can simultaneously enforce regulations And, it Buzbee, Prof of Law @ Emory, ‘6
(William, 2/1, “Contextual Environmental Federalism” http://www.law.nyu.edu/journals/envtllaw/issues/vol14/1/v14_n1_buzbee.pdf ) Environmental policy analysts sometimes make broad claims  about federal and state environmental roles based on isolated,  anecdotal examples. This essay suggests that policy analysts  should seek to distinguish events that are the result of particular historical opportunities and context, from propensities and  incentives that are more stable and predictable under current forms  of environmental federalism. Greater attention should be paid to  the array of regulatory actors and regulatory modalities. Activity  by one actor in one modality does not necessarily reveal much  about “the state’s” proclivities. This essay suggests that recent  state enforcement activism proves little about inherent state  environmentalism, but instead reflects political opportunities  created by a shift on the federal level towards a more antienvironmental position. Rather than seeing recent state actions as  providing support for the elimination or reduction of the federal  environmental role, this essay argues that these recent state actions  reveal once again the benefits of regulatory overlap, cooperative  federalism structures, and redundant enforcement mechanisms.  These aspects of the American system of environmental federalism reduce the risk of regulatory underkill that can result from failures  to address environmental ills, as well as failures adequately to  fund, implement and enforce written laws and regulations.1

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

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2AC Gas Tax CP 1/2

1. Perm – do the plan and establish the gas usage tax Solves the case at net benefit best Gerard and Lave, Center for Study and Improvement and Regulation at CMU, ‘3
(David and Lester, “The Economics of CAFE Reconsidered: A Response to CAFE Critics and A Case for Fuel Economy Standards http://aeibrookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/phpAo.pdf) After examining the arguments against CAFE, we discuss the economic arguments for the program. First, most vehicle lines have a range of fuel economies where the lifetime cost of vehicle ownership are roughly constant (NAS, 2002). That is, technology exists to improve fuel  economy at some up-front cost, and this cost will be paid back in fuel savings over the lifetime  of the vehicle. Current market outcomes provide vehicles with lower up-front costs, though  social preferences would tend to favor vehicles with greater fuel economy. Second, most analysts assume that private agents employ discount rates that are far higher than reasonable social  discount rates for fuel conservation. As a result of this discrepancy, market outcomes  systematically under-provide fuel efficiency. A combination of higher gasoline taxes and  modifications of the CAFE program would be superior to either instrument on its own.  

2. More evidence – combing social progrmas like CAFE and higher gas costs is the only way to solve our oil advantage Gerard and Lave, Center for Study and Improvement and Regulation at CMU, ‘3
(David and Lester, “The Economics of CAFE Reconsidered: A Response to CAFE Critics and A Case for Fuel Economy Standards http://aeibrookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/phpAo.pdf) High gasoline prices from 1975 through the early 1980s provided consumers with the incentive to purchase more fuel-economic vehicles. Gas prices fell dramatically in the 1980s,  leading consumers to emphasize performance features such as power, size, styling, and safety  over fuel economy. Persistently low gasoline prices send consumers a signal that contradicts  social conservation objectives. Automakers must simultaneously satisfy the CAFE standards and  consumer demands for larger, highperformance vehicles.  

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

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2AC Gas Tax CP 2/2

3. Saving the best for last – this evidence is offense for the perm over the counterplan and it’s even better than your hot shit CP 1NC evidence Gerard and Lave, Center for Study and Improvement and Regulation at CMU, ‘3
(David and Lester, “The Economics of CAFE Reconsidered: A Response to CAFE Critics and A Case for Fuel Economy Standards http://aeibrookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/phpAo.pdf) There is a spirited debate among CAFE proponents and opponents concerning whether consumers are rational in choosing fuel economy for their vehicles. Many CAFE proponents argue that consumers select a vehicle based on a variety of performance characteristics, but have difficulty assessing whether benefits of added fuel efficiency are worth the costs. In contrast, CAFE opponents, including many economists, argue that information is readily available and that consumers are capable of evaluating whether the higher vehicle price is worth the gasoline savings. Although assuming consumer rationality makes the CAFE debate less interesting, we argue that CAFE is justified even for rational, well-informed consumers, since there are social benefits of fuel conservation that private decision makers do not internalize. We do not argue that CAFE is necessarily the best instrument for achieving conservation objectives, but we judge that a combination of gas taxes and CAFE will be superior to gas taxes alone. Lifetime Costs A series of studies have found that the total cost of owning a vehicle over its lifetime is about the same for vehicles across a range of fuel economies. Subsequent studies have confirmed this conclusion by determining the range of fuel economies where the lifetime savings in gasoline would pay for the higher manufacturing cost of making a more fuel economic vehicle that had the same performance.  NAS (2002) finds that fuel efficiency improvements are cost-effective for current technology, since the higher sticker price would be off-set by fuel savings over the lifetime of the vehicle. The implication of this finding is that the current market conditions lead to equilibrium where vehicles are at the low end of the feasible fuel economy range.  Greene (1998) estimates that the lifetime cost of owning a subcompact car vary by less than $100 for cars that got between 30 and 40 miles per gallon.16 While consumers should be indifferent between vehicles in this range, a number of empirical studies suggest that consumers prefer lower up-front costs to lower operating costs. This suggests that consumers will purchase at the low end of the fuel economy range. Since a 40 mpg car would use 1,250 fewer gallons of gasoline over its 150,000 mile lifetime, society strongly prefers vehicles that will consume less gasoline. Green’s calculation suggests that requiring the 40 mpg car would save gasoline at a cost of less than 8 cents per gallon. Note that higher fuel prices will not solve this problem, but only raise the minimum end of the range. Table 3 presents the NAS (2002) estimates of break-even levels across different market segments. The numbers suggest both that a large range exists where lifetime vehicle ownership costs are constant, and that there is room for significant improvements in fuel economy across every market segment. Consumers are assumed to have a discount rate of 12% and gasoline prices are $1.50. The most striking numbers are that the biggest potential fuel savings come from the market segments that currently have the worst fuel efficiency. The lower-bound estimate for large cars is that a 4.2-MPG improvement is possible while keeping lifetime ownership costs approximately constant. Such an improvement would save 882 gallons of gasoline over the life of the vehicle. Similarly, for the large SUV segment, the lower-bound estimate is an improvement from 17.2 MPG to 23.2 MPG – a 28% increase, resulting in fuel savings of 2477 gallons of gasoline over the come on, come on, sign up, come on, this one’s nothing like vietnam except for the bullets, except for the bombs, except for the youth that’s gone

LMDIT 2008 CAFE

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vehicle lifetime. Social Versus Private Willingness to Pay for Conservation Crandall (1992) recognized that differences in social and private discount rates are a potential justification for minimum fuel efficiency standards. High discount rates lead consumers to choose lower levels of fuel efficiency than society would choose with its lower discount rate. If the divergence were small, the effect might be neglected. However, CAFE critics assert that consumers have high discount rates. For example, Kleit (2002) assumes that consumers discount at a rate of 20% for new vehicle purchases, and Lutter and Kravitz (2003) argue that NHTSA should employ discount rates of seven to 10%, or even higher, to reflect consumer discount rates in evaluating the program benefits. Given Kleit’s assumption of a 20% discount rate for consumer purchases, he calculates that the average vehicle is driven 55,000 discounted miles. A consumer would be willing to pay $275 for a two-MPG improvement in fuel economy (a half-cent per mile cost decrease). Using a 7% discount rate, society would see the vehicle as going nearly 100,000 discounted miles, implying that the fuel sayings is worth $500. Thus society would value the fuel savings at $225 more than the rational consumer for the same fuel-economy improvement. Thus, the assumptions underlying recent criticisms imply that even if there were no external costs, market outcomes would under-provide fuel economy. Figure 5 illustrates the differences by contrasting the willingness to pay for a threemile per gallon increase in fuel economy using a private discount rate of 20 percent and a social discount rate of four percent. We choose the four percent rate because this is closer to typical social discount rates (and it is also the discount rate that Kleit uses to analyze effects of gasoline savings). Assuming a fuel price of $1.50, the social WTP for an increase from 22 to 25 MPG is approximately $400 more than private WTP. Moreover, the divergence in WTP is highest for vehicles that get the poorest fuel economy. For example, the adjusted average fuel economy for a large SUV is 17.2 MPG. Figure 5 shows that society would be willing to pay almost $660 more for fuel economy improvements than the rational consumer. The significant divergence between public and private discount rates creates a social inefficiency that could be internalized either by a fuel tax increase that offsets the externality, by a CAFE standard that is derived from the social discount rate, or by some other market intervention. Justifying fuel economy standards on the basis of a divergence of social and private discount rates opens the door to regulation of air conditioners, furnaces, light bulbs, and any number of products that have tradeoff between up-front costs and operating costs. We observe that the federal government has intervened in each of these markets to regulate the efficiency of the units, prohibit units of lower efficiency, or at least to inform consumers of the savings from the more efficient units. As emphasized above, we do not view CAFE alone as an efficient mechanism for internalizing social costs. We do note that CAFE opponents draw the wrong implication for the large divergence in consumer versus social discount rates that they assume. If new car consumers have discount rates that are much higher than the social discount rate for fuel conservation, then consumers will choose vehicles with too little fuel economy, resulting in a benefit to a market intervention to correct the problem.

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

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Politics – Plan Popular

Gerard and Lave, Center for Study and Improvement and Regulation at CMU, ‘3
(David and Lester, “The Economics of CAFE Reconsidered: A Response to CAFE Critics and A Case for Fuel Economy Standards http://aeibrookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/phpAo.pdf) In 1975 Congress established Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards as a means to conserve petroleum and to reduce U.S. reliance on imported oil. The program continues  to enjoy solid public support as a means to conserve fuel, enhance domestic petroleum security,  reduce air pollution, and curb greenhouse gas emissions. Many economists and free-market  proponents argue that the CAFE program has a host of direct and indirect costs that overwhelm  its conservation benefits.  

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

Chase 37/45
Case 1NC 1/

1. Cafe standards jack car prices and lead to more fuel consumption – turns case Galt, Economics graduate from U Chicago, 3
(Jane, March 03, “Cafe Standards” http://www.janegalt.net/blog/archives/004002.html) Kevin Drum asks a good question: WHY ARE SUVs SO EXPENSIVE?....So I watched 60 Minutes tonight, and in the segment on SUVs I heard once again about how the profit margin on these vehicles is anywhere from $5,000 to $10,000 or more. This compares with ordinary cars, which we are lead to believe are practically sold at a loss. I've heard this so many times that it must be true, but what's the explanation for this? The same companies compete in both the car and the SUV market, so shouldn't competitive pressures force the profit margins to similar points? Isn't that how this whole free market thing is supposed to work? Can anybody out there who works for a car company explain this? I believe I can, in two words: CAFE standards. CAFE stands for Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency. And what that means is that rather than setting a baseline below which no car can fall, the regulators examine the average efficiency of the entire fleet in order to see whether they're making their target. There are several current ways to make cars more fuel efficient: 1) You can make the engine
smaller. This makes the car hard to get up hills, reduces its carrying capacity, and decreases its safety, since averting accidents sometimes requires the ability to accelerate quickly. 2) You can make the car lighter without reducing its size. This is very hard and very expensive to do, and it makes the car much less safe, because less metal around you to absorb the kinetic energy of an impact means that that energy gets absorbed by you. Advocates like to argue that this is only because other people are driving heavy, inefficient SUVs, but this is a canard: lightening the car makes it less safe even in an accident with a car of similar weight. The problem is the velocity, not the weight of the other car. 3) You can make the car smaller. Americans don't like small cars, and they're also less safe. Compact and sub-compact cars are, as SUV-critic Gregg Easterbrook points out, death traps. However, they have the advantage of being cheaper to make than light big cars. 4) You can get creative with the design. The Honda Insight combines all teh abovementioned: it's smaller (two seater with no luggage space!), lighter, underpowered. It also has an innovative engine design. However, I've heard estimates that Honda's losing 20K on every model it sells (no one seems to know the true figure, as Honda and Toyota are very tight with their figures on their hybrids). Basically, what it boils down to is that in order to get cars to consume less fuel, you

have to sacrifice features that Americans like, like size, power, and safety. You can't just decree that everyone only make tiny underpowered cars, because that would not only focus the ire of the people on Washington instead of automakers; it would create problems for people who genuinely need the features you're eliminating, because for example they live on a ranch in Wyoming. So the regulators set an average (and also, I believe, a low floor), and told the automakers to figure it out. Well, they've got the same problem that Washington does -- no one wants to buy a death trap with no luggage space. So they make small cars and sell them to people who wouldn't be able to afford a more powerful one. Flexible people who don't mind cramming eleven people in a Geo from New York to Maine. People without a lot of stuff to put in the trunk. People who don't care about safety because they think they're immortal. Your kids, in other words. The only problem with kids is that they can't afford cars. So the automakers lower the price to the point where a kid with a modest after-school job can make the payments. Now we begin to see the perverse logic of fiat solutions. Have we lowered the total output of carbon emissions here? No, we've raised them, because in order to placate the customers who don't want less power & room, the automakers have increased the number of cars they sell. Now kids who would otherwise be riding the schoolbus are zooming around until all hours, merrily spewing carbon dioxide as they go. The fact that they consume less gas than a family sedan doesn't really matter, because in a lot of cases they're consuming gas that wouldn't have been consumed at all, as those of us who made it through high school without cars can attest that we were not given unlimited access to the family minivan to come on, come on, sign up, come on, this one’s nothing like vietnam except for the bullets, except for the bombs, except for the youth that’s gone

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gallivant around the highways with. (Actually, my family had a brown 1976 Chrysler Cordoba, and I was probably the only child in America who was offered the opportunity to borrow the car and refused it. It was not only radically uncool; parking it was like trying to parallel park the Love Boat.) Anyway, in order to make up the money they're losing on the compact and sub-compact market, the automakers jack up the rates on the rest of us. Especially in the most price-insensitive part of the market: the SUV owners, who have proven that they're sufficiently oblivious to cost that they're willing to buy a car that costs $50 to fill the tank.

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

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Case 1NC 2/

2. CAFE standards deck the environment, cause oil dependence, and hurt the economy Coon, Heritage Foundation, 1
(Charli, E. July 11, “Why the Government’s CAFE standards for fuel efficiency should be repealed, not increased http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/BG1458.cfm) Congress may soon decide to increase the standards for fuel economy imposed on manufacturers of vehicles sold in the United States. 1 This would be a mistake. In 1975, Congress reacted to the 1973 oil embargo imposed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) by establishing the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Program as part of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act. The goal of the program was to reduce U.S. dependence on imported oil and consumption of gasoline. Advocates also hoped it would improve air quality. But the evidence shows that it has failed to meet its goals; worse, it has had unintended consequences that increase the risk of injury to Americans. Instead of perpetuating such a program, Congress should consider repealing the CAFE standards and finding new marketbased solutions to reduce high gasoline consumption and rising prices. There is significant pressure on Members of Congress, however, not only to continue this failed program, but also to raise fuel efficiency standards even higher. The current CAFE standards require auto manufacturers selling in the United States to meet certain fuel economy levels for their fleets of new cars and light trucks (pickups, minivans, and sport utility vehicles, or SUVs). The standard for passenger cars is currently 27.5 miles per gallon; for light trucks, it is 20.7 mpg. 2 Manufacturers face stiff fines for failing to meet these standards based on the total number of vehicles in each class sold, but compliance is taken out of their hands. The government measures compliance by calculating a sales-weighted mean of the fuel economies for the fleets of new cars and light trucks a manufacturer sells each year, and it measures domestically produced and imported vehicles separately. Clearly, the CAFE program has failed to accomplish its purposes. Oil imports have not decreased. In fact, they have increased from about 35 percent of supply in the mid1970s to 52 percent today. Likewise, consumption has not decreased. As fuel efficiency improves, consumers have generally increased their driving, offsetting nearly all the gains in fuel efficiency. 3 Not only has the CAFE program failed to meet its goals; it has had tragic even if unintended consequences. As vehicles were being made lighter to achieve more miles per gallon and meet the standards, the number of fatalities from crashes rose. 4 Politicians should stop distorting the marketplace with unwise policies and convoluted regulations and allow the market to respond to consumer demand for passenger vehicles. In addition to free-market considerations, there are other compelling reasons to reject the CAFE standards. For example: CAFE standards endanger human lives; CAFE standards fail to reduce consumption; and CAFE standards do not improve the environment.

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

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Gas Tax CP 1NC 1/2

The United States federal government should tax the usage of gasoline at a level reflecting the costs to the United States federal government of obtaining gasoline. The United States federal government should also rescind all Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards. Solves the entirety of the case – net benefits are econ, politics, and solvency Hamilton, UCSD Prof of Economics, 7
(James, March 3, “Cafe Standards” http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2007/03/cafe_standards.html) Featuring prominently in the new energy plan from President Bush is a call for changes in the corporate average fuel efficiency (CAFE) standards that the Administration claims could reduce U.S. gasoline consumption by 5% over the next 10 years. Here are some of the reasons I'm not thrilled by that suggestion. CAFE standards are based on the premise that auto manufacturers and consumers are making inappropriate decisions about the kind of vehicles that get produced. The clearest way to motivate this from an economic perspective would be to suggest that there are costs to using gasoline beyond those paid directly by consumers, such as a geopolitical cost when the U.S. relies on imported oil or possible consequences for the world climate. But if that is the motivation, an economically more efficient way to accomplish the objective would be to tax the gasoline use itself so that the after-tax price paid by consumers completely reflects whatever these true costs are deemed to be. This has the benefits of providing an incentive not just to purchase more fuelefficient cars, but also to encourage more fuel conservation in the use of the existing fleet through such measures as driving slower, driving less, or getting more of the existing mileage from the more fuel-efficient vehicles. And it allows consumers and firms the maximum flexibility to figure out how to do this in the least disruptive way. When you force consumers to buy something other than their first choice, the consequences may not be quite what the policy-maker originally envisioned. One example sometimes given is the shift to SUVs. Because the initial CAFE standards were different for "light trucks" as opposed to "cars", one way Detroit responded to CAFE was to create a new supersized vehicle that in practice is used the way a "passenger car" used to be, but that wasn't similarly regulated. A second example of a possible unintended consequence of tightening CAFE is that if American cars no longer have the characteristics sought by consumers, they will buy more imports. There is an interesting new study of this by Mark Jacobsen, an economics Ph.D. student at Stanford whom we're trying to persuade to join our faculty at UCSD. Jacobsen notes that auto producers generally fall into one of three groups, as exemplified by Toyota, Ford, and BMW in the diagram below. The fleet of a Japanese producer like Toyota usually has an average fuel economy that is higher than the existing CAFE standard, meaning that a modest increase in the standard would not affect them directly. European producers like BMW fail to meet existing CAFE standards, and choose to just pay the fine that is required for any company that fails to comply. The third group is the U.S. producers like Ford, who feel that violating the CAFE standards would expose them to unwanted publicity, litigation, or further undesirable legislation, and therefore stay just inside the standard. It is thus the U.S. auto producers who do the adjusting when CAFE standards are tightened. Jacobsen builds a detailed model of the American new and used car market based on the choices consumers make between different kinds of cars. His simulations suggest that one consequence of tightening CAFE standards is an increase in the number of come on, come on, sign up, come on, this one’s nothing like vietnam except for the bullets, except for the bombs, except for the youth that’s gone

LMDIT 2008 CAFE

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imported cars and a decrease in the fuel efficiency of those cars. Essentially the European producers have an advantage over the American producers in being more willing to flaunt their violation of the CAFE standards, and the Japanese producers have the advantage of selling enough compact vehicles to be allowed to expand lessefficient models such as the Acura. Thus, people who like bigger cars end up buying more of them from the importers when the standards are tightened.

(HAMILTON CONTINUES BELOW)

Gas Tax 1NC CP 2/2
(HAMILTON CONTINUES, NO TEXT OMITTED)
Overall, Jacobsen estimates that a one-mile-per-gallon increase in the required average corporate fuel efficiency would increase the average fuel-efficiency of all new cars sold by 2.5%. However, since most of the older cars would still be on the road, Jacobsen estimates that during the first year, total U.S. gasoline consumption would decline by only 0.8%. He estimates the costs of this 1 mpg tightening of CAFE would be $20 billion in the first year, with these first-year costs shared about equally between U.S. consumers and producers. For comparison, Jacobsen claims that a gasoline tax could accomplish the same first-year effect at an efficiency cost of significantly less than $1 billion. Over time, the fuel savings from tightening CAFE would of course increase, but even after 10 years, Jacobsen concludes that that a gasoline tax could accomplish the same thing at 1/6 the cost. Although it is hard to motivate CAFE from sound economic principles, somehow it has political staying power. The public evidently sees the costs associated with CAFE as borne by "somebody else" whereas they know they pay the gasoline taxes themselves. But here's another possible proposal that might be suggested by Jacobsen's research. Why not start decrying the fact that some of those foreign companies are failing to comply with our existing CAFE standards, and claim that what we need to do is get more serious about enforcing these, and raise the payment required per vehicle of any company that fails to meet the standards? In practice, this would amount to either raising the tax on BMWs, or forcing the European importers to sell some more fuel-efficient vehicles. Ford and GM would be spared, as long as they continue to stay within the existing standards.

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

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Gas Tax CP 2NC Overview

Our Hamilton evidence is game over – counterplan creates a new gas tax on usage instead of purchase, Hamilton says the government will set the tax at the level required to accurately reflect the cost of obtaining gas – solves the case, creates incentives to buy more fuel efficient cars – companies have an incentive to produce more fuel efficient vehicles without CAFE regulations – also, consumers want to use existing vehicles more efficiently, counterplan solves better Hamilton isolates three net benefits – a. 2AC concedes Hamilton’s solvency turn to the aff and the perm – raising CAFE standards creates an incentive for foreign automakers to flaunt noncompliance and reduce fuel efficiency – people who want big cars will import them from overseas – turns solvency, total fuel efficiency goes down b. economy – CAFE has unintended costs dealing with forcing a nonvoluntary transition and cumbersome regulations – in the first year alone, the CP costs 19 billion dollars less than the plan, even after ten years the cost of the CP costs 1/6 of what the plan does – total savings are massive – plan links harder to the spending da c. politics – CAFE is popular with consumers, they see the costs as paid by ‘someone else’ – however, the counterplan is unpopular because consumers have to pay the tax themselves – cp doesn’t link to the bush bad disad

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

Chase 43/45
Gas Tax 2NC CP Solves / Case Solvo Turn

Economists conclude neg – CAFE is expensive and creates more fuel usage, CP solves Gerard and Lave, Center for Study and Improvement and Regulation at CMU, ‘3
(David and Lester, “The Economics of CAFE Reconsidered: A Response to CAFE Critics and A Case for Fuel Economy Standards http://aeibrookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/phpAo.pdf) More recently, there have been concerns that fuel-economy improvements increase the  external costs associated with driving. Because CAFE reduces marginal driving costs and  encourages more driving, there are costs associated with the CAFEinduced vehicle miles  traveled. An average point estimate is that a 10 percent increase in fuel economy (or decrease in  fuel prices) leads to a two percent increase in driving (Greene, Kahn, and Gibson, 1999). The  “take-back” or “rebound” effect cuts into the conservation benefits of improved fuel economy.  Moreover, because there are significant externalities associated with driving, e.g., crashes,  congestion, and pollution, any additional driving generates enormous social costs.  The rebound effect has figured prominently in recent attacks on the CAFE program.  Figure 4 illustrates the private and social benefits and costs of fuel economy improvements and  the rebound effect. Fuel economy improvements reduce the price of driving ($/mi) from P0 to  P1, inducing a movement along the demand curve and vehicle miles traveled (VMT) increase  from VMT0 to VMT1. The private benefit of the improvement is represented by the trapezoid  bounded by P0, P1, and the demand curve (VMT1 * ∆P – 0.5*∆P*∆VMT). Assuming that the  performance and size of the vehicle are unchanged, there will be an additional manufacturing  cost to increase fuel economy. Thus, the net private benefit is the trapezoid less these up-front capital costs. With per-mile external costs, S, the CAFE-induced social costs from the additional  VMT are S * ∆VMT.  Economists generally support gasoline tax increases as the most efficient means for  increasing fuel economy. The intuition is straightforward. First, CAFE standards apply only to  new vehicles and therefore the effects are introduced over fifteen or more years. Second, fuel efficiency increases reduce per-mile fuel costs, thus encouraging more driving. In contrast, fuel taxes both encourage consumers to drive less now, and demand more fuel-efficient vehicles in the future. The cost estimates are also difficult to argue with: Gasoline taxes achieve the same fuel conservation levels at costs that are seven to 10 times less than those of the CAFE program (Crandall, 1992).  

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

Chase 44/45
CP Solves Oil Shocks

MacKenzie, Union of Concerned Scientists Vehicles Engineer, ‘6
(Donald, April 29, “Cutting Oil Dependence” http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_vehicles/fuel_economy/fuel-economy-the-single-mosteffective-step-for-cutting-oil-depedence.html) Increasing fuel economy is by far the best tool we have for cutting our oil dependence. It will deliver fast results. It has been proven to work from experience— we roughly doubled the fuel economy of our cars between the 1970s and the late 1980s. We can do this right now. The technology needed to increase the average fuel economy of our cars and trucks to 40 miles per gallon (mpg) has already been developed, but for the most part is collecting dust on automakers' shelves. If we increased fuel economy to 40 mpg over 10 years, then within 15 years we would have saved more oil than we would ever get out of the Arctic Wildlife Refuge over its entire 40-50 year life. And the savings from better fuel economy would keep on growing indefinitely, while the oil wells would dry up.

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LMDIT 2008 CAFE

Chase 45/45

AT Artificially Competitive / Perm Out of Ban
It’s not artificially competitive – banning generates uniqueness for our turns, but Hamilton creates competition between the new gas tax and the CAFE standards – that’s the link differentiation 2NC overview above

come on, come on, sign up, come on, this one’s nothing like vietnam except for the bullets, except for the bombs, except for the youth that’s gone