2 MICHIGAN
v.
EPA Syllabus of the relevant factors.’ ”
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc.
v.
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.
, 463 U. S. 29, 43. Even under the deferential standard of
Chevron U. S. A. Inc.
v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
, 467 U. S. 837, which directs courts to accept an agency’s reasonable resolution of an ambiguity in a statutethat the agency administers,
id.,
at 842–843, EPA strayed well be-yond the bounds of reasonable interpretation in concluding that costis not a factor relevant to the appropriateness of regulating powerplants. Pp. 5–6. (b) “Appropriate and necessary” is a capacious phrase. Read natu-rally against the backdrop of established administrative law, this phrase plainly encompasses cost. It is not rational, never mind “ap-propriate,” to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits. Statutory contextsupports this reading. Section 7412(n)(1) required the EPA to con-duct three studies, including one that reflects concern about cost, see §7412(n)(1)(B); and the Agency agrees that the term “appropriate andnecessary” must be interpreted in light of all three studies. Pp. 6–9.(c) EPA’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. That other Clean Air Act provisions expressly mention cost only shows that §7412(n)(1)(A)’s broad reference to appropriateness encompasses
multiple
relevant factors, one of which is cost. Similarly, the modest principle of
Whitman
v.
American Trucking Assns., Inc.
, 531 U. S. 457—when the Clean Air Act expressly directs EPA to regulate onthe basis of a discrete factor that does not include cost, the Act should not be read as implicitly allowing consideration of cost anyway—hasno bearing on this case. Furthermore, the possibility of considering cost at a later stage, when deciding
how much
to regulate power plants, does not establish its irrelevance at
this
stage. And althoughthe Clean Air Act makes cost irrelevant to the initial decision to regu-late sources other than power plants, the whole point of having a separate provision for power plants was to treat power plants
differ-ently
. Pp. 9–12. (d) EPA must consider cost—including cost of compliance—beforedeciding whether regulation is appropriate and necessary. It will be up to the Agency to decide (as always, within the limits of reasonableinterpretation) how to account for cost. Pp. 12–15.748 F. 3d 1222, reversed and remanded. S
CALIA
, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which R
OBERTS
, C. J., and K
ENNEDY
, T
HOMAS
, and A
LITO
, JJ., joined. T
HOMAS
, J., filed a concurring opinion. K
AGAN
, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which G
INSBURG
, B
REYER
, and S
OTOMAYOR
, JJ., joined.