Mr. Michael E. Horowitz January 29, 2015 Page 2 forfeited assets resulting from these investigations in the form
of
cash
or
property through
DOJ s
"equitable sharing" program.
3
The Order has been praised as a "major reform"
of
federal asset forfeiture policy.
4
The
Washington Post
described it as "the most sweeping check on police power to confiscate personal property since the seizures began three decades ago as part
of
the war
on
drugs. "
5
Even the Attorney General's critics have hailed the order, with Senator Charles E. Grassley (R-IA) stating, "[w]e're going to have a fairer justice system because
of
it[.]"
6
While the Order purports to safeguard civil liberties by ending federal adoption, it actually does not have a significant impact
on
the government's overall use
of
asset forfeitures.
7
In the analysis that follows, we show that the majority
of
asset forfeitures involve administrative forfeitures, which the Order does not restrict. Therefore,
if
the DOJ in fact believes that inappropriate asset forfeitures pose systemic risks to our civil liberties, then your office should immediately audit or review the entire Asset Forfeiture Program.
Discussion A. The Order fails to address the majority
o
federal seizures which occur administratively and not through civil or criminal forfeiture.
DOJ s
authority to conduct asset forfeitures is generally derived from
18
U.S.C.
§
981
(civil forfeiture),
18
U.S.C. § 982 (criminal forfeiture), and
19
U.S.C. § 1607 (administrative forfeiture).
8
Civil forfeitures result when the government files a court action against property
(in rem).
Criminal forfeitures result from the criminal prosecution
of
a person
(in personam).
The government must "indict" the property used or derived from a crime and
if
the jury finds the property forfeitable, then the court issues an order
of
forfeiture.
9
However, "administrative forfeitures," an
in
rem
action through which the government takes property without judicial involvement,
1
are used most often.
3
21
U.S.C. §881(e)(l)(A) and (e)(3), and
18
U.S.C. §981(e)(2) each authorize the Attorney General to share federally forfeited property with participating state and local law enforcement agencies.
4
Charlotte Alter,
Feds Limit
aw
that Lets Cops Seize Your Stuff,
TIME
(Jan. 16, 2015),
available at
http://time.com/3 672140/civil-forfeiture-assets-ho Ider/.
5
Robert
O
Harrow Jr., Sari Horwitz, Steven Rich,
Holder Limits Seized-Asset Sharing Process That Split Billions with Local, State Police,
WASH. POST
(Jan. 16, 2015),
available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/ho der-ends-seized-asset-sharing-process-that-sp lit-bi lions-withlocal-state-police/2015/01/16/0e7ca058-99d4-11 e4-bcfb-059ec7a93ddc _story.html
6
Id
7
See, e.g.
Radley Balko,
How much civil asset fo1feiture will Holder s new policy actually prevent?
WASH. POST
(Jan. 20, 2015),
available
athttp://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/01/20/how-much-civil-assetforfeiture-will-holders-new-policy-actually-prevent/.
8
U.S.
Dep t
of
Justice, Types
of
Federal Forfeiture, (December 2014),
available at
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/afp/07federalforfeiture/
9
Id
1
Id
11
See infra note
21.