FOREIGN POLICY INSIGHT / March 4, 2014 1
4 Borys Hrinchenko st., office 3, Kyiv, 01001, Ukraine | Phone (380 44) 279 88 23 | icpsua@gmail.com | www.icps.com.ua
March 4, 2014
№1
FOREIGN POLICY INSIGHT
Russian Aggression, International Support and Action Plan for Ukraine
FOREIGN POLICY INSIGHT / March 4, 2014 2
Russian aggression in Crimea and power play on the Ukrainian-Russian border has become a key issue of the international agenda today. Russian actions are aimed at making the world take into consideration its own geopolitical ambitions, enforcing the order of the post-Soviet region which would best fit its interests as well as solving a number of its internal problems. The international community demonstrates an increasingly appropriate response to Russian aggression - it was the stance of global players that became a major counterbalance to the Russian pressure.
However, further steps need to be taken by Ukraine’s new leadership to
strengthening their institutional capacity in terms of responding to this serious challenge from their neighbour. 1. Russian aggression and international response
1.1. Positions of major global players
Insisting on the legitimacy of Viktor Yanukovych, Russia used him as a tool in achieving its goals in Crimea, while breaching a number of international treaties, namely: United Nations Charter; 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law; 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine; Agreement on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet stationing on the territory of Ukraine dated August 8
th
, 1997 (it was prolonged in April 2010). Besides, refusal of the Russian Federation to carry out preliminary consultations with Ukraine and the countries, which are guarantors of its security and territorial integrity (Great Britain, USA and France), blatantly neglects international commitments enforced in the Budapest memorandum of 1994.
Russia breached a number of international treaties
1.2. Geopolitical and economic interests of Russia
From geopolitical viewpoint, Crimean affairs are part of Russian foreign strategy and the means to enforce its geopolitical positions, predominantly in the region it considers to be its area of influence. Through the campaign in Crimea Russia tries to attach the Crimean peninsula to a so-called
“
small security belt
”
which already includes Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, and Kaliningrad. At the same time it wants to increase the presence of its Navy in the Black Sea, which is perceived as a component of national security system and factor of regional stability in confrontation with NATO. Besides, Russia tries to solve the following economic tasks: To ensure energy security through reducing the cost of South Stream which, in this case, would be constructed on the continental shelf of the Black Sea instead of deep international
Russia tries to attach the Crimean peninsula to a so- called
“
small security belt
”
FOREIGN POLICY INSIGHT / March 4, 2014 3
waters; To use gas pipelines to
“
tie
”
Crimea to Russia, whereas nowadays the former totally depends on Ukraine in terms of infrastructure and resources; To neutralize or take under the Russian control profitable projects of gas exploration and extraction in the Black Sea, which were initiated by Ukraine with the assistance of major European and American companies; To deprive
“
Ukraine without Crimea
”
of major territory of exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea etc.
1.3. Conspiracy theories
In order to explain the Russian logic, experts consider several conspiracy theories. 1.
A Russian game to raise the stakes
. Russia decided to use the vulnerability of the newly appointed Ukrainian government in order to raise the stakes in the negotiations on Ukrainian-Russian relations after Maidan. Such a step was aimed at preventing new Ukrainian officials from raising the issues of Kharkiv treaties denouncement or the withdrawal of the Russian Black Sea Fleet from the territory of Ukraine. According to this scenario, after Russian power play, which would not transform into military conflict, the parties will start negotiations where Russia will insist on its terms for the conflict resolution. Russia needs a loyal Ukrainian government which would not enter NATO and would take into account Russian economic and military interests. 2.
Russian reply to the US.
Russia perceives Ukrainian Maidan exclusively as an American
“
special operation
”
, the first stage of post-Soviet
“democratization” based on the scenario of
the Arab spring. The Kremlin believes that events in Ukraine from November 2013
–
February 2014 may serve as
an example for weakening Putin’s regime in Russia. Therefore, after Yanukovych’s defeat Moscow decided to counterattack and fight the US on
the Ukrainian territory. In this case it is unknown how far Russia would go; yet, considering the vulnerability of the newly appointed Ukrainian government, Moscow may try to split the country and return Viktor Yanukovych as a puppet leader of a quasi-state. 3.
Oligarch
s’
theory.
Supporters of this theory believe that Viktor Yanukovych failed to ensure Russian interests in Ukraine and Vladimir Putin decided to return or introduce other individuals in Ukrainian politics. The scenario of aggression on the Crimean peninsula was used to regain control over the processes in the country and allow particular individuals to get power. In this case Moscow will start negotiations or make concessions when a pre-approved negotiator will be offered to whom Vladimir Putin will
“
grant the victory
” –
settlement of the conflict and return of control over Crimea. 4.
Economic theory.
According to this theory, the Russian leadership understands that their global positions have weakened due to end of the crisis in the EU, the start of economic growth in the US, considerable economic growth in the East and progress in the resolution of Iranian problem. It is believed that by the end of 2014 an irreversible processes will start in the Russian economic and financial system, and the Crimean affair was initiated to distract attention from the Russian economic problems and
After Russian power play the parties will start negotiations Moscow may try to split the country and create a quasi-state A pre-approved negotiator will be
“
granted the victory
”
The Crimean affair as distraction attention from the Russian economic problems
|