Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of
Manila,respondents.

Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent
Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City
Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.

LABRADOR, J.:

I. The case and issue, in general

This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a
legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses questions
of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of
fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist.
Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to
protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it
regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and
national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and
tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien,
so that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence and
bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?

II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180

Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes
the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not
citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of
which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the
retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said
business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are
forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural
persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of
juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United
States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of
the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually
engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision
requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper
authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature
of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities;
and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to
continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to
obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance
and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its
provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3)
the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the
provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to
engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of
Article XIV of the Constitution.

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was
passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the
Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced
in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary
succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution
of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved

a. The police power. —

There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner
claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of
due process and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the consideration and
resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well to bear in mind certain basic and
fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever recurrent conflict
between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. What is
the scope of police power, and how are the due process and equal protection clauses related to it?
What is the province and power of the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts?
These consideration must be clearly and correctly understood that their application to the facts of the
case may be brought forth with clarity and the issue accordingly resolved.

It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible
to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not
need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and
survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most
essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where
the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field
and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and
public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight.
Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this
constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of
police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So
it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they
do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and
the equal protection clause.

b. Limitations on police power. —

The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our
Constitution:

SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)

These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220,
226.)

c. The, equal protection clause. —

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation,
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)

d. The due process clause. —

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the
police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable,
arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter
involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived
be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest?
These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees
are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means
for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute
power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for
that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property,
provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups,
provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is
reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a
reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification
has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —

Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It must
not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of
police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by force of
circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law
promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the public
policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of
individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of
the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or
palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not
supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.

V. Economic problems sought to be remedied

With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue involved.
If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be no question
that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further and prohibits a group of
residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes more complex because its
subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself, which from the immemorial has
always been open to residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.

a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation. —

In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they
produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live in
communities producing more than what they consume and needing an infinite number of things they
do not produce, the dealer comes into existence. As villages develop into big communities and
specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under modern conditions
and standards of living, in which man's needs have multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents
and proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru him the infinite variety
of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail
dealers perform the functions of capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed food and
supplies are ministered to members of the communities comprising the nation.

There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community. He
ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the various little gadgets
and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his customers around his store with the rice
or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to sell,
even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear out. The retailer,
therefore, from the lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator of a department
store or, a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.

b. The alien retailer's trait. —

The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of
population (Time there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but
gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big centers of
population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of community life appear,
ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale in
the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has replaced the native
retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a
slave.

Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred and
insolent neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets and
forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and extremely useful.

c. Alleged alien control and dominance. —

There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the
controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and
other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him. In
big cities and centers of population he has acquired not only predominance, but apparent control
over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs,
sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And were it not for some national
corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa, his control over principal
foods and products would easily become full and complete.

Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it is
said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law is
merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not an
element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business make control virtually
impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious consideration. The
others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the legislature and beyond our
prerogative to pass upon and decide.

The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and
white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and
control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and the
year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics
unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail trade,
as witness the following tables:

Assets Gross Sales

Year and
No.- Per cent Per cent
Retailers Pesos Pesos
Establishments Distribution Distribution
Nationality
1941:
Filipino 106,671 200,323,138 55.82 174,181,924 51.74
..........
Chinese 15,356 118,348,692 32.98 148,813,239 44.21
...........
Others 1,646 40,187,090 11.20 13,630,239 4.05
............
1947:
Filipino 111,107 208,658,946 65.05 279,583,333 57.03
..........
 Chinese 13,774 106,156,218 33.56 205,701,134 41.96
...........
Others 354 8,761,260 .49 4,927,168 1.01
...........
1948: (Census)
Filipino 113,631 213,342,264 67.30 467,161,667 60.51
..........
Chinese 12,087 93,155,459 29.38 294,894,227 38.20
..........
Others 422 10,514,675 3.32 9,995,402 1.29
..........
1949:
Filipino 113,659 213,451,602 60.89 462,532,901 53.47
..........
Chinese 16,248 125,223,336 35.72 392,414,875 45.36
..........
Others 486 12,056,365 3.39 10,078,364 1.17
..........
1951:
Filipino 119,352 224,053,620 61.09 466,058,052 53.07
.........
Chinese 17,429 134,325,303 36.60 404,481,384 46.06
..........
Others 347 8,614,025 2.31 7,645,327 87
..........

AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT

Item Gross
Year and Retailer's
Assets Sales
Nationality
(Pesos) (Pesos)

1941:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 1,633

Chinese 7,707 9,691

..............................................

Others 24,415 8,281

...............................................

1947:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 2,516

 Chinese ........................................... 7,707 14,934

Others .............................................. 24,749 13,919

1948: (Census)

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 4,111

Chinese 7,707 24,398

.............................................

Others .............................................. 24,916 23,686

1949:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 4,069

Chinese 7,707 24,152

..............................................

Others .............................................. 24,807 20,737

1951:

Filipino ............................................. 1,877 3,905

Chinese 7,707 33,207

.............................................

Others 24,824 22,033

...............................................

(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of
Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics,
Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)

The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino
establishments already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..

The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien
participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the
edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through their
assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the very many Filipino
retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests more capital, buys and
sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The same official report, pointing out to the
known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the Filipino retailers were
largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native investment is
thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and
supply.

d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention. —

It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the
legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have been adopted.
The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien dominance and control
when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it is the sense of
the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ." (II
Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That
was twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been either pleasant or comforting.
Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law, commenting on the patrimony clause
of the Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general
preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests that had already brought under their
control the commercial and other economic activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th
ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the members of the constitutional convention for the
economic life of the citizens, in connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he
says:

But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the
country is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political independence
alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private capital is not big
enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but of
recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such
conditions, the government as the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and
assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of the
nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . it
(the Constitution) envisages an organized movement for the protection of the nation not only
against the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien
interests in the economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)

Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino
businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien
control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution No.
1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and a similar
resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention of Manufacturers and
Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears, alien predominance and control; so our
newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to control but to alien stranglehold. We,
therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt
by all the sections and groups that compose the Filipino community.

e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail. —

But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the
predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the
national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough organization, alien
retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters as the
fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available in the
market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize or distribute,
that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of national
economy and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers and
consumers alike can be placed completely at their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an
article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or importer does
not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger profits for its
introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it from
their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the
prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its
consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free
enterprise correspondingly suppressed.

We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien
domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact
within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the interests of
truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien participation in
the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the mention of a few of
which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they have cornered the market of
essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to justify and enhance profits to
unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and
prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the Government has had to establish the
National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public from their continuous hoarding practices and
tendencies; that they have violated price control laws, especially on foods and essential
commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1168),
authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for price control convictions; that they have
secret combinations among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the law of supply
and demand; that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater
or yield to their demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed
by the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of the land, violated
import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and contempt of lawful authority.
It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly
causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As a matter of fact appeals to
unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and by their own lawful diplomatic
representatives, action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the
above practices.

The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the
future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population,
therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not
have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what
we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and
commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to
the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national
holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even
become the potential enemy of the State.

f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security. —

We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is
not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate
desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free the nation from
the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its
disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and
indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State insures its
existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.

VI. The Equal Protection Limitation

a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. — The next question that now poses solution is,
Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage
is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien
resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for
personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we
admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and
enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of
regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking
advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the
alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of the
country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on
whom he makes his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may
seem.

Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine
contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but
the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country's economy
and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient and
temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of retail
distribution to his hands.

The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above, their
secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their
customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are mere guests,
which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the
nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an
alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the retail trade
measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the
alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no
reason or ground for a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.

b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. —

The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are
actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals
and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we answer,
that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that the classification is
actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said
that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the
legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the act transcends the
limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.

Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among
persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power
admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only
when the classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we have earlier
cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369,
which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal protection clause to a law sought to be
voided as contrary thereto:

. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the
state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the
wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some
reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with
 mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the
classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was
enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially
arbitrary."

c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification. —

The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has
already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United
States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No. 2761
of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting the ownership of
vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the Philippine Islands or
the United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that the Philippine Legislature did not
violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The legislature in enacting the law
had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these
Islands from foreign interlopers. We held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all
presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. In substance, we held that the limitation of domestic
ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the
equal protection of the law and due process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In
rendering said decision we quoted with approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the
case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows:

"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts
licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is
distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which is to
encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other
nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its
coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is contemplated,
in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an
American character, that the license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to
the act of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her American privileges, as contra
distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in
surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds
upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected."

The rule in general is as follows:

Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise
justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That
would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes
than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status
between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise
of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)

In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of

hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has declared
his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the following reason: It
may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are supposed to have regard for
the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the court cannot question this
judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which
prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors, was found not
to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was
based on the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our institutions and our life
as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular business to our entire social fabric", and
was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115
(1926), the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati
prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly irrational
discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may
not bear in some instances such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the
basis of permitted classification, and that it could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and
that latitude must be allowed for the legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the
legislative choice of methods for controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124
N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30
(Washington, 1922), the business of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring
public interest, and limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying
aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151
(Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that
aliens are judicially known to have different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty,
hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard,
card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State
Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens as
barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's findings that the exercise of
the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the health, or even the
convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479
(1947), a California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to person ineligible
to citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power over immigration, and
because there is no public interest in the mere claim of ownership of the waters and the fish in them,
so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It further added that the law was the
outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices
dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated traditionally as natural resources.
In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed
a tax on every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age, was
declared void because the court found that there was no reason for the classification and the tax
was an arbitrary deduction from the daily wage of an employee.

d. Authorities contra explained. —

It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold
that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in this
decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or
were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no question of public
interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United States
Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of books of account in
any language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the main reasons for the
decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be no other system of
distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be
deprived of their right to be advised of their business and to direct its conduct. The real reason for
the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public benefit would be derived from the
operations of the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese of something indispensable for
carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring
powers on officials to withhold consent in the operation of laundries both as to persons and place,
was declared invalid, but the court said that the power granted was arbitrary, that there was no
reason for the discrimination which attended the administration and implementation of the law, and
that the motive thereof was mere racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900),
a law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because the
discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification
was proposed.

The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens
do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with whom
they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except in so
far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the land.
These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many occasions and
instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the
language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and significance of the
distinction between the alien and the national, thus:

. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without the
intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own people have. So it is
likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different psychology from our fellow
countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign born,
whose allegiance is first to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental environment
and control have been engendered and formed under entirely different regimes and political
systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are they as well disposed
toward the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of the government itself.
Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously it cannot be
affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without plausible reason for
making the classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations against aliens as it
relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .

VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.

a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive. —

We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been stated
by the highest authority in the United States that:

. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a
real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be
deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its
purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared
by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to
a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of
due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus
officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)

Another authority states the principle thus:

 . . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the
scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the
constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the restriction
it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not
whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the
persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must not
be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)

In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:

. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . .

Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of
constitutionality:

In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police
power to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of the first
questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised has a sufficient
foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive,
and capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to the health, safety, morals,
comfort, and general welfare of the public.

b. Petitioner's argument considered. —

Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those privileges
long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful
and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit and penalized.
This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e.,
that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it has been so engaged by him,
by the alien in an honest creditable and unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the
citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the
Legislature has found, as we have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly
abused by the alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys
a monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's
economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.

The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the
facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade
unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and
manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is
clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative
objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily
unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test
of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the
means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation,
which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the
constitutional limitation of reasonableness.

The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the bill,
which later was enacted into law:

This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are
not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the
persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance
to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and who have no
permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our destiny. All
aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of other people.

In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who
are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks to take
away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a power that can be
wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our national security it
respects existing rights.

The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.

If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is none

the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the
economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country. The
removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one of the
noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation
that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of
a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.

c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action. —

The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of
due process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and
domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution must have given to
the legislature full authority and power to enact legislation that would promote the supreme
happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us, they
expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the legislation
in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared the their Resolution:

That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of
retail trade; but it abstain from approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate for
Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is convinced that the National
Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and American citizens the
privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution,
quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the Petitioner.)

It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the
Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the
nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation,
development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that
"no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of the public utility shall
be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade is only a
continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution.
Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions
of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional?

The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the
approval of the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its duties
towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with the
complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of public
interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the Legislature
was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the danger and threat
that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.

d. Provisions of law not unreasonable. —

A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the
Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those
already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar
recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied
to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the Court on this case,
attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been denied to children and heirs
of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself, its aims and
purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. It is well
settled that the Court will not inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general
matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an
enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the
Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not
palpably in excess of the legislative power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as
a violation of due process, is not its reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the
provisions are not unreasonable. These principles also answer various other arguments raised
against the law, some of which are: that the law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of
aliens would be thrown out of employment; that prices will increase because of the elimination of
competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that adequate replacement is problematical; that
there may be general breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of
these arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the
legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.

VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law

A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof is
misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail
business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional provision which is claimed to
be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:

No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill.

What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the
legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and the
provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does not
and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which
terms express the two main purposes and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than
either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the term
regulation.

Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may
prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page
41 of Answer.)

Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the
Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, etc."
sufficiently expresses the subject of an actprohibiting the sale of such liquors to minors and
to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters being properly included within the
subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of
Answer.)

The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of restraint and
prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated. While word
regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute reason why it
should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in connection with a
thing the best or only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression. (State vs. Morton,
162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)

The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the title
need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, See.
4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in question adopted the more general
term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains other rules
for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms "nationalization" or
"prohibition"; so were the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have
been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which would have made the Act invalid.
The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the drafting of
statutes, under which a simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all
other provisions found in the body of the Act.

One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is
to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the
enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action and study of the legislators or
of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have been appraised of the
nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition provisions. The legislators took
active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons affected by the
prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed, therefore,
that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must therefore, be
overruled.

IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations

Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the
Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal
obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United
Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a
mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p.
39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights
can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and
Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws
against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18,
1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of
treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But
the nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all other countries, except
those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from
engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty
is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed.
257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State
(plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)

X. Conclusion

Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real
actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls
within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the
law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry
out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of
the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may
not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no
duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it
cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually
been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any
treaty or any other conventional agreement.

Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been
made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been
given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close. Our
legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority
and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection guaranteed in the
Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law should be addressed to the Legislature;
they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.

The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix,
JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:

I agree to the proposition, principle or rule that courts may not inquire into the wisdom of an the Act
passed by the Congress and duly approved by the President of the Republic. But the rule does not
preclude courts from inquiring and determining whether the Act offends against a provision or
provisions of the Constitution. I am satisfied that the Act assailed as violative of the due process of
law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution does not infringe upon them,
insofar as it affects associations, partnership or corporations, the capital of which is not wholly
owned by the citizens of the Philippines, and aliens, who are not and have not been engaged in the
retail business. I am, however, unable to persuade myself that it does not violate said clauses
insofar as the Act applies to associations and partnerships referred to in the Act and to aliens, who
are and have heretofore been engaged in said business. When they did engage in the retail
business there was no prohibition on or against them to engage in it. They assumed and believed in
good faith they were entitled to engaged in the business. The Act allows aliens to continue in
business until their death or voluntary retirement from the business or forfeiture of their license; and
corporations, associations or partnership, the capital of which is not wholly owned by the citizens of
the Philippines to continue in the business for a period of ten years from the date of the approval of
the Act (19 June 1954) or until the expiry of term of the existence of the association or partnership or
corporation, whichever event comes first. The prohibition on corporations, the capital of which is not
wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, to engage in the retail business for a period of more than
ten years from the date of the approval of the Act or beyond the term of their corporate existence,
whichever event comes first, is valid and lawful, because the continuance of the existence of such
corporations is subject to whatever the Congress may impose reasonably upon them by subsequent
legislation.1 But the prohibition to engage in the retail business by associations and partnerships, the
capital of which is not wholly owned by citizen of the Philippines, after ten years from the date of the
approval of the Act, even before the end of the term of their existence as agreed upon by the
associates and partners, and by alien heirs to whom the retail business is transmitted by the death of
an alien engaged in the business, or by his executor or administrator, amounts to a deprivation of
their property without due process of law. To my mind, the ten-year period from the date of the
approval of the Act or until the expiration of the term of the existence of the association and
partnership, whichever event comes first, and the six-month period granted to alien heirs of a
deceased alien, his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, do not cure the defect of the
law, because the effect of the prohibition is to compel them to sell or dispose of their business. The
price obtainable at such forced sale of the business would be inadequate to reimburse and
compensate the associates or partners of the associations or partnership, and the alien heirs of a
deceased alien, engaged in the retail business for the capital invested in it. The stock of
merchandise bought and sold at retail does not alone constitute the business. The goodwill that the
association, partnership and the alien had built up during a long period of effort, patience and
perseverance forms part of such business. The constitutional provisions that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due process of law2 and that no person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws3 would have no meaning as applied to associations or partnership and alien
heirs of an alien engaged in the retail business if they were to be compelled to sell or dispose of their
business within ten years from the date of the approval of the Act and before the end of the term of
the existence of the associations and partnership as agreed upon by the associations and partners
and within six months after the death of their predecessor-in-interest.

The authors of the Constitution were vigilant, careful and zealous in the safeguard of the ownership
of private agricultural lands which together with the lands of the public domain constitute the
priceless patrimony and mainstay of the nation; yet, they did not deem it wise and prudent to deprive
aliens and their heirs of such lands.4

For these reasons, I am of the opinion that section 1 of the Act, insofar as it compels associations
and partnership referred to therein to wind up their retail business within ten years from the date of
the approval of the Act even before the expiry of the term of their existence as agreed upon by the
associates and partners and section 3 of the Act, insofar as it compels the aliens engaged in the
retail business in his lifetime his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, are invalid, for
they violate the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.

RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN.
EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of
a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines
(the Marines) to join the Philippine National Police (the PNP) in visibility patrols around
the metropolis.
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like
robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the
PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention
and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (the AFP), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior
and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. In
compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief
Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 [1] (the LOI)
which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task
Force Tulungan, would be conducted.[2] Task Force Tulungan was placed under the
leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
 Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of
the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff
of the AFP and the PNP Chief.[3] In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire
to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime
prevention program including increased police patrols.[4] The President further stated that
to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is
necessary.[5] Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to
assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.[6] Finally, the
President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely
temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation
shall have improved.[7]
The LOI explains the concept of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols as
follows:
xxx

2. PURPOSE:

The Joint Implementing Police Visibility Patrols between the PNP NCRPO and
the Philippine Marines partnership in the conduct of visibility patrols in Metro
Manila for the suppression of crime prevention and other serious threats to
national security.

3. SITUATION:

Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not only by ordinary
criminals but also by organized syndicates whose members include active and
former police/military personnel whose training, skill, discipline and firepower
prove well-above the present capability of the local police alone to
handle. The deployment of a joint PNP NCRPO-Philippine Marines in the
conduct of police visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence of
crimes specially those perpetrated by active or former police/military
personnel.

4. MISSION:

The PNP NCRPO will organize a provisional Task Force to conduct joint
NCRPO-PM visibility patrols to keep Metro Manila streets crime-free, through
a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile
crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose
members include those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active
or former PNP/Military personnel.
5. CONCEPT IN JOINT VISIBILITY PATROL OPERATIONS:

a. The visibility patrols shall be conducted jointly by the NCRPO [National

Capital Regional Police Office] and the Philippine Marines to curb criminality
in Metro Manila and to preserve the internal security of the state against
insurgents and other serious threat to national security, although the primary
responsibility over Internal Security Operations still rests upon the AFP.

b. The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to eradicate all forms

of high-profile crimes perpetrated by organized crime syndicates operating in
Metro Manila. This concept requires the military and police to work cohesively
and unify efforts to ensure a focused, effective and holistic approach in
addressing crime prevention. Along this line, the role of the military and police
aside from neutralizing crime syndicates is to bring a wholesome atmosphere
wherein delivery of basic services to the people and development is achieved.
Hand-in-hand with this joint NCRPO-Philippine Marines visibility patrols, local
Police Units are responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in their
locality.

c. To ensure the effective implementation of this project, a provisional Task

Force TULUNGAN shall be organized to provide the mechanism, structure,
and procedures for the integrated planning, coordinating, monitoring and
assessing the security situation.

xxx.[8]
The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa
(SM City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial
Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic Airport.[9]
On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) filed the instant
petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines,
null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that:
I

THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS

VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:

A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD

JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN
DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION;
B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY
THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW
ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF
THE CONSTITUTION;

C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY

ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE
GOVERNMENT.
II

IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE

ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE MILITARY MORE
POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION.[10]

Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden
duty to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
Without granting due course to the petition, the Court in a Resolution,[11] dated 25
January 2000, required the Solicitor General to file his Comment on the petition. On 8
February 2000, the Solicitor General submitted his Comment.
The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the
President in deploying the Marines, contending, among others, that petitioner has no legal
standing; that the question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny
since the same involves a political question; that the organization and conduct of police
visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine
soldier, does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal
standing; (2) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review; and, (3) Whether or not the calling
of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character
of the PNP.
The petition has no merit.
First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of
standing to raise the issues in the petition. Second, the President did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a
violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution.
The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to
wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its
power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the
existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the
party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.[12]

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the governmental act that is being challenged.[13] The term interest means a material
interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest
in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.[14] The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. [15]
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility
to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the
IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP
of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not
sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is
shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated,
the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the
case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court,
is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of
justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also
be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is
his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To
be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on
the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National President
to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer
by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the
IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation
of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested
or that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the
IBP projects as injurious is the supposed militarization of law enforcement which might
threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the
long run. Not only is the presumed injury not personal in character, it is likewise too vague,
highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner
has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the
questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment
of the Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has
absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must,
by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain
judicial resolution of the controversy.
Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion
to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when
paramount interest is involved.[16] In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal
attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people.[17] Thus, when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure.[18] In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents.Moreover, because peace and order are under
constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated
by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost
certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the
Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.

In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual determination of the
President of the necessity of calling the armed forces, particularly the Marines, to aid the
PNP in visibility patrols. In this regard, the IBP admits that the deployment of the military
personnel falls under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President as stated in
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to call out the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. What the IBP
questions, however, is the basis for the calling of the Marines under the aforestated
provision. According to the IBP, no emergency exists that would justify the need for the
calling of the military to assist the police force. It contends that no lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the calling of the Marines. Thus, the IBP prays that
this Court review the sufficiency of the factual basis for said troop [Marine] deployment. [19]
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the issue pertaining to the
necessity of calling the armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a
political question and the resolution of factual issues which are beyond the review powers
of this Court.
 As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of presidential powers
and limits, and the extent of judicial review. But, while this Court gives considerable
weight to the parties formulation of the issues, the resolution of the controversy may
warrant a creative approach that goes beyond the narrow confines of the issues
raised. Thus, while the parties are in agreement that the power exercised by the President
is the power to call out the armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power involved
may be no more than the maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the general
welfare.[20] For one, the realities on the ground do not show that there exist a state of
warfare, widespread civil unrest or anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not
brought upon the citizenry, a point discussed in the latter part of this decision. In the words
of the late Justice Irene Cortes in Marcos v. Manglapus:

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the Presidents powers as
protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power of the
President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State
against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only
clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked
with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and
ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the
horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential
duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an
emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the
President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot
be said to exclude the Presidents exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers
short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and
maintain public order and security.

xxx[21]
Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is the Presidents power
to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
the resolution of the controversy will reach a similar result.
We now address the Solicitor Generals argument that the issue involved is not
susceptible to review by the judiciary because it involves a political question, and thus,
not justiciable.
As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is
appropriate for court review.[22] It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of
being decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court does not
automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even
in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates
to rule on are political questions. The reason is that political questions are concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being
assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers,
the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless
the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the
Constitution.
As Taada v. Cuenco[23] puts it, political questions refer to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of government. Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the
Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or
to the people themselves then it is held to be a political question. In the classic formulation
of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr,[24] [p]rominent on the surface of any case held to
involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to
a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on the one question.
The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that (T)he
Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.[25] Under this definition, the Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General
that the issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to
review. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue
of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations
respected, is justiciable - the problem being one of legality or validity, not its
wisdom.[26] Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given
to this Court.[27] When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the
determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being
questioned.[28]
By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.[29] Under this definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over
which full discretionary authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no power
to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it may look into the
question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion. [30] A
showing that plenary power is granted either department of government, may not be an
obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to
justiciable controversy.[31]
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom.This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution
itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or
substitute its own.However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power
was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give
the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed
forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally
bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there
is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the
armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse
was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate
the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of
this Courts duty of purposeful hesitation[32] before declaring an act of another branch as
unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
Court interfere with the Presidents judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President
full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the
exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the
powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the

Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period
not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

xxx
The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the
exercise of the calling out power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of Section
18, Article VII which reads, thus:
xxx

Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by
a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be
set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress
may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a
period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any

citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.

Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or

suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis
thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or
review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the
calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. [33] That the intent of the
Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power to call is fully discretionary
to the President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, to wit:

FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a
graduated power of the President as Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call
out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence;
then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can
impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence.

When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his judgment is subject to review. We
are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to
concurrence by the National Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser
power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my
opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.

xxx

FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have imminent danger, the
matter can be handled by the first sentence: The President may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger.

MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels that there is imminent

danger, the matter can be handled by the First Sentence: The
President....may call out such Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. So we feel that that is sufficient for handling
imminent danger, of invasion or rebellion, instead of imposing martial law or
suspending the writ of habeas corpus, he must necessarily have to call the
Armed Forces of the Philippines as their Commander-in-Chief. Is that the
idea?

MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature
nor is it subject to judicial review.[34]

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers
highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in
using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power
compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the
power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of
certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by this Court.
Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two
conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public
safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call
out the armed forces. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes necessary, the
President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in
the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers.
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted
without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation
beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily
quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying
the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the
courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge
necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or
wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the
President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature
not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence
network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or
affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot
decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military
to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to
have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present
situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of
the country. The determination of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to
unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power
may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining order every time
it is exercised.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in
his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion
was gravely abused, the Presidents exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded
respect from this Court.
The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the
armed forces. In his Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, [V]iolent crimes like
bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in Metro
Manila...[35] We do not doubt the veracity of the Presidents assessment of the situation,
especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the
recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities,
and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI
2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis
to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.

The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor
does it infringe the civilian character of the police force.
 Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify the calling
of the Marines, the IBP asserts that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of
law enforcement is militarized in violation of Section 3, Article II[36] of the Constitution.
We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible
use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the
conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation
of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the
metes and bounds of the Marines authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces
are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to
the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine
Marines joint visibility patrols.[37] Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or
orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures.[38] It is their responsibility to direct and
manage the deployment of the Marines.[39] It is, likewise, their duty to provide the
necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. [40] In
view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over
civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious
incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article
XVI of the Constitution.[41]
In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the
AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been virtually appointed
to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited provision. The real authority in these
operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP,
and not with the military. Such being the case, it does not matter whether the AFP Chief
actually participates in the Task Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority
or control over the same.Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as
members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence,
the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian
character of the PNP.
Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than
assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no insidious
incursion of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian
supremacy clause in the Constitution.
It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various
forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippine experience reveals that it is not
averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the implementation and execution of
certain traditionally civil functions. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, some
of the multifarious activities wherein military aid has been rendered, exemplifying the
activities that bring both the civilian and the military together in a relationship of
cooperation, are:
1. Elections;[42]
2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross;[43]
 3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters;[44]
4. Amateur sports promotion and development;[45]
5. Development of the culture and the arts;[46]
6. Conservation of natural resources;[47]
7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program;[48]
8. Enforcement of customs laws;[49]
9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities;[50]
10. Conduct of licensure examinations;[51]
11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school students;[52]
12. Anti-drug enforcement activities;[53]
13. Sanitary inspections;[54]
14. Conduct of census work;[55]
15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board;[56]
16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices;[57]
17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units.[58]
This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress
and, yet, never before questioned.[59] What we have here is mutual support and
cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian
supremacy.
In the United States, where a long tradition of suspicion and hostility towards the use
of military force for domestic purposes has persisted, [60] and whose Constitution, unlike
ours, does not expressly provide for the power to call, the use of military personnel by
civilian law enforcement officers is allowed under circumstances similar to those
surrounding the present deployment of the Philippine Marines. Under the Posse
Comitatus Act[61] of the US, the use of the military in civilian law enforcement is generally
prohibited, except in certain allowable circumstances. A provision of the Act states:

1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by

the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the
Air Force as posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.[62]

To determine whether there is a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act in the use of
military personnel, the US courts[63] apply the following standards, to wit:
Were Army or Air Force personnel used by the civilian law enforcement
officers at Wounded Knee in such a manner that the military personnel
subjected the citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory,
proscriptive, or compulsory[64] George Washington Law Review, pp. 404-433 (1986), which
discusses the four divergent standards for assessing acceptable involvement of military personnel in civil
law enforcement. See likewise HONORED IN THE BREECH: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO
EXECUTE THE LAWS WITH MILITARY FORCE, 83 Yale Law Journal, pp. 130-152, 1973. 64 in nature,
either presently or prospectively?

xxx

When this concept is transplanted into the present legal context, we take it to
mean that military involvement, even when not expressly authorized by the
Constitution or a statute, does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act unless it
actually regulates, forbids or compels some conduct on the part of those
claiming relief. A mere threat of some future injury would be
insufficient.(emphasis supplied)

Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the present case to
determine whether there is permissible use of the military in civilian law enforcement, the
conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the
Constitution is committed. On this point, the Court agrees with the observation of the
Solicitor General:

3. The designation of tasks in Annex A[65] does not constitute the exercise of
regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory military power. First, the soldiers do not control or direct the
operation. This is evident from Nos. 6,[66] 8(k)[67] and 9(a)[68] of Annex A. These soldiers, second, also
have no power to prohibit or condemn. In No. 9(d)[69] of Annex A, all arrested persons are brought to
the nearest police stations for proper disposition.And last, these soldiers apply no coercive
force. The materials or equipment issued to them, as shown in No. 8(c) [70] of Annex A, are all low
impact and defensive in character. The conclusion is that there being no exercise of regulatory,
proscriptive or compulsory military power, the deployment of a handful of Philippine Marines
constitutes no impermissible use of military power for civilian law enforcement.[71]

It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces
are deployed, the military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished
liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are unfounded. The power to call the armed
forces is just that - calling out the armed forces. Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it
has not, that in the deployment of the Marines, the President has violated the fundamental
law, exceeded his authority or jeopardized the civil liberties of the people, this Court is not
inclined to overrule the Presidents determination of the factual basis for the calling of the
Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January, 2000, not a
single citizen has complained that his political or civil rights have been violated as a result
of the deployment of the Marines. It was precisely to safeguard peace, tranquility and the
civil liberties of the people that the joint visibility patrol was conceived. Freedom and
democracy will be in full bloom only when people feel secure in their homes and in the
streets, not when the shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., on official leave.
Puno, J., see separate opinion.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Panganiban, J., in the result.
Quisumbing, J., joins the opinion of J. Mendoza.

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO, J.:

If the case at bar is significant, it is because of the government attempt to foist

the political question doctrine to shield an executive act done in the exercise of the
commander-in-chief powers from judicial scrutiny. If the attempt succeeded, it would
have diminished the power of judicial review and weakened the checking authority
of this Court over the Chief Executive when he exercises his commander-in-chief
powers. The attempt should remind us of the tragedy that befell the country when
this Court sought refuge in the political question doctrine and forfeited its most
important role as protector of the civil and political rights of our people. The
ongoing conflict in Mindanao may worsen and can force the Chief Executive to
resort to the use of his greater commander-in-chief powers, hence, this Court
should be extra cautious in assaying similar attempts. A laid back posture may not
sit well with our people considering that the 1987 Constitution strengthened the
checking powers of this Court and expanded its jurisdiction precisely to stop any
act constituting xxx grave abuse of jurisdiction xxx on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.1
The importance of the issue at bar includes this humble separate opinion. We can
best perceive the different intersecting dimensions of the political question doctrine by
viewing them from the broader canvass of history. Political questions are defined as those
questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of government.2 They have two aspects: (1) those matters
that are to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity and (2) matters
which have been specifically delegated to some other department or particular office of
the government, with discretionary power to act.3 The exercise of the discretionary power
of the legislative or executive branch of government was often the area where the Court
had to wrestle with the political question doctrine.4
 A brief review of some of our case law will thus give us a sharper perspective of the
political question doctrine. This question confronted the Court as early as 1905 in the
case of Barcelon v. Baker.5 The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, pursuant to
a resolution of the Philippine Commission, suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Cavite and Batangas based on a finding of open insurrection in said
provinces. Felix Barcelon, who was detained by constabulary officers in Batangas, filed
a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus alleging that there was no open
insurrection in Batangas. The issue to resolve was whether or not the judicial department
may investigate the facts upon which the legislative (the Philippine Commission) and
executive (the Governor-General) branches of government acted in suspending the
privilege of the writ.
The Court ruled that under our form of government, one department has no authority
to inquire into the acts of another, which acts are performed within the discretion of the
other department.6 Surveying American law and jurisprudence, it held that whenever a
statute gives discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him upon his own
opinion of certain facts, the statute constitutes him the sole judge of the existence of
those facts.7 Since the Philippine Bill of 1902 empowered the Philippine Commission and
the Governor-General to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, this power
is exclusively within the discretion of the legislative and executive branches of
government. The exercise of this discretion is conclusive upon the courts.8
The Court further held that once a determination is made by the executive and
legislative departments that the conditions justifying the assailed acts exists, it will
presume that the conditions continue until the same authority decide that they no longer
exist.9 It adopted the rationale that the executive branch, thru its civil and military
branches, are better situated to obtain information about peace and order from every
corner of the nation, in contrast with the judicial department, with its very limited
machinery.10 The seed of the political question doctrine was thus planted in
Philippine soil.
The doctrine barring judicial review because of the political question doctrine
was next applied to the internal affairs of the legislature. The Court refused to
interfere in the legislative exercise of disciplinary power over its own members. In the
1924 case of Alejandrino v. Quezon,11 Alejandrino, who was appointed Senator by the
Governor-General, was declared by Senate Resolution as guilty of disorderly conduct for
assaulting another Senator in the course of a debate, and was suspended from office for
one year. Senator Alejandrino filed a petition for mandamus and injunction to compel the
Senate to reinstate him. The Court held that under the Jones Law, the power of the
Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend an
appointive member from the exercise of his office. While the Court found that the
suspension was illegal, it refused to issue the writ of mandamus on the ground that "the
Supreme Court does not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate
take any particular action. [T]he Philippine Legislature or any branch thereof cannot be
directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process." 12
The issue revisited the Court twenty-two (22) years later. In 1946, in Vera v.
Avelino,13 three senators-elect who had been prevented from taking their oaths of office
by a Senate resolution repaired to this Court to compel their colleagues to allow them to
occupy their seats contending that only the Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction over
contests relating to their election, returns and qualifications. Again, the Court refused to
intervene citing Alejandrino and affirmed the inherent right of the legislature to determine
who shall be admitted to its membership.
In the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez-Vito,14 three Senators and eight
representatives who were proclaimed elected by Comelec were not allowed by Congress
to take part in the voting for the passage of the Parity amendment to the Constitution. If
their votes had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment
would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either House of Congress
to pass the amendment. The amendment was eventually submitted to the people for
ratification. The Court declined to intervene and held that a proposal to amend the
Constitution is a highly political function performed by Congress in its sovereign legislative
capacity.15
In the 1955 case of Arnault v. Balagtas,16 petitioner, a private citizen, assailed the
legality of his detention ordered by the Senate for his refusal to answer questions put to
him by members of one of its investigating committees. This Court refused to order his
release holding that the process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the
legislature is a necessary concomitant of the legislative process and the legislature's
exercise of its discretionary authority is not subject to judicial interference.
In the 1960 case of Osmena v. Pendatun,17 the Court followed the traditional line.
Congressman Sergio Osmena, Jr. was suspended by the House of Representatives for
serious disorderly behavior for making a privilege speech imputing "malicious charges"
against the President of the Philippines. Osmena, Jr. invoked the power of review of this
Court but the Court once more did not interfere with Congress' power to discipline its
members.
The contours of the political question doctrine have always been tricky. To be sure,
the Court did not always stay its hand whenever the doctrine is invoked. In the 1949 case
of Avelino v. Cuenco,18 Senate President Jose Avelino, who was deposed and replaced,
questioned his successor's title claiming that the latter had been elected without a
quorum. The petition was initially dismissed on the ground that the selection of Senate
President was an internal matter and not subject to judicial review. 19 On reconsideration,
however, the Court ruled that it could assume jurisdiction over the controversy in light of
subsequent events justifying intervention among which was the existence of a
quorum.20 Though the petition was ultimately dismissed, the Court declared respondent
Cuenco as the legally elected Senate President.
In the 1957 case of Tanada v. Cuenco,21 the Court assumed jurisdiction over a
dispute involving the formation and composition of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. It
rejected the Solicitor General's claim that the dispute involved a political question.
Instead, it declared that the Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the
choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the exercise of its power thereon
is subject to constitutional limitations which are mandatory in nature.22 It held that under
the Constitution, the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal was designed to insure
the exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting
members of the lawmaking body.23 The Court then nullified the election to the Senate
Electoral Tribunal made by Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of
votes of two of their party members but purporting to act on behalf of the party having the
second highest number of votes.
In the 1962 case of Cunanan v. Tan, Jr.,24 the Court passed judgment on whether
Congress had formed the Commission on Appointments in accordance with the
Constitution and found that it did not. It declared that the Commission on Appointments
is a creature of the Constitution and its power does not come from Congress but from the
Constitution.
The 1967 case of Gonzales v. Comelec25 and the 1971 case of Tolentino v.
Comelec26 abandoned Mabanag v. Lopez-Vito. The question of whether or not
Congress, acting as a constituent assembly in proposing amendments to the Constitution
violates the Constitution was held to be a justiciable and not a political
issue. In Gonzales, the Court ruled:

"It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez-Vito, this Court characterizing the issue
submitted thereto as a political one, declined to pass upon the question
whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a
proposed amendment to the Constitution-which was being submitted to the
people for ratification-satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the
fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been weakened, however,
by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, Avelino v. Cuenco, Tanada v.
Cuenco, and Macias v. Commission on Elections. In the first, we held that the
officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its
supervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the
latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to determine the number of
Senators necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the
election, by Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of
votes in said chamber, purporting to act on behalf of the party having the
second largest number of votes therein, of two (2) Senators belonging to the
first party, as members, for the second party, of the Senate Electoral Tribunal;
and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting
to apportion the representative districts for the House of Representatives upon
the ground that the apportionment had not been made as may be possible
according to the number of inhabitants of each province. Thus, we rejected
the theory, advanced in these four cases, that the issues therein raised were
political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.27

The Court explained that the power to amend the Constitution or to propose
amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to
Congress. As a constituent assembly, the members of Congress derive their authority
from the fundamental law and they do not have the final say on whether their acts are
within or beyond constitutional limits.28 This ruling was reiterated in Tolentino which held
that acts of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing amendments
to the Constitution are at par with acts of Congress acting as a constituent assembly. 29
In sum, this Court brushed aside the political question doctrine and assumed
jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of
powers conferred upon the Legislature.30
The Court hewed to the same line as regards the exercise of Executive
power. Thus, the respect accorded executive discretion was observed in Severino v.
Governor-General,31where it was held that the Governor-General, as head of the
executive department, could not be compelled by mandamus to call a special election in
the town of Silay for the purpose of electing a municipal president. Mandamus and
injunction could not lie to enforce or restrain a duty which is discretionary. It was held that
when the Legislature conferred upon the Governor-General powers and duties, it did so
for the reason that he was in a better position to know the needs of the country than any
other member of the executive department, and with full confidence that he will perform
such duties as his best judgment dictates.32
Similarly, in Abueva v. Wood,33 the Court held that the Governor-General could not
be compelled by mandamus to produce certain vouchers showing the various
expenditures of the Independence Commission. Under the principle of separation of
powers, it ruled that it was not intended by the Constitution that one branch of government
could encroach upon the field of duty of the other. Each department has an exclusive field
within which it can perform its part within certain discretionary limits.34 It observed that
"the executive and legislative departments of government are frequently called upon to
deal with what are known as political questions, with which the judicial department of
government has no intervention. In all such questions, the courts uniformly refused to
intervene for the purpose of directing or controlling the actions of the other department;
such questions being many times reserved to those departments in the organic law of the
state."35
In Forties v. Tiaco,36 the Court also refused to take cognizance of a case enjoining
the Chief Executive from deporting an obnoxious alien whose continued presence in the
Philippines was found by him to be injurious to the public interest. It noted that sudden
and unexpected conditions may arise, growing out of the presence of untrustworthy
aliens, which demand immediate action. The President's inherent power to deport
undesirable aliens is universally denominated as political, and this power continues to
exist for the preservation of the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation. 37
In Manalang v. Quitoriano,38 the Court also declined to interfere in the exercise of
the President's appointing power. It held that the appointing power is the exclusive
prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations may be imposed by Congress,
except those resulting from the need of securing concurrence of the Commission on
Appointments and from the exercise of the limited legislative power to prescribe
qualifications to a given appointive office.
We now come to the exercise by the President of his powers as Commander-
in-Chief vis-a-vis the political question doctrine. In the 1940's, this Court has held that as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the President has the power to determine
whether war, in the legal sense, still continues or has terminated. It ruled that it is within
the province of the political department and not of the judicial department of government
to determine when war is at end.39
In 1952, the Court decided the landmark case of Montenegro v.
Castaneda.40 President Quirino suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for
persons detained or to be detained for crimes of sedition, insurrection or rebellion. The
Court, citing Barcelon, declared that the authority to decide whether the exigency has
arisen requiring the suspension of the privilege belongs to the President and his decision
is final and conclusive on the courts.41
Barcelon was the ruling case law until the 1971 case of Lansang v.
Garcia came.42 Lansang reversed the previous cases and held that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was not a political question. According to the Court,
the weight of Barcelon was diluted by two factors: (1) it relied heavily on Martin v. Mott,
which involved the U.S. President's power to call out the militia which is a much broader
power than suspension of the privilege of the writ; and (2) the privilege was suspended
by the American Governor-General whose act, as representative of the sovereign
affecting the freedom of its subjects, could not be equated with that of the President of
the Philippines dealing with the freedom of the sovereign Filipino people.
The Court declared that the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is neither absolute nor unqualified because the Constitution sets limits on
the exercise of executive discretion on the matter. These limits are: (1) that the
privilege must not be suspended except only in cases of invasion, insurrection or rebellion
or imminent danger thereof; and (2) when the public safety requires it, in any of which
events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for the
suspension shall exist. The extent of the power which may be inquired into by courts is
defined by these limitations.43
On the vital issue of how the Court may inquire into the President's exercise of
power, it ruled that the function of the Court is not to supplant but merely to check the
Executive; to ascertain whether the President has gone beyond the constitutional limits
of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of
his act. Judicial inquiry is confined to the question of whether the President did not act
arbitrarily.44 Using this yardstick, the Court found that the President did not.
The emergency period of the 1970's flooded the Court with cases which raised the
political question defense. The issue divided the Court down the middle. Javellana v.
Executive Secretary45 showed that while a majority of the Court held that the issue of
whether or not the 1973 Constitution had been ratified in accordance with the 1935
Constitution was justiciable, a majority also ruled that the decisive issue of whether the
1973 Constitution had come into force and effect, with or without constitutional ratification,
was a political question.46
The validity of the declaration of martial law by then President Marcos was next
litigated before the Court. In Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,47 it upheld the President's declaration
of martial law.On whether the validity of the imposition of martial law was a political or
justiciable question, the Court was almost evenly divided. One-half embraced the political
question position and the other half subscribed to the justiciable position in
Lansang. Those adhering to the political question doctrine used different methods of
approach to it.48
In 1983, the Lansang ruling was weakened by the Court in Garcia-Padilla v.
Enrile.49 The petitioners therein were arrested and detained by the Philippine
Constabulary by virtue of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO). Petitioners sought the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The Court found that the PCO had the function of
validating a person's detention for any of the offenses covered in Proclamation No. 2045
which continued in force the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It
held that the issuance of the PCO by the President was not subject to judicial inquiry.50 It
went further by declaring that there was a need to re-examine Lansang with a view to
reverting to Barcelon and Montenegro. It observed that in times of war or national
emergency, the President must be given absolute control for the very life of the nation
and government is in great peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable only to his
conscience, the people, and God.51
But barely six (6) days after Garcia-Padilla, the Court promulgated Morales, Jr. v.
Enrile52 reiterating Lansang. It held that by the power of judicial review, the Court must
inquire into every phase and aspect of a person's detention from the moment he was
taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition. Only
after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of the
Constitution has been met.53
It is now history that the improper reliance by the Court on the political question
doctrine eroded the people's faith in its capacity to check abuses committed by the
then Executive in the exercise of his commander-in-chief powers, particularly
violations against human rights. The refusal of courts to be pro-active in the
exercise of its checking power drove the people to the streets to resort to extralegal
remedies. They gave birth to EDSA.
Two lessons were not lost to the members of the Constitutional Commission that
drafted the 1987 Constitution. The first was the need to grant this Court the express
power to review the exercise of the powers as commander-in-chief by the President
and deny it of any discretion to decline its exercise. The second was the need to
compel the Court to be pro-active by expanding its jurisdiction and, thus, reject its laid
back stance against acts constituting grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of government. Then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, a member of
the Constitutional Commission, worked for the insertion of the second paragraph of
Section 1, Article VIII in the draft Constitution,54 which reads:

"Sec. 1. x x x.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
The language of the provision clearly gives the Court the power to strike down acts
amounting to grave abuse of discretion of both the legislative and executive branches of
government.
We should interpret Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in light of our
constitutional history. The provision states:

"Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed

forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public
safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by

any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days
from its filing.

x x x."

It is clear from the foregoing that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the

armed forces of the Philippines, may call out the armed forces subject to two
conditions: (1) whenever it becomes necessary; and (2) to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Undeniably, these conditions lay down
the sine qua requirement for the exercise of the power and the objective sought to
be attained by the exercise of the power. They define the constitutional parameters
of the calling out power. Whether or not there is compliance with these parameters
is a justiciable issue and is not a political question.
 I am not unaware that in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission,
Commissioner Bernas opined that the President's exercise of the "calling out power,"
unlike the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the declaration of
martial law, is not a justiciable issue but a political question and therefore not subject to
judicial review.
It must be borne in mind, however, that while a member's opinion expressed on the
floor of the Constitutional Convention is valuable, it is not necessarily expressive of the
people's intent.55 The proceedings of the Convention are less conclusive on the proper
construction of the fundamental law than are legislative proceedings of the proper
construction of a statute, for in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature the courts
seek, while in the former, courts seek to arrive at the intent of the people through the
discussions and deliberations of their representatives.56 The conventional wisdom is that
the Constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed it, but from
the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people. 57
It is true that the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution expressly gives the Court the power to review the sufficiency of the
factual bases used by the President in the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus and the declaration of martial law. It does not follow, however,
that just because the same provision did not grant to this Court the power to review
the exercise of the calling out power by the President, ergo, this Court cannot pass
upon the validity of its exercise.
Given the light of our constitutional history, this express grant of power merely
means that the Court cannot decline the exercise of its power because of the
political question doctrine as it did in the past. In fine, the express grant simply
stresses the mandatory duty of this Court to check the exercise of the commander-
in-chief powers of the President. It eliminated the discretion of the Court not to
wield its power of review thru the use of the political question doctrine.
It may be conceded that the calling out power may be a "lesser power" compared to
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare
martial law. Even then, its exercise cannot be left to the absolute discretion of the Chief
Executive as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, as its impact on the rights of our
people protected by the Constitution cannot be downgraded. We cannot hold that acts of
the commander-in-chief cannot be reviewed on the ground that they have lesser impact
on the civil and political rights of our people. The exercise of the calling out power may
be "benign" in the case at bar but may not be so in future cases.
The counsel of Mr. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his Dissenting and
Concurring Opinion in Lansang that it would be dangerous and misleading to push the
political question doctrine too far, is apropos. It will not be complementary to the Court if
it handcuffs itself to helplessness when a grievously injured citizen seeks relief from a
palpably unwarranted use of presidential or military power, especially when the question
at issue falls in the penumbra between the "political" and the "justiciable. " 58
We should not water down the ruling that deciding whether a matter has been
committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of
that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is a delicate exercise in
constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of the Court as ultimate interpreter
of the fundamental law.59 When private justiciable rights are involved in a suit, the
Court must not refuse to assume jurisdiction even though questions of extreme political
importance are necessarily involved.60Every officer under a constitutional government
must act according to law and subject to the controlling power of the people, acting
through the courts, as well as through the executive and legislative. One department is
just as representative of the other, and the judiciary is the department which is charged
with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all official
action.61 This historic role of the Court is the foundation stone of a government of laws
and not of men.62
I join the Decision in its result.

SEPARATE OPINION

VITUG, J.:

In the equation of judicial power, neither of two extremes - one totalistic and the other
bounded - is acceptable nor ideal. The 1987 Constitution has introduced its definition of
the term "judicial power" to be that which -

x x x includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies

involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.1

It is not meant that the Supreme Court must be deemed vested with the awesome power
of overseeing the entire bureaucracy, let alone of institutionalizing judicial absolutism,
under its mandate. But while this Court does not wield unlimited authority to strike down
an act of its two co-equal branches of government, it must not wither under technical
guise on its constitutionally ordained task to intervene, and to nullify if need be, any such
act as and when it is attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. The proscription then against an interposition by the Court into purely
political questions, heretofore known, no longer holds within that context.
Justice Feria, in the case of Avelino vs. Cuenco,2 has aptly elucidated in his
concurring opinion:

"x x x [I] concur with the majority that this Court has jurisdiction over cases like
the present x x x so as to establish in this country the judicial supremacy, with
the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of
the government transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but
political questions as well."3
It is here when the Court must have to depart from the broad principle of separation of
powers that disallows an intrusion by it in respect to the purely political decisions of its
independent and coordinate agencies of government.
The term grave abuse of discretion is long understood in our jurisprudence as being,
and confined to, a capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Minus the not-so-unusual exaggerations often invoked by
litigants in the duel of views, the act of the President in simply calling on the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, an executive prerogative, to assist the Philippine
National Police in "joint visibility patrols" in the metropolis does not, I believe,
constitute grave abuse of discretion that would now warrant an exercise by the Supreme
Court of its extraordinary power as so envisioned by the fundamental law.
Accordingly, I vote for the dismissal of the petition.

MENDOZA, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the opinion of the Court insofar as it holds petitioner to be without standing
to question the validity of LOI 02/2000 which mandates the Philippine Marines to conduct
"joint visibility" patrols with the police in Metro Manila. But I dissent insofar as the opinion
dismisses the petition in this case on other grounds. I submit that judgment on the
substantive constitutional issues raised by petitioner must await an actual case involving
real parties with "injuries" to show as a result of the operation of the challenged executive
action. While as an organization for the advancement of the rule of law petitioner has an
interest in upholding the Constitution, its interest is indistinguishable from the interest of
the rest of the citizenry and falls short of that which is necessary to give petitioner
standing.
As I have indicated elsewhere, a citizens' suit challenging the constitutionality of
governmental action requires that (1) the petitioner must have suffered an "injury in fact"
of an actual or imminent nature; (2) there must be a causal connection between the injury
and the conduct complained of; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action by this Court.1The "injury in fact" test requires more than injury to a cognizable
interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among those injured. 2
My insistence on compliance with the standing requirement is grounded in the
conviction that only a party injured by the operation of the governmental action challenged
is in the best position to aid the Court in determining the precise nature of the problem
presented. Many a time we have adverted to the power of judicial review as an awesome
power not to be exercised save in the most exigent situation. For, indeed, sound judgment
on momentous constitutional questions is not likely to be reached unless it is the result of
a clash of adversary arguments which only parties with direct and specific interest in the
outcome of the controversy can make. This is true not only when we strike down a law or
official action but also when we uphold it.
In this case, because of the absence of parties with real and substantial interest to
protect, we do not have evidence on the effect of military presence in malls and
commercial centers, i.e., whether such presence is coercive or benign. We do not know
whether the presence of so many marines and policemen scares shoppers, tourists, and
peaceful civilians, or whether it is reassuring to them. To be sure, the deployment of
troops to such places is not like parading them at the Luneta on Independence
Day. Neither is it, however, like calling them out because of actual fighting or the outbreak
of violence.
We need to have evidence on these questions because, under the Constitution, the
President's power to call out the armed forces in order to suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion is subject to the limitation that the exercise of this power is required
in the interest of public safety.3
Indeed, whether it is the calling out of the armed forces alone in order to suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion or also the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law (in case of invasion or rebellion), the
exercise of the President's powers as commander-in-chief, requires proof - not mere
assertion.4 As has been pointed out, "Standing is not `an ingenious academic exercise in
the conceivable' . . . but requires . . . a factual showing of perceptible harm."5
Because of the absence of such record evidence, we are left to guess or even
speculate on these questions. Thus, at one point, the majority opinion says that what is
involved here is not even the calling out of the armed forces but only the use of marines
for law enforcement. (p. 13) At another point, however, the majority opinion somersaults
and says that because of bombings perpetrated by lawless elements, the deployment of
troops in shopping centers and public utilities is justified. (p. 24)
We are likely to err in dismissing the suit brought in this case on the ground that the
calling out of the military does not violate the Constitution, just as we are likely to do so if
we grant the petition and invalidate the executive issuance in question. For indeed, the
lack of a real, earnest and vital controversy can only impoverish the judicial process. That
is why, as Justice Laurel emphasized in the Angara case, "this power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument
by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented."6
We are told, however, that the issues raised in this case are of "paramount interest"
to the nation. It is precisely because the issues raised are of paramount importance that
we should all the more forego ruling on the constitutional issues raised by petitioner and
limit the dismissal of this petition on the ground of lack of standing of petitioner. A Fabian
policy of leaving well enough alone is a counsel of prudence.
For these reasons and with due appreciation of the scholarly attention lavished by
the majority opinion on the constitutional questions raised, I am constrained to limit my
concurrence to the dismissal of this suit on the ground of lack of standing of petitioner
and the consequent lack of an actual case or controversy.

1
Sec. 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
2
Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1067 [1957], citing 16 C.J.S. 413.
3
Tanada v. Cuenco, supra, 1067, quoting In re McConaughy, 119 NW 408 [1909].
4
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines A Commentary, p. 859 [1996].
5
5 Phil. 87 [1905].
6
Id. at 97.
7
Id. at 104.
8
See Cruz, Philippine Political law, p. 87 [1998].
9
Id. at 113-114.
10
Id. at 106-107.
11
46 Phil. 83 [1924].
12
Id. at 97.
13
77 Phil. 192 [1946].
14
78 Phil. 1 [1947].
15
Id. at 4-5. The court also adopted the enrolled bill theory which, like findings under the political question doctrine,
imports absolute verity on the courts-at 12.
16
97 Phil. 358 [1955].
17
109 Phil. 863 [1960].
18
83 Phil. 17 [1949].
19
Id. at 21-22.
20
Id. at 68-69.
21
103 Phil. 1051 [1957].
22
Id. at 1068.
23
Id. at 1083.
24
5 SCRA 1 [1962].
25
21 SCRA 774 [1967].
26
41 SCRA 702 [1971].
27
Id. at 785-786.
28
Id. at 787.
29
41 SCRA at 713.
30
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines A Commentary, p. 861 [1996].
31
16 Phil. 366 [1910].
32
Id. at 401.
33
45 Phil. 612 [1924].
34
Id. At 630.
35
Id. at 637-638.
36
16 Phil. 534 [1910].
37
Id. at 568-569, 576.
38
94 Phil. 903 [1954].
39
Untal v. Chief of Staff, AFP, 84 Phil. 586 [1949]; Raquiza v. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945].
40
91 Phil. 882 [1952].
41
Id. at 887.
42
42 SCRA 448 [1971].
43
Id. at 474.
44
Id. at 480-481.
45
50 SCRA 30 [1973].
46
Id. at 138, 140-141.
47
59 SCRA 183 [1973].
48
Ibid.
49
121 SCRA 472 [1983].
50
Id. at 490-491.
51
Id. at 500-501.
52
121 SCRA 538 [1983].
53
Id. at 563.
54
See Concepcions sponsorship speech, I Record 434-435; see also Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines A Commentary, p. 863 [1996].
55
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, 423-426 [1970].
56
Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 215 [1946]; see also Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 4th ed., p. 454 [1998].
57
Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the laws, 2d ed., p. 39 [1911].
58
SCRA at 506-507, see also Rossiter, The Supreme Court and the Commander-in-Chief, pp. 16-17 [1951].
59
Baker v. Carr, 7 L Ed 2d at 682.
60
Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, vol. 3, 2d ed., p. 1336 [1929].
61
Tanada v. Macapagal, 103 Phil. At 1067, quoting In re McConaughy, 119 NW 408 [1909].
62
Id.
1
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
2
83 Phil. 17.
3
Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al. vs. Sen. Teofisto Guingona, Jr., et al., 298 SCRA 756.
1
Tatad v. Garcia, 243 SCRA 436, 473 (1995) (concurring). Accord, Telecommunication and Broadcast Attorneys of
the Philippines v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 343 (1998).
2
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992).
3
See CONST., ART. VII, 18.
4
See Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971).
5
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, supra.
6
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936)

[1]
Rollo, pp. 17-21.
[2]
As of 19 May 2000, the Marines have been recalled from their areas of deployment to join the military operations
in Mindanao, and replaced by Air Force personnel who took over their functions in the joint visibility patrols. The Air
Force personnel, just like the Marines, were ordered to assist the PNP, also by virtue of LOI 2/2000. Since both the
Marines and Air Force belong to the Armed Forces, the controversy has not been rendered moot and academic by the
replacement of the former by the latter. The validity of the deployment of the armed forces in the joint visibility patrols
thus remain an issue.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 75-76.
[4]
Id., at 75.
[5]
Id.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Rollo, p. 75.
[8]
Id., at 17-18.
[9]
Id.
[10]
Rollo, p. 7.
[11]
Id., at 24.
[12]
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994) citing Luz Farms v. Secretary of
the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990); Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392
(1980); and, People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
[13]
Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Govenment, 225 SCRA 568, 576 (1993).
[14]
Ibid., citing House International Building Tenants Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA
703 (1987).
[15]
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7L. Ed. 2d 663, 678 (1962).
[16]
Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, supra note 13, at 579 citing Dumlao v. Commission
on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 (1980).
[17]
Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330, 349 (1997) citing Garcia v. Executive Secretary,
211 SCRA 219 (1992); Osmea v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750 (1991); Basco v. Pagcor, 197 SCRA 52 (1991); and,
Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949).
[18]
Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997); Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 225
SCRA 568 (1993); Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989). As formulated by Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. inKilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., [232 SCRA 110 (1994)] "(a) party's standing before this Court is
a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the
issues raised," favorably citing our ruling in the Emergency Powers Cases [L-2044 (Araneta v. Dinglasan); L-2756
(Araneta v. Angeles); L-3054 (Rodriquez v. Tesorero de Filipinas); and L-3056 (Barredo v. COMELEC), 84 Phil. 368
(1940)] where this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public of these
cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technical rules of procedure."
An inflexible rule on locus standi would result in what Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano aptly described as a
doctrinal ball and chain xxx clamped on our own limbs." [Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 250 SCRA 130 (1995)].
[19]
Rollo, p. 12
[20]
Article II, Sections 4 and 5 of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the
people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by
law, to render personal, military or civil service.
Sec. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
[21]
177 SCRA 668, 694 (1989).
[22]
WESTS LEGAL THESAURUS/DICTIONARY (Special Deluxe Edition) p. 440 (1986).
[23]
103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
[24]
369 U.S. 186, 82 S ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 678 (1962).
[25]
Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the 1987 CONSTITUTION.
[26]
Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., 298 SCRA 756 (1998).
[27]
Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 (1991).
[28]
Marcos v. Manglapus,, supra note 21, see also Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1988); Coseteng v. Mitra, 187
SCRA 377 (1990).
[29]
Sinon v. Civil Service Commission, 215 SCRA 410 (1992); See also Producers Bank v. NLRC, 165 SCRA 284
(1988); Litton Mills v. Galleon Trader, Inc., 163 SCRA 494 (1988).
[30]
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 659 (1997).
[31]
Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 (1991).
[32]
Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135 (1994).
[33]
Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549 (1987).
[34]
II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, pp. 409, 412
(1986).
[35]
Rollo, p. 75.
[36]
Section 3, provides:
Civilian authority, is at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of
the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.
[37]
No. 9 of the LOI provides: COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:
a. RD, NCRPO is designated as Task Force Commander TULUNGAN.
[38]
No. 6 of the LOI states: DEPLOYMENT/EMPLOYMENT OF JOINT NCRPO-PHILIPPINE MARINES:
b. Before their deployment/employment, receiving units shall properly brief/orient the troops on police
patrol/visibility procedures.
[39]
No. 8 of the LOI provides: TASKS:
k. POLICE DISTRICTS/STATIONS
-Provide direction and manage the deployment of all Philippine Marines personnel deployed in your AOR for police
visibility operations.
-Conduct briefing/orientation to Philippine Marines personnel on the dos and donts of police visibility patrols.
-Provide transportation to Philippine Marines from districts headquarters to different stations and PCPs.
-Perform other tasks as directed.
[40]
No. 8 of the LOI states: TASKS:
c. RLD/R4
-Coordinate with the Directorate for Logistics for the issuance of the following equipments (sic) to be utilize (sic) by
the Philippine Marines personnel: 500 pieces Probaton, 500 whistle (sic), 500 pieces brazzard blazoned.
-Coordinate with the Directorate for Logistics for the issuance of the following for use of PNP personnel involved in
the visibility patrol operations:
1,000 sets of PNP GOA Uniform
500 each raincoats
500 each Probaton
500 each Whistle
500 each handcuffs
500 each Combat Boots
500 each low cut shoes
-Provide transportation to the Philippine Marines personnel in coordination with LSS, NHQ PNP.
-Provide additional gas allocation to Philippine Marines members of the Inspection Teams.
- Perform other tasks as directed.40
[41]
Sec. 5(4), Article XVI, provides:
No member of the Armed Forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed in the government including
government-owned and controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.
[42]
CONSTITUTION, Article IX-C, Section 2; Comelec Resolution No. 3071 (1999), which is entitled In Re
Guidelines for the Designation of Registration Centers and the Accountable Officers for the Polaroid Instant Cameras
for Purposes of the Registration of Voters on 8-9 May 1999 in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao; Comelec Resolution No. 3059 (1999), which is entitled, In the Matter of Deputizing the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Three (3) AFP Components, Namely: Philippine Army, Philippine Navy and Philippine Air
Force, for the Purpose of Ensuring Free, Orderly, Honest and Peaceful Precinct Mapping, Registration of Voters and
the Holding of the September 13, 1999 Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); Republic
Act No. 7166 (1991), Section 33, which is entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections
and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations therefor, and for other Purposes; Administrative Code of 1987,
Book V, Title I, Subtitle C, Chapter 1, Sections 2 (4) and 3; Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, Article VI, Sections 52 (b) and
57 (3) (1985), which is also known as Omnibus Election Code.
[43]
Republic Act No. 95 (1947), Section 5, which is entitled An Act to Incorporate the Philippine National Red Cross
Section; Republic Act No. 855 (1953), Section 1, which is entitled An Act to Amend Section V of Republic Act
Numbered Ninety-Five, entitled An Act to Incorporate the Philippine National Red Cross.
[44]
Republic Act No. 7077 (1991), Article III, Section 7, which is entitled An Act Providing for the Development,
Administration, Organization, Training, Maintenance and Utilization of the Citizen Armed Forces of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and for other Purposes.
[45]
Republic Act No. 6847 (1990), Section 7, which is entitled An Act Creating and Establishing The Philippine Sports
Commission, Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Appropriating Funds therefor, and for other
Purposes.
[46]
Republic Act No. 8492 (1998), Section 20, which is entitled An Act Establishing a National Museum System,
Providing for its Permanent Home and for other Purposes.
[47]
Republic Act No. 8550 (1998), Section 124, which is entitled An Act Providing for the Development, Management
and Conservation of the Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, Integrating All Laws Pertinent Thereto, and for other
Purposes; Memorandum Circular No. 150 (1996), which is entitled Amending Memorandum Circular No. 128, dated
July 20, 1995 by Reorganizing the Presidential Task Force on Tubbataha Reef National Marine Park; Executive Order
No. 544 (1979), Letter I, which is entitled Creating a Presidential Committee for the Conservation of the Tamaraw,
Defining its Powers and for other Purposes.
[48]
Executive Order No. 129-A (1987) Section 5 (m), which is entitled Modifying Executive Order No. 129
Reorganizing and Strengthening the Department of Agrarian Reform and for other Purposes.
[49]
Republic Act No. 1937 (1957), Section 2003, which is entitled An Act to Revised and Codify the Tariff and
Customs Laws of the Philippines; Executive Order No. 45 (1998), which is entitled Creating a Presidential Anti-
Smuggling Task Force to Investigate and Prosecute Crimes Involving Large-Scale Smuggling and other Frauds upon
Customs and Providing Measures to Expedite Seizure Proceedings;
[50]
These cases involved joint military and civilian law enforcement operations: People v. Escalante, G.R No. 106633,
December 1, 1994; People v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 97393, March 17, 1993; People v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 83260,
April 18, 1990; Guanzon v. de Villa, 181 SCRA 623, 631 (1990). (This case recognizes the complementary roles of
the PNP and the military in conducting anti-crime campaigns, provided that the peoples rights are not violated in these
words: If the military and the police must conduct concerted campaigns to flush out and catch criminal elements, such
drives must be consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of all people affected by such actions. The
creation of the Task Force also finds support in Valmonte v. de Villa, 185 SCRA 665 (1990). Executive Order No. 62
(1999), which is entitled Creating the Philippine Center on Transnational Crime to Formulate and Implement a
Concerted Program of Action of All Law Enforcement, Intelligence and other Agencies for the Prevention and Control
of Transnational Crime; Executive Order No. 8 (1998), which is entitled Creating a Presidential Anti-Organized Crime
Commission and a Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force, to Investigate and Prosecute Criminal Elements in
the Country; Executive Order No. 280 (1995), which is entitled Creating a Presidential Task Force of Intelligence and
Counter-Intelligence to Identify, Arrest and Cause the Investigation and Prosecution of Military and other Law
Enforcement Personnel on their Former Members and Their Cohorts Involved in Criminal Activities.
[51]
Memorandum Circular No. 141 (1996), which is entitled Enjoining Government Agencies Concerned to Extend
Optimum Support and Assistance to the Professional Regulation Commission in its Conduct of Licensure
Examinations.
[52]
Memorandum Circular No. 32 (1999), which is entitled Directing the Government Agencies Concerned to Extend
Maximum Support and Assistance to the National Educational Testing and Research Center (NETRC) of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) in the Conduct of Tests of National Coverage.
[53]
Executive Order No. 61 (1999), which is entitled Creating the National Drug Law Enforcement and Prevention
Coordinating Center to Orchestrate Efforts of national Government Agencies, Local Government Units, and Non-
Government Organizations for a More Effective Anti-Drug Campaign.
[54]
Republic Act No. 4089 (1964), which is entitled An Act Making the City Health Officer of Bacolod City the Local
Civil Registrar, Amending for the Purpose Section Forty-Three of the Charter of said City;" Republic Act No. 537
(1950), which is entitled "An Act to Revise the Charter of Quezon City; Commonwealth Act No. 592 (1940), which
is entitled An Act to Create the City of Dansalan; Commonwealth Act No. 509 (1939), which is entitled An Act to
Create Quezon City; Commonwealth Act No. 326 (1938), which is entitled An Act Creating the City of Bacolod;
Commonwealth Act No. 39 (1936), which is entitled An Act Creating the City of Zamboanga; Commonwealth Act
No. 51 (1936), which is entitled An Act Creating the City of Davao.
[55]
Republic Act No. 36 (1946), which is entitled Census Act of Nineteen Hundred and Forty-Six.
[56]
Republic Act No. 776 (1952), Section 5, which is entitled An Act to Reorganize the Civil Aeronautics Board and
the Civil Aeronautics Administration, To Provide for the Regulation of Civil Aeronautics in the Philippines and
Authorizing the Appropriation of Funds Therefor.
[57]
Republic Act No. 6613 (1972), Section 4, which is entitled An Act Declaring a Policy of the State to Adopt Modern
Scientific Methods to Moderate Typhoons and Prevent Destruction by Floods, Rains and Droughts, Creating a Council
on Typhoons and Prevent Destruction by Flood, Rains and Droughts, Creating a Council on Typhoon Moderation and
Flood Control Research and Development, Providing for its Powers and Functions and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
[58]
Local Government Code of 1991, Book I, Title Seven, Section 116.
[59]
This theory on gloss of executive power was advanced by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion
in Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer, 343 US 579, 610-611 (1952).
[60]
Bissonette v. Haig, 766 F.2d 1384, 1389 (1985).
[61]
18 U.S.C.A 1385 (1878).
[62]
Ibid.
[63]
Bissonette v. Haig, supra note 60, at 1390.
[64]
A power regulatory in nature is one which controls or directs. It is proscriptive if it prohibits or condemns
and compulsory if it exerts some coercive force. See US v. Yunis, 681 F.Supp. 891 (D.D.C., 1988). See also FOURTH
AMENDMENT AND POSSE COMITATUS ACT RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIL
LAW ENFORCEMENT,
[65]
L.O.I. 02/2000, TULUNGAN, Rollo, pp. 17-22.

[66]
No. 6 of the LOI states: DEPLOYMENT/EMPLOYMENT OF JOINT NCRPO-PHILIPPINE MARINES:

a. The PNP NCPRO thru Police Districts will continue to deploy uniformed PNP personnel dedicated for police
visibility patrols in tandem with the Philippine Marines.
b. Before their deployment/employment, receiving units shall properly brief/orient the troops on police
patrol/visibility procedures.66
[67]
Supra note 34.
[68]
Supra note 32.

[69]
No. 9 of the LOI states:

d. In case of apprehensions, arrested person/s shall be brought to the nearest police stations/PCPs.
[70]
Supra note 35.
[71]
Rollo, p. 70.
IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are
merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have
improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and
void and unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However,
there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call
out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to
declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the
framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity
of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is
totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no
evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the
Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the
ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the
police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP,
and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP,
there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the
joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila,
respondents.

Facts:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180
entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business.

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal
treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:

 It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
without due process of law.
 The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
 The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue/s:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

Discussions:
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would
be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police
power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
Ruling/s:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no
conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law
clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”;
and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”