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3697-9

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DANIEL MASTERSON’S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

ANDREW B. BRETTLER (BAR NO. 262928) MARTIN F. HIRSHLAND (BAR NO. 322629)LAVELY & SINGER PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

2049 Century Park East, Suite 2400 Los Angeles, California 90067-2906 Telephone: (310) 556-3501 Facsimile: (310) 556-3615 Email: abrettler@lavelysinger.com mhirshland@lavelysinger.com Attorneys for Defendant DANIEL MASTERSON SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER; CEDRIC BIXLER-ZAVALA; JANE DOE #1; MARIE BOBETTE RIALES; and JANE DOE #2, Plaintiffs, v. CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL; RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER; CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY CELEBRITY CENTRE INTERNATIONAL; DAVID MISCAVIGE; DANIEL MASTERSON; and DOES 1 – 25, Defendants. CASE NO. 19STCV29458 [Hon. Steven J. Kleifield – Dept. 57]

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT DANIEL MASTERSON’S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT Reservation No. 070750198339

Date: September 4, 2020 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept: 57 Complaint Filed: August 22, 2019 FAC Filed: February 28, 2020 Trial Date: None

Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 08/28/2020 01:07 PM Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by A. Miro,Deputy Clerk

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I.INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) is riddled with sensational and irrelevant allegations of sexual assault, and despite Plaintiffs’ contention, all of which are wholly immaterial and irrelevant to their claims. Moreover, the FAC contains improper damages requests, which are unsupported by the causes of action pleaded. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ assertion that these scurrilous allegations are “crucial and essential to the pleaded claims and damages,” they fail to demonstrate, or even argue, why that is so. Opp’n to Mot. To Strike 4:3. The allegations of sexual assault against Danny Masterson are not pertinent to whether he is liable for stalking, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or loss of consortium. Because the allegations identified by Masterson in the Motion To Strike have no legal significance whatsoever on the claims actually at issue in this lawsuit, they must be stricken from the FAC. Code Civ. Proc. §436. Plaintiffs only included the allegations in the first place to sensationalize the claims in the case and garner media attention. Permitting such allegations to remain as part of the lawsuit will greatly prejudice Masterson and lead to confusion among potential jurors who will be expected to determine the merits of the causes of action

actually

at issue in this case.

II.PLAINTIFFS DO NOT ALLEGE THAT MASTERSON COMMITTED ANY OF THE ALLEGED HARMS GIVING RISE TO THE CAUSES OF ACTION IN THE FAC, AND THUS HIS ALLEGED PRIOR CONDUCT TOWARDS THE PLAINTIFFS IS IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL.

By definition, the portions of the FAC Masterson has requested be stricken are irrelevant to this action because they are not essential to any of Plaintiffs’ alleged causes of action for stalking, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or loss of consortium. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 431.10 (defining an “immaterial allegation” as one which “is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense.”) All of the identified extraneous portions of Plaintiffs’ FAC identified in Masterson’s Motion to Strike are immaterial because, if they were stricken, they would not affect the sufficiency of allegations for the causes of action actually pleaded in the FAC.

Seeibid.

(“A material allegation in a pleading is one essential to the claim or defense and which could not be stricken from the pleading without leaving it insufficient as to that claim or defense.”)

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While Plaintiffs claim that the allegations “underlie, frame and impact each of the Plaintiffs’ claims,” Opp’n to Motion To Strike 1:11, Plaintiffs cannot, and do not, argue that their claims are

material

to the causes of action alleged – the proper standard. Indeed, Plaintiffs fail to cite a single case anywhere in their opposition papers that even arguably supports Plaintiffs’ decision to include the unnecessary and inflammatory allegations pertaining to sexual assault. Any cognizable claims of sexual assault against Masterson are long time-barred by applicable statutes of limitations, thus providing an independent basis for them to be stricken from the FAC and public record.

SeePH II, Inc. v. Super. Ct.

, 33 Cal. App. 4th 1680, 1682–83 (1995) (Holding “that when a substantive defect is clear from the face of a complaint, such as a

violation of the applicable statute of limitations

or a purported claim of right which is legally invalid, a defendant may attack that portion of the cause of action by filing a motion to strike.”) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs claim that allegations of sexual assault are “necessary” (again, “necessity” is not the appropriate standard on a motion to strike) for Plaintiffs “to establish

why

Masterson started stalking them.” Opp’n to Motion To Strike 4:17-18 (emphasis in original). However, Plaintiffs do not allege that Masterson himself stalked any of them, but rather that other unnamed Defendants allegedly stalked them. FAC ¶ 264. Plaintiffs likewise claim that the allegations of sexual assault are necessary “to set forth the context and surrounding facts of

why

Masterson began to invade their privacy.” Opp’n to Motion To Strike 6:7-8 (emphasis in original). Again, this is misleading, as Plaintiffs do not allege that Masterson himself invaded their privacy, but rather that other individuals did. FAC ¶¶ 276, 282. There is no logical connection between the alleged assaults of Masterson, and the alleged conduct of other individuals years later. Simply, removal of the sexual assault allegations from the FAC would not impact the sufficiency of the causes of action for stalking and invasion of privacy, so by definition the sexual assault allegations are “immaterial.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 431.10. With respect to Plaintiffs’ cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), Plaintiffs also erroneously claim that “the sexual assaults were the

factual foundation

for them [sic] Plaintiffs’ IIED claims.” Opp’n to Motion To Strike 7:13-14 (emphasis added). However, Plaintiffs’ cause of action for IIED states, in no uncertain terms, that the alleged conduct which