IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXASWICHITA FALLS DIVISIONSTATE OF TEXAS, STATE OF ARKANSAS, STATE OF LOUISIANA, and STATE OF NEBRASKA,Plaintiffs,v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,UNITED STATES DEPARTMENTOF LABOR, and THOMAS E. PEREZ, in hisOfficial Capacity as SECRETARYOF LABOR, Defendants.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§Civil Action No. 7:15-cv-00056-OMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiff State of Texas’s Complaint for Declaratory and InjunctiveRelief and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction/Stay of Administrative Proceedings (ECF No. 1), filed March 18, 2015; Defendants’ Opposition toPlaintiff’s Application for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 11), filed March 19, 2015; Texas’sMotion for Hearing on Application for a Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 12), filed March24, 2015; Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Hearing (ECF No. 13), filed March 24,2015; State of Texas, State of Arkansas, State of Louisiana, and State of Nebraska’s (collectively“Plaintiffs” or “Plaintiff States”) Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief andApplication for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction/Stay of AdministrativeProceedings (ECF No. 14), filed March 25, 2015; and Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Application
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for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction/Stay of Administrative Proceedings(ECF No. 15), filed March 25, 2015. Having considered the motions, related briefing, pleadings,
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and applicable law, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary injunction should be and is hereby
GRANTED
.
I. BACKGROUND
This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the United States Departmentof Labor’s (“Department”) recently promulgated final rule defining “spouse” (“Final Rule”) under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2611. Am. Compl. 1–2, ECF No. 14. OnMarch 25, 2015, Plaintiff State of Texas amended its Complaint to add State of Arkansas, State of Louisiana, and State of Nebraska as plaintiffs. Am. Compl. 1–3, ECF No. 14. Collectively, Plaintiffs
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seek a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, under Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 65, to enjoin and stay the application of the Final Rule, which is codified as 29 C.F.R. Part825 and becomes effective on March 27, 2015. Am. Compl. 20–21, ECF No. 14. Alternatively,
Having considered Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Extend Time to File Reply (ECF No.
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17) and applying the four factors given in
Salts v. Epps
, 676 F.3d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 2012), the Court findsgood cause to
GRANT
Plaintiffs’ Opposed Motion to Extend Time to File Reply (ECF No. 16) by sevenhours due to excusable neglect resulting from the addition of new parties and the approaching deadline.
See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). In footnote one of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs note that the “Amended Complaint adds new parties
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but adds no new claims or independent legal bases for temporary relief in an effort not to moot Defendant’sOpposition.” Am. Compl. 3 n.1, ECF No. 14. In Plaintiff’s Motion for a Hearing (ECF No. 12), Plaintiff Texas clarifies that it continues to seek a
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temporary restraining order, requesting a hearing on the matter. The Court construes the application for atemporary restraining order to be opposed.
See
Defs.’ Opp’n 6 n.1, ECF No. 11. The Court
DENIES
thisapplication for an immediate hearing
as moot
, with leave for the parties to request a hearing should they believe one necessary in light of this order.
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Plaintiffs seek a stay of administrative proceedings under the Administrative Procedure Act(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 705.
Id.
A. FMLA Rulemaking
The FMLA defines “spouse” as “a husband or wife, as the case may be.” 29 U.S.C. §2611(13). In 1993, the Department’s Interim Final Rule defined “spouse” as “a husband or wife asdefined or recognized under state law for purposes of marriage in states where it is recognized.” 58Fed. Reg. 31817, 31835 (June 4, 1993). The 1995 Final Rule clarified that the law of the State wherethe employee resides would control for the purpose of determining eligibility for FMLA spousalleave. 80 Fed. Reg. 9990 (Feb. 25, 2015).On June 27, 2014, the Department published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, in which it proposed to revise the regulation defining “spouse” in light of the United States Supreme Court’sdecision in
United States v. Windsor
, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 79 Fed. Reg. 36445-01 (June 27,2014). Specifically, the Department “proposed to change the definition of spouse to look to the lawof the jurisdiction
in which the marriage was entered into
(including common law marriages), asopposed to the law of the State in which the employee resides, and to expressly reference theinclusion of same-sex marriages in addition to common law marriages.” Summ. Comments, 80 Fed.Reg. 9991 (Feb. 25, 2015) (emphasis added). The proposed rule reads: Spouse, as defined in the [FMLA] statute, means a husband or wife. For purposes of this definition, husband or wife refers to the other person with whom an individualentered into marriage as defined or recognized under State law for purposes of marriage in the State in which the marriage was entered into or, in the case of amarriage entered into outside of any State, if the marriage is valid in the place whereentered into and could have been entered into in at least one State. This definitionincludes an individual in a same-sex or common law marriage that either (1) wasentered into in a State that recognizes such marriages or, (2) if entered into outside3
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