Memorandum of A. I. Mikoyan’s Conversation with Comrades F. Castro, O. Dorticós, E.Guevara, E. Aragonés, and C. R. Rodriguez  November 22, 1962 At the beginning of the conversation, which took place in the Presidential Palace, Fidel Castro asked A. I. Mikoyan what he did yesterday and inquired about his plans for the next several days. A. I. Mikoyan briefly spoke about his trip out of town and, reminding [Castro] that Vilma Espín invited him to spend one or two days in Santiago, he asked whether Raul Castro had already returned to Havana. F. Castro responded that Raul was still in Santiago, and that if Comrade Mikoyan wanted to go there, they should call Raul so that he would not leave Santiago. A. I. Mikoyan agreed with that suggestion and asked what were the impressions of Comrade Fidel Castro and his comrades regarding President Kennedy’s statement at the  November 22 press conference.
F. Castro:
 Do you want to know my sincere opinion?
 A. I. Mikoyan:
 Of course. Just like we always talk to each other.
F. Castro:
 Very bad.
 A. I. Mikoyan:
 In what sense?
F. Castro:
 In every sense.
 A. I. Mikoyan:
 You feel bad that the blockade was lifted?
F. Castro:
 No, that the blockade was lifted is not bad. It was bad that we lost the Il-28  planes. Right now we are preparing a response to Kennedy’s statement at the press conference. We really don’t like his statement that they are going to continue the air reconnaissance.
 A. I. Mikoyan:
 Comrade Fidel, we have taught Kennedy to some extent. Did you notice the form of his statement?
F. Castro:
 I don’t like the form either. He is stomping on the same [issues], like a bear in the circus.
 A. I. Mikoyan:
 You are wrong, Comrade Fidel. Taking into account your wishes, N. S. Khrushchev sent Kennedy some “directives” so to speak, regarding his [forthcoming] speech. And if you examine the statement carefully, you will notice that its tone is very different from Kennedy’s previous speeches on the Cuban issue.
F. Castro:
 I am still in a bad mood, because some points are still unclear to me. I am concerned, first of all, by Kennedy’s statement that all nuclear weapons were removed from Cuba. Has the Soviet Union ever given such a promise? Is it true that all the tactical nuclear weapons are already removed?
 A. I. Mikoyan:
 The Soviet government has not given any promises regarding the removal of the tactical nuclear weapons. The Americans do not even have any information that they are in Cuba.
 
 
F. Castro:
 So then the tactical nuclear weapons are here? And no assurances were given regarding their withdrawal?
 A. I. Mikoyan:
 Not about tactical nuclear weapons.
F. Castro:
 Therefore, then, the weapons are here?
 A. I. Mikoyan:
 Yes, they are here. They are in Comrade Pavlov’s hands. These weapons are not offensive weapons. They can be used in the place of nuclear cannons.
F. Castro:
 If I am not mistaken, you refer to the weapons that we call Colina [
Kolina
]?
 A. I. Mikoyan:
 Yes. And it can be used with two types of warheads—conventional and nuclear.
F. Castro:
 This kind of weapon makes one respect it.
 A. I. Mikoyan:
 That is true. The power of the warhead is quite substantial, although the range is short.
F. Castro:
 I am also concerned with another issue. Judging by Kennedy’s statement, it appears that the Soviet government assured the U.S. government that all the Soviet troops would  be withdrawn from Cuba. Is that true?
 A. I. Mikoyan:
 Americans knew the regions where the missiles were stationed; therefore, they also know the regions where the support troops are deployed.
F. Castro:
 And what is the number of support troops?
 A. I. Mikoyan:
 Presently we have four support regiments in Cuba, 2,000 people each, and 8,000 people altogether. All their armaments and combat equipment, including tanks and armored vehicles, will be transferred to the Cubans. We should start thinking about the plan of withdrawal of the personnel. It is clear that the soldiers will be the first ones to be withdrawn, later officers, and then senior officers. We should do it in such a way so that the Soviet personnel have an opportunity to pass their skills of operating these weapons and equipment on to the Cuban personnel.
F. Castro:
 One more question. When we spoke with you, Comrade Mikoyan, in Varadero, I was very inspired about your concern about us. We need to sit down and have a good talk. This issue is not resolved yet, and we should discuss it in detail. All we did in Varadero was a walk on the beach, but the question deserves serious discussion. I do not think that Kennedy believes that all the Soviet regiments in Cuba serve the  purposes of supporting the missile. For example, there were no strategic missiles in the Oriente Province, but Soviet troops were deployed there as well. We thought that they would serve for destroying the paratrooper landing forces in the event of an invasion.
 A. I. Mikoyan:
 Missiles were supposed to be delivered to the Oriente Province as well.
F. Castro:
 It means that all the Soviet troops are just support forces, then . . .
 A. I. Mikoyan:
 No. The support forces consist of only four regiments, that is, 8,000 soldiers and officers. Altogether, there are 34,000 Soviet soldiers and officers in Cuba. Four regiments of the support battalion support one missile battalion. We will start the withdrawal of the personnel in accordance with the timetable coordinated with you.
 
 
F. Castro:
 It would be better not to rush with the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. However, I am afraid the Americans will remind you about them soon.
 A. I. Mikoyan:
 But they know whom they are dealing with. You see, the United States was screaming about the blockade, but there was no real blockade. Then it made noise that it would demand proof that the strategic weapons were removed from Cuba; it was saying that it would search the ships. And what came out of it? The Americans were scared of confrontation and limited themselves to visual observation. To be precise, they limited themselves to receiving our information—there was no real inspection. And what did they see? Boxes, kind of like coffins. But they still did not demand to inspect the ships.
F. Castro:
 I believe that the American guarantees have no great significance for us. There were no guarantees before October 22. The blockade existed [before], approximately the same. But we had the Il-28 bombers. Now our situation is even worse. We agreed to the withdrawal of the Il-28 bombers only in order to help the Soviet Union.
 A. I. Mikoyan:
 No, Comrade Fidel. If we remind ourselves how we compared the Cuban situation in June of this year with its situation today, in November, we would see that it has improved in the military as well as in the political and diplomatic sense. Recall how the Americans were preparing an operation under the code name “Ortsac,” that is, “Castro” spelled  backward. They were preparing to land 20,000 marines!
F. Castro:
 Well, the invasion was only hypothetical!
 A. I. Mikoyan:
 And what would you say about the active preparations for the invasion in the Latin American countries?! You know well that the United States was preparing an invasion in mid-September under the guise of naval maneuvers.
F. Castro:
 We saw a possibility of an invasion even in October, but it was only a  probability.
 A. I. Mikoyan:
 It was you, Comrade Fidel, who informed us that a U.S. attack on Cuba was possible in the next twenty-four hours. The first goal of such an invasion could be to destroy the missiles, but the second would be an invasion.
F. Castro:
 I think that first of all there would have been a strike against the missile bases, and speaking about an invasion, it was much less probable. I do not believe in an invasion. And I do not think that an invasion would have caused a world war. Such danger was present, it seems to me, at the moment when the Soviet missiles were discovered. Obviously, the Soviet military specialists did not undertake all necessary measures to camouflage the missiles. They should have used the antiaircraft guided missiles against the U-2 from the very beginning to prevent them from discovering the missiles.
 A. I. Mikoyan:
 I have already told you, Comrade Fidel, that when we received your telegram where you spoke about the danger of imminent invasion, we immediately gave Comrade Pavlov an order to bring the Soviet forces in Cuba to the highest combat readiness so that the Soviet soldiers and officers could fight together with the Cubans to repel the aggression. After all, we have a whole army here. If an invasion on the part of the Americans began, it would have led to a global confrontation.
View on Scribd