BRINGING ORDER TO CHAOS

:
HARNESSING AND DISTRIBUTING INFORMATION AT ALL LEVELS OF LARGE-SCALE RESPONSES

Emerging Best Practices and Decision-Making in Crisis Emergencies Gail Kulisch, CAPT, USCG (ret) EricTelfer, CDR, USCG Alliance of Hazardous Materials Professionals 13 September 2012

Bringing Order to Chaos
Three Key Elements

• Understand the Unique Characteristics of Large-Scale Response

• Design for Complex and Layered Decision-Making
• Generate Meaningful Information and Understand Stakeholder Needs

Bringing Order to Chaos
Three Key Elements

• Understand the Unique Characteristics of Large-Scale Response

• Design for Complex and Layered Decision-Making
• Generate Meaningful Information and Understand Stakeholder Needs

The Unique Characteristics
Two Types of Emergencies
Mode R : Routine Emergency

Mode C : Crisis Emergency
─ ─ ─
Significant Novelty Relatively Low Understanding of the Situation Requires Creativity to Improvise New Approaches Situation Goes Beyond Existing Plans Cognitively Driven Routines Collaborative adaptive C2 Style Limited Expertise in Key Areas of the Response No Comprehensive Script Variably Flattened Structure

─ ─ ─ ─


─ ─

Key Elements Known Situation has Familiar Aspects Methods Exist to Adapt Response to Specific Circumstance Necessary Skills Have Been Trained to Authority Based C2 Structure Suited to Directing Execution Implement Well-Developed and Practiced Routines Familiar Script or Elements Requiring Only Moderate Adjustments or Scaling Hierarchical Structure with WellDefined General Routines


─ ─ ─ ─ ─

(Ref: Howitt, Arnold and Herman B. Leonard; Managing Crises: Responses to Large-Scale Emergencies, CQ Press, Washington, D.C., 2009.)

The Majority of Responses Routine Emergencies

 All emergencies start as „operations‟  Most incidents resolved before ever leaving the stem and entering planning cycle

chaos

 For complex or extended response – Move to the Spiral: Get “Planning” ahead of “Operations”.  Responses can start as „routine‟ but become „crisis‟ emergencies.

Bringing Order to Chaos
Three Key Elements

• Understand the Unique Characteristics of Large-Scale Response

• Design for Complex and Layered Decision-Making
• Generate Meaningful Information and Understand Stakeholder Needs

Design for Layered, Complex Decision-Making
 
Recognize Key Attributes of Large-Scale Response - Novelty, Complexity, Distributed Consequences, Insufficient Quantities of Specialized Equipment. Get A System in Place (GASP) – Quickly.

National Incident Management System (NIMS) – Necessary - But Not Sufficient…need:
     Need additional structural elements to coordinate political entities. Local engagement strategy. Adaptive leader skilled in collaboration while developing solutions, hierarchical in execution. Adjusted organizational structure: flattened for solution development, hierarchical for execution. Implementing National Incident Commander framework - leadership and experience matter to more rapidly orient.

 

Flatten the Organization and Distribute Decision-Making. Harness the Information.
 Recognize corresponding complexity of information needs .

Sustainably Staff and Equip.
 

Shift and Communicate National, International, and Corporate Level Allocation and Resources - Scale Up Rapidly, Plan for Long Duration. Establish Priorities and Decision-Making for Allocation of Limited Critical Resources.

The Game-Changers
Crisis Emergencies

11 SEPTEMBER 2001: Commercial Aircraft as Weapon to Destroy Iconic Infrastructure.
─ ─
A „war‟ on US soil. Entire US federal agency structure revisited through the lens of US „defense‟ and domestic security - DHS created.

ANTHRAX ATTACKS: U.S. Mail System as a Delivery System for a Biological Weapon.
─ ─
Distributed terror attack and unique vulnerability of every citizen to „new‟ weapons. 15 Threats Vectors established with corresponding substantial investments in critical infrastructure protection, early warning systems.

HURRICANE KATRINA: The Known But Unthinkable - Levee Failures (5 locations).
─ ─ ─
Hurricane “Pam” Laid Out the Unlikely Scenario. National Response Framework established. FEMA paradigm and culture substantively changed.

DEEPWATER HORIZON: Uncontrolled Release of Oil at Virtually Inaccessible Depths.
─ ─ ─ ─ ─
Started as a „routine‟ emergency (platform fire). Exceptionally complex decision-making in unique political environment (5 States, x „county equivalents‟). National Contingency Plan‟s adequacy tested; response mechanisms adjusted and added Private sector owned the financial capacity and technical means. Exposed significant limitations of the National Contingency Plan.

Emergency Response Starts With NIMS ICS

Forms the Backbone of Routine and Crisis Response.
─ ICS developed by Firefighting Resources of Southern California Organized ─ ─ ─ ─
for Potential Emergencies (“Firescope”). Chartered by Congress 1972; developed and Implemented in 1982. Early adoption by some municipal fire departments and National Strike Force. Post-Katrina FEMA adopted it and integrated it into a whole of response solution (tailored from FIRESCOPE ICS to NIMS ICS). NIMS ICS and FEMA Joint Operations Center/Emergency Management Functions harmonization evolving. Regardless of complexity, NIMS allows you to orient.

Formally adopted by DHS
─ Whole of government sanctioned and supported. ─ Element of the National Response Framework.

Novelty: Anthrax Capitol Hill 2001

Distributed Attack ─ Entire US mail system potential
source of increased contamination

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Unique Weapon ─ Weaponized biological agent Created Adjusted Structures ─ US Congress Oversees

Response – Maintains Continuity of Government. ─ Executive Branch Supports. ─ Supreme Court Facilities Impacted.

Novelty: No Prior Anthrax Playbook

When There Is No Playbook - Create One:

Build on What You Do Have/Know.
 

Tannery Field Decontamination Protocols. Medical Community/USAMRID Microbiological Sampling Experience. „Repurposed‟ Existing Methods for Decon (Chlorine Dioxide and Ethylene Oxide for Medical applications).

Apply Fundamentals of Hazmat Response.
   

Slow it down. Isolate and Control Entry. Deliberate Assessment. Organizational Discipline (Rigor of the ICS Planning Cycle). Life Safety Priorities.

Actively Manage The Differences
  

Legislative Branch Culture. Continuity of Government Requirements. Large Area Assessments of Commercial and Government Buildings.

Standardization Provides a Baseline – Adaptation Makes It Work

Distributed Consequences: National Mail System As An Attack Vector
 
Extent and Location of Contamination Unknown - Emerged Over Time. ─ Established a system of reporting from Public Health System and First Responders. Postal Service Established a Unified Command. ─ Collaboration with Public Health agencies. ─ Tracked and engaged on every report. ─ Aggressively traced each report back to finite number of letters. ─ Localized decontamination efforts were situation dependent. ─ Ultimately „pieces of the puzzle‟ became known. ─ Applied and shared guidance and protocols evolved as incident evolved. EPA Retained National Federal On Scene Coordinator Role. ─ Legal authorities and fund access. ─ Created a body of adapted knowledge and techniques. ─ Developed and applied tailored techniques learned from one site to another. ─ Created technical and response protocol continuity. Every Hazmat Unit in the US a Potential Responder. ─ Required extensive distributed decision-making and professional collaboration. ─ Adapted existing and evolving response protocols while preserving a common framework; applied

the basic principles of hazmat response. Commercial sector adapted equipment to expedite detection.

Unprecedented Consequences: World Trade Center Ground Zero

No Script. Requires Critical Leadership Adaptations.
POTUS Channeled the Emotions:  Struck the right chord at the right moment  In two sentences framed a common purpose.  Harnessed the emotion and gave it a direction.  Visual display of solidarity across fed, state, and local elements. Mayor Guillianni harnessed the culture of New Yorkers.  Engaged leadership.  Resilient and independent.  Invincible culture despite the obstacles.

Addressed emotional overlay of an entire nation.

Katrina: Insufficient Resources, Inadequate Response System Design
   
The Known But Too Hard to Address Scenario – Levee Failures. Disproportionate Impact to the Poor and Infirmed. Extraordinary Property Damage. Complexity Exceeded Designed Roles and Capabilities of the Federal Disaster Response System.
─ ─
FEMA Redesigned. Creation of the NIC and Whole of Government Mechanisms. Federal Role in Disasters Reevaluated.

Decision-Makers Operated in an Information Vacuum.

Hurricane Pam: Too Hard to Even Plan

2004 SE Louisiana/Gulf Coast Catastrophic Hurricane Exercise.
─ 12 parishes represented, State Agencies and 15 federal agencies
for an 8 day workshop.

─ Slow moving Cat 3 Hurricane (120 mph) with 20 inches of rain

 

Resulted in the SE Louisiana catastrophic hurricane functional plan – with some highly detailed, some sketchy, and some TBD sections. Last "Hurricane Pam" training exercise was completed August 24, 2005, less than a week before Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast.

Katrina: What Went Right
 
6,000 Coast Guard personnel rescued 33,000 people along the Gulf Coast – largest helicopter rescue op in history. Private citizens heroic personal contributions.


 

Military contributions to support and logistics.
Private sector role including Wal-Mart‟s now reknown „empty the shelves‟ philosophy. States and individual federal agencies created unique solutions to tackle extraordinary issues.

Post-Katrina: Government and Organizational Insufficiencies Exposed and Addressed.

Chapter Six Transforming Preparedness.
 Define and Implement A Comprehensive National Preparedness System. Foster a New, Robust Culture of Preparedness.
• Align Federal Response Structures to NIMS with ICS as field command structure.
• Create New Principal Federal Official Authorities.

• Substantial Revisions to the National Response Plan.
• Significant Review of All Federal Agency Support Rules in Response.

DWH: Novelty, Complexity, and Unprecedented Technical Challenges


  

Largest National Contingency Plan Governed Response In History. Whole of Government Engagement – The NIC Role. Novelty Elements Delayed Critical Flattening of Organization. Critically Dependent on Common Operating Picture. Unique Legal, Fiduciary Obligations of Responsible Party (BP) Challenged Decision-Making. Capping at Depth; Limited National Boom Inventory.

DWH: Novelty, Complexity, and Unprecedented Technical Challenges


   

The „Responsible Party‟ and the National Contingency Plan. NIC Communication Skills Essential. Extraordinary Legal Claims. New legislation required to allow funding for government costs in advance of reimbursements from BP. Limited Technical Solutions and Specialized Equipment.

DWH: NIC Role Proved Critical

     

Identified Air Space Safety As Critical Need – Facilitated National Command Authority Action to Control the Air Space. Mobilized Senior Interagency Partners, Cabinet Level Officials - Mechanism for Higher Level Engagement and Decision-Making. Filled Critical Cross-Government Facilitation Role. Effective Communicator: Ability to Simplify Complex Information. Supported Flattened Organization and Broadened Engagement of the Locals in Decision-Making. Drove Development of a Common Operating Picture.

DEEPWATER HORIZON
       
Single greatest challenge was lack of a common operating picture (adm allen) DWH Example: Authorities: Incident Command authority to prescribe the Persistent Demand for accurate, real time info RRI underfunded and unsupported for years- incomplete and inaccurate inventory of response equipment. Information requirements and authorities Air Tasking Order essential to manage all flights operating above and around the spill site Before ADM Allen implemented it, there were 8 near air-to-air

Flatten the Organization: Engaging the Locals


Establish pre-existing relationships with community based organizations who can take leadership roles. Establish strong engagement with business community (large-scale capabilities, logistics mechanisms) Collaborative decision-making – Capture and incorporate info requirements of all stakeholders. Staff and sustain – surge versus dribble. Common Operating Picture – can they see what you see. The articulate communicator. Elevate quickly to NRF/NIC structure - can always back off.

 
   

Engaging the Locals: A Checkered History
  
Ground Zero – Solidarity of Purpose (citizenry supported responders) Cosco Busan –Responders became „the enemy‟. Deepwater Horizon – Scale and complexity across 5 states exceeded routine collaborative methods.
─ Ultimately created additional and incident command elements
with distributed authority and power, collaborative decisionmaking within discrete geographic areas. ─ Incident leadership distributed to personally engage locals.

Flatten the Organization: Engage the Private Sector
„The Restorative Function of Business‟
Director Craig Fugate Federal Emergency Management Agency Role of Business in Disaster Response US Chamber of Commerce Report

Pre-Crisis Alignment and Partnerships
─ ─ ─ ─
Business Leaders Emergency Operations Center Coca Cola partnership with the Red Cross Target partnership with FEMA Citi partnership with World Food Programme

Bring Unique Expertise, Logistics, Innovation and Speed

Bringing Order to Chaos
Three Key Elements

• Understand the Unique Characteristics of Large-Scale Response

• Design for Complex and Layered Decision-Making
• Generate Meaningful Information and Understand Stakeholder Needs

Harness The Information

Proactively Engage at All Levels Collect and Distribute Information Define Information Requirements

Mature the Feedback Loops Adjust the Response

Establish Incident Management Structure

Harnessing Information: Facilitated By Technical Tools

   
Common Orientation.
Consistency. Effective/Efficient Resource Allocation. Accelerate Assessment and Decision-Making. Safety. ─ People do not need to physically „be‟ in the danger zone to have
information. ─ Operate moving resources in concentrated areas (air, marine, ground) without physical danger.

Harnessing Information: Managed As A System
Requires:

Authorities.
Air Space Management. Collection Means Authorized. Decision-Makers Engaged.

Processes.
─ Requirements Identified and Validated. ─ Standard Requirements Developed in Plans.

Tools.
─ Common Operating Picture. ─ Real-Time Video. ─ Accessible Network.

Harnessing Information: Structured By Defined Requirements.

Learn From Other Disciplines:
─ The Intelligence Community.
   

Requirements Developed, Validated, Sourced. Collected Information Distributed. Intelligence Cycle Repeatable. Plan, Collect, Analyze, Produce, Disseminate.

─ The Coast Guard‟s SDCIP Operational Planning Model.
    

Surveil. Detect. Classify. Identify. Prosecute.

SDCIP Tactics and Fusion Model

Harnessing Information: Collect and Distribute.

 
Defined By:
─ Pre-scripted Priority Incident Requirements. ─ Event Specific Requirements.

Collected by: ─ Real-Time Systems In A Repeatable Cycle. Displayed In: ─ A Common Operating Picture.

Augmented By:
─ Push Tools Such as
  

Emergency Incident Alerts Notifications Updates

Harnessing Information: Strengthened By The Power of Social Media.
Emergency Situation Awareness - Twitter for Crisis Management (Cameron et al) “Emergency Situation Awareness–Automated Web Text Mining” (ESA-AWTM) system. .

     

Detect unexpected or unusual incidents. Condense and summarize messages maintaining awareness of aggregated content. Classify and review high-value messages during an incident - understand the impact of an incident on people and infrastructure. Identify, track, manage issues within an incident. Pro-actively identify and manage issues that may last for hours, days or weeks. Perform forensic analysis of incidents by analyzing social media content from before, during, and after an incident.

The Common Operating Picture
  
DWH - Initial lack of a GIS-based Common Operating Picture.
─ Hampered sharing and decision-making. ─ No tool to effectively manage airspace safety.

Single biggest impediment to response decision making and communications: lack of common operating picture (ADM Thad Allen) The emergence of ERMA - Emergency Response Management Application.
─ GIS base/on-line mapping tool. ─ Integrates both static and real-time data
     

Maps Environmental Sensitivity Index (ESI) maps Ship Locations Weather/Ocean Currents Impacted Areas Industrial Data

Deepwater Horizon ERMA

Arctic ERMA

Caribbean ERMA

ERMA Architecture

Real-Time Situational Awareness

From the Civil War:
─ President Lincoln and “T-Mail”
(Wheeler, Tom; Mr. Lincoln‟s T-Mails: How Abraham
Lincoln Used the Telegraph to Win the Civil War; Harper Collins Publishers, NY, NY, 2006)

─ Personally Coordinated with
Generals in the Field

To the War on Terror:
─ The Raid on Bin Laden
─ Real-Time Camera feed
from an Isolated Location in Pakistan.

Tactics and Tools At The Speed of Light
 
New environment demands new tools to meet those needs. Data and information must be contextualized.
─ Rapid evolution of COP tools, incident notification tools, mapping
tools; e.g.

HSIN:
− − − Common Operational Picture (COP) provides situational awareness and analysis; Integrated Common Analytical Viewer (iCAV) gives geographical visualization,; 24/7 availability, document Libraries, instant-messaging tool, Web conferencing, incident reporting, Common Operational Picture (COP) provides situational awareness and analysis, announcements, discussion boards, task lists, requests for Information/or Your Information (RFIs/FYIs), calendars Really Simple Syndication (RSS) Feeds Online training materials ERMA

− − −

Virtual On-line Sharing Tools (VOST)

Reference: Bledsoe, Cheryl; VOST The Basics, Clark Regional Emergency Services, Twitter@CRESA@cherylble

Reference: Bledsoe, Cheryl; VOST The Basics, Clark Regional Emergency Services, Twitter@CRESA@cherylble

Value of a Video
─ 911 - the repeated image of the towers falling created an
enormous emotional impact.

─ Katrina - primary info in first 3 days was provided by CG
Helicopter clips of rescues.

Katrina Clips

Repeated Video Impact

Al Qaeda techniques:
─ IED explosion from multiple angles over mass comms medium –
viewer perceives a single attack as multiple attacks. ─ Repeated viewing of same attack – exponential emotional impact. ─ Increases emotional impact of the terror.

Power of the Private Sector
Resilient communities have:  A greater percentage of small businesses with disaster plans;  85% of business is small business (confrim)

  

Yet: 71% of small businesses have no disaster plans 43% with no plan never reopen If they do reopen, only 29% are still open two years laterThe Role of Business in Disaster Response, US Chamber of Commerce (Ref: The Role of Business in Disaster Response, US Chamber of Commerce, Business Civic Leadership Center, 2012

The Human Element
In times of crisis, and on a daily basis, Allen said members of the public are going to base their perceptions of government on personal transactions, as they did after oil spill. Alluding to the dissatisfaction among Gulf Coast residents with contractors staffed in the region, the retired commandant said, "You cannot outsource core values -- empathy and compassion -- to a third party." Admiral Thad Allen, National Incident Commander Hurricane Katrina and Deepwater Horizon

 

The power of a picture…and the value of a video – Airsta Rescue – Katrina piece from

Commercial Tools
 
Rapidly expanding

Pre-incident warning

Backup Slides

Deep Dive into Information Management: DEEPWATER HORIZON Case Study - CDR Erich Telfer, USCG

Information Management – Broader Context

Social Media Explosion

Data, data everywhere…Monitoring Social Media During a Crisis

Evolving Capabilities of the Private Sector

People Finder (Google)

Satellite Based emergency networks for responders
─ Private Sector capabilities rapidly expanding

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Its not the size that matters – complexity as a differentiator When there is no script – the unthinkable aand the new normal US Government Structural Transition and the Rise of the super-NIC NIMS is necessary – but not sufficient Situational Awareness on Steroids Tools and schools Brokering limited resources – Whole of Effort – global private sector players as experts in Scalewho understand large problems…and can opportunity to Scale

In large-scale, a number of issues rise to this level….how best to maximize that „opportunity‟
─ Invest in a solid NIMS process to bring as many issues into the
NIMS/IC – Area Command process as possible; the better the workings and processes inside NIMS, the better the chance issues not „addressable‟ at AC level or IC level must ─ Courageous, knowledgable, articulate NIC
     

Meta-Leader Knows what moves into the brokered sphere Knows how to minimize the disconnects creating unnecessary engagement of senior leaders Communications mastery – complex concepts made simple Visible No personal agenda/affiliation – „agnostic‟ – direct report to CIC…

  

Information versus data How do you educate at the same time you inform? What parameters guide or determine how porous and rapid the data flow is versus information assessment by „experts‟ – does free flow of data (accurate or inaccurate) spur

Efforts to flow data and information…

Can not themselves create more chaos - still need a system, still need some degree of site control, accounting for victims and responders, hazard assessment….

Pentagon 911 response, the DC fire dept and units from MD that they mobilized showed up and operated on the pentagon site without informing or integrating into the professionally well-known ICS structure - acted independently

A Number of Solutions on the Market

  

Words matter – careful and deliberate selection of terms can ease tension, minimize misunderstanding…poorly selected terms can fuel rhetoric and misinform perception Cat spirit: Safe anchorage vs „harbor of refuge‟ (what is it hiding from) Returned to international svc (conveys acceptance of standards by a legitimate independent body) versus „allowed to enter port‟ (implies a personal decision of an individual cotp without context) Others?

KATRINA
Photo clip/Video

 

The predicted crisis Hurricane Pam – 2004 full deliberate effort to plan and exercise reponse to a catastrophic hurricane in NOLA – all 12 parishes represented, state agenceis and 15 federal agencies for an 8 day workshop – slow moving cat 3 hurricane w20 inchses of rain……SE Loisiana catastrophic hurricane functional plan resulted – with some highly detailed, some sketchy and some TBD sections – assumed there were no levee breaches (yet believed it to be the worst case)…communicating the unthinkable…

http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html? webmap=ecfd899b55e944a1977f00c06a111013&e xtent=-95.4268,29.5805,-94.747,29.8685 Wetlands map baseline

Effective comms and info mgmt and decision making structures will depend on whether there is a culture of „self-relience‟ and „resilience‟ or a culture of „dependence „ and „vulnerability‟….in either case, the need for extraordinary external engagement and support is necessary, how that becomes interfaced, coordinated, and implemented depends on which circumstance the community is grounded in. Individuals can be either, this is a characterization of the collective behavior not individual behavior.

 

Precrisis alignement and pre-existing relationships (w/business, govenrment entities, private sector groups, the broader response community) – increase resilience Precrisis macro culture (reliance or independence)

Resilient communities
 

have

Greater percentage of small businesses with disaster plans; - 85% of business is small business (confrim) 71% of small businesses have no disaster plans 43% with no plan never reopen If they do reopen, only 29% are still open two years later

  

RISK COMMUNICATION

 

Incredible restorative function of business (Director Fugate) ROB rules in disaster resonse….

The Power of a Picture: Photos and Videos.

Study topics
 
When is too much info „bad‟ How to optimize the theory “transparency breeds selfcorrecting behavior”

References

The Role of Business in Disaster Response, US Chamber of Commerce/Business Civic Leadership Center, 2012

Nyc - resilience 911
 
Greatest example of resilience – canal street south completely shut down to vehicles – cement dust and debris coated every inch of buildings and streets – 16 acre „pile‟ – gutted center of the financial district

Wrap

Large-scale have phases that go on for decades – still working Katrina issues , still individuals in „temp‟ housing; still an active series of recovery issues that are actively managed -

Info needs
    
Need to add the context against the array of distributed info that spews from an incident Who adds the context, how, how to then distribute it, refresh it, stay relevant How to embrace the disparate nodes and corral them to a more powerful effect. Aggregation tools? – visual displays Data and info must be proactively contextualized – by credible source?, by an aggregate in a freely dispersed environment…

The Cycle

Social media and extensive communications channels, including historically novel and significant expectations on

Expectations
 
The president was expecdted (via press q‟s) to everyday know how much ice and water were distributed to new orleans Or in dwh, how much oil had leaked that day – info mgmt means accurante info on details has to move from reliable/validated source Info: how much/how many. Will always be many answers unless all agree on „as of time and date‟ and from „what geographic area‟ – a „simple‟ question but unless there is a common understandingof the parameters, answers will sound „uninformed‟….get through this by establishing a set time for reporting/freeze the counts, communicate the agreement of parameters

 

The standup 8 hr (really every 6) change of shiftsL - LB FD reponse to 5000 gal baker tank 30% hydrogen peroxide self-venting….the 36 hour perspective watching 6 shift changes. Whiteboard on a pier – each brief, key pieces were dropped – perished. Not uncommon – continuity of people balanced against fatigue question

Info expectations
  
All responses have phases Need to be clear about movement from one „phase‟ to another‟ and the info expectatIons between different phases Create distinct phases that cause shift in tactics, and communicates the progress
─ cap hill: emergency phase to recovery phase ─ dwh: katrina: rescue phase to recovery

References

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      

Howitt, Arnold and Herman Leonard, Managing Crises: Responses to Large-Scale Emergencies; CQ Press, Washington DC, 2009. Renaud, Cynthia Leonard, Herman and Arnold M. Howitt, Katrina as Prelude: Preparing for and Respnding to Future Katrina-Class Distrurbances in the United States; Testimony before the U.S. Senate Homealnd Security and Governmental Affairs Committee; 8 march 2006 Townsend, Francis, et al; The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina – Lessons Learned; February 2006. Kulisch, Gail P. et al; LNGC CATALUNYA SPIRIT Adrift Incident After Action Report; une 2008. Telfer, Erich; Unlimited Impossibilities: Intelligence Support to the Deepwater Horizon Response; Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, National Defense Intelligence University, DIA (Unpublished) Dec 2011. Rupert, Richard; Federal on-scene Coordinator‟s Report for the Capitol Hill Site, Washington, D.C.; USEPA Region 3; undated. US Coast Guard, On-Scene Coordinator Report Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Submitted to National Response Team, Sept 2011. Floriida Division of Emergency Management, Deepwater Horizon Response 30Apr2010 – 27AUg2010, After Action Report/Improvement Plan, 2March2011 Papp, Rober t, COMDT USCG, BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR), Final Report, Jan 2011

National Level Exercises The „Next Best Thing‟ to Actual Events

NLE11 – New Madrid Fault Earthquake (May 2011)

NLE12 – Cyber Focus (October 2012)
─ New Paradigm: Distributed Effects ─ Specifically Test:
   

Impacts to Infrastructure/Physical Effects Information Exchange/Communications National Cyber Incident Response Plan Federal Government Continuity

─ Deep Dive into Information Management:
DEEPWATER HORIZON Case Study - CDR Erich Telfer, USCG

─ Information Management – Broader Context ─ Decision-Making in Large-Scale Crises

Bring Order to the Chaos

Get A System in Place (GASP) – quickly

National Incident Management System (NIMS)
− Necessary, But Not Necessarily Sufficient

National Response Framework
− Whole of government effort

 

Recognize the Key Attributes of a Large-Scale Response – Novelty, Complexity, Distributed Consequences, Insufficient Quantities of Specialized Equipment Sustainably Staff and Equip – National and Corporate Level Allocation and Designations

Tool Time
     
Volunteer Tracking COP ICS Forms Management/Tracking Notifications and Alerts Interactive Mediums Hybrid Emergency Management Software

Volunteer2.com

VolSoft

www.iamresponding.com

Katrina (2005)
  
Worst case scenario – levees protecting major city breached Required full national engagement – „Beyond FEMA‟ Led to comprehensive review of National structure and established whole of government mechanisms

NRF published 2008

Deep Water Horizon

Complexity exceeded previous incidents.
─ Role of designated private commercial entity („responsible
party‟) in a national level response

─ Uncontrolled release at unprecedented depth

Sufficiency of the National Contingency Plan challenged.

Erich

Define Information Requirements, Systems, and Dissemination

Incident Communications and Structures:
Before, During, and After

Before – Minimize the Impact: Information „pushed‟ to potential victims – e.g. warning phase
Good Robo Calls : one of the first times „robo calls‟ used to scale was LA fires in 200x warned individuals in remote area and communicated instructions e.g. „evacuate and go to the Staples Center‟ Downside: Non-receipt and tracking of same – this past summer‟s Waldo Canyon fire in Colorado - more then 20,000 evacuation calls never delivered to residents in the path – two-thirds of the 32,000 impacted residents

New tools to account, distribute, and engage all levels:
─ ─ ─
- People Finder (Haiti) - Real-Time Logistics Tracking/Inventory and Distribution Technology (post-Katrina emphasis) - Codified NIC structure and instituted multiple Incident Commanders concept creating mechanisms for direct engagement with impacted populations (Cosco Busan concerned citizen volunteers), impacted industries (fishermen in GOM), Congressional Members and staff (Cap Hill Anthrax), and accountable elected leaders (DWH).

Command and control – distributed decision-making and engagement of the local elected leaders (DWH)

Information Management

Proliferation of tools
─ Emergent and initial incident (warning phase) ─ Incident management (response phase) ─ Post-crisis (recovery phase)

Define Information Requirements, Systems, and Dissemination

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    

Its not the size that matters – complexity as a differentiator When there is no script – the unthinkable and the new normal US Government Structural Transition and the Rise of the super-NIC NIMS is necessary – but not sufficient Situational Awareness on Steroids Tools and schools Brokering limited resources – Whole of Effort – global private sector players as experts in Scale who understand large problems…and can opportunity to Scale

  

Harnessing the Private Sector - People Finder - Satellite Based emergency networks for responders

Tactics and tools at the speed of light

New environment demands new tools to meet those needs data and information must be contextualized
─ - rapid evolution of COP tools, incident notification tools, mapping
tools; e.g.

HSIN:
− − − Common Operational Picture (COP) provides situational awareness and analysis; Integrated Common Analytical Viewer (iCAV) gives geographical visualization,; 24/7 availability, document Libraries, instant-messaging tool, Web conferencing, incident reporting, Common Operational Picture (COP) provides situational awareness and analysis, announcements, discussion boards, task lists, requests for Information/or Your Information (RFIs/FYIs), calendars Really Simple Syndication (RSS) Feeds Online training materials ERMA

− − −

Is too much information Bad?
Is the info „accurate‟? Is it „current‟ with respect to the receive-act timeframe? If it was accurate 1 minute ago and you now receive it at time +3min does it cause more harm? Who determines „accurate‟? Is it this data or information? – experience accelerates the determination of „harm vs benefit‟ for info pieces and cycles – other ways to rapidly assess „harm vs benefit‟? Who decides – one persons harm is another‟s benefit….and, on top of that, what is the power and value of „transparency‟…do we underestimate the power of
“Transparency breeds self-correcting behavior” – ADM Thad Allen, USCG (ret)

Frameworks and Structures
 
Evolve over the course of the incident Nims is necessary but „not sufficient‟ in large-scale disasters – in addition to accepted and trained-to structures, LSDs must have systems for addressing contentious decisions that require „not insignificant‟ trade-offs
─ Role for elected and appointed leaders responsible to the
citizenry. ─ Facilitated by an agreed upon, „codified‟ acknowledged process. ─ Realistic acknowledgement of individual tactics , using information means and media, to influence others and position ones priorities above others - goal here is to gain as much common consensus with agreed upon best possible data/information, visible to each other.

In large-scale, a number of issues rise to this level….how best to maximize that „opportunity‟
─ Invest in a solid NIMS process to bring as many issues into the
NIMS/IC – Area Command process as possible; the better the workings and processes inside NIMS, the better the chance issues not „addressable‟ at AC level or IC level must ─ Courageous, knowledgable, articulate NIC
     

Meta-Leader Knows what moves into the brokered sphere Knows how to minimize the disconnects creating unnecessary engagement of senior leaders Communications mastery – complex concepts made simple Visible No personal agenda/affiliation – „agnostic‟ – direct report to CIC…

Information versus data

- How do you educate at the same time you inform? New language, no framework…. - what parameters guide or determine how porous and rapid the data flow is versus information assessment by „experts‟ – does free flow of data (accurate or inaccurate) spur

Efforts to flow data and information…
 
Can not themselves create more chaos - still need a system, still need some degree of site control, accounting for victims and responders, hazard assessment…. How to share imperfect and evolving information – will you always be „wrong‟? ─ Create deliberate structures of reporting e.g. “as of” information ─ Match to normal cycles of information requirements ─ Simultaneous „picture‟ ─ The CG helicopter rescues during Katrina

Pentagon 911 response, the DC fire dept and units from MD that they mobilized showed up and operated on the pentagon site without informing or integrating into the professionally well-known ICS structure - acted independently

The Meta Leader as Communicator
      
Must earn the confidence of highly diverse set of both the engaged and enraged. Must see strategic picture. Be able to speak to detail of most elements. Communicate at multi-levels. Make people feel „safe‟ when they are „unsafe‟ and „unsure‟. Contextualizes data and information for common understanding. Lays out the areas for hard-choices
─ DWH not enough boom for everyone.

Info needs
    
Need to add the context against the array of distributed info that spews from an incident Who adds the context, how, how to then distribute it, refresh it, stay relevant How to embrace the disparate nodes and corral them to a more powerful effect. Aggregation tools? – visual displays Data and info must be proactively contextualized – by credible source?, by an aggregate in a freely dispersed environment…

 Do the same principles apply if  - event is predicted - Resources are prestaged - Vulnerabilities and impact area are known

The Averted Crisis – LNGC CATALYUNA SPIRIT Disabled Adrift – April 2008

Words matter – Be Careful With Terms of Art
─ Careful and deliberate selection of terms can ease tension,
minimize misunderstanding…poorly selected terms with specialized meaning can fuel rhetoric and misinform perception.
 

Safe Anchorage versus Harbor of Refuge (what is it hiding from) Returned to International Service (conveys acceptance of standards by a legitimate independent body) versus „Allowed to Enter Port‟ which others might interpret as a personal decision of an individual without context.

Info mgmt within the zone

- disaster and crisis phase – rely on preexisting natural nodes within the community – unique to each community – a church, civic group, or school system (joplin high school) – serve as comms and coordination nodes Citizens want to engage – economic incentives, environmental sensitivity incentives, desire to contribute, feeling of having control (COSCO Busan) The Role of Business

- effective comms and info mgmt and decision making structures will depend on whether there is a culture of „self-relience‟ and „resilience‟ or a culture of „dependence „ and „vulnerability‟….in either case, the need for extraordinary external engagement and support is necessary, how that becomes interfaced, coordinated, and implemented depends on which circumstance the community is grounded in. Individuals can be either, this is a characterization of the collective behavior not individual behavior.

Influencers

- precrisis alignement and pre-existing relationships (w/business, govenrment entities, private sector groups, the broader response community) – increase resilience precrisis macro culture (reliance or independence)

RISK COMMUNICATION

References

The Role of Business in Disaster Response, US Chamber of Commerce/Business Civic Leadership Center, 2012

The meta leader as communicator
     
Must see strategic picture Know every detail of every element Communicate at multi-levels Make people feel „safe‟ when they feel „unsafe‟ and „unsure‟ Contextualizes data and information for common understanding Lays out the areas for hard-choices
─ - DWH not enough boom for everyone

 

The standup 8 hr (really every 6) change of shiftsL - LB FD reponse to 5000 gal baker tank 30% hydrogen peroxide self-venting….the 36 hou r perspective watching 6 shift changes. Whiteboard on a pier – each brief, key pieces were dropped – perished. Not uncommon – continuity of people balanced against fatigue question Risk was „local‟ if they dropped a key piece of info – so didn‟t illustrate critical need; but you operate for the big one the way you practice for the little ones.

Information Disrupters
 
Phase Change Significant New Variable

References
        
Howitt, Arnold and Herman Leonard, Managing Crises: Responses to Large-Scale Emergencies; CQ Press, Washington DC, 2009. Leonard, Herman and Arnold M. Howitt, Katrina as Prelude: Preparing for and Respnding to Future Katrina-Class Distrurbances in the United States; Testimony before the U.S. Senate Homealnd Security and Governmental Affairs Committee; 8 march 2006 Townsend, Francis, et al; The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina – Lessons Learned; February 2006. Kulisch, Gail P. et al; LNGC CATALUNYA SPIRIT Adrift Incident After Action Report; une 2008. Telfer, Erich; Unlimited Impossibilities: Intelligence Support to the Deepwater Horizon Response; Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, National Defense Intelligence University, DIA (Unpublished) Dec 2011. Rupert, Richard;; Federal on-scene Coordinator‟s Report for the Capitol Hill Site, Washington, D.C.; USEPA Region 3; undated. US Coast Guard, On-Scene Coordinator Report Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Submitted to National Response Team, Sept 2011. Floriida Division of Emergency Management, Deepwater Horizon Response 30Apr2010 – 27AUg2010, After Action Report/Improvement Plan, 2March2011 Papp, Rober t, COMDT USCG, BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR), Final Report, Jan 2011

Spare Slides

http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html? webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&ex tent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104 Migratory bird map - baseline

http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html? webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&ex tent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104 Migratory bird map - baseline

Wrap

Large-scale have phases that go on for decades – still working Katrina issues , still individuals in „temp‟ housing; still an active series of recovery issues that are actively managed -

  

Uncomfortable to responders National Security Concerns Decision-Making Ahead of Decision-Makers

http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html? webmap=ecfd899b55e944a1977f00c06a111013&e xtent=-95.4268,29.5805,-94.747,29.8685 Wetlands map baseline

Frameworks and Structures

Evolve over the course of the incident

HARNESSING THE INFORMATION
  
Chaos phase Initial response NIMS ICS →→ NRF Build-out

Define Information Requirements Collect and Distribute Information Establish Incident Management Structure

Mature Feedback Loops and Adjust Proactively Engage/Deliberat Response ely Distribute

Mode R: Refine Structure and Processes Mode C: Escalate - Shift Leadership and Structure

Incident Communications and Structures:
Highly Engaged Communities and Opportunities

Before – Minimize the Impact: Information „pushed‟ to potential victims – e.g. warning phase
─ Good Robo Calls : one of the first times „robo calls‟ used to scale was LA fires ─
in 200x - warned individuals in remote area and communicated instructions e.g. „evacuate and go to the Staples Center‟ Downside: Non-receipt and tracking of same – this past summer‟s Waldo Canyon fire in Colorado - more then 20,000 evacuation calls never delivered to residents in the path – two-thirds of the 32,000 impacted residents

Now - New tools to account, distribute, and engage all levels:
─ People Finder (Haiti) ─ Real-Time Logistics Tracking/Inventory and Distribution Technology (postKatrina emphasis)
Command and control – distributed decision-making and engagement of the local elected leaders (DWH)

Information Management

Proliferation of tools.
─ Emergent and initial incident (warning phase) ─ Incident management (response phase) ─ Post-crisis (recovery phase)

New Methods and Innovation

Novelty Requires Technical and Organizational Improv and Adaptation.
─ Anthrax

Decontamination techniques.

─ DWH
 

Capping Technologies Manually Controlling a Well at Unprecedented Depth

The Power of the Private Sector.

Is too much information Bad?
Is the info „accurate‟? Is it „current‟ with respect to the receive-act timeframe? If it was accurate 1 minute ago and you now receive it at time +3min does it cause more harm? Who determines „accurate‟? Is it this data or information? – experience accelerates the determination of „harm vs benefit‟ for info pieces and cycles – other ways to rapidly assess „harm vs benefit‟? Who decides – one persons harm is another‟s benefit….and, on top of that, what is the power and value of „transparency‟…do we underestimate the power of
“Transparency breeds self-correcting behavior” – ADM Thad Allen, USCG (ret)

Info mgmt within the zone

- disaster and crisis phase – rely on preexisting natural nodes within the community – unique to each community – a church, civic group, or school system (joplin high school) – serve as comms and coordination nodes

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