^CLASSIFIED'
TOP
SECRET
Nofqrn
Senate
Select
Comiiiittee
on
Infelligeoee
Committee
Study
of
the
CentralIntelligence
Agmcy
's
Detention
and
Interrogation
Program
SBg=53
Foreword
by
Senate
Select
Committee
on
Intelligence
Chairman
Bianne
FeinsteinFindings
and
Concliisioiis
Executive
Summary
ApprovedDeeember13,,2012
UpdatedforReleaseApril
3,
2014
DeciassificatioriRevisionsDecember3,
Ml
4
TQPSECRE^
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Foreword
On
April
3,
2014,
the
Senate
Select
Committee
on
Intelligence
voted
to
send
the
Findings
andConclusions
andthe
Executive
Summary
of
itsfinalStudyon
the
CIA'sDetention
and
Interrogation
Program
tothe
President
fordeclassification
andsubsequentpublicrelease.
This
actionmarked
the
culmination
ofa
monumental
effort
that
officially
began
with
theCommittee's
decision
to
initiate
the
Study
in
March2009,butwhichhad
its
roots
in
an
investigation
into
the
CIA's
destruction
of
videotapes
of
CIA
detaineeinterrogationsthatbeganinDecember2007.
The
fullCommittee
Study,which
totals
morethan
6,700pages,remains
classified
butis
now
an
official
Senate
report.
Thefull
report
has
been
provided
to
the
White
House,theCIA,theDepartmentofJustice,theDepartmentofDefense,the
Department
of
State,
andtheOffice
of
the
Director
of
National
Intelligence
in
the
hopes
thatitwill
prevent
future
coercive
interrogationpractices
and
inform
the
managementofothercovertactionprograms.
AstheChairman
of
theCommitteesince2009,1writetooffersomeadditional
views,context,andhistory.
I
began
myserviceonthe
Senate
Intelligence
Committee
in
January
2001.
I
remembertestimonythatsummerfromGeorgeTenet,theDirectorofCentral
Intelligence,that
warned
ofapossiblemajorterroristeventagainsttheUnited
States,
but
withoutspecificsonthetime,location,ormethod
of
attack.On
September11,2001,the
world
learnedtheanswerstothosequestionsthathad
consumed
the
CIA
and
other
parts
of
the
U.S.
Intelligence
Community.^
Irecallvividlywatchingthehorrorofthatday,toincludethetelevisionfootageof
innocentmenand
women
jumpingoutofthe
World
TradeCenter
towers
toescape
thefire.Theimages,andthesoundsastheirbodieshitthepavementfarbelow,
willremainwithmefortherest
of
mylife.
Itisagainstthatbackdrop-thelargestattackagainsttheAmericanhomelandinourhistory-thattheeventsdescribedinthisreportwereundertaken.
'
Forinformation
on
theevents
attheCIA
prior
to
September
11,
2001,
see
theFinal
Report
of
the
National
Commission
onTerrorist
Attacks
upon
the
United
States
(9/11
Commission)
and
Office
ofthe
Inspector
General
ReportonCIAAccountabilityWithRespecttothe9/11Attacks.
Page
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of
6
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Nearly13yearslater,theExecutiveSummaryandFindingsandConclusions
of
thisreportarebeingreleased.TheyarehighlycriticaloftheCIA'sactions,and
rightfullyso.Readingthem,itiseasytoforgetthecontextinwhichtheprogrambegan-notthatthecontextshould
serve
asanexcuse,butratherasawarningfor
the
future.
Itisworthrememberingthepervasivefearinlate2001andhowimmediatethe
threatfelt.JustaweekaftertheSeptember
11
attacks,powderedanthraxwassent
tovariousnewsorganizationsandtotwoU.S.Senators.TheAmericanpublicwas
shockedbynews
of
newterroristplotsandelevations
of
thecolor-codedthreat
level
of
theHomelandSecurityAdvisorySystem.Weexpectedfurtherattacks
againstthenation.
IhaveattemptedthroughouttoremembertheimpactonthenationandtotheCIA
workforcefromtheattacks
of
September11,2001.Icanunderstandthe
CIA's
impulsetoconsidertheuse
of
everypossibletooltogatherintelligenceandremove
terrorists
fromthe
battlefield,^
and
CIA
was
encouraged
by
political
leaders
and
thepublictodowhateveritcouldtopreventanotherattack.
The
IntelligenceCommitteeaswelloftenpushesintelligenceagenciestoact
quicklyinresponsetothreatsandworldevents.
Nevertheless,suchpressure,fear,andexpectation
of
furtherterroristplotsdonot
justify,temper,orexcuseimproperactionstakenbyindividualsororganizationsin
thename
of
nationalsecurity.
The
major
lesson
of
this
report
is
thatregardless
of
the
pressures
and
theneed
toact,theIntelligence
Community's
actions
must
alwaysreflect
who
weareasanation,andadhereto
our
laws
and
standards.Itis
preciselyatthesetimes
of
nationalcrisisthat
our
government
mustbe
guided
by
the
lessons
of
our
history
and
subjectdecisionstointernal
and
external
review.Instead,
CIA
personnel,aided
by
twooutsidecontractors,
decided
toinitiatea
program
of
indefinitesecretdetentionandtheuse
of
brutalinterrogation
techniquesinviolation
of
U.S.law,treatyobligations,and
our
values.
ThisConomitteeStudydocumentstheabusesandcountlessmistakesmadebetweenlate2001andearly2009.
The
ExecutiveSummary
of
theStudyprovides
^Itis
worth
repeating
thatthe
covert
actionauthorities
approved
by
the
President
in
September
2001
didnot
provide
anyauthorizationorcontemplatecoerciveinterrogations.
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of
6
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