Cornelia MATABUENApla intiff-a ppella nt vPetronila CERVANTESdefendantappellee [G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971] [G.R. No. L-28771.

March 31, 1971] TOPIC: Nature and concept of statutory construction FACTS: The stipulated facts agreed upon by both the plaintiff and the defendant assisted by their respective counsels, are: 1. The deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in question; 2. Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos (referring to a transfer or gift made during one's lifetime, as opposed to a testamentary transfer which is a gift that takes effect on death) in favor of defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on February 20, 1956, which same donation was accepted by defendant; 3. The donation of the land to Petronila (defendant) which took effect immediately was made during the common law relationship as husband and wife, they were married on March 28, 1962; 4. The deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962; 5. The plaintiff claims the property by reason of being the only sister and nearestcollateral relative of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. Cornelia (plaintiff-appellant), sister of Felix Matabuena maintains that the donation made by Felix to Petronila Cervantes (defendant-appellee) was void because they were living without the benefit of marriage (common law marriage). This is in pursuant to Article 133 of Civil Code which provides "Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. On 23 November 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the donation as it was made before Cervantes‘ marriage to the donor. Hence this appeal.

and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials.

CHING vs GOYANGKO

On December 30, 1947, Joseph Goyanko (Goyanko) and Epifania dela Cruz (Epifania) were married.[1] Out of the union were born respondents Joseph, Jr., Evelyn, Jerry, Imelda, Julius, Mary Ellen and Jess, all surnamed Goyanko. Respondents claim that in 1961, their parents acquired a 661 square meter property located at 29 F. Cabahug St., Cebu City but that as they (the parents) were Chinese citizens at the time, the property was registered in the name of their aunt, Sulpicia Ventura (Sulpicia). On May 1, 1993, Sulpicia executed a deed of sale[2] over the property in favor of respondents‘ father Goyanko. In turn, Goyanko executed on October 12, 1993 a deed of sale[3] over the property in favor of his common-law-wife-herein petitioner Maria B. Ching. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 138405 was thus issued in petitioner‘s name. After Goyanko‘s death on March 11, 1996, respondents discovered that ownership of the property had already been transferred in the name of petitioner. Respondents thereupon had the purported signature of their father in the deed of sale verified by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory which found the same to be a forgery.[4] Respondents thus filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint for recovery of property and damages against petitioner, praying for the nullification of the deed of sale and of TCT No. 138405 and the issuance of a new one in favor of their father Goyanko. In defense, petitioner claimed that she is the actual owner of the property as it was she who provided its purchase price. To disprove that Goyanko‘s signature in the questioned deed of sale is a forgery, she presented as witness the notary public who testified that Goyanko appeared and signed the document in his presence. By Decision of October 16, 1998,[5] the trial court dismissed the complaint against petitioner, the pertinent portions of which decision read: There is no valid and sufficient ground to declare the sale as null and void, fictitious and simulated. The signature on the questioned Deed of Sale is genuine. The testimony of Atty. Salvador Barrameda who declared in court that Joseph Goyanko, Sr. and Maria Ching together with their witnesses appeared before him for notarization of Deed of Sale in question is more reliable than the conflicting testimonies of the two document examiners. Defendant Maria Ching asserted that the Deed of Sale executed by Joseph Goyanko, Sr. in her favor is valid and genuine. The signature of Joseph Goyanko, Sr. in the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale is genuine as it was duly executed and signed by Joseph Goyanko, Sr. himself. The parcel of lands known as Lot No. 6 which is sought to be recovered in this case could never be considered as the conjugal property of the original Spouses Joseph C. Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz or the exclusive capital property of the husband. The acquisition of the said property by defendant Maria Ching is well-elicited

ISSUE: WON the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship

HELD: The lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint with costs is REVERSED. The questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso (for an undivided part). The case is remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the above opinion. RATIO: It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. If there is ever any occasion where the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written, then such would be it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code says clearly that if the policy of the law is (in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court) "to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear ofundue

.from the aforementioned testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the defendant. Sr. Sr. Although for a time being the property passed through Joseph Goyanko. and the defendant-appellee. good customs. and the defendant-appellee. when it dismissed the complaint a quo . despite the clear findings of forgery and the non-credible testimony of notary public. ―the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union. . Sr. II. 138405 was issued in her favor. have in fact been living together as common-law husband and wife. and the defendant-appellee. a basic policy in civil law. . having been made by Joseph Sr. . in effect. in favor of his concubine. 1352. . to herein defendant Maria Ching. petitioners arguing that the appellate court gravely erred in: I. . WHO BECAME AS SUCH IN CONTEMPLATION OF LAW. a basic social institution which public policy vigilantly protects. still we cannot sustain the validity of the sale of the property by Joseph. or with unlawful cause. AND THAT THE SAME WAS NEVER PART OF THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS‘ MOTHER EPIFANIA GOYANKO AND PETITIONER‘S COMMON LAW HUSBAND. . in dismissing the complaint a quo . ALLOWING RESPONDENTS TO ABANDON THEIR ORIGINAL THEORY OF THEIR [10] CASE DURING APPEAL. produce no effect whatsoever. . good customs. . THE SAME BEING FOUND BY THE COURT A QUO. And this is so because transfers or conveyances between spouses. Furthermore. IV. is irrevocable and indefeasible. It is therefore undeniable that the 661-square meter property located at No. despite the fact that the marriage of Joseph... . . . AS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF PETITIONER. underscoring supplied) been living together as common-law husband and wife. . while this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable with clear and convincing proof to the contrary. 1352. sustaining the sale of the subject property between Joseph. . Sr. Sr. . undermines the stability of the family. Hence. to defendantappellant Maria Ching. Held the appellate court: . The land subject of the litigation is already registered in the name of defendant Maria Ching under TCT No. in effect. In recognition of the proverbial virtuality of a Torrens title. . sustaining the validity of the sale of the subject property between Joseph. NOT FINDING THAT A CONVEYANCE OVER A PROPERTY MADE BY A TRUSTEE. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2003. 1352 of the Civil Code provides: ―Art. we find no evidence on record to conclude otherwise. The prohibition was designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other and is likewise applicable even to common-law relationships otherwise. when it dismissed the complaint a quo . there is no other owner than that in whose favor it has been issued. . The record shows that while Joseph Sr. . in effect. . . . By Decision dated October 21. . Moreover. AND WHO HAPPENS TO BE A COMMON LAW HUSBAND OF THE BENEFICIARY. 138405. 138405. . and then from Joesph Goyanko.[9] (Underscoring supplied) Before the Court of Appeals where respondents appealed. and Epifania. Even if we were to assume that the subject property was not conjugal.[6] (Citations omitted. subject to certain exceptions. Cebu City belongs to the conjugal partnership. APPLYING THE STATE POLICY ON PROHIBITION AGAINST CONVEYANCES AND TRANSFERS OF PROPERTIES BETWEEN LEGITIMATE AND COMMON LAW SPOUSES ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. The subject property having been acquired during the existence of a valid marriage between Joseph Sr. Sr. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law. produce no effect whatever. defendant Ching justified her financial capability to buy the land for herself. public order or public policy. Maria Ching claimed that it was even her money which was used by Joseph Goyanko. On this score. Contracts without cause. 3. and Epifania was then still subsisting thereby rendering the subject property as conjugal property of Joseph.[8] the appellate court reversed that of the trial court and declared null and void the questioned deed of sale and TCT No. NOR THE EXCLUSIVE OR CAPITAL PROPERTY OF THE LATTER AT ANYTIME BEFORE THE SAME WAS VALIDLY ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER. . they argued that the trial court erred: 1.[7] 2. 29 F. Sr. Cabahug Street. unless bad faith can be established on the part of the person appearing as owner on the certificate of title. there has never been a judicial decree declaring the dissolution of his marriage to Epifania nor their conjugal partnership. Art. III. . . The transaction undertaken was from the original owner Sulpicia Ventura to Joseph Goyanko. and his wife Epifania have been estranged for years and that he and defendant-appellant Maria Ching. there being overwhelming evidence on records that they have The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which apply to the present case read: ART. is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. the present petition. . It is a well-known doctrine that a Torrens title. sustaining the sale of the subject property between Joseph. it has been repeatedly held that. despite the proliferation in the records and admissions by both parties that defendant-appellee was the ‖mistress‖ or ―common-law wife‖ of Joseph. Contracts without cause.‖ We therefore find that the contract of sale in favor of the defendantappellant Maria Ching was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. Sr. the law emphatically prohibits spouses from selling property to each other. . . if allowed during the marriage would destroy the system of conjugal partnership. as a rule. The purported sale. JOSEPH GOYANKO. NOT FINDING THAT A JURIDICAL RELATION OF TRUST AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLES 1448 AND 1450 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE CAN VALIDLY EXIST BETWEEN COMMON LAW SPOUSES. SR. In her testimony. . The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law. in the purchase of the land and so it was eventually sold to her. morals. or with unlawful cause. morals. and Epifania dela Cruz-Goyanko. . . Sr. . as a buyer yet his ownership was only temporary and transitory for the reason that it was subsequently sold to herein defendant Maria Ching. A Torrens title is not subject to collateral attack. public order or public policy. and the duty of the court is to see to it that this title is maintained and respected unless challenged in a direct proceedings [sic]. Sr. By virtue of the Deed of Sale executed in favor of Maria Ching. Sr. IS NOT A VIOLATION OF A STATE POLICY ON PROHIBITION AGAINST CONVEYANCES AND TRANSFERS OF PROPERTIES BETWEEN LEGITIMATE AND COMMON LAW SPOUSES.

does not persuade. vs. a party in a litigation is not permitted to freely and substantially change the theory of his case so as not to put the other party to undue disadvantage by not accurately and timely apprising him of what he is up against. produce no effect whatsoever. Article 1352 also provides that: ―Contracts without cause.k. (4) Those whose object is outside the commerce of men. emphasis and underscoring supplied) MILAGROS JOAQUINO a. -. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived. 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. .law-wife-herein petitioner. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning: (1) Those whose cause. or with unlawful cause.[13] and to ensure that the latter is given the opportunity during trial to refute all allegations against him by presenting evidence to the contrary. [12] (Italics in the original. a basic policy in civil law. . REYES. good customs. MILAGROS J.. or (2) When there has been a judicial separation of property under Article 191.:[11] Anent the second issue. it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child. And this is so because if transfers or conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage. morals. petitioner cannot be said to have been put to undue disadvantage and to have been denied the chance to refute all the allegations against her. a trust arises by operation of law in favor of the person to whom the money is loaned or for whom it is paid. LOURDES REYES. it too does not persuade. WHEREFORE. or purposes is contrary to law.a. 2002 Decision and the August 14. legitimate or illegitimate. However. public order. respondents. As to the change of theory by respondents from forgery of their father‘s signature in the deed of sale to sale contrary to public policy. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other. (5) Those which contemplate an impossible service. no trust is implied by law. For petitioner‘s testimony that it was she who provided the purchase price is uncorroborated. If the price of a sale of property is loaned or paid by one person for the benefit of another and the conveyance is made to the lender or payor to secure the payment of the debt. In the present case. . Hon. These contracts cannot be ratified. Generally. while the latter is the beneficiary. the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions. good customs. morals. it being violative of the above-cited Articles 1352. “the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union. except: (1) When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements.‖ Additionally. . (6) Those where the intention of the parties relative to the principal object of the contract cannot be ascertained. Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause. The former is the trustee.” Those provisions are dictated by public interest and their criterion must be imposed upon the will of the parties. ARTICLE 1490. object. MIRIAM and RODOLFO JR. 1409 and 1490 of the Civil Code. it was null and void. The husband and wife cannot sell property to each other. et al.all surnamed REYES. or public policy. object or purpose is contrary to law. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubineafter he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their support. we find that the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. Fortun. 1409. of the one paying the price of the sale. that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership. property acquired with the salaries and earnings of a husband belongs to his conjugal partnership with the legal spouse. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law. seeking to [2] [3] nullify the February 4. (3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction. which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage. as well as to protect the institution of marriage. a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. (Underscoring supplied) The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to common law relationships. There is an implied trust when property is sold. For the nullification of the sale is anchored on its illegality per se. petitioner. Similarly. The Case Before the Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Though registered in the paramour‘s name. So this Court ruled in Calimlim-Canullas v. MANUEL. (2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious. or public policy are void andinexistent from the very beginning. The CA disposed as follows: [1] As the conveyance in question was made by Goyangko in favor of his common. good customs. and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. etc. That she may have been considered the breadwinner of the family and that there was proof that she earned a living do not conclusively clinch her claim. Petitioner‘s argument that a trust relationship was created between Goyanko as trustee and her as beneficiary as provided in Articles 1448 and 1450 of the Civil Code which read: ARTICLE 1448. public order or public policy. public order. The latter may redeem the property and compel a conveyance thereof to him. if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child. ARTICLE 1450. otherwise.ART. 45883. donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. (7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law. morals. MERCEDES. The filiation of the paramour‘s children must be settled in a probate or special proceeding instituted for the purpose. The sale was subversive of the stability of the family. the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. not in an action for recovery of property.

Resolution. before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. a [D]eed of [S]ale of a property consisting of a house and lot at BF Homes. Branch 111 in Civil Case No. 1981. 1947 in Manila.‘‖ The questioned Reconsideration. by way of special and affirmative defenses.000.79. Metro Manila was executed by the spouses Ramiro Golez and Corazon Golez in favor of [petitioner] Milagros B.000.00 was to be paid out of his Philam Life Insurance [p]olicy. Reyes to be apportioned among the [other respondents] as his forced heirs. the allegations of which have been summarized by the trial court in the following manner: ‗In her Answer. much less to [respondent] Lourdes P. Joaquino alleges that she purchased the real property in question with her own exclusive funds and it was only for convenience that the late Rodolfo Reyes facilitated the mortgage over the same. namely: Mercedes. 1981 when the latter died. Jr. Declaring the house and lot registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 90293 of the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila. To pay [respondents] attorney‘s fees in the sum of P20. 1979. Reyes was Vice President and Comptroller of Warner Barnes and Company with an income of P15. and ‗c. [Petitioner] prays for a judgment dismissing [respondents‘] complaint and for the latter to pay unto [petitioner] moral and exemplary damages in such amounts as may be determined during the trial. pursuant to the applicable law on succession. Reyes and the other half to the estate of Rodolfo A. the outstanding balance of P110. as follows: ―WHEREFORE. all surnamed Reyes. assigning the proceeds thereof to Commonwealth ―On February 2. containing the following allegations: ‗x x x The complaint alleges that [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes had illicit relations with [petitioner] Milagros B.‘ xxx xxx xxx Motion for ―[Petitioner] eventually filed her Answer. he secured a life insurance [policy] with Philam Life Insurance Corporation for the said amount. ‗b. Reyes before his death and at the time of his death. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendant as follows: ‗a.00 and to guaranty payment thereof. Milagros Joaquino. 90293 (26627-A) of the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila. Manuel. No. District IV as conjugal partnership property of the late Spouses Rodolfo and Lourdes Reyes.. Joaquino. including atto[r]ney‘s fees and the costs of the suit. Reyes who died on September 12. Reyes executed a mortgage in favor of Commonwealth Insurance Corporation for P140. Parañaque. At the time of his death. pray that the property covered by T. Miriam and Rodolfo Jr. to the respective estates of the late Rodolfo Reyes and Lourdes Reyes and to pay a reasonable rental of P10. 1994.―WHEREFORE. ‗[Petitioner] further alleges in her answer. Reyes to mortgage the property to Commonwealth Insurance Corporation in order to pay the balance of the purchase price. upon their failure to do so until possession of the property is delivered. Ordering the [petitioner] to surrender possession of said subject property. [Respondents] therefore.C. They have four children.00 a month and. 1982.000. ‗The complaint further alleges that on July 12. the money came exclusively from [her]. Miriam and Rodolfo. that before his death. of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. that for years before his death. 1980.000. ‗The complaint finally alleges that the deceased had two cars in [petitioner‘s] possession and that the real and personal properties in [petitioner‘s] possession are conjugal partnership propert[ies] of the spouses Lourdes P. dated August 1. 90293 be declared conjugal property of the spouses Lourdes P. are the legitimate children of [respondent] Lourdes P. 1982. Imelda May and Charina.00 a month. ―Subsequently.‘ xxx xxx xxx The Facts The CA narrated the facts as follows: ―[Respondents] filed a Complaint for reconveyance and damages. Rodolfo Reyes was living with his common-law wife. Reyes and Rodolfo A. 9722-P isMODIFIED to read. Reyes as executive of Warner Barnes and Company as [petitioner] Joaquino was without the means to pay for the same.00 and to pay the costs. Manuel. [petitioner] never had knowledge whatsoever that he was married to someone else. Reyes. that the funds used to purchase this property were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased Rodolfo A. that the two cars in [petitioner‘s] possession be delivered to [respondents] and that [petitioner] be made to pay actual. that said Rodolfo A. on the other hand. compensatory and moral damages to [respondents] as well as attorney‘s fees. that although the late Rodolfo Reyes paid the monthly amortization of the mortgage as attorney-in-fact of [petitioner]. 1981. that during all the nineteen (19) years that [she] lived with Rodolfo Reyes from 1962 continuously up to September 12. Reyes and that [petitioner] be ordered to reconvey the property in [respondents‘] favor. that [petitioner] executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo A. Reyes and Rodolfo A. . that [respondent] wife was not the recipient of any portion of the said amount.T. Reyes. [petitioner] Milagros B. Reyes and one-half belongs exclusively to [respondent] Lourdes P. that the monthly amortizations of the mortgage were paid by said Rodolfo A.000. District IV was issued in the name of [petitioner] Milagros B. received from said company benefits and emoluments in the amount of P315. x x x Rodolfo A. after retirement on September 30. the appeal is hereby partially DENIED and the Decision dated May 30. to the same juridical entities. x x x with whom she begot three (3) children namely: Jose Romillo. x x x. Rodolfo A. 1993. Joaquino. premises considered. Rodolfo Reyes died on September 12. dated January 23. that [petitioner] was never the beneficiary of the emoluments or other pecuniary benefits of the late Rodolfo Reyes during his lifetime or after his death because [she] had the financial capacity to support herself and her children begotten with the late Rodolfo Reyes. that [respondents] Mercedes. denied petitioner‘s [4] Insurance Corporation. Reyes and the deceased Rodolfo A. all surnamed Reyes and co[respondents] in this case. the trial court granted the complaint based on the following factual findings: ‗Lourdes Reyes was legally married to Rodolfo Reyes on January 3. Joaquino for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. Reyes is the widow of Rodolfo A.0[1]1. [respondent] Lourdes Reyes died.

it said. As to the facts. not having been recognized or acknowledged by him in any of the ways provided by law. Issues Petitioner submits the following issues for the Court‘s consideration: “I.00. [6] First Issue: The Conjugal Nature of the Disputed Property Before tackling the merits. Ruling of the Court of Appeals Affirming the RTC. The loan was payable in ten (10) years with a monthly amortization of P1. it is undisputed that the deceased Rodolfo Reyes was legally married to [8] Respondent Lourdes Reyes on January 3. Whether or not the legitimate children of the late Rodolfo Reyes should respect their father‘s desire that his illegitimate children should have a home or a roof over their heads in consonance with his [7] duty to love. 1979. ‗To secure the finances with which to pay the purchase price of the property in the amount of P140. they decided to buy the house and lot situated at No. therefore. and 2) the propriety of ruling on the filiation and the successional rights of petitioner‘s children. Phase 3. it found no sufficient proof that petitioner was financially capable of buying the disputed property. 12 Baghdad Street.011. a conjugal partnership of gains (CPG) is created upon marriage and lasts until the legal union is dissolved by death. to secure a loan from the Commonwealth Insurance Company.] shows that her husband Rodolfo had illicit relations with the petitioner Milagros and had lived with her in a house and lot at Baghdad Street. 1980.000. It was during this time. we must first point out some undisputed facts and guiding principles. hence. BF Homes. however. Hence. Whether or not the Supreme Court should enforce the rule that the parties to a lawsuit should only tell the truth at the trial and in [their] pleadings x x x. where he assumed the position of Vice-President [Comptroller] until he retired onSeptember 30. The Court’s Ruling The Petition is devoid of merit. which were his and Lourdes‘ conjugal funds. [petitioner] executed on July 20. annulment. as attorney-in-fact. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 12. held that the trial court should not have resolved the issue of the filiation and the successional rights of petitioner‘s children. care and provide for his children even after his death. Hence. “II. as well as the premiums for the life insurance policy that paid for the balance thereof. in 1979. or that she had actually contributed her own exclusive funds to pay for it. a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo A. legal separation or judicial separation of . acquired no successional rights to his estate. “III. Reyes for the latter. it ordered her to surrender possession of the property to the respective estates of the spouses.‘‖ On appeal to the CA. 1979. Whether or not the fact that the Court of Appeals made a finding that the house and lot at Baghdad Street are conjugal property of lawfully wedded Rodolfo and Lourdes including the insurance proceeds which was used to pay the final bill for the house and lot. Rodolfo Reyes worked with Marsman and Company and later transferred to Warner Barnes & Co. Metro Manila.‖ The issues boil down to the following: 1) the nature of the house and lot on Baghdad Street (BF Homes Parañaque. and while their marriage was subsisting. Whether or not it is legally permissible for [respondents] to make a mockery of the law by denying [the] filiations of their [two] 2 illegitimate sisters and one [1] illegitimate brother when in fact the very complaint filed by their mother. petitioner questioned the following findings of the trial court: 1) that the house and lot had been paid in full from the proceeds of the loan that Rodolfo Reyes obtained from the Commonwealth Insurance Company. the Regional Trial Court. His monthly salary at Warner Barnes & Co. the lawful wife. An application for mortgage loan was filed by Rodolfo Reyes with the Commonwealth Insurance Company and a Real Estate Mortgage Contract was executed as collateral to the mortgage loan. Such issues. this will prevail over Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. S-90293 covering the said property was issued in the name of [petitioner only] on July 20. The monthly amortizations were paid by Rodolfo Reyes and after his death. Parañaque. Lourdes[.797. he was actually living with petitioner. the applicable law is the Civil Code of the Philippines. The appellate court. paid for the loan and.00 x x x and upon his separation or retirement from said company. and 3) that petitioner‘s illegitimate children. that petitioner‘s three [3] illegitimate children are x x x indeed the children of the late Rodolfo Reyes. the balance of P109.67. Under Article 145 [9] thereof. the CA held that the property had been paid out of the conjugal funds of Rodolfo and Lourdes because the monthly amortizations for the loan. ‗During the common-law relationship of Rodolfo Reyes and [petitioner] Milagros Joaquino and while living together.000. Reyes.79 in full payment and settlement of his separation and retirement benefits. Whether or not it has been indubitably established in a court of law and trier of facts. Plainly. as insurer of the deceased Rodolfo A. 1979 was executed in favor of [petitioner] Milagros Joaquino and Transfer Certificate of Title No.166.. came from his salaries and earnings. 1947.‗During his lifetime. Like the trial court. that the disputed house and lot was purchased and registered in petitioner‘s name. was P15. Rodolfo Reyes received a lump sum of P315. “V. “IV. this Petition.64 was paid in full to the Commonwealth Insurance by the Philam [5] Life Insurance Co. the disputed property was conjugal. It is also admitted that for 19 years or so. Metro Manila). 2) that his salaries and earnings. were not properly cognizable in an ordinary civil action for reconveyance and damages and were better ventilated in a probate or special proceeding instituted for the purpose.

Article 144 of the Civil Code mandates a co-ownership between a man and a woman who are living together but are not legally married. The present controversy hinges on the source of the funds paid for the house and lot in question. 1980. the latter would be better situated [36] than the former. and that the loan was. we have found none. because the CA came up with the same factual findings as those of the RTC. Moreover. his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. what constitutes such properties are laid out in Article 153 of the Code. 2) that at exactly the same time the property was allegedly [23] [24] [25] purchased. the purchase and the subsequent registration of the realty in petitioner‘s name was tantamount to a donation by Rodolfo to Milagros. whether the acquisition be for the partnership. or for only one of the spouses. 4) that he paid the monthly amortizations for the loan as [28] well as the semi-annual premiums for a Philam Life insurance policy. and 5) that with the proceeds of his life insurance policy. The above issue. Even then. 148. property. In fact. [17] though. using his salaries and earnings. upon which he received [22] a sizeable retirement package. In contrast. otherwise.. all properties of the marriage.‖ Moreover.‖ Thus. with similar results in favor of respondents. we now proceed to the merits of the first issue. a preponderance of evidence has duly established that the disputed house and lot was paid by Rodolfo Reyes. as in this case. he applied for a mortgage loan -. Indeed. has been passed upon by both the trial and the appellate courts. Respondents had not been given any opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. under Article 160 of the Code.property. it is well-settled that only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court [21] in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals or under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.that she was financially capable of buying the house and lot. the couple must not be incapacitated to contract marriage. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. Unfortunately for petitioner. or as salary of the spouses. coming from the common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse. are presumed to belong to the CPG. (3) The fruits. which were conjugal funds under the Civil Code. Inc. the properties must first be proven to have been [12] acquired during the existence of the marriage. respondents showed the following facts: 1) that Rodolfo was gainfully employed as comptroller at Warner. when a common-law couple have a legal impediment to marriage. The law places the burden of proof on the plaintiffs (respondents herein) to establish their [14] claim by a preponderance of evidence -. In default of Article 144 of the Civil Code. who had not testified on these matters. Article 87 of the Family Code now expressly provides thus: [35] [30] ―(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund. It has been held that the Article is inapplicable to common-law relations amounting to adultery or concubinage. petitioner has failed to substantiate either of her claims -. a fact that gives rise to the presumption that it is conjugal. which is clearly factual. however.evidence that has greater weight or is more convincing [15] than that which is offered to oppose it. [20] it is not the function of this Court to review questions of fact.through their actual joint contribution of money. paid from his salaries and earnings. Article 148 of the Family Code has been [19] applied. Hearsay are the Affidavits and the undated Certification she had presented to prove that she borrowed money from her siblings and had earnings from a jewelry business. only the property acquired by them -. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article.‖ The prohibition against donations between spouses must likewise apply to donations between persons living together in illicit relations. All told. Based on the rules of evidence. ―The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. 3) that he secured the loan with a real estate [26] [27] mortgage over the same property. because it was ―made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. ―If one of the parties is validly married to another. rents or interests received or due during the marriage. unless proven to pertain to the husband or the wife exclusively. only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money. With these facts and principles firmly settled. Indeed.from the Commonwealth Insurance Company. the balance of [29] the loan was paid to Commonwealth by Philam Life Insurance Company. (2) That which is obtained by the industry. In the absence of proof to the contrary. which he was required to take as additional security. we have gone through the pleadings and the evidence presented by the parties to find out if there is any circumstance that might warrant a reversal of the factual findings. If the party which acted in bad faith is not validly married to another. such donation was void. Upon the resolution of this issue depends the determination of whether the property is [16] [13] . Conjugal properties are by law owned in common by the husband and wife. it does not appear that she was gainfully employed at any time after 1961 when [31] [32] the property was purchased. Prevailing jurisprudence holds.shall be owned by them in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. until his retirement on September 30. Such finding is generally conclusive. property or industry -. they have no probative value. they have established that the proceeds of the loan obtained by Rodolfo were used to pay for the property. More important. the Affidavits and the [33] Certification have to be rejected.intended for ―housing‖ -. Under the circumstances. their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. therefore. in turn. which we quote: [10] [11] As to conjugal (owned by Rodolfo and Lourdes) or exclusive (owned by Milagros) or co-owned by Rodolfo and Milagros. On the other hand. By express provision of Article 739(1) of the Civil Code. For the rebuttable presumption to arise. The reason therefor is the absurdity of creating a co-ownership in [18] cases in which there exists a prior conjugal partnership between the man and his lawful wife. that for Article 144 to apply. his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. heeding petitioner‘s plea. The CA was also correct in disregarding petitioner‘s allegation that part of the purchase money had come from the sale of a [34] drugstore four years earlier. or that she actually contributed to the payments therefor. Barnes and Co. respondents have shown that the property was bought during the marriage of Rodolfo and Lourdes. or of either of them. or work. The latter Article provides: ―Art. This principle applies with greater force herein. By substantial evidence.

this Court renders judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff. it cannot be used as an [37] instrument for the deprivation of ownership. affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court which ruled. because they were voluntarily acknowledged by Rodolfo as his children. though she did not assign this matter as an error.00 as and for attorney‟s fees. she should not be permitted to raise it now. raise and discuss this issue. Petitioner further avers that these properties were administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis. By operation of law. we note that the issue concerning the applicability of Articles 19 and 21 was not raised by petitioner in the trial court or even in the CA. petitioner. FRANCISCO. which was submitted to the trial court. heart disease and cancer. Therefore. 1991. Indeed. S.000. Sustaining the appellate court in Agapay v. she could not have shown that respondents had acted in bad faith or with intent to prejudice her children. except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. Her position is untenable. Barangay Balite. Private respondents Conchita Evangelista. WHEREFORE. (2) a house and lot at Barrio San Isidro. was for the recovery of property.had acted in a manner contrary to morals. the illegitimate filiation of her children could not have been [47] duly established by the proceedings as required by Article 887 of the Civil Code. Araceli F.―Art. Even unassigned errors may be taken up by such court if the consideration This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse respondent appellate court‟s decision[1] promulgated on October 7. 87. Considerations of due process should have likewise deterred the RTC from ruling on the status of petitioner‘s children. These are conditions necessary to [51] show that an act constitutes an abuse of rights under Article 19. In this case. good customs or public policy. she and Eusebio have acquired the following: (1) a sari-sari store. and. a constructive trust is deemed created under Article 1456 of the Civil Code. the Petition is hereby DENIED. and an apartment house. Rizal. for this case is a well-known exception to the principle of conclusiveness of a certificate of [39] title. between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. petitioner is deemed to hold the property in trust for them. SO ORDERED [49] [50] TERESITA C. a residential house and lot. Moreover. Petitioner also claims that private respondents succeeded in convincing their father to sign a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita Evangelista to administer the house and lot together with the apartments situated in Rodriguez. 1962.in violation of the provisions of Article 21 of the Civil Code -. Neither did petitioner‘s Memorandum.‖ (Italics supplied) Regarding the registration of the property in petitioner‘s name. Thus. by force of law. Costs against petitioner. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud. and 3) Sentencing the plaintiff to pay the defendants the sum of P10. Cruz St. the person obtaining it is. . rendering him unfit to administer them. Rodriguez (formerly Montalban). 1456. In view thereof. which we quote: ―Art. She also failed to show that respondents -.. SO ORDERED. and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10.that only errors assigned may be passed upon by an appellate court – admits of exceptions. as in this case. Clearly. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. 2) Declaring the defendant Eusebio Francisco the administrator of the properties described in paragraph eight (8) of the Complaint. she faults the CA for ruling that the issue was improper in the instant case. as follows: 1) Ordering the dismissal of the Complaint with costs against the plaintiff. thereby. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage. In view of the foregoing reasons. The general rule -. It is evident from the pleadings of the parties that this issue was not [42] [43] presented in either the original or the Supplemental Complaint for reconveyance of property and damages. considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. COURT OF APPEALS second Issue: Ruling on Illegitimate Filiation Not Proper It is petitioner‘s alternative submission that her children are entitled to a share in the disputed property. all situated at Col. premises considered. It has been held that property is conjugal if acquired in a common-law relationship during the subsistence of a preexisting legal marriage. that it was not pleaded and specifically prayed for by petitioner in her [44] Answers thereto. Marilla and Antonio Francisco are children of Eusebio by his first marriage. Palang. even if it is [38] titled in the name of the common-law wife. Rodriguez. the illegitimate filiation of her children was not the subject of inquiry and was in fact not duly established in this case. this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent‘s estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which. Claiming that the issue of her children‘s illegitimate filiation was duly established in the trial court. it has been ruled that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of [40] [41] determining such rights.” Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio) by his second marriage. and that it was not traversed by respondents‘ Reply to the Supplemental [45] [46] Complaint. direct or indirect. Rizal. Rizal. the CA cannot be faulted for tackling the propriety of the RTC‘s ruling on the status of the children of petitioner.‖ The registration of the property in petitioner‘s name was clearly designed to deprive Rodolfo‘s legal spouse and compulsory heirs of ownership. Basic is the rule that parties may not bring up on appeal issues that have not been raised [52] on trial. HON.[2]thus: “WHEREFORE. Hence. of those errors would be necessary for arriving at a just decision or for serving the interest of [48] justice. it is enough to stress that a certificate of title under the Torrens system aims to protect dominion. vs. The invocation by petitioner of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code is also unmeritorious. she cannot rely on the registration in repudiation of the trust.

is considered his or her separate property. „U-1‟ and „U-2‟. Accordingly. albeit in the concept of a possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name. Rodriguez. or donation. Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to his second marriage is inconsequential.[14] Moreover. and that he has the capacity to administer them. pp. private respondents aver that these properties were either constructed or established by their father during his first marriage. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. Essentially. Petitioner also sought to be declared as the administratrix of the properties in dispute. this petition. Hence. Record. TOGETHER WITH THE OTHERS. On the other hand. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively. the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code does not operate to prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become vested or accrued while the said provisions were in force. Hence. 1988. the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment of said general power of attorney. Interestingly. It must be emphasized that the aforementioned documents in no way prove that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage. the court ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio. 1989. page 6-7) are diametrically opposed to her pretense as they all described Eusebio Francisco as the owner of the structures (Article 1431. SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR RESPONDENT COURT FURTHER ERRED IN NOT APPLYING ARTICLE 124 OF THE FAMILY CODE. Rule 129. New Civil Code). Article 158. On appeal. “during the marriage.[18] Hence.[4] To our mind. Exhibit „G‟. they stress that Eusebio is not incapacitated contrary to petitioner‟s allegation. 285-290. It held that the petitioner failed to adduce proof that said properties were acquired during the existence of the second conjugal partnership. cited in Civil Code of the Philippines by Tolentino. Rizal. New Civil Code. page 421).[15] In this case. We find petitioner‟s contention lacks merit. property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage. we cannot invoke the new law in this case without impairing prior vested rights pursuant to Article 256 [8] in relation to Article 105[9] (second paragraph) of the Family Code. „T‟. petitioner even admitted that Eusebio brought into their marriage the said land. With respect to the land at Col. The aforecited articles fall under Title VI. even if it be assumed that Eusebio‟s acquisition by succession of the land took place during his second marriage. petitioner relied on the building permits for the house and the apartment. „U‟. the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents. Volume 1. the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. with her as the applicant although in the name of Eusebio. petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio. Balite.On August 31. Petitioner raised the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court: “FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLES 160 AND 158.[12] Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. HAVE (SIC) ALREADY BEEN REPEALED BY ARTICLE 253 OF THE FAMILY CODE. legacy. Normally. the land would still be his “exclusive property” because it was acquired by him.”[20] . Moreover. In due course. unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife”. petitioner insists that the said assets belong to conjugal partnership. devise. „T-1‟. 158 and 160 of the Civil Code”. Cruz St. January 17.”[19] As regards the house. Section 4. petitioner posed the sole issue “whether or not Article 116 of the Family Code applies to this case because Article 253 of the same Code [which] expressly repeals Arts. 44-47. Nonetheless. And the mere fact that plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] is the licensee of the sarisari store (Exhibit „F-3‟. she should administer these on account of the incapacity of her husband. are not conjugal but the capital properties of Eusebio exclusively. Petitioner contends that the subject properties are conjugal.[13] The party who asserts this presumption must first prove said time element. as hereafter elucidated. pursuant to Article 148[16] of the New Civil Code. clear and convincing evidence. by reason of the dearth in proof that it was erected during the alleged second marriage (5 Sanchez Roman 840-841. UNDER TITLE VI OF THE (NEW) CIVIL CODE BECAUSE SAID TITLE. 1983 Edition. „E‟. „E-1‟. the crucial issue in this petition is whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in affirming the trial court‟s ruling that the properties. the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. However.[10] Hence. Needless to say. Neither is it plausible to argue that the sari-sari store constructed on the land of Eusebio Francisco has thereby become conjugal for want of evidence to sustain the proposition that it was constructed at the expense of their partnership (second paragraph. And the fact that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the property is conjugal or not. by lucrative title. subject matter of controversy. the rights accrued and vested while the cited articles were in effect survive their repeal. there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. apartment and sari-sari store. TSN. In support of her claim. 1988. Record) or is the supposed applicant for a building permit does not establish that these improvements were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio Francisco. On the other hand. Revised Rules on Evidence).. especially so when her exhibits („D-1‟. petitioner failed to refute the testimony of Eusebio that he inherited the same from his parents. but only with strong.[11] We shall therefore resolve the issue of the nature of the contested properties based on the provisions of the New Civil Code. this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable. Articles 158[5] and 160[6] of the New Civil Code have been repealed by the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3. and brought to the marriage. thus. 38-40. and thereby enjoining its enforcement. As the appellate court aptly noted: “x x x. Indeed. this absence of evidence on the source of funding will call for the application of the presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil Code that the store is really conjugal but it cannot be so in this particular case again. 9 Manresa. as a matter of law. pp.[17] Acquisitions by lucrative title refers to properties acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage by inheritance. She also invoked the business license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone.”[3] But in her reply. Book I of the New Civil Code which was expressly repealed by Article 254 [7] (not Article 253 as alleged by petitioner in her petition and reply) of the Family Code. private respondents maintain that the assets in controversy claimed by petitioner as “conjugal” are capital properties of Eusebio exclusively as these were acquired by the latter either through inheritance or through his industry prior to his second marriage. or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. „T-2‟.

t h e c a s e wa s s u b m i t t e d f o r s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t . Eusebio.[21] It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. in this case. incapacitated to perform acts of administration over his own properties. c r e a t e d a p r i n c i p a l . p e t i t i o n e r ‘ s m o t h e r . petitioner cannot administer them inasmuch as Eusebio is not incapacitated. Dissatisfied. M a r i l o u . ruling that the tenor of the power of attorney in question is broad enough to include the authority to sell any property of the principal. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. private respondents assert that their father purchased it during the lifetime of their mother. 5036. petition is hereby DENIED. had authority. being a portion of Lot 2637. As found by the RTC and confirmed by the CA. t h a t t h e i s s u e a s t o w h e t h e r t h e p o we r o f a t t o r n e y w a s a s p e c i a l o r g e n e r a l o n e i s o f no moment. C a t r a l . [5] Petitioner claims that the power of attorney executed in favor of Catral. Cagayan. herein subject property. the attorney -in-fact Gloria Roa Catral. particularly. x x x[ 4] O n M a y 1 7 . The RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order wherein it declared that no factual issue exists and that the sole legal issue to be resolved is: W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e p o w e r o f a t t o r n e y i s a g e n e r a l p o we r o f attorney or a special power of attorney. and then only for the latter to administer the properties of the former. t h a t the Deed of Absolute Sale is valid and binds the principal. it follows that Eusebio shall retain control thereof considering that the assets are exclusively his capital.” It must be stressed that the certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her claim is inadequate. did not render him. insofar as the administration of the subject properties is concerned.[22] The phrase “married to” preceding “Teresita Francisco” is merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio Francisco. V illegas in f avor of Gloria Roa Catral. Catral.267 square meters. Branch 4.[3] On the basis of the pre -trial order and upon motion of counsel for petitioner. The fact that the land was registered in the name of “Eusebio Francisco. containing an area of 1.C o f t h e Subdivision plan Psd. a c e r t i f i c a t e o f s h e r i f f ‘ s s a l e w a s i s s u e d a n d . M a r i l o u . the property was sold at public auction and. Corrolarily. [6] On December 19. T -63809 of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan. That he is handicapped due to a leg injury sustained in a bicycle accident. executed a Deed of Sale in favor of respondent. that the power ―to enter into any and all contracts and a g r e e m e n t s ‖ q u a l i f i e d t h e s a i d p o we r o f a t t o r n e y a s a s p e c i a l p o w e r o f a t t o r n e y . more or less. s h e h a d n o s p e c i a l a u t h o r i t y t o s e l l o r convey any specific real property. CV No. Pengue. s i n c e t h e petitioner himself signed the power of attorney affirming the authority of the agent.R. and the CA Resolution [2] dated June 10. that the a u t h o r i t y t o s e l l c a m e f r o m b o t h t h e p e t i t i o n e r a n d h i s wi f e . By virtue of a power of attorney exec uted by [petit ioner‘s] wife. i n e x e c u t i n g t h e D e e d o f A b s o l u t e S a l e i n f a v o r o f r e s p o n d e n t wa s within her power or authority. allegedly aggravated when petitioner pushed him to the ground in one of their occasional quarrels. since f r o m t h e v e r y w o r d i n g s o f t h e p o we r o f a t t o r n e y . in the Court‟s view. WHEREFORE. the undisputed facts are as f o l l o ws : The CA held that when the redemption of the property had been made by Catral b y v i r t u e o f a G e n e r a l P o w e r o f A t t o r n e y e x e c u t e d i n h e r f a v o r b y M a r i l o u . C a g a y a n . 55837.i n . C a t r a l ( C a t r a l ) . 151. as the HMDF was itself the highest bidder at such public auction. is not suffering from serious illness so as to impair his fitness to administer his properties. G l o r i a R . 1996. petitioner claims ownership over said property inasmuch as the title thereto is registered in the name of “Eusebio Francisco. 1 9 9 6 . the petitioner appealed the adverse judgment to the CA claiming that the trial court erred in finding that there was a principal -agent relationship between petitioner and Catral. 2001. t h e r e a f t e r . k n o wn a s L o t 2 6 3 7 . Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. as found by the lower court. [8] Villegas vs Lingan Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision [1] dated November 28. because the petitioner was no longer the owner of the property when it . Rodriguez. and that even if Catral in fact exceeded her authority. This case originated from a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Instrument with Damages filed by the petitioner against Victor Lingan (respondent) and Atty. the act is deemed to have been performed within the scope of the agent‘s authority if such is within the t e r m s o f t h e p o w e r o f a t t o r n e y a s wr i t t e n . denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Isaac Villegas (petitioner). without a n y o b j e c t i o n s f r o m r e s p o n d e n t . and Catral. [24] Even assuming for the sake of argument that the properties are conjugal. 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In contrast. Tuguegarao. whether upon the terms thereof. and that the trial court erred in concluding that the power of attorney is a special power of attorney with an authority to sell. Marilou C. Ernesto Carreon as the Register of Deeds of Cagayan. b y v i r t u e o f t h e s a m e p o we r o f attorney.Regarding the property at San Isidro. the latter redeemed the property from the HMDF. Cagayan in Civil Case No. or none at all.2 -01-019664. In order to secure the payment of a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) the [petitioner] constituted a real estate mortgage over the said parcel of land in favor of DBP. who. Marilou Catral -Villegas (Marilou) as principal. as agent. is the petitioner. and that Catral had no authority to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the respondent. that he never authorize d Catral to administer his properties. Contrary to the allegation of petitioner. married to Teresita Francisco”.a g e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p o n l y b e t we e n h i s wife.l a w. the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. 1996. i t f o l l o ws t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r i s n o l o n g e r t h e o w n e r o f t h e s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y b u t h i s wi f e . herein petitioner. Cad. r e g i s t e r e d wi t h the Register of Deeds on March 8. the appellate court cannot be said to have been without valid basis in affirming the lower court‟s ruling that the properties in controversy belong exclusively to Eusebio. the RTC dismissed the Complaint. the real estate mortgage he constituted over the property was foreclosed. is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture. [ P e t i t i o n e r ] I s a a c V i l l e g a s wa s t h e r e g i s t e r e d o wn e r o f a p a r c e l o f l a n d i n T u g u e g a r a o . to execute the deed of sale in favor of [respondent] Victor Lingan. The said loan and m o r t g a g e wa s s u b s e q u e n t l y t r a n s f e r r e d b y t h e D B P t o t h e H o m e Mut ual Development Fund (HMDF). The respondent filed his Answer and pre-trial ensued. situated at Bgy. married to Teresita Francisco. which affirmed in toto the Decision dated December 19. affirming in toto the RTC Judgment and dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. that the act of the a g e n t . [7] On November 28.[23] In the light of the foregoing circumstances. 2001 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA -G. Now. Tuguegarao. W hen the [petitioner] failed to settle his loan. 2002. Rizal.

or any person having a l ien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold. wh e t h e r t h e petitioner has a cause of action against the respondent. There are two principal issues raised by the pleadings in the present petition t h a t m u s t b e r e s o l v e d : F i r s t . . Rules of Court. m a y v a l i d l y r e d e e m t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n . Article 109 of the Family Code provides that property acquired by right of redemption is the exclusive pr operty of the spouses redeeming the property. i n s o f a r as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Ac t . b y t h e f o l l o wi n g p e r s o n s : (a) The judgment obligor. that if there was really a legal defect in the sale. Consequently.j u d i c i a l l y f o r e c l o s e d a n d s o l d t o H M D F . and that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed between the respondent and Catral was not valid. All rights and title of the judgment obligor are transferred upon the expiration of the right of redemption. t h e w i f e o f t h e p e t i t i o n e r . T h e p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner b y the same officer unless a third party is actuall y holding the property adversel y to the judgment obli gor. interest and cla im of the judgment obligor to the p r o p e r t y a t t h e t i m e o f t h e l e v y. in his Memoranda. a right he shared with his wife. ‖ c o n n o t i n g a n i m p l i e d a d m i s s i o n t h a t h e w a s n o t a n y m o r e the owner of the said propert y. respondent. o r h i s s p o u s e o r h e i r s . and in the latter case shall have the same validity as though the officer making the sale had continued in office and executed it. [ 9 ] In his Memorandum. states: SEC. any disposition of the property needs no power of attorney from the petitioner himself. [13] A n d wh e r e t h e r e d e m p t i o n i s m a d e u n d e r a p r o p e r t y r e g i m e g o v e r n e d b y t h e conjugal partnership of gains. provides: SEC.was sold. the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights. 33. the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the pr operty. finally. [ 1 2 ] Section 33. on the following grounds: I. x x x x The ―successor-in-interest‖ of the judgment debtor referred to in the above p r o v i s i o n i n c l u d e s a p e r s o n wh o s u c c e e d s t o h i s p r o p e r t y b y o p e r a t i o n o f l a w. his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor. a n d s e c o n d . and that Marilou has all this time remained passive. herein Petition. petitioner argues that the genera l power of attorney of Catral did not clothe her with authority to sell the property of petitioner. W as there a vali d redem pti on effecte d b y Maril ou ? T h e a n s we r i s i n t h e a f f i r m a t i v e . Section 6 of Act No. by whom execut ed or given. or. Hence. a s s u c c e s s o r i n . I n a l l c a s e s i n w h i c h a n e xt r a j u d i c i a l s a l e i s m a d e under the special power hereinbefore referred to. o f t h e C o d e o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e .i n t e r e s t . Marilou acquired ownership of the subject propert y. may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter p r o v i d e d . title. and the time for redemption has expired. –Real property sold as provided in the last preceding section. Who may redeem real property so sold.s i x . AS A CONSEQUENCE. or any part thereof sold separately. the person who has the legal standing and t he right to question the valid ity of the sale in his name is Marilou. a n d notice thereof given. the l a s t r e d e m p t i o n e r i s e n t i t l e d t o t h e c o n v e ya n c e a n d p o s s e s s i o n . II. and. Upon the expiration of the right of redemption. – If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale. and such redemption shall be governed b y the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred a n d s i x t y. petitioner could have redeemed the property from Marilou after she had redeemed it. [11] The petition must fail. (emphasis supplied) Under the above provision. or his successor -in-interest in the whole or any part of the property. as correctly held by the CA. that the Deed of Sale bet ween Marilou (through Catral) and respondent is valid. The pleadings filed and the records of this case do not show that petitioner exercised said right. in other words. o r a p e r s o n wi t h a j o i n t i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e r t y . [10] On the other hand. Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. T h e d e e d s h a l l b e e x e c u t e d b y t h e o f f i c e r making the sale or by his successor in office. ( e m p h a s i s s u p p l i e d ) Section 27. the person who exercised the right of redemption and the person in whom the right to dispose legally resides. 3135 provides: S e c . that the petitioner signed the General Power of Attorney a b o v e t h e wo r d ― c o n f o r m e . I T I S F U R T H E R S U B M I T T E D T H A T T H E C O U R T O F A P P E A LS DISREGARDED THE LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT W HEN IT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED O F A B S O L U T E S A L E E XE C U T E D I N F A V O R O F V I C T O R L I N G A N . wh e t h e r M a r i l o u . Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period. 6 . i n c l u s i v e . IT IS SUBMITTED THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDE D THE LAW AND APPLICAB LE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT W HEN IT DISMISSED THE COMP LAINT ON THE G ROUND THAT PETITIONER W AS NO LO NGER T HE OW NER OF TH E PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THE CASE. IT DID NOT MATTE R W HETHER OR NOT THE G ENERAL POW ER OF ATTO RNEY OR A SPECIAL POW ER OF ATT ORNEY W AS ISSUED IN THIS INSTANT CASE. t h a t wh a t w a s left for petitioner was only the right of redemption. 27. He maintains that petitioner lost his ownership of t h e p r o p e r t y a f t e r i t w a s e x t r a . but in all cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire period o f o n e ( 1 ) ye a r f r o m t h e d a t e o f t h e r e g i s t r a t i o n o f t h e s a l e t o r e d e e m t h e p r o p e r t y. c ontends that the petitioner has no cause of action against him. may r e d e e m t h e s a m e a t a n y t i m e wi t h i n t h e t e r m o f o n e y e a r f r o m a n d after the date of sale. Rule 39. if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) d a ys h a v e e l a p s e d a n d n o o t h e r r e d e m p t i o n h a s b e e n m a d e . the debtor.

the question whether Catral had validly sold the subject property to respondent by virtue of the General P ower of Attorney executed by Marilou. CV No. herein respondent. as a contract. Branch 29. 59986 rendered on June 3. Jr. were married on August 8. The Deed of Absolute Sale.000 loan used to purchase a house and lot located at Paranaque. which affirmed with modification the October 18. San Pablo City. Hence. is binding only between the contracting parties. 94-051-2802. The seller of the property acknowledged receipt of the full payment. 146504. respondent. The spouses were separated in fact for more than a year prior the filing of the complaint hence spouses filed separate answers.R. the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of $25. The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes under Assessment of Real Property No. Costs against the petitioner. a s w e l l a s t h e t h i r d p e r s o n wh o t r a n s a c t s w i t h t h e p a r t i e s t h e m s e l v e s . Abelardo GR No. Respondent Miguela C. c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t t h e i s s u e o n d a m a g e s w a s d e e m e d wa i v e d w h e n t h e p a r t i e s limited themselves to the legal issue arrived at during the pre -trial in the RTC.whether petitioner has a c a u s e o f a c t i o n a g a i n s t r e s p o n d e n t . This rule is a corollary of the foregoing doctrine on the rights of real parties in interest. This brings us to the resolution of the second issue -. San Pablo City from a certain Sandra Dalida. the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San Francisco. (2) an obligation of the defendant to respect such right. ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against the conjugal partnership.i n t e r e s t of the petitioner. had t he right to sell the property to another. Divested of all interest over the property. RTC decision was in favor of the petitioner. his son-in-law for recovery of the $25. Thus. Laguna in Civil Case No. 2002 Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo. respondent expressed violent resistance to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner. as owner. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises.Clearly. [14] In the present case. The propert y in question was the exclusive property of Marilou by virtue of her redemption. A cause of action is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right of the plaintiff. DAILO. a n d . There was no violation of a legal right of the petitioner. 2002. Abelardo‘s contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that will entitle him to the profits and income of the company. April 4. The following factual antecedents are undisputed. It must be stressed that there is no allegation or proof that Marilou redeemed the property in behalf of the petitioner—Marilou did not act as agent of the petitioner. Marilou.[16] WHEREFORE. n o s u c h o b l i g a t i o n a r i s e s i n b e h a l f o f t h e d e f e n d a n t . vs. 1997 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court. petitioner. It was in October 1989 when the petitioner issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in conducting their married life independently. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo.[3] On December 1. Marilou. since. the agency. was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo. should there be an y right violated. authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank . The Court cannot grant the relief prayed for in petitioner‘s Complaint as to d a m a g e s . HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK. the petition is DENIED. s h e e x e r c i s e d t h e r i g h t o f r e d e m p t i o n i n h e r o wn r i g h t a s s u c c e s s o r . This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.. as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. R a t h e r . therefore. m a y question the validity of the agency or the violation of the terms and conditions found therein. They did not deny that the same served as their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Abelardo contended that the amount was never intended as a loan but his share of income on contracts obtained by him in the construction firm and that the petitoner could have easily deducted the debt from his share in the profits. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo. as a rule. 1993. there was a check issued worth $25. [15] then only the p a r t i e s . Thereafter. C o u r t o f A p p e a l s a r e AF F I R M E D . however. peti tioner’ s wife.000 paid to the owner of the Paranaque property which became the conjugal dwelling of the spouses. 1967. petitioner has no valid cause of action against the respondent.i n . is not within the realm of the Court‘s jurisdiction to resolve in this case as said issue is not properly raised by the right person. the spouses are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. SP-4748 (97). the petitioner inquired from spouses status of the The Decision and Resolution of the amount loaned from him. Jr. Moreover. petitioner made a formal demand but the spouses failed to comply with the obligation. Marcelino Dailo. Under the circumstances.000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary damages and attorney‘s fees. The wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign. there is no property right that exists in favor of the p e t i t i o n e r . In 1994. wi t h m o r e r e a s o n . Consequently. Jr.a n d t h e a n s we r i s i n t h e n e g a t i v e . and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff. to respect such right. Evidently. however CA reversed and set aside trial court‘s decision for insufficiency of evidence. the spouses pleaded that they were not yet in position to make a definite settlement. HELD: Yes. In July 1991. the petitioner has c eased to be the proper party who may challenge the validity of the sale. Hence. MIGUELA C. During their marriage. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife. the aggrieved part y i s M arilou. assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Carlos vs.

It contends that Article 124 of the Family Code should be construed in relation to Article 493 of the Civil Code. JR. The abovementioned transactions. Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property. raising the following issues for this Court‘s consideration: 1. was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises. III. In the latter‘s Answer with Counterclaim. 1995. San Francisco. San Pablo City. a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo. Zayas. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE. 406. respondent learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her car.000.00 as exemplary damages. Jr. covered by ARP No. a Ford sedan. The counterclaim is dismissed. 493. Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner.00 from petitioner. respondent instituted with the Regional Trial Court. In one of her visits to the subject property. Pursuant to the SPA. 2.00 representing the value of the car which was burned. As security therefor.[7] The appellate court declared as void the mortgage on the subject property because it was constituted without the knowledge and consent of respondent. Series of 1996 of Notary Public Octavio M. ON BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION 1. 1997. this petition. the appellate court affirmed the trial court‘s finding that the subject property was conjugal in nature. the Court finds for the plaintiff and hereby orders: ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: 1. petitioner takes issue with the legal provision applicable to the factual milieu of this case. shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. it upheld the trial court‘s order to reconvey the subject property to respondent. and even substitute another person in its enjoyment. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10. 3. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P25. in accordance with Article 124 of the Family Code. with respect to the co-owners. died on December 20. Branch 29. Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership. No. through its vice-president.00 as attorney‘s fees. The assessment of real property No. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. 1996 an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P40. 95-051-1236. The declaration of the following documents as null and void: (a) The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated December 1. 83. (b) (c) (c) (d) 2. petitioner. Thus. Book No. the appellate court found petitioner to be liable therefor because it is responsible for the consequences of the acts or omissions of the person it hired to accomplish the assigned task. . 95-091-1236 entered as Doc. . in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the subject property acquired during the marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to their conjugal partnership.[8] With respect to the damage to respondent‘s car.00 as moral damages. XXI. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto. except when personal rights are involved. Jr. [5] In the meantime. Page No. 44. No. 124. SP-2222 (97) for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale. JR. consolidated the ownership thereof by executing on June 6. Series of 1993.to be secured by the spouses Dailo‘s house and lot in San Pablo City. To pay the cost of the suit. Marcelino Dailo. Page No.[4] Upon maturity. the appellate court affirmed the trial court‘s Decision. 1. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage. The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows: WHEREFORE. Civil Case No. 4. petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. but deleted the award for damages and attorney‘s fees for lack of basis. petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo. San Pablo City. After the extrajudicial sale thereof. After trial on the merits. which states: ART. 2. The Certificate of Sale executed by Notary Public Reynaldo Alcantara on April 20.000. WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO. SO ORDERED.[10] Hence. . After the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed. which was conjugal in nature.[9] All told. ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION .000. 212. Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount ofP300.000. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.000. As a result. The defendant to pay plaintiff P25. 1993 executed before Notary Public Romulo Urrea and his notarial register entered as Doc. the loan remained outstanding.[11] First. the trial court rendered a Decision on October 18. 1995. The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the defendant The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the defendant over the residential lot located at Brgy. the plaintiff having proved by the preponderance of evidence the allegations of the Complaint. The defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the plaintiff. Book No. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part: ART. took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent. and he may therefore alienate.[6] Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals. Deed of Sale. Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. assign or mortgage it.

[12] Thus. 1967. Jr.[18] the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.[25] A party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory. The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime. must prove).[16] The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo. he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal. by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code. Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo. petitioner vigorously asserted that the subject property was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo. there is no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code as an exception to Article 124 of the Family Code. . Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Marcelino Dailo.[14] In applying Article 124 of the Family Code. a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial. ―[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void. products. (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited.[13] it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. . suppletorily. In the absence of such authority or consent. on the conjugal partnership to the extent that it redounded to the benefit of the family. the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation. . These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. Jr. the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. the framers of the law could not have intended to curtail the right of a spouse from exercising full ownership over the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to him under the concept of co-ownership. Certainly. by Chapter 4 onConjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and. Where the law does not distinguish. Second. redounded to the benefit of the family. Jr. the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter. there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that. In case of conflict. fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.[17] Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner.[19] Thus. . Jr. Other than petitioner‘s bare allegation. petitioner would have this Court uphold the validity of the mortgage to the extent of the late Marcelino Dailo. does not persuade this Court. both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondent‘s consent. Jr. petitioner imposes the liability for the payment of the principal obligation obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property. the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. Jr. As shall be discussed next. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below. petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. In Guiang v. In the absence of a marriage settlement. [21] Under Article 121 of the Family Code. Court of Appeals. where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds. which formed part of their conjugal partnership. the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband. . . the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. foremost. not he who denies. Jr. justice and due process. the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed. without adducing adequate proof. in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse. Jr.[23] Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit. . to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family. Jr. courts should not distinguish. In addition.[22] The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such.‖ For the subject property to be held liable. The same principle in Guiang squarely applies to the instant case. . 1988. the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo. without the knowledge and consent of his wife. were married on August 8. [20] Thus.[24] Petitioner‘s sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo.In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties. Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the Family Code requires the consent of the other spouse to the mortgage of conjugal properties. There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses.[2 . The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. Consequently. Even on appeal. any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. non qui negat (he who asserts. even in a suppletory manner. . indeed. [15] With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3.‘s share in the conjugal partnership.

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