You are on page 1of 14

HAZOP

Session 10

Hazard and Operability Studies – Overview Originated as a hazard identification technique for process plants – developed by ICI in mid 1960s also commonly applied in petrochemical. nuclear and food processing industries Described as a system of imaginative anticipation of hazards Differs from Functional Failure Analysis in 4 key ways: always a team activity concentrates on deviations in flows between components uses well-defined guide words to steer analysis considers both plausible causes and possible consequences of deviations HAZOP .2 .

HAZOP – technical approach In the process industries.3 . shutdown and plant maintenance Scope of study does not include making detailed design changes. HAZOP is normally applied once the piping and instrumentation (P&I) diagram has been produced Scope of study explicitly extends to cover unusual circumstances such as startup. results are recorded in a tabular format No reason why HAZOP cannot be applied to any system in which flows can be identified – including information flow in software HAZOP . although recommendations and follow-up questions should be produced As with FHA.

4 .HAZOP procedure Start Select a component Select a flow Suggest a deviation using a guide word Investigate and document causes Investigate and document effects NO NO Finish YES All components analysed? YES All flows analysed? YES NO All guide words considered? Record as hazard. with a justification NO Does deviation have plausible causes and hazardous effects? YES HAZOP . Make recommendations for action if necessary Record as non-hazardous deviation.

site facilities ask questions. process / project engineers understand and explain the plant design answer questions about the plant and process need good knowledge of process chemistry. operator.5 .g. maintenance crew supply information about the context in which the system will be used. and help decide which issues affect safety Recorder participant in study (?) document the analysis Expert(s) key function is to explore ask questions suggest deviations / causes / effects Designer(s). or experience of similar plant Team may recruit extra members (technical specialists) if required HAZOP .HAZOP Team Members 1 Leader planning and preparation act as chairman for meeting sign off documentation ensure follow-up work is completed User(s) may be site representative. e.

6 .g. but continuity (e.HAZOP Team Members 2 Team may recruit additional members when required Typically to answer specific questions.g. e. same leader) usually recommended HAZOP . control engineer mechanical engineer occupational health / hygienist environmental specialists Different teams often appropriate for different stages of the lifecycle.

flow rate. Quantity of material is too large... flow rate.. solid) One or more components of mixture missing. water... oil.) Chemicals present in more than one phase (vapour. temperature. Quantity of material is too small. Physical properties  Temperature  Viscosity  Flow rate  Pressure  Reaction rate HAZOP . Impurities in flow (air.. temperature.. or ratio of components is incorrect Unusual circumstances etc. Lower pressure. see next slide Reverse flow.. but with or AS WELL AS additional effects (qualitative increase) PART OF Only some of the intention is achieved (qualitative decrease) OTHER THAN A result other than the intention is achieved REVERSE The exact opposite of the intention is achieved Example Interpretation No forward flow when there should be.7 . Higher pressure.HAZOP – guide words Guide Word Deviation NO or NONE No part of the intention is achieved MORE Quantitative increase in a physical property (rate or total quantity) LESS Quantitative decrease in a physical property (rate or total quantity) MORE THAN All intentions achieved.

location of instruments. alarms and trips failure of plant services cooling water. power supplies other external factors weather spare / non-installed / portable equipment safety fire and leak detection.8 . shutdown.HAZOP – guide words 2 Guide word “Other Than” has many interpretations this word particularly is often defined specifically for particular study examples include plant operation phases startup. fuels. emergency planning HAZOP . maintenance. sampling and inspection instrumentation control philosophy.

9 .HAZOP example – a bit of P&I Valve (normally closed during operation of the plant) Valve (normally open during operation of the plant) Manually operated valve Pump Non-return valve LC Automation (level controller) Hydrocarbon from storage PG LC Drain PG Settling tank Drain Transfer pumps (one working. one spare) To reactor Drain HAZOP .

1) Ensure good communication Polymer formed in with storage area heat exchanger 2) Install low level alarm on settling tank As above Covered by 2) Settling tank overfills More pressure More temperature Line subjected to full pump pressure Higher pressure in transfer line and settling tank 3) Install high level alarm 4) Check size of overflow 5) Establish locking-off procedure for LCV bypass when not in use 6) Install kickback on pumps 7) Install warning of high temperature at intermediate storage HAZOP .HAZOP example – output Guide Word NONE Deviation No flow Possible Causes No hydrocarbon available from storage Consequences Action Required MORE More flow Transfer pump fails (motor fault.10 . impeller corroded etc. loss of power.) Level control valve fails to open. or LCV bypassed in error Isolation valve or LCV closed when pump running High intermediate storage temperature Loss of feed to reactor.

Hazard Study Phasing 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 Research and Process Development Process and Project Definition Project Design Procurement and Construction Commissioning Operation HAZOP .11 .

completeness of HAZOP actions HAZOP .Concept Study PHI.Audit / review of process Final review of evidence. Sneak. Fault Trees. inspections 6 .12 . checklist.Hazard Study Phasing 2 1 .Process Flow Study HAZOP 3 . first outline HAZOP 2 . review of HAZOP actions.Detailed Design (Physical) Study HAZOP update. materials and reagents study. FMEA 5 .Detailed Design (P&I) Study HAZOP 4 .Audit of installed plant against design Checklist.

has both inductive and deductive phases team conclusions may carry more weight than those reached by individual analysts Disadvantages can produce lots of output.HAZOP – Pros and Cons Advantages very methodical. Use of guide words can give confidence in completeness of analysis.13 . Structure is only obtained by reference back to P&I diagrams team approach is expensive – must be shown to be cost-effective HAZOP .

2% of total plant cost HAZOP .1 . cost is typically about 1% of design cost 0.ICI Experience More operability problems than hazards are usually found though difference is smaller with existing plants Number of post-commissioning modifications to plant is reduced Time to achieve intended production rates is reduced For major plant.0.14 .