Hearing Date: Wednesday, April 27, 2016 Calendar No.: 8 Case Name: DeCrescenzo v. Church of Scientology International, et al. Case No.: BC411018 Motion: Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication Moving Party: Defendants Church of Scientology International and Religious Technology Center Responding Party: Plaintiff Laura Ann DeCrescenzo aka Laura A. Dieckman Tentative Ruling: Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. Summary adjudication is granted as to the 3rd COA and is otherwise denied. Background and Procedural History On 4/2/09, Plaintiff Laura Ann DeCrescenzo aka Laura A. Dieckman filed this action against Defendant
Church of Scientology International (“Scientology”) arising out of her experi
ence and employment with Scientology. After Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on 5/19/09, Scientology removed this action to federal court. On 11/5/09, the District Court remanded this action to state court. On 2/2/10, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint which added Religious Technology Center as a defendant and asserted causes of action for (1) forced abortion in violation of her right to privacy under the California Constitution; (2) forced abortion in violation of her right to privacy under common law; (3) deprivation of liberty in violation of her rights under the California Constitution; (4) false imprisonment; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) wage and hour violations; and (7) unfair business practices. On 3/18/10
and 4/30/10, the Court sustained Defendants’ demurrers to the SAC without leave to
amend based on the statute of limitations. Judgment was entered on 6/9/10. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and ordered that the demurrers be overruled, concluding that Plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to support an equitable estoppel (DeCrescenzo v. Church of
Scientology Int’l, 2011 WL 2508142 *5
-6 ). Remittitur issued on 10/5/11. On 1/13/12, the Court bifurcated trial as to the issue of eq
uitable estoppel. On 10/23/13, the Court denied Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment. On 9/17/14, this action was assigned to this Court. A Trial (with a court-trial phase concerning equitable estoppel to be convened first) Setting Conference is set for 4/27/16. The parties have stipulated to extending the time within which this case must be brought to trial (see Order filed 10/23/15). Defendants now move for summary judgment/adjudication. Evidentiary Objections Plaintiff objects to portions of the declarations of Warren McShane (Nos. 1-12), Allan Cartwright (Nos. 13-20), Benjamin J. Hubbard (Nos. 21-36), and Jesse DeCrescenzo (Nos. 37-45). Objection No. 36 is
sustained; the remainder of the objections are overruled. The Court notes that Plaintiff’s obje
ctions to the declaration of Benjamin J. Hubbard essentially attempt to dispute the weight of his testimony (see Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1318-
19), and Plaintiff’s remaining objections
otherwise largely dispute the factual basis o
f Defendants’ arguments.
Defendants object to the declaration of Robert V. Levine. The objections are overruled. In Headley v.
Church of Scientology Int’l (9th Cir. 2012) 687 F.3d. 1173, 1181 n.1, the Court of Appeals concluded that
the District Court had
discretion to strike Levine’s declaration therein which was based on a review of deposition transcripts. This does not establish that Levine’s present declaration based on a review of Plaintiff’s declaration (Levine Decl. ¶ 7) is necessarily not based on
matters of a type that may
reasonably be relied upon by Levine (Evid. Code § 801(b)), in light of the Court’s broad discretion in
ruling on foundational matters (see generally Maatuk v. Guttman (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1197). To the extent Defendants a
rgue that Levine’s theories are not generally accepted (see U.S. v. Fishman
(N.D. Cal. 1990) 743 F.Supp. 713, 719-20), the Court notes that Levine submits that he has published peer-reviewed research concerning his theories (Levine Decl. ¶¶ 4-5). Whether the conclusions reached in Fishman hold true today to one extent or another has not been established. Finally, Defendants argue
that consideration of Levine’s declaration would impermissibly question the religion of Scientology. However, Levine’s declaratio
n at its core is offered to present an opinion as to the effect on Plaintiff based on her long relationship with Scientology. It is not offered to support some kind of pronouncement that all Scientology practices are wrongful, and has not been construed as such. Plaintiff objects to the reply declaration of Nicholas F. Daum as new evidence that was not included with
the motion. However, the Court notes that this evidence was incorporated in the parties’ revised papers
to which Plaintiff responded. Therefore, the Court perceives no prejudice in considering this evidence. See Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1183. Ministerial Exception and the First Amendment The ministerial exception is grounded in the First Amendment and generally precludes the application of the employment discrimination laws to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C. (2012) 132 S.Ct. 694, 705-6. Based on this exception, the courts have declined to right alleged wrongs related to the hiring, firing, discipline, or administration of clergy. Higgins v. Maher (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1168, 1175. The courts have refused to adopt a rig
id formula for a definition of “minister.”
Alcazar v. Corporation of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle (9th Cir. 2010) 627 F.3d 1288, 1291-92; Hosana-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 707. In Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) 406 U.S. 205, the Supreme Court noted the deep religious convictions of the Amish which relate to their daily living (id. at 216-17), and concluded that the First Amendment
prohibited the application of a state’s compulsory education requirement because of parents’
fundamental interests in guiding the religious future and education of their children (id. at 232-34).
Similarly, a church’s disciplinary conduct such as shunning is protected under the First Amendment. Paul
v. Watchtower Bible and Tact Society of New York, Inc. (9th Cir. 1987) 819 F.2d 875, 883; see also Headley, 687 F.3d at 1180 (distinguishing between improper threats or coercion, from permissible warnings of adverse but legitimate consequences). However, Plaintiff correctly notes that merely because Scientology is an undisputed religion does not make the Defendants immune for all purposes from all tort liability even for acts that are in some
measure religiously motivated. See Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass’n (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1114, 1119
-20 (addressing deceptive recruitment practices); see also Higgins, 210 Cal.App.3d at 1176 (stating in dicta
that torts such as battery, false imprisonment, or conversion cannot be perpetrated upon a church’s
ministers or members with civil impunity). Additionally, Plaintiff correctly notes that to the extent Defendants attempt to classify all individuals as ministers, this could be determined by a fact-finder to be subterfuge (Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria (7th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 1036, 1039 (stating in dicta that designating a janitor as a minister would be treated by the courts as subterfuge) (abrogated on other grounds in Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 709
n.4)). This is particularly relevant as it relates to Plaintiff’s early years with Scientology as a minor.
Notably, the ministerial exception arguably does not apply to minors. See Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 1292
(declining to address the extent of the ministerial exception to minors); see generally Brock v. Wendell’s
Woodwork, Inc. (4th Cir. 1989) 867 F.2d 196, 198-99 (concluding that the religious beliefs of a church cannot immunize employers from child labor laws). Forced Abortion
Plaintiff’s 1st and 2nd COAs for forced abortion in violation of her privacy rights are based on
Defendants allegedly forcing her to have an abortion by threatening her with losing her job, housing,
and husband, and owing a “freeloader debt.” SAC ¶¶ 8, 24. Defendants argue that they merely exercised their First Amendment right to attempt to persuade Plaintiff to have an abortion and that Plaintiff’s
claims impermissibly question t
he validity of Plaintiff’s belief in making her decision (see Katz v. Superior
Court (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 952, 986-87). But this is disputed, with Plaintiff submitting evidence that she and Jesse had agreed to keep the baby but that Defendants (later joined by Jesse) then pressured her into changing her mind by telling her that she would be made subject to the freeloader bill and would
have to leave without Jesse. Opp’n Sep. Statement [“OSS”] ¶¶ 45
-51. This raises triable issues of fact as to whether Defendants violated her privacy rights concerning abortion (see generally People v. Garziano (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 241, 243) by interfering with her marriage relationship (see Carrieri v. Bush (Wash. 1966) 419 P.2d 132, 543-44; Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church (Pa. 1975) 341 A.2d 105, 334-
35). See also Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35 (autonomy privacy).
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s 1st COA based on the Constitutional right of privacy does not
support damages, relying on the standards stated in Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 300, 317. However, Defendants have provided no substantial analysis as to the language or history of the Constitutional right of privacy, or whether adequate remedies exist for violations thereof. Cf. Weimber v. County of Kern (E.D. Cal. 2006) 2006 WL 3834237 *8 (concluding that the Constitutional right of privacy does not suggest a damages action, and that a damages remedy may be available under
Civil Code § 52.1). Defendants’ r
eply argues that Civil Code § 52.1 is unavailable to Plaintiff which suggests that, as applicable to Plaintiff, a damages claim for violation of the Constitutional right of privacy might be proper here under the circumstances. Liberty and False Imprisonment
Plaintiff’s 3rd and 4th COAs are based on her being confined to the Rehabilitation Project Force (RPF).
SAC ¶¶ 40-45, 54-56. Defendants submit that Plaintiff voluntarily chose to go to the RPF for religious reasons, but this is disputed with Plaintiff submitting that she stated numerous times that she wished to leave Scientology but Plaintiff was placed under watch (which included someone sleeping with her in her bed and someone outside her door) so that she would be physically prevented from leaving until she
