UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
) AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, ) ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 1:18-cv-1261 (KBJ) ) DONALD J. TRUMP,
et al.
, ) ) Defendants. ) )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
) NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES, FD-1, IAMAW, AFL-CIO,
et al.
, ) ) ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) DONALD J. TRUMP,
et al.
, ) ) Defendants. ) ) ) AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO,
et al.
, ) ) ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) DONALD J. TRUMP,
et al.
, ) ) Defendants. ) ) ) NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION, ) ) )
ii Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) DONALD J. TRUMP,
et al.
, ) ) Defendants. ) )
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1
II.
BACKGROUND ................................................................................................... 7
A.
An Historical Overview Of The Management Of Federal Public Employees ....... 7
The Statutory Provisions That Are Relevant To The Instant Dispute ................. 10
1.
The Purpose, Structure, And Provisions Of The FSLRMS ........................... 11
2.
The Federal Labor Relations Authority ....................................................... 14
3.
Relevant Miscellaneous Provisions Of The United States Code ................... 16
The Challenged Executive Orders .................................................................... 17
1.
Executive Order 13,836 (“The Collective Bargaining Procedures Order”)
... 17
2.
Executive Order 13,837 (“The Official Time Order”)
.................................. 19
3.
Executive Order 13,839 (“The Removal Procedures Order”)
....................... 23
Procedural History ........................................................................................... 25
III.
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ................................................................. 27
IV.
ANALYSIS ......................................................................................................... 31
This Court Has Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Because Congress Did Not Intend For This Matter To Be Resolved Through The FSLMRS Or CSRA Administrative Review Schemes ...................................................................... 33
1.
Both The FSLMRS And The CSRA Evince A Fairly Discernable Congressional Intent To Channel Certain Claims To The FLRA And The MSPB .......................................................................................... 35
2.
The Unions’ Claims Are Not Of The Type That Congress Intended To
Funnel Through The FLRA or CSRA Statutory Review Schemes ................ 37
a.
Meaningful Judicial Review Of The Unions
’ Claims Would Be
Foreclosed If The District Courts Could Not Hear These Claims ..... 37
b.
The Unions’ Claims Are Wholly Collateral To The FSLMRS
And The CSRA Administrative-Judicial Review Schemes ............... 48
iii c.
Although Potentially Helpful, The Agencies’ Expertise Is Not
Essential To Resolving The Instant Claims ..................................... 56
The Unions’
Claims Are Fit For Judicial Resolution......................................... 59
The President Has The Statutory And Constitutional Authority To Issue Executive Orders That Pertain To Federal Labor-Management Relations, So Long As His Orders Do Not Conflict With The Will Of Congress ................ 66
Before The Enactment Of The FSLMRS And CSRA, Presidents Had The Authority To Issue Executive Orders Regulating Federal Labor-Management Relations ................................................................................ 66
2. The FSLMRS And CSRA Did Not Divest The President Of Any Authority In This Field ............................................................................... 71
3.
The President’s Exec
utive Orders Concerning This Area Must Be
Consistent With Congress’s Pronouncements
.............................................. 75
Many Of The Order Provisions The Unions Have Challenged In This Case Impermissibly Infringe Upon The Statutory Right To Bargain Collectively ...... 76
1. Section 7103(a) And D.C. Circuit Caselaw Define The Contours Of The Statutory Right To Bargain Collectively ............................................... 78
a. The Duty To Bargain ..................................................................... 80
b. The Duty To Act In Good Faith ..................................................... 82
c.
Takeaways Regarding Agency Conduct With Respect To Federal Labor Negotiations ..................................................... 83
2. Certain Provisions Of The Challenged Executive Orders Dramatically Curtail The Scope Of Bargaining Because Agencies And Unions Will No Longer Negotiate Over A Host Of Significant Issues ............................. 88
a.
The Orders Remove These Matters From The Scope Of The Right To Bargain Despite The Fact That Congress Has Made Them Negotiable ........................................................................... 88
b.
The Removed Topics Are Important To The Functioning Of Labor Organizations And The Fairness Of Collective Bargaining Negotiations ................................................................ 92
3. Certain Provisions Of The Executive Orders Impede The Prospect Of Good Faith Negotiations ...................................................................... 100
4.
Defendants’ Best ‘No
-
Conflict’ Counterarguments Are Meritless
.............. 105
a.
The Specious Section 7117 Suggestion ........................................ 105
b.
The Mistaken ‘Mere Guidance’ Characterization
.......................... 111
The Remaining Challenged Provisions Of These Executive Orders Are
Legitimate Exercises Of The President’s Authority
........................................ 113
V.
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 118