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n October 4, 2018, Joseph Malanji, Zambia’s Foreign Minister, went in front of Parliament and assessed relations with China in glowing terms. He had accompanied President Edgar Lungu to the 7th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Summit in Beijing in early September.
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A month after the Foreign Minister’s parliamentary presentation—ordinary Zambians in the Copperbelt Province demonstrated their own view of China, diametrically opposed to the government one: They attacked and damaged five Chinese-owned businesses.
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The trigger was allegations that China was about to grab and take ownership of several Zambian state-owned enterprises through underhanded privatization or for debt default. Chinese entrepreneurs across the Copperbelt fled the area. President Xi Jinping, “disappointed”
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by the events, dispatched a special envoy to see President Lungu. In writing, the Chinese ambassador, Lie Jie, called the attacks xenophobia. Still, Minister Malanji is not wrong. Zambia’s governments since independence have all been unanimous on one issue: they value Beijing. The central reason is the 1,860 km-long Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) which was built with a loan from China during 1970-1975. It gave resource-rich but landlocked Zambia access to the Indian Ocean through Tanzania, Zambia’s ideological twin. TAZARA freed Lusaka from economic dependence on two
Chinese Migrants Versus Ordinary Zambians: Causes of Tension and Possible Peace Pathways
By Emmanuel Matambo, Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding Scholar January 2020
The Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding (SVNP)
is a continent-wide network of African policy and research organizations that works with the Wilson Center’s Africa Program to bring African knowledge and perspectives to U.S., African, and international policy on peacebuilding in Africa. Established in 2011 and supported by the generous financial support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the project provides avenues for African researchers and practitioners to engage with and exchange analyses and perspectives with U.S., African, and international policymakers in order to develop the most appropriate, cohesive, and inclusive policy frameworks and approaches to achieving sustainable peace in Africa. This publication was made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the author and do not represent the views of the Wilson Center or the Carnegie Corporation of New York.For more information please visit https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-southern-voices-network-for-peacebuilding
The Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding
Research Paper No. 24
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Wilson Center - Africa Program
implacably hostile neighbors, Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. Both Salisbury and Pretoria were then under white supremacist minority regimes that repressed the huge indigenous African majorities. Significantly, Zambia and Tanzania approached China only after the West had been asked first and had refused.
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China was handsomely rewarded. In 1971, Beijing, with overwhelming African support, defeated Taipei for a UN seat.
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A recently disclosed recording, of then-governor Ronald Reagan, denotes how infuriated certain sections of the United States were by China’s diplomatic victory. Reagan exploded into a race-laced tirade while pressurizing fellow Californian, President Richard Nixon, to find ways to punish the “monkeys” (in reference to African countries that supported China’s UN bid). This background explains why national-level Sino-Zambian concord has been stable for more than 50 years. However, recent sentiment among urban Zambians outside of government is quite another story. Their attitude has emerged coincident with at least 4 factors: the late surge of Chinese migrants into Zambia; severe inequality in Zambia even during a 10-year (2004-2014) economic boom; the recent economic precipitous downturn; and perceived racist attitudes and abusive behavior of Chinese employers. Admittedly, coincidence is not causality. But the problematic phenomenon this research focuses on exists and is serious, having frequently boiled over into verbal and even physical violence. The current study is thus important as it outlines possible solutions to the existing tension. The first section introduces constructivism and track two diplomacy, the theoretical frameworks used for the paper. The second section gives a background to Zambia-China relations. The third traces emerging trends in Chinese migration to Zambia and the role of Zambia’s Patriotic Front (PF) in amplifying anti-Chinese sentiment. The fourth section presents the economic dimension of subnational tension. The fifth section is a constructivist analysis of the paper. Section six demonstrates and recommends how track two diplomacy could resolve the said tension. The final section concludes the research.
Constructivism and Track Two Diplomacy
Constructivism
Constructivism argues that international relations are determined by the ideas and identities of the agents involved. Friends and allies could forge a mutually empowering association that is unlikely among competitors or foes. This paper uses the constructivist emphasis on social identities
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as determinants of the quality and motive for international relations. It shows how constructing negative identities of China and its citizens has bred hostility in Zambian citizens.
Track Two Diplomacy
Track two diplomacy “engages individuals and organizations from outside the government in the complex task of conflict resolution.”
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Those involved “develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict.”
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Both in democratic and authoritarian states, leaders who take “risks for peace” without the consent of their constituents could forfeit their “political base.”
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A national-level quixotic attitude towards China and the Chinese could prove costly for the Zambian government. Resentment toward Chinese migrants in Zambia emanates from “a sense of victimhood felt in varying degrees by the collectivity of the members in [an] identity group caused by a historical experience of oppression, aggression or some other major experience.”
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For example, the proximity of a successful migrant entrepreneur to the many citizens struggling to secure economic empowerment evokes fears of colonial encroachment.
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Zambia-China Relations: A Background
Official Zambia-China relations were established on October 29, 1964, five days after Zambia gained independence. Whereas Taiwan’s relations with apartheid South Africa sullied its reputation in the Third World, China’s avowed opposition to colonial and minority rule, such as was present in southern Africa at the time, was an endearing characteristic that resonated with Zambia. China also provided more than USD$400 million and sent Chinese workers
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to build the TAZARA which served as a lifeline for Zambia during the liberation struggles. In addition to compatible views on minority rule, Zambia and China had similar socialist-leaning economies and views on democracy. Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia’s first president, described multiparty democracy as “a beautiful anachronism—a pattern ideally suited to the genius of the British people but of limited value, without drastic modifications, in Modern Africa.”
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Similarly, Zhang Weiwei defends China’s “hybrid model…that combines selection with some kind of election” and argues that it “is probably better than the pure election in the West.”
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These arguments obliquely support one-party systems. In 1973, Zambia became a one-party state. However, in the 1980s Kaunda faced mounting pressure to reintroduce multiparty politics and abandon socialism. Economic stagnation and an unsuccessful experimentation with Bretton Woods-imposed Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) contributed to the growing opposition. In 1990, Frederick Chiluba, an erstwhile trade union leader, formed the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) and led the pressure on Kaunda to foreswear one-party politics. Finally, in 1991, the Zambian constitution was amended allowing for a return to multiparty politics.
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Chiluba defeated Kaunda at the 1991 polls and became Zambia’s second president. Chiluba went about privatizing Zambia’s economy, a move that created space for foreign investment. It was under these circumstances, coupled with China’s “going out” policy that augmented interaction between ordinary Zambians and Chinese migrants.
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Chinese Migration to Zambia and the Role of the Patriotic Front (PF) in Inflaming Anti-Chinese Sentiment
Before 1991, Chinese citizens came to Zambia under the auspices of their government. The Chinese citizens that worked on the TAZARA went back to China at the end of their duty.
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Thus, Zambia-China relations were consigned to state actors. The recent increase in the number of Chinese entrepreneurs in Zambia is “an unforeseen development of [China’s]…. ‘going out policy’. These migrants arrive in Africa through a number of roots [
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] and often with no support from the Chinese state.”
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On the other hand, Andrew Malone argues that “the strategy has been carefully devised by officials in Beijing, where one expert has estimated that China will eventually need to send 300 million people to Africa to solve the problems of over-population and pollution.”
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Up to 2001, Zambian opposition parties campaigned on promises of fighting corruption—with which the MMD was associated during Chiluba’s reign from 1991 to 2001. Levy Mwanawasa, Chiluba’s successor, launched a “New Deal” government with “zero tolerance” to corruption.
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Thus, opposition parties trained their focus on the preponderance of Chinese investment and migration. During this time, the PF, a key opposition party led by Michael Sata, inflamed anti-Chinese sentiment especially during the 2006 general election, including a claim that there were about 80,000 Chinese in Zambia.
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The predatory traits that were imputed to China as an investor were projected on Chinese migrants. Li Baodong, China’s ambassador to Zambia at the time, threatened that China would cut ties with Zambia if Michael Sata won the election.
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This was the first time that China had openly gone against its its non-interference policy.
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Sata lost that election, and another (by-election) in 2008 but won the 2011 general election. His victory bespoke “the first time in Africa [that] the electorate…pronounced their opinion [on the Africa-China] relationship.”
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However, he did not stem the tide