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US-China Cooperation Affirmative
US-China Cooperation 1AC (1/12)........................................................................................................................................................3 US-China Cooperation 1AC (2/12)........................................................................................................................................................4 US-China Cooperation 1AC (3/12)........................................................................................................................................................5 US-China Cooperation 1AC (4/12)........................................................................................................................................................6 US-China Cooperation 1AC (5/12)........................................................................................................................................................7 US-China Cooperation 1AC (6/12)........................................................................................................................................................8 US-China Cooperation 1AC (7/12)........................................................................................................................................................9 US-China Cooperation 1AC (8/12)......................................................................................................................................................10 US-China Cooperation 1AC (9/12)......................................................................................................................................................11 US-China Cooperation 1AC (10/12)....................................................................................................................................................12 US-China Cooperation 1AC (11/12)....................................................................................................................................................13 US-China Cooperation 1AC (12/12)....................................................................................................................................................14 Relations Adv. – Relations Link EXTN (1/5)......................................................................................................................................15 Relations Adv. – Relations Link EXTN (2/5)......................................................................................................................................16 Relations Adv. – Relations Link EXTN (3/5)......................................................................................................................................17 Relations Adv. – Relations Link EXTN (4/5)......................................................................................................................................18 Relations Adv. – Relations Link EXTN (5/5)......................................................................................................................................19 Relations Adv. – AT: Relations Resilient.............................................................................................................................................20 Relations Adv. – AT: No Conflict.........................................................................................................................................................21 Relations Adv. – AT: Alternative Causality..........................................................................................................................................22 Relations Adv. – US-Sino Relations Good – Nuclear War..................................................................................................................23 Relations Adv. – US-Sino Relations Good – US-Sino Conflict...........................................................................................................24 Relations Adv. – US-Sino Relations Good – Economy.......................................................................................................................25 Relations Adv. – US-Sino Relations Good – Terrorism.......................................................................................................................26 Relations Adv. – US-Sino Relations Good – Kashmir.........................................................................................................................27 Relations Adv. – US-Sino Relations Good – Environment .................................................................................................................28 Relations Adv. – US-Sino Relations Good – North Korea..................................................................................................................30 Relations Adv. – US-Sino Relations Good – North Korea EXTN.......................................................................................................31 Relations Adv. – US-Sino Relations Good – Central Asia...................................................................................................................32 Relations Adv. – Peaceful Rise – Link EXTN.....................................................................................................................................34 Relations Adv. – Regime Stability – Link EXTN (1/2).......................................................................................................................35 Relations Adv. – Regime Stability – Link EXTN (2/2).......................................................................................................................36 Relations Adv. – Regime Stability – Impact EXTN............................................................................................................................37 Relations Adv. – Regime Collapse – AT: No Energy Crisis.................................................................................................................38 Solvency – Coop Solves Climate Change EXTN (1/3).......................................................................................................................39 Solvency – Coop Solves Climate Change EXTN (2/3).......................................................................................................................40 Solvency – Coop Solves Climate Change EXTN (3/3).......................................................................................................................41 Solvency – Coop Solves Climate Change EXTN – Solves Coal.........................................................................................................42 Solvency – Coop Solves Relations EXTN (1/3)..................................................................................................................................43 Solvency – Coop Solves Relations EXTN (2/3)..................................................................................................................................44 Solvency – Coop Solves Relations EXTN (3/3)..................................................................................................................................45 Solvency – Coop Solves China Energy Quest EXTN (2/2).................................................................................................................46 Solvency – Coop Solves China Energy Quest EXTN (2/2).................................................................................................................47 Solvency – Incentive Key EXTN (1/3)................................................................................................................................................48 Solvency – Incentive Key EXTN (2/3)................................................................................................................................................49 Solvency – Incentive Key EXTN (3/3)................................................................................................................................................50 Solvency – AT: Vagueness...................................................................................................................................................................51 AT: Status Quo Solves – AT: Coop Now..............................................................................................................................................52 AT: Status Quo Solves – AT: China Solve Now...................................................................................................................................53 AT: Status Quo Solves – AT: China Solve Now EXTN (1/2)..............................................................................................................54 AT: Status Quo Solves – AT: China Solve Now EXTN (2/2)..............................................................................................................55 AT: Status Quo Solves – AT: No Pollution Now..................................................................................................................................56 AT: Status Quo Solves – AT: Coop Inevitable.....................................................................................................................................57 AT: Incentive Fails...............................................................................................................................................................................58 Solvency Mechanism – R&D...............................................................................................................................................................59 Solvency Mechanism – Technical Cooperation (1/2)..........................................................................................................................60 SDI 2008

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Solvency Mechanism – Technical Cooperation (2/2)..........................................................................................................................61 Iran Add-On.........................................................................................................................................................................................62 Iran Add-On – Link EXTN (1/2).........................................................................................................................................................63 Iran Add-On – Link EXTN (2/2).........................................................................................................................................................64 Saudi Relations Add-On.......................................................................................................................................................................65 Saudi Relations Add-On – Link EXTN...............................................................................................................................................66 Saudi Relations Add-On – Impact EXTN............................................................................................................................................67 Shunning Add-On.................................................................................................................................................................................68 Shunning Add-On – Link EXTN.........................................................................................................................................................70 Shunning Add-On – Sudan Impact .....................................................................................................................................................71 Tar Sands Add-On................................................................................................................................................................................72 Terrorism Add-On................................................................................................................................................................................73 Military Modernization Add-On (1/2).................................................................................................................................................74 Military Modernization Add-On (2/2).................................................................................................................................................75 Mil Mod Add-On – Link EXTN..........................................................................................................................................................76 Mil Mod Add-On – Impact EXTN – Taiwan War................................................................................................................................77 Mid-East Stability Add-On..................................................................................................................................................................78 Asia Stability Add-On .........................................................................................................................................................................79 Asia Stability Add-On – Link EXTN (1/3)..........................................................................................................................................80 Asia Stability Add-On – Link EXTN (2/3)..........................................................................................................................................81 Asia Stability Add-On – Link EXTN (3/3)..........................................................................................................................................82 Food Security Add-On.........................................................................................................................................................................83 Pollution Add-On.................................................................................................................................................................................84 Pollution Add-On – Link EXTN .........................................................................................................................................................85 Pollution Add-On – Link EXTN..........................................................................................................................................................86 Sino-Russia Relations Add-On (1/2)....................................................................................................................................................87 Sino-Russia Relations Add-On (2/2)....................................................................................................................................................88 AT: Central Asia DA (1/2)....................................................................................................................................................................89 AT: Central Asia DA (2/2)....................................................................................................................................................................90 AT: Central Asia DA – #5 Link Inevitable EXTN..............................................................................................................................91 AT: Central Asia DA – Russia Stability Turn.......................................................................................................................................92 AT: Elections DA – AT: Election Solves Case.....................................................................................................................................93 AT: Elections DA – AT: China Impact.................................................................................................................................................94 AT: States CP (1/3)...............................................................................................................................................................................95 AT: States CP (2/3)...............................................................................................................................................................................96 AT: States CP (3/3)...............................................................................................................................................................................97 AT: States CP – Constitutionality DA..................................................................................................................................................99 AT: States CP – Leadership DA.........................................................................................................................................................100 AT: States CP – AT: Uniform Action Good........................................................................................................................................101 AT: States CP – Modeling Link EXTN..............................................................................................................................................102 AT: States CP – Modeling Key EXTN...............................................................................................................................................103 AT: States CP – Modeling – Stability Link EXTN............................................................................................................................104 AT: Pressure China / Financial Assistance CP...................................................................................................................................105 AT: Energy Cooperation CP...............................................................................................................................................................106 AT: IAE CP........................................................................................................................................................................................107

Produced By:
Kallmyer/Murillo/Tate Lab. Paras Bansal, Raeesa Chinikamwala, David Lee, Meagan Sanchez, Parth Singh, Dan Vredenburg. Kevin Kallmyer.

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US-China Cooperation 1AC (1/12)
Contention One: Climate Change Status quo US-Sino energy cooperation is ineffective – dialogue is not leading to action, and limited business deals are directionless – targeted US action is necessary to reverse this trend
Wallis, journalist, 6/17/2008
[Paul, "Economic Crisis? Maybe, but US and China just signed 71 contracts worth $13.6 billion," http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/256226]

All the rhetoric between the US and China hasn’t meant much in terms of doing business. Ford, Oracle, and others, have
been merrily signing deals with China while Treasury Secretary Paulson carries the banner at the Strategic Economic Dialogue. It’s like a census of diplomatic terms. What it actually means is business as usual, and any domestic issues in either country aren’t issues. Reading the various reports is pretty impressive, because anything verbal of substance is almost entirely theoretical, while the hard business is obviously thundering along regardless of global economic turmoil. Bloomberg has been watching the parade: The shift in focus represents an effort by Paulson to create a venue for continuing talks once he and President George W. Bush leave office on Jan. 20. ``Focusing on energy and the environment is part of the strategy to make this dialogue last beyond this administration,'' said Nicholas Lardy, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. ``Paulson is dialing back on the currency issue in part because he's had some success.'' Chinese officials are also making 30 business deals with firms including Ford Motor Co. and Oracle Corp. American soybean processors anticipate a $3 billion commitment from China this year with agreements involving companies such as Cargill Inc. and Archer Daniels Midland Co., the St. Louis Regional Chamber & Growth Association said yesterday. Some of the American views of this process are more than a bit critical. The Chinese, however, are all in favor. Xinhua has created a series of articles, which if not a blow by blow are a showpiece of positive spin: During his visit to St. Louis earlier in the day, (Chinese Vice President) Wang met with local political and business leaders and spoke highly of growing economic and trade relations between the U.S. state of Missouri and China. He noted that the China-U.S. business relationship has expanded from coastal areas of the United States to the Midwest region, which includes Missouri, since China adopted its opening-up and reform policy 30 years ago. Wang said both the Chinese and U.S. governments need to attach great importance to their cooperation in the U.S. Midwest region and create favorable conditions and an environment for cooperation between entrepreneurs of both countries. This is the unfolding of an agreement put in place by Presidents Hu and Bush in 2006. Talks under the Strategic Economic Dialogue framework are held twice per year. The general negative feeling on the American side is that the talks are directionless. One comment in the Bloomberg piece is that America “has no idea what it wants.” The rest of the weather report is that currency is no longer an issue, everyone's happy, and energy is another area for bilateral cooperation. That means, perhaps, that the world’s two biggest oil slaves are hoping to take advantage of America’s total inability to cope with oil prices and China’s total inability to balance inflation and energy consumption. Stay tuned, there may be an attack of competence any decade now. The world’s two biggest polluters have also agreed on carbon credit trading. The talk from the political zone about how much China should cut emissions is big, but there’s no indication of any actual progress to doing that, as far as I could see.

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US-China Cooperation 1AC (2/12)
Effective US-Sino action to curb GHG emissions solves global climate change – China is willing to change consumption patterns but cooperation is key to create the shift and create a global model
Chandler, Carnegie Endowment Senior Associate, March 2008
[William, "Breaking the Suicide Pact: US-China Cooperation on Climate Change," http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb57_chandler_final.pdf Chinikamwala]

Together, China and the United States produce 40 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. Their actions to curb or expand energy consumption will determine whether efforts to stop global climate change succeed or fail. If these two nations act to curb emissions, the rest of the world can more easily coalesce on a global plan. If either fails to act, the mitigation strategies adopted by the rest of the world will fall far short of averting disaster for large parts of the earth. These two nations are now joined in what energy analyst Joe Romm has aptly called “a mutual suicide pact.” American leaders point to emissions growth in China and demand that Chinese leaders take responsibility for climate change. Chinese leaders counter that American per capita greenhouse gas emissions are five times theirs and say, “You created this problem, you do something about it.” Concern for energy security deepens this dilemma. U.S. congressional staff experts think energy is twice as likely to cause conflict between the two countries as human rights. Mainstream Americans fear that China is gobbling up oil and driving up the price of gasoline. The Chinese fear American control of Middle East oil and of shipping lanes to China. However, current events are opening a window for change. The United States is moving to address climate change, if only at the state level. Almost half the fifty states have made significant commitments to cut carbon emissions. Crucially, Chinese leaders recently suggested that they might be willing to make a climate commitment. Analysts at the Energy Research Institute, a leading Chinese government think tank, suggest that China could cut its current emissions growth rate by half through 2020, and from that level reduce absolute emissions by one-third by 2050. This scenario would put within reach a global goal of stabilizing the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide below 500 parts per million. Such a commitment would represent a profound shift in China’s position, and it could be pivotal in reducing the worst risks of climate change. Thus, a path can be glimpsed to breaking the suicide pact and achieving a bilateral breakthrough, if Chinese and American leaders and policy makers can find a deeper understanding of energy realities; grasp the need for immediate action to reduce carbon emissions; and develop a new, non-treaty-based approach to reaching an international agreement—and eventually even a post-Kyoto global climate accord.

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US-China Cooperation 1AC (3/12)
Warming leads to extinction – collapses the earth’s life support system
Pearce, New Scientist Magazine Environment Consultant, 2007
[Fred, With Speed and Violence, environment and development consultant, pg. 240-241] Fifteen years on, the urgency of the climate crisis is much clearer, even if the story has grown a little more complicated. But we are showing no signs yet of acting on the scale necessary. The technology is still straight-forward, and the economics is only easier, but we can't get hte politics right. Even at this lat hour, I do believe we have it in our power to set Spaceship Earth back in the right course. But time is short. The ship is already starting to spin out of control. We may lose all chance of grabbing the wheel. Humanity faces a genuinely new situation. It is not an environmental crisis in the accepted sense. It is a crisis for the entire life support system of our civilization and our species. During the past 10,000 years, since the close of the last ice age, human civilizations have plundered and destroyed their local environments, wrecking the natural fecundity of sizable areas of the planet. Nevertheless, the planet's life-support system as a whole has until now remained stable. As one civilization fell, another rose. But the rules of the game have changed. In the Anthropocene, human influences on planetary systems are global and pervasive. In the past, if we got things wrong and wrecked our environment, we could pack up and move somewhere else. Migration has always been one of our species great survival strategies. Now we have nowhere else to go. No new frontier. We have only one atmosphere, only one planet.

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US-China Cooperation 1AC (4/12)
Contention Two: Sustainable Relations China’s energy rise is resulting in US-Sino competition – this undermines US strategic interests, collapsing US-Sino relations and results in escalating conflicts
Lieberthal, Michigan University China Center Research Associate, William Davidson Institute China Director and Distinguished Fellow, Political Science Professor, and Herberg, National Bureau of Asian Research Asian Energy Security Director, ARCO Strategic Planning group Global Energy and Economics Director, April 2006
[Kenneth, Mikkal, "NBR Analysis," http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?ID=93a9dcaa-b9d5-4601-ac32-93f702696db5, Vredenburg] Thus far the U .s . response to China’s energy rise has been relatively ad hoc, reactive, and counterproductive . Compounded by China’s own lack of transparency, U .s . reactions have suffered from a poor understanding of China on many levels, including China’s energy dilemmas, the complex interests driving beijing’s global energy approach, the goals and relationships that characterize Chinese energy institutions and state energy companies, and the linkages between energy and other issues in the People’s republic of China (PrC) . U .s . Congressional reaction to China national Offshore Oil Corporation’s (CnOOC) 2005 bid for Unocal both revealed how little some U .s . policymakers understand about China’s global energy push and showed how divisive these issues have become for an already strained U .s .-China relationship . The failed bid also demonstrated that, in today’s atmosphere of high energy prices and fears over long-term energy scarcity, both the United states and China are focused intently on their national energy security and tend to assume the worst of the other’s intentions . Moreover, the energy policymaking institutions of both China and the United states make effective energy cooperation very difficult . Therefore, the central question hinges on whether the United states and China will be able to reduce their existing

mistrust, which is exacerbated by broader strategic tensions, and devise prudent and serious ways to begin working together to achieve mutual interests in energy . in fact, energy cooperation could actually contribute to building the trust required for potentially broader international cooperation between China and the United states . The United states and China seem to hold fundamentally different views of global energy markets . This reality makes
effective dialogue on energy issues both more difficult and more necessary . China’s energy strategy currently appears rooted in a statist, mercantilist mentality among political leaders in beijing . The United states, on the other hand, has a stated policy of relying largely on global markets to deliver energy supply security .4 The United states does not always fully appreciate how its own colossal weight in global energy and geopolitics affects China’s concerns regarding U .s . ability to threaten China’s energy interests . Ed Morse, an expert on energy and politics, sums up the problem by asserting that, “The U .s . is mostly ‘brawn’ and limited ‘brain’ .”5 suspicions remain high both in beijing and Washington regarding the other’s intentions on key

energy security and supply questions . Without a more sophisticated policy response in both Washington and beijing, the risk is that energy issues are becoming not a source of constructive cooperation but rather a deepening source of competition, misperceptions, and excuses for obstructing one another’s interests . if beijing believes that the United states is attempting to use energy politics as an instrument to weaken and contain China, then beijing will be more likely to use its growing energy influence to frustrate U .s . foreign and security policies . The array of negative results from such a scenario might include increasing Chinese “hoarding” of oil and natural gas fields and supplies, tying Chinese energy investments abroad ever more closely to dubious regimes, promoting security cooperation with adversarial governments, and politicizing global energy markets . such fallout would also increase the leverage of government hard-liners in beijing who want to develop blue-water naval capabilities to challenge U .s . control of the slOCs through which large shares of China’s future oil and natural gas supplies will flow .6 a wide range of other negative outcomes could be imagined . it is therefore in the best interests of both countries to try to understand each other’s energy insecurities and find new ways to work toward cooperative outcomes .

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US-China Cooperation 1AC (5/12)
This makes military conflict inevitable absent the plan – cooperation is key to align strategic interests
Zweig, Hong Kong University China Transnational Relations Center Director, and Jianhai, Hong Kong University China Transnational Relations Center Director Postdoctoral Fellow, October 2005
[David, Bi, "China's Global Hunt for Energy," Foreign Affairs, bansal] China's resources hunt has been a boon to some states, especially developing countries, as it has allowed them to exploit as yet untapped resources or gain leverage to negotiate better deals with older customers. But for other states, particularly the United States and Japan, China's insatiability is causing concern. Some governments worry as Beijing enters their spheres of influence or strikes deals with states they have tried to marginalize. In some quarters in Washington, including the Pentagon, the intelligence services, and Congress, the fear that China could challenge U.S. military dominance in East Asia and destabilize the region is rising. Whatever the prognosis, China's boom can no longer be understood in regional terms alone; as Beijing's economic influence brings it international political influence and the potential for more military power, China's growth will have worldwide repercussions. Although China's new energy demands need not be a source of serious conflict with the West in the long term, at the moment, Beijing and Washington feel especially uneasy about the situation. While China struggles to manage its growing pains, the United States, as the world's hegemon, must somehow make room for the rising giant; otherwise, war will become a serious possibility. According to the power transition theory, to maintain its dominance, a hegemon will be tempted to declare war on its challengers while it still has a power advantage. Thus, easing the way for the United States and China -- and other states -- to find a new equilibrium will require careful management, especially of their mutual perceptions.

US-Sino war would escalate to global nuclear annihilation
Strait Times, June 25, 2000, No one gains in war over Taiwan, lexis, Singh The high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a fullscale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the

prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else. Gen Ridgeway recalled that the biggest mistake the US made during the Korean War was to assess
Chinese actions according to the American way of thinking. "Just when everyone believed that no sensible commander would march south of the Yalu, the Chinese troops suddenly appeared," he recalled. (The Yalu is the river which borders China and North Korea, and the crossing of the river marked China's entry into the war against the Americans). "I feel uneasy if now somebody were to tell me that they bet China would not do this or that," he said in a recent interview given to the Chinese press.

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US-China Cooperation 1AC (6/12)
Rebuilding the US-Sino relationship is critical to a peaceful Sino rise
Schriver, Armitage International Partner, January 2007
[Randall, “China’s March on the 21st Century,” http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F848DF23CA704F5%7D/CMTCFINAL052307.PDF] While the current administration understandably devotes enormous amounts of time to Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and the Middle East conflict, the defining strategic challenge of our age is unfolding in a different region. The emergence of China in the context of a rapidly changing Asia is arguably the most important strategic development on our agenda. This view is endorsed by authoritative sources. For example, a report by the U.S. National Intelligence Council 2020 project suggested that the emergence of China resembles the advent of a united Germany in the 19th century and a powerful United States in the early 20th century, with the potential to dramatically transform the geopolitical landscape. However, the U.S.-China bilateral relationship and U.S. relations with Asia more generally, may not be receiving the kind of senior-level attention that their strategic importance requires. It is critical that senior leaders in the U.S. government find the time to provide thoughtful stewardship of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. Although the United States may have more important bilateral relationships in the world (Japan and the United Kingdom come to mind), there is no other bilateral relationship that, if managed poorly, could carry as many regional and global costs. In other words, because the

stakes are so high and the consequences of failure so global, the U.S.-China relationship is perhaps the most significant bilateral relationship in the world. There is strong cause for concern that the relationship will falter and burden us with the afore- mentioned consequences. Considering the degree of uncertainty in the present U.S.-China relationship, the current trend seems to be moving toward greater strategic distrust. Perhaps most notably, the problems that will emerge over the near- to mediumterm are likely to be exception- ally challenging. All country-to-country relationships experience problems, but as this paper seeks to convey, the future of the U.S.-China relationship will almost certainly be turbulent. Although the frequency and

magnitude of the expected perturbations would be difficult to manage in any 

Violent rise results in global conflict
Hoge, Foreign Affairs Editor, International Relations Expert, August 2004
[James, "A global power shift in the making," http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040701facomment83401/james-f-hoge-jr/a-globalpower-shift-in-the-making.html?mode=print]

Major shifts of power between states, not to mention regions, occur infrequently and are rarely peaceful. In the early twentieth century, the imperial order and the aspiring states of Germany and Japan failed to adjust to each other. The conflict that resulted devastated large parts of the globe. Today, the transformation of the international system will be even bigger and will require the assimilation of markedly different political and cultural traditions. This time, the populous states of Asia are the aspirants seeking to play a greater role. Like Japan and Germany back then, these rising powers are nationalistic, seek redress of past grievances, and want to claim their place in the sun. Asia's growing economic power is translating into greater political and military power, thus increasing the potential damage of conflicts. Within the region, the flash points for hostilities -- Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and divided Kashmir -- have defied peaceful resolution. Any of them could explode into large-scale warfare that would make the current Middle East confrontations seem like police operations. In short, the stakes in Asia are huge and will challenge the West's adaptability.

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US-China Cooperation 1AC (7/12)
Switch to environmentally friendly energy consumption is key to the Chinese economy and prevent CCP disintegration – environmental degradation destroys state legitimacy and causes mass backlash
Ogden, Center for American Progress National Security and International Policy Senior Policy Analyst, and Rogier, Center for American Progress Researcher, 5/2/2008
[Peter, Matt, "Climate Change Challenges Cannot Be Met Without Sino-U.S. Cooperation," http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/05/china_climate.html]

While no clear consensus appears to have emerged about how to solve China’s energy and environmental challenges, there is broad internal agreement among the political elite about the threats of failing to do so. One threat is that environmental degradation will dampen the country’s torrid rate of economic growth, which has been the Chinese Communist Party’s primary claim to political legitimacy. In order to ensure more sustainable growth, Pan Yue, for instance, has advocated calculating China’s economic growth in terms of “Green GDP,” which, unlike traditional GDP, factors in the environmental costs associated with economic development. President Hu Jintao tried to implement
Green GDP as a means of measuring environmental performance for Chinese officials. The first report released by the government said that pollution had cost China $64 billion in 2004, about 3% of its overall gross domestic product. Unfortunately, subsequent results, especially those on the local level, were so politically unacceptable that the program was dropped in 2007. In some provinces, Green GDP reflected growth rates of almost zero. A second threat comes directly from the anti-government protests sparked by China’s failed environmental policies. One stark example: 10,000 People’s Liberation Army troops had to be deployed to a village in Zhejiang Province in 2005 when as many as 60,000 rioters swarmed chemical plants that were polluting their village. More recently, in May of 2007, up to 20,000 protestors peacefully took to the streets in Xiamen to protest the construction of a $1.4 billion petro-chemical plant near the city. The protestors took videos and posted them on YouTube, with some referencing Tiananmen Square in 1989. According to Elizabeth Economy of the Council on Foreign Relations, protests like these “represent the Chinese leadership’s greatest fear, namely, that its failure to protect the environment may someday serve as the catalyst for broad-based

demands for political change.” Moreover, as desertification exacerbated by global warming affects some 400 million people in China alone, internal migration may cause civil unrest as the resettling population competes for scarce resources with established residents in other regions.

This independently triggers the impacts, prevents Asian nuclear conflict, and sustains the global economy and the environment
Despres, Former Assistant Commerce Secretary, Private Consultant/International Relations Expert, 2001
[John, China, the United States, and the Global Economy, pg: 229, Singh] Nevertheless, America’s main interests in China have been quite constant, namely peace, security, prosperity, and a healthy environment. Chinese interests in the United States have also been quite constant and largely compatible, notwithstanding sharp differences over Taiwan, strategic technology transfers, trade, and human rights. Indeed, U.S.-Chinese relations have been consistently driven by strong common interests in preventing mutually damaging wars in Asia that could involve nuclear weapons; in ensuring that Taiwan’s relations with the mainland remain peaceful; in sustaining the growth of the U.S., China, and other Asian-Pacific economies; and, in preserving natural environments that sustain healthy and productive lives. What happens in China matters to Americans. It affects America’s prosperity. China’s growing economy is a valuable market to many workers, farmers, and businesses across America, not just to large multinational firms like Boeing, Microsoft, and Motorola, and it could become much more valuable by opening its markets further. China also affects America’s security. It could either help to stabilize or destabilize currently peaceful but sometimes tense and dangerous situations in Korea, where U.S. troops are on the front line; in the Taiwan Straits, where U.S. democratic values and strategic credibility may be at stake; and in nuclear-armed South Asia, where renewed warfare could lead to terrible consequences. It also affects America’s environment. Indeed, how China meets its rising energy needs and protects its dwindling habitats will affect the global atmosphere and currently endangered species.

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US-China Cooperation 1AC (8/12)
Thus the plan: The United States federal government should mandate an increase in financing for US businesses engaging in alternative energy projects in the People’s Republic of China, including the extension of loan repayment time, the reduction of requirements for local financing, and allowing joint partnerships with private banks, for such alternative energy projects.

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US-China Cooperation 1AC (9/12)
Contention Three: Solvency Incentives for US businesses to cooperation with China on alternative energy is the necessary catalyst – this reduces tensions, makes relations sustainable, and resolves environmental concerns
Daojiong, Renmin University (Bejing) International Studies Professor, Fall 2007
[Zha, "Promoting energy partnership in bejing and washington," the washington quarterly, Sanhcez] There are differences between China and the United States, but it would be a waste of resources on both sides to encourage more competition or confrontation. Both stand to lose from further complication or politicization of an already complex international energy system. The case for collaboration is easy when there is so much at stake. Collaboration on energy technology development and increasing oil extraction are two politically low-cost solutions to reduce tension

between the United States and China.
Competition is not the sole feature of government or government-endorsed interactions between China and the United States. Energy technology development in China was a key component when President Jimmy Carter signed a framework agreement of cooperation in science and technology with Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in 1979. Since then, the cooperation framework has been strengthened to include an increasing number of government agencies and a multitude of scientific and business interests from both societies.17 In fact, the United States is the country with which China has launched the largest number of collaborative energy development programs and projects. These activities have in no small part contributed to improvement in energy technology development in China. As a result of these government-sponsored projects, thousands of energy scientists and policy analysts regularly interact with

each other across the Pacific.
For more than a decade, Beijing and Washington also have made energy policy an agenda item in governmental-level dialogues. Such vehicles include the U.S.-China Energy Policy Dialogue, the U.S.-China Oil and Gas Industry Forum, the U.S.-China Economic Development and Reform Dialogue, the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technologies Agreement, the Joint Coordinating Committee on Science and Technology, and the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue. Still, the prevailing sentiment in both capitals is that China and the United States are parties for dialogue, at best, rather than partners in concerted action. Policy dialogues are certainly useful. Yet, as is true of so many other venues for government communication, they often result in being a means for defending one side’s own policy orientations. Partnership, on the other hand, is action oriented. Although China and the United States are not yet strategic partners in the field of energy, actions in the spirit

of partnership are certainly desirable. First, Washington should continue to collaborate with Beijing on China’s energy technology development. The logic for doing so is simple: energy saved in China means an increase in worldwide supply and a reduction of pollutants into the air, which migrate across the Pacific Ocean. The areas for action include working to increase the use of nuclear and other
cleaner forms of power, improving recovery rates of coal and oil production, achieving better user efficiency, and replacing technologically obsolete plants. In addition, China and the United States can benefit from discussing how to address policy issues associated with energy use such as fuel and electric power price systems, urban planning, and the encouragement of lifestyle changes to enable energy conservation.

In order to promote energy technology development in China, it is essential for U.S. companies to see the benefits of participation. For U.S. and other international companies, two issues stand in the way of the transfer of energy-saving technologies to China: inadequate Chinese protection of intellectual property rights of foreign technology and low-cost competition from Chinese-made equipment. As such, transfer of the best available technologies, a frequent suggestion of Chinese government officials, is often regarded as undesirable by the U.S. business community.
Energy conservation in China and environmental protection is nonetheless a matter of urgency and in the interest of the entire world. The U.S. government has sound reason to provide incentives for U.S. businesses to establish a stronger presence in China’s energy development and environmental protection. Intellectual property rights concerns are legitimate. One compromise is for U.S. technology companies to partner with their Chinese counterparts to produce better-thanavailable (though not the most high-end) energy technologies and equipments for adoption in China. This approach can establish in- tellectual property rights protection within the Chinese system from the start, with Chinese partners having an interest in protecting their own investments. As for concerns about competition from cheaper Chinese-made energy-saving technologies, energy conservation is a worldwide task. Such competition thus ought to be viewed as a benign if not welcome development.  SDI 2008

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The plan’s specific incentive is the key to spark business investment in China – this leads to critical innovations and creates a new market for the US economy
McDonough, Center for American Progress Senior Fellow, and Ogden, Center for American Progress National Security and International Policy Senior Policy Analyst, 1/30/2007
[Denis and Peter, "Cleaning up China: Opportunities Beckon for US Businesses," http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/01/green_china.html]

Members of Congress this week should ask Paulson why he hasn’t made such a move, and then encourage him to do so by requiring that the U.S. Export-Import Bank (which currently provides billions of dollars each year of financing and credit to export American products) allocate a fixed percentage of all of its financing solely to clean energy projects. Furthermore, the Export-Import Bank could offer extended loan repayment time, reduced requirements for local financing, and the opportunity to forge joint partnerships with private banks to leverage additional assistance. The global market for green technologies is not waiting for the United States to act. Now is the time to invest in the development of a domestic clean energy industry that can outperform its international competitors and capture a large share of this rapidly growing market. This is how America can work towards getting its trade deficit back into the black, and how we can help China to get into the green—for the good of both nations and everyone else around the globe.
Paulson and Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman are well aware of the challenges posed by China's voracious appetite for fossil fuels. A recent report by the International Energy Agency projects that China will overtake the United States as the world's worst carbon emitter by 2009, thanks in large part to its reliance on environmentally caustic coal-fired power plants for electricity. Last year, China built approximately 75 such plants, and it will continue to build them at a rate of almost one per week for years to come. The carbon shadow of these plants stretches for decades into the future and their pollutants already reach across the Pacific. China, like the United States, is not bound by any international commitment to reduce its carbon emissions, but there are signs that Beijing has begun to recognize the dangers of fossil fuel dependence and the resulting environmental damage. China’s latest Five Year Plan on national priorities and goals places unprecedented emphasis on environmental sustainability. Moreover, there is growing awareness that its energy security will be enhanced by diversifying away from fossil fuels.

China’s interest in clean energy presents an enormous business opportunity as well as an environmental one. Unfortunately, it is an opportunity that the United States has not yet fully seized. A study released in October by former World
Bank Chief Economist Nicholas Stern on the economic impact of climate change calculated that the markets for low-carbon energy projects will be worth at least $500 billion by 2050. In other words, combating global warming is not only an

environmental necessity, but a vast economic opportunity. Some U.S. investment companies are beginning to take notice. Morgan Stanley recently announced that it plans to invest some $3 billion in the carbon trading market and other clean energy related projects. But if the United States does not do more to promote the development of our domestic clean energy sector industry, it will find that its international competitors will be the ultimate beneficiaries of this new market.

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Alternative energy tech is key – China’s pro-environment mandates are circumvented by local party cadres that favor economic growth, new tech resolves the issue
Mattis, National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) Program Associate, 6/21/2006
[Peter, "The Strategic Vulnerability of China's Reliance on Coal," http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2874.html]

Local party cadres can also contribute to the regulation problem. The economic transformation and boom has created space for a new kind of party official guided by a “big-fish-in-a-small-pond” strategy who tries to build up his or her own little fiefdom. Rather than aiming for promotion, some rent-seeking cadres attempt to play locals off against their superiors and
serve as the intermediary brokering settlements—not coincidentally to their own financial benefit. Also at the local level, party cadres often face a number of contradictory directives. Even when cadres are ordered to lower pollution within their districts, controlling pollution receives a lower priority than economic development on the cadres’ evaluation scale. Consequently, a negative rating will have a minimal impact on an individual cadre’s career—assuming that the official actually seeks promotion—if the jurisdiction performs well economically. A cadre, consequently, is unlikely to shut down a small coal mine that provides jobs and income to the district barring direct higher-level intervention; yet, as noted above, the regulatory organizations are ill-equipped for such a task across the entire country. Cadre evaluations have been used in the past to cement necessary reforms. During the early days of the reform era, cadre evaluations that focused on economic and market liberalization strengthened directives from Beijing to move away from socialist economic practices. Additionally, in China’s potentially tempestuous domestic political environment, such evaluations demonstrate clearly the central government’s intent for future policy and provide political cover (Holding China Together, 2004). Moving Forward and the Prospects for Resolution The Chinese government is embarking on a new campaign to shut down many of the small coal producers and power plants in an effort to reform the coal sector. The plans call for the creation of coal production base-areas and the closing of all coal mines that produce less than 30,000 tons of coal per year (Xinhua, April 4). Although such plans are already inhibited for the reasons stated above, there is another significant issue here. Chinese construction of coal power plants is proceeding at a very high rate and these plants will need coal. Beijing’s energy planning calls for an additional 562 coal-fired power plants in the next few years and anecdotal evidence suggests that smaller plants are going up at a rate of three to five per day (Christian Science Monitor, 2004). Simply put, coal will be a considerable part of China’s energy future. China can take a number of steps to alleviate the impact of coal. China’s demonstrated need to improve its debilitating coal situation offers a vast market for both old and new technologies that China can utilize on its own. Coal liquefaction offers a potential source for diesel and gasoline and utilizes China’s abundance of coal, but it is only economically viable with oil prices above 35 to 40 dollars. Newer clean coal technologies designed to improve efficiency and alternative energy could also help ameliorate the Chinese energy dilemmas. From Beijing’s perspective, the capital improvements required for

exploiting these technologies in China’s inland provinces could aid the success of the “New Socialist Countryside” campaign and help reduce the rural-urban divide. Any solution will probably need a larger energy bureaucracy with greater regulatory authority and monitoring capability. An expanded and more capable energy bureaucracy alone will not be successful; significant investment in newer and more efficient energy infrastructure and technologies will be required.

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Federal action is key to international modeling – inaction signals the US is not committed
Dernbach, Widener University Law Professor, Spring 2003
[John, ""LEARING SUSTAINABILITY": SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES: SYMPOSIUM HELD AT THE UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO LAW SCHOOL, OCTOBER 13, 2001: Toward a National Sustainable Development Strategy," 10 Buff. Envt'l. L.J. 69] Finally, a national strategy is needed to ensure integration of domestic and international actions. This is hardly a novel objective. Sustainable development is neither totally domestic nor totally foreign, and the United States needs to ensure that its actions concerning sustainable development are coherent in both realms. The nation's antiterrorism effort arguably provides a reason for not adopting and implementing a national sustainable development strategy. Yet the antiterrorism campaign has forced Americans to think collectively about their long term national interest. It has also made Americans realize that they cannot separate themselves from problems that exist in the rest of the world. When we also realize that sustainable development requires an antiterrorism effort to achieve peace and security, and that the world's social, economic, security, and environmental problems are related, it makes sense to see that the antiterrorism campaign should be part of a broader sustainable development effort. n64 The purposes of sustainable development, after all, are human quality of life, opportunity, and freedom. Our nation has long stood behind these purposes. The Rio Declaration principle of developed country leadership provides another important reason for understanding the connections between domestic and foreign policy. Developed country leadership is premised on both the superior resources of developed countries and their relatively greater responsibility for creating many of the environmental problems that need to be addressed by sustainable development. n65 Strategic actions by the United States and other developed countries are likely to more effectively further economic, social, environmental, and security goals at the same time, and are more likely to achieve these goals more quickly, than ad hoc or piecemeal actions. In addition to the intrinsic value of such actions to the United States and the rest of the world, they are also more likely [*89] to encourage developing countries to follow suit. Since the founding of the Republic, U.S. leaders have often recognized that domestic actions have foreign policy implications, and vice versa. "To the generation that founded the United States, designed its government, and laid down its policies," Professor Walter McDougall has written, "the exceptional calling of the American people was not to do anything special in foreign affairs, but to be a light to lighten the world." n66 While U.S. foreign policy since has been much more active, n67 the idea the United States can have a positive international role through its domestic actions is still alive and well, and is relevant here--U.S. domestic actions that make significant progress toward sustainable development would encourage or

nudge other countries to also make significant progress. Failure by the United States to take domestic actions is understood by countries with fewer resources as an excuse to do nothing.

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US-Sino energy competition dooms relations – Mid-East energy conflicts
Leverett, Brookings Middle East Policy Center Senior Fellow, and Bader, Brookings China Initiative Director, 2006
[Flynt, Jeffrey, "Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle East," Winter 05-06, Washington Quarterly] The bid by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to acquire Unocal earlier this year triggered not only a hostile reaction in the U.S. Congress but also growing interest and debate within the foreign policy community about the rapid growth in China’s energy demand and the prospect for competition between the United States and China for access to global oil and gas resources.1 Henry Kissinger has gone so far as to argue that competition over hydrocarbon resources will be the most likely cause for international conflict in coming years.2 China’s hunt for oil is clearly in- fluencing its foreign policy toward its neighbors, such as Russia, Japan, and the Central Asian states, and toward regions as far afield as sub-Saharan Af- rica and Latin America.3 As China seeks access to global energy resources, its status as a rising power is already enabling it

to exercise influence in ways that make it more difficult for the United States and the West to achieve their goals on a number of issues. The potentially explosive combination of a China less willing to passively accept U.S. leadership and the prospect of competition between China and other states for control over vital energy resources poses particularly critical challenges to U.S. interests in the Middle East.
Chinese engagement in the Middle East has expanded economically, po- litically, and strategically over the last several years. Since the late 1990s, Beijing’s policies toward the region have been closely linked to the objec- tives of the three major, stateowned Chinese energy companies—the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China National Petrochemi- cal Corporation (Sinopec), and CNOOC—to seek access to Middle East- ern oil and gas, frequently on an exclusive basis. Since 2002, the Middle East has become the leading arena for Beijing’s efforts to secure effective ownership of critical hydrocarbon resources, rather than relying solely on in- ternational markets to meet China’s energy import needs. There is every reason to

anticipate that China will continue and even intensify its empha- sis on the Middle East as part of its energy security strategy. China will likely keep working to expand its ties to the region’s energy exporters over the next several years to ensure
that it is not disadvantaged relative to other for- eign customers and to maximize its access to hydrocarbon resources under any foreseeable circumstances, including possible military conflict with the United States. It seems doubtful that Chinese energy companies’ fledgling efforts to lock up petroleum resources will succeed in keeping a critical mass of oil reserves off an increasingly integrated and fluid global oil market. Nevertheless, China’s search for oil is making it a new competitor to the United States for influence in the Middle East. If not managed prudently, this competition will generate multiple points of bilateral friction and dam- age U.S. strategic interests in the region.

China’s growing oil thirst causing tensions with US, other major oil consumers
Pablo Bustelo, Senior analyst at Elcano Royal Institute , Professor of Applied Economics at the Complutense University of Madrid, 5/9/05 [“China and the Geopolitics of the Asian Pacific Region,” http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/226.asp] China’s growing demand for oil is significantly changing the international geopolitics of energy, especially in the Asian Pacific region. The recent growth in oil consumption, combined with forecasts of increased oil imports (especially from the Middle East), have led to deep concern among Chinese leaders regarding their country’s energy security. They are responding in a number of different ways. In particular, they are determined to increase the security and reliability of oil imports by searching for new sources of supply, and to control purchases and transport lanes, while boosting national production at any cost. This is already causing tension and could lead to further disputes with the US and other big oil consumers, such as Japan and India, as well as with other Asian Pacific countries. However, enhanced cooperation among the big East Asian economies (China, Japan and South Korea) is also a possibility.

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US-China entering new Cold War – conflicting energy policies
F. William Engdahl, Research Associate of the Center for Research on Globalization, 3/21/07 [“China and USA in New Cold War over Africa’s Oil Riches: Darfur? It’s the Oil, Stupid...,” http://www.propeller.com/viewstory/2007/05/21/china-and-usa-in-new-cold-war-over-africas-oil-riches-darfur-its-the-oilstupid/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.inteldaily.com%2F%3Fc%3D172%26a%3D2061&frame=true] Chad and Darfur are but part of the vast China effort to secure “oil at the source” across Africa. Oil is also the prime factor in US Africa policy today. George W. Bush’s interest in Africa includes a new US base in Sao Tome/Principe 124 miles off the Gulf of Guinea from which it can control Gulf of Guinea oilfields from Angola in the south to Congo, Gabon, Equitorial Guinea, Cameroon and Nigeria. That just happens to be the very same areas where recent Chinese diplomatic and investment activity has focussed (sic). “West Africa’s oil has become of national strategic interest to us,” stated US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Walter Kansteiner already back in 2002. Darfur and Chad are but an extension of the US Iraq policy “with other means”—control of oil everywhere. China is challenging that control “everywhere,” especially in Africa. It amounts to a new undeclared Cold War over oil.

Chinese energy policy collapses US-Sino relations through Chinese courting of US allies
Zweig, Hong Kong University China Transnational Relations Center Director, and Jianhai, Hong Kong University China Transnational Relations Center Director Postdoctoral Fellow, October 2005
[David, Bi, "China's Global Hunt for Energy," Foreign Affairs]

Energy diplomacy has also prompted China to seek access to Canada's resources, especially the massive tar sands of
Alberta. Since late 2004, Beijing and Ottawa have concluded a series of energy and resource agreements, providing for greater Chinese involvement in developing Canada's natural gas sector, its vast oil sands deposits, and its uranium sector. Last April, PetroChina and the Canadian giant Enbridge signed a memorandum of understanding to build a $2 billion pipeline that would carry oil to the western coast of Canada for shipment to Asia. Although no money is yet on the table, western Canadians see China's investment in the tar sands as a major opportunity; according to an Enbridge analyst, without such foreign investment, the fields would remain undeveloped. Yet the deal could create tensions between the United States and China, as well as between the United States and Canada, particularly since Vice President Dick Cheney's 2001 national energy policy report emphasized the importance of Canada's tar sands to U.S. energy security. According to one Canadian Foreign Ministry official who declined to be identified, the U.S. State Department is carefully watching negotiations between Beijing and Ottawa. David Hale and other American resource analysts believe that the U.S. Congress is getting nervous about Chinese fishing in American waters. This testiness highlights

one of the risks of China's energy strategy: by treading on what Americans perceive as their turf and vying for resources they also covet, Beijing is stepping on some very sensitive toes.

Cooperation and ending China’s support for pariah oil-wealthy states is key to integration and sustainable relations
Zweig, Hong Kong University China Transnational Relations Center Director, and Jianhai, Hong Kong University China Transnational Relations Center Director Postdoctoral Fellow, October 2005
[David, Bi, "China's Global Hunt for Energy," Foreign Affairs]
It is true that difficult

times may be ahead. U.S. officials, particularly in the Department of Defense, the Pentagon, and Congress, see China's resource hunger as a new strategic challenge. Consider, for example, Congress' response to the China National Offshore Oil Corporation's recent bid to buy the American
energy company Unocal. Few impartial analysts see any serious threat to U.S. national security in the deal, yet in a statement approved by 398 votes to 15, members of the House of Representatives said the sale would "threaten to impair the national security of the United States." Under its resource-based foreign policy, China has become quite assertive in seeking the raw materials it needs to keep its economic juggernaut rolling. Just how benign China's rise remains is partly in the hands of China's leaders. Supporting

pariah states that scoff at global norms, all in the name of economic growth, will not endear China to the world, especially not to the United States.
Washington and Beijing must reach some accommodation on how to view China's ties to such rogue states. Yet China has a right to pursue energy sources through market strategies, and unlike the Soviet Union, it is not orchestrating regime changes to advance its interests. Washington must recognize that it would be irresponsible for China's leaders not to increase the country's energy supply. Washington

must learn to cooperate with this rising China and continue to work to integrate it into the global economy. Beijing, for its part, must develop ties that do not flout international standards of good governance and human dignity or threaten U.S. security interests. The world needs farsighted leaders on both sides of the Pacific to adapt to rapid changes in the global distribution of economic and political power, not leaders who let such shifts push them into an increasingly acrimonious confrontation.
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China-US energy security concerns prevents sustainable relations
Lieberthal, Michigan University China Center Research Associate, William Davidson Institute China Director and Distinguished Fellow, Political Science Professor, and Herberg, National Bureau of Asian Research Asian Energy Security Director, ARCO Strategic Planning group Global Energy and Economics Director, April 2006
[Kenneth, Mikkal, "NBR Analysis," http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?ID=93a9dcaa-b9d5-4601-ac32-93f702696db5] Over the years i have pointed out that China’s rise as a global power is likely to be the most significant event in international affairs in the 21st century. One dimension of China’s growing impact is its rapid emergence as a major force in world energy markets and global energy geopolitics . beijing’s booming energy consumption and intensifying

search for energy security have raised a new range of contentious issues between China and the United states that are adding a new layer of issues to an already complex and dynamic relationship . The clearest example of growing problems
was the Congressional furor surrounding the China national Offshore Oil Company’s (CnOOC) bid for U .s . oil company Unocal last summer, but there are also added U .s . concerns revolving around China’s growing energy ties with energy-rich problem states, such as iran and the sudan, and apparent efforts to “lock up” equity oil supplies around the globe . alternatively, from China’s perspective, the Congressional furor over the CnOOC-Unocal bid and U .s . opposition to its involvement in problem states confirm the view of many in beijing that the United states is intent on blocking China’s efforts to secure future energy supplies . in sum, energy now is adding a new layer of mistrust and suspicion to U .s .- China relations that threatens to further undermine efforts to forge a cooperative and constructive long-term relationship .

US-Sino paranoia over energy security causes conflict – creates a self-fulfilling cycle
Lieberthal, Michigan University China Center Research Associate, William Davidson Institute China Director and Distinguished Fellow, Political Science Professor, and Herberg, National Bureau of Asian Research Asian Energy Security Director, ARCO Strategic Planning group Global Energy and Economics Director, April 2006
[Kenneth, Mikkal, "NBR Analysis," http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?ID=93a9dcaa-b9d5-4601-ac32-93f702696db5]

The consequence of an outmoded view is that policymakers from both Washington and beijing are continuing to react in ways that reinforce each side’s suspicions of being denied future oil supplies . a similar dynamic is contributing to China’s
increasingly acrimonious battle with Japan over oil pipelines and natural gas fields . similarly, China and india, despite tentative steps toward limited cooperation, are basically investing with the understanding that they are “competing” head-to-head for oil supplies in africa and the Middle East .24 These delusions are motivating real actions . China and other asian countries, therefore, need to be discouraged from this “hoarding” mentality . although vital to the competitive commercial success of China’s nOCs, equity oil becomes a form of national “hoarding” when cast in political and national security terms . as will be suggested later, U .s . policymakers need to avoid reacting to an outmoded view of oil markets in a way that unnecessarily reinforces China’s paranoia over oil security .

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Distrust and mutual threat perceptions mean general dispute mechanisms do not apply – the plan’s shift to coop is key to solve
Lieberthal, Michigan University China Center Research Associate, William Davidson Institute China Director and Distinguished Fellow, Political Science Professor, and Herberg, National Bureau of Asian Research Asian Energy Security Director, ARCO Strategic Planning group Global Energy and Economics Director, April 2006
[Kenneth, Mikkal, "NBR Analysis," http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?ID=93a9dcaa-b9d5-4601-ac32-93f702696db5]

China and the United states are the two biggest players on the international energy markets and will retain their positions as the world’s largest oil importers far into the future . neither country serves as a model for others, though,
given that both on balance privilege increasing supply over constraining demand, and prefer promoting growth over preserving the environment . both, moreover, fall well short of being able to craft and implement a disciplined energy strategy for themselves either at home or abroad . These two countries do, however, share enormous interests in maintaining overall supply security and price stability, two goals that are well served by far greater and more effective bilateral and multilateral cooperation . such cooperation is difficult, though, given both the very real misperceptions held in each

capital about the energy situation in the other and the deep underlying strategic distrust of motivations in each direction .

Chinese energy demand leads to US-Sino competition – causes conflicting strategic interests
Bremmer, World Policy Institute Senior Fellow, Eurasia Group President, 1/24/2005
[Ian, "Are the U.S. and China on a collision course?," http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2005/01/24/8234063/index.htm]

U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, STABLE IN RECENT YEARS, MAY soon be replaced by sustained political conflict. This has less to do with the political philosophies of Jefferson and Mao than with China's need for a steady supply of energy and raw materials--a need that is pulling China into deeper political involvement in regions where Washington has long enjoyed a near monopoly on international influence.
The numbers are staggering. Having become a net importer of oil only in 1994, China now imports half its daily consumption. Its demand for oil surged nearly 40% in the first half of 2004, accounting for roughly one-third of the increase in world oil consumption. If its oil demand grows at an average rate of 7% a year (as it has since 1990), China will be consuming 21 million barrels a day by 2022--equaling the amount currently used in the U.S. That growing demand has taken China to places like Iran, which has put it in direct conflict with U.S. efforts to force Iran to renounce its ambition to become a nuclear weapons state. In November, China signed the largest energy deal in Iran's history--an agreement to buy 250 million tons of liquefied natural gas over 30 years. Iran will also export 150,000 barrels of crude oil per day to China once Sinopec, a Chinese state-owned energy company, has developed Iran's Yadavaran field. The deal is valued at $70 billion. Shortly after the agreement, Beijing made clear it would oppose any attempt in the UN Security Council to impose comprehensive sanctions in response to Iran's failure to satisfy the UN's nuclear watchdog, the IAEA, that it remains in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Iran has now negotiated a watered-down deal with three European countries over its nuclear program, a deal Washington calls inadequate. But China's lucrative new energy contract ensures it won't

allow the Security Council to be used to punish Iranian noncompliance. China's search for energy supplies has also complicated Washington's efforts to stop what the Bush administration has called a state-sponsored genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan. Southern Darfur is rich in oil, and China National Petroleum holds the largest concession there. China whittled down U.S.-sponsored warnings to Sudan to stop the violence in Darfur,
changing Security Council threats to "take further action" against Khartoum to the weaker "consider taking additional measures." Even with the change, China abstained. The demand for commodities has sharpened China's traditional political rivalries in Asia as well. There have been recent conflicts with Japan in the East China Sea and with Vietnam in the South China Sea, which has oil and gas reserves. Conflicts among China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan over sovereignty aren't new. But they are intensifying as China's aggressiveness grows with its demand for energy. China and the U.S. are also likely to compete for oil in Russia. The U.S. wants to reduce its energy dependence on Persian Gulf states by using cooperative pipeline projects to move oil through Siberia to Murmansk, where it can be put in tankers and shipped across the Pacific. But China also wants that oil to fuel its economy. SDI 2008

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China’s need for oil and un-easiness with the US in the past brings tension between both countries which could result in an oil war.
Daojiong Zha, Is Associate Professor Of International Studies At The Renmin University Of China and Weixing Hu Is Associate Professor Of Political Science In The Department Of Politics And Public Administration At The University Of Hong Kong, Promoting Energy Partnership in Beijing and Washington, 2007
Although China became a net importer of oil products in 1993 and of crude oil in 1996, energy as a national security matter did not begin to feature prominently in China’s political discourse until several years later. The most powerful trigger was the dramatic rise in China’s oil imports in 2000: 72 million tons (roughly 25 percent of total Chinese consumption), compared with 37 million tons in 1999. The tripling of world oil prices from January 1999 to January 2000 compounded these new considerations. Ironically, part of the cause for alarm was that Chinese government statistics on oil imports began more accurately to reflect reality, thanks to a three-year campaign against oil smuggling into the country.4 As energy security began to be publicly discussed as a national security challenge for China, assessment of China’s external environment inevitably turned to focus on the role of the United States. Chinese discussions about bilateral relations in the late 1990s were permeated with several incidents pointing to a pattern of strategic volatility: U.S. opposition to China’s bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games in 1993, granting a visa to then-Taiwanese leader Lee Teng-hui and the ensuing crisis across the Taiwan Strait in 1995–1996, President Bill Clinton’s refusal to sign an agreement on China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in April 1999, and the “accidental” U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade one month later. Coupled with ongoing debates within U.S. security studies circles between engagement and containment as a strategy for dealing with China’s rise, Beijing’s assessment of U.S. strategic intent on China’s search for energy security easily became suspicious. Some Chinese analysts have perspectives on U.S. policy that do not bode well for bilateral interactions in the energy sector. From their point of view, the United States is in a prime position to use oil as a weapon against China.5 One alarmist view even predicts an inevitable war over oil.6 They reason that the United States has historically worked to control the production and movement of oil supplies worldwide. As China pursues domestic and international economic expansion and the United States sees China as a major challenge to its preeminent role in global affairs, U.S. control of the world oil industry can be used at least indirectly to check Chinese ambitions by manipulating movement of world oil prices. Finally, the United States controls vital sea lanes in the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia, making unfettered transportation of oil from Middle Eastern and African ports to Chinese shores a matter of U.S. choice.

CHINA’S RAPIDLY INCREASING ENERGY CONSUMPTION POSES A THREAT TO THE U.S. Gallagher- Director of Kennedy School’s Energy Tech Innovation Policy research group November 2001 Kelly http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/sims_gallagher_workshop_report.pdf Sanhcez China.s energy development poses some direct security concerns to the U.S., especially those related to China.s nuclear energy agenda but also including oil imports and a secure energy supply. China.s nuclear capacity is limited to a few civilian nuclear reactors in operation with just 2 gigawatts (GW) of capacity. According to the 10th Five Year Plan, the government plans to enlarge its nuclear power capacity to 8.7 GW by 2005 (Asia Pulse July 2001). China has stated its intention to commercially reprocess spent fuel (a pilot facility is already under construction), heightening the risk of the proliferation of nuclear materials that could be made into weapons. Regarding oil dependence, although the U.S. presently imports ten times more oil than China, China became a net importer of refined oil in 1993 and a net importer of crude oil in 1996. Increased Chinese dependence on oil imports from the Middle East and Caspian Sea regions may lead China.s government to take steps that the U.S. might find problematic in order to maintain assured access to these sources of oil. China might also take aggressive action to control the energy resources located just off its coasts in the South China Sea and Spratly Islands region. Solutions that reduce reliance on imported oil are advantageous to both countries. More indirectly, a prosperous and stable China is better for the United States since internal volatility can render China.s government less reformist, more defensive, and less willing to cooperate with the United States. Energy plays a fundamental role in such stability because it directly contributes to human well being and satisfaction by providing basic services such as heating, cooking, and lighting as well as supporting economic growth

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Relations Adv. – AT: Relations Resilient
1. Energy conflicts lead to military conflict – competition sparks broad tensions, and build mutual mistrust. This escalates conflicts destabilizing regions and causes US-Sino war because botht the US and China find it in their strategic interest to strike before the other overwhelms its influence – That’s 1AC Lieberthal and Zweig 2. Alternative energy key to prevent economic and regime collapse – status quo overheats the economy, and results in popular backlash. This independently triggers the advantage impacts, and results in Asian nuclear conflict – That’s 1AC Ogden and Desperes. 3. US-China alt. energy cooperation is key to prevent nuclear conflict – plan is key to the alliance
Lieberman, US Senator (D-CT), 2005
[Joe, China-U.S. Energy Policies: A Choice of Cooperation or Collision—Remarks by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, Council on Foreign Relations, Online]

The U.S.-China energy engagement that I foresee could be in one sense the 21st century version of what arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union were in the last century, but we got to start those discussions before the race for oil becomes as hot and dangerous as the nuclear arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union did in the last century. And I’d point out what I think is a fortuitous difference in these two races, if you will. With arms control, we were focused on reducing dangers by destroying weapons systems. Here, we have a chance to reduce dangers by separately and jointly building new energy and transportation systems based on alternative fuels and new technologies to power our vehicles. Let me quote from Bob Zoellick, the deputy secretary of State, who recently told the National Committee on U.S.China Relations — and I quote: “Picture the wide range of global challenges we face in the years ahead — terrorism and extremists exploiting Islam, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, poverty, disease — and then ask whether it would be easier or harder to handle those problems if the U.S. and China were cooperating or were at odds.” End of quote. Well, that’s a question that answers itself and should lead us in the direction of exploring each and every cooperative opportunity with China that we can.

4. Resilience does not apply to energy conflicts – normal dispute mechanisms do not exist
Daojiong, Renmin University (Bejing) International Studies Professor, Fall 2007
[Zha, "Promoting energy partnership in bejing and washington," the washington quarterly]

The absence of meaningful trade and investment ties in the energy sector is a striking phenomenon. Since 1979, U.S. business interests in trade and in- vestment in China have generally served as a key lobbying force, successfully petitioning Beijing and Washington to compromise when differences threaten fragile diplomatic ties. Yet, oil and other forms of energy have hardly been represented in that business lobby because of a lack of major trade and invest- ment in those sectors. The political establishments in Beijing and Washington have therefore not been as educated on the importance of managing bilateral ties from the perspective of the energy sector. This lack of education facilitates alarmist views over energy security on both sides. 

Disruptions in US-China relations spill over to other areas of cooperation
Gladkyy, SMS International Affairs Fellow, 6/23/2003
[Oleksandr, “American foreign policy and U.S. relations with Russia and China after 11 September”]
In the previous sections, which were mainly based on government documents, I discussed newly changed official U.S. policies toward Russia and China and the resulting change in U.S.Russia and U.S.-China relations. Although the documents have demonstrated beneficial changes in the official policies of the states toward one another after 11 September, they do not reflect the whole situation. In reality, it

is still too early to state that U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China relations have become entirely cooperative and strategically stable and that the changes are long term. The actions of one nation, if they do not correspond with the interests and expectations of another country, become constraints on the foreign policy of the latter toward the former. Such restraints are obstacles to further improvement of U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China relations and prevent successful relations in one area from spilling over to another. Moreover, current barriers are dangerous because those issues have the most potential to become serious problems, preventing the further improvement of relations and even hindering already established cooperation.
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Relations Adv. – AT: No Conflict
1. Energy competition makes conflict inevitable – fosters mistrust and misperceptions emboldening hardliners in both countries. This means even if it not rational, conflict occurs because each country has decided the other is its enemy – cooperation is key to solve – that’s 1AC Lieberthal and Zweig 2. Relations key to a peaceful rise – even if no US-Sino war, cooperation is key to intergrate China into the global system. A violent rise will destabilize Asia, resulting in global conflict overwhelming every other scenario of war – That’s 1AC Schriver and Hodge. 3. Chinese collapse triggers the impact – alt. energy is key to prevent economic and regime collapse that destabilizes the region causing nuclear war in Asia, this independently causes conflict – That’s Deveres. Conflict inevitable absent cooperation – mutual distrust creates a self-fulfilling cycle
Lieberthal, Michigan University Professor, January 2007
[Kenneth, “China’s March on the 21st Century,” http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F848DF23CA704F5%7D/CMTCFINAL052307.PDF]
Remarkably comparable debates now rile policy in both Beijing and Washington. In each case, the argument is about how likely the other will be the biggest threat to national goals within two decades. Nobody can say with confidence that the other country cannot become the biggest threat to core national goals. The

“inevitable threat”protagonists adduce realpolitik arguments about the rise of a challenger to the global hegemon to posit inevitable
antagonism and argue for measures to limit the other’s potential power and latitude. The “possible threat”protagonists argue that astute diplomacy and concerted efforts to build

The key issue in both cases is an assessment ofthe ultimate intentionsofthe other country. The “inevitable threat”protagonists advocate military and other measures that essentially signal to the other side that a long-term constructive relationship is beyond reach. The hardliners on both sides, therefore, strengthen each other, as each points to the rhetoric and policies of their counterparts. In this way, advocates of this position can create self-fulfilling prophecies, promoting policies to deal with a threat that in turn induce threatening behavior that was the basis for the policy advo- cacy in the first place. “Possible threat”protagonists tend more to point to
constructive ties can lead to mutual advantage. the types oflong-term interests noted above to say that attentive diplomacy and creative policy can produce an outcome much closer to a win-win situation. To further complicate things, militaries are professionally required to make fairly pessimistic judgments about the long-term future and to invest in developing the pertinent capabilities to assure security. The

relevant timeframe for decisions on major new weapons systems is often 15 to 20 years. These military investments themselves then become grist for the mill for pessimists about the chances oflong-term constructive U.S.-China engagement. The unsurprising result ofthe above facts is that,despite the deep,wide ranging,complex,and rel- atively interdependent relationship that now exists between the United States and China,mutual dis- trust concerning long-term intentions appears to have grown in recent years. A substantial body of elite
opinion in China argues that the United States simply will not allow China to become a coun- try of real wealth and international gravitas, even if China seeks to play by the rules and allow for extensive cooperation. An equally substantial body of opinion in the

United States cannot believe that China will not use its increasing strength to challenge America’s interests,compete for resources in a zero sum struggle,and try to supplant it in the dynamic Asian region. This mutual distrust about long-term intentions inevitably strengthens those who argue in each country that eventual antagonism is unavoidable and that it is therefore necessary to begin preparing for that eventuality. This type ofmindset makes it more difficult to perceive common interests and interpret efforts to establish trust. It even affects our understanding of core Chinese expressions that define their basic strategy. For
example,Deng Xiaoping’s admonition that China should behave modestly and not take the lead internationally was misinterpreted in a Foreign Affairsarticle and has ever since been regarded in the United States as calling for China to “hide its capabilities until it is ready to strike”– i.e.,as a strategy ofdeception and potential aggression rather than one ofsimple caution.

 

China’s energy consumption could cause war with the U.S
Robert Burns-AP Military Writer, Energy Prices fuel US-China Strains, The Associated Press, 6/17/08,http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview, Bansal
Not quite an ally, not quite an adversary, China with its exploding appetite for energy is helping drive up world oil prices and putting still more strain on its relationship with the United States. The importance stretches far beyond the gas pump, although that is where Americans are left wondering what's behind the run-up, why it can't be stopped and who is to blame. China is just one factor. Also at play are worries about future supplies and production disruptions in Africa or the Mideast. Still, the "China factor" is big. By some estimates, car ownership in China is growing so fast, with the expansion of its middle class, that by 2030 its traffic will be seven times or more what it is today. China already is the world's second largest energy consumer, after the United States. That explains why senior-level economic officials from Beijing and Washington are meeting in Annapolis, Md., this week to discuss a range of hot-button issues, including the $256.2 billion U.S. trade deficit with China an all-time high and prospects for increasing cooperation on energy issues. Looming in the background to these and other discussions about U.S. competition with China is the prospect of armed conflict if not over China's demand for the return of Taiwan, then over energy resources. China has invested greatly in modernizing its military in recent years, although its budget even by the Pentagon's high-end estimate is hardly one-quarter what the U.S. spends on defense.

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Relations Adv. – AT: Alternative Causality
1. Energy is the most likely scenario for conflict – the unique role of energy in country’s economies distorts strategic interests so that conflict becomes strategic – this is not true of their alt. causes – That’s 1AC Liberthal 2. Case solves the alt. cause – energy cooperation reduces tensions and fosters mutual trust. Creates sustainable interdependence so that the alt. cause does not escalate to conflict – That’s 1AC Daojiong 3. Energy cooperation spillsover to sustain the alliance – fosters trust and interdepedence
Lieberthal, Michigan University China Center Research Associate, William Davidson Institute China Director and Distinguished Fellow, Political Science Professor, and Herberg, National Bureau of Asian Research Asian Energy Security Director, ARCO Strategic Planning group Global Energy and Economics Director, April 2006
[Kenneth, Mikkal, "NBR Analysis," http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?ID=93a9dcaa-b9d5-4601-ac32-93f702696db5]

The issue of trust is both fundamental and nettlesome . Most of the above suggestions for the formulation of U .s . energy
policy toward China require that beijing trust the United states enough to allow effective cooperation on more than a project- byproject basis . The issue of trust becomes especially important in reducing beijing’s acute security concerns regarding sourcing and transporting its imported energy . an important aspect of beijing’s sourcing strategy is rooted in distrust of U .s . strategic intentions toward China’s energy security needs . state equity oil policy as well as the tough global competitive environment for China’s nOCs are driving beijing into deals with problem states, but those very deals in turn themselves produce outcomes that further erode the trust between the United states and China . The U .s . relationship with China is so wide ranging and complex that energy sector policy alone will not determine the degree of trust that both sides bring to the table . The U .s . rhetoric toward China-related energy issues is, however, watched carefully in beijing . as noted above, Congressional rhetoric during the controversy over CnOOC’s bid for Unocal in the summer of 2005 inevitably strengthened the position of those in China who argue that the United states’ long-term approach to China is hostile . because energy sector policy priorities and related investments tend to be expensive, long term, and of vital importance, this type of perception can become a crippling obstacle to effective cooperation . Energy sector cooperation is, therefore, inevitably hostage to the broad sweep of U .s .- China relations, including many seemingly unrelated diplomatic, security, economic, and other issues . Within this overall relationship, the specific level of

cooperation in the energy sphere can play a significant role in either enhancing or reducing overall mutual trust . both sides should take greater cognizance of this important reality . 

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Relations Adv. – US-Sino Relations Good – Nuclear War
US-CHINA RELATIONS KEY TO SOLVE MULTIPLE NUCLEAR WARS Adhariri, Armed Forces Staff College national security professor, 1999 [Eschan, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, August 1] Looking ahead, a continued deterioration of Sino-US ties does not bode well for the regional stability of the very large and equally important Asia Pacific. Yet this regional stability might be negatively affected for a long time if Washington and Beijing fail to bounce back from this fiasco and assiduously work to improve their strategic relations. In the meantime, the issue of immediate concern for the USA is nuclear non-proliferation. Immediate work has to be done by both sides to minimize damages on this issue. The PRC, armed with the knowledge of America's premier nuclear programs, is likely to be a much more sought after sources for nuclear proliferation than it has ever been in the past by those countries keenly interested in enhancing the sophistication of their extant nuclear programs and by those who have not yet developed indigenous nuclear know-how but desire to purchase it. China, along with Russia, has an established record proliferating nuclear technology. This reality is not likely to change in the foreseeable future, much to the continued consternation of now-nuclear India. The increased nuclear sophistication on the troubled subcontinent carries with it the risk of a potential nuclear holocaust. The Kashmir issue still remains unresolved and very explosive given the continued intransigence of both India and Pakistan to amicably resolve it.

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Relations Adv. – US-Sino Relations Good – US-Sino Conflict
US-Sino relations are key to preventing military conflict
J Stapleton Roy, Managing Director, Kissinger Associates, 2003 (US-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century, Christopher Marsh & June Dreyer, p. 106-7) At the moment, therefore, relations between the United States and China are relatively smooth. China is now a member of the WTO, which has stimulated enormous interest in our business community in trade and investment opportunities in China. Moreover, China's economy continues to be one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Nevertheless, while there are myriad reasons why we should use this opportunity to try to stabilize our relationship with China, there are lurking problems in the U.S.-China relationship (hat we would be foolish to ignore. First, Americans have widely divergent views of China. It was no accident that during the 2000 presidential campaign advisors to Governor Bush talked about China as a strategic competitor. Even now it is easy to find articles and speakers explaining why a stronger China is going to be more threatening to the United States. On the other hand, one can also find people who think that China has been moving in the right direction over the last twenty years. As some of the contributors to this volume argue in preceding chapters, China today is a more open country, and power is more institutionalized. Additionally, as Minxin Pei discussed, Chinese students are flooding our country. China today has officials at al I levels of government who have been educated in American universities. None of this existed twenty years ago. Not surprisingly, many people see this as a positive evolution. However, if one looks at the way China is sometimes discussed by U.S. government officials, it is often not clear which China it is that they are talking about: the China that has abandoned the rigid ideology of the past, that sees its interests as closely linked to the industrialized countries of the West, and that is successfully implementing market-based economic development; or the China that is growing stronger and potentially more threatening, and that is preparing for military conflict with the United States. The second problem is the challenge posed to America by the modernization of China's military. And finally, there is the very troublesome issue of Taiwan, which is getting worse, not better. It is a problem that, if mishandled, poses a genuine risk of military conflict between the United States and China. Such a conflict would have an enormous impact not only on both countries, but on the world as a whole. In the pages that follow, I will consider each of these issues and hopefully shed some light on the situation as I see it.

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Relations Adv. – US-Sino Relations Good – Economy
A. US –Shino relations are key to Global Economy Xianquan Xu, 1999, SINO-U.S. ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS, China, the United States, and the Global Economy, pg: 250-51, Singh China is the largest developing country in the world. The United States is the most developed country in the world. Both countries have vast territories and abundant natural and human resources. Both countries have huge domestic markets of great potential. Through trade and economic cooperation, both countries can achieve resource complementarily and market sharing. Combining U.S. capital, technology, and management expertise with China’s low-cost labor and huge domestic market will bring enormous opportunities of common interest to both countries. Therefore, improving Sino-U.S. relations and dissolving differences will help both countries forge benign and interactive relations and will have significant bearing on the economies of both China and the United States, as well as far-reaching implications for world prosperity in the 21st century.

B. Economic collapse causes nuclear war and extinction
Bearden, U.S. Army (Retired), 2000
[T.E., LTC, U.S. Army, “The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How to Solve It Quickly,” http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3aaf97f22e23.htm, June 24]

History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China-whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for
decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is

rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.
to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed,

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Relations Adv. – US-Sino Relations Good – Terrorism
A. U.S.-Sino Cooperation Solves Terror and Weapon Prolif Wang President of First China Capital, Inc. and a consultant at RAND 2001 [Hui Wang U.S.-CHINA: BONDS AND TENSIONS Page 265 David Lee] The United States and China also share an interest in limiting the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. For many years, the United States has been combating Islamic fundamentalist terrorists, whose anti- U.S. activities range from kidnapping to embassy bombing. Recently having suffered bombings on city buses and in busy shopping areas in cities of Xingjian and other areas. Some of these terrorists have been trained in traditionally anti-U.S. and anti-West terrorist camps in central and southwest Asia. Although China has traditionally had good relations with Muslim countries, it has become more alarmed by the destructive activities of Islamic fundamentalists. When U.S.-China relations are stable, the United States may find China more willing to cooperate in limiting the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, given China’s recent terrorist experiences.

B. Nuclear terrorism is likely and causes global nuclear war
Patrick Speice, JD Candidate, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427, February 2006, Lexis

Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the
stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver

a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear
material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. n49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the

perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. N50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and
material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. n51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [*1440] or its allies by hostile states, n52 as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate

to the use of nuclear weapons.

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Relations Adv. – US-Sino Relations Good – Kashmir
A. U.S.-Sino Cooperation Solves Kashmir

Wang President of First China Capital, Inc. and a consultant at RAND 2001
[Hui Wang

U.S.-CHINA: BONDS AND TENSIONS Page 266 David Lee]

Both the United States and China want to see a stable South Asia and prevent conflicts between nuclear-equipped India and Pakistan from getting out of control. Recently, the high-profile race for nuclear weapons tests between the two in 1998 and the Kashmir conflict in 1999 alerted the world to the instability in this region and confirmed the possible use of the ultimate threat. These incidents further remind the world of how disturbing their profound distrust could be to the region specifically and the world in general if a hostile game of threatened nuclear weapons use abruptly escalated. The United States is expected to continue to play a role in cooling down crises between India and Pakistan. China, although historically inclined to favor Pakistan, would be the last to want to see relations between the two escalate, both of which share borders with China. Since China has increasingly neutralized its position in such conflicts, both countries will try to garner China’s favor, as indicated by both India and Pakistan sending top envoys to Beijing during their most recent confrontation. China, thus, could provide strong support to the United States in preventing any such crises from becoming extreme.

B. Nuclear war over Kashmir is the most likely scenario- it risks nuclear winter
GHULAM NABI FAI, Executive director, Kashmiri American Council, 2001 [“The Most Dangerous Place,” Washington Times, July 8, p. 13] The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central intelligence, the Defense Department, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.

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Relations Adv. – US-Sino Relations Good – Environment
A. US-Sino Cooperation Solves World Environment

Wang President of First China Capital, Inc. and a consultant at RAND 2001
[Hui Wang

U.S.-CHINA: BONDS AND TENSIONS Page 282-283 David Lee]

China is a major partner with the United States in the global effort to protect the environment. Although China’s per-capita production is very low, with one-fifth of the world’s population, China should expect to cooperate more on and contribute more than it has in the past to pollution control and environmental protection. Currently, China is the world’s number one producer of steel, coal, cement, fertilizer, and similar products. And two-decade’s economic growth, which has lifted millions out of poverty, has caused serious environmental damage that will be felt for many years to come. Some of this damage is already devastating. A survey in 1997 shows more than one-third of monitored urban river sections are seriously polluted and that they do not even meet the lowest standards necessary for irrigation water, not to mention drinking water. In many major cities, such as Hangzhou and Yibin, over 70 percent of rainfall is acid rain. The frequency of acid rainfall in some cities, such as Changsha and Zhuengyi, reaches 90 percent. Although China has taken many measures to prevent environmental damage, it will likely see its environment get worse before it gets before. The United States and China are both among the top polluting countries in the world. The principal pollutants include carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen oxide, and sulfur oxide. China is the world’s second largest greenhouse gas producer, trailing behind only the United States. Although it has a long way to go, China has voluntarily devoted substantial financial and human resources, in addition to regulation efforts, to clean air and water and to preserving the ecological system. China’s increasing market orientation requires a strategy for future environmental protection that goes beyond the measures of the past. Achieving environmental protection goals will require sacrifices in the near term and experience to make the battle more effective. The United States and China, together with other countries, need to cooperatively work out incentive programs for China and other less developed countries to shorten the process of cutting down emission rates to the level of more-developed countries. China remains a poor country, with half the population subsisting on under $2 a day. As Mark Hertsgaard observed, although being a big source of pollutant emissions, “China emits a far smaller amount of greenhouse gases per capita than the rich nations whose earlier industrialization has already condemned the world to climate change.” The fact is that the per-capita income of China is still well below the world average, and the Chinese in most of the inland areas have basic and urgent needs still to be met. Given this, future benefits and costs are subject to a higher discount rate in calculations and decision making. Controlling pollution and improving the environment may involve near-term sacrifices and disproportional allocations of the benefits. Environmental protection could be an extra or unfair burden for certain generations. On top of that, it requires understanding, cooperation, investment, and conscious action from all of the people. Although determined, China is facing an uphill battle in this ambitious environmental war—to reduce emissions in 2020 below today’s levels, improve air and water quality, and lower pollution-related health costs by 75 percent—while at the same time China will again quadruple its output. As for the United States, it needs to work with China on the environment. Absent a radical shift in world policies, the greenhouse effect, for example, and other environmental damage will accelerate global climate change, melting polar ice caps, and causing more and nastier hurricanes, droughts, and blizzards. The United States, China, and the rest of the world will suffer from such changes. The United States also has the resources and experience to assist China. This is a potential a major bond for the United States and China. Although China has realized the benefits of preserving the earth and protecting the environment, China undoubtedly has its own agenda, which may be far from that of the United States on this score. Given the huge differences in social and economic development, both the United States and China can see a clear common interest in working closely on accelerating China’s environmental efforts.

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Les Kaufmann, Chief Scientist at Edgerton Research Lab, THE LAST EXTINCTION, p. 4]

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The fourth argument for preserving biological diversity is the simplest: Our lives depend on it. We are part of a common fabric of life. Our survival is dependent on the integrity of this fabric, for the loss of a few critical threads could lead to a quick unraveling of the whole. We know that there have been previous mass extinctions, through which some life survived. As for our own chances of surviving this mass extinction, there can be no promises. If the Grim Reaper plays any favorites at all, then it would seem to be a special fondness for
striking down dominant organisms in their prime. David Joblinski examines the fates of rudist dames, mammalike reptiles, dinosaurs, and a host of other scintillating but doomed creatures in his essay. Humans are now the dominant creatures, at least in terms of their influence. So, lest history bear false witness and barring some serious conservation efforts on our part, this mass extinction could well be the last one that we will ever know about.

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Relations Adv. – US-Sino Relations Good – North Korea
A. China key to solving North Korea
Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State, 9/21/05 [“Whither China: from Membership to Responsibililty?,” http://www.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm] The most pressing opportunity is North Korea. Since hosting the Six-Party Talks at their inception in 2003, China has played a constructive role. This week we achieved a Joint Statement of Principles, with an agreement on the goal of "verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner." But the hard work of implementation lies ahead, and China should share our interest in effective and comprehensive compliance. Moreover, the North Korea problem is about more than just the spread of dangerous weapons. Without broad economic and political reform, North Korea poses a threat to itself and others. It is time to move beyond the half century-old armistice on the Korean peninsula to a true peace, with regional security and development. A Korean peninsula without nuclear weapons opens the door to this future. Some 30 years ago America ended its war in Viet Nam. Today Viet Nam looks to the United States to help integrate it into the world market economic system so Viet Nam can improve the lives of its people. By contrast, North Korea, with a 50 year-old cold armistice, just falls further behind. Beijing also has a strong interest in working with us to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that can deliver them. The proliferation of danger will undermine the benign security environment and healthy international economy that China needs for its development.

B. KOREAN WAR CAUSES EXTINCTION
Chol, ’02 (Kim Myong, The Agreed Framework is Brain Dead, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0212A_Chol.html)
The second choice is for the Americans to initiate military action to knock out the nuclear facilities in North Korea. Without precise knowledge of the location of those target facilities, the American policy planners face the real risk of North Korea launching a full-scale war against South Korea, Japan and the U.S. The North Korean retaliation will most likely leave South Korea and Japan totally devastated with the Metropolitan U.S. being consumed in nuclear conflagration. Looking down on the demolished American homeland, American policy planners aboard a special Boeing jets
will have good cause to claim, "We are winners, although our homeland is in ashes. We are safely alive on this jet." The third and last option is to agree to a shotgun wedding with the North Koreans. It means entering into package solution negotiations with the North Koreans, offering to sign a peace treaty to terminate the relations of hostility, establish full diplomatic relations between the two enemy states, withdraw the American forces from South Korea, remove North Korea from the list of axis of evil states and terrorist-sponsoring states, and give North Korea most favored nation treatment. The first two options should be sobering nightmare scenarios for a wise Bush and his policy planners. If they should opt for either of the scenarios, that would be their decision, which the North Koreans are in no position to take issue with. The Americans would realize too late that the North Korean mean what they say. The North Koreans will use

all their resources in their arsenal to fight a full-scale nuclear exchange with the Americans in the last war of mankind. A nucleararmed North Korea would be most destabilizing in the region and the rest of the world in the eyes of the Americans. They would end up finding themselves reduced to a second-class nuclear power.

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Relations Adv. – US-Sino Relations Good – North Korea EXTN
U.S.-Sino Cooperation Solves North Korea Wang President of First China Capital, Inc. and a consultant at RAND 2001
[Hui Wang

U.S.-CHINA: BONDS AND TENSIONS Page 267-268 David Lee]

In terms of security and stability in Northeast Asia, outstanding is North Korea and its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile capabilities. Moreover, North Korea is heavily armed with over one million troops and has also developed other weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical weapons. North Korea’s ideological isolation and economic failure heighten the risk for a military miscalculation. Although dia268 China, the United States, and the Global Economy logue and negotiations with North Korea have increased in recent years, North Korea in general remains one of the most uncertain and explosive regimes in the world. While having much less influence over Pyongyang than most of Kim II Sung’s time, China has been critical in averting a second conflict on the Peninsula. China

explicitly opposes any military action from the south against the north, and China still holds the most influence over North Korea in any major crisis. Therefore, although the United States has been making the most initiatives on security issues with North Korea, China’s support and cooperation remains crucial to any lasting success. Such joint diplomacy should include resolving questions about
Pyongyang’s nuclear program, persuading North Korea to halt further missile testing, and coordinating humanitarian relief. As members of the Four Party Talks on Korean security, the United States and China should continue their cooperation in dissuading North Korea from obstructing progress or from bolting from the process altogether. The talks remain one of the most important channels to diffuse tensions between North and South Korea—a near-term interest that Washington and Beijing share. Even if there were a potentially dramatic change in North Korea, even beyond the point of North Korea being a threat, the United

States needs to cooperate with China regarding the Korea Peninsula. Preparation for a wide range of possible challenges and events of new conflicts or lasting peace requires, at the minimum, the United States to closely consult with China. Likely, the Chinese influence on a unified Korea could grow substantially. Certainly

any postunification arrangement in which Washington maintains a military presence in Korea will require some clear understanding with Beijing. Otherwise, China can be expected to exert tremendous, albeit subtle, pressure on the government of a unified Korea to forego any continuing U.S. military presence, leaving Japan domestically vulnerable as the only country in Asia with troops. After all, understanding and cooperation from China on any such security issues require a reasonably good relationship between the United States and China.

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Relations Adv. – US-Sino Relations Good – Central Asia
A. U.S.-Sino Relations Solves Central Asia stability and Russian expansionism Wang President of First China Capital, Inc. and a consultant at RAND 2001 [Hui Wang U.S.-CHINA: BONDS AND TENSIONS Page 269-270 David Lee] It is in both U.S. and China’s interests to maintain stability in the countries of Central Asian members of the former Soviet Union, including Mongolia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Most of these newly independent countries suffer to different degrees from economic decline and social unrest. The United States wants to see a continuing orderly transition in these countries to a market economy and a democratic political system. Moreover, given the geographic location, the United States wants to assimilate the new Central Asian states into the international community and avoid any adverse changes in relation to the Americandominated security of the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, as its economic reach rapidly extends, China is enjoying growing interactions in this area. China wants to increase its trade and economic ties with this area and to develop a local partnership for stability and development near its western border. It was in Central Asia that the United States and China once successfully cooperated against invasion by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and made a classic example for Sino- U.S. cooperation by combining the most advantageous resources from each. However, if the relationship deteriorates, China could be displeased by U.S. strengthening ties in the region—China may perceive such a move as a new potential threat to its western border. Neither the United States nor China want Russia to lose its remaining social and economic order. Since Russia possesses thousands of nuclear warheads and sophisticated missiles, further deterioration in Russia could potentially make world security uncertain and the already costly efforts at stabilization more costly. At the same time, both the United States and China do not want to see an expansionist Russia again but a cooperative and restrained Russia. In a long run, the United States and China potentially have more ground regarding Russia to cooperate on than to compete about. Russia is deeply suspicious about the United States and recent NATO
developments. The unexpected Russian occupation of Pristina airport in Kosovo and firing of antimissile rockets are clear signs of this suspicion. Russian leaders were explicitly aggravated by the U.S. antimissile plan and implied that there would be consequences if the United States resigns from the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty. In addition, Russia does not want to degrade economically into a third-world country, and although Russia has been accepting U.S. support, its understanding of U.S.-Russian relations are very different from that of the United States. As Russia’s status as a world power continues to fall, its complaints and distrust will deepen. Even if Russia should become strong again someday, it will present uncertainties to its neighbors and to world powers, no matter whether it is capitalist or communist. Russia is no doubt less threatening than it was 15 years ago. And only ten years’ experience of the “new” Russia has not contested the memory of the “Great Russian imperial consciousness” of the hundred previous years.6 As long as China possess little military projection power, Russia will view China more as a counter balance to the U.S. superpower and less as a rival. Nevertheless, because of the long shared border, Russia and China’s vigilance of and hedging against each other will reappear when Russia becomes stabilized. From a geopolitical point of view, the

United States and China have common interests in preventing a reemergence of an expansionist Russia. But if U.S.-China relations deteriorate, a Russia-China alliance would likely emerge to counter U.S. dominance, which is the last thing that the United States would want to see.

B. Central Asian conflict is the most likely scenario for nuclear war
Blank, Strategic Studies Institute former Soviet states expert, 2000
[Stephen, "U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia," http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/docs/Blank2000.pdf, pg. 24-5]

In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to deter Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new RussoArmenian Treaty and Azeri-Turkish treaty suggest that Russia and Turkey could be dragged into a confrontation to rescue their allies from defeat. 72 Thus many of the conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict in which third parties intervene are present in the Transcaucasus. For example, many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may fail to grasp the other side’s stakes since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a client’s defeat are not as well established or apparent. Clarity about the nature of the threat could prevent the kind of rapid and almost uncontrolled escalation we saw in 1993 when Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. 73 Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally, Russian nuclear threats could trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia’s declared nuclear strategies). The real threat of a Russian nuclear strike against Turkey to defend Moscow’s interests and forces in the Transcaucasus makes the danger of major war there higher than almost everywhere else. SDI 2008

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Relations Adv. – Peaceful Rise – Link EXTN
Energy cooperation solves peaceful rise – leads to integration
Ma, Petroleum Economist, Dundee University Center for Energy, Petroleum and mineral law and policy doctoral candidate, December 2007
[Xin, "Geopolitics of Energy: China and the Central Asia," Insight Turkey, CIAO] China's energy needs will inevitably bring about significant geopolitical power-shift, which China and other major players have to manage carefully. The massive size of its reliance on petroleum imports and the specific approaches it takes to secure its imports may be seen as a threat. However, China's expanding energy interests should not necessarily pose a threat to the West or to its Asian neighbours. Instead they can be used as an opportunity to integrate China into existing and new institutions and mechanisms at global and regional levels.

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Relations Adv. – Regime Stability – Link EXTN (1/2)
Chinese energy security is critical to regime stability
Zweig, Hong Kong University China Transnational Relations Center Director, and Jianhai, Hong Kong University China Transnational Relations Center Director Postdoctoral Fellow, October 2005
[David, Bi, "China's Global Hunt for Energy," Foreign Affairs]

An unprecedented need for resources is now driving China's foreign policy. A booming domestic economy, rapid urbanization, increased export processing, and the Chinese people's voracious appetite for cars are increasing the country's demand for oil and natural gas, industrial and construction materials, foreign capital and technology. Twenty
years ago, China was East Asia's largest oil exporter. Now it is the world's second-largest importer; last year, it alone accounted for 31 percent of global growth in oil demand. Now that China is the workshop of the world, its hunger for electricity and industrial resources has soared. China's combined share of the world's consumption of aluminum, copper, nickel, and iron ore more than doubled within only ten years, from 7 percent in 1990 to 15 percent in 2000; it has now reached about 20 percent and is likely to double again by the end of the decade. Despite calls by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and other politicians to cut consumption of energy and other resources, there is little sign of this appetite abating. Justin Yifu Lin, director of the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University, in Beijing, says the country's economy could grow at 9 percent per year for the next 20

years. These new needs already have serious implications for China's foreign policy. Beijing's access to foreign resources is necessary both for continued economic growth and, because growth is the cornerstone of China's social stability, for the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since China remains a relatively centralized, government-driven economy,
Beijing has been able to adapt its foreign policy to its domestic development strategy. Traditional institutions, such as the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group of the CCP, are still making the key decisions, but a more pluralistic environment is emerging and allowing business leaders to help shape foreign policy. The China Institute for International Studies, a government think tank, holds numerous conferences bringing together academics and leaders in business, the military, and the government to devise strategies for the top rung of the Communist Party.

Chinese energy security is key to regime stability
Lieberthal, Michigan University China Center Research Associate, William Davidson Institute China Director and Distinguished Fellow, Political Science Professor, and Herberg, National Bureau of Asian Research Asian Energy Security Director, ARCO Strategic Planning group Global Energy and Economics Director, April 2006
[Kenneth, Mikkal, "NBR Analysis," http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?ID=93a9dcaa-b9d5-4601-ac32-93f702696db5] China’s growing dependence on imported energy, in particular oil, and recent moves abroad by Chinese nOCs to secure physical access to future supplies have been documented in a number of recent studies .7 in order to appreciate why access to energy supplies abroad has become such a critical economic and political concern for beijing’s leadership, however, several key points warrant particular attention . First, at a visceral level, China’s leaders fear that domestic energy shortages and rising energy costs could undermine the country’s economic growth and thus seriously jeopardize job creation . For a regime that increasingly stakes its political right to rule on economic performance and rising standards of living, the threat of economic stagnation raises real risks of social instability, which could in turn threaten the continued political monopoly of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) . Hence, energy security is a strategic domestic political concern for the leadership . against this backdrop, beijing has been further alarmed by a huge rise in global energy prices over the past three years and the increasing specter of long-term global energy “scarcity .”

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Relations Adv. – Regime Stability – Link EXTN (2/2)
Chinese shift to renewables is key to prevent economic collapse – fossil fuel economy is crushing their GDP, the renewable sector encourages growth and innovation
Ferry, Suffolk University Law Professor, Harvard Law School Visiting Professor, 2007
[Steven, THE NEW POWER GENERATION: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ELECTRICITY INNOVATION: COLLOQUIUM ARTICLE: WHY ELECTRICITY MATTERS, DEVELOPING NATIONS MATTER, AND ASIA MATTERS MOST OF ALL," 15 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 113] There are other environmental costs from burning fossil fuels besides possible climate change and global warming. For example, the environmental costs associated with human health and land degradation as a result of fossil fuel use are large enough to overshadow China's remarkable economic expansion. n104 Using a conservative estimate, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing calculated that environmental degradation is costing China 8-15% of its annual GDP, a number greater than China's annual economic growth rate of 7-8% of GDP. n105 In contrast, renewable resources are abundant and diverse. As indigenous resources, they encourage both local control and economic growth. Renewable energy sources provide an important hedge against rising fossil fuel prices. In deregulated electricity markets, renewables reduce energy costs for the entire power market because they lower the marginal clearing price of [*144] electricity. The marginal cost of renewable fuel sources is essentially zero, and renewable energy alternatives have substantially less negative environmental impact than fossil fuel sources over the long term. n106 Many renewable energy facilities can be built in size increments proportionate to load growth patterns and local needs. Furthermore, smaller sized plants located closer to the customer load reduce infrastructure costs for transmission and distribution, reduce losses, and help secure local power reliability and quality. The challenge is to affect and deploy energy technology today in countries around the globe to reflect sustainable development. This is incumbent on all nations. In those fast-electrifying developing nations, there is a particular opportunity because the electric infrastructure is being constructed from the ground up. There is an opportunity to build it right from the beginning.

China’s reliance on coal stifles economic growth
Mattis, National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) Program Associate, 6/21/2006
[Peter, "The Strategic Vulnerability of China's Reliance on Coal," http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2874.html] The consequences of Chinese coal usage also extend into the economic sphere, overlapping with the human and environmental problems. The burden that coal places on strained healthcare and infrastructure systems exacerbates the urban-rural and coastalinland divides in China and makes meaningful reform more difficult. In terms of deepening the divides within China, heavy reliance on coal inhibits economic growth in rural and inland economies. The air pollution resulting from coal increases national healthcare costs by an estimated two percent of GDP annually (Environment, June 2004). Given that the benefits of the last decade of economic growth have been mostly confined to the cities, this places a disproportionate burden on rural areas for increasing healthcare expenses. These costs inhibit rural and inland government spending on needed development projects including energy, education, and transportation. In areas such as Sichuan and Guizhou, investment in hydropower could conceivably meet increasing energy demand, but the local governments lack needed financial resources while existing projects direct the energy toward coastal areas. On the transportation side, China’s inland provinces are already inadequately serviced by railways with a transportation density less than one-fourth that of the coastal provinces (Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian, 2004). The need to transport coal, consisting of 40 percent of all freight in China, creates bottlenecks that prevent exports (Asian Development Bank, 2002). Lacking a means to move their products to external or even coastal markets, the inland provincial economies can produce only for themselves. Even goods that in a period of declining profit margins in China could be produced more efficiently and profitably in these inland provinces cannot be moved beyond local markets. The net result is that the bottlenecks created by coal exacerbate unemployment problems and restrict economic potential. Transporting coal, in part, was a significant reason for the failure of the “Open Up the West” campaign designed to improve the economic performance of these inland provinces. Barring substantial reform, the “New Socialist Countryside” campaign is unlikely to prove more fruitful.

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Relations Adv. – Regime Stability – Impact EXTN
CCP collapse collapse results in WWIII
The Straights Times, 6/28/03 (Tom Plate, UCLA professor, neo-cons a bigger risk to Bush than China,” But imagine a China disintegrating- on its own, without neo-conservative or Central Intelligence Agency prompting, much less outright military invasion because the economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia into chaos. A massive flood of refugees would head for Indonesia and other places with poor border controls, which don’t’ want them and cant handle them; some in Japan might lick their lips at the prospect of of World War II revisited and look to annex a slice of China. That would send Singapore and Malaysia- once occupied by Japaninto nervous breakdowns. Meanwhile, India might make a grab for Tibet, and Pakistan for Kashmir. Then you can say hello to World War III, Asia style. That’s why wise policy encourages Chinese stability, security and economic growth – the very direction the White House now seems to prefer.

Chinese regime collapse leads to lashout and nuclear war
The Epoch Times ‘5, 8/3/05 http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The “speech,” free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the “speech.” The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCP’s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.

CCP collapse spills over to cause Chinese civil war and mass instability
Arthur Waldron, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, September/October 2005, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19950901fareviewessay5071/arthur-waldron/after-deng-the-deluge.html

Lieberthal has considerable confidence in the ruling elite's ability to prevent its bitter rivalries from escalating into countrywide conflict. But in the administration of China, disagreements are ubiquitous within the center, between the center and the increasingly wealthy regions, within regions and units, and between rulers and the ruled. Any of these could supply the spark. Suppose, a few years down the line, an increasingly assertive National People's Congress passes laws that conflict with regulations promulgated by the party administration, or the governor of a wealthy southern province refuses to leave his post when Beijing tells him to. Each side might use its connections in the security apparatus and the military and among the regional authorities to get its way. Resolution might come, but it might not. Unanticipated escalation could even lead to civil war.

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Relations Adv. – Regime Collapse – AT: No Energy Crisis
Chinese energy security is doomed in the status quo – reforms are insufficient and a crisis is inevitable
Lieberthal, Michigan University China Center Research Associate, William Davidson Institute China Director and Distinguished Fellow, Political Science Professor, and Herberg, National Bureau of Asian Research Asian Energy Security Director, ARCO Strategic Planning group Global Energy and Economics Director, April 2006
[Kenneth, Mikkal, "NBR Analysis," http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?ID=93a9dcaa-b9d5-4601-ac32-93f702696db5]

In the face of mushrooming energy demand, other segments of China’s domestic energy system are also experiencing intensifying supply bottlenecks, including severe (if temporary) shortages of electricity and bottlenecks in coal production and transportation . These shortages are adding to the atmosphere of crisis in the energy sector and aggravating the leadership’s sense of vulnerability to supply disruptions. China’s energy policies and institutions accentuate demand growth and aggravate energy supply and infrastructure shortages . subsidized energy prices promote
excessive demand growth, which in turn increases pressure on supplies and infrastructure to move energy around the country . at the same time, investment in improving energy efficiency is badly underfunded .12 although beijing has begun to recognize the need for demand-side energy reforms, the government has moved cautiously out of fear of the impact of higher energy prices on employment, inflation, and social stability . There appears to be a growing recognition of these problems among China’s top leadership . such concerns are evident in recent efforts to reorganize energy policymaking, most notably the 2005 establishment of a new state Energy Office, which reports to a new Energy leading Group headed by Premier Wen Jiabao .13 nevertheless, the

pace of reform remains slow .

Transportation of oil-based resources hurts Chinese energy security
Zweig, Hong Kong University China Transnational Relations Center Director, and Jianhai, Hong Kong University China Transnational Relations Center Director Postdoctoral Fellow, October 2005
[David, Bi, "China's Global Hunt for Energy," Foreign Affairs] Securing China's energy needs does not simply entail obtaining resources; it also requires getting them home. Transport is no easy feat for a country that still has no cross-border pipeline. The China National Petroleum Corporation struck a deal for a major pipeline with the Russian oil giant Yukos in 2003, but the plan fell apart after the Russian government first dismantled Yukos and then accepted Japan's higher bid on the project. Negotiations for a pipeline that would transport Caspian Sea oil to China through Kazakhstan are slowly moving forward, but China remains heavily dependent on international sea-lanes, especially through the Strait of Malacca and other navigational chokepoints, to bring oil from Africa and the Middle East.

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Solvency – Coop Solves Climate Change EXTN (1/3)
Case solves globally – incentives solve cooperation sparking broad solutions to GHG emissions that will be modeled globally
Chandler, Carnegie Endowment Senior Associate, March 2008
[William, "Breaking the Suicide Pact: US-China Cooperation on Climate Change," http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb57_chandler_final.pdf] A Path to Cooperation

The United States and China seemingly remain locked in their suicide pact, each arguing that the other is the reason it cannot stop its self-destructive energy-using behavior. Negotiations for a global post-Kyoto climate agreement are not likely to break this impasse. On the contrary, reaching a global climate change agreement will first require accommodation
between the United States and China. There is a way forward. Chinese climate leaders, at the Bali climate conference and elsewhere, have suggested that China could set a target to cut emissions growth to half the rate of growth in gross domestic product through 2020, and then cut emissions from that level by 30 percent by the middle of this century. Significantly, China is already aggressively pursuing a goal to reduce the energy intensity of its economy by 20 percent by 2010. Many inefficient and outmoded state-owned cement plants and other heavy industrial facilities are being shut down to shift production to newer, more efficient plants.
At the same time, U.S. states including California have set strenuous targets for emission reductions—50 to 80 percent or more by 2050. Some states have imposed stringent fuel economy standards on cars and portfolio standards on utilities. The states’ emission goals are voluntary in the sense that no outside power can enforce them. But the standards and the measures they impose to achieve them are enforceable. This same model could be applied internationally. China and the United States could cooperate to set individual, national goals and then work together to achieve them through domestically enforceable measures and international agreements that prevent either nation from taking advantage of steps taken by the other. Cooperation could be organized in three priority areas: deployment of best practice technologies, innovation in new technologies, and agreements to prevent the two countries from taking advantage. Deployment means promoting the market penetration of existing carbon emission reduction technologies. Business leaders could help by working with both governments to solve problems impeding the market application of existing technologies. Joint policy initiatives to provide tax breaks for investment and impose tax penalties on high-carbon energy would reduce the risk that either country would take advantage of goals and measures set by the other. Beijing could make it easier for foreign companies to invest directly in clean energy projects by removing constraints on converting foreign exchange for investing and repatriating profits. Another priority is to exempt energy-efficiency services from China’s 17 percent value-added tax. The government could encourage banks to do risk-based clean energy lending, which means removing the regulatory cap on interest rates for energy-efficiency investments. No investor or lender wants to earn interest at rates just barely above inflation, as banks in China are limited to doing. The leaders among U.S. states in energy innovation, especially California, could provide assistance to Chinese provincial leaders struggling to deal with energy problems. The Chinese central government has set sound high-level policies for efficiency and clean energy development, but it leaves implementation to unprepared, underresourced provincial leaders. Beijing could support these provincial leaders by providing funds, training, expertise, and tax and regulatory flexibility to enable them to take decisive action to encourage clean energy investment. And the U.S. states could share their experience, providing advice on which policies actually work.

Efforts to develop new technologies—carbon capture and storage systems, very effi- cient industrial production processes, a smart electric grid system to integrate distributed energy production and demand-side management— all would take massive investments, the best scientists and engineers, and many years. To pursue this process, it would be in the interest of

American laboratories to link more closely to Chinese markets. Innovation stems from feedback from the marketplace, making joint research and development in China, where the market is most dynamic, necessary for U.S. firms to remain competitive. Unfortunately for American science, there is little congressional support for this approach. Fortunately,
however, China today is in a position to share research and development costs with the United States. Strikingly, given the urgency of climate action, resources are meager within both China and the United States for energy efficiency and power sector decarbonization. Technology deployment gets little support within either nation. Official funding for clean energy cooperation between the countries amounts to only about $1 million a year. The private U.S. Energy Foundation provides twenty times more, but even this level of funding is far below the need. Making climate cooperation integral to trade policy should be a priority. For example, both countries could agree that after 2015 they would export only appliances, cars, and equipment with efficiency levels higher than the world average today. And they could jointly set production standards to limit the energy used in manufacturing exports. If this U.S.–China policy experiment works, it could be replicated in other countries, notably India. China and the

United States could develop packages of policies and measures, test them for efficacy, correct them, and share them. U.S.–China collaboration should not be envisaged as a threat to the climate leadership of any region or nation or to global cooperation. It should not challenge existing or planned emissions cap and trade systems. Rather, it would be, and should be, considered an act of mutual self-preservation, helping both the United States and China to avert climate disaster and the eventual sanctions of other nations if they do not act, and laying the basis for successful global action.

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Solvency – Coop Solves Climate Change EXTN (2/3)
US-Sino cooperation on climate change is critical to solve – creates a standard for global action
Ogden, Center for American Progress National Security and International Policy Senior Policy Analyst, and Rogier, Center for American Progress Researcher, 5/2/2008
[Peter, Matt, "Climate Change Challenges Cannot Be Met Without Sino-U.S. Cooperation," http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/05/china_climate.html] President Bush gave a major address last week in the White House Rose Garden about the need for the United States to curb its carbon emissions. The speech has been roundly derided as being “too little, too late,” and deservedly so. It is also, unfortunately, characteristic of much of the energy debate in the United States in that it failed to make a case for what must be an integral part of any successful energy and climate strategy in the 21st century: robust U.S.-Sino cooperation. Politicians and policymakers in Washington today are caught up in a largely domestic debate over the future of U.S. energy policy. Yet U.S. energy and climate security ultimately requires winning China’s support for a new international, rules-based energy system that works for developed and developing countries alike. After all, the United States and China are the top two emitters of greenhouse gases and two of the three top oil importers. If the U.S. and China cannot work together

to create a sustainable global energy environment, there is little chance of averting the ill-effects of climate change or of building more efficient and transparent international energy markets. U.S. INVESTMENT CAN INPROVE CHINESE ENERGY EFFICIENCY VIA NEWER TECH AND RENEWABLE RESOURCES.
Gallagher- Director of Kennedy School’s Energy Tech Innovation Policy research group November 2001 Kelly http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/sims_gallagher_workshop_report.pdf Sanhcez United States foreign direct investment in the Chinese energy sector has a mixed environmental record. U.S. firms can contribute positively to environmental quality in China when the technologies they employ contribute to greater energy efficiency or reduce emissions of pollutants into the environment. U.S. firms do not appear to be transferring technology that worsens the efficiency or environmental impact of a potential project as compared with business as usual in China. The overall investment, however, is environmentally dubious given the heavy emphasis on coal, a fuel that releases many pollutants into the environment without special controls. Regarding efficiency, the average thermal efficiency of Chinese plants is reportedly around 30 percent according to the China Climate Change Country Study (DOE and SSTC 1999) compared with an average efficiency of 35 percent in OECD industrialized countries (IPCC 1996). The relatively low efficiency is because many power plants in China use dated technologies and are often quite small, reducing the efficiency potential that comes from scale. It appears that most energy FDI is not replacing existing Chinese plants, but instead affecting the growth of the Chinese energy system by contributing to the construction of new plants. If these foreign-invested plants are more efficient that an average Chinese one, there is
some environmental benefit (assuming that a less efficient plant would have been built without foreign involvement). Murray et. al speculate that the presence of foreign investment in China could increase the likelihood of price rationalization in the power sector in China. If prices reflected the true costs of electricity generation, then conservation programs would seem more attractive (Murray et. al 1998). In this regard, it should be noted that the government liberated coal prices in 1993 and pegged oil prices to international levels in 1998.

While United States firms may have successfully penetrated the Chinese energy market, the investment has still been predominantly in coal, which is problematic for a number of environmental reasons. First, coal-fired power plants have few environmental controls on them in China, resulting in very high levels of emissions of pollutants such as sulfur dioxide and particulate matter. This can result in severe local air pollution. Regionally, China already contends with major acidification of its soils as a result of this air pollution. At a global scale these coal-fired power plants contribute to climate change through emissions of carbon dioxide.10 Yet, the more efficient a plant is, the less carbon dioxide it will release. Potential responses to these concerns are to increase the use of renewable energy and cleaner fuels such as natural gas and to improve energy efficiency. To take one example, if gas were to be used in place of coal, it would substantially improve the quality of the environment in China and the rest of the world. Since U.S. firms possess some of the most efficient gas-fired power plant technologies available, such a diversification of fuel supply in China could provide a new (or at least much larger) market for U.S. companies. According to one estimate, for every 1 bcm/year of natural gas used in place of coal to generate electricity (about the amount used in a 775 MW plant), China
would reduce total suspended particulates (TSP) by 243,000 tons, sulfur dioxide by 53,000 tons, and carbon dioxide by 2,590,000 tons (Logan & Chandler 1998). In a World Bank study of global FDI into the largest power projects in China, 88 percent were coal-fired projects, and the rest were either generated by oil or nuclear power (Zhao 2000). The Chinese government officially plans to continue efficiency programs and also to diversify its energy supply with renewables and natural gas under its current 10th Five Year Plan but it isn.t clear how much these plans will affect foreign investment (Xinhua News Agency 2001).

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Solvency – Coop Solves Climate Change EXTN (3/3)
US-Sino cooperation is critical to solve climate change and energy security
Ogden, Center for American Progress National Security and International Policy Senior Policy Analyst, and Rogier, Center for American Progress Researcher, 5/2/2008
[Peter, Matt, "Climate Change Challenges Cannot Be Met Without Sino-U.S. Cooperation," http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/05/china_climate.html]

The United States, however, must itself address the energy challenge responsibly, and by doing so it will be able to demonstrate the leadership necessary to build and bolster the international architecture that the world needs to achieve greater energy and climate security. China and the United States together can help lead the world toward more sustainable energy policies that promote global economic growth and combat global warming, but they will never make significant progress toward their goal until they are willing and able to work closely with one another on these issues.

Chinese energy consumption is pushing global warming to a brink and causes mass domestic pollution
Saiget, AFP staff writer, 11/6/2006 [Robert, "China's Coal Addiction Causing Environmental Disaster," http://www.terradaily.com/reports/China_Coal_Addiction_Causing_Environmental_Disaster_999.html] China has seen a massive increase in greenhouse gas emissions over the past decade despite ratifying the Kyoto Protocol -- and the situation will only worsen as coal remains its main energy source. The nation is the world's second-largest emitter of climate change gases after the United States and the world's largest coal burner. But as a developing country it is not obliged to reduce emissions under the protocol. About 70 percent of China's energy comes from burning the fossil fuel and with hundreds more coal-fired power plants being built -- often with old, heavy-polluting technology -- the situation is only going to deteriorate. China last year built 117 government-approved coal-fired power plants -- a rate of roughly one every three days, according to official figures. But even the central government conceded the real number was much higher, with local and provincial governments building many unauthorized coal plants in an effort to ensure economic growth steamed ahead. A report issued by the International Energy Agency in July said that every two years China was adding new electricity capacity equivalent to that of the total annual output of France or Canada. Correspondingly, China's coal production has more than doubled since 1990, from one billion tonnes to a forecast 2.16 billion tonnes this year, according to Chinese government and industry figures. The massive amount of extra pollutants being pumped into the atmosphere has had predictable short-term impacts on the environment. China's coal burning has put five of the nation's cities in the top 10 of most polluted cities in the world, the International Energy Agency report said. "Acid rain falls on one-third of China's territory and one-third of the urban population breathes heavily polluted air. Poor air quality imposes a welfare cost of between three and eight percent of GDP," it said. "China's power sector is the single largest culprit," responsible for an estimated 44 percent of sulphur dioxide emissions, 80 percent of nitrous oxide emissions, and 26 percent of carbon dioxide emissions, it said. China has set goals for renewable energy to account for 16 percent of its overall energy production by 2020 and to increase energy efficiency per unit of gross domestic product by 20 percent over the next four years. But already there are signs that those targets are being missed, with energy per unit of GDP rising by 0.8 percent in the first half of the year, according to government figures. Even if the government were to meet its target of 16 percent for renewable energy, coal would still remain overwhelmingly the biggest source of energy for China's fast modernizing population of 1.3 billion people. "The Chinese government needs to correct their thinking on economic growth, they have to focus more on the environmental price they are paying for rapid economic growth," Yang Ailun, a renewable energy expert with Greenpeace China told AFP. "We need to find other ways to decarbonize and still develop our economy. We can't burn so much fossil fuels."

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Solvency – Coop Solves Climate Change EXTN – Solves Coal
US incentives are key to solve Chinese reliance on coal Lewis, China’s Strategic Priorities in International Climate Change Negotiations, Washington Quarterly, 2008 [Joanna, winter 2007/2008 “China's Strategic Priorities in International Climate Change Negotiations," http://www.twq.com/08winter/docs/08winter_lewis.pdf, Chinikamwala] An important part of any multilateral climate deal will likely include a commitment from developed countries to increase developing country access to advanced technologies and to provide incentives and financial assistance for their mitigation and adaptation activities. China’s own climate change plan has clearly identified its priority areas for international collaboration to include cooperation on advanced coal technologies, energy-efficient building technologies, clean vehicle technology, and advanced industrial technologies. China has placed a particularly heavy emphasis on technology transfer in international climate negotiations, most recently proposing the establishment of a Technology Development and Transfer Board to oversee and implement technology transfer–related activities, as well as a Multilateral Technology Acquisition Fund to support the “development, deployment, diffusion and transfer of technologies to developing countries, through, inter alia, the buying out of intellectual property rights.”44 Increased attention to developing these technologies and increased experience deploying them is important not only for China but also for the rest of the world. The United States and China in particular share a common interest in determining a way to continue their reliance on coal while moving toward more efficient coal-combustion and gasification technologies and capturing and storing the emissions from coal power plants. Increased bilateral assistance in this area can complement and even facilitate multilateral climate negotiations.

US alternative energy is key to solve Chinese reliance on coal – this is the key lever to solve warming
Kerry, Senator, D-MA, 10/29/2007 [John, "Prepared Remarks by US Senator John Kerry," http://www.cfr.org/publication/14659/prepared_remarks_by_us_senator_john_kerry.html] That is why, in Bali and beyond, we must also commit ourselves to a massive new campaign aimed at fostering green development. And at the heart of that effort must be coal. We have to spread carbon capture and sequestration techniques -which can capture up to 100% of coal's emissions -- to China and the rest of the developing world. We must be realistic about

the fact that a developing county like China -- rich in coal, growing at 11%, and in need of a cheap source of energy -won't adopt clean coal technology unless we help them. And their decisions may be irreversible: Today the Chinese are building one coal-fired power plant per week -- most are not even designed so that they might be retrofitted later with clean technology. That's the real cost of inaction in real time. Coal accounts for 80% of China's CO2 emissions, and the EPA tells us that Chinese pollution accounts for ¼ of the smog over Los Angeles. That too is a cost of inaction. We should
create an internationally-funded research consortium devoted to developing green technologies and spreading them to developing countries -- we need to do everything we can -- not just to develop green technologies, but to see them actually adopted

by billions of people.

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Solvency – Coop Solves Relations EXTN (1/3)
Alternative energy cooperation is critical to make interdependence sustainable
Daojiong, Renmin University (Bejing) International Studies Professor, Fall 2007
[Zha, "Promoting energy partnership in bejing and washington," the washington quarterly]

Energy security as a bilateral issue between China and the United States has the potential to become contentious. Although energy has little chance of being the issue that diffuses the myriad tensions between Beijing and Washington, energy cooperation in the spirit of partnership can help improve the status quo. Future government-level dialogue between Beijing
and Washington on en- ergy should proceed beyond understanding each other’s policies and positions to partnership in the energy field. Such partnership should include strength- ening U.S. cooperation with China to improve the latter’s technological and administrative capacity in energy conservation and environmental protection.

The two governments should also encourage their energy companies to launch joint ventures in oil extraction in other countries to lower the business and political costs of enlarging global supply. A pattern of interdependence has been built into bilateral relations be- tween the two countries. That interdependence manifests not just in com-  mercial trade. The United States and China, as the largest and third-largest importers of oil, respectively, must be able to count on effective energy conser- vation in both societies before the hopes for a less competitive international energy market can be realistic. 

Cooperation on alt energy prevents conflict with China
Ian Bremmer, January 24, 2005. Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy, and a senior fellow at the World Policy Institute. http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2005/01/24/8234063/index.htm “Are the U.S. and China on a collision course?” FORTUNE MAGAZINE, Sanchez First, Washington must recognize that China plays a different role in the world than the Soviet Union did. Trying to punish China just won't work: An economic crisis there will hurt the U.S. as well. Rather, the Bush administration should be thinking of ways to help China, and the easiest way it can do that is to make China more energy efficient. If China isn't compelled by its energy demand to take actions that bring Beijing into conflict with Washington, both sides win. Among other things, Washington can help China develop alternative sources of energy, including hydropower, natural gas, and, to a lesser extent, nuclear, solar, and wind power. American companies that provide China with such technology can also benefit. And the U.S. can help China build an Asian strategic oil reserve so that it is less vulnerable to sudden shocks in world oil markets. Without financing from the West, it could be years before China is able to stock even a 90-day emergency supply of oil. Such moves could lead to long overdue demand-side coordination in the global energy market. Instead of considering China a strategic competitor and Saudi Arabia a partner, the U.S should recognize that the interests of two of the world's largest oil importers are more in harmony than are the interests of the biggest oil buyer and the biggest seller. Aligning U.S. and Chinese interests would allow them both to better resist profiteering in world energy markets. Unfortunately, if China's foreign policy frustrates Washington's efforts to protect U.S. national interests, lawmakers are liable to fall back on a familiar counterstrategy: a Cold War containment policy. But persuading U.S. lawmakers to put aside Cold War zero-sum thinking in its relations with China and to begin to see China as a strategic partner in the world economy is a challenge worth accepting.

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Solvency – Coop Solves Relations EXTN (2/3)
US-Sino energy cooperation is key to long-term sustainability of relations
Daojiong, Renmin University (Bejing) International Studies Professor, Fall 2007
[Zha, "Promoting energy partnership in bejing and washington," the washington quarterly] Although China and the United States do not rely on one another for energy supplies, energy security has ironically become a necessary agenda item in Chinese-U.S. relations. As the world’s second-largest and largest con- sumers of oil, respectively,

China and the United States are becoming more sensitive to each other’s pursuit of energy sources from other countries. Likely because the Chinese and U.S. economies have absorbed the impact of the most recent global oil price spikes and still enjoyed steady growth, energy re- mains mostly an issue for dialogue rather than a cause for confrontation. Yet, the prospects for energy to become a cause for more serious clashes are high, with demand in both countries set to rise
continuously, even rapidly.

In an age of global interdependence, Beijing and Washington should seek to ameliorate differences on tense energy issues. Although dialogues on energy security conceptualizations and policy preferences are positive, they must move beyond talking toward a true partnership that can confront the common challenges they face as importers.

US-Sino energy cooperation solves
Turner, China Environment Forum Director, Kim, China Environment Forum Former Program Assistant, 2/7/2007 [Jennifer, Juli, "China's Filthiest Export ," http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3978] Long-term congressional restrictions on aid and assistance to China, combined with a lack of leadership from the administration on promoting clean energy and environmental cooperation with China, have hampered sustained and truly effective U.S. government programs. These U.S. environmental and energy projects in China are often uncoordinated, inconsistent, and not nearly as effective as similar work conducted in other countries. In stark contrast to the U.S. government presence, nearly 60 U.S.-based NGOs, professional societies, and universities have been active in helping Chinese government agencies and NGOs work on a broad range of energy and conservation issues. The San Francisco-based Energy Foundation, for example, helps Chinese and U.S. NGOs and research centers to promote energy efficiency in China with grants that are significantly greater than the total Department of Energy budget in China. The growing regional impacts of China's pollution and energy hunger could create more incentives for the Bush administration and Congress to pursue collaboration with China. Or, as the controversy over China's bid to purchase the Unocal oil company in 2006 illustrated, China's energy hunger and pollution could be used as another reason to vilify the country. There is an unprecedented opportunity to develop a coherent approach to energy and environmental relations with China. On the American side, the war against terrorism will continue to require the U.S. government to engage China so that it does not undercut U.S. efforts in central Asia, the Middle East, or the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, cooperating with China on energy and environmental issues would help strengthen U.S.-China ties, which are continually strained by friction over Taiwan, trade imbalances, and a wide range of other issues. Thus a concerted effort by the world's two largest energy consumers to work together to solve their mutual energy problems and to develop a partnership to help China with its pollution problems could build some degree of confidence that would help the relationship weather tough times.

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Solvency – Coop Solves Relations EXTN (3/3)
Cooperation over energy security overcomes mutual threat perceptions and distrust
Lieberthal, Michigan University Professor, January 2007
[Kenneth, “China’s March on the 21st Century,” http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F848DF23CA704F5%7D/CMTCFINAL052307.PDF]]

Both sides obviously will hedge against uncertainties even as they seek to broaden constructive engagement. The issue is how to prevent the hedges from contributing to mutual distrust so that they create a self-fulfilling prophecy of mutual antagonism. Part of the answer lies in the classic dictum,“Do no harm.” That is,each side should take care to avoid the types of rhetoric and sym- bolic moves that signal deep pessimism about the longterm relationship. The oil sector provides a good current example of both the nature of the problem and the types of initiative that can be help- ful in dealing with it effectively. The PRC and the United States share major com- mon interests in the oil sector. Both are
domestic producers but are now, and will be for at least the coming few decades, the largest oil importers in the world. Both,therefore,have tremendous inter- ests in bolstering the leverage of oil importers over oil exporters, increasing supply security, and moderating price volatility. Moreover,each will benefit mightily ifboth can achieve greater energy efficiency and reduce the environmental costs of their energy use. With all these shared interests, the countries should on most international oil issues find themselves on the same side ofthe table. In reality,though,oil

imports have become a sharply divisive issue,increasing threat perceptions and long-term distrust on each side. America accuses China ofseeking to “take oil offthe market” for China’s exclusive use,through acquisition ofequity oil (i.e.,buying ownership ofoil that is still in the
ground). It also points to the reality that much of the equity oil that China has purchased is in countries governed by bad actors,concluding that China’s oil interests are being pursued in a way that is completely counter to America’s interests in oil accessibility and international security. This critique is accurate in only minor degrees and misses the underlying realities. China pur- chases oil mostly from bad actors because its oil companies are not sufficiently competitive (in business acumen,financial skills,or technology) with the Western oil majors. Almost wherever the oil majors compete, therefore, the Chinese are not seriously in the game, and are limited to rela- tively marginal fields or to fields in countries where Western oil majors are barred by their own governments – such as Iran and Sudan. Even then,equity oil abroad equals in volume just 15 per-  cent ofthe oil Chinese companies imported in 2005,and ofthat only a small percentage was actu- ally shipped back to China (the rest was sold in the international oil markets). Some Chinese equity purchases abroad are driven primarily by price considerations, and these amount to rational investments (Western majors each year acquire far more equity oil for the same reason). Others,though,appear to be driven by concerns over security of supply. These amount to largely irrational investments,as that oil must still be delivered over long and highly vulnerable supply routes to the PRC. Regardless of China’s rationale,a more sophisticated understanding of oil markets would lead to the conclusion that China’s efforts are actually increasing the oil avail- able on those markets (it is pumping oil that otherwise would be untouched and thus freeing up the oil that it would otherwise have consumed from the international markets). In sum,both the United States and China are bringing incorrect analytical lenses to the oil situ- ation. China mistakes equity oil for secure oil,and thus does not appreciate the reality that much greater supply security can be obtained by becoming a sophisticated contractor in the internation- al oil markets. The United States confuses Chinese equity oil with oil “taken off the market”and fails to appreciate the extent to which investments in rogue states are forced on China by the supe- rior capabilities ofWestern companies. In this context,America’s denial ofCNOOC’s effort to pur- chase UNOCAL in 2005,based on utterly wrong allegations about every aspect ofBeijing’s inten- tions, sent a strong signal to Beijing that reinforced its underlying fear that over the long term America seeks to deny China access to vitally needed oil. China imported 40 percent ofits oil con- sumption in 2004,and consensus forecasts put that figure at 70 percent as of2020. To put this issue on a more constructive track,the

United States should consider taking steps that would both make sense in terms of America’s long-term interests and signal to China that Washington anticipates and encourages long-term cooperation with the PRC in the oil sector. Two initiatives highlight what the United States can do in terms of engaging China with multilateral regimes to assure more stable and
secure oil markets in the future. Each,moreover,would require a significant Chinese response,thus giving Beijing an opportunity to demonstrate its equal desires for long-term cooperation.

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Solvency – Coop Solves China Energy Quest EXTN (2/2)
US-Sino energy cooperation solves China’s Mid-East energy quest – solves motivation and allows for broader coop
Leverett, Brookings Middle East Policy Center Senior Fellow, and Bader, Brookings China Initiative Director, 2006
[Flynt, Jeffrey, "Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle East," Winter 05-06, Washington Quarterly]

It is imperative for the United States to develop a strategy for managing these challenges in the near term so that they do not escalate unduly in the medium-to-long term. It will not be possible for the United States to ex- clude China from the region, even if that were judged a desirable objective of U.S. policy. China will not stop its drive for energy resources in the Middle East, and Middle Eastern energy producers will not follow exhortations from Washington to cut off China. The smarter and potentially more successful U.S. policy would be to try to work with China to give it both a sense of energy security and a shared interest in a stable Middle East. For energy security, the goal of U.S. policy should be twofold. First, Washington should initiate active cooperation with Beijing to help it implement policies and programs that would reduce China’s demand for hydrocarbons. The more that China is able to use alternative sources of energy to generate power, such as nuclear energy and “clean” coal, in which U.S. companies enjoy a technological edge, the less it will need imported petroleum. In particular, the United States should
modify its export control and related policies to facilitate the transfer of nuclear tech- nology to China. China is seeking to construct up to 40 nuclear power plants by 2020. As a result of unilateral U.S. sanctions on nuclear transfers to China from 1989 to 1998, subsequent delay in negotiating a new frame- work for nuclear cooperation till 2002, and continued ambiguity by Washington in response to U.S. nuclear suppliers seeking to sell to China, the United States has effectively dealt itself out of China’s nuclear market to the benefit of France, Japan, and Russia. Helping China increase its nuclear energy supply would not only provide commercial benefits to U.S. suppliers but would also decrease, at least on the margins, China’s demand for oil im- ports. Helping China use its abundant coal resources more efficiently through the provision of clean coal technology would also decrease the por- tion of the country’s petroleum imports going toward power generation and improve China’s air quality.

In the SQ, China will only become more reliant on Middle Eastern Oil—alternative energy necessary to remedy
Phar Kim Beng, Vic Y.W. Li, consultant to Waseda University, 11/05 [“China’s Energy Dependence on the Middle East: Boon or Bane for Asian Security?,” http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/November_2005/Phar_Kim_Beng_and_Vic_Li.pdf] To be sure, China will become more reliant to the oil produced in the Middle East. But this is not surprising because other countries will also be dependent on the Middle East. Since China does not have the means to protect its supply from the Middle East, it is almost inevitable that China’s sensitivity to events in the region will increase proportionately. Hence, China is adopting market measures to secure the supply line in future. The latter, however, is bound to be a long term strategy because China cannot adopt a forceful or military profile without scaring other countries. Such an act would trigger an arms race which China wants to avoid in order to concentrate its economic resources on modernization. Hence, in the short to medium term, while it would make China more sensitive to the events in the region, China’s reliance on the Middle East will not lead to the destabilization of Asia’s security just yet. Also, China cannot be considered “vulnerable” in the way Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane has denoted in their book on complex interdependence.30 Their concept of vulnerability suggests a scenario where a problem emerges when there are completely no policy alternatives. But China does have alternatives for its energy import strategy such as reaching out to other African, and Central Asian countries, or to Russia. Aside from market-centric measures, this diversification also includes using alternative energy, such as wind, nuclear, and solar power to secure its energy supply.

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Solvency – Coop Solves China Energy Quest EXTN (2/2)
Solving China’s reliance on oil solves Chinese ties to rogue states
Lieberthal, Michigan University China Center Research Associate, William Davidson Institute China Director and Distinguished Fellow, Political Science Professor, and Herberg, National Bureau of Asian Research Asian Energy Security Director, ARCO Strategic Planning group Global Energy and Economics Director, April 2006
[Kenneth, Mikkal, "NBR Analysis," http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?ID=93a9dcaa-b9d5-4601-ac32-93f702696db5]

Energy ties to “problem” states . a major concern for the United states is the growing involvement of China’s energy sector in a
number of problem states, including iran, the sudan, Myanmar, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Cuba, and, lately, syria . iran and the sudan are clearly of the most significant concern and raise a host of problems because of the challenges iran poses to the international arena in terms of potential nuclear weapons development and the sudan’s severe human rights problems . in a number of cases, these relationships with problem states are accompanied by broader military ties and weapons sales elements that increase the problems posed for U .s . policymakers . as long as the Chinese government believes that equity oil

supplies are vital to energy security, China’s NOCs will have strong incentives to expand their investments in these “problem” states . From a commercial standpoint, these “problem” states also represent important and unique opportunities to
purchase equity reserves .

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Solvency – Incentive Key EXTN (1/3)
US INCENTIVES ARE KEY TO SPARK CHINA SHIFT AND DISPERSION OF ALT. ENERGY
Gallagher- Director of Kennedy School’s Energy Tech Innovation Policy research group November 2001 Kelly http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/sims_gallagher_workshop_report.pdf Sanhcez Environmental interests in China are direct and indirect. China.s environmental problems are severe. Seven of the ten most polluted cities in the world are located in China, a third of China.s land is now affected by acid deposition, and Chinese pollutants are suspected to be traveling across the entire Pacific Ocean to reach the Oregon coast (EIA April 2001, Wilkening et al. 2000). The costs of environmental damage in China have been estimated to be equivalent to between 4.5 and 12 percent of China.s annual GDP (US Embassy December 2000). Even if the U.S. is not directly affected by the state of environment and health in China, it must confront the fact that China is second only to the United States as a producer of climate-altering carbon dioxide, and its greenhouse gas emissions will rapidly increase as it continues to industrialize. Of course, the U.S. currently produces about a quarter of the world.s greenhouse gas emissions, and China emits only half that amount at this time. Yet, China is rapidly building a gigantic energy infrastructure and therefore accumulating expensive capital stock that will last for decades. If climate change proves to be as disruptive as many projections suggest, the world.s energy system might have to be radically altered. It would be exceedingly difficult to rapidly transform China.s energy system because its entire energy infrastructure is still mostly based on coal, one of the most carbon-intensive fuels available to humankind. The United States and China are the two largest energy-consuming countries in the world and they share some similarities. Both depend heavily on coal as a fuel for electricity production and industrial use, both have experienced regional energy shortages in recent years, both have good renewable energy and hydropower resources, and both are struggling to manage the environmental consequences of their energy consumption. But there are important differences as well. Unlike America, China has substantially improved its overall energy efficiency during the last two decades and its total energy consumption actually declined after peaking in 1997 (Sinton and Fridley 2000). China also contends with much faster growth in its demand for energy, has fewer oil and gas resources (although more exploration is incomplete in China especially for natural gas), and China lacks affordable advanced energy technologies. Historically, the two countries have had different approaches to energy management so there is much these two Pacific powers could potentially learn from each other. Cooperative energy activities could also make energy more readily available to China as it industrializes, widen market access for U.S. energy goods and services, improve Chinese and U.S. energy efficiency to reduce global competition for oil supplies, and limit both countries. emissions of air pollutants and greenhouse gases.

Status quo incentives are insufficient – substantial increases are key to business investment – this solves China’s confrontational energy policies
Collier, Chronicle Staff Writer, 7/5/2007
[Robert, "U.S. is pressured to help China curb emissions," lexis] Kelly Gallagher, director of the Energy Technology Innovation Policy Project at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, proposed a multibillion-dollar, multinational fund with a "major U.S. contribution" that would give loans and grants for construction of low-emission power plants. Currently, the Bush administration spends approximately $1 million per year in energy cooperation with China -- less than the $5.7 million spent on China last year by the Energy Foundation of San Francisco, much of which was given to scientists at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory for their work with Chinese policymakers. "Given what's at stake for us, that's an insignificant amount of money," said Jeffrey Logan, an analyst at the World Resources Institute in Washington, referring to the federal outlay.
Other experts warn, however, that there are no short-term fixes. Karen Harbert, the Energy Department's secretary for policy and international affairs, said the most widely touted technology for reducing coal generation emissions -- carbon sequestration, in which global warming gases are siphoned off and pumped underground -- will require another 30 years of research before it is ready for widespread use in China or anywhere else.

"That's way too late," replied Richard D'Amato, a former senior congressional staff member who is a Democratic appointee on the security review commission. "We have only 20 years to get this under control before the tipping point (of climate change) could occur. We need something like our effort in World War II. We need to be more aggressive." Thomas Donnelly, a China expert at the conservative American Enterprise Institute and a longtime China skeptic, said that

helping China adopt energy efficient technology could reduce its need to seek energy from governments hostile to Washington, including Iran, Sudan and Venezuela. "The degree to which the Chinese feel themselves less vulnerable in the international energy market, the less they will use energy supplies from unstable places," he said.
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Solvency – Incentive Key EXTN (2/3)
Alternative energy incentives key to solve – status quo will sustain failure
Chandler, Carnegie Endowment Senior Associate, March 2008
[William, "Breaking the Suicide Pact: US-China Cooperation on Climate Change," http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb57_chandler_final.pdf] New energy supply options are also quite similar. Importing low-carbon natural gas is a relatively simple approach that over the next two or three decades could help both nations meet their emission reduction goals. Gas contains only half the carbon content of coal, and it remains affordable. Nuclear power costs about the same as hydroelectric power in both countries but is twice as expensive as coal-fired power. Beyond economics, the key question for nuclear advocates is how nations can secure the plutonium —fuel for nuclear weapons— unavoidably produced by commercial power reactors. For coal advocates, carbon capture and sequestration seems to provide a technical solution that nations can explore for the long term. But budget pressures recently led to the cancellation of U.S. government support for PowerGen, the largest demonstration project of this technology.

The overwhelming conclusion from numerous technical and sectoral analyses is that the potential for energy-efficiency intervention in the U.S. and Chinese economies is very large and growing. The research literature, anecdotal evidence, case studies, and direct experience all suggest that this potential could be captured profitably—but probably will not be without intervention. Saving energy is simply no one’s priority, even when it saves them money. Fiscal and financial incentives can help elevate energy saving in indus- try, but regulatory policy seems to work better for households. The challenge for policy makers is to develop strategies that help the market converge on the most cost-competitive technologies. This means that U.S.–China cooperation should focus on encouraging feasible market-based technologies and on removing barriers to their widespread deployment.

US is key to improve China’s energy security
Lieberthal, Michigan University China Center Research Associate, William Davidson Institute China Director and Distinguished Fellow, Political Science Professor, and Herberg, National Bureau of Asian Research Asian Energy Security Director, ARCO Strategic Planning group Global Energy and Economics Director, April 2006
[Kenneth, Mikkal, "NBR Analysis," http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?ID=93a9dcaa-b9d5-4601-ac32-93f702696db5] Fourth, the United states needs to invigorate its ongoing efforts to engage China on such issues as accelerating domestic energy market reform, improving efficiency, reducing demand growth, and developing and diffusing new energy technology (particularly transportation technology) . These efforts have been going on for many years without having had

much impact on China’s energy policies and development . Due to the growing influence of those advocating market reform and improved efficiency in China’s energy bureaucracy, the United states may have greater opportunities in the future to accelerate movement in this direction .

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Solvency – Incentive Key EXTN (3/3)
Cooperation is key to spark action – absent US involvement developing countries will continue inaction
Pataki, Former NY Governor, Climate Change and Energy expert, Vilsack, Former Iowa Governor, Renewable energy expert, Levi, CFR Energy and Environment Senior Fellow, Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Fellow, and Victor, Standord Law School Professor, Energy Law, regulation and political economy expert, June 2008
[George, Thomas, Michael, David, “Confronting Climate Change," Concil on Foreign Relations Task Force] Understanding Dangerous Climate Change  The most obvious incentive for reducing emissions is a desire to avoid dangerous climate change. Yet for essentially all major developing countries, this has proven an insufficient reason to tackle emissions directly. Each of the developing countries examined here invests in climate science, notably in assessments of the impacts of climate change on its own territory, though to differing degrees. Those studies are, for example, revealing that China is vulnerable in many ways, including along its long coastline (where most of its economic production is concentrated), in agricultural areas, and in its already stretched water supplies. The others have done far less to assess the potential impacts of climate change on themselves. The Task Force finds that cooperation with these countries in assessing their vulnerability to climate change, while far from enough alone to induce them to take steps to control their emissions, would help steer them in that direction at essentially no cost to the United States, and recommends a concerted effort on this front. 

Incentives are key to solve developing countries CO2 production
Pataki, Former NY Governor, Climate Change and Energy expert, Vilsack, Former Iowa Governor, Renewable energy expert, Levi, CFR Energy and Environment Senior Fellow, Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Fellow, and Victor, Standord Law School Professor, Energy Law, regulation and political economy expert, June 2008
[George, Thomas, Michael, David, “Confronting Climate Change," Concil on Foreign Relations Task Force] The major developing countries will be much harder to address than the major developed countries, yet they are at least equally, and eventually will be much more, important. Burning coal for power and industry, the single largest contributor to China’s and India’s greenhouse gas emissions, is anchored in strong economic and security fundamentals. Both countries need increasingly large amounts of energy to fuel their rapid economic growth, and coal is cheaper and more readily available than other fuels. While some factors mitigate against coal’s dominance—notably an interest in cutting local air pollution as well as in diversifying energy supply— unseating coal from its position is likely to be impossible. A similar pattern holds for oil use, most prominently in transportation but also, significantly, in heating and other applications. Brazil’s and Indonesia’s emissions come principally from defores- tation. Economics is a primary driver, with cleared forests providing income through timber sales as well as by opening land for livestock pasture and agriculture.51 This is exacerbated by ambiguous property rights and poor enforcement of existing rules. As in the case of coal and oil, some countervailing incentives exist—illegal deforestation costs governments taxmoney, while accidental forest fires wipeout valuefor all. Without improved policies, deforestation is unlikely to significantly abate. In some respects, the current boominenergy prices and growing concerns about energy security have made matters worse by creating incentives to put lands into biofuels production, which can indirectly amplify pressure to destroy natu- ral forests. The Task Force finds that, absent new incentives, emissions from coal and oil in China and India will rise, and those from deforestation in Brazil and Indonesia will not drop, despite the existence of some countervailing factors. The Task Force finds, though, that each activity has drivers— primarily but not exclusively economic—that foreign governments can in principle affect in ways that would lead to lower emissions. 

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Solvency – AT: Vagueness
Can’t predetermine what type of alternative energy to cooperate on – each country and region has unique needs and capabilities
Ferry, Suffolk University Law Professor, Harvard Law School Visiting Professor, 2007
[Steven, THE NEW POWER GENERATION: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ELECTRICITY INNOVATION: COLLOQUIUM ARTICLE: WHY ELECTRICITY MATTERS, DEVELOPING NATIONS MATTER, AND ASIA MATTERS MOST OF ALL," 15 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 113] While many nations - particularly developing nations - have no significant reserves of oil, coal or natural gas, every nation has solar energy in some form - sunlight, wind, ocean wave power, etc. Every nation has some indigenous renewable energy resource, allowing for greater energy independence and providing a source for domestic economic development. While the commercial and national interests involved in fossil fuel are extremely concentrated, solar energy interests and flows are much more decentralized and diverse.

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AT: Status Quo Solves – AT: Coop Now
1. Cooperation fails in the status quo – meetings are limited to dialogue, and even dialogue is directionless. Absent concrete action, Chinese energy consumption and US-Sino competition over limited resources will remain unchanged – That’s 1AC Wallis and Daojiong 2. Plan incentive is key – the status quo is a limited instance of action, the plan fosters an entire new market for alternative energy in China. This is the key lever to solve warming and change threat perceptions – that’s 1AC McDonough and Ogden 3. US-Sino energy meetings are ineffective and directionless – the plan is key
Brinsley and Yanping, Bloomberg staff writer, 6/17/2008
[John and Li, "Paulson's China Talks Shift to Energy as Yuan Gains (Update4)," http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=afxoPypxvwdQ&refer=home]

Two former U.S. trade representatives, Charlene Barshefsky and Mickey Kantor, who served under President Bill Clinton, criticized today the talks as unwieldy and ineffective. ``You can't put 16 people in a room with an agenda that has any reality to it,'' Kantor said at a seminar in Beijing, urging
narrower talks by smaller groups.

The U.S. ``has no idea what it wants,'' Barshefsky said. Negotiations on an investment treaty follow 41 such deals with other countries, though none with an economy that is close to the size of China's.
4. CURRENT U.S. INVESTMENT IN CHINESE ECONOMY LACKS INTREST IN ENVIRONMETAL CONSEQUENCES. Gallagher- Director of Kennedy School’s Energy Tech Innovation Policy research group November 2001 Kelly http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/sims_gallagher_workshop_report.pdf Sanhcez Several analyses indicate that the U.S. technologies introduced into China are typically more advanced and efficient than what the Chinese would have used otherwise. Yet, from the data available, it is clear that much of the U.S. investment has been in coal projects. Although this is reasonable and predicable because coal is China.s dominant fuel, coal production and consumption produces the most pollution of all available fuels. It was not until the late 1990s that the U.S. government and the development banks made a concerted effort to factor environmental concerns into their planning and activities despite the fact that the environmental consequences of energy consumption were well understood before then. None of the U.S. actors have seriously tried to address the threat of climate change as it relates to U.S. or Chinese energy development. Climate change does not appear to be influencing private sector behavior in China at all. In contrast, the U.S. government and the development banks have recognized the challenge and begun to address it, albeit fairly weakly. Compared with the potential scale of the climate change problem, the United States. inability to address climate change through energy cooperation with China is a significant shortcoming. In general, it seems that the environment presents some big hurdles, but also opportunities, for U.S. engagement with China. During Premier Zhu Rongji.s last visit to the United States, he clarified Chinese needs for clean energy methods and technologies. He stated, .So now we need to restructure our economy and to use more natural gas and other clean energy and oil. I think the United States has developed their advanced technology in this regard and we are fully prepared to cooperate with the United States. (Zhu 1999).

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AT: Status Quo Solves – AT: China Solve Now
1. Chinese action is fails – local implementation of mandates fails. Party cadres sacrifice environment goals for economic growth. A new surge of tech is key to make the shift, and solve local circumvention – that’s 1AC Mattis. 2. Does not solve US action – The US is the largest GHG emitter, action is key to solve warming – that’s 1AC Chandler 3. Status quo does not solve relations – absent US action, mutual threat perceptions will be sustained, making conflict inevitable – that’s 1AC Lieberthal and Zweig. 4. Chinese tech is insufficient to solve – new tech is key to cause shift away from coal
Pel, Carnegie Endowment China Programme Director, 5/13/2006
[Minxin, "China's Big Energy Dilemma," http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18315&prog=zch,zgp&proj=zec]

China's demand for energy has risen at an explosive pace. Between 1980 and 2004, the size of the Chinese economy
increased seven times; but thanks to more efficient use of energy, its total energy consumption merely doubled. Still, with China poised to quadruple its gross domestic product by 2020, the country's consumption of energy is expected to at least double

again, assuming further efficiency gains in energy use.

And that poses three immense challenges: ensuring adequate supply, coping with the environmental impact and ensuring secure access. Fortunately, China has huge reserves of coal, which provide 65 per pent of energy today. It is not likely to run out of coal for another two decades at least. Unfortunately, if China burns 2.5 trillion tonnes of coal by 2020 (compared with about two trillion tonnes per year now), the impact on the environment would be severe. To lessen the environmental damage, China has announced plans to diversify its sources of energy. For example, Beijing intends to build more nuclear power plants, and has recently signed an agreement with Australia to gain access to that country's uranium supplies. Natural gas, a cleaner form of energy, is expected to account for 8 per cent of China's primary energy supplies However, even after factoring in alternative fuels, coal will probably still remain the most important source of energy in 2020, accounting for about 60 per cent of China's total usage. Unless China develops or obtains new technologies that can drastically reduce the greenhouse gases emitted from coal-burning, the current diversification strategy will reduce environmental damage only very modestly. in 15 years' time, up from 2 per cent today.

5. Weak oil ministry dooms domestic energy policies – entrenched interests overwhelm reforms
International Crisis Group, Belgium Based Think Tank, June 2008
[China's Thirst for Oil," http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5478&l=1] However, the “super ministries” plan that was put forward at the NPC in March 2008 stopped short of reviving an energy ministry. Authority was instead di- vided between a new National Energy Commission responsible for developing strategies and an expanded Energy Bureau under the central planning agency to control administration and oversight.45 The plan is widely seen as a political compromise shaped by op- position from energy companies. A State Council statement said the restructuring was “aimed at resolv- ing long-term problems and contradictions as China’s economy grows”, but energy experts doubt that there will be much improvement in government coordina- tion.46 It is possible that the bodies could eventually become a full ministry, but not for several years.47 Only a strong ministry would be able to manage China’s dynamic energy industries effectively. The institution’s effectiveness would depend on address- ing the issues that led to the failure and dissolution of the previous energy ministry. It would require the au- thority, staffing, and financial resources to manage energy security policy and reconcile competing inter- ests within the vast government bureaucracy. It would also need to be well staffed; have access to quality data to support decisions and policies; possess the ability to integrate energy demand, supply and security issues; and enjoy the necessary standing to inter- act with other ministerial-level agencies on an equal level.48

In addition to the authority to stand up to entrenched interests of oil and coal companies, a new energy ministry must be structured to allow for representa- tion of the interests of all stakeholders, including those with weak institutional
power, such as energy consumers and environmental protection agencies.49 It would need to allow the government to improve its own expertise, so that it can be a competent and im- partial rule-maker, rather than depend on advice from companies. An

adviser to government officials in planning the restructuring has noted that real change in the way the Chinese government operates requires deeper political reforms to expose officials to greater public accountability.50
Government officials will find that they can improve their “governing capability through greater policymaking transparency and a sys- tem of policymaking checks and balances, as well as public debate during the policymaking process”.51 SDI 2008

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AT: Status Quo Solves – AT: China Solve Now EXTN (1/2)
Chinese action fails – empirically insufficient
Ogden, Center for American Progress National Security and International Policy Senior Policy Analyst, and Rogier, Center for American Progress Researcher, 5/2/2008
[Peter, Matt, "Climate Change Challenges Cannot Be Met Without Sino-U.S. Cooperation," http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/05/china_climate.html] According to a Chinese government-run news agency, the commission’s mandate is “to strengthen the government management on the energy sector.” Set up under the auspices of the National Development and Reform Commission, China’s main energy and environmental planning body, the National Energy Commission will integrate the functions of a previous government energy body and will promote nuclear energy, alternative fuels, and environmental conservation. China’s leaders also directed the National People’s Congress to upgrade the State Environmental Protection Administration to full ministry status and rename it the Ministry of Environmental Protection. The new title and mandate for the 33-year-old agency requires it to “prevent and control environmental pollution, protect nature and ecology, supervise nuclear safety, safeguard public health and environmental safety, and promote the harmony between man and nature.” The agency issues an annual report on the state of the environment in China and is responsible for drafting all environmental laws and monitoring their implementation. Of course, this is the same agency that under a variety of previous names failed to rein in the country’s billowing pollution. One of China’s biggest energy and environmental failures has been its inability to ensure that its national policies are properly implemented by local party officials whose primary concern is meeting immediate economic growth targets. Significantly, however, the vice-minister of the newly upgraded MEP, Pan Yue, is one of China’s most famous environmental activists. In 2005, Pan surprised the local and provincial authorities and the Chinese people when he ordered projects worth $14 billion dollars in investments shut down because they failed to file proper environmental-impact statements.

Chinese local-national tensions dooms Chinese energy mandates
International Crisis Group, Belgium Based Think Tank, June 2008
[China's Thirst for Oil," http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5478&l=1] 3. Local-national tensions

Tensions between the central and local governments are another obstacle to the effective implementation of energy policies. The central government has diffi- culty enforcing policies due to a disconnect with the provinces. This has always been a critical issue in Chinese politics – the emperor’s powers stopped at the village gate.62 While Beijing sets directions for na- tional policy, local governments are tasked with im- plementation. Unfortunately, the draft energy law does not address how to reduce this tension. It pro- vides that the State Council holds primary authority over the
energy system but becomes vaguer when re- ferring to “other related departments under the State Council” executing tasks “within their responsibili- ties”. Furthermore, many articles task “all levels” or “various levels” of the government. These

provisions add up to a confusing picture that is likely to continue to be characterised by inefficiency and overlap, even
while recognising that decentralisation and adaptation to local conditions are necessary for a large and di- verse country. Central-local tensions manifest themselves, for exam- ple, in the issue of conservation. President Hu pro- moted a “conservation culture” of reduced carbon emissions, as well as a sustainable balance between economic growth and environmental preservation in his report to the Party Congress in October 2007.63 However, because the performance of provincial gov- ernment officials – and their promotion – has been measured by economic growth, many local govern- ments have ignored directives on energy efficiency. In July 2006, the NDRC noted that some local govern- ments were turning a “blind eye” to planned reductions in energy

consuming sectors and urged the govern- ment to address the link between increased economic output and promotions.64 Having recognised that en- ergy efficiency and the environment are often sacri- ficed for growth, the central
government has begun to link career prospects to compliance with directives on energy conservation and the reduction of emissions.65 At the same time, however, policies at the central government level also contradict a strict conservation message, as seen in the February 2008 announcement of subsidies for products such as refrigerators, as part of a campaign to boost rural consumption.66

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AT: Status Quo Solves – AT: China Solve Now EXTN (2/2)
Chinese climate action is insufficient – more reform is needed
Ogden, Center for American Progress National Security and International Policy Senior Policy Analyst, and Rogier, Center for American Progress Researcher, 5/2/2008
[Peter, Matt, "Climate Change Challenges Cannot Be Met Without Sino-U.S. Cooperation," http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/05/china_climate.html]

Creating a new Energy Commission and a more-empowered MEP are signals that China is attempting to come to terms with its intertwined energy and environmental challenges, but more reform is needed. Many analysts in the United States,
as well as some in China, believe that the Energy Commission itself ought to have been upgraded to ministry status and been endowed with more power to enforce compliance at the local level.

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AT: Status Quo Solves – AT: No Pollution Now
China’s short term action is insufficient to solve China’s environmental crisis
Plumer, The New Republic Assistant Editor, 7/9/2008
[Bradford, "Cultural Devolution," http://www.tnr.com/story_print.html?id=9ef5103b-15cf-4bd6-b7a1-34940b9edeca]

Even if the Chinese government does spruce up Beijing in time for the 2008 Olympics, the environmental situation in China remains horrifying. Toxic discharge from factories is turning rivers bright red or even black. Water shortages and rampant
desertification are threatening to force tens of millions off their land. Sixteen of the 20 dirtiest cities in the world are in China. And, while few would begrudge China the right to follow in the West's footsteps and pollute in the service of getting richer, studies have found that contamination in the air and water now costs China up to 10 percent of GDP each year, destroying crops and forests and sending hundreds of thousands to the hospital with respiratory diseases or worse. A recent World Bank study estimated that pollution causes some 750,000 premature deaths in China each year. Even scarier for the Communist Party is the prospect of social turmoil: In 2006, China saw 60,000 pollution-related "incidents," a number of them violent.

China increasing emissions—radical increase in coal use
Energy Information Admininstration, Official Energy Statistics from the US Government, June 08 [“International Energy outlook 2008,” http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/highlights.html] In the absence of national policies and/or binding international agreements that would limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions, world coal consumption is projected to increase from 123 quadrillion Btu in 2005 to 202 quadrillion Btu in 2030, at an average annual rate of 2.0 percent. Coal’s share of world energy use has increased sharply over the past few years, largely because of strong increases in coal use in China, which has nearly doubled since 2000 and is poised to increase strongly in the future. With its large domestic base of coal resources and continuing strong economic growth, China alone accounts for 71 percent of the increase in world coal consumption in the IEO2008 reference case. The United States and India—both of which also have extensive domestic coal resources—each account for 9 percent of the world increase.

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AT: Status Quo Solves – AT: Coop Inevitable
The energy crisis is insufficient to solve US-Sino energy coop
Daojiong, Renmin University (Bejing) International Studies Professor, Fall 2007
[Zha, "Promoting energy partnership in bejing and washington," the washington quarterly] Chinese-U.S. energy relations are full of ironies. For the past 30 years, China and the United States have in reality gained from each other’s energy poli- cies. China has benefited from the security that U.S. “hegemony” has wield- ed in stabilizing volatile spots of the energy-producing world. Meanwhile, the U.S. economy has on the whole benefited from a steady flow of cheaply made exports from China. Because a sufficient energy supply is crucial to meeting trade demands, the United States and China, as the largest and third-largest trading nations in the world, respectively, must treat energy as a key factor in economic interdependence. Energy considerations are rooted primar- ily in domestic economic and social develop- ment. Chinese public opinion, reflected in media reports and commentary, questions why consumer oil prices in China fail to change by the margins as world crude oil prices fluctu- ate. Yet, few appreciate the benefits that high oil prices can bring to controlling air pollution in China or reducing the grinding traffic jams that are now routine in major cities. In the United States, conversely, although energy independence has been a 30-year political goal, voters continually shun politicians who are seen as failing to tame prices at the gas station. Until U.S. consumers start to control their con- sumption of oil, however, reducing dependence on foreign supply is an unat- tainable goal. Like China, the U.S. government has every reason to encourage investment in alternate forms of energy to reduce oil dependence. Thus, although higher energy prices are theoretically conducive to meeting policy goals of conservation and reduction in dependence on foreign sources of supply, domestic political dynamics discourage both governments from sup- porting any increase in what end users have to pay for energy consumption. The politically low-risk option when prices rise is to blame a major competitor in the world energy market for the domestic woes. The second irony is that, despite mutual suspicions, an increase in real wage levels for the mass majority of the labor force is essential for managing energy use in both countries. Labor-intensive, low-wage manufacturing has been a key contributor to China’s path of growth to date. Low wages, however, place a limit on consumers’ financial capacity to afford increases in energy prices and are not conducive to the introduction of newer, usually more expensive sources of energy. In several cities in China, natural gas facilities for household use have been installed and gas supplied, but consumers choose instead to re- turn to their coal stove because the costs for using gas to meet daily household needs are several times higher than coal.15 Likewise, slow rises or even stagna- tions in real U.S. wage levels in recent years have inhibited market support for energy innovations leading to reductions in oil consumption. Meaningful con- servation leading to a reduced reliance on energy imports can only take place when consumers are willing to pay the added costs. For both governments,  therefore, a significant part of managing energy security is effectively enabling demand for alternative energy sources in both countries to grow. The third irony is that because China and the United States have a high level of dependence on energy imports, particularly oil, they are exposed to the same risks of the international oil markets. As dependent consumers, China and the United States have to choose between political preference and market pragmatism when faced with an exporting country practicing resource nationalism.16 An exporting government is in a prime position to exploit po- litical differences between a set of big powers by threatening to curtail exports to one and offering to divert them to another. 

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AT: Incentive Fails
1. Incentives solve – sparks business interest in the Chinese market and causes key tech transfers to solve a Chinese shift – Even if businesses are afraid of IPR violations they still share better-thanavailable tech, which is sufficient to solve the case– that’s 1AC Daojiong 2. Plan incentive solves – increase financing, extending loan time, and allowing partnerships solves core business concerns. Even if there are other objections, the plan overwhelms them – that’s 1AC Ogden 3. Case solves relations – sends a signal of cooperation, that changes mutual perceptions, even if businesses don’t respond.

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Solvency Mechanism – R&D
US promotion of R&D cooperation with China sparks massive innovations that solve global climate change
Pataki, Former NY Governor, Climate Change and Energy expert, Vilsack, Former Iowa Governor, Renewable energy expert, Levi, CFR Energy and Environment Senior Fellow, Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Fellow, and Victor, Standord Law School Professor, Energy Law, regulation and political economy expert, June 2008
[George, Thomas, Michael, David, “Confronting Climate Change," Concil on Foreign Relations Task Force] International Cooperation in Research, Development, and Demonstration 

International cooperation on research, development, and demonstration of climate-friendly technologies addresses important gaps in national- level efforts. Just as public-sector investment in RD&D is made necessary by the fact that firms cannot fully capture the benefits of their own early-stage investments, so international cooperation addresses the fact that RD&D funded by one country will benefit others. Intensive international RD&D cooperation—among advanced industrial coun- tries as well as with major developing-country emitters—can dramati- cally ease the task of mitigating emissions by speeding the development of technologies that would reduce the costs to developing countries of cutting their emissions. Eventually, all nations might be expected to contribute to an international RD&D program. However, only a small number of nations account for the vast majority of energy-related research—these countries include all of the largest emitters from energy use—and a program that begins with them would achieve most of the benefit of a concerted global approach.
Particular focus will be needed for the aspects of international tech- nology cooperation that will be most costly and where the capabilities of even the large emitting countries are mismatched. That means an emphasis on technology demonstration programs. Carbon capture and sequestration, for example, is likely to be developed primarily by techno- logically advanced countries, but will need to be widely deployed in the developing world. Demonstrating the feasibility of CCS in Norway or Canada does not prove its viability in China or India, where local conditions, such as geologies and regulations, are different. International cooperation on demonstration, in this case and in others, is the only way to bridge this gap. Successful efforts in these areas can also take advantage of nascent centers of technological expertise in the emerging countries. For example, one of China’s power generation companies is already developing many elements of a carbon capture system, and some of India’s power companies are keen to deploy more efficient advanced power plants. An international technology demonstration

program would be most productive if it concentrated its efforts in areas such as these where doors are already open and where there are competent technological partners with local knowledge that are best able to work in concert with an international program. In all cases, the United States will need to balance an interest in promoting its own firms with the need to get others to engage wholeheartedly in cooperation. If the United States insists on too large a role for its own companies in cooperative
projects, at the expense of its partners, those partners may simply focus their collaborative efforts on others. China, for example, might choose to cooperate with Europe rather than with the United States. If that happens, both the United States and U.S. firms will lose out. The United States will also need to be careful to ensure that its firms’ intellectual property is protected in any venture.  The Task Force finds that international cooperation on RD&D holds the promise of leading to new technology developments more quickly and more cost- effectively than national-level efforts, in turn creating incentives for developing countries to reduce emissions. Demonstration projects in collaboration with develop- ing countries, in particular, can have the dual effect of promoting technology diffusion and positioning U.S. exporters advantageously. The Task Force accord- ingly recommends that the United States aggressively pursue opportunities for RD&D cooperation, with a particular emphasis on demonstration projects in developing countries, notably in carbon capture and sequestration, while being mindful of intellectual property concerns. 

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Solvency Mechanism – Technical Cooperation (1/2)
Technical assistance
Plumer, The New Republic Assistant Editor, 7/9/2008
[Bradford, "Cultural Devolution," http://www.tnr.com/story_print.html?id=9ef5103b-15cf-4bd6-b7a1-34940b9edeca]

The main obstacle is not Beijing's refusal to take green issues seriously. It's that the central government has essentially lost the ability to control its provinces and regulate its markets. Since the 1980s, after Deng Xiaoping declared that "To get rich is glorious," China has granted its provinces a large measure of autonomy to pursue that goal. State-owned enterprises have been sold off, markets deregulated, and local officials given wide leeway to stimulate their regional economies. Today, provincial officials rely on tax revenue (or even bribes) from local companies, and they sometimes own or have a personal stake in the businesses they oversee. But the same decentralized set-up that helped produce China's extraordinary economic growth has now made it difficult for Beijing to enforce rules issued from on high.
In the United States, state and federal agencies work together to enforce environmental laws. In China, however, provincial officials tend to focus on protecting their industries, and local regulatory agencies are on the payroll of the provinces, rather than the national government. Local officials determine matters like how emissions credits are doled out, often without clear rules from above. Many of the regulatory agencies, meanwhile, are bare-bones operations, especially inland. "You might have only three regulators for an area the size of Idaho," says Charles McElwee, an environmental lawyer based in Shanghai. "There could be factories going up that they're not even aware of." (All told, China's national environmental ministry has a few hundred employees, compared with more than 18,000 for the U.S. EPA.) As a result, green laws are rarely followed. One recent survey of 509 cities, for instance, found that 77 percent of sewage went untreated, as polluters simply ignored China's clean-water laws. Beijing is aware of this local lawlessness, but has had little success handling it. "China used to send in swat teams from the central government," says Barbara Finamore, who directs the Natural Resources Defense Council's (NRDC) China program. "I've seen these campaigns going on for twenty years-- they'll come in, shut down some factories, and, when they leave, they'll open up again." More recently, though, Beijing has begun tying performance evaluations for local officials to how well they meet their energy conservation goals. And, under a new green-finance effort, bank loans are being linked to environmental performance. Still, even these attempts to rein in the provinces aren't enough. So, at the same time, Beijing is grudgingly permitting China's burgeoning green NGO movement to play a role. After all, part of what allows environmental rules to work in

the United States is the fact that green groups can monitor polluters for violations of the law and either publicize the problem or file lawsuits. Since the early '90s, China has slowly begun giving green nonprofits, both domestic and international, a freer hand to expose polluting companies and put pressure on local regulatory agencies. After an illegal
battery dump in a fishery in An Hui Province, Green An Hui, a small Chinese nonprofit with seed-money from U.S.-based Pacific Environment, drew press attention to the event, shaming local officials into disposing of the waste properly. But NGOs in China can only do so much: China's donation laws hamper their ability to raise money; and there are still unspoken limits on how freely they can speak out. "It's fine to criticize a hydropower dam on the basis of its ecological impact," says Wen Bo, a prominent green activist. "But you can't say particular officials were corrupted--then you would be in trouble." Even so, the international community would be wise to follow the lead of these nonprofits. Right now, governments spend a lot of time imploring Beijing to take steps to curb its pollution. They might get further, however, by helping the central government implement the laws it's already passed. Finamore points out, for instance, that if China enforced all the building codes it has on the books, it could cut its energy use dramatically. NRDC is training Chinese building inspectors, who often don't understand the codes, and helping set up independent certifiers to act as watchdogs. But too many international green groups, Wen notes, avoid this hands-on approach, instead staying in Beijing, writing papers and trying to influence national policy. Nor have governments really stepped in on a local level, either. In 2005, Beijing invited officials from California to persuade Jiangsu's provincial government that it could save money by conserving energy rather than by building new coal-fired plants. Since then, other provinces have expressed interest in similar partnerships, yet Congress has given such efforts only sporadic attention. Offering technical advice on, say, energy efficiency may sound perversely trivial in the face of the runaway destruction of the Chinese landscape. But, for now, steps like these may be the best remedy China could receive for its ailing

environment--at least until the Chinese public begins demanding greener growth and even more robust protection.

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Solvency Mechanism – Technical Cooperation (2/2)
MECHANISM - Technical cooperation
Pataki, Former NY Governor, Climate Change and Energy expert, Vilsack, Former Iowa Governor, Renewable energy expert, Levi, CFR Energy and Environment Senior Fellow, Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Fellow, and Victor, Standord Law School Professor, Energy Law, regulation and political economy expert, June 2008
[George, Thomas, Michael, David, “Confronting Climate Change," Concil on Foreign Relations Task Force] Technical Cooperation  In perhaps the simplest direct approach to effecting emissions reductions, advanced industrial states would work with developingcountry govern- ments and firms to identify and exploit negative-cost opportunities to reduce emissions. Cooperation tends naturally, though not exclusively, to focus on improving efficiency in energy use. Efforts can include identifying opportunities for increased efficiency, sharing best practices, helping design regulatory codes, and assisting in building the capacity to enforce them. Such initiatives cost the United States little and can have large payoffs in reduced emissions. The United States and others already work with China and India in these areas. In particular, Japan and China are already engaged in extensive cooperation. Heavy industry can also benefit from technical cooperation in improving energy efficiency. This could be politically controversial in the United States, since it would reduce production costs for firms that compete with U.S. companies. It might also, however, reduce costs for American consumers of some imported goods. Technical cooperation can also contribute to reducing the rate of deforestation. Cooperation on strategies to improve forest management can help governments improve enforcement of forest policies, remove perverse incentives that encourage deforestation, and make forests more productive. Those outcomes can deliver large benefits beyond lowering the emissions that cause climate change. Better management would include improved systems for remote sensing, fire detection and suppres- sion systems, and, where relevant, improved surveillance and management of timber operations. Stronger property rights would also create incentives for sustainable forestry, which could moderate CO2 emissions, and the United States and others could assist with sharing best practices and with legal advice. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), for example, has worked with Indonesia, Brazil, and nations of the Congo Basin, among others, on a variety of efforts to stem deforestation.52 Avoiding deforestation on a scale large enough to con-tribute meaningfully to climate change mitigation, though, would likely require direct payments for avoiding deforestation that would tilt the economic balance. (Options for financial support are discussed later in this chapter.) Weak property rights and enforcement, though, could undermine any scheme built on such payments; technical cooperation is thus an essential component of any strategy to address forests.  The Task Force finds that technical cooperation, typically and most naturally conducted on a bilateral or regional basis, is too often overlooked or denigrated by policymakers focused on ‘‘high diplomacy.’’ Technical cooperation can prompt large reductions in developing-country emissions at a low direct cost to the United States and its partners, and the Task Force recommends aggressive efforts on this front. Since the emissions reductions resulting from much of that cooperation also reduce energy or other costs, it is likely to be welcomed. Those changes in costs, however, are generally small enough as to not raise competitiveness concerns for U.S. firms. 

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Iran Add-On
( ). Iran A. Chinese energy consumption dooms effective action against Iran – relies on Iranian oil
Leverett, Brookings Middle East Policy Center Senior Fellow, and Bader, Brookings China Initiative Director, 2006
[Flynt, Jeffrey, "Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle East," Winter 05-06, Washington Quarterly]

The Chinese drive for energy is already a source of tension in bilateral rela- tions. China’s efforts to establish influence with Middle Eastern energy pro- ducers have thwarted U.S. efforts to impose sanctions on Sudan over the Darfur genocide and are currently complicating Washington’s attempts to persuade the IAEA to refer Iran to the Security Council for violating its nonproliferation obligations. Over time, China’s engagement in the region could, at least theoretically, provide Iran strategic backing for a foreign policy posture that would eschew engagement with the West and challenge Western interests more assertively.
Chinese investments in Iran’s oil and gas sectors are exceeding the limits set to trigger secondary sanctions under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), enacted in 1996 and renewed in 2001, in part to impose U.S. sanc- tions on foreign companies that engage in specified economic transactions with Iran. Washington’s unilateral sanctions keep U.S. companies from oper- ating in Iran, and the implicit threat of secondary U.S. sanctions under ILSA and an informal understanding reached through high-level U.S.-Euro- pean consultations late in President Bill Clinton’s second term has had a re- straining effect on European energy investment in Iran. Now, Chinese companies are moving to fill the vacuum, in the process complicating the Bush administration’s efforts to isolate Tehran economically and pressure it for its nuclear activities. The prospect that Chinese companies would move into the development of Iran’s Azadegan oil and gas fields contributed to Japan’s 2004 decision to sign a $2.5 billion deal with Tehran to develop part of these fields. The Bush administration had specifically worked with Euro-

pean allies to obtain assurances that European companies would not take over the project from Japan but failed to anticipate the possibility of Chi- nese-Iranian collaboration.

B. A nuclear Iran ensures regional proliferation, a multiparty arms race, and nuclear war
Allison, Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs director, 3-18-06
[Graham, "The Nightmare This Time," The Boston Globe, l/n]

If Iran crosses its nuclear finish line, a Middle Eastern cascade of new nuclear weapons states could produce the first multiparty nuclear arms race, far more volatile than the Cold War competition between the US and USSR. Given Egypt's historic role as the leader of the Arab Middle East, the prospects of it living unarmed alongside a nuclear Persia are very low. The International Atomic Energy Agency's reports of clandestine nuclear experiments hint that Cairo may have considered this possibility. Were Saudi Arabia to buy a dozen nuclear warheads that could be mated to the Chinese medium-range ballistic missiles it purchased secretly in the 1980s, few in the American intelligence community would be surprised. Given its role as the major financier of Pakistan's clandestine nuclear program in the 1980s, it is not out of the question that Riyadh and Islamabad have made secret arrangements for this contingency. In 1962, bilateral competition between the US and the Soviet Union led to the Cuban missile crisis, which historians now call "the most dangerous moment in human history." After the crisis, President Kennedy estimated the likelihood of nuclear war as "between 1 in 3 and even." A multiparty nuclear arms race in the Middle East would be like playing Russian roulette with five bullets in a six-chamber revolver-dramatically increasing the likelihood of a regional nuclear war.

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Iran Add-On – Link EXTN (1/2)
China-Iran energy partnership puts China in Iran’s pocket
Leverett, Brookings Middle East Policy Center Senior Fellow, and Bader, Brookings China Initiative Director, 2006
[Flynt, Jeffrey, "Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle East," Winter 05-06, Washington Quarterly] China’s energy-driven initiatives in the Middle East have been generally well received in the region. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have responded positively to Chinese overtures. For Iran, the political and strategic advan- tages of cultivating closer ties to China seem obvious. As Tehran comes un- der increased international pressure over its nuclear activities, the support of a permanent member both of the UN Security Council and the Interna- tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors provides much needed international political cover. Given China’s history of supplying arms and sensitive military technology to Iran, Tehran almost certainly calculates that Beijing might play such a role again. Under new Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who seems to disdain Europe almost as much as the United States and has spoken openly about the imperative for Iran to forge strategic alliances with strong, non-Western countries such as China, the Chinese “option” is likely to become even more attractive.26 Tehran sees China’s support for watering down an IAEA resolution referring Iran’s

nuclear program to the UN Security Council and China’s abstention on the final weakened resolution as an early benefit. Just as Chinese oil companies sometimes pay market premium for access to hydrocarbon resources, Iranian officials seem willing to pay their own premiums for better relations with China. Although China is a large market, deals with Chinese oil
companies currently do little to help Iran obtain the advanced exploration and production technologies needed for its own upstream sector. Western oil industry executives familiar with negotiations be- tween Iran and foreign oil companies say that Chinese companies, in contrast to their Western counterparts, come to the bargaining table with experience and technical capabilities that, for the most part, the NIOC al- ready has.27 The oil and gas deals that Iran has concluded with China have

a distinctly strategic quality to them; they seem intended to ensure access to an important export market and bolster a developing political relationship rather than to bring about the transfer of civilian technologies or infusions of capital.

China will not fold – absent a change in energy calculations, it will not support action against Iran
Shen, Fudan University (Shanghai) International Studies Executive Dean, American Studies Center Deputy Director, Professor, Spring 2006
[Dingli, "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Test China's Wisdom," Washington Quarterly]

If Iran continues to refuse to implement existing and future IAEA resolutions demanding that it clarify its nuclear history, China would be tested. Beijing’s ability to block Security Council debate or action would become increasingly difficult if Iran
continues its lack of compliance with the IAEA mandate. China possibly would be forced to abandon Iran in its defense of its claimed rights. Nevertheless, even though nuclear proliferation has become an increas- ingly higher priority in Chinese foreign policy, Beijing likely believes that the existing international monitoring and spot- light on Iran would make it virtually inca- pable of developing any existing clandestine nuclear programs further. For this reason, because of its emphasis on peaceful meth- ods of resolving the dispute and because China’s growing energy demand forces it to value Tehran, Beijing likely would still not support a largely Western action to sanction Iran. If China is reluctant to support a West- ern sanctioning effort, it would not imply Chinese support for Iranian prolif- eration or Chinese cowardice or unwillingness to act in the face of a nuclear threat. Rather, it would result from Beijing’s philosophy of peaceful conflict resolution coupled with its need for energy cooperation.

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Iran Add-On – Link EXTN (2/2)
Chinese energy policy strengthens Iran and Venezuela/Chavez
Zweig, Hong Kong University China Transnational Relations Center Director, and Jianhai, Hong Kong University China Transnational Relations Center Director Postdoctoral Fellow, October 2005
[David, Bi, "China's Global Hunt for Energy," Foreign Affairs]

Washington remains wary, especially as Beijing seeks cooperation from other governments on the United States' shortlist of rogue states. China is undermining U.S. efforts to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions by resisting the imposition of sanctions against the Islamic Republic in the event it resumes its efforts to enrich uranium. And Beijing is strengthening
ties with the temperamental Venezuelan president, Hugo Chávez, who likes to poke the Americans in the eye. "We have been producing and exporting oil for more than 100 years," Chávez told a group of Chinese business executives last December. "But these have been 100 years of domination by the United States. Now we are free, and place this oil at the disposal of the great Chinese fatherland." Souring relations between Caracas and Washington have already prompted the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to mandate contingency plans in case Venezuelan oil stops flowing to the United States. Chinese officials, meanwhile, deny that China's oil hunger is increasing friction with the United States. According to Han Wenke, deputy director general of the energy institute affiliated with China's National Development and Reform Commission, "Although oil trade plays an important role in every field, it has a limited influence in Sino-American relations."

China’s energy ties are the root of support for Iranian prolif
Aarts, Amsterdam University International Relations Lecturer, and Rijsingen, Amsterdam University International Relations Grad Students, 2007
[Paul and Machteld, "Beijing's Rising Star in the Gulf Region," http://home.medewerker.uva.nl/p.w.h.aarts/bestanden/Paul%20Aarts%20and%20Machtheld%20van%20Rinsingen.pdf] It is clear that China’s energy-driven initiatives have been generally well received in the region. In particular for Tehran, the political and strategic advantages of cultivating closer ties with Beijing are obvious. Given its pariah status, but more specifically because of its nuclear aspirations – which bring it under increasing international pressure – the support of a permanent member of the UN Security Council (and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors) is mostly welcome. But diplomatic support does not satisfy Iran’s current leadership. President Ahmadinejad speaks openly about Iran’s imperative to build full-blown “strategic partnerships” with non-Western countries such as China, and seems to disdain Europe almost as much as the United States.55 For sure, Iran is a strategically important partner for China and that is why Beijing is making an all-out effort to forge relations and tries to integrate Iran into forms of regional cooperation. At the same time, China has to perform a balancing act when it comes to Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. China has always tried to balance its interests in the nuclear standoff by em-- phasizing both Iran’s rights and obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Given its own history, the Chinese are particularly sensitive to the im— portance of sovereignty and independence. That is why, from a legal point of view, China fully supports Iran’s right to civilian nuclear energy based on the principle of sovereignty. At the same time, Beijing has made it explicit that non- proliferation is high on its agenda – cultivating an image as a “responsible stake-- holder” of the international community – and expects Tehran to honor its treaty commitments and to cooperate fully with the IAEA. Because stability in the Middle East is China’s first priority, it thinks that a more proliferation-prone environment complicates and harms its interests. Apparently it believes that the emergence of another nuclear power in this region – possibly followed by a nu-- clear arms race – would lead to destabilization and thus undercut China’s pursuit of energy security.56 It is an understatement that Beijing is caught in a dilemma vis-à-vis Iran’s uranium conversion program, given its increasingly closer energy and economic ties with Tehran. Sooner or later, Chinese policy makers will have to decide

whether to risk its energy and economic interests and join the international pressure group and support sanctions, or to use its veto power (or play a passive role of abstention without a clear position) and thus diminish its newfound role of “responsible stake-- holder”, frustrating and angering the United States.57

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Saudi Relations Add-On
( ). Saudi Relations A. Chinese energy search dooms US-Saudi relations – this causes OPEC to switch from the dollar, collapsing its value
Leverett, Brookings Middle East Policy Center Senior Fellow, and Bader, Brookings China Initiative Director, 2006
[Flynt, Jeffrey, "Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle East," Winter 05-06, Washington Quarterly]

China’s energy engagement in the Middle East could also conceivably weaken strategic cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia on a number of fronts. For one, Sino-Saudi financial coordination could have ramifications on the dollar’s international standing over time. Consid- erable anecdotal evidence in recent years suggests that the Saudis and the Chinese have sought to draw down their dollar-denominated assets. It is very likely that these moves were informally coordinated to ensure that nei- ther country took a major “hit” through a sudden decline in the dollar’s value. Ultimately, Sino-Saudi collaboration could pave the way for the Or- ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to decide to accept payment for oil in a basket of currencies rather than exclusively in dollars, a develop- ment that could have a significant impact on the dollar’s status as the world’s leading reserve currency.32

B. OPEC dollar shift collapses the global economy – destroys the dollar
Freeman, Middle East Policy Council President, 9/17/2004
[Chas, "Securing US Energy in a Changing World," http://www.mepc.org/forums_chcs/37.asp] The second matter, far more grave in many ways, is the demonstration of the end of some aspects of the special relationship with Saudi Arabia; the end of the discounts and the end of the Saudi emphasis on primacy in the American market signals because there's another issue you didn't mention, which we will get into, and that is the defense of the dollar by the Saudis. Twice within OPEC, other members, Iran in particular, have moved to eliminate the dollar as the unit of account for the oil trade.

Were this to occur in the current context of massive U.S. budget, balance of trade, and balance of payments deficits, the results could be absolutely devastating for the global economy and to our own. The reason the Saudis defended the dollar on the two previous occasions was not economic analysis but political affinity for the United States. Question: if that affinity is no longer there, will they play that role? This is a large issue, with people like Paul Volcker saying there is a very substantial danger within the next five years of some sort of dollar collapse. This is
not a minor matter.

C. Global economic collapse causes nuclear war and extinction
Bearden, U.S. Army (Retired), 2000
[T.E., LTC, U.S. Army, “The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How to Solve It Quickly,” http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3aaf97f22e23.htm, June 24]

History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China-whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for
decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is

rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.
to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed,

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Saudi Relations Add-On – Link EXTN
Chinese energy search is causing Saudi Arabia to shift away from a strong US partnership to favor China
Leverett, Brookings Middle East Policy Center Senior Fellow, and Bader, Brookings China Initiative Director, 2006
[Flynt, Jeffrey, "Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle East," Winter 05-06, Washington Quarterly] In contrast to Iran, Saudi Arabia is a long-standing U.S. ally, complicat- ing Beijing’s efforts to cultivate better relations with Riyadh. The Saudi leadership, however, was disturbed by the anti-Saudi backlash in Congress and in U.S. public opinion following the September 11 attacks. Saudi leaders, including then–Crown Prince, now King, Abdullah, were also disappointed by what they perceived as President George W. Bush’s less-than-vigorous public defense of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. They were also dismayed by what from their perspective were serious defi- ciencies in the Bush administration’s Middle East policies during its first term in office.28 Although the atmospherics of U.S.-Saudi relations improved some- what with the BushAbdullah summit in Crawford, Texas, in April 2005, the dis- may with U.S. policy continues. In Sep- tember, for example, Saudi foreign minister Saud al Faisal publicly criticized U.S. policy toward Iraq for allowing the country to disintegrate toward civil war.29 As a result of these concerns, the Saudi leadership is pursuing a hedging strategy toward the United States, its traditional partner, by developing a more robust strategic relationship with China. Similar to Iran, the kingdom is paying something of a premium to encourage this relationship. For ex- ample, it is not clear that Chinese involvement in Sinopec’s previously dis- cussed 2004 agreement to develop some of the kingdom’s nonassociated gas resources was, from a Saudi perspective, fully congruent with Riyadh’s origi- nal goals in allowing foreign participation. Asked to comment on the agreement, a senior Saudi Aramco executive observed wryly, “Well, getting foreign companies in was always about technology transfer. And we’ve achieved it, from Aramco to Sinopec!”30 Western oil industry executives note that, when Saudi energy minister Ali Naimi first approached Abdullah in 2003 about increasing Saudi Aramco’s investment budget to expand the company’s oil production capacity, at least partly in response to exhortations from Washington, he was rebuffed. It was only after the Chinese established their interest in increased Saudi production capacity that Aramco’s invest- ment budget was increased substantially.31 As the Saudis work to establish the basis for a future China option, they can reap some more immediate benefits. Saudis, similar to Iranians, calcu- late that China could expand its role as a supplier of advanced weapons and related technology. In addition to serving as a strategic hedge for Riyadh, China provides the Saudis with a safe haven for their oil wealth. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Saudi officials were impressed by Beijing’s deter- mination to protect the value of China’s currency. After the September 11 attacks, as the United States became a less attractive destination for Saudi investments, the Saudis have turned increasingly to China to help recycle some of the enormous liquidity accumulating in the kingdom from record- high oil revenues.

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Saudi Relations Add-On – Impact EXTN
US-Saudi relations key to oil security and prevent price spikes
Aarts, Amsterdam University International Relations Lecturer, and Rijsingen, Amsterdam University International Relations Grad Students, 2007
[Paul and Machteld, "Beijing's Rising Star in the Gulf Region," http://home.medewerker.uva.nl/p.w.h.aarts/bestanden/Paul%20Aarts%20and%20Machtheld%20van%20Rinsingen.pdf]

Tightening ties between Saudi Arabia and China could have a negative im-- pact on both US-Saudi relations and US-China
relations. Whether this is going to happen will depend to a large extent on Saudi Arabia’s policies. Let’s imagine the situation where the Kingdom no longer wants to be the number one supplier to the United States. Why would that be? Apart from the 9/11 fall-out and the continu-- ous Saudi bashing in US media, there is a strictly economic argument to that. If markets were left to their own devices, Saudi Arabia would no longer be the US’s prime supplier. It is mainly due to Riyadh’s benevolent pricing policy, i.e. discount-- ing their oil for the US market, that this situation was established and endures until this very day. Without this special pricing, US imports of Saudi oil would probably drastically drop (from the current 25 percent to a level closer to 10-15 percent).45 Following this scenario, one might expect the US public to turn away from support of America’s role as protector of Middle East oil producers as well as of long-haul supply lines. In that case, other oil-importing countries in Europe and East Asia could move in and protect their own oil supplies directly. It is doubtful, however, that China – or any individual European country for that matter – would be will-- ing (and able!) to fill the security vacuum – at least not in the foreseeable future.46 Obviously, the regime in Riyadh is aware of that too. Also from an oil supply perspective a hands-off attitude would be unwise. Even if the United States were to reduce its oil imports from Saudi Arabia or were to refrain from using Saudi oil altogether, it would still be in Washington’s best interest to preserve friendly relations with Riyadh. Why is that? By far the most important motive for the United States not to neglect the Saudis is the unique position of Saudi Arabia as the world’s only “swing producer”: the country retains the single largest spare production capacity of all oil producers.47 This means that the world market – and the world’s largest oil consumer in the first place – has a major interest in a cooperative Saudi government. Although it has declined in recent years, the national spare capacity allows the Saudis, for now and for the near future, to “control” the oil market to such an extent that they can fix or at least contain serious disturbances (but not control prices, as is often suggested). It takes them just a few days to gear up production or to ratchet things back down.48 It is hardly imaginable that a serious disruption of the Saudi oil supply (and its at-- tendant rise in oil prices) would be without consequences to the A– even if the Americans would stop using Saudi oil altogether.

Saudi regime change leads to anti-american regime
Aarts, Amsterdam University International Relations Lecturer, and Rijsingen, Amsterdam University International Relations Grad Students, 2007
[Paul and Machteld, "Beijing's Rising Star in the Gulf Region," http://home.medewerker.uva.nl/p.w.h.aarts/bestanden/Paul%20Aarts%20and%20Machtheld%20van%20Rinsingen.pdf] A third motive might be termed “fear of the alternative.” The economic and security situations of the Kingdom nurture plenty of worries, not to mention the uncertainties and possible problems over the succession to King Abdullah. Never-- theless, the Al Saud remain in control of plenty of “capital” – economic, religious, political and symbolic. It is, moreover, in the best interests of the United States to see that the current regime stays in power. Washington simply cannot afford to witness regime change in Riyadh (let alone contribute to it). As recent history has shown, radical domestic political changes in oil-producing countries often lead to suppressed output, whether the change is “anti-American” (as in Iran) or “pro- American” (as was the case after the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union). It is rather difficult to imagine a situation where a radically different Saudi regime willingly cuts all its oil exports and orders its citizens to tighten their belts for more than one month or so.51

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Shunning Add-On
( ). Shunning A. China’s reliance on fossil fuels shields and protects human rights violators – creates strategic interests for an immoral foreign policy
Zweig, Hong Kong University China Transnational Relations Center Director, and Jianhai, Hong Kong University China Transnational Relations Center Director Postdoctoral Fellow, October 2005
[David, Bi, "China's Global Hunt for Energy," Foreign Affairs] Another important feature of Beijing's resource-based foreign policy is that it has little room for morality. Because coveted

natural resources are often found in pariah states, Beijing has struck energy deals with governments that do not respect international regimes. This strategy has created a set of complicated problems. It does not exactly pit China against the United States in a competition over the same resources; by shunning these states, Washington had already given up on their goods. But it does undermine other U.S. goals, such as isolating rogue governments or punishing them for failing to promote democracy, comply with international law, limit nuclear proliferation, or respect human rights. As Beijing's search for resources prompts it to reinforce relations with Iran, Myanmar, and Sudan, China is challenging the United States' moral hegemony and its ability to check states whose records it abhors. Last June, Chris Hill, the assistant secretary of state
for East Asian and Pacific affairs, told a subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives that a major task for the United States and its Asian allies was "to ensure that in its search for resources and commodities to gird its economic machinery, China does not underwrite the continuation of regimes that pursue policies seeking to undermine rather than sustain the security and stability of the international community." Such concerns have already proved justified, as in the case of Sudan. In 1997, while the Muslim-led Sudanese government was waging a gruesome war against Christian rebels in the south, Washington barred U.S. oil companies from doing business with Khartoum, leaving the door open for their Chinese counterparts to expand their operations there. Now China gets about five percent of its oil from Sudan and has reportedly stationed 4,000 nonuniformed forces there to protect its oil interests. Beijing has brushed off accusations that it is helping to prop up Khartoum. "Business is business. We try to separate politics from business," said then Deputy Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong in the summer of 2004. "I think the internal situation in the Sudan is an internal affair, and we are not in a position to impose upon them." Meanwhile, Beijing has deftly protected its oil interests there. In September 2004, it successfully watered down a UN resolution condemning Khartoum, undermining U.S. efforts to threaten sanctions against Sudan's oil industry. As if oblivious to the tensions created by Beijing's maneuvering, two highly respected Chinese professors argued this past April that China's assistance in turning Sudan into an oil-exporting state shows how China is raising standards of living in the developing world.

C. We have a moral obligation to shun human rights violaters
Beversluis, Aquinas College, 89
[Eric H. April 1989. “On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions.” Public Affairs Quarterly, April, vol. 3, no. 2] But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality. Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The stronger may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by thregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning, there seem to be no “rights” that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not being apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions. We find the answer when we note that there is another “level” of mural duties. When Galtung speaks of “reinforcing…morality,” he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people’s rights. The argument goes like this. There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one’s actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid

violating the rights of others with one’s actions has also to support that moral order. Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people’s rights being respected. If ones so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior, this moral community people mutually reinforce each other’s moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other’s moral behavior, there would be much more violation of
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people’s rights. That to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people’s rights. And this is where shunning fits in.

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Shunning Add-On – Link EXTN
In the SQ, China will resort to exploiting unstable states to guarantee oil access.
Phar Kim Beng, Vic Y.W. Li, consultant to Waseda University, 11/05 [“China’s Energy Dependence on the Middle East: Boon or Bane for Asian Security?,” http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/November_2005/Phar_Kim_Beng_and_Vic_Li.pdf] In particular, China will find its reliance most acute, given its voracious  demand for oil as it races towards more economic growth. As Erica  Downs astutely noted, such dependence on energy has been characterized  as a debate that revolves around China’s future behavior. More precisely,  how will China try to break “out” from this Middle Eastern trap?9 Is  China on course for some destabilizing policies or will Chinese’s reliance  on foreign oil facilitate its deeper integration into the international  system and mark the rise of a benign, status quo power instead?  The first scenario presents a realist perspective whereas the second,  which adduces a more pacific outcome, is informed by liberalism.  Analysts with realist persuasions foresee the emergence of China as a  revisionist, if not a belligerent state. They speculate that China’s oil  needs could prompt it to pursue destabilizing policies such as naval arms build up and oil for arms exchanges. While these scenarios have not  happened, China’s embrace of rogue regimes such as Sudan and Iran, in  exchange for obtaining almost exclusive rights for “overseas infrastructural investment” has clearly been regarded as alarming; and to  the realists, reflects a “preliminary” form of behavior that is within the  ambit of what they are predicting.10

Chinese energy search dooms effective action against Sudan
Leverett, Brookings Middle East Policy Center Senior Fellow, and Bader, Brookings China Initiative Director, 2006
[Flynt, Jeffrey, "Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle East," Winter 05-06, Washington Quarterly] The Chinese drive for energy is already a source of tension in bilateral rela- tions. China’s efforts to establish influence with Middle Eastern energy pro- ducers have thwarted U.S. efforts to impose sanctions on Sudan over the Darfur genocide and are currently complicating Washington’s attempts to persuade the IAEA to refer Iran to the Security Council for violating its nonproliferation obligations. Over time, China’s engagement in the region could, at least theoretically, provide Iran strategic backing for a foreign policy posture that would eschew engagement with the West and challenge Western interests more assertively.

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Shunning Add-On – Sudan Impact
Genocide in Sudan threatens two million lives – even in optimal conditions, the ethnic cleansing taking place in Darfur will kill hundreds of thousands by the end of the year Capdevila ‘04
[Gustavo, Staff Writer for IPS, RIGHTS-SUDAN, “Darfur ‘World’s Worst Humanitarian Crisis’”, June 3rd, http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=24027] GENEVA, Jun 3 (IPS) - Everyone

seems to agree on the severity of the crisis that threatens some two million people in the Sudanese region of Darfur, but governments are focusing on a response based on humanitarian aid, while human rights groups are calling for urgent protection for the civilian population. Even in the best-case scenario, humanitarian experts estimate that more than 300,000 people will die as a result of
violence and starvation. Amnesty International, based in London, holds the Janjaweed -- militias backed by Sudan's armed forces -- responsible for the massive human rights violations suffered by hundreds of thousands of civilians in Darfur, a region in the country's northwest. Human Rights Watch, another powerful non-governmental organization,

headquartered in the United States, maintains that Darfur is carrying out a campaign of ”ethnic cleansing” promoted by the government of Sudan against three communities located in the Darfur area. This persecution has left some two million people, or a third of the Darfur population, in a situation of grave danger, according to the European Humanitarian Aid Office. (Sudan has a population of more than 32 million.) As a result, between 750,000 and one million internally displaced peoples are spread throughout Sudan, and another 110,000 have crossed the border into Chad as refugees, European aid director Constanza Adinolfi told reporters here
Thursday. Officials and activists gathered in Geneva Thursday for a donors meeting on Darfur sponsored by the United Nations, United States and European Union. Amnesty International research”confirmed again the systematic and well-organized pillaging and destruction of villages which led to the forced displacement of the rural population of Darfur,” said Liz Hodgkin, a spokeswoman for the organization. Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch (HRW), stressed that Darfur is not seeing a mere problem of spontaneous ethnic conflict. On the contrary, the Khartoum government is”sponsoring ethnic atrocities against African ethnic populations... in order to clean the region of the three targeted African ethnic groups.” HRW says the

non-Arab African communities of the Fur, Masaalit and Zaghawa, mostly settled farmers, are the target of attacks by some 20,000 Janjaweed, militias emerging from Arab nomadic tribes whose arms and uniforms are provided by the Sudan government. The ethnic makeup of Sudan is complex, with more than 500
groups, some of Arab descent, particularly in the north and central regions of the country. The national government is controlled by Arab Muslim sectors. The humanitarian angle was taken up Thursday in a meeting of representatives from donor countries with international officials. They all agreed that Darfur today is the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. Jan Egeland, coordinator of U.N. emergency aid, estimated that 236 million dollars are needed for the rest of the year to attend to the urgent needs of the communities of Darfur and the refugees in neighboring Chad. Those funds would be earmarked for food, medicine, housing, agriculture, potable water and sanitation, as well as for education and protection of human rights. Egeland said there are an estimated one million internally displaced people and 150,000 who have sought refuge in Chad. An additional 700,000 to 800,000 will be severely affected by the conflict by the end of the year, predicted the U.N. official. A more somber outlook came from the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Andrew Natsios:” Even in a best-case scenario,

under optimal conditions, we could see as many as 320,000 people die. Without optimal conditions, the numbers will be far greater.” U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan had warned the international body's Commission on
Human Rights in April that the threat of genocide was brewing in Darfur, just as it had a decade earlier in Rwanda.

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Tar Sands Add-On
( ). Tar Sands A. China’s energy quest is key to Canadian tar sands development
Zweig and Jianhai, Hong Kong University China's Transnational Relations Center director and fellow, 5 [David and Bi, "China's Global Hunt for Energy," Foreign Affairs, general onefile]

Energy diplomacy has also prompted China to seek access to Canada's resources, especially the massive tar sands of Alberta. Since late 2004, Beijing and Ottawa have concluded a series of energy and resource agreements, providing for greater
Chinese involvement in developing Canada's natural gas sector, its vast oil sands deposits, and its uranium sector. Last April,

PetroChina and the Canadian giant Enbridge signed a memorandum of understanding to build a $2 billion pipeline that would carry oil to the western coast of Canada for shipment to Asia. Although no money is yet on the table, western Canadians see China's investment in the tar sands as a major opportunity; according to an Enbridge analyst, without such foreign investment, the fields would remain undeveloped.

B. Tar sands development leads to massive environmental damage
Eric Anderssen, Globe and Mail senior writer and global energy reporter, Shawn McCarthy, Eric Reguly, and 1-26-8, The Globe and Mail, "An empire from a tub of goo," l/n Many projects proposed for the oil sands tout promising new technology, but much of it has yet to be proved on a larger scale. One of the more favourable approaches - known as sequestration - involves trapping carbon gases underground. It's not required yet, although recent proposals have included space to add such facilities if they ever become mandatory. Unless improvements are made, the environmental damage will mushroom, given that production could triple over the next seven years, says study co-author Simon Dyer, a biologist and senior policy analyst at the Pembina, which has called for a moratorium on approving further projects. "We are really at the tip of the iceberg," he warns. "If people are concerned about

the environment, you don't want to be around in 2015."

C. Environmental degradation results in extinction
Les Kaufmann, Chief Scientist at Edgerton Research Lab, THE LAST EXTINCTION, p. 4]

The fourth argument for preserving biological diversity is the simplest: Our lives depend on it. We are part of a common fabric of life. Our survival is dependent on the integrity of this fabric, for the loss of a few critical threads could lead to a quick unraveling of the whole. We know that there have been previous mass extinctions, through which some life survived. As for our own chances of surviving this mass extinction, there can be no promises. If the Grim Reaper plays any favorites at all, then it would seem to be a special fondness for
striking down dominant organisms in their prime. David Joblinski examines the fates of rudist dames, mammalike reptiles, dinosaurs, and a host of other scintillating but doomed creatures in his essay. Humans are now the dominant creatures, at least in terms of their influence. So, lest history bear false witness and barring some serious conservation efforts on our part, this mass extinction could well be the last one that we will ever know about.

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Terrorism Add-On
( ). Terrorism A. Chinese oil reliance funds extremist groups and prevents action against nuclear terrorism
International Crisis Group, Belgium Based Think Tank, June 2008
[China's Thirst for Oil," http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5478&l=1] The damage that oil can do to the development of healthy economies and governments is well docu- mented. One-third of the world’s civil wars take place in oil-producing states.162 In addition to the havoc wreaked on a country’s economy by

the so-called re- source curse, oil makes it easier for insurgents to fund rebellions and aggravates ethnic grievances.163 And while countries wracked by internal conflict and mas- sive human rights abuses have provided an investment environment free from Western competition and some strategic advantages, they have brought China closer to situations of conflict and internal strife. This, along with Beijing’s stated policy of non-interference in domestic affairs, has led to

accusations that it is enabling the regimes in such states to resist demands from the international community to end conflict, stop human rights abuse or halt suspected nuclear weapons programs.

B. Nuclear terrorism risks world war and extinction, even if it doesn’t work
Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Al-Ahram Weekly political analyst, 4
[Al-Ahram Weekly, "Extinction!" 8/26, no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm]

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

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Military Modernization Add-On (1/2)
( ). Military Modernization A. Chinese reliance on oil causes military modernization in an attempt to create energy security
Zweig, Hong Kong University China Transnational Relations Center Director, and Jianhai, Hong Kong University China Transnational Relations Center Director Postdoctoral Fellow, October 2005
[David, Bi, "China's Global Hunt for Energy," Foreign Affairs]

A big test of the U.S.-Chinese relationship may come if China's current economic growth and need for resources push it to expand its military influence -- a prospect that makes many people nervous. Survey results released by the BBC in 2005
show that although 49 percent of respondents in 22 countries welcome China's economic growth, most people feel negatively about the prospect of China significantly increasing its military power. Few analysts expect China to become belligerent. But its growing dependence on oil, especially from the Middle East, will make it more actively concerned with sea-lanes, in particular the Strait of Malacca and the Taiwan Strait, both of which its oil tankers use. Zhang Yuncheng, an expert at the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations, in Beijing, believes that China would face an energy crisis if its oil supply lines were disrupted and that whoever controls the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean could block China's oil

transport route.
Concerns about safety in the Strait of Malacca are not new, but the potential for terrorism to target oil tankers in the region has understandably been taken more seriously since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Although the coastal states of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have long patrolled the strait to ensure free passage, now that four-fifths of China's imported oil comes through it, Beijing increasingly shares that interest. The Taiwan Strait has also long been a source of concern, since it is seen as a possible battleground between China and Taiwan were Taipei ever to declare full sovereignty. With China increasingly reliant on foreign resources, Beijing is now also worried that Taiwan could threaten China's supplies. But China's oceangoing navy is small, and with a U.S. naval base at Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean, and India's navy dominating the mouth of the Strait of Malacca, Beijing seems to feel vulnerable about its limited capacity to patrol on its own. President Hu has reportedly commented on the problem, which he calls "the Malacca dilemma," and considers it key to China's energy security. He is concerned that "certain powers [read 'the United States'] have all along encroached on and tried to control the navigation through the strait." There is talk of China boosting its navy to protect its commercial ships, although so far it is unclear how far that project has come along. In a January 2004 article in the Beijing-controlled Hong Kong newspaper Wen Wei Po, a Chinese military expert recommended both defensive and offensive options for a new naval strategy: "One [option] is making quick reactions, including military reaction, when a crisis occurs ... to display the strength for safeguarding the country's interests. The other is the capability of reciprocal deterrence. This means if you can threaten my international shipping route, I can also threaten your security in various fields, including your international shipping route security." Some members of China's naval officer corps want to readjust the country's entire naval strategy. In their view, China

faces threats not only along its coast but also on the high seas and so it should shift its focus from coastal to oceanic defense. According to a report written for the Pentagon by the consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton, "China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China's energy interests, but also to serve broad security objectives." Beijing is reported to be helping Pakistan build a port at Gwadar, upgrading a military airstrip in the South China Sea and monitoring stations in Myanmar, and negotiating for naval facilities in Bangladesh.

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Military Modernization Add-On (2/2)
B. Chinese military modernization dooms US hegemony
O'Connell, UPI Staff writer, 6/22/2006
[Meghan, "China Threatens To Rival American Power Status," http://www.spacewar.com/reports/China_Threatens_To_Rival_American_Power_Status.html]

China's rapid military expansion over recent years has sparked concern amongst American officials that its battlefield capabilities may eventually pose a threat to U.S. dominance. Experts recently met at the Heritage Foundation to discuss the
Pentagon's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and its implications for the U.S. strategy with China. The Pentagon report states, "Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages... The pace and scope of China's military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk." Chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Larry Wortzel said, "The United States and Western countries in general face a concerted effort on the part of the Chinese military to build this new defense infrastructure, and they're pretty good at it." Military modernization in China has accelerated since the 1990s. China has increased its defense spending by more than 10 percent in real terms every year except 2003 since 1996, the defense review says. China's stated defense budget for 2006 increased by 15 percent from last year to $35 billion. However, the Pentagon report says that the actual budget is between $70 billion and $135 billion dollars. But China lagged far behind the United States in the CIA's estimates of each country's military expenditures in 2005. The CIA estimates the United States spent over $518 billion last year, while China's estimated total hovered around $81 billion. China cannot realistically catch up with the U.S. military budget, said Wang Yuan-kang, a professor at the National Chengchi University in Taiwan and visiting fellow at the Brookings Institute. And America remains a larger economic force. "China does not like American troops at its footsteps," Wang said, "and it wants to have a multi-power world but it cannot do it now because the United States is simply too powerful." But the gap between America's dominance and China's power seems to be lessening. The debate is no longer about whether China has the military strength to pose a threat, but what to do about it, said Daniel Blumenthal, commissioner of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. "China is probably the only country in the world that can compete with the United States militarily and actually pose a challenge to its hegemony," Blumenthal said, pointing to what he called a serious peacetime military buildup by China over the last 10 years. The United States has been shoring up its alliances around the region, he continued, with countries such as Japan, India, Vietnam and Mongolia all concerned about what China's military rise means. Because of the nation's military expansion, intervention should China attack Taiwan can no longer be accomplished at a low cost, said Randall Schriver, former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. And though China has been bulking up its military presence along borders near Taiwan, Schriver said that the nation's vision extends far beyond the small island to regional and global contingencies. "The game is on in Asia, and the United States has to be engaged," Schriver said, emphasizing the growing global importance of Asia. According to the National Intelligence Council, Schriver said, by 2020, Asia will hold 56 percent of the world's population, six of the 10 largest militaries, three of the four largest economies, and six of the 10 largest energy consumers. By contrast, Schriver added, the NIC expects the population of the Middle East to compose only 4 percent of the world's total in 2020. "The whole center of gravity of the earth and human existence is moving to Asia," Schriver said, explaining that the United States needs a policy that will develop relations with the rest of Asia while confronting China. You get Asia right by getting China right and you get China right by getting Asia right, Schriver said.

C. US leadership solves global nuclear war
Zalmay Khalilzad, policy analyst at RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring ‘95 Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

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Mil Mod Add-On – Link EXTN
Chinese energy reliance results in military modernization – this causes US-Sino conflict
Lieberthal, Michigan University China Center Research Associate, William Davidson Institute China Director and Distinguished Fellow, Political Science Professor, and Herberg, National Bureau of Asian Research Asian Energy Security Director, ARCO Strategic Planning group Global Energy and Economics Director, April 2006
[Kenneth, Mikkal, "NBR Analysis," http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?ID=93a9dcaa-b9d5-4601-ac32-93f702696db5] Energy security and China’s military development . Another important issue for some departments of the U .s . government, particularly the Department of Defense, is the potential for perceived energy security threats to drive China’s military modernization . China’s increasing dependency on oil flows through the Malacca straits and the other sea lanes of southeast asia is potentially accelerating China’s development of the naval capabilities necessary to protect those lanes . China has greatly increased cooperation, port access agreements, and maritime ties with Pakistan, bangladesh, and Myanmar in an apparent effort to be better positioned to protect its maritime energy transport routes during a future crisis . This cooperation,

in turn, risks exacerbating the broader tensions between the United states and China over the increasing pace and scale of China’s military and naval modernization .

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Mil Mod Add-On – Impact EXTN – Taiwan War
Military Modernization leads to nuclear war with Taiwan
Newsweek 2005 (“Soft Power, Hard Choices”, March 7, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7037845/site/newsweek/) With or without the EU ban, it's far too late to keep China from modernizing its military. The Chinese have been using their new wealth for years to buy top-of-the-line weaponry from Russia and Israel. Neither country ever joined the embargo. And in most places China clearly wants to make money, not war. What scares the Bush administration is the risk of armed conflict between China and Taiwan. That fear is more than just a neocon thing; it's shared by observers like Kenneth Lieberthal, the top Asia hand at the National Security Council during the Clinton years. "The fundamental reason to worry is that these two sides neither trust nor under-stand each other," he says. Last year he and David Lampton, director of China studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, issued a joint warning: "Unless an improved framework [for PRC-Taiwan relations] is adopted, war across the strait will become increasingly probable." Last year a U.S. expert with close Chinese military ties warned privately that China's brass were displaying "a new cockiness" on the risks of war in the strait. "They think they have figured out how to win," he said. Their solution: barrages of missiles, along with rapid escalation. The new strategy seems to call for early attacks on U.S. aircraft carriers and on key U.S. bases in Japan. A U.S. source who has participated in Pentagon war games of an attack on Taiwan says the almost inevitable outcome is "rapid escalation to a very substantial conflict" with "consequences that are extremely serious." The threat of nuclear weapons was deliberately excluded from the games.

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Mid-East Stability Add-On
( ). Mid-East Stability A. Conflict is not inevitable but absent an end to China’s Mid-East energy quest, Mid-East instability and escalating conflicts will occur
Leverett, Brookings Middle East Policy Center Senior Fellow, and Bader, Brookings China Initiative Director, 2006
[Flynt, Jeffrey, "Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle East," Winter 05-06, Washington Quarterly] Without drawing Beijing into such a posture, the Chinese drive for en- ergy is likely to fuel a gradually escalating clash of interests between the United States and China in the Middle East. This clash of interests could threaten the attainment of U.S. goals in the region. It could also feed a more general and unwelcome antagonism between the world’s only superpower and the world’s fastest-growing power. An escalatory cycle of this nature is not inevitable. If it is to be avoided, however, policymakers in Washington need to start thinking now about the elements of a strategy for managing the Chinese challenge in the Middle East.

B. Mid-East instability results in global nuclear war
Steinbach, DC Iraq Coalition, 2002
[John, Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: a Threat to Peace, March, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.03/0331steinbachisraeli.htm] Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

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Asia Stability Add-On
( ). Asia Stability A. Chinese energy dependence causes Asian instability – conflicting oil interests draws in major powers
Pablo Bustelo, Senior analyst at Elcano Royal Institute , Professor of Applied Economics at the Complutense University of Madrid, 5/9/05 [“China and the Geopolitics of the Asian Pacific Region,” http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/226.asp] This double response has had –and will continue to have– significant geopolitical consequences, especially in the Asia Pacific region. To limit the problem of extreme (though inevitable to a large extent) dependence on the Middle East, while at the same time guaranteeing supplies from that region, China has used trade agreements and the acquisition of oil interests to establish closer ties with several producer countries and regions: Russia, Central Asia (especially Kazakhstan, but also Uzbekistan), Sudan, Iran, Venezuela and Myanmar, among others. This frenetic global search for oil, which will surely continue in the coming years, could create conflicts with other big importing countries (the US, the European Union, Japan and India) and sometimes political tensions with the US (for example, over Sudan, Iran and Venezuela). The construction of oil and gas pipelines from Russian and central Asia could also lead to conflict with Japan. The search for land and sea alternatives to the chokepoint formed by the Strait of Malacca (now the route for three quarters of China's oil imports) could lead to a strategic rapprochement with Thailand, Myanmar and Indonesia. Naval protection of lanes in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea could cause tension with India, Vietnam and the US.

B. Asian conflict would go nuclear and collapse the economy
Jonathan S. Landay, National Security and Intelligence Correspondent, 2000
[“Top Administration Officials Warn Stakes for U.S. Are High in Asian Conflicts”, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, March 10, p. Lexis]

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. “Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,” said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a
Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster.” In an effort to cool the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia’s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would

instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

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Asia Stability Add-On – Link EXTN (1/3)
Southeast China volatile-countries increasing military action to secure oil routes
Pablo Bustelo, Senior analyst at Elcano Royal Institute , Professor of Applied Economics at the Complutense University of Madrid, 5/9/05 [“China and the Geopolitics of the Asian Pacific Region,” http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/226.asp] Although territorial claims in the South China Sea are less likely to lead to disputes than in the past –especially since the signing of the Code of Conduct in 2002, the rapprochement between Beijing and Hanoi in recent years, and the tripartite accord of 2005– energy interests in the Spratly and Paracel islands could change the situation and eventually lead to conflict among the claimant countries.(3) [There is a risk of conflict]With India, since China wants a naval presence in the Indian Ocean and has sought closer ties with Myanmar to accomplish this. The expansion of the Chinese navy can be considered, at least in part, an expression of Beijing’s desire to protect maritime oil supply lanes and, eventually, natural gas routes. Also, India’s growing consumption is forcing Indian companies to compete with the Chinese for international agreements and investments in countries such as Angola, Russia and Kazakhstan.

China’s energy search fuels escalating instability in Asia
Lieberthal, Michigan University China Center Research Associate, William Davidson Institute China Director and Distinguished Fellow, Political Science Professor, and Herberg, National Bureau of Asian Research Asian Energy Security Director, ARCO Strategic Planning group Global Energy and Economics Director, April 2006
[Kenneth, Mikkal, "NBR Analysis," http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?ID=93a9dcaa-b9d5-4601-ac32-93f702696db5] Energy and Northeast Asian geopolitics . China’s efforts to secure energy supplies and oil and gas transport routes have aggravated geopolitical tensions in northeast asia . These tensions are also being fueled by the equally competitive policies of other major regional importers (particularly Japan) as well as by russia’s erratic policies on the promise of future energy supplies to northeast asia . The Kremlin is seeking to use energy as a strategic instrument to reassert its influence in the region

and is thereby contributing to the competitive environment in the region, particularly between China and Japan . “Energy nationalism” has become a potential threat to regional stability as energy disputes increasingly spill over into broader geopolitical rivalries . These geopolitical rivalries, in turn, undermine cooperative solutions to the region’s energy needs . This “vicious circle” is a major and growing regional concern for both the United states and China .

Chinese energy policy results in Asian instability and Sino-Jap conflict
Zweig, Hong Kong University China Transnational Relations Center Director, and Jianhai, Hong Kong University China Transnational Relations Center Director Postdoctoral Fellow, October 2005
[David, Bi, "China's Global Hunt for Energy," Foreign Affairs] Although such friction is most obvious with the United States, resource competition could also pit China against Japan. Tension between Beijing and Tokyo is increasing over gas reserves they both claim in the East China Sea. In late 2004, Japanese media reported that the Japanese Defense Agency had revised its security strategy partly on the assumption that conflicts over resources could escalate into war. And last April, after the Japanese government awarded two Japanese companies the right to drill for oil and gas in a disputed area of the East China Sea, the Chinese People's Daily argued that competition over the

East China Sea was "only a prelude of the game between China and Japan in the arena of international energy."

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Asia Stability Add-On – Link EXTN (2/3)
Chinese energy needs leads to Asian instability drawing in China, Japan, Vietnam, India and other states into escalating conflict
Lee, Hong Kong Open University Public Administration and Liberal Studies Leader and Assistant Professor, June 2005
[Pak, "China’s quest for oil security: oil (wars) in the pipeline?," The Pacific Review 18.2]

The competition over oil between China and Japan unfortunately renews tensions and distrust between the two Asian powers. On the one hand, Japan feels threatened by China’s ballooning growth of oil and gas imports, which would make it less able to find sufficient energy resources in the in- ternational market. In August 2004 Japan struck a cooperation agreement with
four Central Asian nations – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Japan would provide economic aid to the Central Asia states in return for cooperation in a number of areas including energy (AKIpress 2004; Blagov 2004a; 21 shiji jingji baodao, September 6, 2004: 33). The Japanese move was viewed as a strong sign that Japan has spared no ef- fort to promote its economic and political presence in oil-producing areas.31 On the other hand, China

is so paranoiac that it views the Japanese in- trusion into the Sino-Russian oil deal as a means whereby Japan aims not only to strengthen its political clout in East Asia but also to contain China. Lu Nanquan, a vice director of the Russian Research Centre at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, holds that Japan’s move aims at weak- ening
China’s stable economic growth by threatening its energy security and at adversely affecting the strategic partnership between China and Russia (Shijie zhishi, October 16, 2003: 44–6; Huanqiu shibao, August 11, 2004: 7). The Japanese involvement in the construction of the pipeline intensifies the security dilemma facing China and Japan.32 In response, China has actively competed with Japan over oil in Iran as well as in China’s offshore areas between the two nations. The setbacks in Central Asia and Russia inevitably prompt China to pay increasing attention to the energy resources in the country’s offshore areas. Apart from the mutual competition over the routeing of the Russian oil pipeline discussed above, conflicts between China and Japan over the ex- ploitation of oilfields in the East China Sea have recently become intense. They hold competing views of how the boundary of its respective exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is to be drawn, though both allege that they abide by the rules laid down in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. China claims that its EEZ should extend to the edge of the continental shelf (i.e. close to Okinawa). Defining the boundary as a line equidistant from the coasts of the two countries, Japan expressed concerns about the construction of new Chinese natural-gas drilling rigs close to its EEZ in the East China Sea – just 4 km away from the median line between the two countries’ coasts. Japan contended that China could siphon off resources from Japan’s EEZ, even though legally speaking the rigs are in Chinese territory.33 It has been estimated that the East China Sea holds 6–7 billion tonnes of oil and gas, much of which lies in the west of the centre line (Huanqiu shibao, June 28, 2004: 7; Shijie zhishi, July 1, 2004: 34–5; Takahashi 2004). In June 2004, Shoichi Nakagawa, Japan’s Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, met Zhang Guobao, vice minister of China’s State Development and Reform Commission, on the sideline of a meeting of energy ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus Japan, China and South Korea in Manila. At the meeting Nakagawa expressed Japan’s concern and asked China to present solid evidence that the gas- fields do not encroach on Japan’s EEZ, but the Chinese side was reportedly non-committal (Muramatsu 2004; Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2004). Later in the same month, Yoriko Kawaguchi, Japan’s then foreign minister, reiterated the country’s worry over the Chinese move in a meeting with her Chinese coun- terpart, Li Zhaoxing. Kawaguchi urged China to provide more information about the project. China countered by arguing that Japan had no right to re- quest the information, as China was exploring only its own areas of the East China Sea (Far Eastern Economic Review, September 16, 2004: 32; Xinhua 2004). In mid-June a Liberal Democratic Party working team on the rights to the surrounding waters submitted a proposal on protecting maritime interests to the Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda. The proposal called for an appointment of a Cabinet minister with responsibility for policy in protecting maritime interests and for test-drilling natural resources in Japanese territo- rial waters in the East China Sea. In July, Japan sent survey ships to conduct research in its own EEZ (Okubo 2004). Japan currently possesses no ships equipped with specialized devices that send seismic waves to the seabed. Coinciding with the release of a revamped National Defence Programme Outline, covering the period April 2005 to March 2009, which singled out China and North Korea as potential threats to the country (Brooke 2004;  Huanqiu shibao, December 13, 2004: 16), Japan was reported to start build- ing a high-performance ocean survey vessel, estimated to cost 20–24 billion yen, to gauge the size of the underwater reserves in the Sea. Since July 2004 Japan has charted a Norwegian ship for the research. In January 2005 two Japanese oil firms sought permission from their government to drill for oil and gas in a disputed area in the East China Sea. Tokyo was expected to grant approval and subsidies to the two companies (AFP 2004f; Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2004, 2005; SCMP 2005c). The United States had urged the two countries to exercise restraint over the issue. Although the US claims that it is nonpartisan in the maritime dispute, it is rather generally believed by China that it is part of Japan’s national strategy to side with the US to contain China (Zhang 2004).

Another

flashpoint in China’s offshore areas is the South China Sea. In

spite of the fact that China and ASEAN signed in November 2002 a joint declaration on the code of conduct regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the Chinese Academy of Sciences has established a research centre in Guangzhou for exploring and developing natural gas hydrates in the South China Sea and sent a research team to the Sea in June 2004 (Wiest 2004a). Apparently with an aim to demonstrate its presence and authority in the area, Vietnam, a claimant to the disputed Spratly Islands, sent a group of tourists to the islands in April 2004 and announced four months later that it would start commercial flights to an island in the atolls (FEER 2004a; Richardson 2004b). Departing from a long-standing unwritten convention in China’s oil industry that CNPC concentrates on onshore oil exploration and production while CNOOC is dominant in offshore activities, Beijing has allowed CNPC to step into the South China Sea. This bears testimony to China’s determination to speed up exploring oil and gas resources in the area (IHT 2004a; Xiao 2004). In September 2004 two

Chinese and Filipino state oil companies reached a deal on

research on parts of the Spratly Islands when the Philippine President

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo visited China. The two countries began to hold discussions about joint exploration in the islands in 2003 after CNOOC sealed an agreement with the exploration arm of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) in November 2003 to study the possibility of joint explo- ration and production in the South China Sea and in the Philippines. The talks between the two state-owned oil enterprises followed a visit by Wu Bang- guo, chairman of China’s National People’s Congress, to the Philippines in August–September 2003 (Mai 2003b; Reuters 2003a, 2003b). Although both countries wished to play down the significance of the three-year agreement to do joint marine seismic work signed by PNOC and CNOOC, it has been believed that the deal would arouse the ire of rival claimants to the disputed territories in the South China Sea. Vietnam complained that the two coun- tries had violated the agreement on the code of conduct on the South China Sea (AFP 2004c).34 More importantly, the deal opened the way for China to promote bilateral discussions about energy exploration as well as accommo- dation of the territorial conflict (Boyd 2004; Dickie and Landingin 2004; Tan 2004). It remains to be seen whether the

agreement would rekindle tensions in the region, particularly when and if the two companies find potential oil and gas reserves in the area. One month later, however, the Vietnamese government came under strong criticism from China for its ‘unilateral’ oil exploration near the disputed Spratly Islands (Reuters 2004a). Another area of concern in Southeast Asia is the Strait of Malacca through which about 80 per cent of China’s imported oil passes.
Chinese energy ana- lysts have proposed various measures to reduce dependence on shipping oil through the Strait for fear that the Strait would come under American con- trol. Earlier in March 2004 Admiral Thomas Fargo, commander of US Pacific Command, proposed a Regional Maritime Security Initiative whereby the US would cooperate with regional countries to combat terrorism and piracy around the Strait. Initially the US proposed to station its elite forces to pa- trol the Strait, together with Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Only with the opposition of Indonesia and Malaysia, could the four countries agree that the vital waterway would be jointly patrolled by the three littoral states (Burton and Donnan 2004a, 2004b; IHT 2004b). The Strait has evolved into the latest issue at the forefront of the rivalry between China and Japan. Singapore’s Defence Minister Teo Chee Hean said in December 2004 that the joint patrols of the Strait would be more effective if other like-minded countries, including Japan, could participate. In a prompt response, Japan indicated that it was willing to offer assistance to boost the security of the Strait (Dow Jones 2004; Huanqiu shibao, December 13, 2004: 2; Jakarta Post 2004). Some Chinese analysts argue that the US would use strengthening maritime security as a pretext to exercise dominance in the vital shipping lane and consequently threaten China’s oil security. Accordingly, a num- ber of alternative oil transportation routes, which would enable oil delivery bypassing the Strait, have been proposed. One of them is to build a canal through the Kra Isthmus in southern Thailand, through which oil tankers would go from the Andaman Sea to the Gulf of Thailand. Another alterna- tive is to develop the port of Gwadar in southwestern Pakistan, followed by a pipeline to Xinjiang over the Karakoram Pass. The third option, proposed by China’s Yunnan provincial government, is to build an oil pipeline from Myanmar’s western deepwater port of Sittwe in the Bay of Bengal to the city of Kunming in Yunnan. It seems that China is less interested in the Thai waterway than

Continued…
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…Continued
in the Burmese project simply for the reason that Thailand is an ally of the US, which has military bases in the country. However, for the Burmese pipeline to be operational, China has to invest massively in the in- frastructure of refineries in Kunming as well as a network of pipelines taking the oil products to coastal consumers. The viability of the Pakistani route is also in doubt because it has to pass through the politically volatile Kashmir area on the border of Pakistan and India with China (21 shiji jingji baodao, December 30, 2004: 30; Jingji cankao bao [Beijing], August 2, 2004: 2; Shijie zhishi, July 1, 2004: 46–51; December 16, 2004: 25; Wen Wei Po, January 10, 2005: A20; Becker 2004; Lam 2004; Richardson 2004c; Tschang 2004). China’s voracious appetites for oil and its worldwide quest for oil security have also fuelled the concerns of India, another Asian fast-growing economy, about its own energy security. In recent years Indian domestic annual oil pro- duction has been stagnant at more or less 36 million tonnes while its annual oil consumption had risen steadily to 113 million tonnes in 2003 from 63 mil- lion tonnes in 1993 (British Petroleum 2004: 7, 10). The

South Asian country

relies on overseas supplies for 70 per cent of its crude-oil demand. Akin to

the strategy used by China, India has strengthened its presence in oil-rich countries to secure its oil supplies. In January 2005, India’s Oil and National Gas Corporation (ONGC) was reportedly in talks with Russia about investing in Yukos shortly after the auction for Yuganskneftegaz. ONGC could spend as much as US$2 billion for a 15 per cent stake. Subir Raha, the Corporation’s chairman and managing director, has said that India and China would be engaging in fierce competition over energy sources. Mani Shanker Aiyar, India’s Minister of Petroleum and National Gas, was touring Kazakhstan and Russia in February 2005. In Moscow he met Rosneft’s head, Sergei Bogdanchikov, as well as his Russian counterpart, Viktor Khristenko, and reportedly expressed interest in acquiring stakes in Yuganskneftegaz. In the same month, a subsidiary of ONGC also clinched a 25-year deal with Na- tional Iranian Oil Company to import liquefied natural gas and develop two Iranian oilfields, including Yadavaran, in which China has also invested, and a gasfield. India shows an interest in importing gas from Myanmar through Bangladesh. While it battles with China for oil resources in West Africa, notably in Angola, India is exploring the possibilities of investing in the oil industry in Ecuador in South America and in Saudi Arabia. As a sign of his worries about China’s relative gains, Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, said in January 2005 that his government would restructure state- owned oil firms to enable them to compete with China over oil (AFP 2004e; Bhadrakumar 2005; Bradsher 2005; Browne et al. 2005; Buckley et al. 2005; Ghosh 2005; IHT 2005; Luce and Morrison 2005; SCMP 2005e; White et al.  2005).35

China’s search for oil security has opened up a new contentious issue in the country’s foreign policy. A

couple of great and middle powers are involved in China’s bid to enhance its energy security. The oil diplomacy
international institutions, China has called for strengthening regional energy cooperation.36 In the years to come, one

also has much bearing on one of the guiding principles of China’s foreign relations in the twenty-first century decided by the Chinese Communist Party in its 16th National Congress in November 2002, namely cementing friendly ties with neighbouring countries and building good-neighbourly relations and partnership with them (Jiang 2002). Recently, in meetings of regional

might need to closely monitor and examine whether China, in seeking to satisfy its surging demand for energy resources, could cooperate and resolve
conflicts with the major powers of Russia, Japan and India, as well as the United States, and with the middle powers in the south, or unfortunately exacerbate actual or potential tensions with them. 

Chinese energy demand leads to US-Sino competition, and Asian political instability
Bremmer, World Policy Institute Senior Fellow, Eurasia Group President, 1/24/2005
[Ian, "Are the U.S. and China on a collision course?," http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2005/01/24/8234063/index.htm]

The demand for commodities has sharpened China's traditional political rivalries in Asia as well. There have been recent conflicts with Japan in the East China Sea and with Vietnam in the South China Sea, which has oil and gas reserves. Conflicts among China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan over sovereignty aren't new. But they are intensifying as China's aggressiveness grows with its demand for energy. China and the U.S. are also likely to compete for oil in Russia. The U.S. wants to reduce its energy dependence on Persian Gulf states by using cooperative pipeline projects to move oil through Siberia to Murmansk, where it can be put in tankers and shipped across the Pacific. But China also wants that oil to
fuel its economy.

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Food Security Add-On
( ). Food Security A. China’s reliance on coal leads to a food crisis
Mattis, National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) Program Associate, 6/21/2006
[Peter, "The Strategic Vulnerability of China's Reliance on Coal," http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2874.html]

Coal extraction and resulting mine tailings contribute in part to China’s already serious problem of losing agricultural land to urbanization, economic development and pollution. Moreover, mining and washing coal, particularly by small producers, is contributing to the water shortages already prevalent throughout the country. With 28 percent of the world’s population but only seven percent of its arable land, China cannot afford to continue destroying its most fertile agricultural areas for the sake of economic development—lest it bring about a food crisis. This is what Premier Wen Jiabao was
referring to when he discussed the loss of Chinese farmland in his speech introducing the “New Socialist Countryside” (Renmin Ribao, March 6). The combination of the fact that only 28 percent of China’s coal is washed, water shortages in coal-producing areas, and the potential for an agricultural crisis mean that washing coal—one of the most common methods for producing cleaner burning coal—is simply not an option for China (Asian Development Bank, 2002).

B. Food crisis outweighs – prioritize starvation impacts even if it leads to extinction
LaFollette, South Florida University Ethics Chair, 2003
[Hugh, "World Hunger," http://www.stpt.usf.edu/hhl/papers/World.Hunger.htm] Those who claim the relatively affluent have this strong obligation must, among other things, show why Hardin's projections are either morally irrelevant or mistaken. A hearty few take the former tack: they claim we have a strong obligation to aid the starving even if we would eventually become malnourished. On this view, to survive on lifeboat earth, knowing that

others were tossed overboard into the sea of starvation, would signify an indignity and callousness worse than extinction (Watson 1977). It would be morally preferable to die struggling to create a decent life for all than to continue to live at the expense of the starving. However, most who think we ought to feed the starving will claim, or imply, that if
feeding the starving had the terrible consequences Hardin predicts, then we should not feed them (Singer 1977/1972: 34). Therefore, most who reject Hardin’s neo-Malthusianism must show that the projected consequences are at least implausible, if not demonstrably wrong. To set the stage for showing that Hardin’s views are wrong, I must first describe the developmental alternative.

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Pollution Add-On
( ). Pollution A. China’s reliance on coal leads to mass pollution – this leads to mass death in rural and urban populations
Mattis, National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) Program Associate, 6/21/2006
[Peter, "The Strategic Vulnerability of China's Reliance on Coal," http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2874.html]

China’s reliance on coal has a number of consequences for both the Chinese citizenry and the environment. The high sulfur content of much of Chinese coal results in high levels of sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions that not only aggravates respiratory and heart problems but also contributes to the toxification of water resources and desertification through acid rain. Additionally, mine tailings, particularly from smaller producers, play a noticeable role in the already substantial loss of
Chinese farmland each year. The impressive economic growth of China in the last 25 years has tangibly improved the overall standard of living. Nevertheless, the resulting pollution—especially that from increased coal burning—has had a substantial toll on human life. In both urban and rural areas, diseases aggravated by SO2 inhalation account for 30 to 35 percent of the mortality rate (World Health Organization, 2005). A World Bank report estimated that 178,000 people die each year due to high ambient pollution levels in urban centers brought about in large part by industrial coal usage. Household use accounts for an additional 111,000 premature deaths (World Bank, 1997). While these statistics are somewhat dated, the air pollution problem has indeed

worsened as coal consumption has increased.

B. Deaths from pollution outweigh – systemic impacts come first
Rescher 83, “Risk: A Philosophical introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation and Management,” p. 50 The worst possible case fixation is one of the most damaging modes of unrealism in deliberations about risk in real-life situations. Preoccupation about what might happen “if worst comes to worst” is counterproductive whenever we proceed without recognizing that, often as not, these worst possible outcomes are widely improbable (and sometimes do not deserve to be viewed as real possibilities at all). The crux in risk deliberations is not the issue of loss “if worst comes to worst” but the potential acceptability of this prospect within the wider framework of the risk situation, where we may well be prepared “to take our chances,” considering the possible advantages that beckon along this route. The worst
threat is certainly something to be borne in mind and taken into account, but it is emphatically not a satisfactory index of the overall seriousness or gravity of a situation of hazard.

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WATER POLLUTION CAUSES DISEASE SPREAD.
Chieko Ito July 2005. “Urbanization and Water Pollution in China” Chieko Ito has a Master of public policy degree specializing in Development Administration. http://dspace.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/43193/1/PDP05-13.pdf - Sanchez The deterioration of water quality in China seriously affects the inhabitants. For example, the residents in Chongqing and Guangyuan are suffering from diseases due to water pollution from industrial wastewater (Searchina 2004ab). Another serious problem is unsafe drinking water. According to Chinanet (2005), 300 million people in China cannot drink water which passes the standard for safe drinking, and some people in villages are suffering from diseases due to unsafe drinking water, like in Chongqing and Guangyuan. This problem that people are drinking unsafe water does not occur only in rural areas. Even in urban areas, sources of drinking water are polluted. For instance, only 31 of 47 major cities in China passed the national standard for the quality of sources for drinking water (People daily 2004). This means that people in 16 major cities in China are in danger of drinking unsafe water if appropriate water treatment is not carried out. Thus, it is essential for China to solve the water pollution problem.

POLLUTION CAUSES ACID RAIN IN CHINA
Environmental Science & Technology, January 15, 2006 / Volume 39 / Issue 2 http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/journals/esthag-a/40/i02/html/011506feature_larssen.html# Environmental Science & Technology is a peer-reviewed scientific journal- Sanchez Acid rain emerged as an important environmental problem in China in the late 1970s. Many years of record economic growth have been accompanied by increased energy demand, greater coal combustion, and larger emissions of pollutants. As a result of significant emissions and subsequent deposition of sulfur, widespread acid rain is observed in southern and southwestern China. In fact, the deposition of sulfur is in some places higher than what was reported from the “black triangle” in central Europe in the early 1980s. In addition, nitrogen is emitted from agriculture, power production, and a rapidly increasing number of cars. As a result, considerable deposition of pollutants occurs in forested areas previously thought to be pristine. Little is known about the effects of acid deposition on terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems in China. In this article, we present the current situation and what to expect in the future, largely on the basis of results from a five-year Chinese–Norwegian cooperative project. In the years ahead, new environmental challenges must be expected if proper countermeasures are not put into place. Acid rain, acidification, and their environmental consequences Acid deposition is formed from SO2 and NOx emitted to the atmosphere, largely because of fossil-fuel combustion. The most important sources are energy production, especially coal- and oil-fired power plants, and transportation sources, such as vehicles and ships. The air pollutants are transformed in the atmosphere to H2SO4 and HNO3, transported across distances potentially as far as hundreds of kilometers, and deposited as precipitation (wet deposition) and as gas and particles (dry deposition). Alkaline dust and NH3 are other important components. These compounds act to neutralize the acids. The main source of NH3 to the atmosphere is agriculture. Although NH3 neutralizes acidity in precipitation, the resulting NH4+ contributes to acidification of soil and surface water through chemical processes in the soil. Alkaline dust in the atmosphere can, for instance, be particles of limestone (CaCO3) or CaO. The sources of alkaline dust are many; some are natural (e.g., windblown dust from deserts) and some anthropogenic (e.g., industrial and construction activities). Such alkaline dust can neutralize much of the acidity from the SO2 by forming neutral CaSO4, instead of H2SO4, in the atmosphere. Acid rain has been a well-known environmental problem for decades and can lead to acidification of surface waters and soils. Surface-water acidification has caused widespread loss of fish populations, especially in Scandinavia but also in the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. Severe forest dieback caused by direct SO2 damage has been noticed repeatedly in the vicinity of emission sources over the centuries. In the 1980s, forest decline was observed to be widespread and far from emission sources in central Europe. Although other stress factors were present, the forest losses created concern over the effects of soil acidification, which was hypothesized to damage trees through mechanisms involving aluminum toxicity and nutrient deficiency.

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Pollution Add-On – Link EXTN
China has mass pollution Stern senior fellow at Center for American Progress, Antholis managing director of Brookings Institution, A Changing Climate: The Road Ahead for the United States, Washington Quarterly, Winter 08 [“A Changing Climate: The Road Ahead for the United States,” Winter 07/08http://www.twq.com/08winter/docs/08winter_stern.pdf, Chinikamwala] Sixteen of the world’s 20 most polluted cities are in China, particulate pollution in Beijing is six times higher than in New York, and premature deaths from respiratory disease are estimated in a joint World Bank/China research project at 750,000 per year.12 Water pollution is just as bad. Ninety percent of the aquifers in China’s cities are polluted, and more than 75 percent of river water in urban areas is unsuitable for drinking or fishing. This is not just China’s problem. On any given day, 25 percent of the particulate pollution in Los Angeles is made in China, as is the acid rain problem in Japan and Korea.

Chinese energy consumption results in mass domestic pollution
Podesta, Center for American Progress President and CEO, Deutch, MIT Professor, and Ogden, Center for American Progress National Security and International Policy Program Coordinator, January 2007
[John, John, Peter, "China's Energy Challenge,” http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F848DF23CA704F5%7D/CMTCFINAL052307.PDF] The health and environmental threats posed by China’s emissions are not purely domestic con- cerns. Clouds of sulfur and other pollutants from China’s coal power plants are drifting offshore and affecting China’s neighbors, and the impact of its carbon emissions on global warming is growing more severe each week. In 2005, China built about 75 large coal power plants, each of which emits about 15,000 metric tons of CO 2each day.

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Sino-Russia Relations Add-On (1/2)
( ). Sino-Russia Relations A. Chinese energy needs cause a collapse in Sino-Russia relations
Lee, Hong Kong Open University Public Administration and Liberal Studies Leader and Assistant Professor, June 2005
[Pak, "China’s quest for oil security: oil (wars) in the pipeline?," The Pacific Review 18.2] Aspiring to be a major, independent oil exporting country, Russia under Vladimir Putin is tightening its grip on the country’s oil industry by grant- ing state-owned companies monopoly rights in pipeline operations.22 The pipeline going to Nakhodka instead of Daqing would allow Russia to under- take oil diplomacy not only with such East Asian countries as China, Japan and South Korea but also possibly with the United States. Feeling the need to reduce over-reliance on Middle Eastern oil, the West, particularly the US, has looked to Russia – the world’s second-largest oil exporter, behind Saudi Arabia – as a new source of crude oil. Western oil conglomerates such as BP, ConocoPhillips and TotalFinaElf have made inroads into the country’s oil sector (Arvedlund and Mouawad 2004; OGJ 2004).23 Also, Russia antic- ipates that untapped oil resources in its Far East could be developed as a result of the Pacific route, boosting the economies of the less developed re- gion. In addition, according to Igor Rogachev, Russia’s ambassador to China, Russia does not want its exports to China to be limited to raw materials and primary products. Rather, it is at pains to promote its energy equipment and technology to the Chinese market (Huanqiu shibao, September 22, 2004: 20). With regard to national interests, there are obvious grounds for Russia not to opt for the Daqing route. In contrast, China is concerned about the steady inflow of oil from the north. With worries about the possible forced sell-off of Yukos, China in August 2004 sought reassurances from Moscow that oil deliveries would not be adversely affected (Chazan and Robbins 2004).24 China has also resented the abolition of the pipeline option after a lengthy process of negotiations. It would undermine China’s trust in the credibility of the Russian government and the basis of the ‘elite-initiated and elite-managed’ strategic partnership between the two powers (quoted in Dittmer 2004: 336; see also Huanqiu shibao, October 20, 2003: 3; Feng and Xiang 2004: 205). In the wake of the demise of the Daqing project, it was reported that China raised the thresholds

for Russia to join the World Trade Organization, requiring Russia to raise the domestic prices of natural gas to international levels (Ta Kung Pao, July 30, 2004: A4; 21 shiji jingji baodao, September 23, 2004: 6).25 With the disparity in the relative national power of China and Russia widening, there is likelihood that Russia seeks to offset Chinese growing influence by aligning itself with Japan, which, like Russia, is a declining power in Northeast Asia.26 Except in arms transfers, the bilateral relations and common interests between China and Russia seem to be more in word than in deed.

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Sino-Russia Relations Add-On (2/2)
B. Russian-Chinese relations are necessary to prevent border conflicts- empirically proven
The Hindu, July 15, 2001 [ Russia to sign friendship pact, http://www.hinduonnet.comlthehindu/2001 /07/1 6/stories/03 1 6000c.htm]

For Russia. the treaty is important as a guarantee that the two countries will not revert to hostility and border conflicts that marred their relations in the 1960s and 1970s Under their new treaty, Russia and China will renounce territorial claims to each other “This is very important in view of the 4,000-km border between our two countries, and considering the
tortuous history of border delimitation talks that have dragged on for the past several decades,” the highly- placed Russian diplomat said. To date, Russia and China have demarcated 98 per cent of their border, but are still at logs over three strategically placed islands in the mouth of the Amur river in the Far East. In 1969, the two countries came close to a full fledaed war, when China attempted to take by force the Damansky Island on the Amur. Russia is also worried about massive illegal migration of Chinese to its sparsely populated Siberia and the Far East. Some Russian analysts believe that China’s

traditional expansionism, a by its population boom and a growing shortage of resources, poses a direct threat to Russia “America’s military threat to Russia is purely mythical, whereas China’s military threat is patently obvious but for some
reason there is a taboo to debate it in this country,” Dr. Alexander Sharavin of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis wrote in the influential Izvestia daily on Saturday. “ China’s territorial claims to Russia have been consistent and unrelenting.

C. Russian-Chinese border conflicts escalate to full-scale nuclear war- ensuring nuclear winter
Alexander Sharavin, Director of the Political and Military Analysis Institute, 2001 [ THIRD THREAT: Russia is overlooking the increasing military might of China,” Sept 28, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 28, http://www.cdi.orglrussia/johnsonl547O.html]

Russia may face the “wonderful” prospect of combating the Chinese army, which if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia’s entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II It would require from
our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such “trifles” like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out,what would exhaust Russia’s armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the “Chechen” and the “Balkan” variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter An aforementioned prospect is, undoubtedly, rather disagreeable and we would not like to believe it can be true. However, it is a realistic prospect just like a war against NATO or Islamic extremists.

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AT: Central Asia DA (1/2)
<Read impact extensions / add-on for Central Asia>

1. No link – China has already invested in Kazakhistan, the link is not reverse causal
Ma, Petroleum Economist, Dundee University Center for Energy, Petroleum and mineral law and policy doctoral candidate, December 2007
[Xin, "Geopolitics of Energy: China and the Central Asia," Insight Turkey, CIAO]

By the end of this decade Kazakhstan will likely become a vital part of China's energy security response measures. China has already made a major coup with its investments in Kazakhstan, implementing its intention to function as a highly visible, major player in the country's oil and gas development and helping to create alternative hydrocarbon export
outlets. The resources China has acquired and stands to acquire in the future, by whatever path they may reach China (e.g. from the proposed visionary "Energy Silk Route" pipeline system), will considerably help China's efforts to diversify import sources and bring them closer to home in a geopolitical sense.

2. Chinse-Kazakhistan ties inevitable – strategic interests goes beyond energy deals
Ma, Petroleum Economist, Dundee University Center for Energy, Petroleum and mineral law and policy doctoral candidate, December 2007
[Xin, "Geopolitics of Energy: China and the Central Asia," Insight Turkey, CIAO]

China's quest for energy security is one key reason for its expanding energy linkages with Kazakhstan, but other reasons are equally important, i.e. border security, ethnic unrest in Xinjiang and access to burgeoning consumer markets in Central Asia. Beijing is also fashioning itself as an alternative political and economic development model, conscious of the fact that the Western-dictated structures have led to resentment in this country. Astana and Beijing have so far signed 11 co-operation agreements in various fields since 1993. Efforts to expand economic and commercial relations have resulted in tremendous success as bilateral trade has grown $6.8 bn in 2005--an increase of more
than 16 times in 14 years.

3. No Central Asia diversification – Russia retains power through assassinations
Stratfor, 4/11/2008
["Kazakhstan: The Chinese Connection"]

Russia is likely to begrudge China for wheeling and dealing in what it considers its backyard. However, with Russia’s ties to Kazakhstan gradually weakening, its only remaining tool to prevent China from making too many inroads is the FSB. The FSB could react against Kazakhstan’s economic promiscuity by conducting targeted assassinations. But this is not a strategy of first resort, as it risks attracting too much attention. Even without killing people, the FSB can exercise its power over political figures in Kazakhstan to prevent the country from drifting too far out of Russia’s orbit.

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AT: Central Asia DA (2/2)
4. Central Asia instability inevitable – water conflicts
Golovnina, Reuters staff writer, 6/12/2008
[Maria, "Water squabbles irrigate tensions in Central Asia," http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USL064196320080612]

Central Asia is one of the world's driest places where, thanks to 70 years of Soviet planning, thirsty crops such as cotton and
grain remain the main livelihood for most of the 58 million people. Disputes over cross-border water use have simmered for years in this sprawling mass of land wedged between Iran, Russia and China. Afghanistan, linked to Central Asia by the Amu Daria river, is adding to the tension by claiming its own share of the water.

Water shortages are causing concern the world over, because of rising demand, climate change and swelling populations. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has said water scarcity is a "potent fuel for wars and conflict". Analysts say this year's severe weather fluctuations in Central Asia -- from a record cold winter to devastating spring floods and now drought -- are causing extra friction. "Water is very political. It's very sensitive. It can be a pretext for disputes or conflicts," said Christophe Bosch, a Central Asia water expert at the World Bank. "It is one of the major irritants between countries in Central Asia."

5. China-Central Asia ties inevitable – Chinese railways overwhelm energy links
Stratfor, 1/31/2008
["China: Railroading Central Asia,"] Stratfor has written previously about China’s developing petroleum links to Central Asia. Beijing is constructing a series of oil and natural gas pipelines that will shunt Central Asian petroleum east to China instead of north to Russia. But that is only part of the picture. China is also in the midst of an equally aggressive effort to harness the region’s rail network. Pipelines are certainly

important in orienting a country’s geopolitics, but rail lines allow for two-way trade and deep economic penetration that involves the entire populace. Energy, in comparison, only involves a very few people and writing checks to the producing country. Rails, far more than pipes, are truly the ties that bind.
Of the five Central Asian states’ 11 major rail connections to the outside world, only two — one connecting Turkmenistan to Iran and one linking Kazakhstan to China — do not lead to Russia. This simple fact has left the region firmly in Russia’s economic orbit, despite the fact that the Soviet Union dissolved nearly 20 years ago. This is changing — and quickly. Within the past few months, China has broken ground on two projects to link itself to Central Asia via railways. One will link Kazakhstan’s Almaty region to China’s rail network via the border town of Korgas. The other will link the Chinese city of Kashi — at the terminus of China’s own system — to the Ferghana Valley and on to the Uzbek capital, Tashkent. Both routes also lay the groundwork for later road and pipe connections. Such links would invert the economic relationships that define the region. It is not so much that the Central Asian states wish to be economically integrated with Russia but that they have not had a choice. China’s internal market is more than triple the value of Russia’s, and China’s robust ports are much closer to the Central Asian population centers of Tashkent and Almaty than are Russia’s paltry ports on the Black and Baltic seas. The volume of shipments passing through the single existing rail connection between Kazakhstan and China increased 60 percent in 2007 from a year before. By 2010, both of the new routes are expected to be finished. At that point, anyone shipping goods to Central Asia will have the option of selecting cheaper, and often higher-quality, products from China. Those exporting can elect to send their wares via a cheaper route to a richer market and can access overseas markets that until now have been completely inaccessible. Even if the five Central Asian states do not actively

choose to reduce their contacts with Russia, simply having another option available is certain to weaken links to Russia and strengthen them with China.

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AT: Central Asia DA – #5 Link Inevitable EXTN
Chinese energy deals inevitable
Stratfor, 12/11/2007
[China, Kazakhstan: Pipelines and the Balance of Power]

The Russians have few tools for competing with the growing surge in Chinese power. Economically, the Central Asians would vastly prefer selling their energy to China over Russia — China pays more and connections come with fewer strings attached. There is also the issue of lingering resentment over Soviet imperialism. So unless the Russians are willing to
embrace (and pay for) new export options for the Central Asians, the only remaining option is making the Central Asian leadership too scared of Russian retribution to cooperate with China. This is something with which Moscow has a good deal of experience. But until a few members of Central Asia’s inner circles begin meeting untimely demises, Chinese infrastructure will continue

inching its way across the border, bringing the entire region ever closer to Beijing’s orbit.

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AT: Central Asia DA – Russia Stability Turn
Turn – Russia A. Chinese expansion into Central Asia hurts Russian stability – energy security is key
Stratfor, 8/20/2007
["The Looming Central Asian Battleground"]

Given Gazprom’s technical limitations, without Central Asian natural gas, Gazprom can meet its export requirements for Europe or it can meet domestic demand — not both. And considering that cheap energy acts as a panacea for social disruption at home and is a critical arm of strategic policy abroad, the Chinese decision to grab the ring will muck with Russian geostrategy in Europe, Central Asia and even at home.
The game is on.

B. Russian instability guarantees global nuclear war
David, Johns Hopkins University political science professor, 99
[Steven R., "Saving America from the Coming Civil Wars," Foreign Affairs, January, infotrac]

Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia--even though in decline--does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much materiel. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.

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AT: Elections DA – AT: Election Solves Case
Election does not solve the case
Lieberthal, Michigan University China Center Research Associate, William Davidson Institute China Director and Distinguished Fellow, Political Science Professor, and Herberg, National Bureau of Asian Research Asian Energy Security Director, ARCO Strategic Planning group Global Energy and Economics Director, April 2006
[Kenneth, Mikkal, "NBR Analysis," http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?ID=93a9dcaa-b9d5-4601-ac32-93f702696db5]

No upcoming electoral changes will alter the fundamental reality that the U .s . government is ill-suited to producing and implementing a comprehensive energy policy . The disjointed nature of the U .s . political system—with its separation of powers and ample provision for representation of competing interests in the policy process— must be kept in mind as any recommendations for U .s . government action toward China’s energy future are developed . Washington is
always vulnerable to the charge of “preaching what it does not practice” in terms of a national energy policy . The United states is and will remain a relative energy glutton, a country in which energy efficiency and conservation measures are the result of private sector reactions to the market rather than of comprehensive public policy initiatives .

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AT: Elections DA – AT: China Impact
No risk of China relations – new presidents never rock the boat towards China
Lieberthal, Michigan University Professor, January 2007
[Kenneth, “China’s March on the 21st Century,” http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F848DF23CA704F5%7D/CMTCFINAL052307.PDF]] First, every President since Richard Nixon has run for office at least in part on the argument that his predecessor had been

too soft on China. Upon taking office, each has tried either initially to downgrade the attention given to U.S.-China relations or to toughen America’s stance. After a peri- od of time, each has concluded that it does not serve America’s vital national interests to worsen ties with Beijing. The substance of those ties has evolved greatly over this period, but this fundamental Presidential pattern has held true across both political parties and even in the presidencies ofthe most conservative Republicans. This sug- gests that those most responsible for understanding the full array of American national interests consistently conclude that those interests are well served by seeking to engage China where possible. This bodes well for the future U.S.-China relationship.

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AT: States CP (1/3)
1. Modeling A. Federal action is key to modeling – signals a perception of US leadership and commitment, federal inaction gives the international community an excuse to remain inactive B. Modeling is key to solve warming– Asia is at a crossroads NOW – the choice between alt energy and GHG emissions will determine the efficacy of climate change action
Ferry, Suffolk University Law Professor, Harvard Law School Visiting Professor, 2007
[Steven, THE NEW POWER GENERATION: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ELECTRICITY INNOVATION: COLLOQUIUM ARTICLE: WHY ELECTRICITY MATTERS, DEVELOPING NATIONS MATTER, AND ASIA MATTERS MOST OF ALL," 15 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 113]

The choices for many developing countries are challenging. In the next two decades, there will be a massive electrification of developing nations. During this period, developing nations will choose whether to deploy conventional fossil-fuel-fired or sustainable renewable options to generate electricity. Once installed, those facilities will remain in place, contributing to global warming or not, often for forty years, and in many cases longer. These are "hard" infrastructure choices. Experience in the U.S. demonstrates that older fossil-fuel-fired power plants, at the
conclusion of their originally scheduled lives, typically are refitted with new burners, boilers, and fuel-handling equipment and extended for additional decades. n163 Moreover, once the [*158] transmission infrastructure is established to carry power out of a large fossil-fuel-fired plant to load centers, this creates a transmission and distribution (T&D) corridor, system hardware, and distribution patterns that require a centralized large power generation facility at that terminus of the transmission corridor. Electric T&D facilities, telecommunications equipment, and oil and gas pipelines have relatively long lives. n164 Once a T&D system is created to link centralized generation with distribution, it becomes an embedded "hard" infrastructure. This is where distributed generation and renewable technologies may offer some accommodation: they either can be placed on-site at existing centralized generation locations or distributed solar technologies can be sited at many dispersed locations. Like a highway grid, once configured, locational and use patterns that grow up around that grid make it more difficult later to reroute those electric highways. "Hard" infrastructure choices of any kind, once embedded in the physical and distributional fabric of a country, are not easily removed or altered. This is not to say that one can not later substitute a fossil-fuel-fired unit that has reached the end of its useful life with a new renewable unit, but it is often impracticable. Conventional fossil-fuel-fired projects typically have been sited either (1) where fuel supply, transmission off-take capacity, and cooling water resources coincide, or (2) in transmission proximity to population and load centers. n165 Renewable technologies must go to the place where they can be exploited: only in certain locations is the wind regime sufficient to turn large wind turbines; hydro power is limited to moving water courses; solar photovoltaic power, while ubiquitous, requires a large land/surface area to produce the amount of power equivalent to the power produced by a large fossil-fuel-fired facility (solar power is much less dense than fossil fuels) - though solar collectors can be mounted on roofs or walls and provide a double benefit by functioning as both a roof and electricity generator. n166 Therefore, it does not follow that older fossil-fuel-fired facilities can or will be replaced at their sites with renewable power technologies. With a mature T&D system in place, the total [*159] system economics and technical considerations may militate in favor of continuing the existing fossil-fuel facilities. Therefore, while not diminishing the importance of renewable technologies gradually replacing existing but obsolete fossil-fuelfired facilities in developed systems, the critical challenge is what is now deployed in developing nations to meet rising demand and extension of service to previously unserved areas. This is where there is population growth, pressure for rapid electrification, and a developing infrastructure that can accommodate either renewable or conventional technologies: "Developing countries

offer unique opportunities for cultivating sustainable energy in large part because the bulk of their energy demands and investments still lie before them." n167 There is no expectation that any nation will deploy exclusively fossil-fuel or only renewable electric generation technologies. It is not an "either/or" choice. However, the balance chosen between conventional and alternative electric resources has immense implications for the emission of GHGs. The critical timing of these decisions is now. And Asia, with 60% of forecast future world electrification in one continent alone, is the key ground on which this battle to limit GHGs must be won. While decisions in all developing nations are important, one can not lose the battle against global warming in Asia, and make up the loss in other nations. Therefore, Asia is the laboratory, and electricity is the crucible, which will determine the global warming mix.

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AT: States CP (2/3)
AND – Asia stability A. Expanding alt. energy into Asia is key to growth – reliable energy solves development
Moore, National Renewable Energy Laboratory Chief Economist, Former CA Energy Industry Regulator, Spring 2005
[Michal, "SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND SMART ENERGY: RENEWABLE TECHNOLOGIES TO POWER AND EMPOWER THE DEVELOPING WORLD," 16 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 377, lexis]

Energy is the driver that underlies all economic growth and change in modern societies. Without access to energy sources that are affordable and reliable, no nation will attain or maintain the competitive base needed to improve or advance the lot of its citizens. Although many argue that access to such critical elements as food and water constitute the most
important concerns to developing nations, n1 as a practical matter, the absence of energy to both transform raw materials and provide heating, lighting, and transportation ultimately serves to limit a nation's prosperity - access to water and food only insures a nation's survival, not its strength. The realization that modern society is running short of traditional energy sources has dawned in capitals all over the world. n2 Trading [*379] markets already recognize this fact. For example, natural gas has hit all time highs in the last decade, and when it slows in price, it simply rests at previously attained price plateaus. n3 Oil supplies are considered more and more precious, especially in light of the fact that increasing nationwide reliance on a limited oil supply often creates geopolitical tensions and even outright conflicts. We have discovered that access to oil is not a birthright but a privilege, and with this privilege comes obligation and cost. Even rivers, which have historically been exploited for their energy potential, are now potentially at risk. Shifts in jet stream patterns, whether anthropogenic or not, have made confident reliance on river flows problematic. n4 Without rainfall, rivers cannot run. Without rivers, energy turbines cannot spin - and if that occurs, it may not make a difference whether we want to protect fish or farmers or generate electricity, effective choices will be limited. Although we have access to other energy resources, they are not fully utilized. n5 For example, the wind industry has proven that even with intermittency, wind can make a strong contribution to on-and-off grid electricity generation. n6 Bio-energy resources can generate electricity and chemical compounds, even though they are uniquely local in application. Urban, forest, and agricultural waste products are the ultimate recyclable resources because they are typically renewed or regenerated in less than geologic time scales, as opposed to groundwater or fossil energy supplies. Finally, solar technologies hold great promise, especially in peak load areas available to most developing nations. One of the greatest areas of promise, however, is to mate these [*380] indigenous supplies with a diminished demand for them, or at the very least, a demand with a lower embedded growth rate of its own. Such a combination has great promise to form the

basis of a strong engine for growth; it will work in the face of a great and growing potential for energy and environmental calamity. Developing nations need a new model, because if they embrace the "developed" nations conventional model it may defeat the very thing they are trying to achieve - higher rates of growth, stability, and the opportunity to plan and control their own future.

B. Growth solves conflict
Indra de Soysa, senior research associate at the International Peace Research Institute, 2000, in Greed and Grievance, ed. Berdal and Malone, p. 126 The question is, How can a country escape from resource dependence and manage to innovate? Economic growth is vital because the raising of per capita income proxies innovative capabilities. Bringing about economic growth through development assistance is one obvious answer. Countries with higher per capita wealth are far less likely to suffer internal conflict and are more likely to exhibit strong democracy—which is widely seen as promoting peace and conflict resolution. Thus, renewed efforts at promoting economic growth and democratic institutions seem to be the best long- term strategy for creating what UNESCO has termed “a culture of peace” in the developing world.

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AT: States CP (3/3)
2. Federal action that includes business initiatives is key to solve – federal inaction dooms the counterplan
Dernbach, Widener University Law Professor, Spring 2003
[John, ""LEARING SUSTAINABILITY": SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES: SYMPOSIUM HELD AT THE UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO LAW SCHOOL, OCTOBER 13, 2001: Toward a National Sustainable Development Strategy," 10 Buff. Envt'l. L.J. 69] It is unquestionably true that nonfederal actors need to play a significant role in any U.S. strategy to achieve sustainable development. Indeed, as already suggested, it is difficult to conceive of an effective strategy that does not involve every level of government and every sector of society. But it does not follow that the federal government cannot, or should not, also have a major role. To begin with, some of the sustainable development commitments that the United States has agreed to are contained in treaties to which the it is a party. The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change is an example. That convention specifically requires parties, and especially developed country parties, to develop a strategy to address climate change. n130 Few would argue that the federal government can fulfill that requirement by having others do all the work. Other sustainable development commitments are contained in Agenda 21 or similar texts, and thus are not legally binding. Yet those commitments can only be met if there is significant action at the national level. As the United States already knows from several decades of experience, for instance, it is difficult to protect air and water quality without a strong federal presence. Moreover, a properly implemented national strategy would not simply have the federal government impose more "top down" obligations through regulation. Much of the unsustainable development occurring in the United States is driven by laws and subsidies whose modification or removal would have a positive and powerful effect on sustainable development. Much more sustainable development also would occur if the federal government set a better [*107] example in its own operations. In these and many other ways, the federal government can play a significant role without resorting solely or even primarily to more regulation. In sum, if there is a "primarily nonfederal" strategy, it could not be described as an effective means of integrating national objectives. It may have symbolic value, but it does not address issues that need to be addressed at the national

level; does not represent the level of effort or commitment we need to prevent things from getting worse; and does not take advantage of the economic and other opportunities provided by sustainable development.

3. Federal action is key to solve – creates mindset shift in national and private strategy
Dernbach, Widener University Law Professor, Spring 2003
[John, ""LEARING SUSTAINABILITY": SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES: SYMPOSIUM HELD AT THE UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO LAW SCHOOL, OCTOBER 13, 2001: Toward a National Sustainable Development Strategy," 10 Buff. Envt'l. L.J. 69]

An effective national strategy would help mobilize both governmental and non-governmental actors. Because sustainable development is not likely to happen unless all parts of society are fully engaged, a national strategy is essential to sustainable development. The purpose of a strategy is to "mobilize and focus a society's [*87] efforts to achieve
sustainable development." n61 It would "help to encourage and facilitate institutional and behavioural change for sustainable development." n62 Like a strategy for national defense or economic development, it would ensure that the many needed

actions are guided by an overall sense of purpose; that they reinforce or complement each other rather than undermine or contradict each other; that there are no significant gaps or omissions; and that its purposes are actually achieved. The
problems presented by sustainable development are too important for the United States, alone or in combination with state and local governments, to address. These problems require the active participation of all parts of American society, including

the private sector.
A national strategy would ensure and improve integration among policy objectives. n63 Sustainable development cuts across artificial boundaries between economic, environmental, social, and national security issues. As a result, it involves several goals that need to be accomplished simultaneously, and it is important to find ways of furthering each goal that do not impede or interfere with the accomplishment of other goals. Without some strategic sense of how the nation's security, economic,

environmental, and social objectives are related, and should be realized together, the country will be less able to effectively realize those objectives. Efforts by federal agencies that further social, economic, and environmental goals at the same time are likely to be more efficient than efforts directed at only one goal. An integrated approach is also likely to prevent problems that would cost much more to alleviate later. Most importantly, perhaps, the daunting scope of many of these problems means that they can be resolved only if the government and others act efficiently.
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AT: States CP – Constitutionality DA
State-international cooperation violates the constitution
Reisman, Maine University Economics and Public Policy Associate Professor, 7/24/2002 [Jon, "Statement for the Record of the Joint Committee Hearingon U.S. Environmental Treaties," http://epw.senate.gov/107th/Reisman_072402.htm]
I would like to call the attention of the Committees on Foreign Relations and Environment and Public Works to a troubling development in New England, where all six New England Governors (NEG) have entered into an unconstitutional agreement with the Eastern Canadian Premiers (ECP) to implement the Kyoto Protocol’s caps on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissionsi. In my view, the NEG/ECP climate change agreement: Violates Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution: “No

State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation… No State shall, without the Consent of Congress…enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power…” and Seeks to implement the Kyoto Protocol before the U.S. Senate has ratified it, and when, in fact, it has been rejected explicitly by the President
and implicitly by the terms of Senate Resolution No. 98 by a vote of 95-0. The NEG/ECP climate

change agreement is a transparent attempt to implement the Kyoto Protocol, without reference to the complex terms of the Protocol itself. It calls for reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2010 and to 10% below 1990 levels
by 2020. This level of reduction substantially exceeds the 7% reduction target that the United States would need to meet by 2008-2012 under the Kyoto agreement. Action steps under the NEG/ECP climate agreement include: 1) establishing a regional, standardized greenhouse gas emissions inventory and emissions reduction plan; 2) “educating” the public about the “problem, causes and solutions” of global warming; 3) decreasing emissions from the electricity and transportation sectors, and 4) creating a regional registry and emissions trading mechanism. The New England Governors are scheduled to travel to Quebec this August and likely will sign an agreement with the Eastern Canadian Premiers to begin implementing the unconstitutional pledge they made last year.ii This year, they intend to work out specific goals and implementation schemes. There is settled precedent supporting the position that the NEG/ECP climate agreement violates the U.S. Constitution. In Holmes v. Jennison, Chief Justice Taney emphasized the broad intent of the framers underlying Section 10: “As these words (‘agreement or compact’) could not have been idly or superfluously used by the framers of the Constitution, they cannot be construed to mean the same thing with the word treaty. They evidently mean something more, and were designed to make the prohibition more comprehensive. … The word ‘agreement’ does not necessarily import and direct any express stipulation; nor is it necessary that it should be in writing. … “And the use of all of these terms, ‘treaty,’ ‘agreement,’ ‘compact,’ show that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to use the broadest and most comprehensive terms; and that they anxiously desired to cut off all connection or communication between a State and a foreign power; and we shall fail to execute that evident intention, unless we give to the word ‘agreement’ its most extended signification; and so apply it as to prohibit every agreement, written or verbal, formal or informal, positive or implied, by the mutual understanding of the parties.” 14 Pet. (39 U.S.) 540, 570-572 (1840). In addition to these legal concerns, the policy wisdom of implementing Kyoto may certainly be debated in the face of the National Academy of Sciences’ recent finding that anthropogenic vs. natural causality is still clouded by considerable uncertaintyiii. Correlation is not causation, and the atmospheric models that global warming advocates rely upon predict that the upper atmosphere will warm first, something that has not happened and is still unexplained. Furthermore, those same flawed models predict that the reductions in CO2 envisioned in Kyoto will essentially have no effect on climatevv. The Committee on Foreign Relations should hold a separate inquiry on the purpose and Constitutional legitimacy of the NEG/ECP climate change agreement. Allowing six New England states to move forward to implement the Kyoto Protocol would support the proposition that States are free to ignore Article 1, Section 10, and are at liberty to negotiate and implement international agreements without the advice and consent of the United States Senate. These concerns are far from academic. Suppose, for example, that Vermont had disagreed with the Senate’s rejection of the League of Nations, and had recognized and joined that entity? Article 1, Section 10 exists precisely to avoid such situations. If the Environment and Public Works Committee supports the efforts of New England’s Governors, it should introduce legislation to implement Kyoto’s caps on a nationwide basis, and let

There is absolutely no defensible environmental or economic rationale for piecemeal regional implementation of an international agreement that fails, by its terms, to address future emissions growth by rapidly growing
that legislation be fully debated on the floor of the Senate. developing nations such as China and India. Implementing Kyoto targets on a regional basis would lead only to competitive disadvantage, lost wages and jobs, and larger state budget deficits at a time of increasing economic uncertainty. I hope that the Committees will join me in urging the Administration to notify the New England Governors that the England, even

United States Constitution still applies in New on environmental matters. We have not, as yet, dispensed with the formality of having the President negotiate and the Senate ratify international agreements before we implement them. States are proscribed from making foreign or interstate agreements. That Constitutional principle is at risk here.

Constitutional violations outweigh John A. Eidsmoe is a Constitutional Attorney, Professor of Law at Thomas Goode Jones School of Law and Colonel with the USAF, 1992 3 USAFA J. Leg. Stud. 35, pp. 57-8
Other misfortunes may be borne, or their effects overcome. If disastrous war should sweep our commerce from the ocean, another generation may renew it; if it exhaust our treasury, future industry may replenish it; if it desolate and lay waste our fields, still under a new cultivation, they will grow green again, and ripen to future harvests. It were but a trifle even if the walls of yonder Capitol were to crumble, if its lofty pillars should fall, and its gorgeous decorations be all covered by the dust of the valley. All these might be rebuilt. But who shall reconstruct the fabric of demolished government? Who shall rear again the wellproportioned columns of constitutional liberty? Who shall frame together the skilful architecture which united national sovereignty with State rights, individual security, and public prosperity? No, if these columns fall, they will be raised not again. Like the Coliseum and the Parthenon, they will be destined to a mournful, a melancholy immortality. Bitterer tears, however, will flow over them, than were ever shed over the remnants of a more glorious edifice than Greece or Rome ever saw, the edifice of constitutional American liberty. It is possible that a constitutional convention could take place and none of these drastic consequences would come to pass. It is possible to play Russian roulette and emerge without a scratch; in fact, with only one bullet in the chamber, the odds of being shot are only one in six. But when the stakes are as high as one's life, or the constitutional system that has shaped this nation into what it is today, these odds are too great to take the risk.

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AT: States CP – Leadership DA
National action is key to solve US leadership
Dernbach, Widener University Law Professor, Spring 2003
[John, ""LEARING SUSTAINABILITY": SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES: SYMPOSIUM HELD AT THE UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO LAW SCHOOL, OCTOBER 13, 2001: Toward a National Sustainable Development Strategy," 10 Buff. Envt'l. L.J. 69]

A national sustainable development strategy would lead to a stronger and more efficient country that provides greater opportunities and quality of life for its citizens. The United States would be stronger and more efficient because it would be pursuing social, economic, environmental, and security goals in ways that are more and more mutually reinforcing or supportive over time, not contradictory or antagonistic. A national strategy would ensure that [*73] the health of the
nation's natural environment improves at the same time that other goals are accomplished. A national strategy would also engage all sectors of society in the work of sustainable development, which is essential because sustainable development cannot be accomplished by government alone.

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AT: States CP – AT: Uniform Action Good
Uniform state action dooms effective action – leads to horsetrading weakening the overall system
Engel, Arizona University Law Professor, 2005
[Kristen, "Colloquium Article: MITIGATING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES: A REGIONAL APPROACH," 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 54] The real world dynamics of regional cooperation on climate change need to be examined empirically to determine whether these predictions are born out by practice. It is possible that regional cooperation could be functioning altogether differently [*73] than theory would suggest. Instead of leading to greater action on climate change, regional cooperation could possibly be leading to less. This could be the case if regional cooperation is occurring at the behest of politicians in state A that are generally opposed to addressing climate change in order to curb the activities of neighbor state B that is taking more aggressive actions to address climate change. The motivation of state A would be to reduce the apparent gap between jurisdictions which might otherwise reflect badly on the politicians opposed to the programs. Politicians from the states addressing climate change might join such regional arrangements as a way of both satisfying their environmental constituency (because they are clearly taking action on climate change) and, at the same time, satisfying the opposing constituency because their activities are capped at what their neighbors are doing - they are at least not going out "ahead" of their peers on the issue of climate change.

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AT: States CP – Modeling Link EXTN
Federal action is key bilateral action – only the plan fosters international cooperation
Dernbach, Widener University Law Professor, Spring 2003
[John, ""LEARING SUSTAINABILITY": SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES: SYMPOSIUM HELD AT THE UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO LAW SCHOOL, OCTOBER 13, 2001: Toward a National Sustainable Development Strategy," 10 Buff. Envt'l. L.J. 69]

Effective and supportive national governance is an essential requirement for sustainable development. None of the four broad goals of sustainable development--peace and security, environmental protection and restoration, economic development, and social development or human rights--can be achieved unless national governments work effectively to achieve those goals within their own borders. To be sure, effective national governance will not solve these problems by itself; international cooperation, for instance, is needed on a variety of issues. But in a world of sovereign nations, sustainable development will not happen to any significant extent unless it happens at the national level. Thus it is not surprising that
the texts agreed to at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED or Earth Summit) in 1992 repeatedly state the importance of strengthening the effectiveness of national governments. The ultimate responsibility for sustainable development, Agenda 21 says, rests "first and foremost" with national governments. n9 [*74] Agenda 21 is the global plan of action for sustainable development that was adopted at UNCED. n10

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AT: States CP – Modeling Key EXTN
Modeling is key – Asia is facing a choice between alt energy and GHG emissions – this choice will make or break global action against climate change
Ferry, Suffolk University Law Professor, Harvard Law School Visiting Professor, 2007
[Steven, THE NEW POWER GENERATION: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ELECTRICITY INNOVATION: COLLOQUIUM ARTICLE: WHY ELECTRICITY MATTERS, DEVELOPING NATIONS MATTER, AND ASIA MATTERS MOST OF ALL," 15 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 113]

The war on global warming cannot be won without success in Asia. While the industrialized West currently emits the lion's share of GHGs, Asia's rapidly expanding economies, combined with high population growth with growing wealth and a demand for an energy-intensive Western lifestyle, mean that Asia is on course to vastly increase the level of global GHG emissions if it chooses conventional power generation technologies. China is already the world's second-leading emitter of GHGs, and GHG emissions in India threaten to skyrocket. n117 Reflecting on the GHG formula set forth above - population, industrialization, choice of technology makes clear why Asia is critical in the future of global warming. The U.S. Department of Energy projects energy demand in developing Asia to more
than double over the next twenty-five years. n118 The International Energy Agency in Paris forecasts that two-thirds of all future energy demand will emanate from just China and India. Some projections estimate that by 2020, China's GHG emissions will more than triple 1995 levels, constituting 40% of the world's carbon emissions. n119 Technology

choice, the third variable in the GHG formula, is the critical controllable variable. The future is directly dependent on whether fossil fuels or renewable technologies are chosen now to generate electricity. This is no small choice: it is expected that global energy needs will be almost 60% higher by 2030 if governments fail to change their current policies. n120 There are enough conventional fossil resources in the intermediate term to make this a real choice. n121 Resource economists believe that Asia has fossil fuel reserves enough to last for over 100 years. However, more than 90% of these fossil reserves are coal, and several
of these nations, most notably China, are already highly dependent on coal as their principal energy [*147] source. n122 In 2003 alone, China's oil imports jumped by nearly a third, domestic coal production increased by 100 million tons, and electricity consumption rose by 15%. n123 With regard to industrialization, Chinese total installed electric generation capacity grew from 65 GW in 1980 to 353 GW in 2002, making it the second largest in the world after the United States. n124 Electricity demand between 1996 and 2000 grew at an average of 6.3% annually and is expected nearly to match this pace into the future. n125 In order to avoid shortages and satisfy demand, China would have to increase electric capacity by approximately 40 GW annually. n126 Of this capacity addition, at the Bonn International Conference on Renewable Energies in June 2004, China committed to adding renewable energy to reach an installed capacity for renewable energy of 60 GW by 2010 and 121 GW by 2020. n127 The funding now of renewable energy projects worldwide, and especially in Asia, is necessary to prevent these nations from becoming even more reliant on a fossil fuel-based generation infrastructure. The International Energy Agency projected that it will require an investment of $ 16 trillion by 2030 to meet the world's energy requirements, with $ 5 trillion of that amount allocated to electric power production, primarily in Asia and Africa. n128

Population trends also matter in the GHG equation. Underlying Asia's burgeoning energy demand is the current low per capita energy use base, growing urbanization, and high consumer demand for Western style amenities. Leaving its rural roots,
Asia is migrating rapidly toward an urban future, with rapidly growing per capita energy consumption. By 2025, one [*148] quarter of the world's population will be living in Asian cities. n129 Urbanization and population growth in India have driven a growth of over 200% in India's energy consumption in the last twenty years. n130 In economic conditions where a quarter of the population makes an income of less than a dollar a day, sales

India, despite harsh of consumer goods from shoes to shampoos are rising sharply. n131 In Indonesia, sales of cars and motorbikes are growing annually anywhere from 10-20% on average. n132 China is the
world's second largest energy consumer behind the United States, but on a per capita basis, the Chinese consume only a tenth of the energy Americans use. n133 The intimate link between fossil fuel consumption and macro-economic growth is a major factor in Asia's potentially explosive contribution to global GHG emissions. The economies of China and India are growing at a rapid pace, with projected annual GDP growth rates of almost 6% for the next quarter century. n134 China, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and other Asian nations are already major manufacturing centers, and capital investment from the West has flowed to all sectors of their economies as trade barriers have fallen. India's private sector, buoyed by a growing consumer market and the outsourcing of technically skilled jobs from the United States, is demanding electric infrastructure growth and improvements in reliability from the Indian government. These examples are the stories of all developing nations, made larger by the vigor and numbers of the Asian economies. The needs of countries outside the OECD will require an investment of roughly $ 2 trillion to install approximately 1900 GW of new electric generating capacity by 2025. n135 In 2000, East Asia, China, and South Asia constituted more than

To be successful in any environmental battle on global warming, given the sheer numbers of population, coupled with rapid development, the battle must be successful in Asia for the world to succeed.
half the world's [*149] population. n136

Asian development guarantees global warming – absent a shift in energy sources, massive CO2 will be released into the environment
Moore, National Renewable Energy Laboratory Chief Economist, Former CA Energy Industry Regulator, Spring 2005
[Michal, "SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND SMART ENERGY: RENEWABLE TECHNOLOGIES TO POWER AND EMPOWER THE DEVELOPING WORLD," 16 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 377, lexis] In both developing and developed nations, demand for energy and electricity is growing at faster rates than current supplies. Growth in demand for electricity can exceed six percent in countries like China and India, where high population growth
rates may average three percent per annum. n9 As a consequence, a

significant component of expected future energy demand will materialize

in developing countries, where more

[*382] than two billion people live in rural areas that are not linked to grids and hence do not have electricity. n10 Primary energy

supplies available to serve this demand include hydropower and hydrocarbon-based fuels such as coal or natural gas. Hydrocarbon-based

fuels generate waste byproducts such as carbon dioxide (CO<2>), nitrous oxides (NO<x>), and sulfur oxides (SO<x>), all of which are major contributors to air pollution, and all of which are identified as potential global climate change catalysts. n11 Near-term energy
supply in China, for instance, is closely linked to coal supplies, n12 which if combusted in turbines without modern scrubbers and at higher heat rates, can contribute substantially to increased trends in global warming.

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AT: States CP – Modeling – Stability Link EXTN
Reliable energy source is key to economic growth
Moore, National Renewable Energy Laboratory Chief Economist, Former CA Energy Industry Regulator, Spring 2005
[Michal, "SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND SMART ENERGY: RENEWABLE TECHNOLOGIES TO POWER AND EMPOWER THE DEVELOPING WORLD," 16 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 377, lexis] As pointed out earlier, energy is at the core of economic development activity for any country, and management of supply and demand issues is critical for overall economic vitality. Similarly, energy systems cannot be developed without good access to investment capital, which in turn depends on robust or dependable market activity to ensure repayment and minimize risk. With this in mind, the global policies regarding energy adopted in the UN forum, as well as regional institutions, dictate that developing nations should not be denied their full economic potential. Developed nations want trading partners. Developing nations want markets, jobs, and a higher standard of living for their citizens.

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AT: Pressure China / Financial Assistance CP
China says no to reform A. China is not reliant on the US
Podesta, Center for American Progress President and CEO, Deutch, MIT Professor, and Ogden, Center for American Progress National Security and International Policy Program Coordinator, January 2007
[John, John, Peter, "China's Energy Challenge,” http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F848DF23CA704F5%7D/CMTCFINAL052307.PDF]

The United States has limited leverage on China to encourage modification ofits energy poli- cies. Proposals to use trade or investment restrictions (e.g., Export-Import Bank or World Bank-tied loans) to attempt to compel China to revise its energy policies are unrealistic and unlikely to be effective,particularly because China has no immediate capital needs.

B. China rejects conditions for energy reform
Podesta, Center for American Progress President and CEO, Deutch, MIT Professor, and Ogden, Center for American Progress National Security and International Policy Program Coordinator, January 2007
[John, John, Peter, "China's Energy Challenge,” http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F848DF23CA704F5%7D/CMTCFINAL052307.PDF] This last option is indeed the most direct and immediate solution to China’s carbon emission problem,but it presents a serious, perhaps insurmountable, obstacle. While the international com- munity might be willing to pay for a part ofthe cost of controlling China’s emissions, this plan is feasible only if the United States and other large industrialized countries are willing to make an enormous, ongoing contribution. Given the relationship between the United States and China, it is difficult to imagine that a huge direct payment by the United States would be politically feasible. In addition, any U.S. financial assistance

without conditions of some participation by U.S. industry and some degree of control over project selec- tion and accountability is inconceivable. The possibility that the Chinese would accept such conditions is equally unlikely.

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AT: Energy Cooperation CP
1. Does not solve warming A. US action – the US is the largest GHG emitter, absent US support for alt energy, GHG emissions are unchanged causing warming – that’s 1AC Chandler B. China – natural gas is insufficient to solve the shift – alternative energy is necessary to solve the shift away from coal to resolve local party cadres self-interest – that’s 1AC Mattis 2. Does not solve US-Sino conflict – counterplan sustains China’s reliance to oil, guaranteeing competition and escalation of political conflicts over resources – that’s Liberthal and Zweig 3. Does not solve China collapse – absent a shift to alternative energy, mass pollution causes a popular backlash, and the economy will overheat – This will destabilize the region causing nuclear war in Asia, and independently triggers the case impacts – that’s Ogden and Desperes 4. Permutation – do both 5. Weak oil ministry dooms Chinese shift to coal – entrenched interests overwhelm the counterplan
International Crisis Group, Belgium Based Think Tank, June 2008
[China's Thirst for Oil," http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5478&l=1] However, the “super ministries” plan that was put forward at the NPC in March 2008 stopped short of reviving an energy ministry. Authority was instead di- vided between a new National Energy Commission responsible for developing strategies and an expanded Energy Bureau under the central planning agency to control administration and oversight.45 The plan is widely seen as a political compromise shaped by op- position from energy companies. A State Council statement said the restructuring was “aimed at resolv- ing long-term problems and contradictions as China’s economy grows”, but energy experts doubt that there will be much improvement in government coordina- tion.46 It is possible that the bodies could eventually become a full ministry, but not for several years.47 Only a strong ministry would be able to manage China’s dynamic energy industries effectively. The institution’s effectiveness would depend on address- ing the issues that led to the failure and dissolution of the previous energy ministry. It would require the au- thority, staffing, and financial resources to manage energy security policy and reconcile competing inter- ests within the vast government bureaucracy. It would also need to be well staffed; have access to quality data to support decisions and policies; possess the ability to integrate energy demand, supply and security issues; and enjoy the necessary standing to inter- act with other ministerial-level agencies on an equal level.48

In addition to the authority to stand up to entrenched interests of oil and coal companies, a new energy ministry must be structured to allow for representa- tion of the interests of all stakeholders, including those with weak institutional
power, such as energy consumers and environmental protection agencies.49 It would need to allow the government to improve its own expertise, so that it can be a competent and im- partial rule-maker, rather than depend on advice from companies. An

adviser to government officials in planning the restructuring has noted that real change in the way the Chinese government operates requires deeper political reforms to expose officials to greater public accountability.50
Government officials will find that they can improve their “governing capability through greater policymaking transparency and a sys- tem of policymaking checks and balances, as well as public debate during the policymaking process”.51 <Insert oil reliance bad add-ons>

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AT: IAE CP
Chinese membership is doomed
Lieberthal, Michigan University China Center Research Associate, William Davidson Institute China Director and Distinguished Fellow, Political Science Professor, and Herberg, National Bureau of Asian Research Asian Energy Security Director, ARCO Strategic Planning group Global Energy and Economics Director, April 2006
[Kenneth, Mikkal, "NBR Analysis," http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?ID=93a9dcaa-b9d5-4601-ac32-93f702696db5] Direct Chinese membership in the iEa would, however, be difficult to achieve and potentially very contentious to pursue . The iEa was formed by the countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and membership in the OECD is a prerequisite for membership in the iEa . Qualifications for OECD membership include having a per capita GDP of at least $3,000 and meeting certain standards of human rights .37 in any case, EU members are currently more concerned about bringing russia into this framework than having China join . any effort to relax existing conditions in order to accommodate Chinese membership would, therefore, likely prove too divisive among current iEa members to be feasible .

SDI 2008

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