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DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO THE DECLARATION OF HANA WHITFIELD

SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP

WILLIAM H. FORMAN (State Bar No. 150477) wforman@scheperkim.com DAVID C. SCHEPER (State Bar No. 120174) dscheper@scheperkim.com MARGARET E. DAYTON (State Bar No. 274353) pdayton@scheperkim.com 800 West Sixth Street, 18th Floor Los Angeles, California 90017-2701 Telephone: (213) 613-4655 Facsimile: (213) 613-4656 Attorneys for Defendant, Church of Scientology International

JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER & MITCHELL LLP

ROBERT E. MANGELS (Bar No. 48291) rmangels@jmbm.com MATTHEW D. HINKS (Bar No. 200750) mhinks@jmbm.com 1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor Los Angeles, California 90067-4308 Telephone: (310) 203-8080 Facsimile: (310) 203-0567 Attorneys for Defendant, Religious Technology Center

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT

VALERIE HANEY, Plaintiff, v. CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL; RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER, and DAVID MISCAVIGE; and DOES 1-25, Defendants. CASE NO. 19STCV21210

ssigned to Hon. Richard J. Burdge, Jr.

DEFENDANTS CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER’S OBJECTIONS TO THE DECLARATION OF HANA WHITFIELD IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

[Filed Concurrently with Opposition Brief; Supporting Declarations of Deidre Assam, Lynn R. Farny, William H. Forman, Gary S. Soter, and Michael Sutter; and Objections to the Declarations of Robert W. Thompson and Michael Rinder]

Date: August 11, 2020 Time: 1:30 p.m. Dept: 37 Comlaint Filed: June 18 2019

Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 07/29/2020 11:12 AM Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by A. Miro,Deputy Clerk

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OBJECTIONS TO THE DECLARATION OF HANA WHITFIELD (Exhibit 6 to the Thompson Declaration)

Global Objection to the Declaration of Hana Whitfield

The Whitfield Declaration is entirely inadmissible and should be disregarded for multiple reasons. First, under Code of Civil Procedure Section 2015.5, declarations signed outside of California must state that they were made “under the laws of the State of California.”

Kulshrestha v. First Union Commercial Corp.

, 33 Cal. 4th 601, 606 (2004) (citing Civ. Proc. Code § 2015.5). “[S]uch language is necessary for validity and admissibility purposes.”

Id.

at 618. Therefore, declarations signed outside of California that do not reference the laws of California are inadmissible and cannot be considered as evidence.

Id.

at 606, 608. In

Kulshrestha

, the trial court sustained an objection to the plaintiff’s declaration which stated “I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct, executed this 8th day of August 2001 at Columbus, Ohio.”

Kulshrestha

, 33 Cal. 4th at 607. After sustaining the objection to the declaration in its entirety, the court granted summary judgment in the defendants’ favor, finding no admissible or substantial evidence to support plaintiff’s claims.

Id.

The California Supreme Court affirmed the result.

Id.

Here, the Whitfield Declaration states “I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 3rd day of March, 2020 in Cape Coral, Florida.” (Whitfield Decl. at p. 6.) Because the Whitfield Declaration does not state that it was made under the laws of California, it violates Code of Civil Procedure Section 2015.5, and is completely inadmissible.

Kulshrestha

, 33 Cal.4th at 607, 608. Second, the Whitfield Declaration, like the Rinder Declaration, is nothing more than a mouthpiece for Plaintiff’s allegations and her counsel’s arguments. Such a declaration is inadmissible.

See Tuchscher Dev. Enter., Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port District

, 106 Cal. App. 4th 1219, 1238 (2003) (disregarding evidence submitted in opposition to anti-SLAPP motion that was without foundation, hearsay, argumentative, speculative, impermissible opinions, and without foundation or personal knowledge);

Gilbert v. Sykes

, 147 Cal. App. 4th 13, 27 (2007)

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(“declarations that lack foundation or personal knowledge, or that are argumentative, speculative, impermissible opinion, hearsay, or conclusory are to be disregarded”);

see also Saldana v. Globe-Weis Sys. Co.

, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1505, 1518 (1991) (“It hardly bears mentioning that argument of counsel is neither a declaration nor admissible as evidence in court.”). Third, Ms. Whitfield’s statements concerning Scientology religious arbitration completely lack foundation and are entirely inaccurate. Without citing any basis for her statement, Ms. Whitfield claims “[i]n Scientology parlance, the terms ‘arbitration’ and ‘religious arbitration’ mean nothing more than a ‘Committee of Evidence’ which is outlined in the official Scientology publication

Introduction to Scientology Ethics

.” (Whitfield Decl. ¶ 7.) Ms. Whitfield left the Church of Scientology thirty-six years ago, in March 1984. (Whitfield Decl. ¶ 3.) Ms. Whitfield claims that “the term ‘religious arbitration’ was not in use” until after 1986 –

after she had already departed the Church

. Therefore, based on her own statements, Ms. Whitfield has no personal knowledge of Scientology religious arbitration, (Whitfield Decl. ¶ 7), and her testimony is inadmissible. Evid. Code §§ 403, 702(a). Similarly, Ms. Whitfield claims that Scientology arbitration is a “Committee of Evidence,” and then devotes paragraphs of her declaration to describing her version of a Committee of Evidence. (Whitfield Decl. ¶¶ 7-9.) Ms. Whitfield has never participated in a Scientology religious arbitration and has no personal knowledge of the procedures governing Scientology religious arbitration. In addition, Ms. Whitfield is incorrect in his description of how Scientology arbitration works. Scientology arbitration may utilize certain evidentiary procedures from Scientology Ethics and Justice system, such as are found in Committees of Evidence, but the substantive framework for the arbitration (such as selection of the arbitrators, qualifications of the arbitrators, and the binding authority of the arbitrators), is as set out in the Agreements themselves.

Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Srvc. Org., Inc.

, No. 8:13-cv-10844160, 2015 WL 10844160, at *6-*8, *9 n.11 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2015)). Therefore, Paragraphs 7-9 of Ms. Whitfield’s declaration describing certain procedures

not

used in Scientology arbitration are also irrelevant. Fourth, the entire Whitfield Declaration is irrelevant. All of the “evidence” and arguments