Hadjula v.

Madianda

FACTS:

Complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the Bureau of Fire
Protection (BFP), claimed that she approached respondent for some legal advice and further alleged that
in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential she disclosed personal
secrets only to be informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would refer the matter to a
lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused handling her case
only after she had already heard her secrets.

Respondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them. Respondent also stated the observation that the
supposed confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of common knowledge
in the BFP.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Atty. Madiana breached her duty of preserving the confidence of a client and violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

YES. Respondent was reprimanded and admonished.

RATIO:

The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable
lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain
restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that
which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information acquired
or revealed during legal consultations.

The seriousness of the respondent’s offense notwithstanding, the Supreme Court feels that there is room
for compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning to
condone the error of respondent’s ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends
becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever
convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information respondent
gathered from her conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even the score. At the end
of the day, it appears clear to the Court that respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate without
perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on
confidentiality.
B.R. Sebastian Enterprises v. CA

FACTS:

Petitioner, thru its then counsel of record, Baizas, Alberto and Associates, received notice to file
Appellant’s Brief within 45 days from receipt thereof. Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief thus
respondent Court issued a Resolution requiring said counsel to show cause why the appeal should not be
dismissed for failure to file the Appellant’s Brief within the reglementary period. As the latter failed to
comply with the above Resolution, respondent Court issued another Resolution this time dismissing
petitioner’s appeal.

Petitioner, this time thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution
dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas, senior partner in the law
firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES, the affairs of the said firm are still being settled between
Atty. Jose Baizas (son of Crispin Baizas) and Atty. Ruby Alberto, the latter having established her own
law office; furthermore, Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, the lawyer who handled this case in the trial court and
who is believed to have also attended to the preparation of the Appellant’s Brief but failed to submit it
through oversight and inadvertence, had also left the firm.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of a partner extinguish the lawyer-client relationship with the law firm.

HELD:

NO. Petition was dismissed.

RATIO:

Petitioner’s counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty.
Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between
said firm and petitioner. With Baizas’ death, the responsibility of Atty. Alberto and his Associates to the
petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided
by the Rules of Court. This is so because it was the law firm which handled the case for petitioner before
both the trial and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu, an associate who was designated to handle the
case, later left the office after the death of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm could
have replaced him. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the case
to another associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court
so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer.

Moreover, petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed to make inquiries from counsel
regarding its case. As pointed out by respondents, the president of petitioner corporation claims to be the
intimate friend of Atty. Crispin Baizas; hence, the death of the latter must have been known to the former.
This fact should have made petitioner more vigilant with respect to the case at bar. Petitioner failed to act
with prudence and diligence, thus, its plea that they were not accorded the right to procedural due process
cannot elicit either approval or sympathy.
Burbe v. Magulta

Facts: Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a claim of money against a
creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters for the petitioner, which were not successful and so the
former intimated that a case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and
included also amounts for the filing of the case.

A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as to the status of his case.
Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that the
case has already been filed even invited petitioner to come with him to the Justice Hall to verify the status
of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the prosecutor’s office while the lawyer allegedly
went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news
that the Clerk of Court was absent that day.

Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk of court to see for
himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out that no such case has been filed.

Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being
caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all
filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease
petitioner’s feelings, he offered to reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5,
1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively.

Issue: Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP as
follows: “It is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for
the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant’s deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill
complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to file the
Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client. The failure of respondent to fulfill
this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up
this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes
highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent
reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not
exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds.”
Rabanal v. Tugade

Facts: This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant spouses Cayetano and Lirio Rabanal
against Atty. Faustino F. Tugade. It is alleged that respondent, as counsel for complainant Cayetano
Rabanal, did not file the appellant’s brief in the Court of Appeals despite having been granted by the
appellate court an extension of time to file the same, as a result of which the appeal filed by Cayetano was
dismissed and the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan became final and
executory.

Respondent claims however that he was not the counsel of complainant Cayetano Rabanal prior to the
filing of a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals and he could not be held responsible for
the dismissal of complainant’s appeal for failure of counsel to file the appellant’s brief.

Issue: Whether or not the lawyer should be disciplined

Held: Yes. The absence of a written contract does not preclude a finding that there was a professional
relationship which merits attorney’s fees for professional services rendered. A written contract is not an
essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish
the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any
matter pertinent to his profession. In this case, complainant sought and received legal advice from
respondent Tugade, who admitted that he agreed to sign the appellant’s brief to be filed and that he
received P600.00 from complainant spouses. It is therefore clear that a lawyer-client relationship existed
between the two. He thus violated the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

RULE 12.03. A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.

RULE 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan

Facts: The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), raised a complaint before the
Sandiganbayan (SB) against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and Teodoro Regala and his partners in the
ACCRA law firm, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the
named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippines
versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."

During the course of the proceedings, PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" which
excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint on his undertaking that he will reveal the
identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder.

In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, ACCRA lawyers requested that PCGG similarly
grant the same treatment to them as accorded Roco. The PCGG has offered to the ACCRA lawyers the
same conditions availed of by Roco but the ACCRA lawyers have refused to disclose the identities of
their clients. ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, invoking that the Honorable Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion:

In subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who acted to the strict application of the law of agency
In not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore,
deserving of equal treatment.
In not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners
ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and other information requested by PCGG.
In not requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable
and just grounds and with due consideration to equal protection of the law

ISSUE: Whether or not client’s identity in a case involving and acquiring companies allegedly sourced
from ill-gotten wealth is privileged and disclosure of such is unethical.

RULING
The court held that the client identity in this case is privileged. As a matter of public policy, a client's
identity should not be shrouded in mystery. This general rule is however qualified by some important
exceptions:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name
would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the
client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary
to convict an individual of a crime.

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that
the instant case falls under the first and third exception.

The attorney-client privilege, as currently worded in the Rules of Court provides the disqualification by
reason of privileged communication. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court further emphasizes the importance of
maintaining client confidence. Furthermore, this duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's
fidelity to client.

The Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan are hereby annulled and set aside.
Quiambao v. Bamba

Facts: Felicitas Quiambao was the president and managing director of Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc
(AIB). Quiambao procured the legal services of Atty. Nestor Bamba for the corporate affairs of AIB.
Atty. Bamba was also the official legal counsel of an ejectment case filed by Quiambao against spouses
Santiago and Florito Torroba.

When Quiambao resigned from AIB, Atty. Bamba, without withdrawing as counsel from the ejectment
case, represented AIB in a complaint case for replevin and damages against her. Quiambao filed charges
against Atty. Bamba for representing conflicting interests and violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

For his part, Atty. Bamba denies that he was a personal lawyer of Quiambao, and he believes that it is part
of his duty to pursue cases in behalf of employees at the time Quiambao was working in AIB. Even then,
Atty. Bamba contends that the ejectment case and replevin case are completely unrelated.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Bamba is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held: Yes, Atty. Bamba is representing conflicting interests. Despite Atty. Bamba’s contention that his
legals services extend to AIB’s employees, this should not cover the personal cases filed by its officers.

Even though the replevin and ejectment case are unrelated, representing opposing clients therein gives
rise to suspicions of double-dealing, and would thus result to a conflict of interest.

Furthermore, Atty. Bamba failed to show that he disclosed or procured the approval of Quiambao before
pursuing the replevin case against her. Atty. Bamba was found guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility and was suspended from practicing for one (1) year.
Abaqueta v. Florido

FACTS: Complainant Abaqueta filed this administration complaint against respondent Atty. Florido for
conflict of interest. Abaqueta engaged the professional services of Atty. Florido in a special proceeding
entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Deceased Bonifacia Abaqueta Susana Uy Trazo (1st Case).
Atty. Florido was able to file Objections and Comments to Inventory and Accounting, registering
complainants objection.

Several years later, Milagros Yap Abaqueta filed an action for sum of money against complainant
Abaqueta in a case entitled, Milagros Yap Abaqueta vs. Gamaliel Abaqueta and Casiano Gerona (2nd
Case). Respondent Atty. Florido signed the Complaint as counsel for plaintiff Milagros Yap-Abaqueta,
averring, inter alia, that Plaintiff and defendant Gamaliel Abaqueta are the conjugal owners of those
certain parcels of land. However, the parcel of land referred to as conjugal party of the complainant and
Milagro Yap-Abaqueta are the very same parcel of land in the 1st Case. In short, respondent lawyer made
allegations in the 2nd Case, which were contrary to and in direct conflict with his averments as counsel
for complainant in the 1st case. Complainant also avered that respondent Atty. Florido admitted that he
was never authorized to appear as counsel for Milagro Yap-Abaqueta in the 2nd case, and that Atty.
Florido failed to indicate n the Complaint the true and correct address of herein complainant, which Atty.
Florido knew as far back as August 2, 1990.

In Atty. Florido's defense, he always acted in good faith in his professional relationship with complainant
in spite of the fact that they have not personally met. He based the matters he wrote in the Complaint on
information and documents supplied by Mrs. Charito Y. Baclig, indicating that he was sole and exclusive
owner of the properties. Eight years later, long after the 1st case was settled, and the attorney-client
relationship between complainant and respondent lawyer was terminated, Mrs. Milagros Abaqueta
through Mrs. Baclig, engaged his services to file the 2nd case. Mrs. Baclig presented to him a deed of
absolute sale dated July 7, 1975, showing that the properties subject hereof were not complainants
exclusive property but his conjugal property with his wife, the same having been acquired during the
subsistence of their marriage. Thus, in all good faith, respondent alleged in the complaint that said
properties were conjugal assets of the spouses.

Atty. Florido further pointed out that his law firm handles on the average eighty new court cases annually
and personally interviews four or five clients, prospective clients and/or witnesses daily except Saturdays
and Sundays. It regularly closes to the public at 7:00 p.m., but work continues sometimes until 8:30 p.m.
This has been going on for the last twenty-five years out of respondents thirty-three years of private
practice. The absence of personal contact with complainant and the lapse of eight years resulted in the
oversight and/or lapse of respondents memory that complainant was a former client. Furthermore, the
caption of the Special Proceeding (1st case) was not in the name of complainant but was entitled, In the
Matter of the Intestate Estate of Bonifacia Payahay Abaqueta.

Respondent expressed regret over the oversight and averred that immediately after discovering that he
formerly represented complainant in the 2nd case he filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff,
which was granted by the trial court.

Complainant further countered that Atty. Florido's conduct was geared towards insuring a court victory
for Milagros Yap wherein he deliberately stated a false address of the complainant when he knew fully
well that complainants true and correct address was. By falsely stating and concealing his true and correct
address, respondent eventually succeeded in obtaining a default judgment in favor of his client.

ISSUE: WON Atty Florido violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by
representing Milagros Yap?

HELD: YES. The reasons explained by respondent are hardly persuasive to excuse his clear
representation of conflicting interests in this case.

First, the investigating commissioner observed that the name “Gamaliel Abaqueta” is not a common
name. Once heard, it will surely ring a bell in ones mind if he came across the name again.

Second, assuming arguendo that respondents memory was indeed faulty, still it is incredible that he could
not recall that complainant was his client, considering that Mrs. Charito Baclig, who was complainants
attorney--in--fact and the go--between of complainant and respondent in the Bonifacia Abaqueta case was
the same person who brought Milagros Yap Abaqueta to him. Even a person of average intelligence
would have made the connection between Mrs. Baclig and complainant under such circumstances.

Lastly, the fact that the subject matter of the two cases are the same properties could not have escaped the
attention of respondent.

There is a conflict of interest if there is an inconsistency in the interests of two or more opposing parties.
The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim but it
is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In short, if he argues for one client, this argument will be
opposed by him when he argues for the other client. A lawyer may not, without being guilty of
professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his former client.
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. Indeed, as we stated in Sibulo v. Cabrera, The relation of attorney and
client is based on trust, so that double dealing, which could sometimes lead to treachery, should be
avoided

WHEREFORE, Atty. Bernardito A. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for Three (3)
months. He is further ADMONISHED to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his
duties towards his clients and the court. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Hilado v. David

In April 1945, Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled against Selim
Assad. Attorney Delgado Dizon represented Hilado. Assad was represented by a certain Atty. Ohnick.

In January 1946, Atty. Vicente Francisco replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad and he thenafter
entered his appearance in court.

In May 1946 or four months later, Atty. Dizon filed a motion to have Atty. Francisco be disqualified
because Atty. Dizon found out that in June 1945, Hilado approached Atty. Francisco to ask for additional
legal opinion regarding her case and for which Atty. Francisco sent Hilado a legal opinion letter.

Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his disqualification. In his opposition, he said that no material
information was relayed to him by Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing Hilado’s story, Atty. Francisco
advised her that her case will not win in court; but that later, Hilado returned with a copy of the
Complaint prepared by Atty. Dizon; that however, when Hilado returned, Atty. Francisco was not around
but an associate in his firm was there (a certain Atty. Federico Agrava); that Atty. Agrava attended to
Hilado; that after Hilado left, leaving behind the legal documents, Atty. Agrava then prepared a legal
opinion letter where it was stated that Hilado has no cause of action to file suit; that Atty. Agrava had
Atty. Francisco sign the letter; that Atty. Francisco did not read the letter as Atty. Agrava said that it was
merely a letter explaining why the firm cannot take on Hilado’s case.

Atty. Francisco also pointed out that he was not paid for his advice; that no confidential information was
relayed because all Hilado brought was a copy of the Complaint which was already filed in court; and
that, if any, Hilado already waived her right to disqualify Atty. Francisco because he was already
representing Assad in court for four months in the said case.

Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the said civil case.

HELD: Yes. There already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty. Francisco.
Hence, Atty. Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado without the latter’s consent.

As ruled by the Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not necessary that any
retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted
did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his
business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the
view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in
such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.
Further:

An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor-when

he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as
truly as when he is drawing his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open court.

Anent the issue of what information was relayed by Hilado to Atty. Francisco: It does not matter if the
information relayed is confidential or not. So long as the attorney-client relationship is established, the
lawyer is proscribed from taking other representations against the client.

Anent the issue that the legal opinion was not actually written by Atty. Francisco but was only signed by
him: It still binds him because Atty. Agrava, assuming that he was the real author, was part of the same
law firm. An information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information
imparted to the firm, his associates or his employers.

Anent the issue of the fact that it took Hilado four months from the time Atty. Francisco filed his entry of
appearance to file a disqualification: It does not matter. The length of time is not a waiver of her right.
The right of a client to have a lawyer be disqualified, based on previous atty-client relationship, as
counsel against her does not prescribe. Professional confidence once reposed can never be divested by
expiration of professional employment.
Gonzales v. Cabucaba

In the case of LETICIA GONZALES vs. ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, A.C. No. 6836, January
23, 2006, Rule 15. 03 was intended “to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only
then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.”

X x x,

Before going to the merits, let it be clarified that contrary to the report of Commissioner Reyes,
respondent did not only represent the Gatcheco spouses in the administrative case filed by Gonzales
against them. As respondent himself narrated in his Position Paper, he likewise acted as their counsel in
the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against them.

With that settled, we find respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.

It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Such prohibition is founded on principles of
public policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of
the highest degree. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent
the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. As we expounded in the recent case of
Quiambao vs. Bamba,

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing
parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer
would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other
client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in
one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s
respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to
both clients.

The claim of respondent that there is no conflict of interests in this case, as the civil case handled by their
law firm where Gonzales is the complainant and the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against the
Gatcheco spouses are not related, has no merit. The representation of opposing clients in said cases,
though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or, at the very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing
which this Court cannot allow.
Respondent further argued that it was his brother who represented Gonzales in the civil case and not him,
thus, there could be no conflict of interests. We do not agree. As respondent admitted, it was their law
firm which represented Gonzales in the civil case. Such being the case, the rule against representing
conflicting interests applies.

As we explained in the case of Hilado vs. David:

…[W]e… cannot sanction his taking up the cause of the adversary of the party who had sought and
obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to
keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the courts and of the bar. Without condemning the
respondent’s conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent, we do believe that upon the admitted facts it is
highly inexpedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of which he is a distinguished member,
“into public disrepute and suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice.”

The claim of respondent that he acted in good faith and with honest intention will also not exculpate him
as such claim does not render the prohibition inoperative.

In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down the spouses as no other lawyer is willing to
take their case cannot prosper as it is settled that while there may be instances where lawyers cannot
decline representation they cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest between a present client and
a prospective one.[34] Granting also that there really was no other lawyer who could handle the spouses’
case other than him, still he should have observed the requirements laid down by the rules by conferring
with the prospective client to ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict
with another client then seek the written consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts.[35]
These respondent failed to do thus exposing himself to the charge of double-dealing.

X x x.

In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests a penalty
ranging from one to three years’ suspension was imposed.
Santos v. Beltran
Trenas v. People

DOCTRINE: In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. Facts:

1. Elizabeth Luciaja gave P150,000.00 to Atty. Hector Treñas to assist in the titling of a house and lot
located in Iloilo City. Treñas prepared and issued a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. He also
gave Elizabeth three Revenue Official Receipts amounting to P120,000. However, when Elizabeth
consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted
to her that the receipts were fake and that he used the money for his other transactions. Elizabeth
demanded the return of the money. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against Hector. 2. An
Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the RTC Makati City which rendered a
Decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa. Petitioner appealed with the CA which also
rendered a Decision affirming that of the RTC. 3.

Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that ₱ 150,000
was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Also, the evidence shows that the Receipt issued
by petitioner was without any indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City. Petitioner
claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo City,
especially since his residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any direct proof as to the
place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable presumption that things happened according to the
ordinary course of nature.

Issue:

1. Whether RTC Makati has jurisdiction over the controversy.

Ruling + Ratio:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction. For jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have
been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited
territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa was
committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City. Also, the Affidavit of Complaint executed
by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the offense was committed. Aside from the lone
allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that the
offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City. There is nothing in the documentary
evidence offered by the prosecution that points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was
committed. There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, The RTC of that city
has no jurisdiction over the case. The case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for
investigation and recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

DISPOSITION

: There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, The RTC of that city has no
jurisdiction over the case.
Villanueva v. Gonzales

Facts: In 2000, Vivian Villanueva engaged the services of Atty. Cornelius Gonzales to help her transfer a
title to her name. Villanueva gave Atty. Gonzales Php8,000.00 as acceptance fee. She also gave her the
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) subject of the legal services she engaged Atty. Gonzales for.

However, after receiving the fee and the TCT, Atty. Gonzales did not do anything. Villanueva then asked
Atty. Gonzales to return the acceptance fee as well as the TCT. But instead of returning said money and
property, Atty. Gonzales ignored and avoided Villanueva.

It was only in 2003 that Atty. Gonzales returned the Php8,000.00 to Villanueva but only after the latter’s
daughter confronted and pressured the lawyer. But still, Atty. Gonzales failed to return the TCT.
Consequently, Villanueva filed a administrative case against Atty. Gonzales. The latter did not even
respond to the administrative complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Cornelius Gonzales violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: Yes. He violated Canons 16, 17, and 18.

More particularly Canon 18 which provides:

A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the client’s request for information.

Atty. Cornelius Gonzales avoided Villanueva for three years and kept her in the dark. He did not give her
any information about the status of her case or respond to her request for information. After giving the
money, Villanueva never heard from Atty. Gonzales again. Complainant went to the lawyer’s office
several times to request for information. But every time, Atty. Gonzales avoided Villanueva and gave her
the run-around.

Atty. Cornelius Gonzales was suspended for two years from the practice of law.
Rayos v. Hernandez

FACTS:
1. Rayos was a client of Atty Hernandez in Rayos vs NAPOCOR.

The story of the case:

On Oct 26-27, 1978, typhoon Kading hit Bulacan and concurrently, NAPOCOR imprudently opened
three floodgates of the spillway of Angat Dam which caused flooding of Angat River. Consequently, 10
relatives of Rayos died and his family’s properties were destroyed. Rayos sued NAPOCOR. RTC
dismissed the case for lacking credible evidence. CA reversed the decision and awarded damages in favor
of Rayos, which was also affirmed by the SC.

Final and executory on Aug 4, 1993. The awards were as follows:

a. Actual damages - P520, 000
b. Moral damages – P500, 000
c. Litigation Expenses – P10,000.

2. The check issued by NAPOCOR was turned over to Atty Hernandez as he was the counsel of Rayos.
Rayos demanded the check from Atty H but Atty H refused

3. Rayos filed a motion with the RTC to direct Atty Hernandez to deliver to him the check. Despite the
Court Order, Atty H refused claiming that it was his means to ensure payment of his attorney’s fees.

4. Atty Hernandez deposited the amount of P502, 838. 79 to the bank account of Rayos.

5. Rayos filed a disbarment case against Atty H for his failure to return the remaining P557, 961. 21.

6. Atty H replied: Rayos allegedly agreed to a contingent basis fee on a 40%-60% (client-lawyer) sharing:
40% - attorney’s fees
20% - litigation expenses

7. The Court referred the case to Commission on Bar Discipline of IBP for investigation.
• Investigating Commissioner recommended the DISMISSAL of the case.
• IBP adopted and approved the same.

MAIN ISSUE:
Whether or not the contingent fee agreement is binding upon Rayos and Atty Hernandez.

DECISION:
YES, but with RESERVATIONS.

CONTINGENT FEE – the contingent fee is the amount agreed upon by the parties subject to the
stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers.

YES: Contracts of this nature are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor client and the
lawyer especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action but no means to pay for legal
services, unless he agrees to a contract of contingent fee. A much higher compensation is allowed as
contingent fee in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails.

RESERVATIONS: Contingent fee contracts should always be subject to the supervision of a court as to
its reasonableness. When the courts find that the stipulated amount is excessive or found to have been
marred by fraud, mistake, undue influence on the part of the attorney, public policy demands that said
contract be disregarded to protect the client from unreasonable exaction.

In the case at bar, Atty H collected 53% of the total amount due to Rayos.
• Rayos was unschooled and frustrated with the loss of his loved ones and the destruction of his
family’s properties. Given these facts, Rayos would easily succumb to the demands of Atty H regarding
his attorney’s fees.
• Taking note also of Atty H’s efforts in litigating Rayos’ case for 15 years and the risk he took in
representing Rayos on a contingent fee basis, a fee of 35% of the amount awarded to Rayos would be a
fair compensation for Atty H’s legal services.

Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would
accomplish the end desired. Thus, guided by previous rulings of the Court, Atty Hernandez’s
SUSPENSION FOR 6 MONTHS is justified in the case at bar.

-----------------------------------------------------
NB:
Factors which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:
Rule 20.1 of CPR:
a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; 

c) The importance of the subject matter; 

d) The skill demanded; 

e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which
he belongs;
g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Sps. Concepcion v. Atty. Dela Rosa

Facts:
This is an administrative case that stemmed from a Verified Complaint filed by complainants Spouses
Henry A. Concepcion (Henry) and Blesilda S. Concepcion (Blesilda; collectively complainants) against
respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa (respondent), charging him with gross misconduct for violating,
among others, Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Complainants alleged that
from 1997 until August 2008, respondent served as their retained lawyer and counsel. In this capacity,
respondent handled many of their cases and was consulted on various legal matters, among others, the
prospect of opening a pawnshop business towards the end of 2005. Said business, however, failed to
materialize. Aware of the fact that complainants had money intact from their failed business venture,
respondent, on March 23, 2006, called Henry to borrow money. The checks were personally encashed by
respondent. Demanded the return of payment but failed to do so. Respondent denied borrowing
P2,500,000.00 from complainants, insisting that Nault was the real debtor.18 He also claimed that
complainants had been attempting to collect from Nault and that he was engaged for that specific purpose.
In fine, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP concluded that respondent’s actions degraded the
integrity of the legal profession and clearly violated Rule 16.04 and Canons 7 and 16 of the CPR.
Respondent’s failure to appear during the mandatory conferences further showed his disrespect to the
IBP-CBD. Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred and
that he be ordered to return the P2,500,000.00 to complainants, with stipulated interest.

Issue: Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.

Held:
The Court concurs with the IBP’s findings except as to its recommended penalty and its directive to
return the amount of P2,500,000.00, with legal interest, to complainants. the complainants and incurring
the same obligation.
Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money from his client
unless the client’s interests are fully protected:
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his clients that may come into his
possession.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client
except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is
handling for the client.”

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued
with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this “trust and confidence” is prone
to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the
lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client.
The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation. A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent
did, is very unethical. It comes within those acts considered as abuse of client’s confidence. The canon
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to
renege on her obligation.
As above-discussed, respondent borrowed money from complainants who were his clients and whose
interests, by the lack of any security on the loan, were not fully protected. Owing to their trust and
confidence in respondent, complainants relied solely on the former’s word that he will return the money
plus interest within five (5) days.
However, respondent abused the same and reneged on his obligation, giving his previous clients the
runaround up to this day. Accordingly, there is no quibble that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the
CPR.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa is found guilty of violating Canon 7 and Rule 16.04,
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective upon finality of this Decision, with a stern warning
that a commission of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Edquibal v. Ferrer

FACTS: Edquibal charged Atty Ferrer with professional misconduct and neglect of duty .Edquibal
engaged the services of Ferrer to assist his mother Ursula in cases she filed against his sister Delia
involving a certain property. In one of the cases, the trial judge rendered a decision adverse to his mother.
Atty Ferrer then advised complainant to appeal to the CA and that the cost involved is P4,000. When
complainant Edquibal informed responden tAtty Ferrer that he does not have enough money, Atty ferrer
said P2,000 is sufficient. Edquibal followed up the appealed case. He then learned that the appeal was
dismissed for failure to file the required appelant's brief. Respondent Atty Ferrer denied that he filed an
appeal. He claimed that he never agreed to handle the appeal.

.ISSUE:W/n Atty Ferrer is guilty of professional misconduct...

HELD: YES. Records show that respondent was the counsel of record for Edquibal. The resolution of the
CA clearly states that the “notice sent to counsel for defendants-appelants requiring him to file appelants
brief within 45 days from receipt thereof, was received by him...". However, respondent failed to file the
appellants' brief despite receipt of such notice. Sec2 rule44 of the Rules of CivPro provides that the
counsel of the parties in the court of origin shall be considered their counsel in the CA. If it were true that
Atty Ferrer did not agree to represent Edquibals, why did he not file with the CA a motion to withdraw as
their counsel? The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence. All that is required is ordinary
diligence expected of a bonus pater familias. Suspended for 3 mos.
Solatan v. Inocentes

FACTS:

Atty. Jose A. Camano was an associate in the firm of Atty. Oscar Inocentes. The Oscar Inocentes and
Associates Law Office was retained by spouses Genito, owners of an apartment complex when theGenito
Apartments were placed under sequestration by the PCGG. They represented the spouses Genito before
the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan and in ejectment cases against non-paying tenants occupying theGenito
Apartments.Solatan’s sister was a tenant of the Genito Apartments. She left the apartment to Solatan and
othermembers of her family. A complaint for ejectment for non-payment of rentals was filed against her
and adecision was rendered in a judgment by default ordering her to vacate the premises. Solatan was
occupying said apartment when he learned of the judgment. He informed Atty. Inocentes of his desire to
arrange execution of a new lease contract by virtue of which he would be the new lessee of the apartment.
Atty.

Inocentes referred him to Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of ejectment cases against tenants of the
Genito Apartments. During the meeting with Atty. Camano, an verbal agreement was made in which
complainant agreed to pay the entire judgment debt of his sister, including awarded attorney’s fees and
costs of suit. Complainant issued a check in the name of Atty. Camano representing half of the attorney’s
fees. Complainant failed to make any other payment. The sheriff in coordination with Atty. Camano
enforced the writ of execution and levied the properties found in the subject apartment. Complainant
renegotiated and Atty. Camano agreed to release the levied properties and allow complainant to remain at
the apartment. Acting on Atty. Camano’s advice, complainant presented an affidavit of ownership to the
sheriff who released the levied items. However, a gas stove was not returned to the complainant but was
kept by Atty. Camano in the unit of the Genito Apartments where he was temporarily staying.
Complainant filed the instant administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Camano and
Atty.Inocentes. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to suspend Atty. Camano from the practice of law
for 1 year and to reprimand Atty. Inocentes for exercising command responsibility.

ISSUE:

1)Whether or not Atty. Camano violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

2)Whether or not Atty. Inocentes violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD:

All lawyers must observe loyalty in all transactions and dealings with their clients.

An attorney has no right to act as counsel or legal representative for a person without being retained. No
employment relation was offered or accepted in the instant case.

Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires all lawyers to observe loyalty in all
transactions and dealings with their clients. Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal advice to a party
with an interest conflicting with that of his client may be held guilty of disloyalty. However, the advice
given by Atty. Camano in the context where the complainant was the rightful owner of the incorrectly
levied properties was in consonance with his duty as an officer of the court. It should not be construed as
being in conflict with the interest of the spouses Genito as they have no interest over the properties. The
act of informing complainant that his properties would be returned upon showing proof of his ownership
may hint at infidelity to his clients but lacks the essence of double dealing and betrayal.2. Atty. Inocentes’
failure to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm is a blameworthy
shortcoming. As name practitioner of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked with the responsibility to
make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm should act in conformity to the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Atty. Inocentes received periodic reports from Atty. Camano on the latter’s
dealings with complainant. This is the linchpin of his supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano and
liability by virtue thereof. Partners and practitioners who hold supervisory capacities are legally
responsible to exert ordinary diligence in apprising themselves of the comings and goings of the cases
handled by persons over which they are exercising supervisory authority and in exerting necessary efforts
to foreclose violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility by persons under their charge
Salonga v. CA

“Any act performed by a lawyer within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act
of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of petitioners' counsel may result in the rendition of
an unfavorable judgment against them.”

FACTS:Private Respondent Izon, as President of Paul Geneve Corporation, agreed into a joint venture
enterprise with Petitioner Salonga, as owner of Solid Intertain; and that is, both companies will form a
new corporation. This joint venture will then provide leasehold holding rights of the property in Makati
from the former to the latter. Documents were prepared for the joint venture. Private respondent signed
the document, and it was then delivered to petitioner for his signature. However, the said documents were
not signed by the petitioner. With the memorandum of agreement still unsigned, not notarized, and in the
possession of petitioner, the latter transferred all his equipments to the said property in Makati. Club Ibiza
was thus opened and made operational on the leased premises in question under Solid Intertain
Corporation. Private Respondent was totally left out. Private Respondent filed a complaint to Respondent
RTC for specific performance with temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction with prayer for
damages against herein petitioners to enforce a memorandum of agreement that was supposedly perfected
between the parties .A TRO was then served to petitioner which they referred to their counsel, Atty.
Garlitos. Only the private respondents appeared on the hearing for Injunction. Private respondent sought
to cite petitioner for contempt on grounds that the latter disobeyed the temporary restraining order.
Petitioners again failed to appear on the second hearing for the motion for writ of preliminary injunction.
The court then acted, on the private respondent’s motion and it was granted a few days after. Despite two
motions for extension, petitioner failed to answer the court.

Due to failure of petitioner to file an answer, private respondent submitted a third ex parte motion to
declare petitioner, as defendant in Default which the court favorably acted. A month after, RTC rendered
a decision, holding the petitioner in default, in favor of the private respondent. A few more months after,
Petitioner Salonga was adjudged guilty of civil contempt .In defense, petitioner raised before the
Respondent Court of Appeals the following arguments:(a)

Fraud on the part of the petitioner’s counsel

Petitioner alleged that his counsel Atty. Garlitos acted fraudulently in handling the Civil Case based on
the following observations of the petitioner on his counsel:

Very late arrival on the first hearing on preliminary injunction

Failure to appear on the second hearing on preliminary injunction

Failure to appear on the motion for dissolution of injunction

Failure to file an answer within the period required by the Rules of Court

Failure to appear on petitioner’s motion of reconsideration

Failure to appear on a hearing in which private respondent’s counsel successfully obtained a denial of the
aforementioned motion.
Petitioner contend that there is extrinsic fraud when a party was prevented from having presented all of
his case to the court as when the lawyer connives at his defeat or corruptly sells out his client's interests
(b) He was deprived of his basic rights to due process Petitioner’s motion was denied.

ISSUES:W/N The judgment of the lower court should be annulled on grounds of extrinsic fraud and
denial of due process.

DECISION: The court denied the motion of the petitioner, and in affirmed the decision of the lower
courts.

On Annulment of Judgment
There are only 2 grounds in annulment of judgment: (a) Void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due
process of law (b) If it has been obtain by fraud. No Extrinsic Fraud.

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the Court notes that the previously enumerated negligent acts
attributed to petitioner's former counsel Garlitos were in no way shown or alleged to have been caused by
private respondents. Atty. Garlitos neither connived nor sold out to the latter.

Negligence of Counsel Binds Client

The court held that “Any act performed by a lawyer within the scope of his general or implied authority is
regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of petitioners' counsel may result
in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against them. Exceptions to the foregoing have been
recognized by the Court in cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law, or when its application "results in the outright deprivation of one's property through a
technicality." None of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the present case.”

Counsel’s Negligence Simple or Gross?

The court held that counsel Garlitos was merely guilty of simple negligence. Although his failure to file a
timely answer had led to a judgment by default against his clients, his efforts at defending their cause
were palpably real, albeit bereft of zeal.

No Denial of Due Process

The court held that due process was never denied for petitioners Salonga and Solid Intertain Corporation
because the trial court had given them a reasonable opportunity to be heard and present their side in all
the proceedings before it. The records reveal that the judgment by default was rendered by the trial court
in faithful compliance with Rule 18 of the Rules of Court and the constitutional guaranty of due process.

Petitioner Guilty of Indirect Contempt?

The Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals, in which, it correctly ruled that "(in) indirect
contempt proceedings such as in the case at bar, a mere motion to that effect will suffice for the (trial
court) to acquire jurisdiction."

For after all, Section 3 of the Rules of Court requires merely that "a charge in writing has been filed, and
an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel" before one guilty of indirect
contempt may be punished therefore.”
Bernardo v. CA
Pena v. Aparicio

FACTS: This is an administrative complaint for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
against herein respondent, Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio. Resondent appeared as legal counsel for Grace C.
Hufana in an illegal dismissal case. This complaint rooted out when herein complainant, Fernando Martin
O. Pena, sent notices to Hufana for the latter to explain her absences and to return to work. In reply to this
return to work notice, respondent wrote a letter to complainant reiterating his client's claim for separation
pay, in which the letter also contained threats to the company. Moreover, believing that the contents of the
letter deviated from accepted ethical standards, complainant filed this administrative complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s acts constitutes a violation of the Code of professional
Responsibility.

HELD: Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall represent his client
with zeal within the bounds of the law," Furthermore, Rule 19.01commands that a "lawyer shall employ
only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in
presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case
or proceeding." In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through
his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as
settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges
such as tax evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to
violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also amount to
blackmail. Notwithstanding, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing the
same as merely an act of pointing out massive violations of the law by the other party, and, with boldness,
asserting that "a lawyer is under obligation to tell the truth, to report to the government commission of
offenses punishable by the State." He further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard
practice and tradition and that our laws allow and encourage the settlement of disputes. The Supreme
Court ruled that indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this
jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship that he has with his
client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his
client's claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring
payment within a specified period. However, the letter in this case contains more than just a simple
demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory charges against complainant which have
nothing to do with his client's claim for separation pay. The letter was obviously designed to secure
leverage to compel complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely
proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The 26 May 2006Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is
hereby found liable for violation of Rule 19.01of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and is accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely
Mobil Oil Phil Inc. v. CFI of Rizal

FACTS: The partnership La Mallorca, through its partner Miguel Enriquez, entered into a sales agreement
to purchase gasoline on credit with Mobil Oil Philippines. But because the mentioned purchase remained
unpaid, Mobil Oil filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against La Mallorca and its
general partners, which included private respondents.

Subsequently, Mobil Oil filed an Amended Complaint impleading the heirs of the deceased partners as
defendants.

After Mobil Oil had presented its evidence, the counsel of the defendant successfully bargained for a
compromise agreement. The defense agreed to submit the case for decision solely on the basis of
evidence adduced by plaintiff Mobil Oil but past interest in the amount of P150,000.00 shall be excluded
and that only nominal attorney's fees shall be awarded.

Consequently, a Decision was rendered in favor of the Mobil Oil and against defendants. However,
defendants filed a Petition to Modify Decision and/or Petition for Reconsideration, averring that (1) that
there was no stipulation or agreement of the parties on the award of attorney's fees; (2) that Miguel
Enriquez, not being a general partner, could not bind the partnership in the Sales Agreement he signed
with Mobil Oil; and (3) that defendant Geminiano Yabut already withdrew as partner and president of La
Mallorca as of September 14, 1972.

Thereafter, the CFI ISSUEd an order declaring its previous decision favouring Mobil Oil as null and void.
The ground for the decision is that there was no evidence to show that the counsel for the defendants had
been duly authorized by the partnership to enter into a stipulation of FACTS, a compromise agreement or
a confession judgment with Mobil Oil. Mobil Oil filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification but
it was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sales agreement with Mobil Oil which was signed by Miguel Enriquez can
bind the partnership.

HELD: Yes, because Miguel Enriquez is a general partner of La Mallorca. He automatically became a
general partner of the partnership for being one of the heirs of the deceased general partner Mariano
Enriquez. Article IV of the Articles of Co-Partnership of La Mallorca provides that:

“If during the existence of this co-partnership, any of the herein partners should die, the co-partnership
shall continue to exist amongst the surviving partners and the heir or heirs of the deceased partner or
partners.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of Yabut from the partnership will exempt him from liability.

HELD: No, the debt was incurred long before his withdrawal as partner and his resignation as President
of La Mallorca on September 14, 1972. Respondent Geminiano Yabut could not just withdraw
unilaterally from the partnership to avoid his liability as a general partner to third persons like the
petitioner in the instant case.

ISSUE: Does non-active participation in the partnership exempt a partner from liability?
HELD: No, the alleged non-active participation of respondent Agueda Yabut in the partnership cannot
exempt her from the obligation. Active participation in a partnership is not a condition precedent for
membership in a partnership so as to be entitled to its profits or be burdened with its liabilities.

ISSUE: Was there a stipulation of FACTS, a compromise agreement or a confession of judgement?

HELD: Respondent court ISSUEd the following Order:

Calling this case for hearing today, the parties pray the Court that they are submitting the case for
decision on the basis of the evidence thus presented but to exclude past interest in the amount of about
P150,000.00 and to award nominal attorney's fees.

Finding the said motion in order, let judgment be rendered in accordance with the evidence so far
presented.

The foregoing Order is not a stipulation of FACTS nor a confession of judgment. If at all, there has been a
mutual waiver by the parties of the right to present evidence in court on the part of the defendants on one
hand, and waiver of interest in the amount of P150,000.00 and the stipulated attorney's fees of 25% of the
principal amount on the part of the plaintiff, except a nominal one.

The counsels of the parties in this case had the implied authority to do all acts necessary or incidental to
the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of their clients who were all present and never
objected to the disputed order of the respondent court. Parties are bound by the acts and mistakes of their
counsel in procedural matters. Mistakes of counsel as to the relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence
or mistakes in the proper defense, in the introduction of certain evidence, or in argumentation are, among
others all mistakes of procedure, and they bind the clients, as in the instant case.
Masmud v. NLRC
Director of Lands v. Ababa
Orcino v. Gaspar

Facts: Orcino’s husband was murdered and she was zealous in prosecuting the suspects. She hired Atty.
Gaspar as her counsel and they agreed to a P20,000.00 attorney’s fee which Orcino paid. Atty. Gaspar did
his duty religiously from interviewing witnesses to attending hearings and the preliminary investigation.
But on the day bail is to be heard, Atty. Gaspar failed to appear. Bail was granted in favor of the suspects
and this enraged Orcino. She then went to Gaspar’s residence where Gaspar reasoned out that he did not
receive a notice of hearing hence his absence. Finding his reason to be insufficient, Orcino demanded the
records of the case and advised Gaspar that she’ll be hiring another lawyer. Gaspar complied and
thereafter he filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. The court did not grant his motion because the same
was without Orcino’s written consent. Perhaps changing her mind, Orcino refused to give her consent.
Gaspar, however, did not attend the subsequent hearings. Orcino then filed an administrative complaint
against Gaspar for abandoning the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Gaspar violated his duties to his client.

HELD: Yes. The belligerence of Orcino towards Gaspar is understandable and is attributed to her over
zealousness to bring justice to the death of her husband. When she uttered that she’s terminating Gaspar’s
services, she did so in a burst of passion. She did not really mean to terminate Gaspar at all as evidenced
by her refusal to give consent to Gaspar’s motion.

At any rate, a lawyer cannot unilaterally terminate his legal services to his client. Unlike the other way
around where a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship with or without
just cause. Atty. Gaspar has no reason to presume that his motion shall be granted by the court. He should
have not left Orcino in the cold and should have continued appearing for her until there is a withdrawal of
record and a successor placed in his stead. Gaspar was admonished accordingly. He was also directed to
return half of what was paid him.
Metrobank v. CA

FACTS:

Petitioner Metrobank filed a petition for review on certiorari after the Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioner should pay the certain amountbased on the charging lien on the civil case filed against them
which resulted to dismissal. In the dismissed case, private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney’s
fees, based on quantum meruit, which precipitated an exchange of arguments between the parties.
Petitioner manifested that it had fully paid private respondent, Arturo Alafriz and Associates. Private
respondent countered and attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit, but
the negotiations were unsuccessful.

ISSUES:

Whether or not: (1) respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its
attorney’s fees; (2) a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien, and (3) private
respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) percent of the actual and current market values of the litigated
properties on a quantum meruit basis.

HELD:

(1) NO. (2) YES. (3) Ruling subject to separate trial.

RATIO:

A charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney’s fees, requires as a condition
sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main
action by the attorney in favor of his client

The persons who are entitled to or who must pay attorney’s fees have the right to be heard upon the
question of their propriety or amount. Hence, the obvious necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.

In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit,
the determination of elements to be considered would indispensably require nothing less than a full-blown
trial.