1
JUDGE MICHAEL JOHNSON DEPARTMENT 56
Hearing Date: October 6, 2014 Case Name: Woodward v. Church of Scientology International, et al. Case No.: BC540097 Matter:
Defendants’ Anti
-SLAPP Motion
Ruling: Motion is granted.
Plaintiff Vance Woodward filed this action against Defendants Church of Scientology International, Church of Scientology Western United States, Church of Scientology of San Francisco, Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization Inc., and Church of Scientology Flag Ship Service Organization Inc. Plaintiff asserts causes of action for (1) conversion, (2) breach of contract, (3) common counts, and (4) declaratory relief. Defendants have moved to strike the complaint pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. §425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute.
Evidence
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Plaintiff has requested judicial notice of documents filed in other lawsuits and before government agencies. The RJNs are denied. Most of the documents are not properly authenticated. In addition, Plaintiff has offered the documents for the truth of their contents, which is not proper. See Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1564.
Defendants have made extensive objections to Plaintiff’s declaration. The court has disregarded Plaintiff’s opinions (which have no foundation) and hearsay state
ments (which do not identify the declarants or come within a hearsay exception). But the court
has considered Plaintiff’s statements for the limited purpose of explaining his state of
mind, motivation for bringing this lawsuit, and the scope of his claims.
Standard for Motion
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An anti-SLAPP motion involves a two step process: 1) the defendant must establish that the challenged causes of action arise from protected activity; and 2) if the defendant makes this showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish a probability of success on the merits. Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88.
Protected Activity
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In the first step of an anti-SLAPP motion, the moving party must make a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action
“
arises from an act in furtherance of the right
of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue.” Varian Medical Systems v.
2 Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192.
“The phrase ‘arising from’ means the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of
action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the
right of petition or free speech.” City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 67.
Plaintiff’s causes of action all arise from Defendants’ religious activities. The claims all
relate to religious instruction, counseling and related religious services. And Plaintiff has
made a wholesale challenge to the principles and practices underlying Defendants’
religious doctrine. All of this involves religious speech, which is protected under the free speech clause of the First Amendment. See Capitol Square v. Pinette (1995) 515 US 753,
760 (“private religious speech, far from being a First Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression”). Section
425.16(e)(4) of the anti-
SLAPP statute broadly protects “conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of … free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest”. Courts have broadly construed this provision to include “something of concern to a substantial number of people”. Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110
Cal.App.4th 1122, 1132-33; see Briggs v. Eden Council (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1116.
Defendants’ activities involve a substantial number of people, as they are part of a
religious organization that has thousands of churches in more than 150 countries and over 30 churches and ministries in California. Defendants have met their burden to establish protected activity.
Probability of Success on the Merits
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Because Defendants have establish
ed that Plaintiff’s action arises from protected activity,
the burden shifts to Plaintiff to present admissible evidence that supports a prima facie case in his favor, much like the burden on a motion for summary judgment or directed verdict. Code Civ. Proc. §425.16(b)(1); Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 714; Chavez v. Mendoza (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1087. To meet this burden, Plaintiff must submit evidence that would be admissible at trial. See HMS Capital v. Lawyers Title (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 212. He cannot rely upon lay opinions, legal conclusions, speculation or argument. Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 26; Morrow v. LAUSD (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1444. Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden for two reasons.
1. Religious Dispute
In assessing the issues, the court must consider legal defenses raised by the defendant.
See Traditional Cat Assn. v. Gilbreath (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 392, 398 (“the statute
contemplates consideration of the substantive m
erits of the plaintiff’s complaint, as well as all available defenses to it, including but not limited to constitutional defenses.”). In our case, Defendants have argued that Plaintiff’s broad attack on the Scientology
organization raises a religious dispute that cannot be determined by the courts.
3 In response, Plaintiff has tried to argue that his case involves a simple breach of contract and right to possession dispute. As he states in the first paragraph of the complaint:
“Defendants are in possession o
f funds that Vance paid to Defendants for services, food and accommodations that never were and never will be delivered. Vance is entitled to a return of his funds. Vance demanded that Defendants return his funds, and Defendants
refuse to return Vance’s’ funds to him.” Plaintiff’s case is anything but this. The overwhelming content of Plaintiff’s 34 page
complaint consists of challenges to the teachings of the Scientology organization,
challenges to Plaintiffs’ standing and relationship with the Scientolo
gy organization, and challenges to the value of the services that Plaintiff received from the Scientology
organization. Plaintiff’s 66 page declaration largely tracks his complaint, and provides
even more detail about his dissatisfaction with Scientology.
Each of Plaintiff’s causes of action incorporates his allegations concerning his religious
dispute with Defendants, including his challenges to the teachings of the Scientology organization and claims that he suffered emotional harm from its religious activities; see Compl. at ¶¶ 69-
106, 263, 275, 291 & 307. Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim expressly alleges that religious services he received were “of such substandard quality as to be
worth nothing and/or which were in certain instances, damaging to
Vance”; Id. ¶ 275.
In his opposition brief, Plaintiff has argued that his breach of contract claim includes his
allegations that in delivering services Defendants “harmed Plaintiff” and “fell below any
conceivable minimum expectations of the contracting
parties”; see Opp. at pp. 6
-7. Even within his claim for refund, Plaintiff argues Defendants have refused to provide a refund because of his standing and relationship with the Scientology organization; in particular,
that Plaintiff’s funds have not been re
turned because he has spoken out against the organization, disagrees with its teachings, is seen as an opponent, and does not believe that its services will do something positive; Id. at p. 7.
Plaintiff’s declaration contains extensive statements about h
is dissatisfaction with the Scientology organization, asserting (among other things) that the religious services
provided to him “were shoddy, did no good and/or harmed me”; involved promises “to
deliver substantial help (intellectually, emotionally, spiritually, psychologically,
financially), things that it had no ability to deliver and did not deliver”; and resulted in him being “psychologically and emotionally hurt by participating in Scientology”; see
Woodward Decl. at ¶¶ 311, 304 & 318.
Plaintiff’s
challenges to Defendants’ religious principles and practices raise a religious
dispute that is not proper for the courts to decide. See Pres. Church in US v. Mem. Pres. Church (1969) 393 US 440, 447; US v. Ballard (1944) 322 US 78, 85-88; Nally v. Grace Comm. Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 298-99; Maxwell v. Brougher (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 824, 826; Schofield v. Superior Court (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 154, 162.
Because Plaintiff’s religious challenges have infused all of his causes of action and are so
predominant in his arguments, this is not a case in which religious parties have presented